In Search of European Citizens: A Policy Preference Based Approach

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Abstract

We define European citizenship as a set of policy preferences favoring European Union responsibility for functions traditionally seen as being at the core of the nation-state: defense, foreign policy, currency, citizenship. We identify the degree to which such a sense of citizenship exists in each of the member states. (It is highest in Italy, lowest in Denmark.) Using data from Eurobarometer 39.0, we then explore the role of knowledge, trust, general attitudes toward European integration, interest in European matters, location in the social structure, and media use patterns in accounting for European citizenship. General support for and interest in European integration are the most potent predictors of European citizenship, followed by trust, ideology, satisfaction with democracy and knowledge. Variables tapping location in the social structure, e.g., age, gender and class, as well as indicators of news media exposure generally have little impact. The explanatory power of the model varies considerably across the EU member countries; performance is strongest in Denmark and weakest in Ireland. We conclude that European citizenship remains principally a product of general attitudes favoring European integration rather than being knowledge or experience-based. However, it is often influenced by country-specific contextual features.

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Introduction

In this paper we attempt to build on existing studies of European Union citizenship by creating an alternative method of measuring EU citizenship and specifying an analytical model to account for the existence of European citizens. The model includes attitudes, location in the social structure, political involvement, knowledge of the EU, and reliance on the news media as probable contributors to the likelihood that an individual will express a set of policy preferences that we define as European citizenship. However, before we turn to the elaboration of our approach to the study of European Union citizenship, it is important to describe briefly the changing context of this subject, and to locate our effort in the extant body of scholarly work on the subject.

Title II of the Maastricht Treaty raised the profile of European citizenship to a new level by enshrining it as one of the pillars on which the next stage of European integration would be constructed. This despite the fact that what Maastricht proposed in the way of European citizenship is rather limited, and has been criticized for the constraints member governments have placed on the implementation of these modest proposals (O'Leary 1996): freedom of movement and residence, the right to vote and run for office in local government and the European Parliament, diplomatic protection in third countries and the right to petition the European Parliament (*Treaty on European Union*, Title II, Article 8). As we shall see, the Maastricht Treaty defines citizenship in terms of what T. H. Marshall (1965) called its "civil" and "political" components.

Although European citizenship may be limited, interest in it has risen sharply. Furthermore, it seems likely that it will attract additional interest as some within the EU attempt to expand its content (*The European*, 21-27 November 1996). European citizenship is linked directly to political identity, the psychological dimension that provides emotional meaning to an otherwise juridical concept. The politics of identity is an important theme in Europe today and in contemporary scholarship about Europe. National identities, while pre-eminent, seemingly are challenged by fragmentation from below (Basques, Scots, Corsicans, etc.) and by unification from above. Although this is the case, the EC/EU remains a community without polity (Wallace 1994). By most measures, relatively few (circa 10% of the EU's population) think of

themselves principally as citizens of Europe. However, many others see themselves, at least occasionally, as having multiple identities encompassing both a national and a European dimension (Martinotti and Stefanizzi 1995).

The concern for a European polity is not new. As Duchesne and Frognier (1995, 193) put it, "[t]he dream of the founding fathers [of the European Community] was, ultimately, to see the emergence of a European identity. That does not mean that European identity should replace national identity but that it should become strong enough, and be perceived as 'inclusive' enough by European citizens, for Europe to develop as a genuine political entity." This old concern acquires new force today because growing cynicism toward national governments' European actions renders them less able to sell their own people on the desirability of European policies. The legitimacy of EU decisions seems increasingly likely to depend on having popular acceptance, which may, in turn, be a function of a sense of being European, of being a European citizen.

For example, public opinion now is one of the keys to determining whether or not the EU will move through Stage 3 of monetary union to a single currency, and whether the EU will expand to include states from Eastern Europe or the Mediterranean. Support for these measures may turn on the degree to which the publics of the EU's member states also think of themselves as belonging to a larger entity, and to their sense of the boundaries of that entity. Therefore, one important question is whether a European polity is developing? Or, if present evidence is inconclusive, whether such a polity can and will develop?

If a European identity is to develop, how will it occur? (We subscribe to the point of view that identities are constructed and--to some extent--malleable rather than to the idea that they are breathed in with the air where one lives and, therefore, are fixed indelibly.) One way is through the gradual accretion of legal rulings (and public awareness of them) as the courts come to grips with the Maastricht Treaty's provisions concerning the legal basis of a European citizenship. A spate of recent books on the legal aspects of European citizenship have examined potential implications of this development (Meehan 1993, Springer 1994, Rosas and Antola 1995, O'Leary 1996).

Another pathway to the development of a sense of EU citizenship resides in the recent appointment of a European ombudsman and other initiatives undertaken to make Europe more transparent to its residents, and to improve the quality of the information they receive about Europe. For instance, the Commission has sponsored public information campaigns aimed at increasing understanding of the EU in several countries (see survey items in recent Eurobarometers which attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of these campaigns). As part of this effort the EU has issued new publications, e.g., *A Citizen's Europe* (Fontaine 1993) and *The European Union--What's In It for Me?* (Pawnell 1996). Uniquely, in Britain the European Commission published a handbook to de-mystify the Euromythology created by the British media *(Do You Still Believe...?*, Pilkington 1995). Recent Eurobarometers have given substantial attention to the public's interest in and understanding of European citizenship. Principal themes of Eurobarometer 45 are Europeans' perceptions of citizenship and political identity. Unfortunately, these data are not available for analysis in this paper, but the EU's report on the survey offers information that helps provide context and supports the need for greater understanding of the dynamics of political identity in the EU today (*Eurobarometre Rapport Numero 45* 1996).

A potential third pathway to citizenship is suggested by evidence that people are becoming more aware of the EC's importance (*Eurobarometer Trend Variables, 1974-1994*). Even in Euroskeptic Britain, a late February 1997 poll by MORI found respondents naming the EU as the single most important issue facing Britain today--named by 22%, compared to 19% naming unemployment and 14% mentioning the health service. This is an extraordinary development given Briton's usual views of Europe (MORI web site). One may argue that as people become more aware of the EU's importance they will come to identify with it. However, it also is possible that they may reassert their national identities in the face of a perceived Brussels-based juggernaut. The impact on the creation of a sense of European citizenship may well depend upon whether individuals evaluate European Union policies as benefitting or harming their interests.

This is a study of European identity in thirteen countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, East and West Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,

and the United Kingdom. The data come from Eurobarometer 39.0, conducted in March and April 1993. After a brief review of research on European identities, with a sidebar on the concept of citizenship, we develop an operationalization of identification with the European Union, and then estimate multivariate models seeking to pin-point the factors that affect the probability that an individual will identify with Europe. We utilized ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to estimate the statistical models. Although it makes stringent demands on the nature of the data and their inter-relationships, OLS regression is a robust mutivariate statistical technique, well suited for the type of work we shall do here (Cohen and Cohen 1983).

Literature Review

Scholars who have looked at the question of how European identity develops have suggested at least two models. One stresses generational replacement and holds that younger, better educated and more affluent Europeans hold different values than their elders, including greater likelihood of identifying with Europe. This argument is associated with the well-known work of Ronald Inglehart on post-materialism (Inglehart 1977, 1990). The second model stresses diffusion of new identities throughout populations as a result of experiences and information that transcend social strata (Bosch and Newton 1995, 135). Measures of European identity have shown volatility over time, which raises the question of whether the tendency to think of oneself as European is based on instrumental or affective criteria (Duchesne and Frognier 1995, 194). Other scholars have found it useful to distinguish between diffuse and specific support for Europe as dimensions of a European citizenship (Nolan 1997 offers a recent example). Neither type of support inherently provides a firmer foundation for European identity. A further puzzle is whether there is a conflict between identifying with the nation and identifying with Europe, or whether a sense of national identity is a building block toward European identity (Martinotti and Stefanizzi 1995, 164)?

Researchers have used a number of methods in efforts to ascertain the degree to which a European identity exists. One can look at behavioral indicators such as voting in European Parliament elections (although it seems well-established that such elections turn primarily on

national politics and issues within each member state; see Franklin *et al.* 1994 and van der Eijk and Franklin 1996) or participation in protests aimed at EU policy makers (Reising 1997).

The most common approach has been to use Eurobarometer data. Several measures have been used. Some simply look at the four standard questions that have been asked over and over (Are you for or against European unification? Is your country's membership a good thing or a bad thing? Has your country benefitted from membership? Would you be sad if the EC dissolved?). None of these directly taps citizenship or political identity. Martinotti and Stefanizzi (1995) constructed a four-fold typology based on answers to the question of whether one is satisfied with democracy in one's country, and whether EU membership has been a good or bad thing for one's country. Duchesne and Frognier (1995) use another question asking which a person most identifies with: locality, region, nation, Europe, or the world. Finally, there is the question: do you think of yourself most often as: European only, European and national, national and European, national only? Each of these have problems, not the least of which is that the critical questions for the last two are asked only sporadically. Furthermore, they appear to tap different attitudinal dimensions. For example, forty percent of those who favor European integration say they never think of themselves as European citizens (calculated from Eurobarometer 37 data).

Richard Sinnott (1995) has used policy issues to measure the legitimacy of internationalized governance in the European Union. The assumption is that the EU has the legitimacy to act in a particular policy area if members of the public believe it should. He terms this '*attributed internationalization*', or '*European government attribution*' of an issue (Sinnott 1995, 247,255). From his analysis of Eurobarometer policy issue questions, Sinnott concludes that policy preference-based orientations toward internationalized governance are highly differentiated, by time and by country, and by institutional and policy sectors.

Before proceeding to develop an operational definition of identification with European citizenship, we need to look at research on citizenship. Fortunately, after years in the doldrums, a sizable corpus has emerged recently dealing with the notion (see, *e.g.,* Beiner, ed. 1995; Clarke, ed. 1994).

A Note on Theories of Citizenship

According to T. H. Marshall (1965, 92),

> [c]itizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed. There is no universal principle that determines what those rights and duties shall be, but societies in which citizenship is a developing institution create an image of an ideal citizenship against which achievement can be measured and toward which aspiration can be directed.

Citizenship is at once a psychological, legal, and behavioral phenomenon. As Marshall and others note (see Kymlicka and Norman 1995), citizenship entails membership in and identification with a political community. According to Almond and Verba (1965, 1979), citizenship does not exist when an individual does not identify with her or his community. In addition, as reflected in the ancient Roman's right to "appeal unto Caesar," citizens are entitled to certain legal rights. These rights differ from country to country and from time to time, but an essential quality of citizenship is that rights be equal. According to modern lights, a key "failing" of classical Athenian democracy was restriction of citizenship to only a relatively small portion of the residents of that *polis* (see Finley 1985). Citizenship also bestows obligations, and these are enshrined in the behaviors connected to the status, such as the franchise, obedience to the law, military service, paying taxes, etc. (see Walzer 1970).

In many ways, Marshall's 1949 essay "Citizenship and Social Class (1965) has set the agenda for subsequent research on citizenship (see, *e.g.,* 1988). Marshall argued that citizenship has three parts or elements: civil, political and social (1965, 78-79). The "civil" component of citizenship consists of those "rights necessary for individual freedom": personal liberty, freedom of speech and religion, property and contract rights, and the right to justice. Marshall noted that "justice" stands on a different plane than other "civil" rights, and means equality before the law and due process of law. The "political" element of citizenship boils down to the right to take part in the political affairs of the community, and includes voting rights, freedom of assembly and the right to petition elites for redress of grievances (see also Barbalet 1988, 2). Almond and Verba (1965, 117) define the "citizen" as someone who participates in "the process by which political decisions are made." The "social" component of citizenship includes "the whole range from the

right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society" (Marshall, 1965, 78).

Although the concept of citizenship is ancient, perhaps as old as settled communities (Barbalet 1988, 1), its meaning has changed substantially over the ages. Marshall (1965) traces the evolution of citizenship in western society from the earliest notions of civil rights for the nobility in the twelfth century to the development of political rights--first for a few and later for increasing slices of the community--to the emergence of disputes over "social" rights in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (see also Bendix 1977; Turner 1986).

Citizenship's meaning continues to evolve. Bernard Dauenhauer (1996), for example, argues that older notions of citizenship have become outmoded in an increasingly interdependent, albeit "fragile," world. Instead of notions rooted in national identities and constricted notions of people's needs and capabilities, Dauenhauer calls for what he calls "'complex citizenship.' Complex citizenship requires that those who practice it recognize that they have political responsibilities not only to members of their own society but also to humanity as a whole" (1996, 2).

Dauenhauer calls attention to an important facet of citizenship today: identification with large multi-national entities in a world increasingly marked by parochial loyalties, typically rooted in ethnicity, race, religion, and even at times, region. Ironically, the advent of technologically advanced means of transportation and communication has not produced Marshall McLuhan's "global village." Modern transportation and communication technologies have, instead, been accompanied in many places by heightened localism and even virtual tribalism. Long,, bloody strife in places like Bosnia, Northern Ireland, Germany, and eastern Europe belie once confident expectations of an emerging "new world order" based, in part at least, on supra-national identities. As Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. (1992) and others note, not even the United States has been immune to conflict stemming from particularistic identities.

Our excursion into the notion of citizenship has identified several key features of the concept. It is rooted in visions of equality and tied to efforts to balance rights with duties. At least since the rise of the welfare state in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,

citizenship has come to have socio-economic connotations. At bottom, of course, there is the requirement for identification with a community. As Almond and Verba (1965) noted, where one's psychological world is restricted to kith and kin, citizenship does not exist.

Measuring Citizenship

Let us now turn to questions related to measuring European citizenship in the late twentieth century. Before we list our findings, we also provide another measure of identity as a point of reference. In column 1 of Table 1, we reprint the results from Eurobarometer 45. The question asked was whether in the near future the respondent expected to think of her/himself principally as a European citizen, a member of a national state, a region, or some other combination. Table 1, column 1 reports the percentage of those by country identifying themselves as European citizens (*Eurobarometre Rapport Numero 45* 1996). Although the mean percent of those who expect to identify themselves as European in the near future is sixteen, the range is from seven to thirty. This points out the importance of being alert to national contextual differences in attempting to account for European citizenship.

The approach we employ is adapted from Sinnott's. It is a policy preference based approach to measuring the sense of European citizenship and analyzing the impact of several theoretically relevant factors on that sense of citizenship. We define European citizens as those who would prefer that certain policy areas closely identified historically with the essence of national sovereignty, i.e., currency, defense, foreign policy, and citizenship, be made the responsibility of the European Union. This could be thought of as a "specific support" as distinct from a "diffuse support" approach to defining European citizenship. A key assumption is that those who prefer that policies in these areas be made by European authorities identify with Europe and think of themselves as European citizens. Thus we define European citizens on the basis of their policy preferences.

For this initial test of our approach, we have chosen to use data from Eurobarometer 39.0 [EURO39] because it provides a richer array of trust and knowledge indicators than other Eurobarometer surveys available to us, as well as the policy preference items employed in our operational definition of citizenship. Unfortunately, it does not include the direct measures of

EU identity found in several other Eurobarometers. But given our continuing interest in the role of knowledge in accounting for political attitudes and behavior, we opted for EURO39.

We operationally define European citizenship as an index based on a set of eight policy preference variables. Three address the creation of a European currency and central bank (V121,V122, V141), two concern citizenship (V131,V132), and one each defense and foreign policy (V123, V124); the final item asks respondents to indicate whether they would like to see the creation of a European executive responsible to the European parliament (V133). A list of the specific items and their coding for this index, as well as others employed here, is available from the authors upon request. We have combined respondents' answers to the questions in a simple additive index that can range from a minimum score of 8 (for those who prefer that all the policy areas remain the province of the state) to 16 (for those who prefer that all the policy areas become the province of the EU). Table 1 reports the mean scores for each country on our citizenship index (see the second column). The European mean is 13.08; the scores range from Denmark's 11.46 to Italy's 14.19. Most (8 of 13) are between 12.5 and 13.5. Overall, the variation in scores among countries is not that great, posing a potential challenge for explaining the differences we do find. It is also the case that variation in the scores of individuals within countries is limited. For example, the standard deviation for Italy is but 1.58 while the greatest, for the U.K., reaches only 2.24. (We treat East and West Germany separately in this analysis because of the relatively short time Easterners have been in the EU, and because very different societies had emerged in the two Germanies before their unification.)

Note the much greater variation among countries between columns 1 and 2 in Table 1. Certainly this is due to the differences in scale. But we did find that the choices made in operationalization were critical to the findings. Undoubtedly, measuring citizenship is a complex process. Each attempt appears to capture a slightly different dimension. We wanted to note our sensitivity to this difficulty. While we do not think policy preferences capture the full richness of theories of citizenship, we do believe that we are measuring an important facet.

Thus operationally defining European citizens entails one set of problems. Identifying the influences that produce European citizens entails another. Citizenship includes both affective

and cognitive elements which, in turn, may well be conditioned by life experiences. Our attempt to account for the European citizens employs all three potential influences.

Presumably a European citizen, compared to national citizens, would be more inclined to express general (diffuse) support for European integration (V103), and express interest in EU politics (V102). Because trust is often understood to be the basis for political community, we expect those who are willing to see key policies turned over to European decision makers to have trust in other Europeans. EURO39 includes an array of items asking respondents how much they trusted nationals of other EU member states (and their own countrymen and women). From answers to this question (Q10) we created an index by adding the trust question answers for each of the twelve member states. The answer scale was 1=trust not at all through 4=a trust a great deal. Thus the hypothetical range of index scores is from 12 to 48. The European mean was 33.3 with the range from 29.7 (Greece) to 35.8 (Denmark) (See column 3 in Table 1).

Effective citizenship is likely to depend on knowledge. We have learned in other contexts that policy attitudes and support for institutions may be affected by knowledge (Baker *et al.* 1996, Bennett *et al.* 1996). To measure respondents' knowledge of the European Community we created another additive index of 17 items that include identifying the member states of the EC, knowing the total number of EC members, knowing the capital of the EC, knowing the name of the President of the Commission, and knowing who elects the members of the European parliament. The knowledge index could range from 5 to 22. The mean was 17.9 and the range from 16.3 (United Kingdom) to 19.5 (Luxembourg) (See Column 4 of Table 1).

Three other affective domain indicators, in addition to trust, are included in our model. These are: 1) general ideological orientation as expressed in the Eurobarometer standard 10 point left-right scale; 2) materialist/post-materialist value orientation [a standard Eurobarometer item with a 4 point scale]; and 3) satisfaction with democracy in one's own country [another standard item with a 4 point scale]. We are frankly uncertain as to the direction of their impact on European citizenship. Other research suggests that the impact of these factors varies by country when applied to other measures of support for European integration (Niedermayer and Sinnott 1995).

Three items-- age, gender and class (as measured by the Eurobarometer variable European Social Grade)--are included in the model to estimate the impact of location in the social structure and life experience on European citizenship. Some evidence suggests that younger people, men and persons of higher socioeconomic status have been more supportive of European integration (*Eurobarometre No. 45 Rapport*). But we are again uncertain as to whether this will be the case for citizenship as we have defined it, nor do we know to what extent the impact of these factors may be mitigated by different national circumstances.

We included the Eurobarometer-created leadership index to attempt to determine whether those who we identify as European citizens are different from other people in their propensity to discuss politics and attempt to persuade others of their opinions. Simple bivariate analyses indicate that opinion leaders are more likely to support European unification, and to see themselves as European citizens (*Eurobarometre No. 45 Rapport*). A high proportion of such persons among European citizens as we have defined it would be evidence of the existence of a polity with some vitality, not simply a statistical artifact.

Finally, our model includes three indicators of news media exposure: the frequency with which a respondent watches the news on TV, reads a newspaper, or listens to the news on radio. These items were included because of the European Commission's efforts to use the media to foster a sense of European identity. But as the following discussion points out, we have little reason to believe that the media are likely to have the effect the Commission desires.

Disagreement over expectations that the media are not only an integral part of the public arena that reflect societal values but a significant force that shapes the contours of that arena is a common theme in mass communication and political science research. Taking stock of early research on American elections that cautioned against expecting direct media effects (*e.g.*, Lazarsfeld, *et al.* 1968; Berelson, *et al.* 1954), more recent research has sought to fine-tune our understanding of media's impact (McQuail 1994).

The Commission of European Communities' 1984 report, Television without Frontiers, placed great emphasis on the potential for media (particularly the broadcast media) to aid in creating a European identity. An important part of the Commission's expectations was that information was integral to identity-formation, and the media were essential to providing

information. By the early 1990s, they were implementing the directives from their 1984 report to encourage the development of a European "communicative space" where a common identity could be forged. As important was the growing desire of several European countries to protect themselves from the encroachment of American media products. Philip Schlesinger observes:

> It is a nice irony that in order to legitimize the project of forging a supra-national identity the EC technocracy chose a model whose political prospects on the national level were actually waning, although they could not have seen this at the time....Characteristically, the role of audiovisual media in constructing a European identity has been officially defined by counter-position to a culturally invasive other, namely the United States (1994, 30).

The Commission sought to transfer the public service broadcasting model that had worked well in many countries to the serve the interests of the EC. Unfortunately for the Commission, that model is under siege in many countries as technology and changing regulatory environments strip away the coherence that had been a core value of the public systems (Blumler 1992). Changes in the European media landscape reflect an increasingly fragmented system in which "Diversification is visible--many more channels, more choice for consumers . . . segmentation of audiences into smaller, more homogeneous cultural and economic categories" (Sine *et al.* 1993, 3). Far from having the capacity to shape a shared identity, "[m]edia institutions remain nationally specific, strongly influenced in their internal regulatory regimes by domestic political determinants" (Schlesinger 1994, 31).

A case could be made for including other indicators in our model. In fact, we considered several, but rejected them when preliminary analysis suggested that, at least as measured, they were unlikely to matter, e.g., education [surprisingly because of its apparent positive significance in other measures of support for European integration], and reported intention to vote in the next election of the European parliament. Political party preference indicators do appear to matter in some cases (Flickinger 1995), but it was beyond our competence to evaluate how they might matter in each of the member states. Finally, a model including many more indicators would become too unwieldy. It is primarily for this reason that other indicators--such as expressing confidence in European institutions, or having heard or read lately about one or more EU institutions--were not included at this stage.

We expect national differences in the predictive power of our model for two general reasons. First, public perceptions of European integration often are mediated through national governments. Thus where political elites frequently have expressed skepticism about European policies, the impact of otherwise supportive influences may be mitigated. The second reason is the variation in the length of EU membership. Persons in the original six member states have had much more time to learn about European integration and form opinions about it than have those from East Germany, or Portugal and Spain.

Results

Table 2 provides an estimate for each country of the extent to which each independent variable (or predictor) affects the dependent variable of citizenship. The final column in Table 2 also provides an estimate for respondents in all countries combined. Whether each predictor is statistically significant and the achieved level of significance is noted with asterisks after each predictors' T-test score. The adjusted R^2 value indicates how well the independent variables combine to predict variation in the dependent variable, in this case the level of the citizenship index.

[Table 2 about here]

In the analyses of the individual countries, the most potent predictor of European citizenship, as we have defined it, is general support for European integration. It is the only one to achieve statistical significance in every country, and a very high level of significance at that. Interest in EC politics comes next, achieving significance in ten countries (Belgium, Greece and Ireland are the exceptions). Interest is followed closely by trust, a statistically significant predictor in nine countries. It is significant in four of the six original members, as well as in the three who joined in the first enlargement of the Community. But it is not significant in the two of the three newest members: Spain and East Germany. This lends credence to the hypothesis that longer membership gives greater opportunity for trust in other Europeans to develop, and for a foundation for a sense of European citizenship to be prepared.

Ideological position achieves statistical significance in six countries. In four of these (France, the Netherlands, West Germany and the United Kingdom) persons who place

themselves on the political left are more likely to score highly on the European citizenship index, but this is reversed in Denmark and Greece where the more conservative are more likely to be European citizens.

The "satisfaction with democracy" predictor achieves significance in five countries. In four of them (Belgium, East Germany, the Netherlands and Portugal), the more satisfied with democracy at home, the more likely one is to support European citizenship. The exception is the United Kingdom where lack of satisfaction is more closely associated with European citizenship.

It is important to note that all of the most frequently occurring predictors of European citizenship in the country models are from the affective domain rather than the cognitive or behavioral domains. However, it is worth noting that value orientation, often touted in the past as an important influence on European attitudes, achieves significance only in France and the Netherlands.

Knowledge of the EC matters for citizenship in only four countries. However, the effect of knowledge is positive in two cases (West Germany and Greece) and negative in the other two (Denmark and the United Kingdom). This finding points again to the role of differing national political contexts and circumstances. The fact that the well-informed are less likely to be European citizens in the two countries best known for their lack of Euro-enthusiasm suggests that building support for Europe is not just a matter of creating better informed publics. We had expected that knowledge might play a larger role. However, it appears our measure of citizenship does not rest on a solid factual foundation.

Location in the social structure counts for little in most of the country models. Age matters in three cases. In West Germany and Greece the young are likely to score higher on our citizenship index, but the reverse is the case in Luxembourg. Social class is of some importance only in Denmark and East Germany where those of higher social status are more likely to be European citizens. Gender matters only in Denmark, where women are more Euroskeptic. Each of these results is probably better accounted for by local circumstance than broader social forces. In general, these results attest to the waning of age, gender and class as sources of important differences when it comes to attitudes toward European integration.

Our single indicator of political behavior, the leadership index, is significant only in Portugal and its sign is negative, indicating that those who are active in political discussion and attempting to persuade friends are less likely to favor transferring greater policy responsibility to the EU. This predictor's sign is also negative, though not statistically significant, in six other countries. All of which suggests that being engaged politically does not necessarily lead to greater support for European citizenship.

Given the context for understanding the role of media systems described previously, it should come as little surprise that use of the broadcast media and even newspapers contributes little if anything to the construction of a European identity across most of the thirteen countries in this study. Although there are exceptions in a few countries (Ireland and the United Kingdom), and our measures are relatively crude, our findings corroborate the analyses of Schlesinger and others that caution against great expectations for construction of a European identity directly from media sources. (Even where the impact of news sources was not statistically significant, it is worth noting that the direction of their influence was often negative [see Table 2].) Political changes in the wake of the Cold War have stirred old enmities (*e.g.*, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia) and presented the quandary of melding East to West. Technological changes in the communication industry give citizens more options, but conceive of them as consumers rather than information-seeking citizens. In combination with the impact of diverse cultural and language systems, these forces feed fragmentation rather than community and limit media influence. The Irish and United Kingdom cases may be explained by their comparatively high rates of newspaper readership, and the fact that media coverage in Ireland tends to stress the benefits of membership (Kelly and Truetzschler 1993) while much of the British print press has been critical.

The performance of the model varies considerably across the EU member countries with adjusted R^2s ranging from .13 for Ireland to .32 for Denmark. In the cases of Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain, especially, much of the variance in our measure of citizenship remains to be explained. Certainly better measures for some of our predictor variables would be welcome and should help to reduce the amount of unexplained variance. On

the other hand, given the constraints of data and technique, the model performs reasonably well in half the countries. Whether it is important that most of these are from more northerly regions of the EU we cannot say.

Conclusions

We defined European citizenship as a set of policy preferences favoring European Union assumption of responsibility for functions traditionally seen as being at the core of the nation-state: defense, foreign policy, currency and citizenship. We identified the degree to which such a sense of citizenship exists in each of the member states, finding it highest in Italy, lowest in Denmark. We then explored the role of knowledge, trust, general attitudes toward European integration, interest in European matters, location in the social structure, and media use patterns in accounting for European citizenship. General support for and interest in European integration are the most potent predictors of European citizenship, followed by trust, ideology, satisfaction with democracy and knowledge. Variables tapping location in the social structure, e.g., age, gender and class, as well as indicators of news media exposure, generally have little impact in the country models, but media exposure variables were significant in our pooled model. The performance of the model varies considerably across the EU member countries with adjusted R^2s ranging from .13 for Ireland to .32 for Denmark.

We conclude that European citizenship remains principally a product of general attitudes favoring European integration rather than being based on knowledge, location in the social structure, or media influence. However, it is often affected by country-specific contextual features. Our findings cast doubt on the prospect of relying on information presented in the news media to foster a sense of European citizenship

Although none of what we have learned is pathbreaking, we have been able to offer additional perspectives on thinking about and measuring European citizenship as well as clarifying the role of forces that shape European identities. This research can now go in two directions. The first would be to use our measures as a baseline. Now that we have measured citizenship from a policy perspective, we can replicate this research as subsequent surveys become available. We can measure growth in support of or opposition to EU assumption of

these responsibilities. The second research possibility is the continued quest for a comprehensive measure of citizenship. The scholarly literature reflects the lack of a consensus on this topic. We are not certain which elements are crucial to such an identification. But the EU provides a natural experiment to help understand this question. Like all research projects, this one raises many more questions than it answers. But the implications of unlocking the secrets of citizenship would more than compensate for the difficulty of the task.

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Table 1: Index Scores by Country

	EURO Identity*	Citizenship Index**	Trust Index**	Knowledge Index**
France	16	12.97	33.21	18.30
Belgium	15	13.51	34.76	19.33
Netherlands	16	13.53	34.95	17.65
West Germany	16	12.45	34.60	17.77
Italy	30	13.95	31.88	16.63
Luxembourg	25	13.26	33.88	19.52
Denmark	7	11.35	35.83	19.01
Ireland	30	13.75	32.82	17.29
United Kingdom	15	12.32	32.67	16.32
Greece	10	13.48	29.69	19.06
Spain	10	13.79	32.22	18.10
Portugal	9	13.35	32.78	17.35
East Germany	7	12.64	33.73	17.15
European Mean	16	13.08	33.26	17.90

*This is the % of the population who claimed that in the near future they would see themselves "above all" as a citizen of the European Union as opposed to a citizen of their country or of their region. Source: Eurobarometer 44Mega reported in *Eurobarometre Rapport No. 45* p. B.82.

**These indices were constructed from Eurobarometer 39 data. The citizenship index could range from 8 to 16, the trust index from 12 to 48, and the knowledge index from 5 to 22. See text for a full explanation of how the indices were constructed.

Table 2: Predicting European Citizenship in Thirteen Countries

Variable	Belgium		Denmark		France		Germany(E)		Germany(W)		Greece		Ireland	
	b	*T*	*b*	*T*	*b*	*T*	*b*	*T*	*b*	*T*	*b*	*T*	*b*	*T*
Trust Index	.02	1.97*	.05	3.71**	.02	1.61	.02	1.65	.04	3.24**	.03	3.54**	.07	5.02**
Know EC	.05	1.69	-.06	2.34*	.03	1.41	.00	0.20	.11	4.03**	.05	1.98*	.04	1.32
Gender	.12	0.89	.39	2.86**	.12	0.92	-.06	0.43	.02	0.13	.08	0.56	.11	0.76
EU Interest	.06	0.60	.21	2.30*	.27	3.03**	.32	2.93**	.26	2.44*	-.01	0.14	.01	0.06
Support for EU	.94	7.15**	1.31	12.43**	1.29	11.79**	1.28	9.09**	1.17	8.72**	1.14	9.70**	.95	6.65**
Ideology	-.06	1.85	.12	3.26**	-.09	3.21**	.00	0.11	-.09	2.38*	.11	3.61**	.02	0.47
Value Orientation	.06	0 .77	.12	1.10	.30	3.86**	-.12	1.44	.03	0.39	.06	0.97	.03	0.40
Dem. Satisfaction	.26	2.84**	.13	1.34	.05	0.61	.21	2.08*	.18	1.64	.10	1.25	-.04	0.42
Leadership Index	.11	1.27	.01	0.10	-.04	0.52	.12	1.13	-.13	1.50	-.10	1.29	.05	0.56
Age	.00	0.67	.00	0.35	.01	1.40	-.00	0.40	-.01	2.96**	-.01	2.44*	.00	0.46
Social Class	.02	0.50	.11	2.07*	.06	1.60	.15	2.87**	.01	0.19	.03	0.85	-.06	1.25
Watch TV News	.03	0.37	-.08	0.75	.06	0.99	-.18	1.44	.12	1.13	.04	0.38	-.25	2.14*
Read Newspaper	.02	0.31	.04	0.15	-.02	0.32	.08	1.03	.01	0.14	.07	1.48	.14	1.96*
Listen Radio News	.00	0.17	-.01	0.15	-.01	0.17	.08	1.15	-.08	1.07	-.01	0.30	.03	0.37
R^2	.15		.32		.28		.24		.29		.26		.13	
s.e.e.	1.70		1.80		1.72		1.80		1.78		1.53		1.77	
(N)	(658)		(777)		(754)		(651)		(612)		(628)		(629)	

** $p \leq .01$; * $p \leq .05$

T-scores are absolute values.

Source: Eurobarometer 39.0.

Table 2: Predicting European Citizenship in Thirteen Countries (cont.)

Variable	Italy		Luxembourg		Netherlands		Portugal		Spain		UK		Combined	
	b	*T*	*b*	*T*	*b*	*T*	*b*	*T*	*b*	*T*	*b*	*T*	*b*	*T*
Trust Index	.05	3.57**	.04	1.71	.06	4.07**	.04	2.42*	-.00	0.26	.03	2.21*	.02	5.76**
Know EC	.01	0.40	.03	0.65	.04	1.53	.04	1.45	.04	1.26	-.07	2.73**	.04	6.09**
Gender	.12	0.94	.08	0.38	.03	0.28	-.20	1.12	.07	1.06	.10	0 .73	.07	1.75
EU Interest	.18	2.13*	.41	3.04**	.44	5.02**	.34	2.95**	.34	3.48**	.27	2.93**	.24	8.52**
Support for EU	.79	6.40**	1.21	5.73**	1.44	11.16**	.98	5.80**	.92	7.10**	1.43	14.33**	1.42	40.69**
Ideology	-.05	1.52	-.01	0.23	-.15	4.72**	.00	0.03	-.00	0.10	-.14	3.88**	-.11	10.55**
Value Orientation	.02	0.25	.06	0.45	-.23	2.75**	-.06	0.62	.08	0.90	-.10	1.17	.04	1.69
Dem. Satisfaction	-.10	1.07	-.13	0.87	.24	2.60**	.31	2.43*	-.02	0.21	-.19	2.22*	-.14	5.45**
Leadership Index	-.05	0.59	-.08	0.63	-.12	1.41	-.39	3.78**	.12	1.37	-.01	0.15	-.02	0.88
Age	.00	0.07	.13	2.04*	.00	1.30	-.01	1.67	-.00	0.43	.00	0.11	-.00	2.75**
Social Class	.03	0.91	.09	1.40	.01	0.25	-.08	1.65	-.04	0.99	.04	0.80	-.01	0.88
Watch TV News	.06	0.55	-.08	0.69	-.05	0.71	-.02	0.21	.08	1.03	-.19	1.84	.06	2.25*
Read Newspaper	.02	0.34	-.07	0.75	-.02	0.35	.08	1.17	-.09	1.65	-.12	2.31*	-.09	5.67**
Listen Radio News	-.03	0.77	-.14	1.61	-.03	0.85	.04	0.66	.01	0 .29	.05	1.01	-.07	5.37**
R^2	.15		.17		.30		.18		.15		.29		.25	
s.e.e.	1.47		1.70		1.59		1.89		1.70		1.87		1.83	
(N)	(589)		(328)		(729)		(512)		(559)		(804)		(7946)	

** $p \leq .01$; * $p \leq .05$

T-scores are absolute values.

Source: Eurobarometer 39.0.