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Governance - A Matter of Discourse
Discursive Nodal Points in the British Debate over Europe

Paper for presentation at the Biennial Convention of the
European Community Studies Association (ECSA), Seattle, 28 May - 1 June 1997,
panel "Dynamics of Decision-Making in the EU"
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ABSTRACT

The paper suggests a constructivist approach for an analysis of European governance. To the conceptualization of government and governance, it adds a third level of governing, a field of discourses which his called regens and in which governing actors are situated. In this field, discourses are interwoven, and in their nodal points, certain subject positions are produced from which specific notions of European governance are articulated. This approach is put to work in an analysis of the British debate over European integration. It is argued that seven „images“ of Europe are produced in connection to other discourses in which the objects „progress“, „knowledge“, „politics“, „economy“, „society“, and „nature“ are constructed. From such a perspective, the much debated change of British policy towards European integration at the beginning of the 1960s is reconceptualized as an instance of continuity as well as discontinuity, and the current Labour policy is reassessed.
1. A Focus on Discourse

„Governance as discourse“ - how may one utter such a phrase after Sokal's Hoax?1 How may one insist on a constructivist, or even worse, poststructuralist perspective in light of this seemingly devastating critique, the charge of complete relativism, of the abandonment of any scientific standards? Why not get out of this dead end street and turn back to the interstates of political science, looking for the causal mechanisms in the real world?

Because Sokal may have shown that journal editors do not always approach a submission with as much rigour as they should, but he has not made the final blow against the argument made with respect to the construction of reality. The conflict at the center of the debate over Sokal's „hoax“ is about a problem that has steered philosopher's discussions for millenia (Glasersfeld 1985: 1n). To paraphrase the famous „furniture argument“ (cf. Potter 1996: 7): Is this a table because one can knock on it, or is it a table because we make it a table in our minds (the phenomenological position) or in our language (the post/structuralist position)? Obviously, it would be nonsense to deny the existence of material substance. To dismiss constructivist arguments on that ground, however, misses the point: „Sokal's crusade for reality“, wrote George Levine in a letter to Lingua Franca where Sokal had concealed his (insert hoax, betrayal, coup, or whatever else comes close to your reading of the affair), „shows no awareness that a constructionist argument does not and cannot mean that 'reality' can be changed just like that“ (Levine 1996).

But what, then, is all this talk of constructivism about? I suggest to differentiate between two kinds of constructivism that have all too often been lumped together in International Relations recently. There is, on the one hand, a strand of constructivism holding that the individual actor and society are not just there as they are, but that they mutually reconstruct each other. This is the line of argument that Alexander Wendt, for instance, has picked up from Anthony Giddens (Wendt 1987, 1992). Constructivists in this sense are not concerned with epistemological questions. Their puzzle is framed in ontological terms, it is about the status and relationship between agent and structure (Giddens 1988: 34, 52, 215 et passim). The constructivist position from which this paper is written is more radical in the sense that it does not only hold that our (social) reality is constructed, but that so is our knowledge of this reality. Again, this is not aimed at denying the existence of such a reality, but at arguing that the more important question is *in what terms reality is framed when we talk about and thereby act upon it*. Thus, a constructivist argument is „not aimed at denying the existence of tables“, as John Potter insists, „but at exploring the various ways in which reality is constructed“

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1 See Sokal 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, Boghossian 1996, and for an overview of the debate the website [http://www.u-washington.edu/~jwalsh/sokal].
(Potter 1996: 7). Or, to quote a work that is more familiar to political scientists: Its aim is to investigate how „we construct worlds we know in a world we do not“ (Onuf 1989: 39).

Whereas the first constructivist position might be labelled „social constructivism“, the latter I will call „epistemological constructivism“ (Diez 1996: 257). I would argue that poststructuralist work is part of the academic engagement with this second position. In the suggestions to follow for an analysis of European integration, I will draw widely on texts that commonly are subsumed under this heading of poststructuralism. One of the basic arguments, as I read it, that has been made in this work, is that discourse matters. This is central, for instance, to the work of Michel Foucault who stated that „there is no prediscursive providence which disposes the world in our favor. We must conceive discourse as a violence which we do to things, or in any case as a practice which we impose on them“ (Foucault 1984: 127). Thus, what I would like to suggest is a focus on discourse. My argument starts from the premise that whenever we talk about the „EU“ or „European integration“, we pretend to mean the same thing, but our constructions may differ widely - the EU is a „contested concept“ (Connolly 1983). These differences are important in the sense that for political decisions to be made, one has to start from such constructions, being unable to simply mirror the EU's real nature: And furthermore, they are not just differences in short-term aims and preferences, but are embedded in a wider discursive context.

Thus, the analytical focus that I propose is to examine the various constructions or „readings“ of the EU. In the next section, I will introduce various kinds of such readings. Then, I will move on to ask where these readings come from, or rather: how they are embedded in a wider discursive field, which we will get to know as a governmental field called regens. This is followed by a short investigation of various aspects of the case of British policy/ies towards European integration, which will lead to a concluding section trying to assess such an approach in light of the British example.

Before I move on, let me address a question that such an approach can hardly avoid: What is the status of the scientist working from such a position? What is s/he able to do if we cannot know what the world really is? The answer I propose may be frustrating to some, encouraging to others: The task is to offer plausible constructions, to offer alternative readings of the world. If these constructions are taken up in our day-to-day politics, the question of whether they are „true“ or not is of less importance. What counts are the things these words do, to paraphrase John Austin's famous term (Austin 1976). This is what radical constructivists have taken science to be about in the first place (S. Schmidt 1987: 31; Glasersfeld 1985: 9), and it comes close to the Niklas Luhmann's conceptualization of the scientist as an „observer“. Luhmann defines „observation“ as an operation of distinguishing and naming (Luhmann 1990: 73). As such, it is always an action which is performed, not just a rather passive mirroring of what is already given (ibid.: 75, 82). Social science as observation has the task, according to Luhmann, to point to alternative observations (ibid.: 718) - to alternative constructions. The task of this
paper, therefore, is to point to alternative constructions of the EU, how they may be read in a wider discursive context, and how, from such a point of view, an observation of British policy towards European integration becomes possible that differs from traditional narratives.

2. „The EU is the EU is the EU“ - is it?

2.1. Discourse. What discourse?

My answer to the question heading this section should be clear by now. The EU, I argue, is not simply the EU: It is constructed differently in different contexts. Furthermore, these contexts are discourses. This is a somewhat problematic statement. The term „discourse“ has, much like the term „constructivism“, become a buzzword in International Relations and Political Science in general (cf. Brand 1994: 85). Being such a buzzword, it is used in various ways, often without even being defined. Thus, it is often unclear whether „discourse“ is, for instance, used in an Habermasian sense to connote a set of communicative actions not disturbed by domination (Habermas 1981, 1992: 50n, 332n et passim), or in the very different Foucauldian sense according to which in and through discourse there is (a productive, not perse negative) power producing certain objects (Foucault 1991b, 1990: 10-12).

The understanding of discourse that serves as the basis for the following might rather be characterized as Foucauldian than Habermasian. I am interested in how the EU is constructed discursively and I am not, for instance, attempting to sketch how a political system on the EU level should look like in order to allow for wide-ranging debates forming a discourse free from power disturbances. But this does not clarify what a discourse consists of. The literature has provided a number of definitions of discourse in this respect. In a wide definition, discourse comprises of „whatever signifies or has meaning“ (Macdonnell 1986: 3n). This could be textual „codes“ as in Barthes’ semiology (Barthes 1974), everyday speech acts as in conversation analysis (cf. Potter 1996: 57-66), or statements in general. The latter, I believe, is the most useful understanding of discourse in our context. It is broad enough to include any codes, but it is specific enough in the sense that it reduces discourse to text, i.e. a set of written statements or spoken utterances.

This is, of course, a very important (and also contestable) move. Analysts that are more oriented towards social constructivism in the sense defined above tend to subsume social action in general under the heading of discourse. In this respect, Roxanne Lynn Doty argues

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2 For the latter, see, for instance, March/Olsen 1995: 81; Habermas 1992: 650n. It should be noted that I am using the term „debate“ whenever I refer to fields of communication in a broad and general sense, and the term „discourse“ whenever I am referring to a specific theoretical conceptualization.
that "a discourse may refer to a specific group of texts, but it also refers to the social practices to which those texts are linked. The linguistic and behavioral aspects of social practices form a complex and inextricably connected whole that is a discourse" (Doty 1996: 126). And in a sense, I would agree with Doty, referring back to Wittgenstein's argument that a specific "behavioral" action is always connected to speech act (Wittgenstein 1984: 228; cf. Laclau/Mouffe 1985: 108). Language, from this point of view, "frames" and thus already is political action, but it is also situated in a field of political action (Bleiker 1997: 61, 68). But how do we know about action? How do we know outside of language? It seems impossible to get "between language and its object", even if action is the object (Rorty 1994: 27).

But just to refer to language in a definition of discourse is still problematic, raising the question of what we take language to be. Many traditional ideational analyses have worked with a conception of language as the carrier of ideas, and so have various strands of phenomenology and pragmatism. Whether the origin of meaning is structure or the individual's intentional mind, is of less importance here. The question is whether language is merely a carrier and may thus be read by everyone in the same way. Or, to put it in a different way, whether the meaning of a text can be controlled by some origin(al author). Following Derrida, I would argue against such an understanding of language. Rather, my whole argument will rest upon the assumption that the meaning of a specific text, the meaning of an articulation as I will call it later on, can never be controlled, but is dependent upon the nodes to other texts, upon "discursive nodal points" in which such a text is read. Thus, in a sense, it is not the autonomous individual's mind that produces meaning, but it is the discursive context and thus language itself that takes up a productive role in this respect.

There are two features of discourse that are important for the argument to follow. For one, the statements that a discourse consists of, produce an object, and they do so by following specific rules. With respect to the EU, I will call the object a certain "image" of Europe, whereas the rules are criteria of legitimate European governance. Viewed from another perspective, then, a specific discourse is defined by the image it produces and the criteria that this production follows, while I will call the set of discourses that pretend to construct the same object (e.g. the EU) a discursive formation.³

The conceptualization of discursive elements as object and rules draws on the distinction between world views and beliefs as it can be found in Judith Goldstein's and Robert Keohane's work on the role of ideas and institutions in the making of foreign policy (Goldstein/Keohane 1993; cf. Jachtenfuchs 1995).⁴ Goldstein and Keohane introduce three categories of ideas, with

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³ This is close to the Foucauldian notion that a discourse produces a certain object according to specific rules (Foucault 1972).

⁴ I take the work of Goldstein and Keohane as a starting point in this respect because it has gained a quasi-classical status in IR theory. This is not to say that it is the most original in content. Most of what Goldstein and Keohane propose (and even how their edited volume is arranged) has been articulated, for instance, in a volume on "Belief Systems in International Relations" edited by Richard
beliefs being further divided into a class of „principled“ and a class of „causal“ beliefs. Whatever the merits of this distinction are, both kinds of belief do have one thing in common: Whereas „worldviews“ operate on a very basic and abstract level, they define what kind of action seems appropriate in a specific situation. Thus, one might call them „rationalities“, a term I pick from the work of the German sociologist M. Rainer Lepsius (Lepsius 1995), but which is, as we shall see in a moment, also apparent in Foucauldian analyses. At the same time, however, these rationalities are connected to a specific worldview (Goldstein/Keohane 1993: 11). In providing „criteria for distinguishing right from wrong“ and to determine „cause-effect relationships“ (ibid.: 9n), they serve to reproduce the respective worldviews in the daily practices of their adherents. It is in this sense, if we take practices to be textual practices, that the rather abstract and encompassing objects are are connected to a certain set of rules that I will call rationalities.

Two reflections are in place here: one on the status of ideas in our discursive approach, one on the concept of „rationalities“. First, we should note the difference between the definition of ideas as „beliefs held by individuals“ as it is proposed by Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 3), and the conceptualization of ideas as discursive elements in this paper’s approach. The ideational conception put forth in the work of Goldstein and Keohane relies on the aforementioned tradition of ascribing ideas to an individual’s inner mind. In contrast, this paper redefines ideas in a textual way. Second, to speak of „rationalities“ does not suppose that we are dealing with „rational“ actors in the sense of more or less autonomous subjects acting according to an individual preference structure. What is being argued is that there are criteria for a certain object (or action) that render the appearance of this very object/action possible. The criterion to act according to a preference structure would itself be a possible rationality in this sense.

To summarize, the poststructuralist approach to European integration employed in the following concentrates on the analysis of a discursive formation consisting of discourses in which a specific image of the EU is produced according to a respective set of rationalities. Furthermore, given the textual nature of this construction, we might say that the EU is „read“ in such discourses. In such an understanding, „reading“ is more than just a rather passive process. It is an act of re-writing, of re-producing, the „re“ indicating that there is always the possibility of transformation, of change (which I will get back to later on). In the following subsection, I will define what I take the object „EU“ to be and what sort of rationalities we might have to expect in this context, and I will introduce four ideal type images of the EU.

Little and Steve Smith five years prior to the publishing of the Goldstein/Keohane volume (Little/Smith 1988) - with the latter not even mentioning Little and Smith only once.
2.2. Images of EU Governance

Is there anything that all of these EU objects have in common? Is there any restriction that we may impose on the variety of constructions of Europe? I suggest that all of the readings of the EU are concerned with the EU as a system of governance, even in those cases in which the EU is denied such quality (because in denying it, the discursive construction is still concerned with the problematic of governance). To be more precise, then, I should rather speak of „reading European governance“ instead of using the catchy „reading the EU“ phrase.

Governance by now is a well-known concept in International Relations. The title of James Rosenau’s project on „Governance without Government“ (Rosenau 1987; cf. Rosenau/Czempiel 1992) already indicates what the term is used for: to connote a system of governing that does not show the centralized and hierarchical features of the modern territorial states’ systems of government (Kohler-Koch 1993: 113-117; Derliken 1990: 77; Dunsire 1993). Instead, the concept of governance allows for more and other actors besides the state, with the state often acting as a moderator (Scharpf 1991). On an international level, governance is performed by a variety of actors, states being amongst them, agreeing on decisions. This agreement is the defining denominator of governance: In any case, governance is about making decisions that are binding for a certain group of people (cf., e.g., Jachtenfuchs/Kohler-Koch 1996: 15). It is important to note that from such a perspective, these decisions are produced by actors. These actors may be bound up in a network, but they are nonetheless relatively autonomous actors. I will have to refer back to this characteristic of governance in the following section.

With the object of the discourses in the discursive formation to be analyzed thus redefined, we may also take a closer look at how the rationalities in this specific formation may be characterized. As Max Weber has argued, every system of governance in order to be stable needs the belief of the people governed in its legitimacy (Weber 1964: 158). It should be pointed out right away that the Weberian notion of legitimacy does not per se carry any normative undertones. It does not define legitimacy as a category of unchangeable content in an essentialist way, i.e. as something that is either true or false. Instead, following Weber, I will employ an open notion of legitimacy which insists that political power is legitimate if a reference to such a general truth is successfully established within a society, i.e. if legitimation is successful. It does not follow from such a discursive definition of legitimacy that we cannot criticize or challenge specific notions of political power. It does, however, hold that such a critique is always dependent on prevailing rules of "opinion and reputation" (Locke 1959: 476-

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5 This subsection draws heavily on conceptualizations taken from a research project on „Governance beyond statehood: Ideas on Legitimacy in the EU“. The project was funded by the German Science Foundation (DFG), led by Beate Kohler-Koch, and carried out by Markus Jachtenfuchs, Sabine Jung and the present author.
6 Weber uses „rule“ instead of „governance“, but in the definition given above, „governance“ is a kind of „rule“.
and thus cannot simply claim to represent a pre-original truth. It is in this sense that such an understanding of legitimacy also deviates from Habermas's notion of discursive legitimacy. Although Habermas accepts the assumption of a discursive production of legitimacy, his treatment of the latter is nonetheless essentialist in that he introduces a strict formal criterion of how discourse should ideally look like if the political power legitimized by it is indeed legitimate and does not only (false) claim so (see Habermas 1973, 1992: 50f, 332f et passim; cf. Warren 1995: 171). Such a formal criterion, however, does not remain on the level of pure formality, but establishes an essential condition, a claim about what truth is (cf. Hindess 1996: 91-94).

The notion of legitimacy as a set of rationalities in discourses producing images of governance may sound rather strange at first, so further reflections seem appropriate. In an article dealing with „political power beyond the state“, Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller, trying to make use of Foucault's writing for a politico-sociological analysis, employ a concept of rationality that is similar to the one that I have introduced above. Rose and Miller point out that any kind of governing is always bound up with certain „political rationalities“ which they define as „the changing discursive fields within which the exercise of power is conceptualised, the moral justifications for particular ways of exercising power by diverse authorities, notions of appropriate forms, objects and limits of politics, and conceptions of the power distribution of such tasks among secular, spiritual and familial sources“ (Rose/Miller 1992: 175). For the given context, it is important that Rose and Miller suggest that such political rationalities characteristically come in a „moral form“ (ibid.: 178). This, in turn, means that they are about the rightfulness of a particular (governing) action. It is this moral form which allows us to treat notions of legitimacy as political rationalities.

A second feature of political rationalities - according to Rose and Miller - is their „distinctive idiom“, defined as the „intellectual machinery or apparatus for rendering reality thinkable“ (Rose/Miller 1992: 179). In the light of this paper's approach, this „machinery“ is first and foremost lingual - it is the way in which claims about legitimacy have to be phrased in order to be taken seriously. In other words: Each rationality becomes itself an object that is constructed according to certain rules. In the Western democratic societies which this paper is dealing with, this idiom has been established in three dimensions. First, legitimacy might be phrased as a matter of participation; second, legitimacy might be phrased as matter of output; and third, legitimacy might be phrased in terms of identity. This is reminiscent of Abraham Lincoln’s characterization of democracy as „government by the people [participation], and for the people [output]“ (quoted in M.G. Schmidt 1995: 13), with identity defining who the people actually are. Most political theories concerned with the question of legitimacy refer back to some combination of these three dimensions (cf., for instance, Scharpf 1970; Schimmelfennig 1996: 20-22).
Thus, each image of EU governance is linked to a specific set of rationalities as claims of legitimacy that are phrased in terms (and in some combination) of participation, output, and identity. I will now suggest four ideal types of such images. The purpose of doing so is not, as one may read Weber's intention when he introduced the notion of ideal types to the social sciences, to use them as an hermeneutical tool in order to get a better grasp of reality (see, for instance, Weber 1951: 194). Rather, I develop these ideal types to reflect upon my own discursive position as an "observer". Thus, I am making use of a central characteristic of ideal types: their level of abstraction which serves to stress particular features of the object studied. Whatever features one stresses, however, depends on one's own approach towards the object, and thus depends on one's own discursive position.

The first feature that I would like to stress is whether the images of European governance fall within the realm of traditional statehood or whether they can be said to move beyond it. My reading treats the territorial and unitary organization of governance as a central characteristic of statehood, with each political rationality, be it some kind of participation, output or identity, referring to a unitary territory (cf. Ruggie 1993; Diez 1996: 262). Furthermore, I suggest that those images falling within the realm of statehood may be distinguished according to the level of identity they build upon: Is the basic territory constructed as European or on the level of member states? Resulting from such a distinction is the dichotomy of Federal State (European level) versus Intergovernmental Co-operation (member-state level) which has dominated the debates over European integration for long (see Diez 1997a). I will not elaborate on these two ideal types any further. The more interesting (because less well-known) cases are those images falling beyond the boundaries of modern statehood.

These images, constructing governance on multiple and overlapping levels, can hardly be distinguished according to territorial "levels" of identity they take as their basis because there is no territorial unity (which is not to say that there are no borders set up anymore, see Diez 1997b). Instead, I would argue that the major difference between them is the extent to which the various dimensions of legitimacy are stressed in respective political rationalities. For one, we have a strong stress on economic output legitimating a European political order, while the member states remain intact as political systems, stressing participation and identity in their legitimation. This image will be called Economic Community. The basic assumption it rests upon is that there is a neat division between the sphere of politics and the economic realm. Whereas the first is man-made, the latter is following the quasi-natural logics of the market, producing welfare through large-scale competition. Thus, the economic realm can be regulated according to expert knowledge in order to prevent forces from disrupting the natural market development. This regulation, however, fits our definition of governance, because it rests upon decisions that are binding for all members of such a market. From such a perspective, the economic sphere is hardly as apolitical as it is constructed by the advocates of the Economic.
Community. Rather, it is merely one possible way of organizing the economy that has to be defended against competing alternatives, and thus it does itself rest on a political decision.7

In contrast, a fourth image which I will call Network strongly relies on participation and identity. The rationalities in this image do not refer to governance at the European or national level: Instead, the idea is to base politics in various regional and functional communities that are close to the individual citizen and societal groups. These communities might well overlap, and the ensuing picture is one of multiple political organizations bound up in a kind of network, something close to what Philippe Schmitter has called „condominio“ (Schmitter 1996). As absurd as such a political order might seem at first sight - it draws on a long tradition of political philosophy, conceptualized as an alternative to the modern, hierarchical and centralized state which is seen as imposing a superficial identity on its citizens and as an impediment to participation. Strands of such a thought might be found in the „societal federalism“ of Althusius (Hueglin 1991), or in Proudhon’s federal version of radical democracy (cf. Hahn 1975).8

The following figure (taken from Jachtenfuchs/Diez/Jung 1997) summarizes the arguments leading to the distinction of these four ideal types:

![Diagram](image)

*Fig. 1: Four ideal type images of European governance*

The question that such a conceptualization yields is: Can we say something about where these different images come from? This is the puzzle I will address in the following section.

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7 The Economic Community image is presented in more detail in Jachtenfuchs 1997a, 1997b.
8 For the Network image, see also Diez 1996, 1997a.
3. Discursive Nodal Points

3.1. Another Level Added: Regens

To start with, there is a third characteristic of political rationalities suggested by Rose and Miller: That these rationalities are always articulated „in relation to some conception of the objects governed“ (Rose/Miller 1992: 179). The discursive formation we have dealt with so far was concerned with „European governance“, and especially with the kind of political order that goes along with it. But obviously, governance is related to specific threats and problems - to specific „objects“. Most generally, these problems are given in theories of governance: The latter’s puzzle is how to deal with them. The approach that I am suggesting here takes a different stance: It is interested in how these problems are made problems in the first place. The political rationalities have to refer to specific constructions of objects in other discourses not primarily concerned with the construction of governance. Thus, the discourses on governance are interwoven with a range of other discourses - making up various „discursive nodal points“. There’s a decisive twist in the argument at this point, but let me first elaborate on the notion of „discursive nodal points“.

The concept of a „nodal point“ has been used in two constructivist approaches before: First, the German school of Radical Constructivism, built around the work of Humberto Maturana, as it was used for social theory by Peter Hejl, and second, the Post-Marxism of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Hejl tries to tackle the micro/macro-problem of social theory (see Esser 1996) through conceptualizing individuals as nodes in a network of social systems, in which individuals reproduce these systems, but are at the same time brought up by them (Hejl 1987: 319-321). This is close to Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory, but whereas Luhmann insists on the autopoietic character of systems, Hejl conceptualizes them as being radically interdependent, that is: „synreferential“ instead of „autoreferential“ (Hejl 1987: 327). In this synreferentiality, the nodal points connecting the various systems to each other become important objects of study. In the conceptualization of Laclau and Mouffe, nodal points are constructed in order to fix meaning in a wide field of contending discourses (Laclau/Mouffe 1985: 113). This is close to the argument of Rose and Miller: To inscribe some meaning in discourse, it is necessary to draw on a variety of other conceptualizations and bring them together.

The twist in this argument is that although such a construction of nodal points seems to be very active on behalf of certain societal subjects (be it individuals, classes, or other groups), even in Laclau and Mouffe’s case it is rather a matter of reciprocity, in which the subject is at the same time bound up with certain discourses. Thus, it does not only engage in the fixation of a nodal point, but it is also produced in such a nodal point - a conceptualization which is close to the one to be found in Hejl’s work. In the terms of Laclau and Mouffe, the attempt to fix a nodal point is called an articulation which is performed from a discursively produced
subject position (Laclau/Mouffe 1985: 109, 115). The difference between a subject and a subject position in such a sense is the little twist that had to be spelled out, and it is in this sense that Henrik Larsen, in his analysis of „British discourses on Europe“, argues that „what look like battles between parties, departments and the media, are, at a higher level of abstraction, battles between discourses“ (Larsen 1997: 108).

In light of the preceding discussion, we might now add a third understanding of governing which I will call the matrix of regens. In their article, Rose and Miller use the term „government“ in such a sense, defining it as „the historically constituted matrix within which are articulated all those dreams, schemes, strategies and manoeuvres of authorities that seek to shape the beliefs and conduct of others“ (Rose/Miller 1992: 175). In this definition, we might read the „shaping“ as articulations. They are compatible with our notion of governance to the extent that they are performed by actors („authorities“), with state governments only being one amongst others. But at the same time, these articulations are bound up with a larger field of discourses. The authorities are not conceptualized as sovereign actors, but are always part of a wider field of discourses governing them to some extent. It is this wider field of discourses that I will call regens.

3.2. Developing a Model of Discursive Nodal Points

In answering the question of where the various images of European governance come from, I will now draw on this idea of regens, in which discourses in various formations overlap and intersect, thus forming discursive nodal points as subject positions. In such a conceptualization, we cannot simply draw an arrow from one discourse to another. The field of regens is a matrix in which all of these discourses are interwoven. This is why I have refrained from using the word „causality“ (admitting, however, that the notion of „coming from“ is not much better), because causality implies that consequences can clearly be linked to a set of independent factors (Schnell/Hill/Esser 1992: 47). As Foucault once said about his analyses: „I would like to substitute the study of this whole play of dependencies for the uniform, simple activity of allocating causality; and by suspending the indefinitely renewed privileges of cause, to render apparent the polymorphous interweaving of correlations“ (Foucault 1991b: 58). But then again, in approaching the field of regens, we always look from somewhere, and in our case, this somewhere is in the articulations trying to construct a specific notion of European governance. Thus, whenever it seems that, from such a perspective, there are causalities implied, we should keep the caveat in mind that this is an effect of the need to start somewhere.

The following figure is an attempt to visualize the various arguments that I have made in course of developing the concept of discursive nodal points. The figure as a whole should be read as the field of regens. On the left, there are the various discourses (1-n) that are part of discursive formations (A-F) and interwoven with the formation of discourses constructing
European governance according to legitimation criteria as rationalities. For each of the discourses $A_{1-n}$ to $F_{1-n}$, we could draw a similar box as I have done for the discursive formation on European governance. I have not done so for two reasons: First, to keep the figure as clear as possible, and second, because in the actual analysis, the discourses on European governance will be analyzed in depth, since it is them we are mostly interested here, whereas the other discourses that are part of such a nodal point are treated as „metanarratives“ (Gottweis 1996), that is unless we would engage in a quite heroic project, we will have to be satisfied by rather abstract reconceptualizations of these discourses.

![Diagram of discursive nodal points]

**Fig. 2: A model of discursive nodal points**

What we can also see from the figure is the ambivalent status of articulations: To the extent that they are utterances from a specific subject position, they are part of a wider discourse constructing European governance (thus their box reaches into the box of the discourses on European governance), but at the same time they are, right at the moment of the utterance, thrown out into the field of *regens* as text, and in turn read and reconstructed in a variety of discursive nodal points (thus, they are not confined to the box of discourses on European governance). Here, our conceptualization of language not just as a carrier of meaning, but in terms of productive discourse, becomes relevant. If an articulation was controllable, it would strictly remain within the bonds of a specific discourse. In the model shown above, however, it is always up for being reconstructed in the wide field of *regens*. This, however, leads us to the question of change.
3.3. Conceptualizing Change

As we have seen, each discursive formation embodies a number of discourses with contending constructions of an object which they assume to be the same. Furthermore, we have learnt from Laclau and Mouffe that articulations are attempts to fix a particular construction, or, to use a phrase taken again from Rose and Miller, to „inscribe“ a particular meaning into the field of regens. The inscription of such a meaning, however, can only be partial and temporary (Laclau/Mouffe 1985: 111-114; Connolly 1983: 32). Since each and every articulation is reproduced in various nodal points, it is always and constantly being transformed. These transformations may be slight and hard to grasp, but after some time, we find them large enough to speak of a change. So even if we find periods of remarkable stability in the construction of a specific object, there will be transformation going on. It is in this sense that one may, for instance, doubt the punctual character of the change in world politics around 1989/1990 (Albert 1996: 1). The ruptures, it seems, are the result of incremental changes in constructing politics that at a specific point of time were spelled out explicitly and constructed as such: as ruptures.

There are a number of observations to make at this point. A first one is that according to the argument above, change is partly an effect of the inherent tension between articulations as the attempt to fix a certain meaning and the wider field of regens with its proliferation of contesting constructions. This tension is no malice to be overcome. Rather it is „a powerful architectonic tension between the universal and totalizing claims of sovereign judicial discourse [the articulations] and the individualizing, differentiating, technologizing practices of power/knowledge [regens]“ (Dillon 1995: 339; my emphasis). But this does also mean that change is not brought about by the intention of a rational actor. Rather, change is the result of this tension and the uncontrollability of any articulation. As James Ferguson has observed in his study on development in Lesotho: „As one cog in the ‘machine’, the planning apparatus is not the ‘source’ of whatever structural change may come about, but only one among a number of links [or nodal points] in the mechanism that produces them“ (Ferguson 1990: 275).

There are two possibilities why a specific subject position may be more likely to be able to inscribe a specific meaning than others. For one, there are some subject positions which are discursively ascribed a certain societal role to. The very notion of „authorities“ as it is employed by Rose and Miller is such a role. But the source of power to inscribe a specific meaning does not stem from the authority or school as a subject itself, but in the discourse ascribing such roles. Accordingly, these authorities are not by themselves able to take control of the meaning of their articulations. Second, in the case of strong resistances to attempts of inscription (either because there is no widely accepted construction of an authoritative role or because there has already been a significant amount of change in a number of reproductions of a current hegemonical construction), I suggest that those subject positions are more likely to be able to inscribe their particular constructions that possess the highest translatability towards
the old inscription and/or the most alternative constructions at a given time. The notion of translatability has been introduced by Rose and Miller to explain the inscription of a neoliberal construction of the economy under the Thatcher government after decades of Keynesian policies: „A rhetoric of the nation, the family, the traditional greatness of Britain, the virtues of law and order, and the respect for tradition provides a translatability between neo-liberalism and traditional right wing values“ (Rose/Miller 1992: 199). What we can see from this exemplary case is that translatability can be „measured“ in terms of the similarity of constructions in various discursive nodal points.

This leads to a final remark about change in general: A rupture in one discourse will always have effects on changes in other discourses with which it is linked up in nodal points. However, within a specific discourse, it is unlikely that there is such a rupture in all of the discourses the rationalities refer to. Thus, in any historical change we might observe, there will always be continuities as well as discontinuities. The field of regens, we might conclude, is unlike the structuralists’ model of a crystal grid. Instead, one might rather compare it to a slowly moving glacier in which, time and again, ruptures appear and fade again.9

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Up to this point, the discussion has been rather theoretical, abstract, philosophical, and maybe even esoteric to some. I would argue, however, that the model of discursive nodal points might provide one possible answer to the questions constructivist and poststructuralist approaches are faced with from the quarters of realist social science, especially in International Relations.10 The calls for a coherent research design (Keohane 1988: 392) or the provision of a causal story (Yee 1996) may not be satisfied, but at least, it seems to me, the model is a far push into such a direction as far as it is possible within constructivist thought as introduced at the beginning of this paper. Furthermore, such an approach to governance as outlined above yields a number of very practical research questions, some of which will be addressed in the next section which deals with British policies towards European integration: How is the debate underlying these policies structured? To which other discourses are the constructions of European governance present in this debate linked? Does such an approach offer a plausible alternative to traditional narratives, especially with respect to change? And does it offer some useful constructions for dealing with the present situation, for instance with respect to the current Intergovernmental Conference?

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9 The metaphor of a glacier was suggested to me by Beate Kohler-Koch.
10 Realist is meant in the philosophical sense of the term here, not in its IR meaning.
4. Observing the British Debate on European Integration\textsuperscript{11}

4.1. "Bye Bye Europe. Hello Big Wide World": Traditional Narratives of British Policy Towards European Integration\textsuperscript{12}

The traditional narrative of British policy towards European integration has been dominated by the finding that Britain has at least been hesitant to join the integration process, if not overtly anti-European. It may admit that there have been several stances towards European integration causing some conflict on this issue, for instance between the Treasury and Board of Trade on the one hand, and the Foreign Office on the other, as described by Stephen George (S. George 1990: 17-18, 209). Having said so, however, George continues to equate a particular governmental perspective with "the British perspective". Although, in a more recent article, he suggests, in analyzing Margaret Thatcher's Bruges speech, that this perspective cannot be characterized as "anti-European" (George 1996), in 1990 at least, he characterized Britain as an "awkward partner" in European integration, the awkwardness being a result from pragmatism, history, and economic interests (S. George 1990: 15, 152, 165, 176, \textit{et passim}).

For Roy Denman, the history of British policy towards Europe is a history of "missed chances" (Denman 1996). In his view, British politicians have been characterized by a "mix of defiant ignorance and self-assertive insularity" that made them fail "to recognize change" (Denman 1996: 291). This mix, in turn, is said to be the result of various historical and cultural factors: the legacy of the Empire, the status of a victor after World War II, and, partly following from this, an overestimation of British political institutions (Denman 1996: 287-294). Angelika Volle, in one of the most important German works on this topic, sees a change of the U.K. from being a "hesitant outsider" to co-operating as a "pragmatic partner" (Volle 1989: iii). However, her assessment is that this was not the result of a deep change in Britain's view of Europe, but rather part of a changing strategy (Volle 1989: 15, 18). British European policy, writes Volle, is shaped by history and geography (Volle 1989: 60), or what might be called the "island factor".

Sean Greenwood is among those pointing towards some variation in European policy shortly after World War II, when the Labour government, and especially its Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin, developed the idea of a European "third force" (Greenwood 1992: 7, 11; 1993; Larres 1993), a concept quite similar to the one followed by various politicians in Germany at about the same time (Diez 1995: 55-59). But a "series of interlocking difficulties" was,

\textsuperscript{11} This section draws on empirical material gathered by the author during his work on the aforementioned research project (see footnote 5 above). The research is currently continued within a connected dissertation project. I am indebted to the British Council for granting me a Chevening scholarship to complete my dissertation research at the University of Sussex's Sussex European Institute.

\textsuperscript{12} The quote is from Gorman (1996).
according to Greenwood, responsible for the short lives of these propositions (Greenwood 1992: 12-13). A quite similar story is told by John Young in his overview of "Britain and the European Unity" (Young 1993).

The following figure summarizes the growing literature on this issue. It proposes three different categories of explanations as they have been argued in the traditional narratives, often drawing on more than of them simultaneously: (1) a cognitive explanation, referring to misinterpretations of reality following from historical experience; (2) a cultural explanation, referring to a mix of geography and history with special reference to certain cultural traditions and political institutions; (3) a material explanation, drawing on (economic) interest as the driving force behind British foreign policy.

Apart from these country studies, there are various studies investigating party positions towards European policy. For a long time, the Labour Party has been their major object of analysis (see, for instance, Newman 1983 and Robins 1979); recently, the Conservative Party has gained more interest (recent publications include Shipley 1995). But this work, too, most often does not abandon the pro-/anti-Europe-dichotomy. Another fundamental problem with it is that although it is widely accepted that the cleavage on European integration runs across party divisions (see, for instance; Dearlove/Saunders 1991: 69), parties are attributed the status of central actors again. Thus, one finds dominant party factions shifting from pro- to anti-Europeanism and vice versa (see, for instance Paterson/Henson 1995: 54). Much of the current hope of continental European politicians that there will be a change in British policy in the near future is based on the assessment that within such a dichotomy, the current Labour party is predominantly a „Party of Europe“ (ibid.).

![Diagram](image)

*Fig. 3: Traditional explanations for a suggested British Anti-Europeanism*
Why is this traditional narrative problematic from the point of view of this paper? In the following, I will address three themes that, in taking a poststructuralist position as I have developed it, one may read in a very different fashion. First, instead of there being a single British anti-European attitude, such an alternative reading proposes that there is always a multitude of images of European governance produced in a variety of discursive nodal points. Second, the debate about whether there was any change in the early 1960s and if so, to what extent British policy did change, gets a new twist if we take into account that discursive transformations are always characterized by continuity as well as discontinuity. And third, the current hope of continental European leaders does not fit into the observations being suggested here.¹³

4.2. Against the Pro-/Anti-European Dichotomy

The problem of equating „the“ British attitude towards European integration with anti-Europeanism is twofold. First, I have argued that European governance is a contested concept. To say that someone is „anti-European“ is to assume that one knows what it actually is to be „European“, and thus, what „European integration“ and „Europe“ mean. According to the discursive approach developed above, such a knowledge is always a construction and contestable. The standard procedure behind the characterization of Britain as anti-European is to start from a reading of Europe as a federal state in spe, and to equate this vision with European governance per se.

Second, the alleged British anti-Europeanism collides with the view that the meaning of a specific term can never be completely fixed, not even within a national (or party) framework. Therefore, such a debate as the one over Europe (and I would argue that there has been and is much more of such a debate in Britain than in Germany or France), might rather be conceptualized as a discursive formation consisting of a multitude of discourses, each one connected with various other discourses in a field of regens. From such a perspective, one might observe a variety of subject positions with respect to European governance in this debate. They can be read as variations of the ideal type images of European governance presented above. One might observe seven of these variations which are shortly characterized below by taking specific examples from the British debate:

aa - (liberal-democratic) Federal State: This image fits most neatly into the Federal State ideal type introduced above. It has been followed by the Liberal (Democratic) Party

¹³ Above, I have already introduced the work of Henrik Larsen as an approach to the British debate on European integration that is similar to the one developed in this paper. However, there are also some differences, one of which is the tendency within Larsen’s paper to reify the pro-/anti-Europe dichotomy when he divides the discursive formation (defined in a temporal way by Larsen) into a dominant and an antagonistic discourse (Larsen 1997: 99-105), although the dominant discourse, from Larsen’s point of view, is not simply anti-European but pragmatist and interest-based (ibid.: 99).
throughout the post-war period. The political rationalities brought up by the Liberal MP Clement Davies during the House of Commons debate over the European Coal and Steel Community, for instance, refer to economic as well as political gains through integration, and he concluded that the steps taken by the government are far too modest (Hansard 1955: 900). In the 1960s, Lord Gladwyn asked for „new methods“ for European Unity, and his assessment was that a European Government, President and Parliament are not about to come in the near future (Gladwyn 1966: 13f). At the same time, however, he suggested „to have the equivalent of the Brussels Commission for the foreign, political and defence fields“ and „to adopt the system of qualified majority voting in certain limited spheres“ as a preliminary step (Gladwyn 1966: 15). The Liberal Democratic Party's European election manifesto of 1994 was dominated by the call for giving more powers to the European Parliament: "Liberal Democrats want a democratic Europe, in which key decisions are taken in full sight of its people and their representatives." (Liberal Democrats 1994: 26) Although there is ample reference to the objective of decentralizing Europe, we can also read that most of the policy fields that usually are regarded as central for the modern nation-state reappear as tasks to be taken care of at the European level: "The European institutions should exercise power only over policies which cannot effectively be dealt with at local, regional or national level [this is the decentralising move; td] - foreign and security policy, trade and currencies, trans-European competition, cross-boundary pollution, consumer protection in the single market, and so on [this being the centralising move; td]." (Liberal Democrats 1994: 26) But the liberal-democratic Federal State image has also been prominent in certain quarters of the Tories and Labour. A shift of identity from being British to being European, as envisaged by the Conservative Party delegate Peter Price (Conservative Party 1971: 28), the call for economic and monetary union and a European parliament democracy as spelled out by Anthony Speaight, a delegate from the Federation of Conservative Students (Conservative Party 1971: 32), and the necessity of supranational (as a step towards world) regulation „to preserve peace“ as conceptualized by the Labour MP A. Woodburn during the 1961 debate on accession (Hansard 1961: 1515) are all indications of such an image.

ab - (socialist) Federal State: As the liberal-democratic Federal State, this image relies on a concept of unity and basic identity. However, in opposition to image (aa), there is another prerequisite for legitimate governance in this case: the production of welfare by socialist means. This image played quite an important role in the debates over British accession to the EEC around 1970. At the Labour Party's annual convention in Brighton in 1969, the MP Bob Edwards pointed towards his observation that "[t]here is more social ownership without a Labour Government than there is in Britain" - which, at that time, was governed by Wilson's first Labour administration. Edwards continued that therein lies the chance to build "a new civilisation, giving our young people a majestic aim - a united Europe and eventually a socialist Europe" (Labour Party 1969: 313). Central features of this socialist Europe were economic planning „to face up to the challenge of the multi-national companies“, but also „to face up to
the bureaucracy in the Common Market infrastructure", as the Labour delegate Martin Prestidge insisted (Labour Party 1972: 197), and the development of a "bloc that will act as a bridge between the two great powers" (Edwards, Labour Party 1969: 313). As in the case of the liberal-democratic Federal State-image, European integration in this view is about state-building, however with another stage added, that of socialism.

**ba - Intergovernmental Co-operation of Nation-States:** For the Conservative MP Derek Walker-Smith, during the debates on British accession to the EEC at the 1969 party convention, there were other, "less tangible things" beyond material well-being that one should keep in mind when approaching the question of European integration: "What are these other less tangible things?" asked Walker-Smith, and immediately answered: "They are not just arid and academic things - our sovereignty, our institutions, our way of life. They are real things, deeply felt and instinctively understood." (Conservative Party 1969: 84). Questions of national identity and parliamentary democracy within the nation state are central to this image. Labour Party's former MP Emanuel Shinwell argued: "I want [...] to engage in discussion, technologically, scientifically, culturally with every country with whom we engage in co-operation. [...] but] I want this country to preserve a measure of independence [...]" (Labour Party 1969: 314) From this perspective, even the stage of integration around 1970 was going too far, and integration can only mean intense co-operation. More recently, this position has been taken by the "Bastards" within the Conservative Party (Gorman 1993). In a recent policy paper, eight Conservative MPs argued that the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty were "in opposition to the democratic imperative" and that the current Intergovernmental Conference should result in a "substantial repatriation of decision-making" (Body et al. 1996).

**bb - Intergovernmental Co-operation of Socialist States:** In this image, the rationalities of legitimate governance are the same as in the image of a socialist Federal State, however this time referring to the national level. Although sharing a lot of similarities with the Intergovernmental Co-operation of Nation-States, this image refers to slightly different political rationalities. Central to it, as the Labour delegate Jack Jones has put it, "is the question of our own right to plan our own economy" (Labour Party 1969: 308). His colleague Richard Wright added: "The very nature of the Treaty of Rome and those elements in it that subject the right of an independent Government to determine on public ownership, undermine all those issues which we hold dear in this Movement." (Labour Party 1971: 136) Clearly, the planning is based upon a conception of "us", and in that respect this image follows the rationalities that have been observed in connection with image (ba). However, it is not the national identity which most important for legitimacy in this image, but the right of economic planning. Again, the furthest integration can go, seen from this perspective, is intensive co-operation.

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14 I am using this shorthand for "The National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations"; references appear under the full name in the bibliography.
**bc - Free Trade Area:** I am introducing the image of a Free Trade Area as a subtype because although it is often hard to distinguish between adherents of such an image and those of image (ba), the Free Trade Area is adding to the latter a strong focus on economics, resulting in a call for the reduction of tariff barriers within the area. It was particularly prominent in the 1950s, when Macmillan proposed the creation of "a mutual free trade area [comprising] the Customs union, that is the six countries as one unit, together with such other countries, including ourselves, as thought fit to join" (Hansard 1956: 39). The rationale behind this proposal was, according to Macmillan, not to get British products into a disadvantage, and to achieve "that such arrangements as those of the Messina Powers, which are intended to unite Europe, do not have the effect of actually dividing it further." (Hansard 1956: 38) What is legitimized here through economic gains is not governance on the European level, but rather the British government's action in foreign policy. However, this focus on economic output will become highly relevant in the reading of the change in the 1960s proposed in section 4.4.

**ca - Economic Community:** A quote from Nicholas Ridley's review of his work with Margaret Thatcher, the 1991 book "My Style of Government", provides a good example for this image: "It is worth pointing out [...] that we have attained a far higher proportion of our objectives than our continental friends have of theirs. Europe nearly is a single market now; it is a market fairly open to the outside world, although with too many notable exceptions; and fair competition is being enforced by the Commission with welcome vigour. The areas of substance where decisions are imposed in member states by majority voting are, in the main, those where it is necessary for the financing of the Community and for the enforcement of fair trading in all its manifestations." (Ridley 1991: 137) This statement clearly indicates that in the image of a European Community - and in distinction to the Free Trade Area - , it is acceptable (and even desirable) to give up a member state's sovereignty to govern its own economic system and to follow decisions made by a supranational authority even if they run against one's own preferences. At the same time, Ridley clearly indicates that the willingness to do so is restricted to what is defined as purely economic affairs and issues that follow from them. Thus, for Ridley, the 1991 stage of European integration was quite sufficient, although it had some minor defects. Recent speeches made by Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind during his tour through continental capitals follow the same political rationalities: "In some areas supranational integration is beneficial for Europe. We need it, for example, to uphold the common commercial policy, the structural and cohesion programmes, and in some policies in the fields of environment and transport. We need it to sustain the single market, the competition and state aids regimes, the common agricultural and fisheries policies. [...] That must include an effective Commission and a strong, impartial court to ensure that legislation is implemented properly and fairly." (Rifkind 1997).

**cb - Social Democratic Economic Community:** This subtype is a variation of the image of an Economic Community. It generally agrees with the rules of the latter; however, it draws a different distinction between politics and the economy. Especially, governance on the
European level, even if it is restricted to economic matters, cannot be legitimate if it does not count in social rights and security. In a contribution to a volume on socialist visions of Europe, former party leader Neil Kinnock made the case for such an Economic Community: Although concentrating exclusively on economic issues, he insisted that "the rhetoric of the single market has assumed that it is an end in itself. It is not, it cannot be." (Kinnock 1989: 4). But this does not mean that, as in the Federal State image, the single market was just a step towards a United States of Europe. Rather, Kinnock's foremost concern is the addition of a "social dimension" to the market (Kinnock 1989: 7), redefining the border between politics and the economy, but not abolishing it.

4.3. Situating the Images in the Field of Regens

To answer the question of how these images are (re)constructed, the model of discursive nodal points suggests that we observe the linkages to other discourses that the rationalities employed in each of these images refer to. I would propose six discursive formations running through the respective nodal points. Their objects are "progress", "nature", "knowledge", "economy", "politics", and "society". Each of these objects corresponds to a set of rationalities. In most discourses, some of these rationalities provide answers to the question of the status of human beings. Others distribute certain qualities to the objects which are conditions of their appearance. Furthermore, there is always a threat that is constructed, providing the negation against which the object appears. For instance, in the case of the discursive formation constructing "progress", progress may be counterposed to the threat of stasis, whereas in other discourses tradition may be counterposed to a threat of uncontrolled progress. In either case, the rationalities address questions about the nature of history and about the relationship of human beings and history. In answering these questions, they do not only render a certain image of progress/tradition possible, but do also provide criteria according to which human beings may or may not act upon history.

In such a wide field of regens consisting of these discourses, the Federal State image is linked to an automatic and technological conceptualization of "progress". It is automatic in the sense that there is an inherent teleology in the world to ever wider units (Peter Smithers, Hansard 1961: 1555; Conservative Party 1970: 59). However, this automatism, paradoxically, is brought about by human inventiveness and the continuous improvement of technology (Conservative Party 1971: 32; Heath 1970: 48). Technological progress precedes political progress, and the latter is bound to follow (A. Woodburn, Hansard 1961: 1523). Both of these constructs of progress have links to the other discourses important in this nodal point: The idea of increasing size corresponds to the idea of changeable societies, where the nation-state is only a specific development in a specific historical context, a step towards "the new giant states", as Peter Smithers noted during the 1961 accession debate (Hansard 1961: 1556). The central element of societies is the individual person, not a specific group: the identity of the
community the individual belongs to might change, and will change in course of time (see Radice 1992: 19, 162). Increasing size is also an important role in the construction of an economy in which economies of scale are central to achieve societal welfare and stability (Radice 1992: 134n; Brown 1971: 211; Heath 1970: 12). Freedom of trade is another rationality of the discourse constructing „economy“, although not an unconditional one. Stability and the comparative advantage of the respective state take up a more important status, and override freedom of trade if conceptualized as being threatened (Heath 1970: 18, 39n). The idea of human beings as creators of progress is mirrored in the idea of politics as a general and basic mechanism of control (see Radice 1992: 130), as well as in a concept of nature in which humans are on the one hand a threat to, but on the other hand also rescuers of the environment, controlling each other's actions (Conservative Party 1971: 32). This control, referring back to the argument of size, can only be conducted on a European level (Radice 1992: 134). Finally, knowledge is also conceptualized as ever progressing, being the basis for human development in general (Heath 1970: 48).

The Socialist Federal State image shares the idea of a politics of control and an economy controlled even more intensely. However, its conceptualizations of progress and society differ from the ones connected to the liberal-democratic Federal State image. Progress becomes a man-made revolutionary process, in which the creation of a "new civilisation" plays a central role (Labour Party 1969: 313, see above). And beyond any changes in the development of nations, there is a constant factor of identity, which is not located within the individual, but within class (Labour Party 1971: 120; 1972: 201n). If this does not seem surprising at all, it is interesting to note the differences to the image of an Intergovernmental Co-operation of Socialist States. Here, progress still has some revolutionary features, but it is much more equated with economic growth and welfare as achievements of human action (see, especially, Benn 1965, 1979). Progress is not linked to any idea of size. Instead, if we look into the discourse on society, the latter is constructed as a duality of world-wide and local identity. The central rationality is that people decide about themselves, and the best way to do so is on some intermediate level, within the framework of the nation state (Shore 1971: 72n; Labour Party 1969: 311; Benn 1965: 64, 69). Corresponding to this, environmental action is not seen to be necessarily taken on a European scale, as it is in a Federal State image. The nation state is the legitimate political organization of responsible human beings, and thus perfectly fit to handle environmental issues (Labour Party 1971: 128n). Given the idea of self-determination, this is even desirable. Within the Intergovernmental Co-operation of Socialist States image, the whole idea of politics is confined to such a national basis, on which the sovereignty to plan and control as well as the idea of responsibility of politicians is based (Labour Party 1971: 142). Knowledge is necessary for such planning and controlling. It needs to be fact-oriented, but at the same time it is bound up with the purposes set up by politics (Shore 1971: 72; Benn 1965: 52).
There is no strong reference to progress in connection with the image of Intergovernmental Co-operation of Nation-States. Instead, there is a stress on historical legacies and traditions, to the „special and separate position which time and the foil of our forefathers have built up for us“ (Derek Walker-Smith, Hansard 1961: 1512). Technological progress cannot measure up to this „native genius of our forefathers (ibid.: 1513). Basic features of human action are seen as imposed „by geography and by inescapable circumstances“ (ibid.: 1510). „Nature“, thus, is more than the environment-as-object as which it is constructed in other nodal points. It is the setting in which human action is possible and upon which it is dependent. Politics is constructed as the expression of a national self, either in the personality of the Queen (Conservative Party 1970: 58), or in the institutions of democracy and Parliamentary Sovereignty (Walker-Smith, Hansard 1961: 1508). In line with the conceptualization of nature, it is a practice to secure the nation’s well-being in an inter-national environment, which free trade cannot achieve (Viscount Hinchingbrooke, Hansard 1961: 1538, 1544; Jennie Lee, Hansard 1961: 1551). The national community, defined along territorial boundaries, developed in opposition to the EU, and conscious of its history, is a predominant object (Conservative Party 1969: 84, 1970: 58).

In the Free Trade Area image, politics is constructed as a mixture of civitas and power politics, following a clear distinction of inside (the national space of citizens) and outside (the international space of states). Clear institutional structures and responsibility, but also a general interest-orientation are the basic rules of this conceptualization of politics (Rusell, Hansard 1961: 1569; Cash 1991; Jay 1980). But although politics in principle takes up a predominant position over the economy, the latter, defined as an inter-national market on a (theoretically) global scale, plays a much more important role than in the image of the Intergovernmental Co-operation of Nation States. It is conceptualized as consumer-oriented and principally self-governed by market competition (Cash 1991; Jay 1980). Society is, although nationally defined, always situated within an international context: Churchill’s ”Three Circles“ (Churchill 1950: 417n; Hansard 1956: 35; Jay 1980: 425) and/or a world-wide division of labour (Jay 1980: 354). Whereas the Intergovernmental Co-operation of Nation-States stressed tradition over progress, in the FTA image change is read as world development without any teleology and without the possibility for human beings to influence it. In German, an appropriate characterization for such a concept would be Weltenlauf, to which humans have to submit and make the best out of it (see Jay 1980: 348). Finally, we find strong references to a rational-pragmatist conceptualization of knowledge, that situates rationality against faith and places the empirical fact at the centre of knowledge (Hansard 1955: 925; Jay 1980: 425, 427, 497-499).

The discourses connected with the image of an Economic Community overlap broadly with the Free Trade Area’s discursive nodal point: There is a coexistence of national and international society (Ridley 1991: 136; Conservative Party 1971: 42); there is the mixture of civitas and interest-based power politics (Tugendhat 1986: 83, 229; Ridley 1991: 139n; Healey 1989: 459); there is a stress on ”genuine free trade“ building upon competition between
individuals (Callaghan 1987: 305; Ridley 1991: 136; Thatcher 1993: 62, 739); and there is a strong concept of pragmatism and practicability, together with an opposition towards "theology" (Healey 1989: 329; Callaghan 1987: 315; Tugendhat 1986: 56). However, there is a major difference between these two nodal point in the conceptualization of progress. The image of an Economic Community is clearly linked to the idea of a continuous, but also plannable economic and scientific growth (Ridley 1991: 146; Conservative Party 1971: 43; Kinnock 1989: 3; Callaghan 1987: 328). This idea of growth figures prominently in stressing economies of scale within the discourse on economy, and research & development within the discourse on knowledge (Benn 1979: 94; Conservative Party 1969: 90, 1971: 28; Labour Party 1971: 130; Macmillan, Hansard 1961: 1484n), but its influence also has an effect on the rules according to which the political and the economy are differentiated, since the state, from this perspective, is no longer able to govern the growing economy (Healey 1989: 207; Healey 1990: 70; Tugendhat 1986: 83). Thus, there is a clear distinction that is drawn between the economy on the one hand, where the market is the main responsible force, governed only to the extent that its functioning is guaranteed, and the political sphere. There is a direct link to the political rationalities of the Economic Community as they have been developed in sections 2.2. and 4.2. The distinction between the realm of politics and that of the economy is blurred again in the image of the Social Democratic Economic Community. Although it is generally upheld, politics is now given stronger responsibility for the development of welfare, serving as an instrument of control and correction (Kinnock 1989: 4). Furthermore, the discursive construction of nature as a fundamental basis for human action figures more prominently in this nodal point as a fundamental basis for human action, and is now to be taken into account in any pragmatic decision-making (Kinnock 1989: 6).

Besides their differences, there are several continuities between the images of legitimate European governance from such a reading of the field of regens. To start with our first discursive formation, most of these images are connected to a positive conceptualization of "progress", although they differ in the status attributed to the individual human in being part of it. The two exceptional cases are the Free Trade Area, where instead of progress, the object constructed is change without a clear direction, and the Intergovernmental Co-Operation of Nation-States, where progress is rather seen as a threat to responsibilities imposed by history. A kind of "negative continuity" is the absence of references to "nature" in most nodal points. However, if nature is conceptualized as the environment on which human beings are dependent but which they also can control and preserve, this link is often quite a strong one. One should add, though, that such a link begins to appear only in the 1970s, together with a much more technologically oriented concept of knowledge. The applicability of knowledge and its effects on societal, and especially welfare development then became central rationalities to adhere to. There is a strong similarity in the construction of "knowledge" between Free Trade Area and Economic Community, whereas neither the Federal State (in both variants) nor the
Intergovernmental Co-operation of Nation States is constructed with a similarly strong weight on rationality.

There are two predominant continuities in conceptualizing the economy, which basically run along the well-known divide of market liberalism versus socialist planning. A more interesting observation can be made when looking at the discourses on politics. There, we have for one a conceptualization of politics as controlling and planning (central features of the discursive nodal point of the Federal State images and the Intergovernmental Co-operation of Socialist States), whereas in the Free Trade Area and Economic Community images, politics is rather about gaining and exercising influence on the outside, and representative-democratic institutions to guarantee citizens' participation in the inside. Opposed to both constructs, politics in the image of Intergovernmental Co-operation of Nation-States is much more about national identity, and thus dominated by the respective discourse on society giving priority to the nation over the independent human being.

In the following two subsections, I will put this analysis into historical perspective and investigate two concrete instances of the debate on which the approach developed in this paper might offer interesting alternative perspectives.

### 4.4. Change Or No Change? The First Application of 1961

When surveying the debates in the House of Commons in the 1950s, one finds a remarkable consensus on foreign policy issues. Within this consensus, there were divergences as to what European integration should be about, but the whole process of integration was conceptualized with Britain not participating in it. Within Churchill's "three circles", Europe figured least prominent with respect to Britain's active involvement. Britain was conceptualized "as the distant sponsor of integration rather than an active participant" (Greenwood 1993: 68). When the six signed the Treaties of Rome, Britain stayed absent as it had done when the ECSC had been set up in Paris. Instead, in November 1959, Britain was the decisive force behind the agreement establishing the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), which, after initial plans to set up such a FTA including the six had failed, consisted of European countries that were not included in the EEC. But even a month before, in October 1959, the cabinet under Prime Minister Harold Macmillan had formed a committee in order to develop and assess possibilities for closer co-operation with the EEC. Hardly a year later, the cabinet decided to take further steps for rapprochement, and after a ministerial tour through various Commonwealth member states, it agreed on an application for accession in July 1961.\footnote{This narrative of the events around 1960 is following Young 1993: 67-76.}

These events have been intensively studied by various scholars (see, for instance, Camps 1964; Pfaltzgraff 1969; Kitzinger 1973). One of the issues the literature has disagreed upon is
the question of change. Has the policy towards European integration changed in these years, and if so, to what extent? In his memoirs, Harold Macmillan describes the decision to apply for EEC membership as "one of those radical and almost revolutionary steps in policy" (Macmillan 1973: 9). This self-assessment is in agreement with some of the academic literature. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, for instance, argues that in the period from 1957 to 1961, British policy towards European integration "had undergone a major change" (Pfaltzgraff 1969: 20). Others, however, have stressed the continuity behind the application, and conceptualized the change in direction as an instance of adjustment. Stephen George concludes that there has been a "continuity of British policy across all post-war governments" (George 1989: 6), and that to the extent that a change in policy might be observed, it was due to the "gradual official realization of the danger that the EEC might become an economic and political embarrassment to Britain" (George 1990: 32). In such a reading, British foreign policy in the 1960s still kept "with past habits and attitudes" (Bartlett 1989: 121) and was a mere adjustment to a changed international environment (Greenwood 1992: 79). The bid for accession is read as a pragmatic move to restore Britain's power in the face of "the European challenge" (Steinnes 1996).

From the perspective of this paper, this change may be reconstructed as an instance of continuity as well as discontinuity. The treaties of Rome may be read as articulations in order to fix a particular meaning of European integration, which made the British image of an FTA including the six less plausible. It was read as a forceful shift in the international setting, making the image of a Free Trade Area and its rationalities hard to hold up, given that the constructions of how international trade should be organized differed despite the general agreement about the economy as a market on the international level, and that part of the rationalities had been to prevent a European split into various blocs. In this situation, the image that was to establish itself as the new dominant image of European governance, first within the Conservative Party, was the image of the Economic Community.

But that this change from Free Trade Area to Economic Community was driven by pure pragmatism is just one possible reading of it. From the perspective of this paper, it rather seems that around 1960, the image of a Free Trade Area that had been partially and temporarily fixed during the 1950s, came under heavy contestation. The alternative image that had the greatest translatability at that time was the Economic Community. As we have seen above, both images are closely linked in their discursive connections in the respective nodal points. It is important to note, then, that rationalities that are central to the European Community image were already around in the 1950s. In 1952, for instance, the Conservative MP for Wycombe, W.W. Astor, concentrated on the increase of welfare as a rationality for European governance, and drew comparisons to the market in the United States: "If we have the same free flow of trade, if we have the same free opportunities for enterprise [...] we can achieve in United Europe that same high standard of living" (Weekly Hansard 219 [14 May 1952]: 1544). On the side of Labour it was Donald Wale who argued "that if there were a
large degree of unification in economic affairs, quite apart from defence, the standard of living in Europe [and he included Britain in that] could be raised considerably" (Weekly Hansard 219 [14 May 1952]: 1549).

These are just two examples indicating that despite the predominant consensus, there have already been dissenting voices even in the 1950s, close to the rationalities that are linked to the image of an Economic Community. They offered a nodal point in which the articulations of and during the process leading to the treaties of Rome could be reconstructed as a kind of integration that is limited to an economic sphere. The major shift then, was in the rationality determining the linkage of politics and the economy, with the economy now given a status that was more clearly separate from the sphere of politics. A second important shift is observable in the links with the discursive formation on progress. Compared to the discussions of the 1950s, the debate over the EEC in the House of Commons on August 2/3, 1991, has much more references to progress as an unavoidable feature of human existence. The economic image constructed in Macmillan's opening speech captured this increased weight. The development of a mass market and the advancement of technology through research and human inventiveness became twin rationalities (Hansard 1961: 1489). In an ever-progressing world, it was necessary for Macmillan ,,to change and adopt our methods“", ,,if we are not to be left behind and droip out of the main stream of the world's life“ (Hansard 1961: 1494).

In such a reading, pragmatism turns out to be an object that is constructed in discourses on politics which are connected to both Economic Community and Free Trade Area. However, in contrast to the traditional literature, it is not read here as the driving force of adaption in a changed international environment. Instead, the adaption is read as an instance of discursive change and translatability, in which pragmatism, along with a number of rationalities in the construction of politics and the economy, provides the continuity that is necessary for translatability, whereas shifts in the discursive formation of progress and in the relation of the discourses on politics and the economy provide for discontinuity.

4.5. A Brighter Future With Labour?

A final example is taken from the current debate. While writing this paper, the campaigns for the House of Commons elections 1997 are still under way, but anything else than a change in government from Tories to Labour after May 1st would be a surprise. Part of the argument to move the final round of the Intergovernmental Conference on the Revision of the Maastricht Treaty into the second half of 1997 was built on the reasoning that with a more ,,pro-European“ Labour government then in place, the deepening of supranational integration in the EU's second and third pillar would become easier. And although there were some irritations caused by statements of Labour politicians indicating that Labour would, for instance, not join EMU right away and unconditionally, the overall assessment that a Labour government would make further integration steps much easier is generally upheld, and recent articulations that are
read as running counter to this assessment are interpreted as surprising and probably due to short-term strategies to gain in electoral support (Süddeutsche Zeitung 1997: 3).16

From the perspective of this paper, the situation is much more ambivalent. A reading of Labour’s report on its „position in preparation for the Intergovernmental Conference 1996“ (Labour Party 1995) within this analytic framework rather suggests that although the subject position from which a cabinet under Tony Blair would operate would draw a different boundary line between the economic and the political sphere, it would nonetheless be another variant of the (social-democratic) Economic Community image and its rationalities. Thus, we read of the benefits the single market has brought and of the freedoms the market citizen has gained from that. But at the same time, it is stressed that Labour seeks „a Europe which is a union of independent member states, coming together because they share common interests, not because they want to submerge themselves in a single European government“ (ibid.: 2). And we find the insistence on a „pragmatic approach“, which, as we have seen, is much less present in the discursive nodal point of a Federal State image, neither in its liberal-democratic nor in its socialist variant (ibid.).

Throughout the report, the division between an economic and a political sphere is constantly reconstructed. The major objectives are the production of „greater wealth“ and „worthwhile employment for all“ (p. 3), the achievement of „balanced growth and better distribution of the wealth created in this vast single market“ (p. 4), the provision of - and this is an indication of how the social and environmental consequences of free marketism are included in the economic sphere - „social and workplace protection without discrimination“ (p. 4) and the protection of the environment (p. 5). For sure, contributing „to world peace and security“ and the tackling of the democratic deficit are mentioned as further objectives (p. 5-6). But already the weak position these targets are given at the end of the report’s first part indicate that these are not the major rationalities of European governance. Furthermore, they should not be tackled supranationally, but through „co-ordinated approaches“ (p. 5) and through the „accountability to national parliaments and the European Parliament“ (p. 6), respectively. In the chapter on „Institutional Change“, this is put in much clearer terms: The merging of the second and third EU pillar (Common Foreign and Security Policy [CSFP], Justice and Home Affairs [JHA]) is rejected because it touches „on some of the most sensitive areas of national policy“ (p. 9), and the powers of the European Parliament remain restricted and are far from all-embracing, with legislation on the European level concentrating on providing minimum standards (pp. 10-12). The insistence on unanimity in CFSP decision-making and on an

16 Again, there is a noteworthy difference to Henrik Larsen’s assessment. Since he works within the dichotomy of dominant/antagonistic discourse, he has to situate Labour somewhere between these two poles, but he seems to see Labour on the way towards a federal state image, arguing that there is a change within Labour from advocating „socialism in one country“ to „social democracy in one continent“ (Larsen 1997: 106n). In doing so, he shares the view of many continental politicians.
intergovernmental approach to JHA underline that the report follows the rationalities of the Economic Community.

From this perspective, the policies advocated by Labour's 1997 Election manifesto are no tactical drawback to gain electoral support. Rather, they continue the reconstruction of the social-democratic Economic Community image within dominant party fractions since the mid-1980s. Thus, while predictions of the future development of European integration, given the possibility of new articulations and their reproduction in various nodal points, are hard to make it seems most likely that the expected change in British government will make social and environmental policies on the EU level easier, but that there will be hardly any change in matters of the second and third pillar. The subject position the Labour report is written from shows much more continuities vis-à-vis the approach taken in the 1996 White Paper (British Government 1996) than discontinuities. At least from this point of observation, the hope displayed by German politicians seems misplaced.

5. Discourse Matters

The discussion of the British debate over European integration indicates into which directions an approach such as the one developed above would lead. Although the observations that I have made are rather preliminary, it seems that the concept of discursive nodal points is fruitful in the sense that it provides plausible alternative readings of current affairs as well as past developments. In these readings, economic interests, for instance, are not treated as a given, but are part of a discursively constructed subject position. Thus, although the concept of discursive nodal points might be universally employed, its universality is a formal rather than a material one: it leaves room for various conceptualizations of human agency, and for differences between various contexts. Its stress on the variety of positions within the field of regens allows for a problematization of arguments referring to „natural“ developments and identities of whatever kind. This, it seems to me, is an important move away from the dominant structure of the current debate constantly reproducing identities as „pro-“ or „anti-European“, or as the „better“ or „worse Europeans“. The problematization of any such identity-creating arguments should lead to a more searching attitude within the process of intergovernmental treaty revisions. And although this paper might be read as a critique mainly of the policies of continental Europeans vis-à-vis their British colleagues, such a critique might well apply also to the latter. Furthermore, it has to be stressed that even from an epistemological-constructivist position, a critique of images such as the Economic Community, seems possible. It would focus on the underlying constructions that are present (and absent) in such a discursive nodal point and point towards the alternatives that are excluded within that as
well as to the continuities of the construction of „threat“ it shares with the state-oriented images (see Diez 1997b).

Such a constructivist approach might also be fruitfully applied, for instance, in another observation of the development towards the Single Market. For one, the initiative taken by the British government in the mid-80s in favor of the Single Market seems to correspond to the Economic Community image as a classical case. But second, the way the Single Market was read from other discursive nodal points as just another step to a United States of Europe might be a nice instance of the uncontrollability of articulations in the field of regens. Another interesting issue would be the Labour policy towards European integration in the 1970s and early 1980s. It seems that the shifting construction of „progress“ and „knowledge“ was very influential in moving subject positions from the Economic Community to Intergovernmental Co-operation.

The suggested approach promises at least some noteworthy observations on these issues. It might not be able to contest traditional narratives of them on the level supremacy in terms of mirroring the reality. It might, however, have a „therapeutic impact“ on the self-conscious and all-embracing explanations offered in much other work (Albert 1994), and offer observations that provide new perspectives for policy-makers and analysts alike.

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