Panel: The European Union as an international actor

European Community Studies Association
Sixth Biennial International Conference
Pittsburgh,
2-5 June 1999

Developing capabilities reducing expectations: The rebirth of civilian power Europe?

FIRST DRAFT: NOT FOR CITATION OR QUOTATION WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR

Dr. Richard G. Whitman
Centre for the Study of Democracy
University of Westminster
100 Park Village East
London
NW1 3SR

Tel. (0171) 468 2257
Fax. (0171) 911 5164
email: whitmar@westminster.ac.uk

Introduction

The capability-expectations gap, advanced by Christopher Hill in 1993 as a starting-point from which to conceptualise Europe's international role, brought into sharp focus both the contemporary European Community (EC) art-of-the-state and the state-of-the-art in the study of the EC's world role.[1] The capabilities-expectations gap delineated two gaps; first, the gap between the capabilities of the Union and the expectations made of it; second, a gap between the expectation that we should have the ability to theorise about the EC and our capability to do so.

In the period between the birth of the capability-expectations thesis and the present date the European Community has transformed itself into the European Union (EU).[2] Furthermore, in the most pressing problem to confront the international relations of Europe - the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, this Union has manifestly failed to achieve Hill's definition of an effective international actor – 'in terms both of its capacity to produce collective decisions and its impact on events'.[3]

The conflict in the territories of the former Yugoslavia has demonstrated both the inability of the Union to cope with a conflict of such magnitude through its own efforts and problems of decision-making in a system in which the Member States are a substantive source of influence. The EU can take little comfort from its involvement in the region and has been a secondary actor in the attempts at conflict resolution since the UN involvement at the end of 1991. A paradox still exists in which the EU is the political actor of greatest significance in Europe yet is effectively marginalised in the resolution or the management of the conflict. The Yugoslav conflicts have proved a salutary lesson in the development of the international

2

identity of the Union and significantly closed the gap between the realisation of the capabilities of the Union and expectations made of it.

The Union's foreign economic policy is a marked contrast to the failure of the Union to fully engage with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. In its foreign economic policy the EU has been at the centre of a re-casting of notions of both capabilities and expectations in the context of the world political economy. As Michael Smith noted contemporaneously to Hill, and as subsequent events have borne out;

'The 'EU model' and the 'EU method' thus provide a source of important questions about foreign economic policy in the 1990s, both in terms of the nature and role of the Union itself and in terms of its impact on the emerging global order.'[4]

The Gap I

The capability-expectations gap (CEG) has become a familiar refrain in discussions on the EU's international role. The CEG thesis has generated case-study testing and inspired a volume analysing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).[5] Those seeking to theorise the international role of the EU have digested the need to 'Mind the Gap'.

Hill has recently restated his original thesis, albeit in an amended form (CEG II).[6] In some respects Hill has sought to strengthen his original thesis but he has also departed from a number of his original assertions.

The thrust of the CEG thesis was the need to conceptualise the current status of the international role of the Union and to ascertain the extent of the *actorness* of the Union. Hill asserted in 1993 that his main argument was that the capabilities of the

(then) EC had been 'talked-up' and that the expectations of third parties of what the EC could do were at variance with reality.[7] He maintained that two concepts that had been developed for an understanding of the EC's international role were of particular utility – *actorness* and *presence*.

Functions in the international system

Hill clearly had in mind his own conception of the EC's international role by delineating the functions of the EC in the international system before making a decision about the 'form' of the EC. Hill viewed the EC's functions as four-fold:

- the stabilizing of western Europe;
- managing world trade;
- principal voice of the developed world in relations with the South;
- providing a second western voice in international diplomacy.[8]

Hill also identified six functions that the EC might perform in the future and these formed the basis of the 'expectations' from which Hill identified a gap with capabilities:

- a replacement for the USSR in the global balance of power;
- regional pacifier;
- global intervenor;
- mediator of conflicts;
- bridge between rich and poor.
- joint supervisor of the world economy[9]

Expectations

Hill, in CEG II, retains the above as tenable candidates for EU functions. However the assertion in CEG II is that expectations of the EU have been lowered. However, simultaneously Hill has widened the *expectants* to include also those inside the Union.[10] CEG II details the internal and external expectants to a degree that did not

take place in CEG and this concept is now much more operationalised and much more amenable to application in empirical work.

Capabilities

After identifying the expectations in CEG Hill moved on to clarify what he understood by capabilities: the *ability to agree*, the EC's *resources*, and the *instruments* at its disposal. In the original CEG article these were the least developed elements of his thesis but these have been developed at length in CEG II.

In CEG II capabilities have been re-vamped as *resources, instruments*, and *cohesiveness*. Resources are broken down into fundamental resources (population, GDP, geographic and geo-political space), military capability, and financial resources (considered as funding at the disposal of the CFSP). Instruments are those available through the CFSP (Joint Actions, Common Positions), 'consistency' between development, external relations and CFSP policy areas, foreign aid, and sanctions. Cohesiveness is the cohesiveness of the EU in all of its external policies and across decision-making processes. The element of capabilities that was given devoted attention in CEG and CEG II was the defence capability of the Union. In focusing on this capability Hill's view was that a European military capability is a *sine qua non* of actorness.

Ultimately Hill rejected CEG I thesis as 'a static concept which cannot do full justice to the complexities of the Community's evolving impact on world politics'.[11] In its stead Hill plumed for describing the EC-12 *as a system of international relations* that generates international relations and consists of three strands: National Foreign Policies,

5

European Political Co-operation and, External Relations of the EC. The notion of a *system of international relations* represented an entirely new conceptualisation that Hill presented in lieu of a conclusion on the capability-expectations thesis. However, in writing CEG II Hill has advanced his thesis again, albeit in a strengthened form.

This paper utilises Hill's CEG (I & II) thesis to explore the development of capabilities of the Union since 1993. The paper asserts that the criteria for identifying the capabilities of the Union can be restated more clearly. Furthermore in clarifying what are to be understood as the Union's capabilities further observations on the nature of the contemporary international role of the EU can be advanced.

Minding the Gap

Assessing capabilities and expectations

A clear conception of the capabilities of the EU are needed if the CEG is to be assessed accurately. More generally a greater understanding of the capabilities of the Union is necessary if the international role of the EU are to be accurately comprehended. The following section takes one element of Hill's capabilities – instruments – and offers for consideration a more developed typology of instruments The typology of instruments that has been offered therefore represents a development of ideas advanced by Hill. Furthermore the characteristics of the instruments that the EU has utilised since the CEG thesis was advanced demonstrates that the EU has privileged civilian over other forms of power.

The starting point for utilising the CEG is greater clarification of *actorness* – Hill's measure for the EU to have achieved its optimum capability. Hill does not develop

his conception of *actorness* CEG II but did provide an indication in CEG I by citing the work of Taylor and Sjöstedt.[12]

Without engaging in a direct debate on epistemology and ontology the focus Hill has characterised the European Union as a unit of analysis and seeking to further comprehend the nature, or potential nature, of EU actorness by focusing upon capabilities. In metatheoretical terms the approach is agency-objectivistic based upon Jorgensen's meta-theoretical matrix of ontology and epistemology approaches to theorising the international role of the EU.[13] Jorgensen has also assigned theories as to whether they are agency-interpretive, agency-objectivistic, structural-interpretive or structural-objectivistic, perspectives.

The most developed abstract approach agency-objectivistic model of actor capabilty has been offered by Gunnar Sjöstedt who is cited by Hill. Sjöstedt adopted a distinctive tack upon the question of how to give consideration as to whether the EC is an international actor.[14] Instead of attempting to align the then EC with an existing international actor categories, Sjöstedt constructed a criteria of actor capability as a means of assessing whether or not the EC can be assessed as possessing actor capability. The properties that are identified as necessary for actor capability are seven-fold: a community of interests; a decision-making system; a system for crisis management; a system for the management of independence; a system of implementation; external communication channels and external representation; and, community resources and mobilisation system. One possible objection to the use of this framework is that it posits the pre-requisites for actor capability without addressing the significant sources of influence that assist in giving an account of why

the actor conforms to particular behaviour. In short it ignores the environment within which the actor operates and through which it seeks to implement its policies. This theme will be returned to below.

For the purposes of this paper the utility of Sjöstedt's work is that he identifies a system of implementation as a characteristic of actorness. Therefore, this paper will seek to clarify the capabilities of the Union, by the identification of the instruments that the Union has utilised, as the first stage in beginning an exploration of actor capability. Therefore, it is not an attempt to close the capability-expectations gap as identified by Hill, but rather, to seek a greater clarification of the capabilities of the Union as a prelude to further conceptualisation of Europe's international role.

Identifying a system of implementation

The 'system of implementation' identified as necessary for actor capability can be characterised as a set of instruments that are available to the European Union. These instruments are not formally identified by the Union as its 'system of implementation', but provide a typology by which we might establish a framework to consider the extent to which the EU is fulfilling its aspiration to assert its international identity. In short, as with Hill's original injunctive to re-commence conceptualisation prior to theorisation, the exercise here is pre-theoretical.

Therefore this paper steps-back somewhat from exploring the full richness of the capability-expectations thesis by seeking to clarify one facet of the capabilities of the Union. The *ability to agree* and *resources* identified by Hill as the other two elements of his capabilties have been explored by the author at length elsewhere.[15] Therefore

the paper only tackles one side of the capability-expectations gap and largely ignores the question of the expectations of third parties. It concerns itself with questions of supply rather than demand. This paper seeks to identify a typology of instruments available at the disposal of the Union and through this to contribute to the project of conceptualising Europe's international role. Furthermore, through an exposition of a typology of instruments it also seeks to briefly explore what form of international identity the Union has sought to cultivate.

The instruments available to the EU to implement its policies with states and groups of states and can be charted as follows: informational, procedural, transference, and overt.[16] Each of these elements is briefly illustrated by reference to examples drawn from the CFSP and external relations since the foundation of the EU in November 1993. In outlining the form in which the EU has implemented policy since the advance of the CEG thesis it can be asserted that the EC/EU has enhanced its capabilities.

Informational

The use of an informational instrument represents the promulgation of overviews of the rationale of the Union's relationship with a state or a group of states. These informational forms of the identity can be either in *strategic informational* or in *specific informational* forms.

The Treaty on European Union (TEU), when initiating the CFSP, created two new forms of strategic informational instruments at the disposal of EU foreign policy beyond that which had been available under European Political Co-operation (EPC):

Joint Actions and Common Positions. Under the Treaty of Amsterdam Common Strategies have been created which are much more explicitly 'strategic'. The Common Strategies, Joint Actions and Common Positions make clear to third parties that the EU has adopted a specific position on a particular issue or on relations with a particular country. This method of developing foreign policy through the creation of an *acquis politique* by Joint Actions and Common Positions has created a corpus of foreign policy commitments that the Union and its Member States have sought to use as a formula through which to cast collective foreign policy commitments among themselves.

Joint Actions and Common Positions have been largely reactive in nature. However, the 'house keeping' activity required in creating, maintaining, amending, and terminating Joint Actions and Common Positions, through legal acts passed by the Council, ensures that the Union is able to send a signal to third parties of a policy issue appearing on the Union's foreign policy agenda. These Common Positions and Joint Actions may, or may not, be supported by the use of additional instruments (as detailed below).

The conclusions of European Council meetings and Commission Communications also represent sources in which it is possible to discern *Strategic Informational Instruments* being deployed. Examples include the Essen European Council meeting's pronouncement in December 1994 on the adoption of a pre-accession strategy for the aspirant Member States of the Union and the Commission Communication on the proposal for a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership adopted in March 1995.

Specific Informational Instruments are designed to designate the intention to establish or to re-orientate policy in a specific area. *Specific Informational Instruments* include the declarations issued under the CFSP. Declarations are used by the Union as reactive instruments to respond to unfolding international events. The Union has relied heavily upon declarations under the CFSP – as was the hallmark of EPC. Silences - the non-use of a declaration - rather than the use of a declaration can be of equal interest. The paucity of declarations about the Mediterranean basin, despite the intensity of the violence in Algeria during the period, can be read as a lack of substantive agreement among the Member States on an appropriate response to events. All of the institutions of the Union use *Specific Informational Instruments* - for example *demarches* - which may be intended to be self-implementing or be intended accompany other instruments detailed below.

Procedural

The procedural dimension of the Community refers to the creation of a standing institutionalised relationship with a third party state or group of states. These may be established in regionalised form, as noted above, or constituted on a bilateral basis as with relations with the United States. The EC/EU has constructed a network of agreements with states and groups of states. The development and the deepening of the region-to-region dialogue of the then pre-Treaty on European Union Community has provided the basis for characterising 'a new European identity in the international system' in previous analyses.[17] These analyses have illustrated the increase in scope and coverage of the procedural instrument over time especially during the mid- and late-1980s.[18]

These agreements are founded upon different articles of the Treaties, Declarations, exchanges of letters or, in the case of international and regional organisations, the granting of membership or observer status and different mechanisms are established to manage relations between the EC/EU and the third party.[19] Alongside these agreements a political dialogue has also been established that takes place in different formats (through Association and Co-operation Councils, Ministerial meetings, meetings with the Troika, Presidency and the Commission) and at different frequencies. A particularly developed form of procedural instrument has been created for relations with the Europe Agreement countries. In addition to implementing the structured dialogue, defined in the Presidency Conclusions of the 1994 Essen meeting of the European Council, the Europe Agreements, signed by the Central and East European Countries (CEECs), contain an obligation to support the construction of an appropriate political dialogue with the Union.[20] Subsequently the General Affairs Council approved an extension of the dialogue with the CEECs and provided for them to be able to associate with the EU in statements, *démarches* and joint actions and by co-ordinating within international organisations.[21] The Union has thereby used a procedural instrument as one strand in its strategy to progressively bind the aspirant member states into a closer relationship with the Union.

Transference

The *transference* instrument denotes the financial and technical assistance relationships that the Community uses to pursue policy. The Budget of the EU represents one foundation of the *positive transference* instruments available to the Union.. In addition, the Member States provide financial and technical assistance financed through Member State contributions to the European Development Fund

(for Lomé states) and loans from the European Investment Bank. The creation of the European Community Humanitarian Office represents a proceduralisation of the positive transference process.

A more recent source of *positive transference* are elements of the operational expenditure of the CFSP.[22] The *negative transference* instrument of economic sanctions is also used by the Union. The use of economic sanctions was regularised under Article 228a of Treaty on European Union giving the CFSP the ability to use economic sanctions.[23]

Overt

The overt dimension refers to the physical presence of the Community and its representatives outside the Community. This can be either on a permanent basis, for example, the establishment of the external delegations of the Commission, or more transitory, for instance visits of the troika or the bi-cephalic troika or the dispatch of monitors, and special representatives for example, to the Middle East and the Great Lakes for example. The Union has also gone further to create its own overt instrument through its own network of external delegations accredited to one hundred and twelve countries.

The Presidency of the Union is explicitly granted the responsibility for the implementation of the CFSP under the TEU, and the troika and 'bi-cephalic troika' (the troika plus the Commission) are also retained as other instruments at the disposal of the Union. The Presidency retains the responsibility for the extensive network of political dialogue commitments that are the day-to-day substance of CFSP. The

Treaty of Amsterdam in creating the new High Representative for CFSP and reformulating the troika creates new overt instruments of implementation. The Commission and Commissioners perform a similar overt role with the portfolios of Jacques Santer, Sir Leon Brittan, Hans van den Broek, Manuel Marin, Joao de Deus Pinheiro and Emma Bonino being the most public face of overt activity by the Commission.

The Joint Actions of the CFSP have created a number of new overt instruments used by the Union including the convoying of aid in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the sending of observers to the Russian and South African elections and the EU administration of Mostar.

The key test for Hill of actor capability for the EU was the ability to have recourse to military force. Under the typology advanced here this represents an overt instrument of implementation. The central significance of military power for actorness requires consideration of the EU's advances in this area since 1993.

The TEU, in establishing the CFSP, widened the extent of the Member States efforts at foreign policy harmonisation to 'include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence', and designated the WEU as the body which would 'elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications'.(TEU, Articles J.4.1 & J.4.2.) In the TEU the Union had signalled the intent of the Member States of the Union to move beyond a civilian-power Europe and to develop a defence dimension to the Union's international identity. In a declaration

14

attached to the TEU the then nine members of the WEU spelled out their proposals for relationship of the WEU and NATO which was to be developed as both the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. (TEU, Declaration No. 30.)

The development of capabilities by the WEU to match its aspirations was given a boost by the NATO summit of January 1994 and the endorsement of the principle that NATO assets and capabilities could be made available for WEU operations, and in particular through the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). NATO has now gone further and approved the implementation of the CJTF, thereby creating military structures to run military operations that may not include the United States and further support the development of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO.[24] Alongside this endorsement, the WEU Planning Cell developed an inventory of Forces Answerable to WEU (FAWEU) to identify those forces available to carry out WEU tasks and created a framework for the development of a WEU Maritime Force. In addition there has been the creation of the post of Director of Military Staff (which comprises the Planning Cell and the WEU Situation Centre) and the activation of the WEU Military Committee. By enhancing the WEU Satellite Centre at Torrejon, Spain, the WEU has also made a commitment to create an independent European satellite system and to further develop the WEU's capability to use satellite imagery for security purposes. A primary obstacle that remains, if the WEU is to contemplate large-scale operations, is the lack of strategic transport capabilities. In the future a WEU strategic transport capability may be enhanced through the Future Large Aircraft project.

The Union, through the WEU, has, although tentatively, created a defence force and an embryonic defence policy. As noted above these are intended to be compatible with the Atlantic Alliance and to strengthen its European pillar based upon the principle of separable, but not separate, military capabilities. However, the disjuncture between WEU and EU membership remains. Only ten members of the Union are currently full members of the WEU and enjoy the defence guarantee of Article V; Ireland, Denmark, Austria, Sweden and Finland are currently confined to observer status within the WEU.

The defence identity of the Union therefore excludes one third of the membership of Union but, at the same time, through different forms of membership of the WEU, encompasses other states. Alongside an observer status the WEU created an Associate Member status open to European members of NATO. This has been granted to Turkey, Norway and Iceland. These Associate Members, by their nomination of assets to FAWEU, now participate in WEU operations on same basis as full members. The Associate Members are also integrated into WEU planning through the nominating of officers to the Planning Cell and connection to the WEUCOM communications network. The WEU has also created an Associate Partner status offered to the ten Central European and Baltic countries that have Europe Agreements with the EU. The Associate Partner status offers involvement in the meetings of the WEU Council, liaison arrangements with the Planning Cell, participation in exercises, and association with the WEU operations involving Petersberg tasks. In any involvement in WEU operations a right to involvement in the Council's decision-making process and command structures is granted. These arrangements have not been without their critics: one group of expert commentators

characterised them as 'an approach which simply serves to blur the concepts of a common defence policy and common defence'.[25]

A full analysis of the role and activities of the WEU is beyond the scope of this paper but the use of the WEU under article J.4.2 is pertinent as this represents an explicit use of an instrument beyond a civilian form of action. The practicalities of the relationship between the WEU and the EU are being worked out through meetings of an 'ad hoc group' composed of the WEU at 18 (full members, associate members and observers) and the EU. The modalities of the EU availing itself of the WEU to undertake operations on its behalf have been tested through simulations (the 'flow chart' exercise) intended to strengthen procedures. The EU first tasked the WEU under Article J.4.2 in June 1996 to ask it to make preparations to undertake evacuation operations of nationals of Member States when their safety is threatened in third countries. The EU also requested the WEU to prepare a military response to the crisis in the Great Lakes region in May 1997 but the change of events on the ground resulted in this action not being undertaken. In the latter part of 1998 the EU Council tasked the WEU, under article J.4.2, to undertake three activities: monitor the situation in Kosovo, undertake action in the assistance for mine clearing and study the feasibility of international police operations to assist the government in Albania.

However, the WEU has operated alongside, although not under the control of the EU, in the former Yugoslavia in Mostar (providing a WEU police force) and in Albania in the provision of a Multinational Advisory Police Element (MAPE).

The eventual formula agreed upon in the ToA was for a shift from a commitment to the eventual framing of a common defence policy to a 'progressive' framing 'should the European Council so decide' (Article J.7.1) and the 'fostering of closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union'. This possible integration of the WEU into the EU is to be on the basis of a decision by the European Council.

A substantive development was the acceptance on the part of the neutral states (Finland, Sweden, Ireland, and Austria) on the inclusion of the humanitarian and peacekeeping elements of the Petersberg tasks of the WEU into the ToA (Article J.17.2) with the entitlement of non-WEU Members to participate fully in the tasks (J.17.3). The WEU signalled its willingness to respond to the commitment of the Member States under the ToA and a Protocol of the ToA provides for the EU and the WEU to draw up arrangements for enhanced cooperation within one year of the ToA coming into force.[26] The provisions of article J.17 are to be reviewed on the basis of Article 48 (revised TEU) - an intergovernmental conference. In recent months the debate on the future of a European defence capability has been re-opened on the initiative of the New Labour of the United Kingdom.[27] The future relationship between the EU and the WEU now appears to be more open than was suggested in the ToA and a process of reflection is currently being undertaken with the Heads of State and Government scheduled to re-examine the issue at their summit meeting in Cologne on 3-4 June 1999.

Instruments assessed

The typology outlined above provides a means through which the EU's relationship with third party states or groups of states might be compared and the EU's capabilities assessed. However, there are clearly a number of elements that are neglected by a focus solely on instruments. Firstly, there has to be a focus upon the *environment* - the international structures, processes and actors within which the EC/EU is embedded and through which it operates. Secondly, understanding EC/EU policy is a matter of establishing the *process* through which that policy is decided and thereby requires the identification of sources of influence on policy-making and the actors involved in that process. Furthermore, any account also has to accommodate an on-going integration process. The development of instruments for the implementation of the Union's foreign policy has come through treaty amendments both through the TEU and then the ToA

Environment

The central premise upon which Hill's CEG thesis rests is that the EU continues to lack 'actorness'. The section above suggests that with respect to a system of implementation the EU does possess one element of actorness. However, the instruments of implementation available to the Union do not provide any indication as to the international significance of the Union. Rather, it is crucial to have an understanding of the nature of the international environment within which the Union uses its instruments to assess whether these are the appropriate tools for enhancing the capabilities of the Union.

It is disagreements over the nature of the international environment within which the Union operates which have led to different assessments of its international significance, or not. All theorising on the international role of the EC/EU has been accompanied by an assessment of the international environment in which it is embedded. Unsurprisingly there is no agreement as to the nature of its international role. Therefore it is difficult to assess whether the Union is developing capabilities appropriate to the environment within which it operates. Furthermore a discussion of whether the EC/EU possesses, or is enhancing, a foreign policy is complicated by the existence of a wider empirical and theoretical debate about the nature of foreign policy.[28]

The literature that has sought to account for the international role of the EU with the international environment as a significant factor breaks down into two distinctive sets of approaches. Firstly, approaches that have as their primary goal an explanation of the international significance (or not) of the EC/EU through the theoretical literature of the discipline of International Relations.[29] These approaches focus upon the conformity of the EC/EU to particular outcomes, actors or processes deemed to be the substance of international relations. The international role of the EC/EU is thereby a function of the type of actor that the EC/EU represents.

With explanations of the EC/EU's international role tied to developments within International Relations' literature, it is possible to find accounts of the EC/EU written within all of the major stands, including the inter-paradigm debate, contemporary debates between neo-realists and neo-liberal institutionalists and within the post-positivist literature. The substance of these accounts is that the EC/EU is embedded

within the domain of international relations from which it is neither separate nor separable.

A second strand of the literature is represented by the premise that the EC/EU is *sui generis* and requires the construction of new conceptual categorisations to fit the case of the EC/EU and to explain its international role. Embedded within these accounts are premises about the nature of international relations but these are of second-order to the focus upon EC/EU as the referent object. The conceptual categorisation that has attracted the most wide-spread usage is the notion of *civilian power*.

This debate on how to categorise the EU, in terms of its international significance, was first conducted from the early 1970s by attempting to construct a new conceptual category. The debate focused around the issue of whether the EC was a 'civilian power' or a putative 'superpower'.[30] The significance of these approaches is that they focused upon a distinctive (or potentially distinctive) international role for the EC.

François Duchêne's notion of a 'civilian power Europe' has resonated through the debate on the international role of the EC.[31] The notion of civilian power Europe as first advanced by François Duchêne was an exercise in futurology. Duchêne's contention was that maintaining a nuclear and superpower stalemate in Europe ought, and would, devalue military power and give scope to 'civilian forms of influence and action';

'Europe would be the first major area of the Old World where the age-old processes of war and indirect violence could be translated into something more in tune with the twentieth-century citizen's notion of civilised politics.'[32]

Duchêne's conception of a European civilian power rested upon the inconceivability

of a nuclear-armed European federation and the banishment of war from western

Europe;

'The European Community's interest as a civilian group of countries long on
economic power and relatively short on armed force is as far as possible to
domesticate relations between states, including those of its own members and those
with states outside its frontiers. This means trying to bring to international problems
the sense of common responsibility and structures of contractual politics which have
been in the past associated exclusively with 'home' and not foreign, that is *alien*,
affairs.'[33]

The most trenchant, and articulate, criticisms of the notion of civilian power Europe

were provided by Hedley Bull at the height of the second cold war. The central

component of Bull's criticism was that clear-cut; '...the power or influence exerted

by the European Community and other such civilian actors was conditional upon a

strategic environment provided by the military power of states, which they did not

control'.[34] Furthermore there was not one 'Europe' but only a Europe of state

governments – a concert of states. The inference to be drawn from Bull's argument

was that only with a European military capability would there be a European

actorness. However, for Bull supranational authority in the area of defence policy

would be a source of weakness, rather than strength, because only nation-states could

inspire the loyalty to make war.[35]

The changed European strategic post-Cold War and the tentative exploration of

questions of defence within and around the EU framework, detailed above, would

appear to render obsolete the two foundations on which the civilian power hypothesis

was based (and the criticisms thereon). Clearly, and following the line of thinking of

Duchêne, Bull and Hill the development of a military security capability by the European Union would represent an alteration of pre-conditions upon which civilian power Europe was established and maintained. However, the notion of civilian power still represents a touch-stone for debates on the international role of the EC/EU because of the premise that it is conducting a distinctive form of diplomacy, in both form and substance, in the absence of the ability to use military force. However, it offers contemporary insights. Firstly, the wider European context within which the Union operates is crucial for understanding its own significance. Secondly, the Union's pursuit of a distinctive diplomacy would appear to be imbued with the notion of 'civilianising' relations by creating forms of institutionalised association, partnership and co-operation. In short, there is the impact of a set of normative values on the international identity projected by the European Union.

A contemporary view of the EU, in contrast to Duchêne, was Johan Galtung's assertion that the European Community was a superpower in the making.[36] The EC was characterised as a *Pax Bruxellana*; an attempt to create a eurocentric world with its centre in Europe and a unicentric Europe with its centre in the Western half of the continent. The power of the emerging superpower is categorised as two-fold: the resource power and the structural power. The resource power of the Union is relative to that of the other superpowers which were then in existence. Structural power is considered to be the international structures which the EU is promoting serving as instruments of structural power. The notion of resource power appears close to Hill's conception of resources in CEG II as one of the EU's capabilities. The structural power of the EU has been greatly neglected in the study of the international role of the Union.

Without accepting the premises of Galtung's argument, that the EU is a neo-imperial entity, it is possible to utilise two elements to explore the international significance of the Union. The Cold War context, in which these latter approaches were articulated, is no longer in existence and the relevance of the notion of superpower, as then conventionally understood, is no longer useful. However, a comparison of the resource and structural power at the disposal of the EU would be one measure through which to explore the relative international significance of the Union.

The concept of identity has recently gained considerable currency in the social sciences. Indeed within the literature on international relations it appears to suggest that a significant reformulation of the discipline itself is required.[37] A strand of this literature suggests that the politics of identity is declared the central problem for the EU to solve.[38] On questions of the international identity a significant contribution, and a counterpoint to the focus on actorness, is the notion of 'presence' developed by Allen and Smith.[39] 'Presence' is said to manifest itself in four forms: initiator, shaper, barrier, and filter. The former two forms are suggested as being tangible whereas the latter elements, which can be of equal significance as the tangible, are intangible. As with the concept of civilian power, 'presence' implies that the EC/EU already possesses a distinctive international role with a distinctive substance to its policy. The 'presence' thesis has been recently been re-stated by Allen and Smith.[40] For Allen and Smith both the capabilities-expectations gap and civilian power Europe represent attempts to delineate the boundaries of the EC/EU's presence. The typology of instruments, utilised through further empirical work, may assist in further

understanding of how the EU, in tangible terms, makes its presence felt and thereby contribute to a clearer delineation of the EC/EU's international presence.

The assessment of the capabilities of the Union is complicated by a lack of agreement as to the environment within which the Union is operating. This represents a formidable obstacle to overcome in assessing whether the typology of instruments identified above with provide a useful device through which to assess whether the Union is developing appropriate capabilities. Hill's emphasis on the development of a military capacity for the Union provides only one measure of capabilities that are necessary for the Union to exercise influence.

Process

The other factor that is crucial for assessing the development of the Union's capabilities is process. There is a substantive body of literature on the international role of the EC/EU that focuses upon an exposition of the content of specific policies conducted by the EU for projection externally from the Union and theoretical explanations or assumptions as to the manner in which that policy was formulated. This body of literature consists primarily of the individual case study, although these are supported by a limited amount of comparative case study work. The focus upon the process of decision-making that is central to this approach also represents an enduring division in accounts of the international role of the EC/EU.

In attempting to map the external relations of the EC/EU, accounts invariably focus upon the legal foundations for a particular agreement or set of agreements.[41]. Although commentators disagree as to whether the CFSP represents a meaningful

'foreign policy' its joint actions and common positions have been subject to case study scrutiny.[42] Accounting for the role of the decision-making process has been central to analysis of EPC/CFSP.[43] Other case studies seeking to account for a foreign policy 'event' and EC/EU action, or inaction, have delved in the domestic sources of Member States foreign policy stances.[44]

A number of other case studies have also argued for a theoretical uniting of both EPC/CFSP and external relations into a single framework. This argument proceeds from the premise that the nature of foreign policy itself has undergone transformation as a consequence of changes in the nature and structure of the international system that have rendered distinctions between 'high' and 'low' politics less pertinent.[45] The contention of such approaches is that separate consideration of these two processes (pillar one and pillar two), both empirical and conceptual, is at the cost of neglecting study of the factors that are common to both sets of policies and has lead to neglect of frameworks that may accommodate both sets of processes.[46]

The situation is further complicated by the fact that certain internal EC/EU policies (that are neither external relations or CFSP) have external implications. This is best illustrated by the analysis of the impact of the Single Market Programme.[47] The concept of *externalisation* conceived by Schmitter conveys a mutually supporting direct link between internal integration and external responses.[48] Such an analysis has been extended to illustrate such a processes extending beyond states to encompass non-state and sub-national actors.[49] This have given rise to the notion that alongside the policy-making processes of external relations and CFSP the EC/EU's international activities represent an on-going *negotiated order* involving actors within and without

the EU engaged in an institutionalised negotiation process which is itself embedded in the international arena.[50]

The consideration of the process through which EC/EU policy is formulated represents a crucial insight into the rationale for the Union both developing and utilising different instruments of implementation. Hill characterised *cohesiveness* in decision-making (taking decisions and holding on to them) as one strand of capabilities available to the Union.[51] Recent work on decision-making suggests that decision-making processes demonstrate contradictory characteristics both greater 'Brusselisation'[52] but also a widening of the actors and influences[53]. Cohesiveness may therefore be better measured through agreement measured by greater recourse to instruments than cohesion in decision-making processes.

Conclusion

This focus upon a typology of instruments used by the EC/EU to assert its identity on the international scene is both cursory and sketchy. However, it does illustrate a means for capturing a particular dimension of the international role of the EC/EU. Focusing upon the instruments through which the EU conducts its international relations provides a limited insight to the full international role and significance of the EU. The environment within which these instruments are deployed and the EU's position in that environment and the process of formulating policy is of crucial significance and needs to be considered alongside instruments.

The focus of this paper has been to give analytical primacy to the EC/EU and not to its Member States. The intention is not to posit a theory to explain or predict the

formulation of the international identity of the European Union. Rather the intention is to refine and to make explicit the assumptions that inform later empirical work.

This paper has argued that a clear conception of the capabilities of the EU are needed if appropriate forms of understanding of the international role of the EU are to be developed. In particular it has been argued that a greater understanding of the instruments of implementation through which the EU gives effect to policies are necessary. The typology of instruments that has been offered represents a development of ideas advanced by Christopher Hill through the expectations capabilities thesis. Furthermore the characteristics of the instruments that the EU has utilised since the CEG thesis was advanced demonstrates that the EU has privileged civilian over other forms of power.

The recourse to civilian forms of power by the EU has remained despite the changed environment of international relations in Europe with the demise of the cold war overlay. The re-Europeanisation of security in Europe has not been accompanied by the EU greatly advancing the project of a military security identity since the Treaty on European Union in 1993. In short, civilian forms of power have been retained, and strengthened, in Europe and remain the hallmark of the European international identity beyond the continent.

-

[1] C. Hill, 'The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualising Europe's International Role' *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31, 3 (September 1993). pp.305-328.
[2] At the time of Hill writing his original article the Treaty on European Union was not yet ratified.
[3] *Ibid.*, p.306
[4] M. Smith, 'The European Union, foreign economic policy and the changing world arena' *Journal of European Public Policy* 1:2 Autumn 1994. pp.282-302. p.300.
[5] For case study examination see:

'Bridging the Capability-Expectations Gap: A Case Study of the CFSP Joint Action on South Africa' *Journal of Common Market Studies* 33, 4 (December 1995). Pp. 555-572. Another application of the CEG thesis to the same case by the same author is to be found as 'The Joint Action on South Africa: a Successful Experiment?' in: M. Holland (ed.) *Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Record and Reforms* (Pinter, London, 1997).

The volume inspired by Hill's thesis is:

J. Peterson and H. Sjursen (eds.) *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing visions of the CFSP* (Routledge, London, 1998).

[6] C. Hill, 'Closing the capabilities-expectations gap?' in: Peterson and Sjursen, *op.cit.*

[7] Hill, *op.cit.*, p.306.

[8] Hill, *op.cit.*, pp.310-312.

[9] Hill *op.cit.*, pp.312-315.

[10] Peterson and Sjursen, *op.cit*, p.23 & pp.29-30.

[11] Hill, *op.cit.*, p.322.

[12] Hill, *op.cit* p.309.

Gunnar Sjöstedt, *The External Role of the European Community* (Farnborough, Saxon House, 1977). P. Taylor, 'The European Communities as an Actor in International Society' *Journal of European Integration* VI, 1 (Fall 1982). Pp.7-41.

[13] K. E. Jorgensen, 'EC External Relations as a Theoretical Challenge'; Theories, Concepts, Trends' in: F.R. Pfetsch, *International Relations and Pan-Europe: Theoretical Approaches and Empirical Findings* (Hamburg, Lit, 1992).

[14] Gunnar Sjöstedt, *The External Role of the European Community* (Farnborough, Saxon House, 1977).

[15] R.G. Whitman, *From Civilian Power to Superpower? The International Identity of the EU* (London, Macmillan, 1998). Chapter 5 & 6.

[16] These forms of the international identity have been drawn, with modification, from:

M. Clarke, 'The Foreign Policy System: A Framework for Analysis' in:

M. Clarke & B. White (eds.), *Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems Approach* (Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 1989).

[17] E. Regelsberger, 'The dialogue of the EC/Twelve with other regional groups: a new European identity in the international system?' Chapter 1 in:

G. Edwards & E. Regelsberger (eds.), *Europe's Global Links: The European Community and Inter-Regional Cooperation* (London, Pinter, 1990).

E. Regelsberger, 'The Dialogue of the EC/Twelve with Other Groups of States' *The International Spectator* XXIII, 4 (October-December 1988).

[18] Regelsberger, *op.cit.*, Table 1.1 p.6.

[19] For details see:

European Commission, *Annoted Summary of Agreements Linking the Communities with Non-Member Countries* IA/47/96EN Brussels January 1996

[20] As indicative of this see the Europe Agreement signed by the Czech Republic, and the provisions contained in: Title I 'Political Dialogue: Proposal for a Council and Commission Decision concerning the conclusion of a Europe Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Czech Republic, of the other part', COM (93) 386 final, Brussels, 28 July 1993.

[21] 'Guidelines for the Implementation of the 7 March General Affairs Council Conclusions on Enhanced Political Dialogue with the Associated Central and Eastern European Countries', Doc. 10344/94.

[22] For a discussion of the complexities of funding the administrative and operational expenditure of the CFSP see:

J. Monar, 'The Finances of the Union's Intergovernmental Pillars: Tortuous Experiments with the Community Budget' *Journal of Common Market Studies* 35, 1 (March 1997). pp.57-78.

[23] EC Treaty, Article 228a.

Sanctions have been enacted under article 228a in support of common positions on Libya, Sudan, Haiti and the former Yugoslavia. The enactment or termination requires a Regulation to be passed that takes effect, without the need for measures at the level of the Member States, either once the Regulation is published in the 'L' (Legislation) series of the *Official Journal of the European Communities* or on the date contained in the Regulation.

[24] North Atlantic Council, 'Communiqué from the Ministerial Meeting in Berlin, 3 June, Agence Europe Documents, No. 1989, 5 June 1996.

[25] .High Level Group of Experts on the CFSP, op.cit , p. 4.

[26] Declaration of Western European Union on the role of Western European Union and its relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance Brussels, 22 July 1997.

[27] For a discussion of this initative see:

Richard G. Whitman, *Amsterdam's unfinished business? The Blair government's initiative and the future of the Western European Union* Occasional Papers no.7 (Paris, The Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 1999).

[28]See:

W. Carlsnaes & S. Smith (eds.), *European Foreign Policy: The EC and Changing Perspectives* (London, Sage, 1994).

[29] B. Soetendorp, 'The Evolution of the EC/EU as a Single Foreign Policy Actor' in:

W. Carlsnaes & S. Smith (eds.), *op.cit*

[30] For the superpower view see:

J. Galtung, *The European Community: A Superpower in the Making* (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1973).

[31] See for example:

P. Tsakaloyannis, 'The EC: from civilian power to military integration' in:

J. Lodge (ed.), *The European Community and the Challenge of the Future* (Pinter, London, 1989).

F. Laursen, 'The EC in the World Context: Civilian power or superpower?' *Futures* (September 1991) pp.747-759.

J. Lodge, 'From civilian power to speaking with a common voice: the transition to a CFSP' in:

J. Lodge (ed.), *The European Community and the Challenge of the Future* 2nd Ed. (Pinter, London, 1993).

[32] F. Duchêne, 'Europe's role in World Peace' in:

R. Mayne (ed.), *Europe Tomorrow Sixteen European's Look Ahead* (Fontana, London, 1972).

[33] F. Duchêne, 'The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence' in:

M. Kohnstamm & W. Hager, *A Nation Writ Large? Foreign-Policy Problems before the European Community* (London, Macmillan, 1973).pp.19-20.

[34] H. Bull, 'Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?' *Journal of Common Market Studies* 21, 1 (September 1982). P.151.

[35] Bull, *op.cit.*, p.163.

[36] J. Galtung, *The European Community: A Superpower in the Making* (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1973).

[37] M. Zalewski & C. Enloe, 'Questions about Identity in International Relations' in:

K. Booth & S. Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theory Today* (Oxford, Polity, 1995).

[38] B. Laffan, 'The Politics of Identity and Political Order in Europe' *Journal of Common Market Studies* 34, 1 (March 1996). pp.81-102.

[39] D. Allen & M. Smith, 'Western Europe's presence in the contemporary international arena' *Review of International Affairs* (1990), 16, pp.19-37.

[40] D. Allen & M. Smith, 'The European Union's Security Presence: Barrier, Facilitator, or Manager' in: C. Rhodes, (ed.) *The European Union in the World Community* (Lynne Rienner, London, 1998).

[41] I. Macleod, I.D. Hendry, and Stephen Hyett, *The External Relations of the European Communities: A Manual of Law and Practice* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996).

[42] See for example:

M. Holland (ed.) *Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Record and Reforms* (London, Pinter, 1997).

M. Holland, *European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy: From EPC to CFSP Joint Action and South Africa* (London, Macmillan, 1995).

[43] C. Hill (ed.), *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy* (London, Routledge, 1996).

[44] S. Stavridis & C. Hill (eds.), *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy: Western European Reactions to the Falklands Conflict* (Oxford, Berg, 1996).

[45] See for example:

H. Smith, *European Union Foreign Policy and Central America* (Macmillan, London, 1995). Chapter Two.

For Michael Smith the real foreign policy action is taking place in pillar one. See:

M. Smith, 'Does the flag follow trade? 'Politicisation' and the emergence of a European foreign policy' in Peterson and Sjursen, *op.cit*

[46] For an attempt to overcome this neglect see:

R. H. Ginsberg, *Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community: The Politics of Scale* (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado, 1989).

Also the author's own work: Whitman, *op.cit.*

[47] J. Redmond, (ed.), *The External Relations of the European Community: The International Response to 1992* (London, Macmillan, 1992).

[48] P. Schmitter, 'Three Neo-Functional Hypotheses about International Integration' *International Organization* 23, pp.161-166.

[49] See the multilayered analysis adopted by the following:

B. Hocking and M. Smith, *Beyond Foreign Economic Policy: The United States, the Single European Market and the Changing World Economy* (London, Pinter, 1997).

[50] M. Smith, 'The EU as an international actor' in:

J. Richardson, *European Union: Power and Policy-making* (London, Routledge 1996).

[51] Peterson and Sjursen, *op.cit,* p.28.

[52] D. Allen, ''Who speaks for Europe?' The search for an effective and coherent external policy' in: Peterson and Sjursen, *op.cit,*

[53] Smith in Peterson and Sjursen, *op.cit,*