'A Tale of a Decade: European Security Governance and Russia'

(paper presented to the panel on 'Security Governance in Europe' of the Sixth Biennial International Conference of the European Community Studies Association, University of Pittsburgh, June 1999)

Mark Webber

Mark Webber
Department of European Studies
Loughborough University
Leicestershire, UK
LE11 3TU

Tel: +44(0)1509 222996
e-mail: M.A.Webber@lboro.ac.uk
This paper is one of the first products of a project on 'Security Governance in Europe' funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). As such, its contents are both tentative and provisional. In forwarding a conceptualisation of security the author is aware of faults immediately apparent to a critical eye. At face value, the paper has three obvious weaknesses: it uses the term 'security' in a seemingly traditional and static manner; makes no explicit attempt to locate a definition of security among debates in security studies and international relations theory more generally; and underspecifies its central concept – 'security governance' – to such an extent that it can be applied to almost anything and everything broadly regarded as relevant to the organisation of security in Europe.

In raising these points I do not mean to excuse the paper's weaknesses, only to point out that addressing these fault-lines will be a central concern of the project. While perhaps not so apparent here, it does ultimately aim at a rigorous and extensive elaboration of the notion of security governance, is informed by broad currents of thought in international relations scholarship (specifically, institutionalism and constructivism), and intends to apply the concept in well-specified, empirical case studies.

These preliminaries aside, it is perhaps worth explaining what this paper does attempt (rather than what it does not). Its main purpose is to analyse the position of Russia in relation to security governance and, in so doing, to introduce one of the empirical tests of the concept that of 'inclusion' and 'exclusion'.

DEFINING SECURITY GOVERNANCE

The concept of governance is both ambiguous and controversial, with different analysts using the term in different ways. R.A.W. Rhodes, for example, has delineated six separate uses of the term 'governance' with respect to the domestic political arena.¹ In the realm of international politics it is equally possible to identify a range of closely related but

separate meanings. There is not, in short, a simple definition or conceptualisation of 'governance' that would be commonly acceptable. That important qualification aside, it remains necessary for the purposes of this and related studies within the current project, to offer at the outset a tentative statement of what is meant by 'governance' and more specifically 'security governance'.

Governance, like 'government', can be said to refer to 'purposive behaviour, to goal-oriented activities, to systems of rule'; but unlike government, governance refers to activities based on shared goals that may or may not derive from formal legal or prescribed responsibilities and are not necessarily dependent on authority to enforce compliance. As James Rosenau has argued, governance is 'a system of rule that is as dependent on intersubjective meanings as on formally sanctioned constitutions and charters'. Regulatory mechanisms are, in fact, present but these are only truly effective when underpinned by a common appreciation of their purpose. Governance thus can only work if the regulatory mechanisms are accepted by the majority of international actors, or at least the most powerful of those it affects, as there is no consistent, effective form of policing.

The concept of governance is close to and inter-related, with the concepts of 'international order' and regimes. A key element of international governance, which distinguishes it from international order, is that there is a degree of intentionality; that is, the regulatory mechanisms exist because they are self-consciously created rather than simply emerge out of an aggregation of human activities and decisions that are individually designed to serve immediate sub-system concerns. This feature of intentionality or deliberativeness makes governance sound much like regimes. Regimes can be defined as 'sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge', and 'specialised arrangements that pertain to well-defined activities, resources, or geographical areas and often involve only some subset of members of international society'. Governance, on the other hand, connotes something broader. It can be regarded as the aggregate of a series of overlapping arrangements governing the activities of all, or almost all, the members of international society (or a regional sub-system of it), over a range of separate but reinforcing issues. Systems of governance thus can be said to contribute to the development of international order, while regimes contribute to the system of governance.

---

From this can be derived a tentative definition of security governance: an intentional system of rule, dependent on the acceptance of a majority of states (or at least the major powers) that are affected, which, through regulatory mechanisms (both formal and informal), governs activities across a range of security and security-related issue areas.\(^5\)

On the basis of this definition it is possible to identify the state actors involved in the system of security governance and to quantify the extent of their involvement. In short, one can posit parameters or dimensions of 'inclusion' and 'exclusion'. A state's relationship to the system of security governance is seen in terms of the following:

- how far it accepts the system of security governance (the normative dimension)
- the extent of its involvement in the purposeful creation of that system (the intentionality dimension)
- the degree to which it participates in the regulatory mechanisms of that system, seen in terms of first, membership of formal security-related structures and second, compliance with treaty and related commitments in the security field (the regulatory dimension).

These parameters should be seen as cumulative in effect. To be amiss in one does not in itself suggest complete exclusion, only a degree of exclusion. In the system of security governance in Europe at least five types of exclusion are apparent; these are ranked in descending order. It is assumed, logically, that exclusion is in inverse relation to inclusion: the greater the extent of exclusion the smaller the degree of inclusion.

The first refers to states such as Yugoslavia/Serbia and Belarus. These are detached from the formation and development of the system, disagree with it in principle and are not involved (other than when forced) in its regulatory mechanisms. The second is an exclusion which stems from geography, and refers to those states on Europe's periphery such as Ukraine, Moldova, and the Transcaucasian states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. These hold an ambiguous disposition toward the operational principles and format of the system (a function both of distance and calculations regarding their more immediate, Russian-influenced, security environment) and tend to be only partially involved in its regulatory mechanisms. The third type of exclusion relates specifically to Russia, a state that, over time, has departed from security governance on the normative dimension but which, by dint of size, history, geo-strategic importance and the absence of a realistic alternative has helped to define

---

\(^5\) The above five paragraphs have been taken (and in places amended) from a note by Terry Terriff, who has, for the purposes of the ESRC project on Security Governance, offered a written definition of the concept.
its evolution and has retained a significant involvement in its regulatory mechanisms. The fourth type is a form of exclusion that derives not from any lack of commitment to the system of security governance by the state concerned, but is a consequence of an unwillingness by the core states to involve it to the fullest extent in the system's mechanisms (most importantly, be denying it membership of NATO and the EU/WEU). Romania, and the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania fall into this category. Closely related to this is the fifth form, finally, which refers to the European neutrals - states such as Ireland, Austria, Finland and Sweden who are closely involved in many aspects of security governance but who willingly depart from a desire to join formal military alliances such as NATO.

A part of the 'Security Governance' project is concerned with exploring the nature of both inclusion and exclusion within Europe's evolving security system. The parameters described above can be equally applied to the core (i.e. NATO member) states of the system - its 'included' as well as its 'excluded'. The purpose of this paper, however, is to consider security governance in relation to the excluded states, and specifically, in relation to the Soviet Union/Russia. The following sections will attempt this by considering the system of security governance in Europe at two defining periods in its recent evolution: 1989-1991 and 1997-1999. In each case the system, such as it exists, will be characterised in terms of the parameters of inclusion/exclusion and these, in turn, will be utilised with a view to identifying the location of Moscow within that system. From this it will be possible to argue that Moscow has been and still is involved with the system of security governance to a significant extent. Its inclusion was the more substantive in the first of these two periods, circumstances of exclusion having developed subsequently. Yet Russia retains a meaningful role, and this is a role the 'included' core has been willing to accommodate to a certain

---

6 At a time of war in Europe, it may seem perverse to speak of a system of security governance at all. Yet governance, while it may imply a condition of peace, does not require that peace be present in the system as a whole. What matters when talking about security governance in Europe is the security condition of the region in its widest sense. Local wars - be these in Kosovo, Bosnia, Northern Ireland, the Basque country or elsewhere - detract from security governance in the territories immediately and indirectly affected and even have knock-on effects on certain broad aspects of the system as a whole. That system as such, nonetheless, continues to endure. Inter-state war would be far more injurious to security governance, but not necessarily fatal. How damaging would depend on the number of states involved, the configuration of rivalry (i.e. whether powerful states were lined up against one another or in league against a small state) and the territorial extent of the conflict. In western Europe and, indeed much of east-central Europe such inter-state war is a remote possibility and here, at least, security governance is facilitated by the presence of what Ole Waever has referred to as a 'non-war community'. See his 'Insecurity, Security, and Ascecity in the West European Non-war Community', in E. Adler and M. Barnett (eds.), Security Communities (Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

7 Other 'excluded' states will be the subject of subsequent study.
degree. This is not to suggest that Russia is, or indeed, is likely to be, included fully within the system of security governance, only that exclusion is neither total nor pre-ordained. Russia's relationship to the system of security governance is, in short, an ambivalent one, one in which it is incorporated but not integrated.  

THE EVOLUTION OF SECURITY GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE: TWO MODELS

1989 - 1991

This period coincided with three monumental developments in the history of the Twentieth Century: the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the demise of communism as a viable system of political and economic regulation. Europe, broadly defined, was the pivot around which these changes were played out. As such it bore witness to a transformation of a Cold War security system that had consisted of bipolar division, superpower 'overlay', and inert (but potent) military conflict. Amidst such tumult the political leaderships of Europe were hard pressed to conceptualise and to control the process of change. In the security sphere several efforts were made to bring some sense of order by means of grand proposals on Europe's future. During 1989-1990 these ranged from the notion of a 'European security architecture' proposed by US Secretary of State James Baker, through Mikhail Gorbachev's 'common European home' and Czech Foreign Minister, Jiri Dienstbier's 'European Security Commission', to Vaclav Havel's 'Organisation of European States' and Francois Mitterand's Confederation of Europe.  

What had emerged by the end of 1991, however, was not in accord with any grand scheme. It reflected rather the pragmatic adjustment of some existing security related organisations (NATO, the CSCE and the WEU, but not the Warsaw Pact which was dissolved earlier in the year), the entrenchedment of disarmament (in terms, principally, of the INF and

---

4 My apologies here for introducing what may appear surrogate (but confusing) terms for exclusion and inclusion respectively. The phrase is used to convey the sense that Russia is included in aspects of security governance but does not form part of the 'included pace integrated core of NATO member states. The phrase itself is derived from O. Schuet, 'Russia and Europe: Balancing Cooperation with Integration' (University of Birmingham, Institute for German Studies: Discussion Papers in German Studies, No.IGS98/1, 1998), p.29.

CFE Treaties of 1987 and 1990\textsuperscript{10} and the legal provisions surrounding German unification. Neither was it in accord with any general settlement amongst the major powers - there was, in other words, no peace treaty that ended the Cold War. That said, in combination, documents such as the treaties on German unification,\textsuperscript{11} the CFE Treaty and the 1990 CSCE Paris Charter did amount to a settlement of sorts. This, moreover, was underpinned by a general acceptance of the ingredients from which the emerging system of security should be derived, to wit - a unified Germany, a lesser divided Europe, conventional and nuclear arms reduction, continued US engagement in the continent, and the reconfiguration of European-based international organisations.\textsuperscript{12} These may be regarded as some of the features of a nascent system of post-Cold War security governance.

In retrospect, it is apparent that the last of the features noted above would come to prove the most controversial in Moscow. This was a controversy generated, in part, by circumstances that unfolded after 1991, but equally it has its origins in certain developments of the 1989-1991 period itself. These include, first, the absence of any clear agreement between NATO and Moscow on the strategic status of East-Central Europe (ECE) in the context of German unification and Soviet troop withdrawals\textsuperscript{13} and, second, the consolidation of NATO.

What had started to become apparent by 1991 was the defining role that would be played by NATO in shaping security governance. This was a function partly of the demise of a counter-bloc in the shape of the Warsaw Pact/Soviet Union, but partly also of the Alliance's own seeming robustness. Although after 1989 a considerable amount of soul searching had surrounded the future role of NATO,\textsuperscript{14} it had, in fact, emerged from the Cold War with its political and military credentials intact. It had also signaled in the London and Rome Declarations (of July 1990 and November 1991 respectively), and in the 1991 new Strategic Concept its readiness to adapt to the new circumstances through a reformulation of its strategy and mission in Europe. Furthermore, there was no credible

\textsuperscript{10} The INF Treaty was concluded before the 1989-1991 period used in this section, but is included in the discussion here in that it forms an important component of the Cold War's denuouement and because its implementation (if not its signing) overlaps with that period.

\textsuperscript{11} The Treaty between the FRG and the GDR on the Establishment of the Unity of Germany (August 1990); Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany (September 1990); and the Treaty between the FRG and the Soviet Union on Good-Neighbourliness, Partnership and Cooperation (September 1990).


\textsuperscript{13} As I will detail below this is crucial in view of subsequent Russian opposition to the enlargement of NATO membership. The lacuna was rarely commented upon at the time. For an exception see S. Van Evera, 'Primed for Peace. Europe after the Cold War', *International Security*, Vol.15(3), 1990/91, pp.45-46.

\textsuperscript{14} P. Corterier, 'Quo vadis NATO?', *Survival*, Vol.32(2), 1990, pp.141-156.
institutional alternative to the Alliance for the majority of European states. Calls to strengthen the CSCE as the core of a pan-European collective security system had been made by German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher in 1990 and this was a view articulated outside of NATO's membership by the new post-Communist administrations in Poland and Czechoslovakia.\(^5\) This particular vision of the CSCE was, however, easily dispelled. Spearheaded by London and Washington, the NATO position on the CSCE outlined in the London Declaration involved only a modest security-related function.\(^6\) The institutionalisation of the CSCE at the Paris Summit in 1990 largely reflected this position. Shortly after, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary abandoned their own preference for the CSCE and began to request admission to NATO. As for the Maastricht Treaty's identification of the CFSP and the related designation of the WEU as the defence dimension of the EC, these, in 1991, were also hardly seen as a challenge to NATO's operational profile.\(^7\)

The consolidation of NATO by the end of 1991 suggests, at first sight, a negligible role for Moscow in the evolution of security governance in the 1989-1991 period. This was not, in fact, the case. Security governance at this juncture was fluid and about more than just alliance systems. In the two years prior to its demise in December 1991, the Soviet Union actually played a crucial role in defining European security. This was a role, moreover, that went beyond the simply permissive. As well as removing obstacles to the end of the Cold War, Moscow also participated in the creation and consolidation of structures that have come to define the shape of post-Cold War Europe.

*The normative dimension*

The significance of Soviet acquiescence to security-related developments in Europe at the end of the Cold War can hardly be overstated. At the time of Gorbachev's arrival in power in 1985, Soviet policy toward Europe reflected several long-held assumptions that were the very acme of Cold War thinking. In essence, this involved the indefinite presence of a Soviet sphere of influence in ECE, a heavy reliance on military instruments of security, the continued division of Germany, and finally, opposition to an American military presence on the continent. For

---


\(^ {6}\) 'The London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance' (6 July 1990), paragraph 22.

at least the first year of Gorbachev's stewardship, Soviet policy did not deviate fundamentally from these themes. Even Gorbachev's much vaunted notion of a 'common European home' could be seen at this point as nothing more than a means of telling the Americans that they had no business in Europe.¹⁸

By the end of the Gorbachev period, all these assumptions had been overturned and one can point to several areas where, in practice, Soviet policy acceded to the emerging structures of security governance. These included the following: (i) the INF and CFE Treaties; (ii) German unification and the place of a unified Germany in NATO; (iii) the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and agreement on the removal of Soviet troops from ECE; (iv) a continued American presence in Europe; and (v) a continuing role for NATO after the Cold War. This, moreover, was underpinned by a seeming acceptance of a set of values and a vision of order in Europe that was more Western than Soviet (or socialist) in inspiration. It is unimaginable, for instance, that any of Gorbachev's predecessors would have signed the Paris Charter given its endorsement of pluralistic democracy and economic liberalism, and its assertion that friendly relations between states rested upon the consolidation of democracy.¹⁹ Similarly, it is hard to imagine any Soviet foreign minister other than Eduard Shevardnadze declaring that the Soviet Union's status as a 'civilized country' depended on its successful construction of a 'law-rulled and democratic state', and its participation in 'the creation of an integral European economic, legal, humanitarian, cultural and ecological space'.²⁰ In this sense, the tendency of Soviet policy toward inclusion was a movement that was normative in more ways than one.

Just how substantive was this shift is further born out when one considers some of its underlying driving forces. Several levels of explanation are relevant when charting Soviet foreign policy after 1985. Least convincing is the notion that this was a policy of capitulation in the face of Western pressure. Prior to Gorbachev, Soviet leaders such as Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko had, after all, faced economic conditions and military challenges as seemingly irresolvable as those confronting Gorbachev in 1985. Their responses,

---


¹⁹ The Soviet Union had also signed up to the Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE in 1975, which in 'Basket Three' contained statements on political rights then incompatible with Soviet practice. This document did not, however, go as far as the Paris Charter in explicitly outlining the values most closely associated with Western democratic capitalism. The Paris Charter is reprinted in NATO Review, Vol.38(6), 1990, pp.26-31.

however, were quite different. Unlike the last Soviet leader, they did not push for an accommodation with the West based on Soviet concessions but rather re-emphasised traditional military means of security. Furthermore, while it was clear that the Soviet economy was in terminal decline by the mid 1980s, the Soviet military still retained a sizeable advantage over NATO in Europe. A closing of this gap only became apparent with the winding down of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, by which time most of the fundamental alterations in Soviet foreign policy had already been effected. Until that point the Soviet Union's military capabilities were of such a scale that it held, in effect, a potential veto over the changes in ECE in 1989-90 and, to some extent, in Germany in 1990.21

That it decided not to exercise this sanction reflected less a surrender of will in the face of Western resolve and east European revolt than a judgement on the part of the Gorbachev leadership that a certain reconfiguration of the European security order was both necessary and desirable. This was a judgement born of some very practical concerns (the diminishing strategic importance of ECE for Soviet security and the need to reduce the economic burden of an inflated defence budget) but, as several studies have convincingly shown, it was informed also by a veritable revolution in the ideational and ideological bases of Soviet foreign policy.22 True, this revolution left much of the Soviet establishment untouched (a good part of the CPSU and military hierarchies opposed the foreign policy line of the leadership) but crucially, it had a fundamental impact on the approach of both Gorbachev and Shevardnadze - the two central architects of post-1985 Soviet foreign policy.23 Just how significant this was is apparent from the clear connection that exists between many of the concepts articulated within Gorbachev's 'new political thinking' and the developments in European security after 1985. Consider the following: 'mutual security', 'defensive defence' and 'reasonable sufficiency in defence' (the INF and CFE Treaties plus unilateral Soviet troop reductions); 'freedom of choice' (Soviet non-intervention to prevent the removal of communist rule in ECE and acceptance of German unification); the 'common European home' (the revamping of the CSCE in 1990); 'interdependence' and the

21 For a longer critique of the capitulation hypothesis see my The International Politics of Russia and the Successor States (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1996), pp.39-42.
importance of 'universal human values' rather than national or class interests (the end of the Cold War predisposition in Soviet policy and European affairs more generally toward confrontation rather than cooperation).\(^{24}\)

There were, however, limits to how fast and how far the Gorbachev leadership was willing to go in its acceptance of change in Europe. In this connection it is important to note that certain of the more far-reaching transformations of 1989-91 were not consistent with Moscow's preferred model of European security. Gorbachev, for instance, opposed German unification throughout 1989 and reversed this stance in early 1990 only following a recognition that the GDR was politically bankrupt. Thereafter, he adamantly refused to accept a united Germany's membership of NATO. On this occasion he relented only after assurances from Washington and Bonn on the terms of German entry\(^{25}\) and the adoption by NATO of the London Declaration with its indications of a far-reaching strategic adaptation of the Alliance. Throughout 1990-1991, Gorbachev was also reluctant to see a termination of the Warsaw Pact. Moscow did agree in the spring of 1990 to Hungarian and Czech requests for an early withdrawal of troops from their territories but held to the hope that the Warsaw Pact itself might survive in some transformed state. When it became clear that Soviet proposals to this end were unacceptable to new post-communist governments in ÉCE, Moscow finally acceded to its dissolution. Yet in so doing, it still remained reluctant to relinquish ÉCE as a sphere of influence, proposing in 1991 that the states of the region sign bilateral treaties with the Soviet Union that included \textit{inter alia} commitments that the parties involved not enter into any alliances with a third party.\(^{26}\)

The Soviet concern in this connection was obviously NATO. Although by 1990, Moscow had undertaken a fundamental reappraisal of the Alliance (Shevardnadze referred to it as a stabilizing influence in Europe during a visit to NATO HQ in December 1989\(^{27}\)) there was no expectation (let alone an acceptance) that NATO would expand into ÉCE. Indeed, Gorbachev and others have since made much of the fact that an unwritten understanding was extracted from the US during the


\(^{25}\) Some of these assurances were subsequently incorporated in the Treaties relating to German unification referred to in note 11. above. In addition, at the Gorbachev-Bush summit in Washington in June 1990 the US presented nine commitments which a unified Germany and NATO would be prepared to undertake regarding the military status of Germany, the demarcation of borders, future negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons and an enhancement of the role of the CSCE in Europe. See R.L. Garthoff, \textit{The Great Transition. American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War} (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994), p.427.

\(^{26}\) Only Romania signed such a treaty and even that went unratified.

\(^{27}\) Garthoff, \textit{The Great Transition}, p.607.
negotiations over Germany that NATO's territorial enlargement would be limited to the incorporation of the former GDR. Furthermore, while Gorbachev and even figures in the Soviet military hierarchy were resigned to NATO's long-term survival after the Cold War, this was premised on a belief that the inter-bloc basis of European security would gradually give way to 'all-European security structures' centred on the CSCE. NATO's centrality in European security matters would thus be marginalised and NATO itself would gradually evolve into a political, rather than simply a military, alliance. The changes of 1989-1990 were seen, then, as a whole, as heralding the 'formation of a fundamentally new model of security on the [European] continent'. Underlying all of this, moreover, was an assumption that the Soviet Union would continue to play a shaping role in Europe. Although put at some remove militarily and strategically, its credentials as a partner in cooperation had, it was felt, been strengthened by its pivotal participation in events from the signing of the INF Treaty in 1987 up to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991.

The Intentionality Dimension

Some aspects of the nascent system of security governance in Europe were not willed into existence by the Soviet Union. As noted above, German unification, the unified Germany's membership of NATO and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact were the consequence of initiatives taken by other states. These developments were initially opposed by Moscow and received Soviet approval either because they were viewed as politically inevitable or because Moscow managed to win compensatory concessions from NATO states. In this sense, certain

---


30 'Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Activity of the USSR, November 1989-December 1990. A Survey by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR', *Mezdunarodnaya zhiza*, No.3 (March 1991), pp.40-54 as cited in Garthoff, *The Great Transition*, pp.613-14. (These expectations now seem a little naive, but they were, in fact, partly encouraged by NATO states themselves. The London Declaration had alluded to the adaptation of the Alliance, an extension of 'the hand of friendship' to East, and the emergence of 'a Europe whole and free'. The assurances in note 25. above also included a reference to a strengthened CSCE and at its Paris summit in November 1990 the CSCE underwent the beginnings of an institutionalisation process and a broadening of its functional competencies).
cornerstones of Europe's post-Cold War system of security governance can not be regarded as the purposeful outcomes of Soviet policy. That said, what is clear is that Soviet participation and its permissive attitude did prove crucial. In terms of the outcome it was just as important that Moscow decided not to prevent change as it was that it actually initiated it. The veto noted in the previous section could have been exercised in ECE and in the German case Soviet obstructionism, while probably not a fatal impediment to unification, could well have made the process that much more risky and destabilising. In neither case, however, did Moscow act in such a preventive manner.

In other respects - principally, with regard to nuclear and conventional disarmament in Europe - the Soviet contribution was more than simply permissive. Taking nuclear issues first, the key development in this regard was the 1987 INF Treaty. This agreement marked an important watershed in European arms control. It involved the elimination by the US and the Soviet Union of an entire category of weapon (nuclear missiles with a range of 500 - 5,500 kilometres), the carrying out of asymmetrical reductions (the Soviet Union was required to destroy more than twice the number of missiles than the US) and the use of new intrusive procedures of verification. The treaty was described at the time as 'a substantial first move towards lowering the level of East-West military confrontation in Europe' and its terms were successfully implemented before the target date of June 1991. The success of the INF Treaty owed a good deal to Soviet initiatives. Prior to 1985 negotiations on the issue had been deadlocked and were, in fact, suspended in 1983 following a Soviet withdrawal. The resumption of talks in March 1985 was soon followed by unilateral Soviet adjustments (a halt to deployment of SS-20 missiles) and negotiating concessions (a delinking of INF from strategic weapons' issues and the SDI controversy; a dropping of demands that British and French nuclear weapons be taken account of in any agreement; and an acceptance of intrusive verification). Without these moves it is unlikely that a treaty would have been signed. It is also important to bear in mind that these concessions were not simply the result of a hard-bargaining Western negotiating stance nor of a Soviet

---

32 Excluded from the discussion here is the 1991 START Treaty on the grounds that this had a less direct relevance to European security.
35 Dean, 'The INF Treaty', p.375.
volte face in the face of a Western military build-up. In other words, the Soviet Union under Gorbachev actively and consciously sought nuclear reductions for its own particular reasons. Thus, in terms of the theme of this section of the paper, the absence of intermediate nuclear forces from Europe can be seen as state of affairs that was a deliberate intention and a direct outcome of Soviet foreign policy.

Turning to conventional military reductions, here too the Soviet contribution was both deliberate and far-reaching. The key development in this regard was the CFE Treaty although prior to its signing Moscow had already undertaken important unilateral steps. These included, most importantly, Gorbachev's announcement at the UN General Assembly in December 1988 of a demobilisation of 500,000 Soviet troops (including 50,000 from ECE along 5,000 tanks). Such cuts went well beyond demands long-advocated by NATO and were implemented over the course of the next two years (dove-tailing with the removal of troops requested by ECE governments after 1989). As for the CFE Treaty itself, this was a truly historic agreement - 'the most important arms-control treaty signed in the post-war period' according to one observer. Not only did it give concrete expression to the reconciliation between the Soviet Union and NATO but it provided the framework for the controlled demilitarisation of post-Cold War (and indeed, post-Soviet) Europe. As with INF, the CFE Treaty, was reached only following significant Soviet concessions, in this case during the negotiations in 1989-1990. These had the net effect, subsequently contained in the Treaty's provisions, of imposing deeply asymmetrical cuts upon the Soviet and other Warsaw Pact militaries in order to achieve a rough equivalence between NATO and Soviet bloc forces. This was a dispensation actively pursued by the Gorbachev leadership and was fully consistent with its general objectives regarding military disarmament. That said, what was not fully appreciated during the negotiations was the limited life-span of the Warsaw Pact. Its subsequent unraveling left the Soviet Union at a quantitative disadvantage vis-a-vis NATO under CFE limits. It was on these grounds that the Soviet General Staff sought to evade certain

---

37 These were linked to (i) a shifting appreciation of the Soviet Union's defence requirements such that lower force requirements were seen as compatible with Soviet security (the notion of 'reasonable sufficiency') (ii) the need to ease the burden of defence on the Soviet economy and (iii) the desire to undertake steps that would repair relations with the West and thus create an external environment favourable to domestic reconstruction. See C.D. Blacker, Hostage to Revolution. Gorbachev and Soviet Security Policy, 1985-1991 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), pp.91-96.
41 See note. 37.
requirements of the Treaty immediately before and after its signing. The
civilian leadership, however, remained committed to its overall
implementation.\textsuperscript{42} Thus, a dispute over the status of coastal defence and
naval infantry was resolved in June 1991, Gorbachev and his new foreign
minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, on this occasion proving more
amenable in negotiations than the Chief of the Soviet General Staff,
General Mikhail Moiseyev.\textsuperscript{43}

\textit{The Regulatory Dimension}

As noted above, this dimension is comprised of two elements. The
degree of Soviet inclusion was greater in the second element (compliance
with treaty and related commitments in the security field) than in the first
(membership of formal security-related structures). As described already
with regard to the treaty provisions surrounding German unification, and
the INF and CFE treaties, the Soviet Union had been an important
participant in both the framing and subsequent implementation of security
commitments. The latter of these, moreover, envisaged a continuing
framework of consultation in the Joint Consultative Group. In addition, it
is also worth mentioning other developments with a direct bearing on
Europe: the signing of the Vienna Document (1990) on Confidence and
Security Building Measures, and the opening of negotiations on 'Open
Skies' in February 1990 and military personnel limits in July 1991 (CFE-
1A). In conjunction, these indicated an ongoing role for the Soviet Union
(and subsequently Russia) in European security governance.

These areas of involvement aside, what the Soviet Union lacked by
1991 was a formal role in security-related structures. With the dissolution
of the Warsaw Pact, the only European body in which Moscow enjoyed
full membership was the CSCE. It also held, of course, a permanent seat
in the UN Security Council, and during 1991 this took on a clear
European flavour through the beginnings of UN action regarding the
crumbling of Yugoslavia. Yet in European security neither the CSCE nor
the UN was equal in stature or potential to NATO. Membership, of the
former, moreover, held no special privileges for Moscow, as all of its
then thirty-four participating states held a right of veto on CSCE action.
The idea that the Soviet Union could resolve this sense of marginalisation
by joining NATO, although not entirely far-fetched, was never seriously
entertained. Gorbachev apparently raised the matter in an off-hand

\textsuperscript{42} J.M.O. Sharp, ‘Dismantling the Military Confrontation’, in Malcolm (ed.), \textit{Russia and Europe}, pp.87-
88.
\textsuperscript{43} M.R. Beschloss and S. Talbott, \textit{At the Highest Levels. The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War}
fashion during the Bush-Gorbachev Washington summit of May 1990 only for it to be palmed off by a joke on the part of the American president.  

1997-1999

1997 marked an important watershed in the evolution of post-Cold War security governance. The previous six years had been marked by a considerable degree of uncertainty concerning the institutional (re)configuration of security structures, and indeed, active challenges to European stability most obviously in the Balkans, but also in the Caucasus (Chechnya) and Transcaucasia (the civil war in Georgia and the Armenian-Azeri conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh). These difficulties have not been removed (indeed, if anything they have intensified with the Kosovo crisis). What has become clearer during the period after 1996, however, is the bases upon which security governance in Europe rest. The principal feature in this respect is the lead and defining role of NATO.

The manner by which this has been achieved and the Alliance's ongoing involvement in shaping security governance are central concerns of the project. Suffice to point out here some of the more obvious features of NATO's own development which have enabled it to play this role. These include: (i) a reform of command and force structure; (ii) an adaptation of strategic thinking, a restatement of NATO's core tasks and the articulation of new missions;  

(ii) an enlargement of membership;  

(iv) the establishment of cooperative arrangements with non-members,  

and (v) the institutionalisation of bilateral ties with Russia and Ukraine.  

In addition, NATO and its member states have helped define other key developments in European security. This is patently obvious in the case of the construction of a WEU/EU defence capability - something that is dependent on access to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance and participation in which will be dominated by joint EU/NATO members. It is also true in relation to the regulation of

---

44 Bush asked the former Chief of the General Staff and Gorbachev's military adviser Sergei Akhромеев how he would like to serve under an American general. See Oberdorfer, The Turn, p.417.  

45 'The Alliance's Strategic Concept' (NATO press communiqué NAC-S[99]65, 24 April 1999)  

46 The accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in March 1999.  

47 These include the 'Partnership for Peace' programme launched in 1994 and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council established in May 1997 to replace the North Atlantic Cooperation Council established in 1991.  

48 The NATO-Russia Founding Act of May 1997 and the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council established under its terms; the NATO-Russia Charter of July 1997 and the associated NATO-Ukraine Commission  

49 Washington summit communiqué, paragraph 10 (NATO press communiqué NAC-S[99]64, 24 April 1999).
conflicts in the Balkans. This is not to argue that NATO has been the only important institutional actor in the region (the roles of the UN and the OSCE are, of course, noteworthy), nor that its membership has been as one in dealing with the various crises and conflicts there (as well as divisions over strategy it is important to remember the largely unilateral role played by the US in framing the 1995 Dayton Agreement). What is crucial, however, is the fact that overt interventions in the shape of Operation Deliberate Force and the I-FOR/S-FOR undertaking in Bosnia, and Operation Allied Force in relation to Kosovo have been NATO-led and executed.

Leaving aside for now the merits of all these various initiatives they can be regarded as contributing to security governance in at least three ways. First, they have a regulatory component, in the shape of the organisational and military infrastructure of NATO itself coupled with the variety of arrangements linking NATO with non-members. Second, these initiatives have meant a continuation and, indeed, a broadening of the political purpose of the Alliance - the undertaking of defence/security coordination and the manufacturing of consensus amongst a core of European states. This is a core, moreover, whose numerical size has grown (it includes the nineteen members of the Alliance proper joined in large measure by the nine others who aspire to membership). Third, they reflect, the assumption of authority in a range of security issues. NATO has, in other words, begun to transform itself from a collective defence organisation concerned with the straightforward military protection of its members to a nascent collective security organisation which claims a responsibility for the 'security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area' as a whole.

The undoubted importance of NATO notwithstanding, the Alliance is not the sum total of European security governance. The OSCE has established a niche in the areas of conflict prevention and management and post-conflict stabilisation, as well as providing a forum since 1994 for discussions on the elaboration of a 'Common and Comprehensive Security Model'. The Council of Europe, meanwhile, has elaborated the notion of 'democratic security' as a political route to regional stability, and the CFE Treaty continues to determine post-Cold War conventional military force levels in Europe. Sub-regional initiatives have also flourished. Some of these claim quite explicit traditional security

50 At this point, I am also leaving aside the merits and effectiveness of the system of security governance itself. For the purposes of this paper - to identify a situation of inclusion/exclusion - it is necessary only to outline the structure of security governance and not to engage with it critically.
51 'The Alliance's Strategic Concept', Part I.
52 This includes, importantly, the elaboration and implementation of sub-regional CSBMs and arms control in post-Dayton Bosnia.
functions of military cooperation (e.g. the Russian dominated Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS]) or undertake contacts in non-traditional security areas relating to international crime, terrorism, environmental concerns etc. (e.g. the Black Sea Economic Cooperation grouping).\textsuperscript{54}

Yet in the main, these various arrangements cannot in any sense be regarded as constituting a form of security governance that is either an alternative to that defined by NATO or outside of its purview. Virtually all have a clear connection to the Alliance, whether this be in the shape of a formal organisational link or by virtue of the preponderant role played by NATO member states.\textsuperscript{55} The one exception to this, the CIS, does provide a vehicle for a weak form of Russian hegemony in the former Soviet Union, but it is, at present far too weak to play any meaningful role in continental European security affairs.\textsuperscript{56}

\textit{The Normative Dimension}

Comparison with the late Gorbachev period is instructive when considering the position of Russia on matters of security at the end of the 1990s. Many of the key changes in European security to which Gorbachev contributed have not been challenged by the subsequent post-Soviet leadership in Moscow. A unified Germany, the removal of a Russian military presence from ECE and the elimination of intermediate nuclear forces are considered legitimate and, thus, have not constituted a source of conflict in relations with the West. Russia, moreover, lacks any messianic ambitions toward Europe. Gorbachev removed the ideological imperative from Soviet foreign policy and the Yeltsin leadership has not replaced it with anything comparable. This is not to ignore the colourful debates in Russia on foreign policy, definitions of national interests and the country's regional and global role. These debates, however, have a distinctly instrumentalist character even if painted on a broad conceptual canvas. No credible political movement within Russia has argued in favour of an active, militarily interventionist policy aimed at subverting the European balance on ideological or power-related grounds. And even


\textsuperscript{55} These connections are detailed in Chapters 6 and 14 of \textit{The NATO Handbook, 50th Anniversary Edition} (Brussels: NATO - Office of Information and Press, 1999). This publication also contains (on p.321) the rather immodest but telling claim that since 1991 NATO has been responsible for promoting the notion of 'mutually reinforcing institutions' in the field of security, involving a coordination of the work of the OSCE, the EU, the WEU, the Council of Europe and NATO itself.

if one attributes such quiescence to a lack of economic, political and military resources, the fact remains that Russia is without any obvious objective in Europe that could be satisfied through military confrontation.\(^5\)

One major difference with the Gorbachev period, however, is striking. Gorbachev's acceptance of changes in Europe was based on an assumption that the Soviet Union was and would remain an important component of the set of new arrangements that emerged with the Cold War's demise. In the Russian case, however, there is a profound sense that these arrangements have evolved during the 1990s in a manner that is inimical to Moscow's interests. The obvious concern in this regard is, of course, NATO. Although attention is often grabbed by the chest-beating rhetoric of the Russian president, there is a relatively sophisticated set of arguments that has been made by Russian analysts and some leading politicians against the manner in which the Alliance has developed after the Cold War. This raises opposition to at least five matters: (i) NATO enlargement; (ii) NATO-centrism (i.e. the establishment of NATO as the core European security body and its consequent overidding or subordination of the OSCE and, as in the case of the Kosovo crisis, the UN); (iii) the survival of NATO as a primarily military organisation; (iv) the articulation of an Alliance military-political orientation to tasks beyond NATO territory and (v) the elevation of NATO above international law.

A full exploration of these themes will make up one element of the 'security governance' project. Suffice to say at the moment that underlying opposition on all these counts is a sense that Russian has been marginalised by NATO's ascendancy in Europe. The dominance of the Alliance (and indeed, other Western organisations such as the EU) has capped a decade of Russian geo-strategic decline and the creation of a European (and even a global) order that has been defined by the West and specifically by the US. The degree to which Russia has exaggerated this sense of isolation by its own foreign policy (and domestic) actions and the extent to which NATO (and the US and European states more generally) has and should seek to accommodate Russia and, thereby ameliorate it are, of course, matters of considerable controversy. What is obvious, however, is that a growing sense of estrangement has come to characterise Russia's interactions with the US and Europe.

Isolation, moreover, has been compounded by a growing feeling of impotence in Russia. There is now a sense of clear frustration in Moscow that Russia is, in fact, powerless to stop Alliance actions. For all its opposition to enlargement and NATO military intervention in Kosovo,

both operations have gone ahead. Both have sparked certain retaliatory responses. The Russian reaction to the Kosovo crisis will be noted below. As for NATO enlargement, several consequences have followed: the Russian Duma has refused to ratify the 1993 START II Treaty and the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention; the Russian military and civilian leaderships have posited the CIS (and also the Russian-Belarus Union) as a military counterweight to NATO; and since 1996 foreign ministers Yevgenni Primakov and Igor Ivanov have pursued the idea of a strategic alliance based around Russia, India, China and Iran. Russia has also posited the OSCE (much like Gorbachev) as the basis of a pan-European security system and thus as an alternative to NATO. Such measures have not, however, been of much positive consequence for Russia and have, if anything, only accentuated its exclusion from the mainstream of European security governance.

Taking just the last of these Russian measures, in that it has the most obvious European focus, here Russia has made a number of proposals. In the run-up to the OSCE's Budapest summit in 1994 the then Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev suggested that the OSCE should assume 'overriding responsibility for the maintenance of peace and the strengthening of democracy and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area'. To this end, it was necessary that the OSCE oversee the operations of regional security bodies (NATO, the WEU and the CIS), preferably through a new Executive Committee modeled on the UN Security Council (and like that body, including Russia as a permanent member). By 1997 Russian advocacy of the OSCE had moderated slightly (for instance in terms of how powerful its executive or 'command' functions should be), but the premise that the organisation stood as an alternative to NATO remained. Late that year Extraordinary Ambassador Vladimir Shustov referred to the OSCE as a 'roof' under which security organisations in Europe should coordinate their work. The following spring defence minister Igor Sergeyev argued in NATO's in-house journal that the Alliance should be 'transformed into a political organisation which would comprise one of the components of [a] European security ...

---

58 Both India and China have, along with Russia, been vocal critics of NATO actions with regard to Kosovo. In late May 1999 Ivanov met with Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh and announced plans to sign a declaration affirming a 'strategic partnership' between Russia and India. A similar declaration was signed with China in April 1997.


60 See N. Afanas'evskii, 'The OSCE Summit in Lisbon', International Affairs (Moscow), Vol.43(1), 1997, p.35. This shift was linked to the emergence in 1997 of Russian-NATO institutions and the realisation that a strengthened OSCE (apparent in discussions on 'OSCE first' within the organisation at that time) could detract from the UN, the one body in which Russia retained a real influence.

architecture ... based on the OSCE. Yet such proposals, however worthy in their advocacy of pan-European inclusiveness, have not been of any real appeal to the vast majority of European states (both NATO and non-NATO). The OSCE is seen as an inappropriate vehicle for traditional security functions and Moscow's suggested promotion of the organisation has been viewed as a fairly transparent effort to grant Russia a platform that would elevate, unfairly, its own status in European affairs. For these reasons Moscow's suggestions were comprehensively rejected, both at Budapest and at the subsequent OSCE review meeting at Lisbon in 1996. The most it has managed to achieve has been to initiate the as yet unfinished OSCE 'security model' discussions and to win a political acknowledgment on the part of NATO of the OSCE's 'key role in European peace and stability'.

The Intentionality Dimension

Russian opposition to NATO's central position in European security governance has not meant opposition to all NATO-related activities nor opposition to all features of security governance. In addition to acceptance of certain legacies of the late Gorbachev period (noted at the head of the previous sub-section), in at least four other areas Russia has played an important, if at times ambivalent, role in shaping security governance. This ambivalence has many sources, but NATO's re-invigoration and, in particular, the decisive turn toward enlargement after 1995 and the intervention in Kosovo have been major contributory factors. From this point Russia's participation in European security affairs, while not always uncooperative has become much more conditional and begrudging in nature.

This is clearly apparent in the first area, that relating to CFE-mandated conventional arms reductions and the adaptation of the CFE Treaty itself. Russia has been an active participant in the implementation of CFE commitments. Under the treaty Russia has been subject to the greatest burden of reductions for a single state. As of January 1997 it had undertaken reductions of 10,395 items (21.6 per cent of the total reductions under a treaty that applies to thirty states) and had hosted 425 inspections. These reductions have, in part, been necessitated by Russian budgetary cuts as much as by the terms of the CFE Treaty.

---

However, what remains noteworthy is their scale and swiftness, and the fact that Russia has adhered to commitments entered into by a previous (Soviet) regime under very different security circumstances to those pertaining when the Treaty was framed. That said, Russia's compliance with the Treaty has not been free of difficulty. By the implementation deadline of November 1995, although in accord with overall treaty limits, Russia was, nonetheless, in breach of sub-zonal territorial limits in the 'flanks' owing to its large deployments in the north Caucasus (an area that includes Chechnya) and the St Petersburg Military District bordering the Baltic states and Scandinavia. After negotiations, among the parties to the Treaty this issue was partly resolved by the Flank Document adopted at the 1996 CFE Treaty Review Conference. This raised Russia's equipment levels in the flanks and required cuts in excess of these new levels by the end of May 1999. The status of this document and Russia's intention of implementing cuts under its terms has been subsequently complicated by the issue of NATO enlargement. This is true also of wider negotiations launched in January 1997 on replacing the 1990 treaty with an adapted CFE framework. During these talks Russia proposed the continued use of a collective ceiling for military alliances (i.e. NATO) and a ban on the stationing of foreign equipment not in situ in November 1995 (thus preventing NATO from deploying forces in any new member states). These suggestions were rejected by NATO. The preliminary agreement for adapting the CFE Treaty agreed in March 1999 is thus based on national and regional ceilings. As a concession to Russia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland did agree to equipment entitlements lower than those under the 1990 treaty. Compromises were also reached on the flank issue and concerning the deployment of foreign troops. A final agreement is due to be signed at the OSCE's summit meeting in Istanbul in December 1999. Concluding this document has, however, been rendered that much more difficult by the Kosovo crisis.

Turning to the second area, that of Russian policy in the Balkans, here a similar pattern of increasingly fragile cooperation has been evident. Up until the NATO intervention in Kosovo, Russia had played a generally supportive role in attempts to bring stability to the former Yugoslavia. This, it is true, had been accompanied by policy undertcurrents that at times cut across the aims of the US and European

---

65 Under the Tashkent Document signed in May 1992 by the eight successor states within the CFE Treaty's area of application, Russia assumed responsibility for implementation of some 54 per cent of Soviet equipment reductions.
67 In early May Defence Minister Sergeyev suggested that Russia might reconsider the terms of the preliminary adaptation agreement. See International Herald Tribune, 5 May 1999.
states. Russia, for instance, was at times sympathetic to Serb positions and consistently argued in favour of UN primacy in the region rather than what it perceived as creeping US and NATO unilateralism. These currents, were not, however, designed to exploit Balkan instabilities for the sake only of competing with the West. They were motivated by three factors: first, a desire on the part of the Yeltsin administration to assuage nationalist opinion at home, particularly in the parliament; second, a desire to carve out for Russia a distinctive role befitting what is viewed as its status as a European power (hence, its emphasis on the UN where Russia had a real voice); and, third, a genuine perception that Western policy was misguided and required correction. At the same time, Moscow was also cognizant of its limited interests and influence in the conflict and of the greater ability of the Europeans and, more especially, the US, to impose a settlement. The outcome of these various calculations was a policy sometimes confrontational in its rhetoric, punctuated by the odd bid for an interventionist role (much was made in Moscow of the deal brokered in March 1994 whereby Bosnian Serbs removed their forces from around Sarajevo) but ultimately in compliance with Western-led diplomatic efforts. Hence, Russian participation in the Contact Group, its overwhelmingly supportive record of backing UN resolutions, its adherence to sanctions, and its acceptance of the 1995 Dayton peace agreement and the terms of its subsequent implementation. Hence, also its subsequent participation in both I-FOR and S-FOR. In this light, Russia can be regarded as a purposeful participant in the extension to the Balkans of aspects of security governance, at least in relation to Bosnia.

In the case of Kosovo the Russian position has clearly been of a different order. Although its policy has, in some senses, been led by factors comparable to those in Bosnia (an emphasis on the UN, a desire not to be sidelined and a sensitivity to domestic opinion) the extent of its differences with Western policy has been much greater. The civilian and military leaderships in Moscow as well as deputies in the parliament, regard the Kosovo crisis as illustrative in extremis of all their fears of NATO dominance in European security governance. In launching Operation Allied Force NATO has been accused of a circumvention of the UN, a lack of consultation with Moscow, an unnecessarily quick resort to the use of force and an extension of the Alliance's tasks beyond those of collective self-defence. Unlike the situation in Bosnia, Moscow

---

has also proven extremely reluctant to associate itself with a settlement that either legitimizes NATO's methods (hence, the demand for a cessation of air strikes before the adoption of a UN resolution) or accords NATO an unrestrained role (hence, the demand that any peace-keeping force should be mandated by the UN). Moscow, it is true, has played a role in diplomatic mediation and, the vehemence of its anti-NATO rhetoric notwithstanding, has refrained from both active resistance to the Alliance and support of the Milosevic regime. It is also probable that Moscow will play some part in whatever face-saving formula is devised to end the crisis. This, however, should not detract from the fact that whatever terms are imposed upon Serbia and whatever means are used to police them, these will have been achieved as much in opposition to Russian policy as with its support. Russian participation would, in other words, have been minimal in the extension of security governance.

A third area concerns nuclear disarmament and arms control. In this area Russia has made an important contribution to nuclear non-proliferation in Europe by securing the removal (completed by the end of 1996) of former Soviet strategic nuclear warheads from Ukraine and Belarus. Apart from its obvious strategic aspects this process was also significant in terms of security governance in that it involved, alongside Russia, the active diplomatic participation of the US, the accession of Belarus and Ukraine to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states, and the formal entry into force (in December 1994) of the 1991 START Treaty. Less progress has been made in controls on tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs). Russia did oversee the removal of former Soviet stocks from ECE and former Soviet republics by the middle of 1992 and has also undertaken unilateral cuts in its TNW stocks. However, Russia is estimated to retain a considerable stockpile and no treaty framework has yet been negotiated to ensure disarmament in this field. The Russia-US summit in March 1997 did agree to the creation of a forum to discuss 'possible measures' regarding TNWs but the prospect of progress has receded following NATO enlargement. Indeed, strategic military thinking in Russia now places a greater emphasis on these weapons as a means of compensating for NATO's conventional military superiority.

---


70 As of writing, Russia has not breached the arms embargo against Serbia nor dispatched offensive naval units to the Adriatic. Moscow has indicated its support of Yugoslav territorial integrity (i.e. that Kosovo remain a province of Serbia) but it has not condoned the 'ethnic cleansing' carried out by Serb units and in a joint communiqué of G8 foreign ministers in mid May 1999 called for the withdrawal of Serb forces.

71 Hence, at the end of April 1999 Yeltsin signed decrees which, according to Security Council Secretary Vladimir Putin, covered the 'development of the nuclear weapons complex and a concept for developing and using non-strategic nuclear weapons'. According to one report, under this concept
The fourth area, finally, concerns conflict management and principally the OSCE. As noted above Moscow has tried unsuccessfully to convert this organisation into a central coordinating body of European security. Instead of assuming this role, the OSCE has, since its institutionalisation in 1990, developed other areas of competence in the fields of (post) conflict prevention and management (also noted above). Russia's contribution to this has been important, if at times ambivalent. Consistent with its case in favour of strengthening the organisation, Moscow has welcomed the OSCE's growing role in these areas. Significantly, this has been a role Russia has been prepared to endorse in relation to conflicts within its own territory (the OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya) and in neighbouring states (Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and the Baltic states). In this sense, Russia has been a purposeful participant in elevating the OSCE to the position of one of Europe's principal multilateral instruments of conflict diplomacy. That said, Russia's cooperation with the OSCE has not always been trouble free. It has at times frustrated the work of OSCE missions on the ground (as in Moldova) and sought to inject specifically Russian positions into OSCE mediation efforts (as in the OSCE Minsk Group's efforts in Azerbaijan's Nagorno-Karabakh enclave). Such practices had been most apparent in the early-mid 1990s but had become less pernicious in 1996-1998.\footnote{This shift after 1995 was linked partly to Russia's general case in favour of the OSCE. In addition, Russia has welcomed OSCE efforts owing to the intractable nature of conflicts within or near its periphery, and because of the failure of its unilateral diplomatic and military interventions (in Chechnya notably but also in Nagorno-Karabakh) in the period up to 1995.} With the NATO intervention in Kosovo Russian diplomacy may well become more unhelpful once more, both in relation to conflicts around its own borders and elsewhere.\footnote{Logically speaking Russia could take the opposite course in order to demonstrate the credentials of the OSCE as an alternative to NATO. In the short term, however, Russian cooperation within the OSCE may fall victim to the general souring of diplomatic relations with the US and European states evident in 1999. The signs thus far are that Russia has attempted to pursue both options - thus in April-May 1999, Russian delegates effectively glued up the work of the OSCE's Permanent Council in Vienna through continual efforts to raise the matter of Kosovo.}

\textit{The Regulatory Dimension}

By the late 1990s Russian inclusion in the regulation of security governance seems at first sight substantial. Russia, as already indicated, is a major party to the key-note treaty of post-Cold War security, that of CFE. It has retained or assumed membership of bodies which have played a central or indirect role in European security, including the UN Security Council, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the Group of Eight tactical nuclear weapons would be used against attacks from conventional weapons. See \textit{The Guardian}, 30 April 1999, p.14.
and the Contact Group on Yugoslavia. Russia has also enjoyed a relatively favoured status in bilateral, 'minilateral' and various *ad hoc* arrangements and initiatives. Some of these are no more than symbolic (e.g. the so-called 'troika' summit of the Presidents of France, Germany and Russia in March 1998) but others are of real substance (the variety of contacts with Russia during 1999 on the Kosovo crisis).

However, in a system of security governance increasingly defined by NATO, what really matters is how far Russia is involved in, and attuned to, Alliance-related mechanisms. Yeltsin and successive foreign ministers have recognised the fact that NATO's key role in Europe necessitates an engagement with it on Russia's part. This initially took a rather utopian bent with Yeltsin raising the prospect in December 1991 of full membership of the Alliance for Russia. More consistently, Russian policy has been based on obtaining terms of engagement that have offered it a special place in NATO arrangements. Prior to 1997 demands of this nature had a certain, limited impact. NATO mechanisms such as NACC and Partnership for Peace (PFP) had a clear egalitarian nature and Russian claims that its greater weight needed to be taken into account only won it symbolic privileges. Russia did, however, become an active, if not entirely enthusiastic participant in these bodies.

The terms of the relationship underwent a qualitative alteration in 1997 with the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the subsequent formation of the Permanent Joint Council (PJC). While the basic disagreement on enlargement was not resolved by the Act, Russia was heartened by specific pledges relating to the modalities of this process (e.g. the absence of nuclear weapons in the new entrant states and the transparency of military integration in ECE) and by the institutionalisation of mechanisms of consultation and cooperation unparalleled for a non-NATO member.

In the eighteen months or so to the beginning of 1999, the PJC and bodies acting under its aegis initiated a range of technical consultations and work plans, and PJC sessions of ambassadors and of Foreign Ministers became a forum for discussions on a range of European security issues (terrorism, CFE, Bosnia, Kosovo). It remains moot how constructive and far-reaching these interactions have been but there

---

74 BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/1262 A1/1, 23 December 1991. This suggestion has been raised subsequently but more with the aim of transforming the Alliance that integrating Russia. In late 1998 Defence Minister Sergeyev, for instance, suggested, that Russia would join a NATO that was politically subordinate to the OSCE.

75 In June 1994 Kozyrev signed the PFP framework document after an accompanying Protocol had been agreed that referred to Russia's special status as 'a major European, world and nuclear power'. In November 1995 Russian and US Ministers of Defence signed a special command and control mechanism for Russian troops involved in I-FOR.

76 For a rather jaundiced view from the Russian side see the article by Col-Gen. Leonid Ivashev (Chief of the Russian Federation Defence Ministry Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation)
mere existence does arguably register something, however minor, on the scale of inclusion in security governance. That said, some fundamental and ultimately debilitating areas of disagreement have also emerged. These essentially revolve around differing interpretations of how constraining (for NATO) or how empowering (for Russia) the Founding Act and the PJC should be. The oft-repeated NATO formula in this regard is that Russia has 'a voice but not a veto' in the affairs of the Alliance. Russia, however, has placed a seemingly greater weight by the Act. Yeltsin shortly after its signing referred to its 'binding' character and the fact that the PJC it mandated would permit Russia and NATO to 'jointly resolve on an equal basis questions of security in Europe'. True to this interpretation Russian officials expressed outrage at NATO's launch of Operation Deliberate Force in March 1999. Moscow argued that the absence of prior consultation and the sidelining of both the UN, the OSCE and the PJC itself breached provisions of the Act. In response Russia suspended its participation in the PJC.

CONCLUSION

By way of conclusion, I would like to offer two points of self-criticism. First, it could reasonably be argued that this paper amounts to nothing other than a rather long-winded way of saying that the Soviet Union/Russia was on the wrong side when the Cold War ended. But this is in itself a crucial point. Since 1989 security governance in Europe has developed in a manner that reflects what Norman Davies has termed the 'Allied Scheme'. This is a view of Europe (and of the international system more broadly) that is derived from Allied victories in 1918, 1945 and 1989. It holds to a belief in the superiority of 'Western' values (democracy, the rule of law and a free market) and an assumption that organisations of West European and Euro-Atlantic origin embody


77 'Text of President Yeltsin's Radio Address on NATO-Russia Agreement', 29 May 1997 as carried on Johnson's Russia List (electronic edition) 1 June 1997.

78 The Founding Act refers to the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for maintaining international peace and security and to the OSCE as 'the inclusive and comprehensive organisation for consultation, decision-making and cooperation in its area'. The PJC, meanwhile, is referred to as 'the principal venue of consultation between NATO and Russia in times of crisis or for any other situation affecting peace and stability'. The Russian case rests on a view that these clauses were overridden. NATO's response has been to argue that while the UN and the PJC may have principal or primary jurisdiction, they do not have exclusive jurisdiction on matters affecting European security.

79 Russia also withdrew its ambassador from NATO HQ and suspended activities under PFP. Its participation in S-FOR, however, has continued.
tried and tested practices of international cooperation and thus should continue to form the basis of European organisation. Such a scheme does allow some indulgence toward Russia but in terms of its locus of power, institutional design and conceptual basis places that state in position where it is constantly trying to catch up with the evolution of European affairs. This is a condition aggravated further by Russia's own internal weaknesses and the broader decline of its international prestige and influence. Russia simply lacks the wherewithal to challenge NATO-led security governance or to construct a viable alternative to it. This marginalisation of Russia has been cushioned to a point by that country's involvement in the development of some aspects of security governance. That said, NATO proper - the core of security governance - remains off-limits to Russia. The great contrast between the two periods covered in this paper is the extent to which in the latter period exclusion of this type has influenced the overall tone and motivation of Soviet/Russian engagement in European security. In this light, NATO enlargement and Alliance intervention in Kosovo, however well-intentioned, have been defining moments. They have had the effect of creating incentives on Russia's part to defect from those aspects of European security governance in which its participation is important.

The second point concerns the notion of security governance itself. At the outset it was suggested that consensus and shared goals constitute some of its defining qualities. In this light, it might reasonably be asked whether a system that generates a degree of dissent and consequent non-compliance is a system of governance at all. In reply one might argue that the dissenters are few in number and that even a withdrawal of Russia, the most consequential, would make little difference in that there would remain a sufficient consensus amongst most of the remaining European states (i.e. the NATO members plus the aspirant members and, in some respects, the neutral states) to give the system effect. This would, however, be a form of governance incomplete in several respects. Geographically, it would not extend to a major part of European territory; politically it would be denied the little (but at times still significant) diplomatic influence Russia wields in some quarters (e.g. in Minsk, Yerevan and Belgrade); institutionally it would freeze the contribution of the UN and the OSCE, owing to the threat of a Russian veto; and militarily it would jeopardise the major gains achieved within the CFE framework. Even in its current dissatisfied position a partial withdrawal of Russia threatens similar, albeit less grave consequences. In this light, security governance would seem as appropriate a concept for

---

understanding what is missing as what is present in the organisation of Europe.