

**EXPLAINING THE GENDER GAP: WOMEN, ECONOMIC
VULNERABILITY, AND PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION**

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Abstract

Do European men and women differ in their attitudes toward European integration? Yes. Using *Eurobarometer 42*, we demonstrate a consistent difference in attitude toward European integration between women and men across the European Union (EU) and Norway, with women less enthusiastic about the process. How do we explain the gender gap in public attitudes toward integration? Drawing on European welfare state literature and work on women and European integration, particularly in the Nordic countries, we developed an explanatory model that focuses on an individual's subjective and objective economic vulnerability. We hypothesize that the more economically insecure a respondent is and feels, the less likely he or she will show support for integration. The model we develop includes the following variables: subjective perception of personal and national economic situation, women-friendly nature of the welfare state, education, wealth, social class, number of children, view of traditional gender roles, and age. Using linear regression (OLS) we find perceived economic security to be a powerful predictor of both men's and women's attitudes toward integration, but women's attitudes more so than men's. Women are also more affected than men by the nature of the welfare state and other objective measures of economic security. Economic uncertainty is the key to understanding women's skepticism toward integration. A more competitive market and a perceived threat to national welfare states increases anxiety among women and leads to lower levels of support for the process of integration.

Do European men and women differ in their attitudes toward European integration?

For at least two reasons we should expect a gender gap in attitudes toward integration. First, students of European public opinion have long noted differences in political attitudes and behavior among European men and women (Margaret Inglehart, 1981; Ronald Inglehart, 1990, pp. 349-350; Jelen, *et al.*, 1992; Morgan and Wilcox, 1992; Togeby, 1994). Furthermore, these differences are sometimes directly related to the European Union (EU) (Manigart and Marlier, 1993; Dobratz, 1993; by contrast, see Caldeira and Gibson, 1995).¹ Second, recent studies on the Danish referenda on the Maastricht Treaty (Siune, 1993; Svensson, 1994) and the 1994 Nordic referenda on EU membership (held in Finland, Sweden, and Norway) point to a substantial difference in men's and women's voting patterns, with women voting "no" to greater integration in much larger proportions than men (Tiilikainen, 1996; Sæter, 1996; Laatikainen, 1996). Few scholars, however, have attempted to identify and explain a gender gap in EU attitudes. This research note pushes forward this task by building on a previous study (Nelsen and Fraser, 1997).

THE GENDER GAP IN PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Data

We used *Eurobarometer 42: The First Year of the New European Union November-December 1994* (Reif and Marlier, 1997) as the data set for this study. This Eurobarometer offers several advantages. First, it includes the twelve EU member states, plus the soon-to-be (January 1, 1995) new member states Austria, Finland and Sweden, as well as Norway—which turned down membership after a negative referendum result. While some relevant questions were not asked in Austria, Finland, and Sweden, the addition of Norway added a strong Nordic dimension to the survey. Second, the timing of the survey in late 1994 was particularly appropriate. Just a year had passed since the implementation of the Maastricht treaty and, more importantly, the referenda campaigns for EU membership in Austria, Finland, Norway, and Sweden were ongoing or had just been completed. EU membership was front-page news and as fresh in many peoples' minds as it was going to be until the introduction of the euro in 1999. Third, *Eurobarometer 42* (*EB42*)—as is explained below—contains several questions particularly suited to exploring hypotheses aimed at explaining the gender gap.

The Dependent Variable: Attitude Toward European Integration

Our dependent variable—what we are trying to explain—is *attitude toward European integration*. Operationalizing the variable required some experimentation. *EB42* contains six

¹Throughout this paper the term "European Union" will stand for the political and economic entity established by the Treaties of Rome, otherwise known as the "European Economic Community" or "European Community."

questions aimed at determining European attitudes toward integration. Factor analyses and reliability tests (results not shown) indicated that three questions tapped the relevant attitudes best: 1) “In general, are you for or against European unification?”; 2) “Generally speaking, do you think that (our country’s) membership of the European Union is a good thing, neither good nor bad, or a bad thing?”; and 3) “Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (our country) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?” Based on these results, we created an additive index as our measure of attitude toward European integration ($\alpha=.7801$)—with values ranging from “1” (low level of support) to “7” (high level of support).

The Gender Gap

Earlier time-series analysis covering the years 1970-1992 demonstrated that women are less enthusiastic about European integration than men (Nelsen and Fraser, 1997). A small but significant difference between men’s and women’s attitudes toward integration existed at the bivariate level for nine of thirteen member states (Northern Ireland was analyzed as a separate unit) and the pooled (EU) sample. For our purposes here, a simple means test applied to *EB42* is adequate to demonstrate a continuing gender gap.

Table 1 reports the mean scores for our dependent variable for each country in the survey and the EU as a whole, then separates out the scores for males and females. Lower scores mean less support for the EU; higher scores mean higher support. The last column reports the difference between the male and female scores (Male minus Female). A modest gender gap exists in the EU as a whole and in every country except Germany with women showing more skepticism toward the EU than men everywhere but in Spain. Large gaps appear in Sweden, Denmark, Norway, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Portugal and the Netherlands. Very small gaps exist in Italy, Finland, Belgium and France. While size varies by country, a clear gender gap exists in attitudes toward integration, thus raising the central question of this study: why are European women less supportive of integration than men?

[Table 1 about here]

EXPLAINING THE GENDER GAP

Matthew Gabel (1998) has recently argued that utilitarian attitudes toward integration—which our attitudinal variable measures²—vary according to the interests of the respondents. He states:

²Gabel (1998) labels the “for or against” question—one of the questions in our additive index—an affective survey question. However, he qualifies this by stating: “I am not convinced that responses to this question are exclusively determined by global affective orientations because the wording of this question is ambiguous. Depending on how respondents conceive of the ‘Unification of Western Europe,’ utilitarian concerns might influence their responses to this question” (p. 21). Our statistical tests indicate that this question does measure the same utilitarian attitudes that the other two questions uncover.

the economic consequences of European integration differentially influence citizens' welfare depending on their economic and political interests. In turn, citizens vary in their support for integration consistent with their economic and political interests concerning integration (p. 109).

In other words, European citizens are rational actors who make a cost-benefit assessment of the *personal* value of integration. If we want to know why individuals do or do not support integration, we must look at what is in it for them personally.

Why might women see integration as a threat to their interests? Clues can be found in the Nordic referendum campaigns of 1994 where women opposed to membership argued that the EU posed a threat to the substantial benefits women receive from the Nordic welfare states (Laatikainen, 1996; Nelsen, 1993). European integration (as defined by the EU) meant the subordination of social needs to economic interests—a process the “no” campaigns asserted was most often detrimental to women. In our previous study we found some evidence that the type of welfare state a respondent lived in did have some independent influence on attitudes toward integration, but the measures used in that study were open to question (Nelsen and Fraser, 1997). Additional clues as to why women are less likely to support integration come from feminist scholars who have recently argued that European integration is “gendered” because its economic costs are borne more heavily by women than men—an idea we explore further below (Laatikainen, 1996; see also the contributions in García-Ramon and Monk, 1996).

These clues from the EU literature suggest that economic interests account for lower levels of support for integration—for all respondents, and for women in particular. Citizens who feel threatened by the changes or possible changes brought on by integration are, as Gabel (1998) has shown, less likely to support the integration process. Since women are often less economically independent and more vulnerable to economic change than men, we might expect lower levels of support for integration. *Does economic vulnerability affect support for integration in different ways for men and women?* We tackle this question by first measuring economic vulnerability.

Independent Variables: Measures of Economic Vulnerability

Objective Measures

Economic vulnerability can be measured in both objective and subjective ways. Objective measures assess respondents' tangible assets and liabilities; subjective measures tap respondents' feelings of economic vulnerability. Several objective measures of economic vulnerability are available to us in *EB42*. These include:

Education: age when respondent stopped full-time education. Lower ages, and therefore a lower level of formal education, indicate higher economic vulnerability.

Material Possessions: *EB42* does not have a measure of income, but it does count the number of possessions owned by the respondent from a list that includes a color TV set, video recorder, video camera, radio-clock, home computer, still camera, electric drill, electric deep fat fryer, two

or more cars, and a second home. Fewer objects indicate lower levels of well-being and, thus, higher economic vulnerability.

Social Class: subjective assessment of social class. This self-placement is the best measure we have of objective social class. Lower class placement indicates higher economic vulnerability.

Number of Children: number of children under 15 living at home. More children indicate greater expenditures and less time for income-producing activities and, therefore, higher economic vulnerability.

We use one more objective measure that we created to tap a specific aspect of women's economic vulnerability. It requires a somewhat longer explanation.

Feminist scholars have argued that women, who find they fall disproportionately into the economically vulnerable categories on most objective measures, are more dependent than men on the European welfare state for their security. As mentioned above, evidence from the Nordic membership campaigns suggests that women perceived the EU as a threat to existing welfare benefits and therefore opposed integration. The perception has its roots in feminist critiques of the modern European state.

Feminist writers almost universally place responsibility for much of the oppression of women in the modern era on "bourgeois liberalism's" insistence on a strict division between public and private spheres. This public-private split is "gendered" because it assigns men to the public arena—where economic, intellectual, and cultural production takes place—while confining women to the private sphere—the home—and its reproductive function (Laatikainen, 1996). The gendered nature of the public-private split, which the liberal state has long enforced, has, according to feminist writers, silenced women by keeping them from the centers of productive power in modern capitalist democracies (see, for example, Elshtain, 1981). The late twentieth century, however, has seen the barriers to women's participation in the public arena, especially in Northern Europe, begin to break down (see Lovenduski, 1986; Lewis, 1993). Much of the responsibility for increased women's involvement in the economy (as paid producers) and in the democratic polity (as voters, party and interest group activists, and democratic officeholders) lies with the creation of welfare states specifically designed, at least in part, to free women from the private, reproductive activities of the home. Modern European welfare states provide universal health care; some take on a portion of responsibility for child and elder care; some actively encourage fathers (through paternal leave programs) to perform more home duties; and most train women for the workforce. Thus, the well-developed welfare state has been, according to feminist writers, an instrument of women's liberation in the twentieth century.³

Many feminist scholars who see the European welfare state as a liberator also see the EU as an enemy intent on undermining the recent gains made by women. To these scholars European

³American scholars have also applied this reasoning to attempts to explain why U.S. women like the welfare state more than men (Andersen, 1999).

integration looks like a massive attempt to elevate market demands over societal needs. Kofman and Sales (1996) put it this way:

The continuing integration of European space is increasingly shaped by a neo-liberal agenda which fundamentally challenges the principles on which the postwar welfare states were built. As global economic competition undermines the ability of individual states to carry out independent economic policy, welfare policies are being subordinated to policies aimed at cost-cutting and maintaining profitability. Reliance on market solutions, and reductions in social expenditure, suggest that responsibility for welfare will increasingly fall on the family, and primarily on women (p. 31).

Market forces, encouraged by EU policy, will pressure member states to homogenize their social and welfare policies at some unacceptably low level (Monk and García-Ramon, 1996).⁴ Whether this is actually occurring or not is beyond the scope of this paper. What we are interested in is whether or not women base their attitude toward integration, at least in part, on their perception of an EU threat to the benefits they already receive. For some women the EU will appear threatening, but to other women EU social policy may look like an improvement over what they have. In other words, women may decide what they think about the EU after comparing their present system with what they perceive to be EU social policy, then determining their net gain or loss. Thus, where they “stand” on European integration depends on the state in which they “sit.”

Developing a measure of “women-friendly” welfare states is difficult. Students of European social policy have devised several schemes for categorizing welfare states, with feminists most concerned with the state’s role in challenging or reinforcing patriarchal social structures (Epsing-Andersen, 1990; Liebfried, 1993; Duncan, 1996; Langan and Ostner, 1991, as cited in Duncan, 1996). Disappointing results using a number of different groupings (Nelsen and Fraser, 1997) prompted us to devise a more precise measure of “women-friendly welfare state.”

We identified five social policies that, whether intended or not, serve to ease the private care-giving burdens of women. These include *family benefits* (payments made by the state to families, based typically on the number and age of the children living at home), *maternal leave* (mother’s work leave granted before and after the birth of a child), *paternal leave* (father’s work leave granted after the birth of a child, which allows women to return to work and encourages men to take a more active role in child rearing), *lone parent benefits* (extra payments made by the state to single parents, typically mothers), and *child care* (state support—usually through subsidies—available to working parents for child care). While precise, comparable information on these policies is difficult to obtain, we were eventually able to describe these policies (as of 1995 for most countries) for each of the EU member states and Norway (see Table 2). We then compared the policies and gave each country a score on each policy from “1” (low benefit) to “4” (high benefit). The scores are reported in Table 3. A factor analysis revealed that each policy variable loads on a single factor. Therefore, we created an additive index (see Table 3) that yields a cumulative score ranging from “5” (low benefit) to “20” (high benefit):

⁴Logically, of course, policies could converge on a high standard, but this does not seem likely to most feminists.

Women-Friendly Welfare State: a measure of the state's role in easing women's care-giving burden. A low score indicates less economic security, and, thus, higher economic vulnerability.

[Tables 2 and 3 about here]

Subjective Measure

Subjective measures tap a respondents' *perceived* economic vulnerability. *EB42* asks a series of nine questions concerning the respondents view of the past and future regarding 1) his or her personal economic situation and 2) the country's economic performance. A factor analysis revealed a single factor underlying all of these questions indicating that perceptions of personal and national economic well-being are thoroughly intertwined. A reliability test for an additive index yielded an alpha of .8383. Thus, we created a subjective variable:

Economic Optimism: a measure of the respondent's perceived economic vulnerability. A low score indicates high perceived vulnerability.

Ideological Measure

EB42 also includes a five-question series that measures a respondent's view of traditional gender roles. We assume that individuals, particularly women, with non-traditional views are likely to depend less on male bread-winners and more on the welfare state for security. Again a factor analysis and reliability test indicate that a single measure combining these questions is justified (alpha=.7903). Thus we include an ideological measure:

Non-Traditional Roles: a measure of the respondent's attitude toward traditional gender roles. A high score indicates disagreement with traditional gender roles and support for non-traditional roles.

Miscellaneous Demographic Measure

A final demographic measure included in our analysis is age. Since child-bearing years are relatively early in life when income is often low, we might assume that young people, especially mothers, will be more economically vulnerable than older individuals. Thus,

Age: a measure of a respondent's chronological age. Lower ages indicate higher vulnerability.

Method

To test the impact of these variables on attitude toward integration, we entered all the independent variables into a multiple regression (OLS) predicting support for the European Union. As we are interested not only in how gender-related ideology might affect such sentiment, but also the different ways these factors might influence male and female attitudes, we ran separate regressions for each gender. As support for the EU varies significantly from member to

member, we also included dummy variables to control for country effects, using French and German citizens as the suppressed reference category. As these nationals fall very near the weighted mean for the entire sample, this seems to be a reasonable choice. (Experimentation with a control variable with individual scores set to the national mean produced very similar results.) In Table 4 we report only the results for the ideological and social variables, but the total variance explained reflects the impact of country dummies as well.

[Table 4 about here]

Analysis

The results shown in Table 4 demonstrate significant differences between men and women in what best predicts attitudes toward integration. The most powerful predictor of attitude for both sexes is our subjective measure of economic vulnerability, “economic optimism.” Individuals who are optimistic about the economy are more likely to support integration, while respondents who are economically pessimistic are less likely to support integration. The measure is powerful for both men and women, but is much more powerful for women than men. Women who perceive themselves to be economically vulnerable are, in fact, less willing to support the EU.

The objective variables also yield differing results for men and women. As we expected, women in more women-friendly welfare states are less likely to favor integration, while the same cannot be said for the men (the coefficient points in the right direction but is not significant). Women in women-friendly welfare states apparently do feel more vulnerable when faced with the possibility that changes brought about by integration will weaken the benefits they receive from their own states. This goes a long way toward explaining why Nordic women who enjoy substantial benefits from women-friendly welfare states are some of the most vociferous opponents of European integration.

Other objective measures are somewhat less important for women. More education leads to higher support for integration for women, but it stands as a much more powerful predictor of men’s attitudes. Subjective social class works in a similar fashion, although women are slightly more influenced by class than men. The number of material possessions also works for women, but does not produce a significant coefficient for men. If this variable does, in fact, measure wealth, then the more materially comfortable the women the more she will embrace integration, at least in comparison to men. The coefficients for number of children point in the right direction for both men and women, with the coefficient for women slightly larger, although neither result is significant—a somewhat disappointing finding. In sum, objective measures of economic vulnerability do significantly influence attitudes toward integration, especially for women. Women with less education, fewer material possessions, and lower class backgrounds are more likely to be skeptical about integration. While almost the same can be said for men, the measures (with the exception of education) are not as powerful as they are for women. These findings confirm Gabel’s (1998) conclusion that European citizens in the best position to take advantage of an integrated, competitive market—namely the well-educated, upper class, wealthier and unencumbered individuals—are more likely to embrace integration. Conversely, the less-educated, lower class, poorer and encumbered (i.e., parents) citizens will be less able, and

therefore, willing to take advantage of the opportunities provided by the EU. This is true for all EU citizens, but more so for women who may fear that any safety net they might have now may be threatened by integration.

While women's attitudes are quite powerfully influenced by economic optimism and objective measures of vulnerability, men's attitudes are more influenced by their views on gender roles. Men with non-traditional views of gender, even when controlling for the objective variables, are more favorable toward integration than traditional men. Presumably men with non-traditional views are more cosmopolitan and, therefore, more interested in international integration—but the same does not hold for women. Non-traditional women (i.e., feminists) show a slight tendency to favor integration, but a strong feminist element that distrusts the EU may counter the cosmopolitan outlook that holds sway for men. The same pattern also holds for age. As expected the older an individual the more likely he or she is to support integration. The young tend to be more economically vulnerable and, therefore, less likely to favor the EU. But the results for men and women are quite different, with age showing a significant effect on men but not on women. Older men may be more likely to support integration because older cohorts are still influenced by World War II and its aftermath. Older women may also favor integration for similar reasons (the coefficient is pointed in the same direction), but the effect is much smaller.

CONCLUSION

In summary, our analysis demonstrates that women's attitudes toward European integration are strongly affected by their objective and subjective economic vulnerability. While not all of our measures of economic vulnerability worked as expected, the pattern is clear: economically vulnerable women tend to view the process of integration as a threat to their economic well-being. Women are also more affected than men by the nature of the welfare state and other objective measures of economic security. Economic uncertainty is the key to understanding women's skepticism toward integration. A more competitive market and a perceived threat to national welfare states increases anxiety among women and leads to lower levels of support for the process of integration.

Further research must be done before we fully understand the relationship between women, economic vulnerability, and attitudes toward integration. Additional experimentation with our data leads us to believe that a complex relationship exists between perceived economic vulnerability and the remaining variables, particularly "women-friendly welfare state." Thorough investigation may yield a path model that shows our independent variables to affect attitudes more indirectly through perceived economic uncertainty. But that remains for future exploration.

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TABLE 1: Mean Support for European Integration by Sex and Country*

COUNTRY	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	MALE-FEMALE
Ireland	5.94	6.06	5.82	0.24
Italy	5.79	5.80	5.79	0.01
Greece	5.67	5.73	5.60	0.13
Portugal	5.59	5.69	5.50	0.19
Netherlands	5.56	5.65	5.48	0.17
Belgium	5.27	5.31	5.23	0.08
Germany	5.17	5.17	5.17	0.00
France	5.00	5.04	4.96	0.08
Finland	4.96	4.99	4.94	0.05
Spain	4.82	4.78	4.87	-0.09
Denmark	4.75	5.07	4.41	0.66
Austria	4.51	4.56	4.46	0.10
Norway	4.39	4.61	4.15	0.46
United Kingdom	4.37	4.53	4.20	0.33
Sweden	4.32	4.81	3.79	1.02
Total**	5.08	5.14	5.01	0.13

* The reported means are derived from an additive scale combining the three questions identified in the text. The scale runs from 1 (low level of support) to 7 (high level of support).

**Luxembourg and Northern Ireland are included in the totals, but not reported separately due to the small number of cases.

Table 2: Descriptions of Women-Friendly Welfare State Policies

THE COUNTRY	MATERNITY LEAVE	FATHERLY LEAVE	FAMILY BENEFITS	CHILD CARE BENEFITS	LONG-TERM BENEFITS
AUSTRIA	100% salary for 16 weeks if insured.	flat rate payment with two year parental leave.	Annual: Sch 18,600 for children under 10, and Sch 15, 600 for others. Universal, nontaxable. See Table 2A.	None.	None.
BELGIUM	82% salary for first month, 75% for 11 weeks, if insured.	-----	Universal, nontaxable. See Table 2A.	None.	None.
DENMARK	4 weeks pre-natal, 24 post-natal: Blue collars receive 90% salary; white collar get at least 50% for 21 weeks.	After 14 weeks, either parent can take 10 weeks with a 90% guarantee.	Annual: Dkr 9600 per child aged 0-2; Dkr 8600 per child 3-6; and Dkr 6,600 per child 7-17. Universal and nontaxable.	Subsidized day care available to all households. No charge if income is below Dkr 89301.	Receive normal family benefits but also qualify for additional payments of Dkr 3,372 per year (independent of the number of children) plus Dkr 4,416 per child aged 0-6 and Dkr 8,436 per child if alimony is not received.
FINLAND	105 days of entitlement calculated on basis of latest earnings. Other benefits: either a box including layette for baby or a compensating sum of 800 FIM.	Father gets 6-12 days @ birth and 6 weekdays afterwards, paid by social security. After maternity leave is up, either parent can take 158 weekdays.	See Table 2B. Universal and nontaxable.	Monthly income depending on income bracket. See Table 2C.	Additional allowance of Fmk 200 per month. Child also receives maintenance payment if parent liable for child support does not.
FRANCE	100% earnings to max limit if insured: 16 weeks if first child, 26 weeks for subsequent child, up to 46 weeks for multiple births. Receives 5 prenatal and 5 postnatal exams, maternity belt, preparatory course and confinement.	Father gets 3 days of leave at child's birth. Either can take up to 3 years of unpaid leave after maternity leave.	See Table 2D. Universal and nontaxable.	Home Child Care Allowance compensates for social security contributions paid to employ an at-home care provider.	Means tested payment. Allocation de parent isole (API) worth FF 3488.49 per month for mother plus FF 1,162.83 per child. Nontaxable.
GERMANY	100% earnings for 6 weeks, then 80% earnings for 8 weeks.	Up to 12 months of unpaid leave for either parent.	Universal and nontaxable. DM 840 per year for 1 st ; DM 1560 for 2 nd ; DM 2640 for 3 rd and DM 2.880 for fourth.	Child care can be covered by social assistance if income is low enough.	Social assistance is higher for lone parents than for other families.

EU COUNTRY	MATERNITY LEAVE	PATERNITY LEAVE	FAMILY MEMBERS	CHILD CARE BENEFITS	LOVE PARENT BENEFITS
GREECE	50% of reference salary for 16 weeks to working mothers.	No paternal. Either parent can take 3 months of unpaid leave, and lone parents can take 6 months.	In ECUs/month: 1 st —3.0 2 nd —17.2 3 rd —47.2		
IRELAND	70% earnings up to a ceiling and with a minimum for 14 weeks if insured.	No paternal or parental provisions.	IR27 per month for first two; IR32 per month for each subsequent. Not means tested. Nontaxable.	None.	Amount depends on lone parent income. The weekly benefit rate is IR 62.50 if weekly gross earnings are less than IR 600. Benefit rate for dependent child increase is IR 15.20 per week. Taxable, but not liable to social security contributions. Increased family allowances. See Table 2F.
ITALY	80% earnings for 5 months if insured.	Additional 30% salary for 6 months for either parent.	Means tested against total family taxable income. See Table 2E.	None.	
LUXEMBOURG	100% earnings for 16 weeks if insured. Also birth payment in 3 installments.	Holiday law allows father 2 days of paid leave.	Not means tested, nontaxable. See Table 2G.	For parents who stay at home with children. Must not be employed in labor force unless income is below a certain level. Calculated benefit at 100% is LF 16058/month.	Special tax allowance of LF 77,400, but no benefits.
NETHERLANDS	100% earnings for 16 weeks if insured.	Collective agreement allows 2 days paid paternal leave. Either parent can take leave on an unpaid part-time basis for a max of 6 months.	Not means tested. Nontaxable. See Table 2H.	Local schemes to reduce child center fees.	Special tax allowance but no specific benefits.
PORTUGAL	100% earnings for 98 days with 60 days after confinement if insured.	Either parent can take unpaid leave of 6 months to 2 years to look after children less than 3 years old.	ESC 30,960 per child per year. Not means tested. Nontaxable.	None.	None.

EU COUNTRY	MATERNITY LEAVE	PATERNITY LEAVE	FAMILY BENEFITS	CHILD CARE BENEFITS	LONE PARENT BENEFITS
SPAIN	100% benefit base 16 weeks if insured.	Father is required to take last four weeks of maternity leave. Also either can take up to 3 years unpaid leave.	Means tested. Taxable. Plus 3,000 per month per child.	None.	None.
SWEDEN	450 weekdays (60 must be taken by mother before parturition), 90% for first 360 days and reduced rate for remainder.	Maternity leave (except for 60 days) can be split. Fathers compelled to take one month, or risk losing benefits.	Skz 9000 per child per year with a supplement of Skz 2,400 for third child, Skz 7200 for 4 th , Skz 9000 for 5 th and subsequent. Not means tested. Nontaxable.	Child care is heavily subsidized by state and local government.	Each child 16 or under (or under 20 if in school) from a lone parent family qualifies. The monthly amount is Skz 1,173 per child, that is Skz 14,076 yearly. Non means tested and is tax exempt. Lone parents also receive full child care benefits.
UNITED KINGDOM	Statutory Maternity Pay (SMP) for 18 weeks. 90% of average weekly earnings for first 6 weeks and to rate of UK 52.5 for remaining 12 weeks. Also a maternity allowance for those not qualifying for SMP.	None.	Weekly rate of UK 10.40 for eldest and UK 8.45 for subsequent. Not means tested. Nontaxable.	The Family Credit includes an extra UK 40.00 per week per child in day care. Means tested.	Lone parent benefit is payable as an addition to child benefit. Weekly rate of UK 6.3. Not means tested and is nontaxable.

TABLE 2A: BELGIUM

AMOUNT PER CHILD	UNDER 6	6-11	12-15	16 AND OVER
1 ST CHILD	2,601	3,505	3,981	4,289
2 ND CHILD	4,813	5,717	6,193	6,501
3 RD AND SUBSEQUENT	7,185	8,089	8,565	8,873

TABLE 2B: FINLAND

	RATE PER CHILD	IN FMK PER MONTH
1 st child		535
2 nd child		657
3 rd child		779
4 th child		901
5 th child		1023

TABLE 2C: FINLAND CHILD CARE BENEFITS

MONTHLY INCOME BRACKET (IN FMK PER MONTH)

FAMILY SIZE	0	1	2	3	4/5
2	5900	8600	9300	10,100	15,700
3	7,500	10,500	11,400	12,500	19,800
4	9,200	13,200	14,200	15,500	24,500
5	11,200	15,200	16,700	18,500	29,300
6	12,900	17,800	19,200	21,100	35,500

BENEFITS PER INCOME BRACKET

INCOME BRACKET	0	1	2	3	4	5
FULL DAY CARE	0	385	550	825	1,100	1,430
MAXIMUM 5 HOURS PER DAY CARE	0	220	330	440	660	880

TABLE 2D: FRANCE FAMILY ALLOWANCES

NUMBER OF CHILDREN	AMOUNT OF BENEFIT (FF PER MONTH)
2	665
ADDITIONAL CHILDREN SUPPLEMENT PER CHILD LESS THAN AGE 10	852
SUPPLEMENT PER CHILD LESS THAN AGE 16	187
	333

TABLE 2E: ITALY FAMILY ALLOWANCES FOR MARRIED COUPLES

FAMILY TAXABLE INCOME (IN 1000S L PER YEAR)	NUMBER OF FAMILY MEMBERS					
	2	3	4	5	6	7+
0-17,306	1080	1920	3000	5088	7176	9264
17,307-21,632	840	1680	2640	4848	7056	9024
21,633-25,958	600	1320	2280	4488	6936	8784
25,959-30,282	240	960	1920	4128	6696	8544
30,283-34,609		600	1560	3888	6576	8304
34,610-38,935		240	1200	3528	6336	8064
38,936-43,260			840	2928	5976	7704
43,261-47,585			480	2328	5616	7344
47,586-51,910				1728	5256	7104
51,911-56,236					3936	6744

TABLE 2F: FAMILY ALLOWANCES FOR LONE PARENTS (IN THOUSANDS L PER YEAR)

FAMILY TAXABLE INCOME (IN 1000S L PER YEAR)	NUMBER OF FAMILY MEMBERS					
	2	3	4	5	6	7+
0-20,190	1080	2160	4248	6336	8424	10,512
20,190-24,517	840	1920	3888	6096	8304	10,272
24,518-28,840	600	1560	3528	5736	8184	10,032
28,841-33,166	240	1200	3168	5376	7944	9792
33,167-37,493		840	2808	5136	7624	9552
37,494-41,818		480	2448	4776	7584	9312
41,819-46,144			2088	4176	7224	8952
46,145-50,469			1728	3576	6664	8592
50,470-54,794				2976	6504	8352
54,795-59,121					5184	7992
59,122+						6432

TABLE 2G: LUXEMBOURG FAMILY ALLOWANCES

FAMILY SIZE	RATE (€/MONTH)
ONE CHILD	3,292
TWO CHILDREN	8,885
THREE CHILDREN	18,012
SUPPLEMENT PER CHILD FROM FOURTH ONE	9,126
SUPPLEMENT PER CHILD AGED 6-11	535
SUPPLEMENT PER CHILD AGED 12+	1,605

TABLE 2H: NETHERLANDS FAMILY ALLOWANCES

NUMBER OF CHILDREN	0-5	6-11 AND 18-24	12-17
1	254.66	406.65	527.65
2	331.88	474.12	616.36
3	347.63	496.61	645.59
4	379.25	541.79	704.33
5	398.23	568.9	739.57
6	410.88	586.97	763.06

Sources: Helen Collins, "The EU Pregnancy Directive: A Guide for Human Resource Managers." Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994; "Benefits Systems and Work Incentives in OECD Countries, Analysis 1995," <http://www.oecd.org/els/pdfs/SocialPolicy/BenefitsCompendium>, viewed 8/10/98.

Table 3: Women-Friendly Welfare State Policies: Evaluation Scores and Additive Index

Country	Family Benefits	Maternal Leave	Paternal Leave	Lone Parent Benefits	Child Care	Total
Austria	4	2	3	1	1	11
Belgium	4	1	1	1	1	8
Denmark	4	3	3	4	3	17
Finland	4	3	3	4	3	17
France	4	3	2	2	2	13
Germany	2	1	2	3	3	11
Greece	1	1	1	1	1	5
Ireland	2	1	1	3	1	8
Italy	2	2	3	3	1	11
Luxembourg	3	2	2	1	2	10
Netherlands	2	2	2	1	1	8
Portugal	1	3	2	1	1	8
Spain	1	2	4	1	1	9
Sweden	4	4	4	4	4	20
United Kingdom	2	1	1	2	1	7

TABLE 4: Accounting for Male and Female Differences in Support for European Integration: A Regression Model

	MALE	FEMALE
<i>Subjective Variable</i>		
Economic Optimism	.194**	.216**
<i>Objective Variables</i>		
Women-Friendly Welfare State	-.086	-.127*
Education	.111**	.083**
Material Possessions	.028	.041*
Subjective Social Class	.065**	.080**
Number of Children	.010	.033
<i>Ideological Variable</i>		
Non-Traditional Roles	.119**	.016
<i>Demographic Variable</i>		
Age	.075**	.027
Adj. R ²	.142	.154

*Standardized regression coefficient significant at $p > .05$; ** $p > .001$.