

Coalition Formation in the European Parliament: From Dogmatism to Pragmatism

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The supranational party groups in the European Parliament (EP) have often been dismissed as politically insignificant despite their high levels of voting cohesion and well-defined internal organizational structures. Most often the cause of this perceived unimportance is the frequent recourse of the two largest party groups, the People's Party of Europe (PPE) and the Socialist Party (PSE), to form bipartisan coalitions. Unfortunately most discussions of coalition formation in the EP have been based on anecdotal evidence or a limited selection of roll-call votes from the past few years (generally under only the cooperation and/or co-decision procedures). The limited nature of these analyses restricts their conclusions and, therefore, our understanding of the importance of party group identity and ideology within the EP. In this paper I examine 300 roll-call votes occurring between 1980-1996, with 100 votes occurring on resolutions, 100 under the cooperation procedure and 100 under the co-decision procedure. Through this broader analysis I demonstrate that the current trend of bipartisanship is new, and has occurred only as the EP has established itself as a potentially effective legislative body. More specifically, I argue that the character of coalitions within the EP have evolved as a reaction to the transformation of the EP from chamber of debate into a legislative body. Furthermore, I demonstrate the extent to which ideology does still play a role in the EP during the first round of the legislative process when the locus of the struggle is within the EP. It is, I argue, only during the second (or the only round for resolutions) when the groups within the EP must unite to fight a common foe (the Council) that you find a high level of bipartisan cooperation between the PPE and PSE.

A result of the European Parliament's history of legislative impotence has been a notable lack of scholarly interest in its internal development and organizational mechanisms, particularly the activity and interaction of the party groups. The earliest discussions of the Parliament consisted primarily of comparisons between the new institution and the national parliaments of the Member-States. These tended, almost inevitably, to conclude that the EP was both politically handicapped and institutionally immature (Dehousse, 1966; Bubba, 1970; Fitzmaurice, 1978; Henig 1979). There were some excellent descriptions of the supranational party groups during the early years of the Parliament and during the run-up to, and immediately following, the first direct elections in 1979 (Fitzmaurice, 1975, Pinder and Henig, 1969; Van Oudenhove, 1965). The focus of these works, however, tended to be the traditional counting of parties and locating them along the left-right spectrum. Little was said about their development or their interactions with one another beyond noting their comparative weakness. Unfortunately, the failure of the EP to immediately become a significant political actor following direct elections discouraged further studies of the party groups and the internal structures of the EP.¹

Subsequent analyses of the European Union have generally included little more than a descriptive chapter about the EP. These studies usually note the existence of the party groups, but rarely move beyond describing their number and ideological (as opposed to national) orientation (Guéguen, 1996; Nicoll and Salmon, 1990; Welsh, 1996). In a few cases, attention has been given to the perceived weakness of the party groups and their tendency towards broad consensus building across significant ideological differences (Nugent, 1994; Westlake, 1994).² A recent analysis of the political parties in the European Union discusses the party groups in the EP and their interactions with the national and federal party organizations at length, but fails to address their interactions with one another or how these have varied over time (Hix and Lord, 1997).

Studies of the European Union have generally concluded that the party groups, like the EP itself, are incidental to the functioning of the EU as a whole. The perceived absence of internal party discipline and leadership combined with frequent recourse to cooperation across ideological boundaries has led most scholars of the European Union to conclude that the party group system is either non-existent, or unimportant. While the role of the EP has recently begun to be re-appraised in the literature, the

¹ One notable exception to this is the recent work by Simon Hix and Christopher Lord, in particular, Political Parties in the European Union, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997.

² Two frequent examples of party groups weakness are their lack of control over electoral lists, which are determined by the national parties, and the extensive use of the d'hondt method for the distribution of internal political offices.

significance of the party groups and their interactions have not. (Peters, 1992; Nugent, 1994; Corbett et al, 1995).³

What recent analyses of the EP have failed to understand is that the exogenous increases in the political power of the EP have led to a series of corresponding internal changes within both the EP's internal structures and the party group system. The strategies and actions of the party groups have evolved significantly to make the most of the EP's increasing powers. For nearly the first two decades after the introduction of direct elections the powers of the EP remained negligible, since 1987 these powers have increased significantly. It is not hard to imagine that the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and the party groups would react to these changes to obtain the greatest possible influence in the EU decision making process. I suggest that as the tools available to the EP to influence EU policy have changed so have the strategies used by the party groups. While ideological dogmatism was useful when the most effective power the EP had was mobilizing public support, it became harmful once direct legislative influence became possible. Despite rapid and significant increases in EP legislative authority it remains far from hegemonic. The EP must create proposals, which not only gain broad support from within, but also from the other institutions of the EU. This suggests that pragmatism, and not dogmatism, must now govern EP political action and as a result the actions of the party groups.

In this paper I examine the evolution of the relationships between the party groups. This examination of voting behavior demonstrates that the nature of the party group system has changed over time, and that this internal transformation corresponds to external increases in the legislative authority of the EP. I also respond to those who claim that inter-party cooperation across ideological boundaries is a sign of party weakness, demonstrating that it is rather a strategic reaction by the party groups and thus, a sign of the Parliament's and the parties' increasing institutional maturity. In the first section I discuss my methodology and the problems inherent in analyses of roll-call votes. In the second section I look at the changing character of coalition formation under the resolution procedure since 1980. In the third and fourth section I discuss the character of coalition formation under the two most recent additions to the EU legislative arsenal, the cooperation and codecision procedures. In the last section I conclude with a

³ It is interesting to note that for the first time studies on power indices and inter-institutional power games has begun to incorporate the EP into their calculations. See Josep Colomer and Madeleine Hosli. "Decision-Making in the European Union: The Power of Political Parties," Annick Laruelle and Mika Widgrén. "The Development of the Division of Power Among EU Commission, EU Council and European Parliament," and Bernard Steunenberg, Dieter Schmidtchen and Christian Koboldt. "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in Policy Games: Strategic Power in the European Union." All presented at the 1997 Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington DC.

discussion of the trends in coalition formation in the European Parliament and their potential significance in terms of the EP's institutional development.

Methodology

The party system of the European Parliament is unique in that it is almost non-existent outside of the EP itself. The party groups are not “mass-based” parties. They have only very tenuous international electoral platforms and, most importantly, they do not create enduring coalitions in support of a particular Government. Freedom from supporting a Government means that coalition formation within the EP can be extremely variable, potentially shifting from one vote to the next without destabilizing the political system as a whole (Kreppel and Tsebelis, forthcoming). Subject matter, legislative procedure, and historical period are all likely to have some influence on the type of coalition formed between party groups. To get an accurate picture of the nature of the party system of the EP and changes that may have occurred across time or according to legislative procedure I examine the voting behavior of the party groups during roll call votes. The bulk of all votes (roughly 75%) in the EP are taken visually (usually by raised hands, but occasionally by sitting and standing). Approximately another ten percent of votes are registered electronically, but with no public record of whom supported which position. Generally, electronic votes are used to establish exact numbers when the vote is perceived to be close and a visual determination of victory unreliable (Guéguen, 1996). The remaining 15% of votes in the European Parliament are taken by roll call vote (RCV).⁴ Only votes taken by this last method provide the necessary information about the voting behavior of individuals, national delegations and party groups to allow a statistical analysis of coalition formation behavior and patterns.

I examine roll call votes that occurred between 1980 through 1996. I begin my analysis in 1980 for two reasons: First, the Members of the European Parliament were not directly elected until 1979. An independent party system could not fully develop as long as individual Members were still appointed by their national legislatures. Second and more pragmatically, roll call votes were taken orally until 1980 when a new electronic registration system was installed. The amount of time required for a RCV dropped from upwards of an hour per vote to less than a minute. The increased ease of roll call voting led almost immediately to a huge increase in its usage. Before 1980 there were an average of approximately four roll

⁴ To be more precise, about 15% of votes since 1980 have been roll call votes. Prior to 1980 there was no electronic voting system and roll call votes were much less frequent because of the incredible amount of time they took to register.

call votes per monthly plenary session. This number has increased steadily over time. In extreme cases, like the annual draft budget, there can now be as many as 300 roll call votes on a single proposal.

By reducing the time necessary to tabulate results, the installation of the electronic voting system significantly lowered the costs involved in calling for a RCV. While electronic votes are almost exclusively used for technical reasons, roll call votes have become largely a political tool. There are three primary strategic goals of roll call votes: control, information, and publicity, the first two being the most common.⁵ Party group leaders frequently use roll call votes to assess the internal cohesion of their group as a whole, and in particular, the influence of regional and/or national deviations.⁶ The party-group hierarchies can also use roll call votes as a means to enforce, or at least measure, the effectiveness of party discipline and the attendance rates of Members.⁷ The importance of this use of the roll-call vote can be seen in the rapid and extensive development of internal party-group whipping procedures. These include special “sessions units” dedicated to ensuring that every MEP in the group has a copy of the group’s positions and measuring the extent to which these are followed.⁸

Party groups also frequently call for a roll call vote to clearly, and publicly differentiate themselves from other groups. In these cases the primary motivation is to make a public statement, measurement or control of internal group cohesion is secondary. More generally, this type of roll call voting is used to highlight the activities and behavior of other groups, rather than investigate behavior in ones own group. The goal is to draw public attention to the activities of other groups that are objectionable to those calling for a roll-call vote.⁹ A roll-call vote might also be called to draw attention to actions of the individuals calling for the vote (as opposed to the actions of others). For instance, prior to a national election, MEPs of the same member state might request a roll-call vote in order to demonstrate

⁵ This typology is based on interviews with 47 MEPs from the PSE, PPE and LDR held between January 1996 and May 1996.

⁶ The use and potential expansion of sanctions against members of a the group that are consistently absent or vote against the party line on important matters is being considered by both the People’s Party of Europe Group and the Socialist Group. Currently, reduced allocation of speaking time, and a failure to be assigned to particularly interesting tasks (usually involving travel) are all potential sanctions against members who consistently fail to vote the political group line.

⁷ Member attendance was of primary importance to party group leaders and absenteeism was described as a significant problem for the EP by all interviewed.

⁸ The use of whips is most developed in the Socialist party-group (PSE) followed closely by the People’s Party (PPE) and then the Liberal group (LDR).

⁹ This type of strategic RCV is frequently used by the Liberal Group to protest what it perceives as the development of a PSE/PPE oligarchy. The relationship between the PPE and PSE are discussed in depth below.

that they were voting in their home state's interests despite their own party group's stance on an issue. This often the case when RCVs are called despite an overwhelming majority on one side or the other.

Because there are numerous strategic reasons for calling roll call votes, in most cases it is impossible to know why any individual RCV vote was called without an in depth analysis of the particular circumstances. As a result it is extremely difficult to infer, based on the results of an analysis of roll call voting, what occurs the rest of the time in terms of voting cohesion and coalition formation. This is an objective limitation of analyses of roll-call votes not only inside the EP, but in any context where the decision to have a roll-call vote is left to the strategic calculations of the actors instead of specific rules. Despite this limitation, an analysis of voting behavior during roll-call votes will increase our understanding of the party system of the EP, and how it has evolved over the last two decades.

Roll-call votes can occur on any subject and under any legislative procedure, although the strategic significance of RCVs may vary by procedure. When created, the Treaties stipulated only one legislative procedure that involved the European Parliament, the consultation procedure. The European Parliament, through its own Rules of Procedure, gave the EP the right to create "own initiative" reports which are known as resolutions.¹⁰ In 1987 the Single European Act (SEA) created the cooperation procedure, and in 1994 the Maastricht Treaty created the co-decision procedure. Each of these procedures grants the EP a different amount of direct legislative influence. Resolutions have no direct influence over legislative outcomes and they are not acted upon by any other institution, but they are the only type of proposals that can be initiated independently by the EP. The consultation, cooperation and co-decision procedures each give the EP increasingly more direct influence over legislative outcomes.¹¹

I examine 300 roll call votes, including 100 RCVs on resolutions occurring between 1980 and 1996, 100 RCVs under the cooperation procedure between 1989 and 1993 and 100 RCVs under the co-decision procedure between 1994 and 1996.¹² Correspondence analysis is the primary statistical tool used

¹⁰ Article 29 in the original Rules of Procedure in 1958, Article 45 in the 12th edition, 1996.

¹¹ The relative power of the EP under the cooperation and co-decision procedures is still somewhat unclear. For a discussion of the cooperation procedure see George Tsebelis "More on the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter," *American Political Science Review* 90, 1990, and Peter Moser. "The European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter: What are the Conditions? A Critique of Tsebelis" *American Political Science Review* 90: 834-838, 1996. For a discussion of the co-decision procedure see George Tsebelis and Geoffrey Garrett. "Agenda-Setting, Vetoes and the European Union's Codecision Procedure." *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 3: 74-92, 1997; and Roger Scully. "The European Parliament and the Co-decision Procedure: A Reassessment." *Journal of Legislative Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 3: 58-73, 1997.

to establish and analyze the patterns of coalition formation in the European Parliament. Every Member of the EP is grouped according to nationality and party group affiliation. These “delegations” (i.e. French * Socialist) are the basis of the analysis. The data sets can be understood as a contingency tables where $X*Y$ votes (the number of votes analyzed * the number of MEPs voting) are distributed to different vote positions (MEPs could vote “yes”, “no” or be “absent”) and different delegations (French Socialists).¹³ Correspondence analysis provides a geometric interpretation of the affinities between the columns and the rows of the contingency table. The result is a graphic representation of the relationships between vote positions and national party group delegations *where spatial proximity signifies a relationship*. When delegations are located next to each other they have similar voting behavior. When a delegation is near a particular vote position it means most members of that delegation supported that position.¹⁴ The relationships between party groups established by the correspondence analysis are checked through the use of correlation coefficients and other, more familiar, statistical tools.

The period analyzed here covers the better part of the first four legislative periods after direct elections.¹⁵ During this period the number and size of the party groups within the European Parliament have changed significantly. In the period immediately following direct election the number of party groups quickly expanded from four to seven, reaching an all time high of ten during the early 1990’s. Only the Socialists (PSE), Christian Democrats (PPE) and Liberal (LDR) groups survived the entire period analyzed without major internal schisms and/or name changes. The PPE merged with the European Democratic Group (ED) (mostly British Conservatives) in 1992, but the two groups had an informal association since Britain’s accession in 1973. The Communist and Neo-Gaullist groups have remained present throughout the period in one form or another, but both have suffered internal schisms and membership instability. The other groups, most of which are comparatively small, have tended to be short

¹² Votes under the Consultation procedure were not included because of the relatively small influence of the EP under this procedure and the changing role of the consultation procedure across time while the position of resolutions has remained consistent.

¹³ Abstentions were not used in the statistical analyses because of their comparatively small number and statistical insignificance.

¹⁴ For more information on this procedure as it relates to coalition formation in the European Parliament see Amie Kreppel and George Tsebelis “Coalition Formation inside the European Parliament.” Forthcoming, *Comparative Political Studies*. For an extended discussion of the statistical method itself see Benjecri (1973). For a discussion in English see Greenacre (1984).

¹⁵ Elections to the EP are in June so legislatures run from July 1979-June 1984, July 1984-June 1989, July 1989-June 1994, and July 1994-June 1999.

lived and unstable.¹⁶ The majority of this analysis will focus on the three major party groups (PSE, PPE and LDR) since their interactions can be charted across time. The behavior of the other groups will be examined primarily in terms of broad right-left coalition behavior rather than individually. A list of all the party groups in the EP since 1979, their membership and ideological location is given in Appendix 1.

Elections to the EP occur every five years, with the first election occurring in June 1979. Because there is a relatively low level of re-election, the membership of the EP changes significantly from one legislative term to the next. To incorporate these changes into the study all votes are divided and examined by legislature. There are approximately twenty-five votes on resolutions per legislature. All 100 votes under the cooperation procedure occurred in the third legislature (1989-1994), and all 100 votes under the co-decision procedure occurred during the fourth legislature (1994-1999). Individual votes were selected randomly. A month was chosen at random for each legislative procedure, a list of all roll call votes under a given procedure occurring during the selected month for each year analyzed were collected into a single database and numbered chronologically. One hundred random numbers were generated for each legislative procedure and the votes corresponding to these numbers were used for the analyses.¹⁷ Votes selected were not restricted by the level of participation, content (amendment or final proposal), or size of majority coalition.¹⁸ Two votes on resolutions were later discarded because of significant reporting errors found in the original document.¹⁹

I examine several aspects of EP voting behavior to achieve a broad understanding of the evolution of the party system. These include changes that have occurred across time, patterns of behavior under each of the legislative procedures and differences between party groups and national delegations. Patterns and changes in the rate of absenteeism are also analyzed since not voting is, in itself, a kind of voting behavior. Additionally, the extremely high rate of absenteeism in the EP is likely to have an important influence on voting behavior on the whole. To simplify the presentation of the data I first

¹⁶ A possible exception is the Green group that has been in existence since 1989. It is still too soon to judge the future durability of this group.

¹⁷ For resolutions all votes were used for the years 1980, 1981, and 1983 because of the small number of total roll call votes occurring during the selected month during these years.

¹⁸ Numerous previous studies of roll call voting have limited their analysis to specific types of votes (final proposal), set participation thresholds, or required a specific distribution of votes between majority and minority. See in particular work by Fulvio Attina and JoAnne Bay Brzinski.

¹⁹ A high percentage of Members were reported in the *Official Journal* as having voted both for and against the specific amendments.

analyze each legislative procedure separately, and then compare coalition and voting behavior between procedures. A summary of participation is included in the discussion of each legislative procedure.

Resolutions (1980-1996):

During the first and second legislatures the majority of EP roll call votes were on resolutions. Although the consultation procedure existed, it does not appear to have inspired recourse to strategic use of roll call voting to the extent that resolutions did.²⁰ During the latter two legislatures roll call voting on resolutions dropped off significantly, probably because of a decrease in the raw number of resolutions presented as a result of the addition of the cooperation and co-decision procedures.²¹ Unlike the other legislative procedures, resolutions are not limited to specific policy areas. As a result resolutions vary widely in topic, relative importance, and level of participation.

I legislature: 1979-1983²²

The variable nature of resolutions might logically lead to incoherent voting patterns if coalitions in the EP vary by policy area. This does not seem to be the case. During the first legislature there are two clear patterns in the data; voting coalitions are divided between the left and right, and absenteeism is universally high, although, there are significant variations between party groups. The clear left-right ideological split and the importance of participation in the EP during the first legislature is demonstrated in Figure 1. In the figure each “x” represents a vote position (“yes” or “no”) on a particular resolution, an absent “position” is represented by a period. The squares are national delegations which belong to the Christian Democratic Group (PPE), the diamonds are delegations which belong to the Socialist Group (PSE) and the “+” are delegations belonging to the Liberal-Democratic Group (LDR). The first axis (horizontal) accounts for 36% of the total variation in voting behavior, the second axis accounts for 14%.²³

²⁰ Since data was drawn only from the November or December plenary session this may be due to timing. It is possible that roll call votes under the consultation procedure occurred more frequently in other months.

²¹ During the second and third legislatures there were changes to the rules of procedure which limited the ease and ability of individual Members or small groups to present “own initiative” resolution independent of a committee.

²² The first legislature ran from July 1979-June 1984. No votes from 1979 are included here for the reasons outlined above.

²³ The sum of all axis equals 100% of variation. Because the first two explain more than 40% of the variation in all cases and the next explains less than 5% only the first two axis will be discussed.

INSERT FIGURE 1

The majority of the PPE delegations fall to the left of the vertical axis while all of the PSE delegations fall to the right. This clear division between members of the PPE and members of the PSE along the horizontal axis indicates that this axis represents ideology. This means that delegations that fall near the vertical axis are ideologically centrist, delegations to the left agree more with the PPE and those to the right are more likely to agree with the Socialist Group. The comparatively centrist role of the LDR can be seen by the location of these delegations between the PPE and PSE (though closer to the former). The other party group delegations conform to this general pattern, with groups on the ideological left primarily to the right near the Socialists and groups on the ideological right closer to the PPE in the left half of the figure.²⁴

The vertical axis is slightly more difficult to interpret, but can be generally understood as a combination of numerical support (for vote positions) and participation (for party groups). Vote positions close to the horizontal axis received a large percent of the vote relative to other vote positions for the same resolution. As vote positions move farther away from the horizontal axis they have comparatively fewer supporters. As they move to the left their supporters are members of the ideological right, and as they move toward the right the ideological left supports them more. The high level of absenteeism can be seen by the position of the “.”s close to the horizontal axis. These are clustered slightly to the right, suggesting that the party groups of the ideological left have a slightly lower rate of participation than the party groups of the right (more absences).

The spatial distance between delegations belonging to the PSE and PPE is a graphic representation of the large proportion of variation in voting behavior explained by ideology (36%). The clear division between the groups of the right and left suggests a high level of ideological dogmatism and relatively little cooperation between the Socialists and Christian Democrats. There are, in fact, very few vote positions (“X”s) which fall between the two party group clusters. The lack of cooperation between the PPE and PSE is supported by the correlation coefficients of the different party groups given in Table 1. While the correlation coefficients between the PPE and the European Democratic Group (.93), and the Socialists and Communists (.55) are both high, the correlation coefficient between the PPE and PSE is extremely low (.15). The Liberal Group votes with both the PPE and the PSE, though more frequently with the former.

²⁴ Any symbol not an “x” or a “.” Is a delegation to a party group. Not all delegations and groups were coded to help make the figure more easily interpreted. The other delegations follow the same pattern with the exception of the Technical Group of Independent Members that cannot be located on the traditional left-right ideological spectrum.

Table 1: Correlation Coefficients- Resolutions I Legislature

	<i>COM</i>	<i>DEP</i>	<i>EDG</i>	<i>LDR</i>	<i>NI</i>	<i>PPE</i>	<i>PSE</i>	<i>TECH</i>
COM	1							
DEP	0.18	1						
EDG	-0.36	-0.17	1					
LDR	-0.03	0.12	0.54	1				
NI	0.02	0.14	0.20	0.20	1			
PPE	-0.32	-0.09	0.93	0.58	0.20	1		
PSE	0.55	0.04	0.13	0.36	0.37	0.15	1	
TECH	0.39	0.25	-0.18	-0.03	0.44	-0.19	0.21	1

Another important aspect of coalition formation and party system behavior is success, since policy is the final goal of the legislative process. This is true even when the ability to impact final legislative outcomes is extremely small. The success of the different voting coalitions can be seen in Figure 2. Here only vote positions that won are “X”s while those that lost are represented by wedges. The proximity of most winning vote positions to delegations belonging to the PPE demonstrates the dominance of the ideological right over resolutions during the first legislature. The supremacy of the right is not, however, clearly linked to a numerical advantage. The Socialist group was actually larger than the PPE with an average membership of 119 compared to 111. The right wing coalition of the PPE and the EDG had only a small numerical advantage over the PSE and the Communist coalition (174 versus 165). The real strength of the right lies in its higher level of internal cohesion (both within and between the party groups) and a higher rate of participation (see Table 2).

INSERT FIGURE 2

While the PPE and EDG each had an internal cohesion rating of 98%, the PSE and Communist Group had cohesion scores of only 89% and 88% respectively.²⁵ The right wing coalition’s advantage was compounded by the difference in participation. The EDG had the highest participation rate at 63%, followed by the PPE with 53%. The Socialist Group had only a 44% participation rate and the Communists a dismal 37%. The combination of higher internal cohesion and higher participation made the coalition of the right practically invincible against the almost numerically equal leftist coalition.

²⁵ Cohesion scores were tabulated on the basis of “yes” and “no” votes only with the function: $(Y+N)/N$; if $<.5$, $= 1 - ((Y+N)/N)$, if $>.5 = (Y+N)/N$.

Table 2: Party Group Cohesion and Participation-Resolutions I Legislature

Party Group	Avg. Percent Voting	Internal Cohesion	Avg. # Members
COM	37	0.88	46
DEP	35	0.97	22
EDG	63	0.98	63
LDR	41	0.95	39
NI	34	0.85	13
PPE	53	0.98	111
TECH	30	0.91	11
PSE	44	0.89	119
Total	47	N/A	424

The general picture of voting behavior on resolutions during the first legislature is one of an ideologically divided parliament with a dominant right wing coalition due not to electoral success, but the internal cohesion and comparatively high participation of its members. The overall image does not change much during the second legislature.

II legislature: 1984-1988

Despite the continued predominance of ideology as a determinant of voting patterns, there are some differences in party group behavior between the first and second legislature. Most notably, the percentage of variation explained by ideology alone dropped from 36% to only 25% (see Figure 3). This decrease is due in part to a general increase in absenteeism. While total average participation for the first legislature was 47%, it was only 38% during the second legislature. This increase in overall absenteeism is demonstrated in Figure 3 by the large cluster of group delegations and voting positions located just below the intersection of the X and Y axes. The centrality of this cluster means that participation fell relatively equally across the ideological spectrum.

INSERT FIGURE 3

Another difference between the first and second legislatures is the relative success of the left and right wing coalitions. While the right still won more votes than the left, it no longer had the near complete

control over resolutions that it did during the first legislature (Figure 4). The number of successful vote positions (“X”s) in the right half of the figure increased from only 4% in the first legislature to 24% in the second. There was also an increase in the number of successful vote positions falling in the center of the figure, and supported predominantly by the Socialist and Liberal Groups, but with some scattered support from members of the PPE. The appearance of vote positions supported in all or part by the three major party groups marks the beginning of a significant trend of “grand coalition” votes.

INSERT FIGURE 4

The increased success of the PSE led left-wing coalition had two main causes. The most obvious was the electoral success experienced by the groups of the left, and the PSE in particular, in 1984. The Socialist-Communist coalition jumped from 165 members to 198, while the PPE-EDG coalition actually lost one member and fell to 173. The PSE on its own had 152 members, significantly more than the PPE’s 114. The Liberal group remained nearly the same with 38 (as opposed to 39) members. An increase in MEPs belonging to the extreme right from 22 to 36, and the creation of a new “Group of the Right” (DR), were not enough to offset the success of the PSE.²⁶

The strong numerical superiority of the PSE was made more significant by the large decrease in the participation of the other party groups. While the average rate of participation for the EP as a whole fell from 47% to 38%, the rates of the PPE and EDG fell from 63% to 43% and 53% to 41% respectively. The PSE was the only group that did not suffer an increase in member absenteeism (see Table 3). In fact, only the small extremist Group of the Right had a higher average rate of participation than the PSE during the second legislature. This was an absolute reversal from the situation during the first legislature.

Another difference between the first and second legislatures was the decrease in cohesion within the left and right coalitions, although internal party group cohesion remained nearly constant (Table 3). The previous lack of cooperation between the PPE and PSE was maintained, but the close relationships between these two groups and their perspective coalition partners diminished. The most striking example of this is the decrease in the correlation coefficient of the PPE and EDG (Table 4). While in the first legislature the two had been nearly unanimous, they had a correlation coefficient of only .67 in the second legislature. Cooperation between the PSE and the Communist Group also decreased, although not as dramatically, falling from .55 to .46. Interestingly, the Liberal group made a decided move toward the

²⁶ This was due, in particular, to the reluctance of the center-right to work with the groups of the extreme right.

right, with a correlation coefficient of .73 with the PPE and only .38 with the Socialists.²⁷

Table 3: Party Group Cohesion and Participation-Resolutions II legislature

Party Group	Avg. Percent Voting	Internal Cohesion	Avg. # Members
ARC	0.27	0.91	20
COM	0.33	0.94	46
DR	0.54	0.90	16
EDG	0.43	0.99	59
LDR	0.26	0.90	38
NI	0.20	0.81	10
PPE	0.41	0.98	114
RDE	0.10	0.98	30
PSE	0.44	0.89	152
Total	0.38	n/a	484

Table 4: Correlation Coefficients - Resolutions II Legislature

Party Group	ARC	COM	DR	EDG	LDR	NI	PPE	RDE	PSE
ARC	1								
COM	0.42	1							
DR	0.24	-0.25	1						
EDG	-0.25	0.19	0.12	1					
LDR	-0.03	0.32	0.16	0.70	1				
NI	0.33	0.18	0.21	0.38	0.29	1			
PPE	0.05	0.19	0.37	0.67	0.73	0.43	1		
RDE	-0.04	-0.19	0.48	0.17	0.33	-0.02	0.47	1	
PSE	0.51	0.46	0.21	0.02	0.10	0.39	0.12	-0.12	1

On the whole, the party system of the EP was fundamentally the same during the first and second legislatures. The shifts that occurred in the relative strength and participation rates of the various party groups were changes that occurred within the same general party system structure. The dominant role of ideology and the existence of clear and stable coalitions of the moderate right and moderate left were consistent throughout the period. The role of the European Parliament in the broader political environment also remained largely unchanged during most of this period. There were several ineffective attempts to increase the legislative and political authority of the EP throughout the decade, including the Stuttgart Solemn Declaration (1983) and the EP's own Draft Treaty on European Union (1984). Finally,

²⁷ This is still a marginal increase over the first legislature where the coefficient was .36.

in 1987, the Single European Act was implemented (passed in 1985) initiating a new phase in the development of the European Parliament. The new legislative powers granted to the EP by the SEA had a huge impact on inter-party group relations, ultimately altering the character of the party system itself.²⁸

III legislature: 1989-1993

The clearest indication of the shift in the party system of the EP is the dramatic reduction in the role of ideology as a determinant of voting behavior. While in both of the previous legislatures ideology had explained at least 25% of voting behavior, and more than any other single variable, in the third legislature the role of ideology slipped to second place, explaining only 16% of the total variation (Figure 5). Previously the party groups had been divided between left and right along the horizontal axis, this division occurs along the secondary vertical axis in the third legislature. The division between party groups of the ideological left and right is still significant, but it is no longer the primary defining characteristic of the EP party system. In the third legislature the varying rates of participation separate the party groups more than ideology (explaining 24% of the variation). Groups to the right of the figure have a lower participation rate than those to the left. This is demonstrated by their graphical proximity to the “absent” vote positions (represented by “.”)s in Figure 5.²⁹ There does not appear to be a significant difference between the participation rates of the party groups on the ideological left and those on the right.

INSERT FIGURE 5

The increase in the cooperation of the ideological left and right can be seen not only in the decreased role of ideology shown in Figure 5, but also in the huge increase in the correlation coefficients of the PPE and PSE (Table 5). While the coefficient had been at just .12 during the second legislature, it jumped to .33 in the third. It is important to note that the tendency to cooperate occurred primarily between the PSE and PPE, most of the other party groups of the left and right continued to vote with their ideological allies. One significant difference is the EDG, which voted PSE more often than the PPE did. The change here from the second to the third legislature is dramatic. Between 1984 and 1988 the PSE and

²⁸ See Chapter 4 for a more in depth discussion of the Single European Act and its impact on the institutional role and legislative authority of the European Parliament.

²⁹ Remember that vote positions closest to the horizontal axis are those with the most votes. The farther away from the horizontal axis a vote position is the less support it received from MEPs.

EDG had a correlation coefficient of just .02, between 1989 and 1993 that number jumped to .47.³⁰ The increase in cooperation between the PPE and PSE had a tremendous impact on the party system as a whole because they were by far the largest party groups in the EP.³¹

Increased cooperation between the PPE and PSE resulted in a kind of oligarchy within the EP. Because of the high proportion of total seats controlled by these two groups, anything they could agree upon would be guaranteed to pass. Their success, as well as the extent of their cooperation is demonstrated by the location of the majority of successful vote positions during the third legislature *between* the clusters of delegations belonging to the PPE and those of the PSE (Figure 6). Once again diamonds marks delegations to the PPE and those belonging to the PSE are labeled with squares. Successful vote positions are X's while wedges mark unsuccessful vote positions. The bulk of successful vote positions were those supported by *both* the PPE and PSE.³² It is this increase in cooperation that resulted in the extraordinary decrease in the role of ideology within the European Parliament.

INSERT FIGURE 6

Table 5: Correlation Coefficients - Resolutions III Legislature

Party Group	ARC	CG	DR	EDG	GUE	LDR	NI	PPE	RDE	PSE	VERDE
ARC	1										
C	0.12	1									
DR	0.09	0.01	1								
EDG	0.11	-0.16	0.30	1							
GUE	0.09	0.09	-0.22	0.29	1						
LDR	0.19	-0.01	0.25	0.65	0.30	1					
NI	0.57	-0.02	0.14	0.34	0.11	0.41	1				
PPE	0.12	0.22	0.22	0.57	0.21	0.87	0.48	1			
RDE	0.08	0.43	0.62	0.17	-0.25	0.32	0.26	0.50	1		
PSE	0.13	0.08	0.02	0.47	0.81	0.34	0.19	0.33	-0.05	1	
Verde	0.53	0.31	-0.29	-0.11	0.14	0.17	0.18	0.16	-0.09	0.00	1

There were few other shifts in the behavior of MEPs between the second and third legislatures. Participation did increase overall to 48%, thus, returning to its 1980-1983 level. On the whole, however,

³⁰ The extremely close organizational and working relationship between the PPE and the EDG should be kept in mind. In fact, in 1992 the two officially merge and the European Democratic Group is dissolved.

³¹ The PPE and PSE have been the two largest groups through-ought the history of the EP, although their combined strength has varied from a low of just over 50% to a high of nearly 70% of total EP membership.

³² There were only two complete exceptions to this, where the PPE and PSE clearly and wholly opposed each other.

this marked simply a return to the situation during the first legislature (Table 6). The EDG regained its superiority in regards to attendance, with only a 32% absentee rate, with the PPE at 49%. The Socialist Group managed to slightly surpass the PPE with only 44% of its members absent on average. As in the first legislature these three groups had the highest rate of participation with the other groups dropping off quickly to a low of 27% (or 73% absent on average).

For the most part other aspects of the previous party system structure remained unchanged. The relative balance of power between the ideological left and right remained largely the same with a slight overall increase in the membership of party groups on the right.³³ The PSE actually increased its percentage of total EP membership from 31% to 35% while the PPE remained nearly constant until the 1992 merger with the EDG which increased its share of EP seats from 25% to 31% (Table 6). Surprisingly, there was also little change in the internal cohesion of the major party groups. The previously high levels of group solidarity continued throughout the third legislature despite the clear move away from ideology. It might have been expected that there would be some increase in internal dissension as cooperation with a previous ideological foe increased. Dissent could have been displayed either by an increase in absenteeism or increased voting defections. Neither occurred (Table 6).

Table 6: Party Group Cohesion and Participation - Resolutions III Legislature

Party Group	Avg. Percent Voting	Internal Cohesion	Avg. # Members
ARC	0.30	0.88	16
CG-LU	0.40	0.82	11
DR	0.37	0.87	15
EDG	0.68	0.98	34
GUE	0.33	0.94	27
LDR	0.32	0.92	47
NI	0.12	0.95	14
PPE	0.51	0.98	127
RDE	0.27	0.90	23
PSE	0.56	0.91	180
VERDE	0.50	0.95	23
Total	0.48	n/a	518

The differences between the second and third legislature are few, but they are extremely important. While participation rates, internal party group cohesion and the relative size of the left and

right coalitions all remained largely unchanged, the importance of ideology as a determinant of voting behavior fell dramatically. Increased compromise between the two largest groups most likely led to the creation of more moderate legislative proposals for two reasons. First, the numerical superiority the PPE and PSE when working together meant that they had no need for additional allies. This could easily lead to the marginalization of the party groups to their left and right, decreasing their impact on successful legislative proposals. Second, Given the near numerical equality of the PSE and PPE, it is unlikely that either was frequently able to enforce its will upon the other. Moderation and compromise seem a much more likely outcome of PPE-PSE cooperation than extremism.

IV Legislature: 1994-1996

The clear move away from ideology toward cooperation by the two largest party groups continued in the fourth legislature despite a slight increase in the overall importance of ideology. The percent of voting behavior determined by ideology grew from 16% in the third legislature to 20% in the fourth (see Figure 7). The growing division between the PSE and the other groups of the left appears to have caused this increase. Unlike the previous case, however, there appear to be three clear clusters of party groups. Just above the horizontal axis are the groups of the right and the Liberals, closest to the horizontal axis are the Socialists and then below them, *in a separate cluster* are the other party groups of the left. Participation is once again the primary axis, explaining 25% of the total variance. As in the previous legislature, there does not appear to be any significant differences in the rates of absenteeism between the left and right wing party groups.

INSERT FIGURE 7

Although there is a clear separation between the PPE and PSE in Figure 7, the distance between the two is smaller than in the previous legislature. The implication that cooperation between the two groups increased during the fourth legislature is supported by their correlation coefficient, which reached an all time high of .45 (Table 7). The increased dissension between the PSE and its previous allies on the left suggested by Figure 7 is substantiated by the correlation coefficients in Table 7. The PSE's highest coefficient is with the PPE. Its traditional partners, the Group of the European Left and the Greens, fall to third and fourth place respectively with correlation coefficients of .38 and .34. Disagreement between the

³³ Because of a major re-shuffling of the party groups it is difficult to make precise comparisons. This is compounded by the existence of groups on the ideological extremes that cannot usually be considered as useful coalition partners.

PPE and its traditional coalition partners was apparently lower since the EDG had already merged with the PPE and cooperation with the Liberal Group continued to be relatively high (though much lower than during the third legislature).

Table 7: Correlation Coefficients - Resolutions IV Legislature

<i>Party Group</i>	<i>ARC</i>	<i>EdN</i>	<i>GUE/NGL</i>	<i>LDR</i>	<i>NI</i>	<i>PPE</i>	<i>PSE</i>	<i>UPE</i>	<i>Verde</i>
ARC	1								
EdN	-0.09	1							
GUE/NGL	0.72	-0.18	1						
LDR	0.00	0.37	-0.23	1					
NI	-0.24	0.49	-0.34	0.65	1				
PPE	0.10	0.27	-0.17	0.53	0.62	1			
PSE	0.42	-0.07	0.38	0.11	0.10	0.45	1		
UPE	0.05	0.30	-0.20	0.71	0.52	0.67	0.14	1	
VERDE	0.67	-0.09	0.69	-0.06	-0.18	-0.04	0.34	-0.19	1

The majority of successful vote positions fell between the PPE and PSE, once again suggesting frequent recourse to the “grand coalition” and a high level of cooperation between these two groups. There were some successful vote positions that fell outside of the area of PPE-PSE coalition, the majority of which were clearly supported by the PPE and its traditional allies to the right (Figure 8). The ability of the right to pass its proposals in spite of PSE opposition is probably due to the internal division of the left-wing coalition discussed above. Also evident in Figure 8 is an increase in the number of extremist vote positions of both the right and left that receive very little support. These are almost universally the result of small groups on the right and left opposing the grand coalition of the PPE and PSE. The small cluster of unsuccessful vote positions close to the vertical axis represent the growing trend of Liberal Group opposition to the PPE-PSE alliance.³⁴

INSERT FIGURE 8

There were few significant changes in the other aspects of the party system (Table 8). The 1994 elections once again increased the numerical superiority of the PSE over the PPE (212 members compared to 171), although the size of the usual left and right coalitions remained nearly equal. The overall participation rate of MEPs remained at 48% with little change in the rates of the largest party groups. The increase in participation by members of the PPE, from 51% to 59%, was most likely caused

³⁴ The existence and importance of this trend was suggested to me during interviews with several members of the Liberal Group conducted in February-May and November-December, 1996.

by the absorption of the EDG. The PSE experienced a slight decline (from 56% to 52%). The most impressive change was the increase in the participation of the Liberal Group's members from 32% to 46% (while remaining numerically constant). The internal cohesion of the individual party groups remained remarkably high, with the PSE's increase from 91% to 99% the only notable change.

The biggest change between the third and fourth legislature was the continued increase in PSE-PPE cooperation and the comparative weakness of the left wing coalition. It is probable that the two are integrally connected. The difficulty of the left in passing proposals against strong right wing opposition was not caused by a numerical disadvantage, a lack of group participation or diminished group cohesion. Numerically the left actually had a slight advantage, and the increase in PSE cohesion should have roughly balanced the decreased participation of its members, leaving the left as a whole no worse off. Instead, it appears that the groups of the far left began to distance themselves from the growing tendency of the PSE towards compromise and cooperation with the right and the PPE in particular.

Table 8: Party Group Cohesion and Participation - Resolutions IV Legislature

Party Group	Avg. Percent Voting	Internal Cohesion	Avg. # Members
ARE	0.28	1	20
EdN	0.38	0.86	19
GUE-NGL	0.34	0.99	32
ELDR	0.46	0.96	47
NI	0.22	0.94	31
PPE	0.59	0.98	171
PSE	0.52	0.99	212
UPE	0.39	0.91	48
VERDE	0.44	0.99	26
Total	0.48	n/a	614

The result is a party system which looks significantly different in 1996 than it did just fifteen years earlier. The defining characteristic of voting behavior on resolutions in the first legislature was ideological polarization and clear coalitions of the left and right. Cooperation between the PSE and PPE was almost nonexistent. The two major groups were closely allied with the smaller party groups to their left and right. In the late 1980's a fundamental shift in coalition building between the PPE and PSE began. Instead of looking to their right and left for political allies who would support them, perhaps moving their positions more towards ideological extremism, they began to look to each other. The rapid

increase in cooperation and compromise between the two largest groups, at the cost of losing support from its traditional allies for the PSE, redefined the character of the EP party system. In the place of the previous polarized system based on ideological extremism, a new, extremely moderate, party system founded on cooperation and bipartisanship evolved.

The next task is to see if this new party system existed and/or was maintained during the third and fourth legislatures under the new legislative procedures introduced by the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty.

*The Cooperation Procedure*³⁵

Since the cooperation procedure was not implemented until 1987 it is not possible to verify a similar transition in party group behavior after the SEA as occurred in voting on resolutions. It is possible, however, to see if the general trend of cooperation between the two major parties witnessed during the third legislature for resolutions, also existed under the cooperation procedure. A priori, a high level of cooperation between the PPE and PSE should not necessarily be expected. The cooperation procedure greatly enhanced the legislative authority of the EP, and in the process rekindled public interest in its activities, both of which could have worked counter to PSE-PPE cooperation.³⁶ The potential to have a significant impact on the policy of the EU might have brought to the fore underlying ideological differences between these two groups that could not be ignored or reconciled. In addition, increased public awareness of EP activities might have made it difficult for diverse political families, generally in opposition to one another nationally, to cooperate extensively at the supranational level.

Other aspects of the cooperation procedure potentially re-enforced the new trend of cooperation discussed above. The underlying goal of most MEPs throughout the history of the EU has been to increase the legislative powers of the European Parliament as a whole. It is possible that ideological divisions between groups were overcome so that the Parliament's new powers would not be diminished by an inability to reach cohesive decisions quickly. New rules which required an absolute majority of MEPs to support any amendment in the second round of the cooperation procedure are also likely to have stimulated an increased level of cooperation between the PPE and PSE. Neither large party group could be sure of its ability to muster the necessary votes from the smaller groups, particularly in light of the high

³⁵ The data used in this section was originally analyzed in Amie Kreppel and George Tsebelis. "Coalition Formation in the European Parliament." *Comparative Political Studies*, forthcoming.

³⁶ See *Eurobarometer: Variables Trend 1974-1993*, European Editions, 1994. In particular, questions B8 - B10.

level of absenteeism, which remained across the ideological spectrum. An analysis of voting behavior under the cooperation procedure suggests the existence of both trends depending on the stage in the legislative procedure.

The patterns of coalition formation for roll call votes under the cooperation procedure during the third legislature differ significantly from those witnessed for votes on resolutions during the same period. At first glance, party group interaction under the cooperation procedure appears to revert to the patterns witnessed in the first and second legislatures for resolutions (Figure 9). Ideology played a greater role in votes under the cooperation procedure than it did for votes on resolutions during the same years. For votes under the cooperation procedure, ideology was the primary determinant of voting behavior, explaining 27% of total variation (compared to only 16% for resolutions). The amount of variation explained by participation, however, was nearly identical for procedures; 23% under cooperation and 24% for resolutions.

INSERT FIGURE 9

Initially the increased importance of ideology under the cooperation procedure appears to conflict with the level of cooperation between the party groups suggested by the correlation coefficients, especially between the PPE and PSE (see Table 9). While cooperation between the PSE and the PPE under the cooperation procedure was clearly less than for votes on resolutions during the same period (.23 versus .33), it is no where near as low as it had been during the second legislature (.12). The apparent conflict between a comparatively high level of cooperation and the obvious importance of ideology can be better understood if the votes are disaggregated to incorporate the intricacies of the cooperation procedure.

Unlike resolutions, proposals under the cooperation procedure are initiated by the Commission, and are legislation, not just public policy statements. The European Parliament has two opportunities to amend the proposed legislative text; once during the “first reading” before the Council of Ministers acts on the proposal (Council’s Common Position) and once afterwards, during the “second reading” (before the Council makes its final decisions). The Commission has the opportunity after each round of action to accept or reject the EP’s amendments (incorporating them into the text or not). The Council makes its decisions based on the (potentially revised) Commission text forwarded to it at the end of each round.³⁷ During the first reading the EP can adopt amendments by simple majority, in the second reading an amendment must garner the support of an *absolute majority* of the EP.

Table 9: Correlation Coefficients - Cooperation Procedure III Legislature (all)

	ARC	CG/LU	TECH	EDG	GUE	LDR	NI	PPE	RDE	PSE	V
ARC	1										
CG/LU	0.38	1									
TECH	0.04	-0.05	1								
EDG	0.11	-0.06	0.17	1							
GUE	0.50	0.72	-0.03	-0.10	1						
LDR	0.25	0.02	0.29	0.57	0.13	1					
NI	0.26	0.23	0.39	0.26	0.08	0.46	1				
PPE	0.20	-0.15	0.28	0.74	-0.10	0.58	0.31	1			
RDE	0.04	-0.17	0.35	0.38	-0.15	0.36	0.18	0.41	1		
PSE	0.48	0.57	0.05	0.21	0.68	0.46	0.25	0.23	-0.02	1	
V	0.55	0.53	-0.03	-0.08	0.70	0.16	0.16	-0.01	-0.14	0.54	1

The effect of the two-stage procedure on the voting behavior of MEPs and the party groups in the EP is demonstrated by the difference in the correlation coefficients between the PPE and PSE in the first and second rounds (Tables 10 and 11). During the first round, when only a simple majority is required there is strikingly little cooperation between the two major parties. The overall pattern of coalition formation is very similar to those witnessed for resolutions during the second legislature. The standard party group alliances of the right and left regain much of their previous strength and the EP as a whole appears, once again, to be ideologically polarized (the PSE and PPE having a correlation coefficient of only .11).

Table 10: Correlation Coefficients - Cooperation Procedure III Legislature (1st Round Only)

	ARC	CG	DR	ED	GUE	LDR	NI	PPE	RDE	PSE	V
ARC	1										
CG	0.31	1									
DR	-0.07	-0.14	1								
ED	0.11	-0.07	0.10	1							
GUE	0.35	0.78	-0.11	-0.06	1						
LDR	0.17	-0.04	0.22	0.59	0.10	1					
NI	0.25	0.04	0.29	0.26	0.03	0.50	1				
PPE	0.11	-0.21	0.36	0.73	-0.19	0.62	0.44	1			
RDE	0.15	-0.15	0.36	0.33	-0.11	0.42	0.47	0.48	1		
PSE	0.37	0.60	-0.06	0.26	0.70	0.38	0.10	0.11	0.02	1	
V	0.47	0.45	-0.09	-0.03	0.63	0.20	0.12	-0.06	-0.07	0.58	1

³⁷ For a more complete description of the cooperation procedure and the specific policy areas falling within its jurisdiction see Richard Corbett et al. *The European Parliament*. 3rd Edition, London: Cartermill Press, 1996.

Table 11: Correlation Coefficients - Cooperation Procedure III Legislature (2nd Round Only)

	ARC	CG	DR	ED	GUE	LDR	NI	PPE	RDE	PSE	V
ARC	1										
CG	0.51	1									
DR	0.23	0.13	1								
ED	0.12	-0.04	0.31	1							
GUE	0.80	0.60	0.11	-0.18	1						
LDR	0.35	0.12	0.38	0.55	0.18	1					
NI	0.27	0.44	0.52	0.29	0.14	0.41	1				
PPE	0.37	-0.03	0.12	0.76	0.09	0.51	0.17	1			
RDE	-0.15	-0.21	0.32	0.47	-0.23	0.26	-0.12	0.26	1		
PSE	0.69	0.51	0.24	0.13	0.64	0.59	0.40	0.34	-0.10	1	
V	0.70	0.65	0.06	-0.19	0.82	0.09	0.19	0.09	-0.25	0.49	1

This trend is mitigated, however, by the special majority requirements for EP action during the second round. The level of compromise between the PPE and PSE in the second stage of the cooperation procedure resembles that for resolutions during the same period (.34 correlation coefficient versus .33 for resolutions). There is also a similar loss of cohesion within the left-wing coalition demonstrated by a reduction in correlation coefficients between the PSE and its traditional allies (CG and GUE).³⁸

The emerging tendency for the Socialists to control the legislative initiative witnessed during votes on resolutions during the III legislature is present under the cooperation procedure as well. The majority of successful vote positions once again fall between the two major groups, and closer to the Socialists than the PPE (figure 10). In addition, a cluster of “grand coalition” votes (those supported by both the PPE and PSE) is clearly evident despite the increased importance of ideology under the cooperation procedure. The bulk of the grand coalition votes occur during the second round of voting when an absolute majority is required to act. This demonstrates the pressure placed on the PPE and PSE to compromise during the second round. This is most likely caused in part by the inability of either party group to achieve the required majority alone or even with its traditional ideological allies (due to the high rates of absenteeism). It should be noted, however, that no grand coalition was formed almost 30% of the time.³⁹ This demonstrates that a compromise between the two groups in the second round is not

³⁸ The right-wing coalition appears to suffer less from increased PPE-PSE cooperation.

³⁹ In eight out of the 30 RCV during the second round of the cooperation procedure the majority of the PPE and PSE opposed each other.

automatic, despite the special majority requirements. The decision to work together to better the power of the institution as a whole is clearly strategic since both groups are willing to accept the status quo rather than cooperate at times.

Most other aspects of party group behavior were similar, if not identical, for both the cooperation procedure and resolutions. The overall rate of participation increased slightly, from 48% to 53%. This increase was largely due to the PSE and LDR, which improved from 56% to 65%, and 32% to 40% respectively. Most of the other groups experienced only slight variations in member participation (see Table 12). The PSE also suffered less internal dissension under the cooperation procedure (a 97% cohesion score as opposed to only 91% for resolutions), while the PPE was actually less cohesive (falling from 98% to 95%). On the whole, however, cohesion scores for all of the groups remained extremely high.

The tension within the party groups between conflict over ideological differences and a desire to have some impact on EU legislation is clear. The cooperation procedure offered the EP its first chance to have a substantive impact on the creation of EU policy. This ability apparently increased the importance of differences in policy goals between the party groups of the left and right. At the same time, the rules associated with the new procedure and the need for proposals to be adopted by the Council and Commission required some level of cooperation between the PSE and PPE if the Parliament as a whole was to have any impact on EU legislative decision-making.

INSERT FIGURE 10

It is interesting that cooperation between the PSE and PPE was easier during this period for resolutions, which have no majority requirements and are generally more ideological, than it was for legislation decided under the cooperation procedure. This suggests that voting requirements alone can not explain the increased tendency towards cooperation during the second round of the cooperation procedure. This is supported by the absence of cooperation in nearly a third of second reading votes and the existence of cooperation in almost 40% of votes in the first round.

Table 12: Party Group Cohesion and Participation - Cooperation Procedure III Legislature

Party Group	Avg. Percent Voting	Internal Cohesion	Avg. # Members
ARC	24%	0.91	16
CG/LU	34%	0.97	11
DR	45%	0.93	15
EDG	71%	0.96	34
GUE	40%	0.98	27
LDR	40%	0.90	47
NI	10%	0.97	14
PPE	54%	0.95	127
RDE	24%	0.94	23
PSE	65%	0.97	180
Verde	56%	0.98	23
Total	53%	n/a	518

One possible explanation for the variation in voting behavior between the two rounds is that that the first round of the procedure is used by the party groups as a bargaining round, not between the EP and the other EU institutions, but between the groups themselves. Both the PPE and PSE might fight for their most preferred policy outcome during the first round in the hopes that the Commission and Council would adopt it. When, or if, this approach fails, and the preferences of the EP majority are ignored in the first round by the other institutions, both groups would be more likely to compromise during the second round to avoid negating the potential power of the EP as a whole. Increased cooperation between party groups in the second stage is likely even without the existence of a special majority requirements, since it is the last chance for the EP as a whole (and the PPE and PSE in particular), to impact final EU policy outcomes.

This type of behavior can be explained by the rational actor model's fundamental principle that goal maximizers work to achieve their ideal outcome. When this is not possible a compromise, which comes closer to their ideal than the default option, will be pursued. In effect, the voting pattern of the party groups under the cooperation procedure suggests that during the first round they are competing with each other over who sets the agenda by creating the proposal to be offered to the Commission and Council. In the second round the groups cooperate to allow the EP as a whole to compete against the other EU institutions for control over policy outcomes. Regardless of how much both groups prefer their own

amendments, it is probable that both would rather successfully exercise the EP's new ability to impact legislative outcomes. Cooperation is made easier by the fact that both groups tend to prefer a higher level of integration than the other EU institutions, particularly the Council.

The addition of a second stage into the legislative procedure appears to have created an opportunity for the party groups to fight their ideological battles against each other in the first round without diminishing the potential of the EP as a whole to impact legislation in the second round. This is very different situation than that created when voting on resolutions, where the EP as a whole has only one chance to make a public statement. Even though resolutions do not have a direct influence on policy, increased public awareness of the EP, combined with its larger role in the legislative process, might encourage the party groups to present a unified front to the public to maximize the EP's newly established political influence.

The Co-decision Procedure

The establishment of the co-decision procedure marked the achievement of a long-standing EP goal; the power to definitively veto proposed EU legislation. While still far short of the power to initiate policy proposals, or adopt them independently, the new procedure forced the other EU institutions (particularly the Council) to seek compromises with the EP. The procedure itself generally followed the lines of the cooperation procedure except that a new conciliation committee and an additional reading were added if the Council rejected even one of the EP's proposed 2nd reading amendments. Of central importance to the development of the party system was the fact that the new procedure was understood to further increase the power of the EP. Like the cooperation procedure, it also offered the party groups the opportunity to struggle against each other during the first stage, and against the other EU institutions later on.⁴⁰

Initially, the pattern of coalition formation under the co-decision procedure appears to be similar to that for resolutions during the same period. Closer analysis, however, demonstrates that party group behavior for co-decision votes also follows the patterns witnessed under the cooperation procedure. In effect, voting patterns under the co-decision procedure are a combination of the other two legislative

⁴⁰ For a more complete description of the co-decision procedure and the specific policy areas falling within its jurisdiction see Richard Corbett et al. *The European Parliament*. 3rd Edition, London: Cartermill Press, 1996. There has been some debate in the literature recently about the true effect of the co-decision procedure on the legislative powers of the EP. See Tsebelis, George and Geoffrey Garrett. "Agenda-Setting, Vetoes and the European Union's Codecision Procedure." *Journal of Legislative Studies* Vol. 3, No. 3, 1997, and Roger Scully. "The European Parliament and the Codecision Procedure: A Reassessment", *Journal of Legislative Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1997.

procedures. While the importance of ideology was once again relegated to second place, explaining 20% of the variation, there was also a significant difference between the first and second readings (Figure 11).⁴¹ The ideological left and right were clearly divided along the vertical axis, with the PPE and its traditional allies located primarily beneath the horizontal axis and the Socialists and allies above it. The internal division within the left-wing coalition that occurred under the cooperation procedure during the previous legislature no longer appears to be significant.

INSERT FIGURE 11

Despite the overall appearance of broad inter-group cooperation, the correlation coefficient between the PPE and PSE is significantly lower for votes under the co-decision procedure than for votes on resolutions, .34 and .45 respectively (Table 13). The reduced overall level of cooperation is attributable once again to the multi-stage nature of the legislative procedure. If the votes are disaggregated by round we find the same pattern of a comparatively low level of cooperation in the first round with an increase in the second round (Tables 14 and 15). The difference between the different stages is less drastic under the co-decision procedure, however, with a difference of only .12 between rounds, versus .23 under the cooperation procedure. Another important difference between the two procedures is the significantly higher level of cooperation in the first round under the co-decision procedure (.27 versus .11). The combination of these facts suggests that, while ideological differences are still substantial during the first round of the co-decision procedure, the party groups consider the general need to avoid extremism and present a united front to the other EU institutions to be more important.

Table 13: Correlation Coefficients - Co-decision Procedure IV Legislature (All)

	<i>ARE</i>	<i>EdN</i>	<i>ELDR</i>	<i>GUE/NGL</i>	<i>NI</i>	<i>PPE</i>	<i>PSE</i>	<i>UPE</i>	<i>Greens</i>
ARE	1								
EdN	0.38	1							
ELDR	0.43	0.13	1						
GUE/NGL	0.63	0.37	0.13	1					
NI	0.01	0.34	0.20	0.05	1				
PPE	0.22	0.00	0.64	0.00	0.26	1			
PSE	0.76	0.23	0.50	0.60	-0.07	0.34	1		
UPE	0.02	-0.13	0.35	-0.10	0.33	0.47	-0.02	1	
Greens	0.57	0.12	0.31	0.64	-0.18	0.07	0.64	-0.19	1

⁴¹ This is the same amount explained by ideology for resolutions during the same period (see Figure 4 supra).

Table 14: Correlation - Co-decision Procedure IV Legislature (1st round)

	<i>ARE</i>	<i>EDN</i>	<i>ELDR</i>	<i>GUE/NGL</i>	<i>NI</i>	<i>PPE</i>	<i>PSE</i>	<i>UPE</i>	<i>Greens</i>
<i>ARE</i>	1								
<i>EDN</i>	0.44	1							
<i>ELDR</i>	0.12	-0.08	1						
<i>GUE/NGL</i>	0.78	0.43	0.03	1					
<i>NI</i>	0.18	0.55	0.21	0.17	1				
<i>PPE</i>	0.13	-0.04	0.80	-0.02	0.26	1			
<i>PSE</i>	0.70	0.19	0.26	0.68	0.05	0.27	1		
<i>UPE</i>	0.11	-0.17	0.55	0.05	0.20	0.72	0.24	1	
<i>Greens</i>	0.52	0.09	0.23	0.68	-0.04	0.05	0.51	0.03	1

Table 15: Correlation - Co-decision Procedure IV Legislature (2nd round)

	<i>ARE</i>	<i>EdN</i>	<i>ELDR</i>	<i>GUE/NGL</i>	<i>NI</i>	<i>PPE</i>	<i>PSE</i>	<i>UPE</i>	<i>Greens</i>
<i>ARE</i>	1								
<i>EdN</i>	0.33	1							
<i>ELDR</i>	0.61	0.35	1						
<i>GUE/NGL</i>	0.63	0.29	0.34	1					
<i>NI</i>	-0.11	0.00	0.25	-0.36	1				
<i>PPE</i>	0.29	0.05	0.54	0.03	0.28	1			
<i>PSE</i>	0.80	0.28	0.65	0.65	-0.18	0.39	1		
<i>UPE</i>	-0.04	-0.10	0.24	-0.30	0.51	0.31	-0.18	1	
<i>Greens</i>	0.63	0.16	0.36	0.69	-0.35	0.09	0.73	-0.34	1

The differences in party group behavior between the two rounds are demonstrated graphically by Figures 12 and 13. In these figures an “X” represents successful vote positions. In the first round there are two clusters of successful votes; one in the area between the PPE and PSE, one near the PSE cluster. In the second round there are also two clusters; the largest in between the PPE and PSE (in the “grand coalition area”) and the other by the PPE. While in the first round the successful votes of the PSE are almost all “yes” votes (+) in the second round all of the successful vote positions near the PPE are “no” votes (-). This suggests that the PPE was able to use the special majority requirement in the second round to effectively block the PSE from obtaining its goals during the second round.⁴² This is supported by the lack of any successful votes in the PSE area during the second round. Votes supported by the grand coalition (PPE and PSE) far out number the PPE’s successful veto votes in the second round, while the number of successful non PPE-PSE coalition votes is quite significant in the first round.

⁴² A similar pattern is also evident in votes under the cooperation procedure during the III Legislature.

INSERT FIGURES 12 & 13

As with the cooperation procedure, there is significantly more cooperation between the PPE and the PSE during the second round of the legislative procedure. Once again it seems unlikely that this increase in cooperation is due to the absolute majority requirement alone. It seems more probable that the differences between the party group coalitions formed in the first and second round are due to a confluence of different variables, of which the majority requirement is only one. The high rate of cooperation between the PPE and PSE on resolutions during the IV Legislature, where there is no majority requirement, suggests that there is a more general tendency towards cooperation in the final (or only) round of EP action regardless of voting requirements.

An important difference between the various procedures is the much higher rate of participation among the larger groups for votes under co-decision. Overall participation during votes on resolutions never averaged more than 48%. There was some improvement in the third legislature for votes under the cooperation procedure, but still nearly 50% of MEPs failed to participate on average. The overall rate of participation under co-decision averaged 65%, with the PPE and PSE averaging 75% (Table 16). This tremendous increase in participation suggests that both MEPs and the party groups believed that the legislative potential of the EP had increased under the new procedure. The growth in participation for co-decision votes was not just a by-product of the special majority requirements of the second round, in fact, there was almost no difference in participation rates between the two rounds.

Table 16: Party Group Cohesion and Participation - Co-decision Procedure IV Legislature

Party Group	Avg. Percent Voting	Internal Cohesion	Avg. # Members
ARE	39%	0.99	20
EdN	44%	0.81	19
ELDR	71%	0.87	47
GUE/NGL	35%	0.95	32
UPE	48%	0.91	48
NI	37%	0.88	31
PPE	76%	0.94	171
PSE	74%	0.96	212
V	61%	0.98	26
Total	65%	n/a	614

Internal party group cohesion under the co-decision procedure was, once again, extremely high (Table 16). The only partial exception was the Liberal group, which dropped to an 87% cohesion score compared to 96% for resolutions during the same period, and 90% under the cooperation procedure. The drop in cohesion was tied, no doubt, to the significant increase in member participation. Only an average of 46% of LDR members voted on resolutions during the fourth legislature, and only 40% on average voted under the cooperation procedure in the third legislature. Over 70% participated in co-decision votes. Given the dramatic increase in participation throughout the EP, it is surprising that more groups did not experience a decrease in internal cohesion. The continuation of high internal party group cohesion across procedures and despite the large increase in participation under co-decision suggests that absenteeism is not primarily used to express political opposition.

The cooperation and co-decision procedures differ significantly from EP resolutions. Proposals under these procedures are created outside the EP, which can only offer amendments, while resolutions are created and passed wholly within the EP.⁴³ The legislative process is far more complicated and time consuming for cooperation, and especially co-decision proposals. Both incorporate multiple readings and complex bargaining between, and it appears, within institutions. Finally, the potential of the EP to have a direct impact on final EU legislation exists only under the cooperation and co-decision procedures. Despite these differences, the patterns of voting behavior in each of the legislative procedures and across time suggest a definite transformation in the character of coalition formation in the EP. I argue that this was a result of the EP's acquisition of legislative authority.

Conclusions:

The above analysis of voting behavior in the EP leads to several very interesting conclusions about the party groups in general. One of the most important is the remarkably high level of internal group cohesion regardless of time or legislative procedure. This once again calls into question the common perception of the party groups as weak and undisciplined. Although there are numerous examples of national delegations defecting from their party groups on a specific vote, the overall trend is extremely positive. This is particularly true of the two largest groups.

⁴³ There is no limit, however, to the scope of their powers of amendment beyond the desire to have these amendments adopted by the Commission and Council. The EP can, and frequently does, add new policy dimensions to legislative proposals through the amendment process. See Amie Kreppel. "European Parliament Influence on EU Legislation: Fact, Fallacy or Fantasy?" Forthcoming, *Journal of Common Market Studies*.

Also interesting is the extremely high level of absenteeism across time and all three legislative procedures. There does appear to be some correlation between perceived EP legislative influence and attendance. While participation averaged just over 45% for resolutions, it jumped to 53% for votes under the cooperation procedure and 65% for votes under codecision. This data is particularly alarming if we consider that roll call votes (only 15% of all votes in the EP) often have comparatively high attendance rates because they are called on important or contentious issues. It should also be noted that there was very little variation in attendance between the first and second round under cooperation and codecision. Thus, the special majority requirement alone does not appear to have an impact on Member participation.

It is also interesting that despite the increases in participation under the cooperation, and especially the codecision, procedure the level of internal party group cohesion remained almost universally high, with the sole exception of the Liberal Group. This suggests that high absenteeism is not usually a sign of internal party group dissension. On the whole Members do not appear to be voting with their feet. At the same time the level of absenteeism is still high compared to many national parliaments and necessarily plays a significant role in determining party group coalition strategy when there are special majority requirements.

What is most important for the purposes of this paper is the clear demonstration that the party group system has evolved in conjunction with the expanding political and legislative role of the EP. In the early years of the EP there was little potential for effective legislative participation by the EP. The Parliament's institutional weakness meant that there was little need for the party groups to cooperate where strong ideological differences existed. Since the opinions and proposals of the EP were largely ignored by the other EU institutions it was not necessary for the groups to formulate broadly acceptable compromise positions. In the absence of an ability to directly affect legislation, party groups were forced to resort primarily to active, public, position taking. For this to be effective, it was necessary for the various groups of the left and right to differentiate themselves and extol clear political and policy goals. The result was that there was a behavioral norm of ideological dogmatism and political polarization within EP. As a result, the EP served as a chamber of debate where issues important to Members could be discussed but no solutions effectively pursued.

As the role of the EP in the broader political environment has evolved from largely insignificant to potentially influential, the constraints placed on party group activity changed significantly. The polarization of the left and right on questions of EU policy served the Members of the EP only as long as

the Parliament remained relatively powerless and largely ignored by the other EU institutions. Once the potential to have a direct influence over legislative outcomes was realized ideological rigidity was no longer in the interests of the political groups, or the EP as a whole. This is particularly true because the legislative powers eventually granted to the Parliament by the SEA and Maastricht Treaty are not unilateral.

The assent and cooperation of the Commission and the Council are still necessary for legislation to be adopted. This means that the party groups can no longer afford the previous level of ideological dogmatism if their proposals are to be acceptable to the other institutions. The rules and norms governing interactions with the Council and the Commission require legislative proposals to be compromises generally acceptable to the ideological right and left, as well as the individual Member States. I suggest that to make the most of the EP's newly acquired legislative potential and realize their policy goals, the political groups now need to cooperate across ideological boundaries. This requires creating compromise proposals moderate enough to be acceptable to a wide range of political and national interests. The pressure to find internal compromises is intensified still further by the special majority requirements of the new procedures, which call for absolute majorities during their final stages. These conditions are extremely restrictive because of the consistently high level of absenteeism within the EP.

Compromise and ideological moderation within the EP did not occur overnight, nor did they occur unilaterally, but the results of the statistical analysis do generally support the thesis that the fundamental character of the EP has shifted over time. The data discussed above strongly suggests that the addition of the cooperation procedure had a significant impact on the character of the party group system. The potential to directly affect legislative outcomes led to a reduction in the role of ideology within the coalition formation process after the second legislature for both resolutions and the second round of the cooperation and codecision procedures.

The existence of the special majority requirements and the need for inter-institutional collaboration no doubt had some impact of the level of party group cooperation, but they cannot explain all of the changes discussed above. Neither the majority restrictions nor the need for Commission and Council agreement were required for resolutions during the third and fourth legislatures. In fact, the only thing that changed between the first two and the last two legislatures for resolutions was the increase in EP legislative authority under *other* procedures. The existence under the cooperation and codecision procedure of the "grand coalition" for a significant number of first round votes, and its absence for many

votes during the second round is also not adequately accounted for by special majority or institutional arguments alone. Only a more complete understanding of the strategic action of the party groups and the modified role of ideology can serve to effectively explain these variations, but what about the difference in voting behavior between the first and second rounds under the cooperation procedure?

I believe that this can be understood if we think of the new legislative procedures as two stage games. The EP has two opportunities to convince the other institutions to adopt its amendments. Where significant differences exist between the PPE and PSE the two stage procedure allows them to fight for their relative ideal positions during the first round and compromise to maximize EP influence during the second round. Thus, the first round is an ideological battle, while the second is an inter-institutional one. This explanation is useful because it accounts for the variation in coalition behavior between the two rounds while still permitting grand coalitions in the first round if there is broad ideological consensus and the absence of grand coalitions in the second round if ideological barriers cannot be overcome.⁴⁴ This pattern of conflict and compromise can easily be compared to primaries in the United States and the French double ballot electoral system. Both initially pit individuals or parties against each other in a first round, only to then require that they work together in a second round to achieve the best outcome against a common opponent. The notion of a two-stage game is offered as a possible explanation, there is no way to test it empirically with roll call voting data. It does, however, suggest further avenues of study, which are, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this research.

The party system of the European Parliament, like the Parliament itself, is clearly still in the process of developing. Effective legislative strategies are still being tested. At the same time the legislative process itself is frequently being revised.⁴⁵ The result is a party system with only partially established behavioral norms that will continue to develop as the role of the EP in the broader political

⁴⁴ This would occur when either the PPE or the PSE preferred the status quo to any compromise that could be reached with the other party group(s).

⁴⁵ Recent negotiations during the 1997 Intergovernmental Governmental Conference (IGC) have resulted in a proposal to largely do away with the cooperation procedure, replacing it with a simplified co-decision procedure in most policy areas. See Council Statement on Amsterdam IGC meeting. See also, Francis Jacobs. "Legislative Co-decision: A Real Step Forward?" Paper presented at the 5th Bi-annual meeting of the European Studies Association, Seattle Washington, June 1997.

to use cooperation and compromise as strategic tools in the inter-institutional struggle for power has been a crucial part of this transformation.

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
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Appendix 1


Ideology	Party Group	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997		
Left	CG/LU--Left Unity	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	14	14	13	13	13	***	***	***	***	
Left	COM-Communists and Allies	44	44	45	48	48	43	43	46	48	48	48	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***
Left	GUE/GUE-NGL-United European Left/Nordic Left	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	28	28	28	28	28	33	33	33	33	33
Left	Verde--The Greens	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	29	29	28	28	23	27	27	27	28	28
Left-C	PSE--Socialists	113	113	120	124	124	130	130	172	165	165	166	180	179	198	198	198	217	217	217	214	214
Center	LDR--Liberal and Democratic Reform	40	40	39	39	39	31	31	42	44	44	46	49	49	45	44	42	52	52	52	43	43
Right-C	ED--European Democrats	64	64	63	63	63	50	50	63	66	66	66	34	34	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***
Right-C	PPE--People's Party	107	107	109	117	117	110	110	118	115	115	113	121	122	162	163	157	173	173	173	181	181
Right	DEP/RDE	22	22	22	22	22	29	29	34	29	29	29	22	22	21	20	26	***	***	***	***	***
Right	DR--European Right	***	***	***	***	***	16	16	16	16	16	16	17	14	14	14	***	***	***	***	***	***
Right	EdN--Europe of Nations	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	19	19	18	18	18	18
Right	FE--Forza Europe	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	27	***	***	***	***	***
Right	UPE (FE+RDE) Union for Europe	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	54	54	55	56	56
Other	ARE--European Radical Alliance	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	19	20	20	20	20	20
Other	CDI/ARC-Tech.	11	11	11	11	11	19	19	20	20	20	20	14	15	15	16	***	***	***	***	***	***
Other	NI--Non-Affiliated	9	9	25	10	10	6	6	7	15	15	14	10	12	13	22	27	31	31	31	33	33
	Total	410	410	434	434	434	434	434	518	518	518	518	518	518	518	518	579	626	626	626	626	626

Figure 1: Ideology and Participation-Resolutions I Legislature




Key: □ = PPE; ◆ = PSE; + = LDR; "." = Absent

Figure 2: Party Groups and Success - Resolutions II Legislature




Key: □ = PPE; ◆ = PSE; + = LDR; X = Successful Vote Position

Figure 3: Ideology and Participation-Resolutions II Legislature



Key: □ = PPE; ◆ = PSE; + = LDR; X = Vote Position; “.” = Absent

Figure 4: Party Groups and Success - Resolutions II Legislature



Key: □ = PPE; ◆ = PSE; + = LDR; X = Successful Vote Position

Figure 5: Ideology and Participation - Resolutions III Legislature






Figure 6: Party Groups and Success - Resolutions III Legislature



Key: □ = PPE; ◆ = PSE; + = LDR; X = Successful Vote Position

Figure 7: Party Groups and Success - Resolutions IV Legislature



Key: □ = PPE; ◆ = PSE; + = LDR; X = Successful Vote Position

Figure 8: Ideology and Participation - Resolutions IV Legislature






Figure 9: Ideology and Participation - Cooperation Procedure III Legislature



Key: □ = PPE; ◆ = PSE; + = LDR; “.” = Absent

Figure 10: Party Groups and Success - Cooperation Procedure III Legislature



Key: □ = PPE; ◆ = PSE; + = LDR; "X" = Successful Vote Position

Figure 11: Ideology and Participation - Co-decision Procedure IV Legislature






Figure 12: Party Groups and Success (1st Round) - Co-decision Procedure IV Legislature



Key: □ = PPE; ◆ = PSE; + = LDR; "X" = Successful Vote Position

Figure 13: Party Groups and Success (2nd Round) - Co-decision Procedure IV Legislature



Key: □ = PPE; ◆ = PSE; + = LDR; "X" = Successful Vote Position