Social Movement or Social Partner? Strategies for the Revitalisation of British Trade Unionism

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Introduction

Paradoxically, as most indicators have pointed to a decline in the power of UK unions in recent decades, so there has been a shift from determinism to voluntarism in theories of trade unionism. In the 1970s, as union power waxed, it was argued that union membership was largely a function of the policies of employers (Bain 1970) and that most aspects of union behaviour were explained by the structure of collective bargaining (Clegg 1978). In the period since, as the union star has waned, it has been argued that unions can and do make meaningful strategic choices and that, at least in part, they are architects of their own destiny (see Kelly 1997).

While this shift is due partly to the turning cycle of intellectual fashion and the wider currency of the strategy concept in the social sciences (Crow 1989), it also reflects real change in the British trade union movement. British unions are in crisis and recent years have been marked by an increasingly urgent, if not desperate, attempts to discover means of reversing a two-decade decline in membership, bargaining power and political influence. Crisis has prompted innovation (cf. Jacoby 1983) and two dominant proposals for the renewal of British labour have come to the fore in recent years. The first has as its focus union relations with employers and government and seeks to develop a new form of interaction based around the notion of social partnership, with its connotation of co-operation for mutual gains. The second response is less widely or less clearly articulated, but has at its centre an attempt to renew the relationship between unions and their members by re-creating labour as a social movement. In this case, there is a commitment to mobilising workers behind demands for workplace justice and an emphasis on recruitment and organisation as the key tasks of union renewal.

Each of these responses can loosely be labelled union strategies or ‘strategic choices’ and the purpose of what follows is to analyse and review both. In doing so, four discrete tasks are attempted, all of which arguably are necessary for a full dissection of trade union strategic choice. First, there is examination of the form or content of each initiative in order to identify the distinguishing characteristics of social partnership and social movement unionism in a British context. Second, there is consideration of the factors internal and external to the union movement which are working for the selection of these choices. Third, there is an attempt to identify the constraints which limit each option. And fourth, there is an evaluation which seeks to identify the strengths and weaknesses of both. Given the emergent nature of each strategy, this final stage, in particular, is necessarily speculative.

The vocabulary and assumptions of social partnership and social movement unionism are strikingly different and they can be regarded as
alternative choices for revitalising British labour (see Kelly 1996). What is striking, however, is that elements of both are occasionally fused in union policy. The central confederation of British labour, the Trades Union Congress (TUC), for example, has simultaneously sought to develop a ‘culture of organising’ across the British union movement and established an Organising Academy, while it advocates ‘partnership’ in relations with employers and has sought an integrative relationship with the new Labour Government elected in 1997 (Heery 1998). Accordingly, the paper concludes by considering the extent to which partnership and movement are genuine alternatives or whether they may prove mutually compatible and even reinforcing elements within a complex strategy for union renewal.

Social Partnership

‘Social partnership’ is an imprecise term and in Britain carries a number of meanings and refers to a range of union activities (Ackers and Payne 1998: 546). At European level it can refer to union involvement in the European Social Dialogue and the negotiation of framework agreements, such as those on parental leave and part-time work, which have been adopted as directives by the European Union (Falkner 1998). At state level it can refer to attempts to position the TUC as an authoritative partner in economic and social management and in the wake of New Labour’s election, the TUC has sought, not only a programme of supportive labour law, but a more extensive role based around the negotiation of a National Economic Assessment. At economy and sectoral level it can refer to attempts to revive multi-employer collective bargaining and the TUC has cultivated relationships with a range of employer and management organisations in recent years with the ultimate purpose of negotiating framework agreements to guarantee minimum employment standards (Heery and Abbott 1999). Finally, at company level ‘social partnership’ can refer to the negotiation of distinctive ‘partnership’ agreements between unions and management which are intended to promote a new and more co-operative set of relations within the firm. Given the decentralised structure of industrial relations in Britain, it is action at this final level which increasingly defines the partnership option and, accordingly, in what follows the primary focus is on the new crop of partnership agreements which have been concluded in major British companies.

Form

A useful framework for the analysis of union strategy has recently been proposed by Hyman (1997b) who claims that in developing strategies of ‘interest representation’, unions have to resolve three fundamental questions: they must determine the scope of their constituency or whose interests they will represent; they must decide objectives or what
interests they will represent; and they must select methods or decide how interests will be represented. On each dimension, therefore, unions can select from a range of potential options and can choose to be more or less inclusive in identifying their constituency, can embrace a narrow economic agenda or broad social and political objectives and can use a variety of methods and relate both to their members and to employers in a number of ways.

The strategy of social partnership involves choices in each of these three areas and Hyman's framework can usefully guide the analysis of partnership agreements. With regard to constituency, what is striking about the majority of recent partnerships is that they have been concluded in mature industries undergoing restructuring which, in turn, is related to exposure to new and more intense forms of competition. Examples include the partnership agreement in Welsh Water which followed shortly on the privatisation of the water industry and which has evolved in step with further deregulation, the negotiation of similar agreements in British-based motor manufacturers in the context of over-supply within the world car industry, and the partnership deals which have emerged from a wave of corporate restructuring in the Scottish spirits industry (Marks et al. 1998; Thomas and Wallis 1998; Towers 1997: 107). These are agreements, therefore, which have been developed to protect the interests of core union members exposed to increased economic risk. Significantly, they often include two-tier wage clauses or agreements on the use of flexible labour which serve to protect 'insiders' from the costs of economic adjustment (Towers 1997: 224; see also Standing 1997: 30). In this respect, therefore, partnership agreements embody an exclusive principle of representation.

Although partnership is predominantly a defensive strategy, used on behalf of core union members, it has been used as a means of recruitment, essentially through a strategy of 'organising the employer'. This approach is chiefly associated with the Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union (AEEU), which has continued the policy developed by the electricians' union in the early 1980s of seeking recognition from employers through the offer of 'new style' or 'strike free' agreements, typically in advance of the recruitment of individual union members (Rico 1987). This policy has been directed particularly at inward investors opening large, greenfield manufacturing facilities and, in this respect, once again embodies a focus on the core private sector workforce.

While partnership above the level of the firm may be oriented towards the broad regulation of the labour market, partnership agreements focus very much on the immediate employment-centred interests of union members and, in this regard, display what in a German context is known as 'company egotism' (Jacobi et al. 1998: 221). What is equally striking about these agreements, however, is that they seek to address interests
which have often been neglected by unions in the past (see Strauss 1998: 103). Typically at their heart is an agreement on employment security in exchange for flexible working, but advocates also emphasise worker entitlements to training and development, which may include personal development un-related to the immediate job function, the ‘empowerment’ of workers through job re-design and team-working and the introduction of common conditions of employment across all occupational categories - ‘single status’ - as a means of signifying full membership of the enterprise community of all employees. While experience varies between agreements, there is a fairly consistent attempt to address the ‘qualitative’ as well as ‘quantitative’ needs of workers (Hyman 1997a) and, in this regard, broaden the ambit of union representation.

The methods which unions can use to represent member interests are manifold and can be classified in a variety of ways. Unions can rely on different processes of job regulation, can impart a militant or co-operative character to their dealings with employers and can choose either to act through the collective organisation and participation of their members or to ‘service’ members through a hierarchy of professional officers. Partnership agreements clearly seek to cultivate shared interests with employers and take the form of a ‘productivity coalition’ (Windolf 1989), in which security, development and involvement ideally are exchanged for worker commitment and flexibility. They also typically seek to de-emphasise distributive collective bargaining and a number feature long-term wage agreements or rely on wage formulae which remove the need for periodic, and potentially conflictual, negotiations over wages (see Thomas and Wallis 1998).

In contrast to the de-emphasis of bargaining, there is renewed stress on consultation and a prominent feature of several partnership agreements is the creation of new company councils or forums, which include union and non-union representatives and which act primarily as advisors to management. In some cases, there has also been reliance on joint working and problem-solving groups in which management and worker representatives come together to develop policy or resolve difficulties in the systems of work and employment relations. Supporting these new institutions of workplace governance, may be arrangements for more extensive communication between management and union, which are designed to foster trust and which, formally at least, may provide the union with a fuller knowledge of and opportunity to influence business strategy. Finally, with regard to union members, the broad pattern of partnership agreements has been one in which the union ‘services’ membership through key officials, who often were the architects of the original partnership deal (Marks et al. 1998). In some cases, though, and most notably in Tesco, the retail chain, there has been an attempt to strengthen workplace organisation in order to operate new consultative machinery (Allen 1998).
Selection

The voluntarist assumption which underlies the current interest in union strategy has helped generate a renewed concern with internal processes of change in unions. Increasingly, the role of leaders in shaping union action at workplace and national levels has become a focus of research and there has been a fresh emphasis on the importance of leadership values and ideology in influencing the ‘selection’ of particular union strategies (Edwards and Terry 1988; Hyman 1997b; Kelly 1998). This, in turn, has generated interest in the factors which shape leadership with writers variously emphasising the importance of generational and gender change, the role of factions and parties and the transfer of leadership styles from institutions beyond the labour movement (see Darlington 1998; Heery 1996; Kelly 1998; Kelly and Heery 1994; Kirton and Healy 1999).

The spread of a ‘partnership agenda’ across the British trade union movement seems to be associated with a number of these factors. First, there has been a retreat of the traditional left within the trade union and wider labour movement and its associated ideology of class conflict and preference for adversarial relations with employers. The one-time influential British Communist Party has imploded, other far left groups have become less influential and the left-wing of the Labour Party has been marginalised through the triumphant Blair Revolution (Kelly 1998). Reflecting these changes, there has been a switch to or confirmation of moderate leadership in a series of major unions, including the AEEU, GMB, Manufacturing, Science and Finance (MSF), the Transport and General Workers’ Union (TGWU) and the Union of Shop Distributive and Allied Trades (USDAW) (McIlroy 1998). Second, increasing integration within the European Union has furnished British labour with a new model and language of worker representation. Over the past decade, union leaders have been attracted to the industrial relations systems of Germany, the Netherlands and, more recently, Ireland and have espoused the view that partnership can foster social inclusion, and an economy which is receptive to all stakeholders, together with economic efficiency. The Rhenish model of capitalist development, with its promise of stakeholder participation at national and company levels, has legitimised the strategy of social partnership (Ackers and Payne 1998).

While ‘selection’ implies choice, it can also refer, in Darwinian fashion, to the process of adaptation to environmental change. Despite their voluntarism, theories of union strategy typically contain claims that change in the environment in which unions must survive is effectively ‘selecting’ different kinds of strategic response. Advocates of social partnership almost invariably make claims of this kind and argue that the changing nature of both work and workers is eliciting a partnership
strategy from within unions (Bacon and Storey 1993; Kochan and Osterman 1994). If one applies the framework developed by Gospel in his historical analysis of workplace change (Gospel 1994), then what is being suggested is that a change in work relations towards high performance work systems is encouraging change in employment relations towards the adoption of practices which promote worker flexibility and commitment which, in turn, are selecting a change in industrial relations towards the adoption of social partnership. The validity of this causal sequence has yet to be tested but at least some of the recent partnership agreements do conform to this pattern. In the Scottish spirits industry they have emerged from changes in work organisation which seemingly require higher levels of performance and commitment from employees (Marks et al. 1998) and in the Tesco supermarket chain partnership has grown from a competitive strategy which emphasises quality and the ‘empowerment’ and development of front-line employees to deliver more responsive customer service (Rosenthal et al. 1997).

Constraints

Despite its advocacy by trade unions, concrete manifestations of ‘partnership’ remain rather thin on the ground within the British economy. At European level, British unions have been drawn into the development of social policy and there may be further important changes secured through this route, providing for the equal treatment of atypical workers and the information and consultation of employees within domestic enterprises (Cressey et al. 1998). Despite signing the Social Chapter, however, the Blair Government has resisted further elaboration of European social policy and transposed directives on working time and parental leave in a weak form. Unwillingness to depart from the policy of ‘labour market flexibility’, set by the preceding Conservative administrations, has also marked the Government’s domestic policy agenda. The Employment Rights Bill 1999 will strengthen protection against unfair dismissal, enhance maternity benefits and introduce a British version of North American certification legislation, but the Government has made it clear that these changes constitute a once-only and limited adjustment to the existing framework of labour law (Taylor 1997). The other main change has been the introduction of a National Minimum Wage but, while this has been overseen by a new tripartite Low Pay Commission, there has been no wider machinery of social partnership established and the long-term future of the Commission itself is in doubt. The almost total political exclusion of British trade unions through the Thatcher-Major years has ended, but New Labour has instituted no National Economic Assessment and has refrained from the kind of social pact which has been attempted in other European states (cf. Teague 1995; Visser 1998).
Progress in relations with employers has also been limited. At national level, broader and more extensive contact with employers’ organisations has failed to generate any revival of multi-employer bargaining and the main employers’ organisations have opposed and lobbied against all the changes in labour law which the Labour Government has proposed. Their opposition has significantly weakened the key legislation on trade union certification. At company-level, significant partnership agreements have been concluded. The Tesco deal is the largest collective agreement in the British private sector and covers 160,000 employees and there are indications of partnership spreading to new sectors, such as banking. At present, however, partnership agreements remain confined to a limited number of large companies, several of which have a tradition of good employment practice and relatively co-operative relations with trade unions. What this suggests is that, while partnership can emerge under certain conditions, there may be barriers to its wider diffusion within British business.

The firms which have developed partnerships with unions tend to be large and dominant in their sectors, have business strategies which emphasise quality and value-added, business structures which are integrated and centralised, an influential, central human resource function and a long-established relationship with trade unions. These features are true of Tesco, Welsh Water, the large distillery firms in Scotland and other partnership companies. Within these companies, therefore, there is a complex of structural characteristics and business incentives which have allowed partnership to emerge. In many other UK firms, however, these features are lacking and there is an emphasis on cost-reduction within competitive markets, a devolved structure founded on internal financial control, a weak personnel function and an effective strategy of avoiding or marginalising trade unions (Purcell 1995). These arguably dominant features of British business, moreover, are widely believed to be reinforced by the framework of corporate governance and financing which places a premium on short-term performance and shareholder value (Sisson 1995). The incentives for companies to invest in partnership and cultivate a long-term and co-operative relationship with workers and their unions are seemingly lacking in much of the UK economy, therefore, and the structure of British business can be regarded as a constraint on this particular union strategy.

If British employers lack incentives to respond to the offer of partnership at company level, then so does the Government at national level. The economic strategy of the Blair administration looks more to the United States than to continental Europe and is committed to retaining the alleged benefits of a flexible labour market (McCloy 1998). Indeed, Blair has boasted that Britain under Labour retains the most deregulated labour market in the developed world and the risk of partnership, from this point of view, is that it will lead inexorably to greater regulation (Taylor 1997).
The political strategy of New Labour also distances it from the unions' interpretation of partnership. There is a concern that if Labour departs from its stance of 'Fairness not Favours' for the trade union movement, through some kind of corporatist exchange, it would provide leverage to the political right and alienate new sources of Labour support amongst private sector middle-income earners and business. Finally, New Labour's dependence on trade union support is less than that of earlier Labour governments and arguably is reducing. Constitutional and administrative reform within the Labour Party have reduced union voting power and dependence on union finance (McIlroy 1998) and both wage inflation and industrial militancy, the problems which governments most need union help to resolve, are at an historic low. Correspondence in the apparent interests of Government, employers and unions is weak, therefore, and this makes it difficult for the unions' vision of partnership to become established and flourish. It is significant that most progress has been made most readily at European level, where a correspondence of interests does exist and where the European Commission is anxious to promote European social policy and the formation of a European policy community as a means of strengthening and legitimating European integration (Falkner 1998).

Evaluation

What then are the strengths and weaknesses of partnership as a trade union strategy? The main union effort is now directed towards the negotiation of partnership agreements with individual companies and has been defended on the grounds of union responsiveness, pragmatism and legitimacy. In seeking to broaden the agenda of union representation, partnership is seemingly responsive to the interests of employees as expressed through various forms of social research. Union members want greater security (Bryson and McKay 1997) and there are indications that they value opportunities for development and involvement at work (Allen 1998; Storey et al. 1993). It may also be the case that a less adversarial union agenda, expressed through the language of partnership, contains greater appeal to women workers, or to workers committed to product quality or high levels of service delivery or to the expanding ranks of managerial and professional labour (cf. Cobble 1991; Cohen and Hurd 1998; Hecksher 1988).

There is also a strong dose of pragmatism in social partnership. Most unions in most circumstances have a limited capacity to compel employers to respond to their members' interests and, even when supported by favourable employment law, remain structurally dependent on employer tolerance, if not goodwill. Partnership has been defended on the grounds that it acknowledges the status of unions as 'secondary organisations' and represents an attempt to maintain, deepen or extend employer recognition by identifying a new agenda of common interests
(Ackers and Payne 1998; Allen 1998). All unions involved in a permanent relationship with employers have to reach an accommodation and the search for partnership can be regarded as the latest, and unusually explicit, incarnation of this perennial task. Moreover, while there may be more rhetoric than reality in the current managerial agenda of high commitment and HRM (Legge 1995), partnership allows unions to connect with the search by progressive employers for a more collaborative set of work and employment relations (see Rainbird and Vincent 1996).

Finally, the language of partnership may endow unions with a new legitimacy, when their relevance and representativeness has been questioned repeatedly over the past two decades. Borrowing Mao’s phrase, Ackers and Payne (1998: 546) have claimed that partnership, ‘allows unions...to swim among the fishes and re-enter the mainstream of employment relations’. It may do this in a number of ways, by self-consciously presenting a ‘new unionism’ which is well-adapted to changed circumstances, by emphasising the non-sectional nature of unions and their positive contribution to economic development and by presenting a ‘discourse’ of trade unionism which can be less easily rejected by employers and government. ‘Now treat us as partners’ is the main headline in a recent public sector union journal which calls on the Labour government to enter wide-ranging negotiations on the reform of public services in a manner singularly absent under the Conservatives and which demonstrates the use of ‘partnership’ as a means of legitimising the restoration of union influence (IPMS Bulletin 3 April 1999).

While partnership may have its attractions as a strategy for union revitalisation it also has its risks. The first of these concerns the implicit exchange at the heart of most partnership agreements. This is meant to secure worker security, development and involvement in return for higher levels of performance and in a number of cases has been resoundingly endorsed in secret ballots of union members (Allen 1998; Thomas and Wallis 1998). There are also reports, however, of support for these agreements eroding over time (Marks et al.; Towers 1998: 224) and the 1980s precursor of the current wave, the ‘new style, strike-free’ agreement, has sometimes been distinguished by low levels of union membership and worker alienation (Delbridge 1998; Garrahan and Stewart 1992). What this suggests is that, in making the employer the primary target of union strategy, unions may compromise their effectiveness as representative agents of employees. To put it bluntly, there may be a trade-off between union effectiveness and union recognition and this may become more apparent over time when key elements of partnership agreements, such as no-redundancy clauses, lose their salience in changed economic conditions.

A second possible weakness of partnership agreements relates to the constraints on diffusion identified above. The strategy is based on the
assumption that there is a wide span of common interests between employers and unions and, while this may be the case in some organisations, arguably the structural characteristics of British business narrow the range of common ground across much of the economy. The issue of worker training provides an illustration. Central to the partnership agenda is the belief that unions can and should develop a new shared interest with employers in the promotion of employee development. Evidence, however, indicates that, while a union presence is associated with higher investment in training, employers have resisted conceding joint regulation of this issue (Claydon 1998; Heery 1999). It has also been noted that, although surveys of managers indicate strong support for the notion of ‘social partnership’, many regard this as having no implications for the role of trade unions and that a ‘union-free’ version of partnership may be available and preferable (Guest and Peccei 1998). It seems that American human resource management, with its focus on the individual employment relationship, may be viewed by employers as an alternative route to the benefits of flexibility and commitment which are meant to lie at the heart of jointly negotiated partnership agreements.

The final weakness of the partnership strategy is its neglect of the issue of power which, in turn, seems to flow from the assumption of relatively broad common interests. What is striking about partnership agreements is that they do not embody the principle of partnership, defined in terms of ‘joint governance’ or ‘joint decision-making responsibility’ (Verma and Cutcher-Gershenfeld 1993; Towers 1998: 219). Instead, they provide expanded opportunities for union consultation and involvement in a decision-making process which rests ultimately in the hands of management (see Thomas and Wallis 1998) and, indeed, may weaken established rights to joint decision-making through collective bargaining. This is in marked contrast to the situation which obtains in Germany and the Netherlands, where sectoral collective agreements and works council legislation embodying the principle of co-determination, impose relatively strong constraints on management. Partnership at company level in these countries is based around joint decision-making and is maintained through regulation which prevents employers from avoiding or escaping from a relationship with worker representatives if there is an economic incentive to do so (Adams 1995; Wever 1994). Partnership at company level in Britain, in contrast, is voluntarist and relies ultimately on employer sufferance.

Social Movement

While the notion of ‘social movement unionism’ is not widespread in Britain, there has been an increased organising effort by unions in recent years which, in certain respects, embodies an attempt to re-create labour as a social movement. The Organising Academy, established by the TUC to train a new generation of paid organisers, has elements of this kind and
so too do a number of the organising initiatives launched by affiliated unions. The Iron and Steel Trades Confederation (ISTC) and Graphical, Paper and Media Union (GPMU), in particular, have invested heavily in organising and aspire to become ‘organising unions’ in the manner of the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) in the United States. Accordingly, in what follows the strategy of renewal as a social movement is examined through the medium of recent union organising initiatives ³.

Form

If Hyman’s framework is applied to current organising initiatives then what is striking is that they are inclusive in scope. Trade union membership is voluntary in Britain and the closed shop is unlawful and for this reason much organising effort is devoted to building membership and organisation in workplaces where the union is established and recognised by the employer. The TUC’s Academy, however, has been created to prompt greater ambition in union organising and expansion, particularly amongst low-paid, service sector workers. Unions using the Academy have developed greenfield organising campaigns with greater frequency than was apparent even three or four years ago and there is a fresh commitment in a number of cases to expand membership amongst hitherto marginal groups. Many organising initiatives have been directed at women workers, whose membership of unions is increasing, and other targeted categories include young workers, members of ethnic minorities, part-timers, agency and contract staff. There is a bias for expansion, therefore, and the organising agenda in Britain is broadly encompassing and based on a belief that the union movement should be receptive to diverse interests (see Heery 1998a).

Organising initiatives share with social partnership a focus on the employment interests of workers and almost exclusively have been developed at workplace and company level. The dominant pattern is issue-based organising, in which organising campaigns are developed around grievances and issues which are current within the target workforce. There is also an emphasis on demonstrating union effectiveness through the use of organising to secure immediate improvements in terms, conditions and treatment of employees and a pronounced attention to the protective function of unions through regulating management decision-making. It is common for organising campaigns in Britain to use the American language of ‘justice’ and ‘respect’ at work and, in this regard, social movement unionism again stresses the ‘qualitative’ function of unions in providing for voice, equity and fairness at work. What is not strongly apparent, however, and which separates British organising initiatives from those in the North America, is an emphasis on ‘community unionism’ and the reciprocal support of union and community organisations in pursuing each others’ goals ⁴.
The promotion of organising is a feature of both moderate and militant unions in Britain and in many cases unions seek to develop campaigns through employer acquiescence or support. Within the Organising Academy, however, it is notable that the theme of partnership with employers has not been strongly articulated and the assumption underlying the training and practice of its organisers is that there is a conflict of interests between employers and unions. Particularly, where greenfield organising is attempted there is an emphasis on identifying ‘levers’ which can be used to pressure recalcitrant employers in to conceding access to the workplace and a recognition agreement. Some of the recent campaigns organised by the steelworkers, in particular, have been highly adversarial and have been developed in the face of strong employer resistance and harassment. The ultimate objective of organising in most cases, moreover, is to strengthen or establish a conventional recognition agreement, founded on distributive collective bargaining and the representation of individual employees within company procedures.

More distinctive is the relationship with employees. Campaigns have been informed by the ‘organising model’ and in most cases extend beyond the direct recruitment of workers and feature attempts to build or strengthen workplace organisation. The use of the word ‘organising’, as opposed to ‘recruiting’, signifies this shift and is another mutation in the lexicon of British trade unionism. The aim is to establish an effective workplace organisation which can reproduce and service itself and provide a channel for the continuing recruitment of new employees into the union. Much of the work of ‘lead organisers’ trained through the Academy, therefore, involves identifying workplace leaders and activists, often with an emphasis on securing greater involvement among young workers, or women or part-timers and other groups who have not participated extensively in union activity before 6. Campaigns themselves, moreover, often have a participative or mobilising dimension. They are developed through an ‘organising committee’ comprised of workplace activists who plan tactics, identify organising issues, map the workplace and become involved in face-to-face recruitment. There is also an emphasis on raising the profile of the union through a series of activities which extend from the simple act of badge (button) wearing, through the completion of surveys and petitions, to street theatre and sit-down stoppages. Central throughout, however, is the objective of building the union through collective organisation and activity.

**Selection**

The recent wave of organising in Britain demonstrates the importance of leadership change for policy innovation within trade unions. In the TUC and in several individual unions, organising has been driven by the appointment or election of new union leaders who, in turn, have
sponsored key change-agents to promote organising activity. In a number of cases, the latter have been women and this partly explains the strong link which is evident between the organising and equality agendas. It is perhaps too early to talk of transition through the emergence of a new generation of union leaders, focused on organising, but for some new leaders organising has become the defining feature of their period of office. The Organising Academy itself, moreover, embodies a strategy of renewal through generational and gender change with the self-conscious attempt to develop a movement-wide cadre of young and majority female organisers who can diffuse an ‘organising culture’.

The Organising Academy has also involved institutional transfer and is derived from the AFL-CIO’s Organising Institute and the Australian Council of Trade Unions’ Organising Works programme. The initiative originated in visits to the Organising Institute by senior trade union leaders and has been supported by a series of visits to the UK by American and Australian organisers. Several participating unions have also had contact with sister organisations in these two countries and arranged exchanges of staff in order to facilitate the transfer of organising expertise. Transfer has led to the adoption in Britain of some of the concepts, techniques and language which underpin the American ‘organising model’, a notion of union best practice which appears to be diffusing across the globe (Oxenbridge 1997). In addition, however, the example of seemingly successful organising initiatives in other countries has legitimised and inspired change in Britain. While unions in Britain have varied in the extent to which they have directly transposed organising techniques from other countries, the basic message from the USA and Australia, that organising requires dedicated resources, has been extremely influential.

Developments in the wider environment which are acting to ‘select’ organising have yet to be fully examined, but those who are sympathetic to this kind of initiative tend to emphasise the erosion of employment conditions in a more global, deregulated economy (cf. Kelly 1998; Voos 1997). If one applies Gospel’s framework, then organising might be viewed, firstly, as a response to the intensification of management control of the work process, through the spread of lean production or the ‘new managerialism’ within public services (see Fairbrother 1996; Moody 1997), and, secondly, to change within employment relations and the collapse of internal labour markets and their replacement with insecure and contingent work (Heery and Salmon 1999). The theoretical case for social movement unionism, therefore, might be regarded as diametrically opposed to that for partnership and rests on an interpretation of contemporary capitalism which stresses, not the transition to a new and relatively benign stage, but the return of old ills as the post-war settlement in welfare and industrial relations unravels.
Within the Organising Academy, the theme of employment degradation in both manual and non-manual employment has been emphasised repeatedly: the message is that organising is required because there are many bad employers and employment conditions are harsh, not just at the rough end of the labour market, but increasingly for many professional workers as well. The issues around which organising takes place also conform to the notion of employment degradation. The petty and arbitrary exercise of management authority, poor working conditions, and low pay, inadequate health and safety, long hours and overwork, fixed-term contracts and job insecurity and the indignities and injustice of performance appraisal have all featured in recent organising activity. Moreover, and as an illuminating counter to the claim that quality enhancement provides the basis for mutual gains, several campaigns have focused on the employee-customer interface and have been built around the need for protection from abusive or overly demanding clients (see Heery 1993).

Constraints

Despite the Organising Academy and parallel initiatives in individual unions, organising unionism remains a minority trend within the British movement. The proportion of union resources committed to organising is low, many unions employ small numbers of organisers if they employ any at all and the most ambitious attempts to develop an organising culture have been confined to small or medium-sized unions. What this suggests is that there are a number of barriers to the diffusion of organising, which lie both within and beyond the trade union movement.

An important internal constraint is the fact that organising, particularly in greenfield areas, is resource intensive and high risk. Effectively, it must be subsidised by the transfer of resources committed to the servicing and government of core members covered by recognition agreements. This may prompt resistance, however, from members who stand to lose through organising, through the reconfiguration of union government structures to accommodate new members, through the re-deployment of officers and the withdrawal of established services (cf. Waldinger et al. 1998). It is often claimed that existing members can benefit from an organising agenda by being ‘empowered’ to represent their own interests but in unions, as in business, ‘empowerment’ may be viewed as a mixed blessing from those on the receiving end.

An additional constraint is that the co-ordination and re-allocation of resources which are needed for organising may be difficult to achieve in unions which are quite decentralised and which in some cases comprise relatively loose federations of regions and industry sections. The TUC, moreover, has only limited formal authority and must pursue policy change through persuasion and alliance-building (Heery 1998b) and it is
notable that several large unions have stayed aloof from the Organising Academy. Where central co-ordination is attempted, therefore, there may be resistance, both at union level and at lower levels within individual unions. There have been cases of resistance to organising from branches and full-time officers who resent the intrusion in their patch and the attempt by new, and often young and female, organisers to change priorities and spread new techniques. Within the Organising Academy a tension has occasionally emerged between tutors, trainees and graduates, and the sponsoring unions over the style of organising to be employed. Unions can be conservative institutions, attached to custom, and in the labour movement as in other fields, ‘path dependency’ has functioned as a constraint on strategic innovation.

Constraints also lie beyond the trade union movement and, while employer resistance to organising is neither as extensive nor as intensive as it is in the United States, it can still act as a brake on initiatives. Campaigns developed through the Academy have, in some cases, encountered denial of access to workers, attempts to redress grievances to undercut union action, the establishment of consultative forums, counter-campaigning by management and the victimisation of activists. In other cases employers have been either compliant or supportive but, for a number of unions, employer resistance has been a significant constraint on the development of more far-reaching, greenfield campaigns.

The changing characteristics of establishments is a further constraint which is particularly relevant to the model of ‘work-site unionism’ (cf. Cobble 1991) propounded by the Academy. In the burgeoning service sector, workplaces tend to be smaller and there is a movement towards greater use of contingent labour. These and other developments make it harder to establish the kind of self-reliant workplace organisation which lies at the core of the ‘organising model’ and means that newly-established pools of union membership are often reliant on external support and susceptible to erosion over time (Kelly and Heery 1994). Workers are also changing and in Britain, as in other developed economies, the percentage of professional and managerial workers is growing. These groups are heavily unionised in parts of the UK economy and are often represented by specialist, occupational unions. While several of the latter have participated in the Organising Academy, there has been some feeling that the more fervent, social movement aspects of the initiative are at best irrelevant and at worst alienating to potential members. ‘They’re not chicken-pluckers from Arkansas’ was how one official made the point that his prospective membership amongst well-healed professionals and administrators might not respond to an up-beat, mobilising unionism.
Evaluation

As with partnership, so can a series of strengths and weaknesses be identified for social movement or organising unionism. Perhaps its main strength is the desire to re-discover the social movement origins of trade unions as collective and campaigning organisations of working people. It is also significant, however, that movement unionism is expansive in its ethos and directed towards closing the ‘representation gap’ which has emerged in the British workplace over the past two decades (Towers 1997). The TUC programme has been labelled the New Unionism, with deliberate allusion to the new unionism of the late nineteenth century which extended organisation to the unskilled, and the aim is to promote a similar wave of organising today. There is an ambition behind current organising initiatives, therefore, which has previously been lacking and which contrasts with the more defensive orientation of social partnership.

Another strength is that the context is seemingly opportune for organising. The albeit limited reforms of New Labour have furnished unions with new legal opportunities to represent workers and secure recognition and a number of developments in European social policy, such as the European Works Council and the working time directives have provided further openings for union organising. Despite the caution of the Blair administration, the end of the long Conservative hegemony has changed the mood in British industrial relations and placed many employers in a more defensive position. In time, employers may adapt to the new context and develop effective strategies of counter-mobilisation but at present, political and legal change have provided unions with a new set of ‘levers’ for use in organising.

A third strength is the realism of the orientation to employers. There is a ready acceptance of conflicting interests and a preparedness to exploit these through issue-based campaigns. There is an awareness, too, that in much of the economy the traditional functions of unions in protecting workers and regulating management authority remain acutely relevant (cf. Voos 1997). There is also an appreciation of the importance of power in industrial relations. Organising is perceived as a way of ‘empowering’ workers in the sense that they become more able to extract concessions from employers and there is awareness that, in many cases, employers will only accept union activity if there is ‘leverage’ and they are pressured to do so.

The final strength of organising unionism is that there are reasons to believe it is effective. Bronfenbrenner’s (1997) research on NLRB certification campaigns in the United States is particularly instructive in this regard. Her work contains two key findings: that union tactics are the primary determinant of a successful outcome, outweighing the tactics of the employer and the structural characteristics of the targeted workforce,
and that a ‘union-building’ or movement approach to organising is the most effective tactic. A certification campaign is most likely to succeed in the USA if it seeks to do the kinds of thing which are being taught at the Organising Academy; involving workers through a representative committee, raising the union profile through actions and basing the campaign on issues of immediate concern to workers.

There is also a theoretical support for the effectiveness of movement unionism. According to Kelly (1998), collective action through a social movement is dependent on the interaction of a number of conditions. These include: a sense of dissatisfaction and injustice, ‘attribution’ of injustice to the action of another party (e.g. the employer), the emergence of a shared identity based around the appreciation of common interests, the opportunity to act collectively with a reasonable chance of success, and the presence of a mobilising leadership which can frame issues in a way which enhances their legitimacy and collective content. The model of organising, described above, maps neatly onto this framework. It seeks to identify issues of collective interest, may be articulated through a discourse of ‘justice and respect’, reinforces momentum by making concrete gains and is conducted through ‘lead organisers’ and ‘activists’ whose task is to mobilise the workforce.

While there may be grounds for believing movement unionism is effective, there are also identifiable weaknesses, two of which are perhaps most significant. First, the constraints on organising may push it to the margins of the labour movement so that successful campaigns in greenfield areas become dramatic but uncommon events. Limited resources and limited internal support could help generate this outcome but so could the features of movement unionism itself. The conditions which Kelly enumerates may only be found in unusual circumstances and, in particular, the combination of perceived injustice, attribution to the employer and effective leadership may be hard to reproduce. A criticism of American certification legislation is that it confines union organisation to the outlying company, where management is sufficiently exploitative and the union sufficiently well resourced to mobilise workers and overcome the numerous legal barriers to a successful campaign (Adams 1995). There is a risk that organising unionism could reproduce this pattern and work to maximum effect only in unusual circumstances.

The other weakness of movement unionism in a British context is its almost exclusive focus on the individual company or workplace. The prime concern is with the process of organising, with little regard paid to the institutions of worker-management interaction which will be generated as a consequence. It is assumed by advocates, however, that organising will result in the reproduction and extension of the existing pattern of workplace trade union organisation and decentralised collective bargaining. The disadvantages of this pattern have become increasingly
apparent over the past two decades. Britain’s labour market has become marked by greater inequality and a low skill, low productivity dynamic which is reinforced by the ease with which employers can resort to cost minimisation. A decentralised system also makes it easier for employers to avoid unions. These problems can be ameliorated through the unionisation of less skilled workers but arguably they also require effective systems of labour market regulation which extend across company boundaries. Britain needs a revival of sectoral bargaining to complement New Labour’s (scarcely adequate) minimum wage but, to date, the organising agenda has not connected with this need. In the USA, there are signs that it has through the growing interest in labour market organising in low-wage industries (Cobble 1991; duRivage et al. 1998; Herzenberg et al. 1998). In Britain, however, the concern to organise beyond the enterprise as a means of labour market regulation has yet to register.

**Conclusion**

This paper has presented an analysis of the two main strategies currently being promoted for the revitalisation of British trade unionism, social partnership with employers and the revival of the social movement foundations of unionism through organising. Each strategy rests on different choices with regard to union constituency, the definition of worker interests and union methods, including the choice of relationship with employees and employers. They also differ in terms of their interpretation of the evolution of British capitalism, in one case identifying a widening scope for common interests between unions and employers and in the other the reverse. What is striking about the current phase of strategic development, however, is that these competing positions do not map neatly onto established factional divisions within the labour movement. Both have been advocated by the TUC, while unions which have signed partnership agreements (e.g. AEEU, BIFU, USDAW) have also sponsored organisers at the Academy and the most militant organising union, the ISTC, has an established ‘partnership’ with British Steel. Given this seemingly contradictory mix of positions, the purpose of this conclusion is to consider whether partnership and movement can complement one another in a combined strategy for renewal.

One means by which this might be achieved is through the segmentation of union strategy in a manner analogous to portfolio management within large corporations. The TUC routinely differentiates between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ employers and it may be that partnership can thrive and produce benefits for workers in those areas of British business where acceptance of unions remains high and there is a commitment to value-added competition. Elsewhere, in contrast, a more campaigning, organising unionism might be needed. This differential approach might also match the varying needs of employees, with partnership suited to the
requirements of core workers in relatively secure jobs and movement unionism directed at the low paid and insecure.

A combination of union strategies, in this way, has been advocated for Britain and other countries (Ackers and Payne 1998; Jacoby 1997). The tensions likely to arise in combining movement and partnership for a sustained period, however, should not be under-estimated. Unions are value-driven, ideological organisations and the language of strategic choice can give a false impression of the capacity of union leaders to select and combine different approaches to employee representation. Social movement unionism depends on the development of committed activists and organisers who are motivated by a desire to mobilise workers and fight injustice and it is difficult to envisage this mindset resting comfortably alongside the pursuit of partnership. The competing assumptions, discourse and rhetoric of partnership and movement, therefore, will make them difficult to combine. Another and related problem is that the presence of mobilised workers and mobilising activists may pose a threat to relations of partnership with employers and government as they become ‘unmanageable’ and spill beyond their allotted sphere. Finally, partnership and movement may come to function as competing, rather than complementary strategies, particularly in a union movement, structured like Britain’s so as to promote inter-union rivalry. As we move closer to the implementation of a statutory recognition procedure, there are signs of this occurring with some unions offering themselves as the ‘responsible’ alternative to employers faced with aggressive organising campaigns.

These tensions may not be so great as to destroy attempts to combine partnership and movement but they will undoubtedly put it under pressure. One means of managing these tensions, which is emerging in a number of unions at present, is the development of a separate organising function. The employment of dedicated organisers is not an established practice in Britain but, as the organising agenda diffuses, unions increasingly have established specialist units, particularly for the task of greenfield organising. Within these units, there may be scope for a distinctive style of movement unionism to emerge which exists at arms length to the main body of servicing officers and lay representatives, for whom a partnership agenda may have more relevance. The integration of these different functions may itself prove problematic but institutional separation may defuse some of the tension which is likely to arise.

Another way in which partnership and movement may be combined is sequentially, through some kind of ‘representation cycle’ in which organising precedes partnership or vice versa. With regard to the latter, for instance, a number of unions with partnership agreements have used the terms of the partnership to invest in major recruitment campaigns which, in the case of USDAW in Tesco, has embraced attempts to
strengthen workplace organisation. The problem with this approach, however, is that the terms of the partnership, which permits access to recruit, may also dampen recruitment activity as issue- or grievance-based organising puts the relationship with management under strain. The alternative is to conceive of partnership as the end-point of organising. The attraction of this conception is that it can draw from the partnership strategy a model of desirable union-employer relations, which is lacking from movement unionism with its emphasis on process. The positive aspects of partnership, such as the extension of the bargaining agenda to embrace a wider set of worker interests and the reconfiguration of corporate governance on stakeholder lines, can thus be identified as key goals. Such objectives may also serve to legitimise union joining amongst groups of workers who are not deeply alienated from their employer and so may counter the weakness of movement unionism, that it tends to flourish outside the employment mainstream. This kind of sequence, however, also draws on the strengths of movement unionism with its attention to organising and its realistic assessment of power and conflict within the employment relationship. Partnership is built from below, and thus can institutionalise the collective power of workers, rather than being offered as an alternative to that power.

In a recent analysis of German industrial relations, Turner (1998) has described the extension of the German system to the east in terms of 'fighting for partnership'. Union organisation and union militancy, he argues, was the precondition for implanting the dual system of industry bargaining and co-determination through works councils, which has supported a mutually beneficial 'productivity coalition' within the German economy. If movement and partnership are to be combined in a British context then surely it must be on a similar basis; through the revitalisation of union membership, organisation and bargaining power so as to constrain employers, prevent them escaping from a union relationship and require them to respond more fully to the needs of their employees.

Notes

1. This change in the ideology of the labour movement is reflected in academic industrial relations in Britain. In the 1970s, pluralist orthodoxy was subject to a vigorous challenge from 'radical' writers to the left and a powerful current of Marxist industrial relations writing emerged. Twenty years later, pluralism has acquired a new vigour and, in the context of a new right policy agenda, has assumed a more radical cast. Central to most pluralist writing today, moreover, is the claim that worker representation through unions and other channels is economically beneficial as well as socially just. The change can be seen most graphically in the work of Richard Hyman who led the Marxist assault on orthodoxy in the 1970s but who is now a, still radical,
advocate of the reconstruction of British industrial relations on European lines (cf. Hyman 1975; 1996).

2. McIlroy (1998: 551) characterises the relationship between New Labour and New Unionism as follows:

The politics of trade unionism developed, but, none the less, there remained a gap between the statist, regulative, interventionist inflexions of TUC policy and the growing emphasis on the freedom of the market and ‘flexibility equals fairness’ of New Labour.

3. The author is engaged on an evaluation of the TUC’s Organising Academy and associated organising initiatives in individual unions, with colleagues at Cardiff Business School. This section of the paper draws on a series of Research Bulletins which have been produced by members of the New Unionism research group at Cardiff and which are available from the author, Heery@Cardiff.ac.uk. Apart from the author, the research group is made up of: Rick Delbridge, Melanie Simms, John Salmon, Dave Simpson and Paul Stewart, to whom thanks are due for permission to use jointly collected data.

4. This is probably because the Labour Party remains the main focus of union political activity in Britain, though it should be noted that the ISTC now has ‘community involvement’ as a formal objective in all of its organising campaigns.

5. Complementing the development of ‘lead organisers’ through the Organising Academy is another initiative, Winning the Organised Workplace (WOW), which is designed to train workplace leaders in recruitment and organising techniques. The aim is that lead organisers will co-ordinate campaigns conducted through lay activists who have undergone complementary training.

6. A favourite example used by the TUC is that unions continue to spend less on organising than they do on their annual conferences, an event which matters greatly to existing activists drawn from organised sectors. Others have pointed to the resource which is absorbed in formal collective bargaining, where it is not unusual for the union side to comprise large numbers of senior officers and lay representatives, many of whom are passive spectators of the actual business.

7. A switch in union strategy may be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the re-establishment of effective labour market regulation. Historically, systems of industry and economy-wide bargaining have been established through state intervention against employers and it remains to be seen how permanent or extensive current American developments prove to be. Perhaps the best hope for the revival of
industry-wide regulation in Britain is the evolution of European social policy with its preference for the implementation of directives through framework agreements negotiated by the social partners. This, of course, returns us to the agenda of social partnership.

References


