Types and Levels of European Attachment in Scotland and Wales

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I. Introduction

European attachment, unless a particular component is specified directly, has a number of potential components. In the first place, particularly when the question is asked in the context of a survey dedicated to attitudes about the European Union (e.g., the Eurobarometer), “Europe” may seem to refer rather specifically to the European Union and its policies.

Secondly, “Europe” may instead refer to the process of European integration, which, while certainly related to the European Union’s specific policies, may be a concept that is either more encompassing than attitudes towards the European Union or may, in fact, be seen as something not directly related to the European Union and its policies. For example one standard question that has been used to tap underlying attitudes towards the European Union is the following (from the Eurobarometer): “Are you in favor or opposed to the attempts to unify Western Europe?” As Neill Nugent (1992) argues, this question does not specifically mention the European Union, nor does it necessarily refer to the member state of the individual who is being asked to answer the question (179).

Thirdly, “Europe” may also refer to some territory—whose exact borders are left rather vague—to which an individual may feel some closeness. Furthermore, as an extension of this third dimension is the fact that this vague territorial unit is comprised of individuals with whom citizens of a given European nation may have had some contact, in business dealings, in watching international news, on holiday, etc. In the positive telling of this story, the individual who has experienced greater contact with the other members of the European Union begins to see

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1 The original title of this paper, “The Impact of European Attachment on Territorial Attachments in Scotland and Wales,” was not only convoluted, but it also did not do justice to the richness of the data that I have collected about European attachment in Scotland and Wales. While the thesis that I develop here certainly has important implications for the pattern of territorial attachments that one finds in Scotland and Wales (and anywhere else where such patterns of attachment are being investigated), I hope that the audience will indulge the shift in emphasis of my paper. I would like to thank Liesl Haas, Gary Marks and Carole Wilson for their help, suggestions and criticisms on various aspects of the preparation of this paper. The errors, however, I claim exclusively for myself.
that, despite their differences (in language, in custom and even in history), they really are not that different. In a more negative spin on this “Contact Hypothesis”--as social psychologists call this phenomenon--individuals may indeed have greater interactions with other Europeans, but this greater contact merely confirms and exacerbates the negative stereotypes that they have about that “other” national group.² In either case, however, it is the perception of other Europeans as part of a collective to which a person does or does not belong (to varying degrees) rather than specific views about the European Union and its policies and/or the beliefs that one has about the impact of greater European integration which can influence how one feels about Europe.

Finally, “Europe” can also refer to an entity which an individual not merely believes is comprised of people who are not really that different from her, but in which individuals begin to establish deep and meaningful bonds across national boundaries as easily (and perhaps, in some case, more easily) than they form relationships with individuals and groups within their given nation state. Like the “Contact Hypothesis” above, what shapes and maintains these deepening and widening networks of relationships is a set of social, economic and political forces which transform Europe from being the environment in which certain business, pleasure, political etc. transactions occur to an entity that becomes a meaningful community in the hearts and minds of the individuals who are a part of that community. In other words, these myriad contacts, the main process whereby Deutsch (1954, 1957) and Haas (1958) suggest that a meaningful international/European community would be forged, may create in the minds of certain individuals a sense that they, as Europeans, are rather similar and that they share a common fate. In the positive extreme they may begin to see Europe as one of the “imagined communities” of which one hears so much when thinking about territorial attachments (Anderson 1991). Mark Aspinwall (n.d.) argues convincingly that the transactional analysis upon which Deutsch and Haas base their analysis has been criticized on theoretical grounds. Furthermore, he argues that, while Britain “leads the league” in many of the precise types of contacts that Deutsch and Haas

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² This more negative hardening of stereotypes is one that a January 24, 1999 edition of the London Times recently discussed (based on an academic study reported in the February 1998 journal, Psychologie Heute). The news article, “Sunlounger stereotypes still on the march,” summarizes the findings that the negative views that the British have about the Germans live on when they encounter one another in the Costa del Sol for holidays. The perception is that all of the Germans band together and take the best spots on the beaches in a deliberate attempt to exclude and annoy the Brits. The article quotes Professor Harold Hussemann as saying, “The beach towel...has become a symbol of the dominance and assertiveness of the Germans” (16).
suggest would lead to greater affinity to the rest of Europe, it remains the awkward partner in Europe, marked by high levels of Euroskepticism (Aspinwall n.d.: 7-11). Therefore, just as with the social psychological “Contact Hypothesis,” the impact of greater interaction with the rest of Europe does not always lead to greater attachment to Europe and to other Europeans.

Most studies look at one or perhaps two of these components when assessing how European particular groups of individuals feel. The overwhelming majority of studies concentrate on what has been designated the diffuse/affective and evaluative/utilitarian divide in attitudes towards Europe (e.g., Linberg and Scheingold 1970; Handley 1981; Feld and Wildgen 1976). The diffuse/affective dimension emphasizes aspects of my notion of European integration and attachment to Europe due to its potential as a vessel of a meaningful identity. The evaluative/utilitarian dimension is more akin to attitudes specifically tied to the European Union. However, there has not been a systematic attempt—to my knowledge—to look at all four components simultaneously. Furthermore, as each of these components may be present to certain degrees within a given individual, it is equally important to investigate how these components interact when an individual is asked to give her level of European attachment.

What these observations seem to suggest is that we need to develop an understanding about not simply the level of European attachment that a particular group or nation expresses at a given time, but we must also formulate better how the various potential components of a European attachment fit together. In other words, while the level of European attachment is important, types of European attachment hold critical information that will be of use to Eurocrats, national leaders and students of European politics alike. What would be particularly useful, of course, is a technique that could allow the analyst to determine both the type and the level of European attachment simultaneously.

An additional benefit to an explicit attempt of uncovering the various types of European attachment that exist in a given polity is that these types may reveal interesting observations about how the social and political contexts of a given polity give rise to certain types of European attachment. Furthermore, these European attachments are in fact but one part of a web of potential political attachments that individuals will form. Social psychology has given us good reason to suppose that it is possible for an individual to have several different, often competing, identities based on the social context in which an individual finds oneself (Brewer
1991; for a critical review of the social psychology literature and its implications for territorial attachments see Conover and Hicks 1996 and Haesly 1995; for an investigation of how different territorial attachments actually fit together in the case of the European Union, see Marks and Haesly 1996). However, what needs to be done is to find out specific information about particular kinds of socio-political attachments (e.g., territorial attachments), how those attachments reflect the social and political environment in which they are formed and how particular types of a given territorial attachment affect (and are affected by) attachments to other territorial units.

This paper is an early attempt at illustrating one possible technique for getting at both the type and the level of European attachments in a particular European Union member state. By limiting the focus to Scotland and Wales, I will be able to illustrate how the various European attachments in Scotland and Wales make interpretative sense given the four separate, but related, aspects of Europe delineated above (Section III). Given that there are important similarities that exist between Scotland and Wales—the most notable being that they are nations that experience(d) the effects of European Union policies, the process of European integration and historical and contemporary relations with Europe primarily as a part of the United Kingdom—there may be similarities that exist across the types of European attachment that exist in Scotland and Wales. These similarities may help us to understand the impact that Britishness has on perceptions of Europe, European integration and the European Union (Section IV).

By using a methodology that allows me to uncover the common types of European attachment that can be found among a group of Welsh and Scottish citizens, I can begin to investigate how the four potential components of a European attachment fit together in the minds of particular individuals. These patterns may yield interesting conclusions about which of these components seems to be the most important in the level of European attachment that is being expressed (Section V). Finally, by analyzing the types as well as the level of European attachment, one can begin to see how close actual Europeans have come in seeing Europe as a meaningful political community (Section VI). Extending Haas’ (1958) definition of political community to include individual level sentiment, I am able to determine how close those in Scotland and Wales who profess some positive view towards Europe are to seeing Europe as the ideal political community that he argues must be in place for Europe to be considered truly
united. It should come as no surprise that the Welsh and Scottish Euroskeptics fail on nearly every criterion. Yet, it is encouraging to note that the core consensus statements shared by all 7 positively-inclined types of European attachment that are uncovered in Scotland and Wales indicate that, even in the most skeptical of all of the European Union member states, some of Haas’ criteria have been partially satisfied.

II. Studying Territorial Attachments in Scotland and Wales

To determine the components—and how those components fit together—of a European attachment one must take into account the fact that these attachments are based on contextual factors. Therefore, the methodology used to elicit the components that comprise given types of European attachment must be one that places these contextual factors at the forefront of the analysis. Q-methodology, with its emphasis on political subjectivity of the respondents, is such a methodology.

This linkage between Q-methodology and political subjectivity is made by Stephen Brown (1980), in a book with the title, Political Subjectivity: Applications of Q Methodology in Political Science. In that book, Brown describes the relationship between the Q-method and the notion of political subjectivity in this way:

Basically, the Q sort enables the subject to provide a model of his point of view. Since Q-statements typically contain opinions rather than facts, the construction of one’s own statement arrangement, like the mixing of a tobacco blend, is strictly a matter of taste, any one Q sort being as valid as any other from the outset. The sorting is interactive, dynamic, and operant, and the factors which emerge are “operational definitions” of attitudes or value preferences which produce them. The categories (factors) of Q method are therefore natural complexes…and genuine rather than ad hoc and arbitrary since they are always grounded in concrete human behavior (55).

While I am not as interested in “selling” this technique as much as Brown seems to be, I think that it is interesting to note that the Q method that I employ helps to overcome some of the barriers to understanding that I lay out in the introduction. Its emphasis on subjectivity is but the most important contribution that I feel this methodology may make to the study of European attachments. The interactive nature of the sorting process and the resulting factors are both very nice properties when one is interested in both the type and the level of European attachment.
Additionally, while I argue that the salient components of a European attachment are those related to the European Union, European integration and the territory and the people of Europe, these may not be the components that individuals who formulate a European identity may hold most salient. In other words the theoretical division that I make, may not be the same ones that people in actuality emphasize. In order to determine if these are indeed the primary components, one needs to allow individuals to compare and contrast these components and put them together as they see fit. One can not be so bold as to ask if an individual is favorably inclined towards Europe because they favor particular European Union policies especially since research has shown time and again that knowledge of specific EU policies is rather thin. Alternatively, one would be stymied if one asked outright, “Do you dislike attempts to integrate Europe because of the negative implications that this process has for the sovereignty of Britain?” Sovereignty is a concept that individuals experience contextually so the questions must contain the contexts with which the political ideas are tied.

Enough about the strengths of the subjective nature of the research project that I have conducted. The results that I analyze here come from a Q-sort experiment that I ran with 135 Scottish (n = 79) and Welsh (n = 56) respondents, during a two-month period in the spring of 1998.

Each participant was asked to sort a set of 43 statements into one of 11 categories. The statements were intended to cover a wide range of components that theoretically and in practice seem to impact the type and level of European attachment that these individuals have. The statements were derived from a number of sources. Many of them came from my analysis of 16 focus groups that I conducted throughout Wales (n = 9) and Scotland (n = 7) which I designed to get a better sense of “how people in Wales and Scotland think about what it means to be Welsh/Scottish, British and European”\(^3\). Other statements came from various sources such as letters to the editor, newspaper stories, television news programs, etc. Still another source,

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\(^3\) This statement comes directly from one of the fliers that I designed to recruit participants, primarily from adult education and community centers.
especially those that deal with sovereignty issues, were written by me to take into account the "general wisdom" about the nature of attitudes towards the European Union.\(^4\)

Each participant was given a sheet of paper with the following instructions:

The European Union and European integration continue to be in the news. These issues bring up some interesting questions about what the European Union should be as well as what we as European citizens feel about Europe. The following 43 statements are statements that have been made by people like yourselves about what it means to them to be Europeans. Please sort these statements from those which are most like what you think about when you think about Europe (+5) to those which are most unlike what you think about when you think about Europe (-5).

They were then given the set of 43 statements. Each statement was written on a note card. The participant was asked to place the card into one of 11 piles (-5 to +5), with the additional instruction that the cards must be placed into the following distribution\(^5\):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>-5</th>
<th>-4</th>
<th>-3</th>
<th>-2</th>
<th>-1</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>+1</th>
<th>+2</th>
<th>+3</th>
<th>+4</th>
<th>+5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The forced nature of the distribution has a particularly nice property for the analysis as I envision it for this paper. Since I am interested in the type and the level, the fact that an individual would chose one of the few spaces on the extremes for a statement such as "I am proud to say that I am a European" suggests an indication of strength of feeling that does not exist on simple written questionnaire.

Once the statements are sorted, they are factor analyzed. While Brown emphasizes how each the technique allows each individual to express their own personal, subjective view of the topic at hand, what is equally nice is that the factor analyses picks out only those response profiles that are shared by a substantial number of individuals. It is these shared visions about

\(^4\) A list of the statements is provided in the Appendix. As I note, the statements were identical in Wales and Scotland except that in Scotland issues dealing with the language included reference to Gaelic and the Scots language.

\(^5\) There is some discussion about the strengths and weaknesses associated with forced distributions rather than allowing each individual to sort the cards however she wants. For a discussion and justification for a forced distribution, see Brown (1980, 201-203). I personally have chosen a forced distribution over a free distribution because it was my sense that individuals would not make give the exercise as much thought if any distribution were allowed. While some individuals discussed how difficult they found the sorting task, only a handful were unable to sort the cards into the appropriate distribution (these few individuals were subsequently removed from the analysis).
the meaning of European attachment that are of interest. The Q method allows the investigator to see what are the underlying types of European attachment that exist within the given group.

These types are calculated in the following manner. The results from my study were factor analyzed, using the principle components and varimax rotation. The factor analysis determines the appropriate number of factors that explain the variation in the responses. For each factor an ideal type for that underlying factor is calculated. This is done by using a weighted sum of the rankings of each of the 43 statements given by individuals who were significantly loaded on a given factor. The individual’s factor score on the given factor is used as the weight. The weighting that I used was one that made it so that those who had higher factor scores contributed more to the eventual ideal factor rankings for the given factor. The weighted sum is then translated back into the original −5 to +5 distribution to facilitate the analysis between and among types. These ideal types highlight what distinguishes one type from another. It is important to remember that the participants are loaded to varying degrees on one (or perhaps two) types of European attachment. It is the ideal types—the underlying meaning that can be made from the specific rankings of the 43 statements by the 130 participants in Scotland and Wales—that serve as the foundation of the analysis in this paper.

While I am primarily interested in analyzing the factors that underpin European attachments in Scotland and Wales, what matters as much as the statements are the individuals who are asked to do the sorting. While the Q-method is unable to tell us what percentage of the population holds the views that are derived from the factor analysis, at the same time, this does not mean that a careful selection of individuals is not critical. The factor analysis, especially when it is based on varimax rotation as it is in this case, obviously selects factors based on the amount of variation of the data is explained by each factor. Therefore, one must have a sample that contains a certain amount of variation on the dependent variable. For that reason, I selected the participants with a hope of gaining significant variation. At the same time, since I knew that I would be interested in making comparisons across the Welsh and Scottish subsamples, I had to make the two subsamples similar enough so that such comparisons were meaningful.

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6 See Appendix B for a discussion of the number of factors that I selected from the data.
7 The equation for the weight \( w \) was \( w = f(1-f) \), where \( f \) = individual’s factor loading. See McKeown and Thomas (1988: 53-54) for discussion of the use of factor scores in Q methodology.
In terms of generating variation on the dependent variable, I selected individuals from a number of different communities throughout Wales and Scotland. I primarily used adult education and community centers, which allowed me to target my recruiting to help get individuals of different backgrounds. While there tended not to be as much variation within a given center (since most centers served small, rather homogeneous communities), by selecting both working class and middle class communities, I was able to get considerable variation. Table 1 emphasizes the similarities between the Welsh and the Scottish subsamples on a selection of demographic characteristics. Table 2 presents information that confirms my claim that my recruitment methods also yielded some interesting variation on the dependent variable.

(Table 1 about here)

(Table 2 about here)

III. Types of European Attachment in Scotland and Wales

Factor analysis of the 43 Q-sort statements dealing with various aspects of European attachment was performed on the Scottish and Welsh subsamples separately. In Scotland, five different types of European attachment were derived, whereas in Wales there were four distinct types. I will limit my comments here to a brief description of what the variation in types suggest about the nature of European attachment in Scotland and Wales.\(^8\)

In Scotland, there are 5 distinct types of European attachment that can be uncovered. These five types can be described as 1) Euroskeptics (Scot1), 2) Europhiles (Scot1'), 3) Instrumental (Economics) Europeans (Scot2), 4) Relative Europhiles (Scot3) and 5) Ambivalent Europeans (Scot4). The Euroskeptics and the Europhiles can be seen largely as mirror images of one another. While the Euroskeptics are concerned with the sovereignty implications of the European Union, the Europhiles are not only unconcerned, they *embrace* European integration.

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\(^8\) In Appendix B there is an extended description of each type, with an analysis of those statements which seem to distinguish one type from all other types in a given nation. In the text I have only presented the conclusions, without providing the comparison of statement rankings upon which these conclusions are based. Readers are invited to read Appendix B to see if they would reach similar conclusions as I.
for precisely this reason: "Pooling our sovereignty with the other nations of the European Union allows Britain to achieve much more than it could ever do on its own (Europhiles = +5; Euroskeptics = -2). The third type of European attachment that exists within the Scottish subsample is a type that endorses one specific aspect of the European Union project. For the Instrumental (Economics) Europeans, the European Union is credited for the economic benefits that it brings to Britain, Scotland and to the deprived areas of Scotland. Interestingly, while the EU is given credit for something that is central to its mission as an international organization, these instrumental Europeans do not show a significant level of European pride due to the benefits that accrue from the economic benefits of integration and the European Union. The fourth type would stand out as the strongest proponent of the European Union if it were not for the existence of the Europhiles. The Relative Europhiles share with the Europhiles a considerable amount—they agree on 82% of the 43 statements—yet they are not willing to concede a greater European attachment than a British attachment as the Europhiles do because the Relative Europhiles, unlike the Europhiles, have some concern about the implications for British sovereignty that European integration has. Finally, the Ambivalent Europeans seem to combine the concerns about the negative consequences for British sovereignty of European integration with the Euroskeptics with the positive views more akin to the Instrumental (Econ) Europeans. The Ambivalent Europeans also seem to have a well-defined pattern of agreeing with the positive effects of European integration in general, while being less sure about them in the particular instance of Scotland.

In the Welsh subsample, 4 distinct types are derived. These four types are 1) Instrumental (Not English) Europeans (Wales1), 2) Europhiles (Wales2), 3) Euroskeptics (Wales2') and 4) Anti-EU (Sovereignty), But Not Anti-Europe (Wales3). The Welsh Instrumental Europeans do not base their attitudes about Europe on the economic benefits that accrue from European integration; instead they use their perceived sense of being positively-inclined towards European to distinguish themselves from the English (who are perceived as Euroskeptics). Such a strategic use of European attachment does not yield considerably high levels of European pride. The Welsh Europhiles distinguish themselves from the other three types of European attachment in the Welsh subsample with their overwhelming support for the idea of a European Union, rejection of the view that Britain is really not a proper part of Europe.
and, most importantly, a lack of concern that European integration means (and will continue to mean) a direct loss of British sovereignty. The Welsh Euroskeptics, on the other hand believe the exact opposite. They dislike the European Union in principle and for is specific policies; they reject the notion that Britain is part of Europe, and, most importantly, are concerned that European integration threatens British sovereignty. The final type of Welsh European attachment can make a distinction between European integration and the European Union, of which they are generally skeptical, especially when it implies a threat to British sovereignty and Europe as a territorial unit, of which they do not see as a threat, yet at the moment they do not really see themselves as a meaningful part. In the future, however, this group seems to think that European attachment will be more than simply a function of support (or disdain) for the European Union’s policies. Instead, it will be a meaningful unit that gains acceptance through a two-pronged socialization process: people will be “taught” to be Europeans and people will become European through the increased contact that European integration will bring.

This brief summary of the different meanings that are placed on the concept of Europe suggests that, to some extent, the four-way division that I presented as being the theoretical ways in which Europe can be viewed exists in the minds of the Scots and the Welsh. For the Euroskeptics, the primary concern is related to the challenges to British sovereignty that stems from the integration process, yet they also include with this concern negative attitudes towards the European Union and a rejection of the notion that the British are like other Europeans. For the more positively-inclined European attachments, we see that for some (Instrumental (Econ) Scots especially) it is the positive benefits of the European Union, rather than the sense of a common bond with other Europeans that matters the most. For the more skeptical of the positive European attachments (i.e., Scot4 and Wales4), while they may have some concerns about the sovereignty implications of European integration, they do sense a shared bond with other Europeans. And finally, for the Scottish Europhiles, the item that makes them stand out is the sense that they have accepted a European attachment—while perhaps not yet a European identity—that allows them to say that they are more proud of a European attachment than a national (British) attachment.
IV. Euroskepticism and Positive Attitudes Towards Europe

Besides yielding types that are internally consistent in terms of the attitudes that they have towards Europe, European integration and the European Union, the types of European attachment can be usefully compared across the nations. This is facilitated by the fact that, in Scotland and Wales, the participants sorted identical sets of 43 statements. Partial correlations were taken between each type of European attachment and every other type of European attachment. The results of these correlations are presented in Table 3. The pattern of correlations suggest that, although there are 5 and 4 separate types of European attachment in Scotland and Wales respectively, there is one fundamental cleavage that divides attitudes towards Europe in both Scotland and Wales. One side of the cleavage is Euroskepticism. The factor array that defines Euroskeptics in Wales is highly correlated with the factor array that defines Euroskeptics in Scotland ($r = 0.75$). The Euroskeptics are also strongly negatively correlated with the other types in their given country. The other side of the cleavage is represented by the remaining 7 types (4 Scottish and 3 Welsh). All 7 of these are negatively correlated with the Euroskeptics and they have consistently high correlations with the other non-Euroskeptics. As we have seen from the analysis of each individual type (and as we will also discuss at length below), not all of these 7 non-Eurosceptical types cannot simply be called, “Europhiles,” because, for many dimensions, some of these types have some negative views of Europe. However, there also seems to be a meaningful core of attitudes towards Europe that set them, as a group, apart from the Euroskeptics.

(Table 3 about here)

(Table 4a about here)

Table 4a presents an excellent summary of what stands at the core of Euroskepticism in Scotland and Wales. Included are some of the strongest statements over which the rankings given by Scottish Euroskeptics and their Welsh counterparts are identical. Not only that, but in contrast to the commonalities of those with a generally positive assessment of Europe, the items
over which there is agreement are precisely those statements with which the Scottish and the Welsh Euroskeptics agreed and disagreed most strongly. The simple, yet powerful, conclusion that can be reached from an analysis of Table 4a is that Euroskepticism in Scotland and Wales is primarily a matter of Britishness. Not only are these Euroskeptics clear that they are not proud to be Europeans (#33), they are equally vehement that they certainly do not feel more European than British (#13). One can imagine that a Euroskeptic would be loath to admit any pride in an entity over which they are so skeptical, but it does not necessarily follow that they must equally strongly reject the claim that they are more European than British. Therefore, the fact that these individuals “use up” one of the scarce +5 spots for this statement (there are only 2 statements of the 43 with which these individuals can agree with the most) is a strong indication that underlying their Euroskepticism is a strong feeling of Britishness.

A second indication of the Britishness of Euroskepticism is that some of the strongest statements those that are concerned with British sovereignty (#3, 40), rather than Scottish or Welsh culture or even Scottish or Welsh autonomy. This lack of concern about the implications of European integration on Scottish and Welsh autonomy or independence can be seen from the response to the statement, “The European Union provides Wales and Scotland with the opportunity to be an independent nation” (-4 in Scotland; -4 in Wales). Further support comes from the fact that the statement, “European integration threatens to undermine the success of the Scottish Parliament/Welsh Assembly...” is given only minimal positive support (+1 in Scotland; +1 in Wales). Similarly, while the Euroskeptics are concerned with the negative impact that European integration might have on Scottish or Welsh culture (discussed in Appendix B), this concern does not reach the level of concern that is expressed for the potential loss of British sovereignty and autonomy.

Both the Scots and the Welsh are clear that it is their British identity which stands as a barrier to a meaningful European attachment (#12, 13). These individuals were also asked if it was their Scottishness or Welshness that they saw as a barrier to a European identity. For the Welsh Euroskeptics, the statement, “I will never feel European because I will always feel Welsh” is given a +3; whereas the Scottish Euroskeptics gave this same statement (although it obviously replaced, “Welsh” with “Scottish”) a +1. Therefore, while both saw their Scottish and Welsh
identities as a potential barrier to a European identity, it was the British identity that was seen as the greater obstacle.\textsuperscript{9}

Additional support for the claim that Euroskepticism is primarily a function of Britishness is discernible from the fact that the pattern of responses taken as a collective highlight precisely those concerns that is being trumpeted by the Conservative Party and the British press\textsuperscript{10}. Like these Euroskeptic British institutions, the Scottish and the Welsh Euroskeptics believe that the European Union is an institution with which Britain competes rather than an international institution in which Britain acts with its fellow members in order to achieve collective benefits that they could not have achieved on their own. The other members of the EU are seen as competitors (or at the very least the European Union is seen as a “them” that tells the Brits what to do). Not only is the Euro a threat to British sovereignty and autonomy in that it seeks to eliminate one of the proud symbols of the British nation (#39), but its economic benefits are fundamentally rejected (#41). Such a pattern of responses could easily be derived from a (formal or informal) content analysis of the predominantly Euroskeptical Conservative Party\textsuperscript{11} (under William Hague) and the Euroskeptical British press.\textsuperscript{12}

Finally, Table 4a and Table 4b together reveal that there is a remarkable level of agreement over those components that comprise Euroskepticism when Scottish and Welsh

\textsuperscript{9} To be accurate, the +3 ranking that the Welsh Euroskeptics give to the statement concerning the incompatibility of Welsh identity and a European identity is not statistically significantly different (at the 0.01 level) from the +5 that they give to the statement concerning the incompatibility of a British and a European identity. However, statements that are different by 2.1 are considered statistically significant so differences of 2 are close to different. The sign of the difference is correct, and there are other indications that Britishness is the primary barrier to a European identity.

\textsuperscript{10} This relationship is one of the factors that Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) highlight in their cross-national, pooled-time series analysis of the factors that seem to effect levels of support for European integration. As they argue, “When citizens are confronted by negative views reports or criticism of EC actions by political elites, their opinions should reflect these influences...” (514). It is also a point made explicitly by Aspinwall (n.d.), who argues, “The poor public opinion levels of Britain relative to other member states...are therefore at least partly constructed by the discourse of hostility” (24).

\textsuperscript{11} It is important to remember that the British Tory Party remains divided over European integration. If anything the divisions have only gotten more entrenched after the disastrous 1997 General Election. While senior members of the Conservative Party (e.g., Chris Patten and Michael Heseltine) remain outspoken Europhiles and even called for a cross party initiative to discuss the inevitability of British admission into the single European currency, the Euroskeptics within the Conservative Party have seemed to gain the ear of the current leader, who adapted John Major’s “wait and see” approach to British membership in the Euro to a “wait longer and watch the Euro prove itself a failure” policy.

\textsuperscript{12} Wilkes and Wring (1998) summarize the position of the British press towards Europe in the following manner: “Between 1948 and 1975, the British press moved from a vaguely ‘pro-Community’ consensus to a pronounced and nearly unanimous Euro-enthusiasm. Gradually this gave way to widespread Euroscepticism in large sections of the press in the 1990s” (185).
Euroskeptics are compared. Of the 43 statements, the Welsh Euroskeptics and their Scottish counterparts gave responses that were statistically indistinguishable from one another on all but 4 statements. If there is so much agreement between Welsh and Scottish Euroskepticism, it is unlikely that the similarity stems from the unique natures of the Welsh and Scottish socio-political environments in which they are formed. Instead, and bolstered by the points that I have made above, Euroskepticism is largely a British concern.

(Table 4b about here)

It is not, however, entirely a British matter. Table 4b lists the only four statements over which the Scottish and the Welsh Euroskeptics diverge in their rankings. Two of the four statements over which there is some disagreement between the Scottish and the Welsh Euroskeptics seem readily explicable only when one takes into account certain aspects of the Scottish and the Welsh socio-political environment. The fact that these two statements are the two that distinguish Welsh from Scottish Euroskeptics the most (Statement 6 because the difference is rather large and Statement 36 because the difference represents a sign change) is indicative of the point that Euroskepticism is largely, but not entirely, a matter of British identity and concerns about British sovereignty. The fact that the Welsh Euroskeptics agree more strongly than the Scottish Euroskeptics that the European Union threatens the Welsh language (Statement 6) is perhaps a function of the fact that language is more salient in Wales than in Scotland. In Wales, 19% of the population speaks Welsh—a large enough presence to make it a salient feature in Wales, but not so large as to feel that its continued usage is assured (especially since the percentage of those who can speak Welsh has consistently declined throughout the 20th century). In Scotland, barely 2% of the population speaks Gaelic, and these Gaelic speakers tend to be concentrated in the Highlands and the Islands of Scotland, far away from the largest percentage of Scottish citizens.\textsuperscript{13} It is less clear how many people speak Scots, or whether it is a language or a dialect. In any case, the greater fear that the Welsh Euroskeptics have that

\textsuperscript{13} There is a regional divide in Welsh language speakers as well. The Welsh speaking heartland ("Y Fro Gymraeg") is in the more rural North-West of Wales. However, the largest number of Welsh speakers is actually in the anglicized capital city, Cardiff. This means that the Welsh language, at least in comparison to Scotland, can make its impact felt throughout the entire nation.
European integration threatens the Welsh language is most likely a function of the greater salience of the Welsh language rather than an admission by the Scottish Euroskeptics that the European Union actively helps Gaelic and Scots. This is further confirmed by the fact that the Welsh and the Scottish Euroskeptics also disagree with the statement that the European Union does not give a lot of money to help Welsh/Gaelic and Scots (-3 for each, data not shown).

Scottish and Welsh Euroskeptics also differ in terms of how they rank the statement concerning whether or not having so many cultures in the EU is a good thing (Statement 36). The Welsh Euroskeptics tend to agree with this statement, whereas the Scottish Euroskeptics tend to disagree. Once again, this seems more of a case that Welsh nationalism is a function of cultural components than Scottish nationalism. This is not to say that Scottish nationalism does not have its cultural components, but, based on research that I have conducted concerning the components that comprise Welsh and Scottish national identities of these respondents, the types of Scottish national identity as a group place considerably less emphasis on cultural and linguistic components than all of the Welsh types of national identity.14

If Euroskepticism is primarily, but not entirely, a British matter, the pattern of responses for those professing some positive attitudes towards Europe cannot be so easily categorized. Table 5 presents a list of 4 statements over which there is agreement by all 7 positively (to some degree) inclined types of European attachment in Scotland and Wales.15 After each statement is the score given to that statement by each of the 7 positive types as well as the average of the Euroskeptic scores for the same items.16

(Table 5 about here)

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14 Data not shown, but it is available from the author on request.
15 There are, in fact, six statements of the list of 43 which have rankings across all 7 types which are statistically indistinguishable from one another. The other two statements, which are not listed in the table, have agreement in that all 7 are indifferent to the statements. These two statements are: "If nothing else the European Union gives a lot of money to help [Gaelic and the Scots language/the Welsh language]" (Average across all 7 types = 0) and "If nothing else, the European Union gives a lot of money to help support my local community" (Average across all 7 types = 0.4).
16 The table lists the individual scores for each statement. In the text, however, the average is the easiest way to express the differences between the Euroskeptics and the more positively inclined types. As the total difference in the rankings for all of the types must be no more than 2 (since these are consensus items), using the average does not unnecessarily distort the level of agreement or disagreement of any given type. The one statement, #2, that is not a consensus item for the Euroskeptics has the separate Welsh and Scottish Euroskeptical scores so as not to
This list of consensus items is not so easily interpretable as the corresponding list of consensus items for the Euroskeptics. One reason is that positive attitudes are based on several factors whereas skepticism seems to be a function of British sovereignty. Another reason is evident from the discussion of the individual types discussed in Section III. The positive types of European attachment range from the Anti-EU (Sovereignty), but not Anti-Europe Welsh (Wales3) to the strong Europhiles (Scot1' and, to a lesser extent, Wales2). Wales3, as discussed in Appendix B, actually shares many attributes with the Welsh Euroskeptics, whereas the Welsh and Scottish Europhiles, to varying degrees, represent the polar opposite of the Euroskeptics. However, despite this variation, the statements over which there is consensus among all 7 pro-European types do suggest that there is a core that is, at the very least, antithetical to the overwhelmingly hostile attitudes towards any aspect of the European Union, European integration or Europe that the Scottish and Welsh Euroskeptics express.

I will emphasize the 3 out of 4 statements that have averages the vary significantly from 0; however, it is important to recognize that all 6 statements (including the two discussed in fn. #25) show a marked difference from the responses that are given by Euroskeptics. Statement 7 re-affirms my claim that Euroskepticism is a matter of Britishness. The fact that all of those with something positive to say about Europe disagree rather strongly (average = -2.9) with the statement that European integration threatens British culture, while the Euroskeptics are either indifferent (Scots) or actually support the statement (Welsh), suggests that part of the positive views expressed by the Welsh and the Scots is due to the fact that the European integration process is not seen as a threat and/or to a lack of concern about an attack on British culture--more about this in Section V.

Moderate agreement with Statement 7 suggests that there are direct benefits to be earned by staying in the European Union. It is also important to notice that, unlike Euroskepticism, which was due to concerns about British sovereignty and identity, the positively-inclined types emphasize the benefits that accrue to Scotland and Wales. One should not take this too far, however, because a fourth consensus item, which is not discussed because its average level of misrepresent the fact that the Scots are indifferent to the statement rather than in support of it as the average would have implied.
consensus is not statistically greater than 0, Statement 42, also admits that there are benefits for Britain as well.

Statement 17 points out that there is consensus over a strong rejection of a claim that has been made by Anthony Smith (1992, 1995) among others. Smith (1995) claims that the true barrier to a meaningful European identity is the fact that there is no common European culture to which all Europeans can lay claim. He argues,

It would appear, then, that there are hardly any common European myths and symbols that can have meaning and potency for the modern inhabitants of the continent of Europe, and can serve to unify them. There are too many lacunae, too many zones of exclusion and incomprehension... (138).

While the individuals in my study were not given a list of the possible items upon which a European identity might be based, they do not seem to accept the principle that there is no common culture that can be called uniquely European. It may be that some of these individuals believe that a European culture is a sum of all of the individual cultures that exist within Europe. In fact this is precisely the case for 6 of 7 of the positively-inclined European types. Statement 35 reads, “To be European is to share in the inheritance of each of the European people, not to lose the heritage of one's own people.” All, with the exception of the Instrumental (Economics) Scots, give this statement a ranking of between +3 and +5. The Instrumental Scots give this statement a ranking of +1, whereas the Euroskeptics rank this statement 0 (Wales) and -2 (Scotland). Others may think that the common economic fate of Europe is the foundation upon which a meaningful European attachment may be based. In any event, it seems clear that the relatively strong rejection of the statement 17 not only distinguishes these 7 types from the Euroskeptics, but it also rejects the rather pessimistic view that Smith presents concerning the possibility for a supra- or super-nationalism.

Taken separately, these consensus items suggest that the positively-inclined types are rather different from the Euroskeptics. Taken as a group, however, is where the distinction is made the most clear. On three of the four dimensions that influence the level of European attachment—attitudes towards the European Union, whether European integration is seen as a
threat or as a source of some benefit and the view of Europe as a territorial entity that can hope to lay claim on the hearts and minds of its citizens\(^{18}\)--these positively-inclined types all seem to embrace attitudes that are favorable towards a European attachment. It is for this reason that we can argue that these 7 types, despite the variation that exists across all of the types, deserve to be in one category that is separate from the Euroskeptics. In the next section I will provide further evidence that this grouping with Euroskeptics on one side and the more positively-inclined Scots and Welsh on the other side is the more correct description of the observed variation.

V. Implications of the Pattern of European Attachment in Scotland and Wales

The similarities between the two Euroskeptic types and among the seven more favorably-inclined types as well as the differences that are observed among the seven more positive types tell us a considerable amount about how individuals “choose” the level of European attachment that they have.\(^{19}\) While I discuss these relationships in the context of Wales, Scotland and Britain, it would be interesting to test elsewhere the hypothesis and the implications that I list below to see how robust the findings are. I will present these relationships in the form of the underlying hypothesis that guided my construction and running of the Q-sorts, a series of three observations that seem to come from the data that I have presented thus far and a conclusion that summarizes the hypothesis and the three observations.

17 It is precisely those statements that deal with the economic benefits of the European integration process with which the Instrumental (Economics) Scots agree the most strenuously, and it is this aspect, in addition to the 6 consensus items, that seem to distinguish these individuals from the Euroskeptics.

18 The fourth item is the potential for a European identity. It is along this dimension over which there is some disagreement among the 7 pro-European types. As I discuss in the next section, the pattern of disagreement on this dimension is critical to understanding the overall assessment of Europe that an individual expresses.

19 It is obviously descriptively inaccurate to say that a European attachment is simply a matter of choice. In some respects it is, most obviously in the sense that there is no real cost to someone expressing pride in Europe when in fact she despises everything about Europe and the European Union. However, I adopt the generally accepted assumption that individuals will tend to reveal their true evaluations when asked because, just as there is no cost to lying, nor is there any benefit to misrepresenting ones beliefs. The one exception may be the social desirability factor. However, given the current political climate in Britain, there does not seem to be any strong social desirability in suppressing ones Euroskepticism, nor is the Euroskepticism so strong that one would be ashamed to show positive affiliation toward Europe and the European Union. Therefore, it seems logical to assume that the responses that individuals give about the pride that they feel about being a European will be as legitimate as any other response, especially since I was very clear to keep my intentions of my research to myself until after the Q-sort and the accompanying questionnaire had been completed. I do think that the word, “choose” is entirely inaccurate in the current research project because European attachment is represented by one of the cards of statements that an individual is asked to sort in the Q-sort experiment. In this sense pride in being a European is a choice because the individual must choose which space that card will occupy. If that individual chooses a ranking with relatively few spaces (e.g., +3, 4 or 5), then this suggests that the choice is rather important to the individual.
Hypothesis: In Scotland and Wales, the types and level of European attachment is a function of four components: attitudes towards the European Union, attitudes towards European integration, attitudes towards Europe and attitudes about the possibility of a European identity.

Observation 1: The primary obstacle to a positive attachment is a strong British identity that precludes the compatibility of a European attachment with their British identity.

A clear division can be made between the Euroskeptics from the rest of the group of territorial attachments. What distinguishes the Euroskeptics from the rest is that they clearly see their British identity as a barrier to a meaningful European attachment. The Scottish and Welsh Euroskeptics stand out not for their claim that they do not feel more European than British (Wales1, Wales4 and Scot4 all have levels of disagreement that are statistically indistinguishable from the Euroskeptics), rather, they stand out because they claim that “I will never feel European because I will always feel British” (Statement 12 = +2 for Scottish Euroskeptics and +3 for Welsh Euroskeptics). Europhiles all disagree to some degree with this statement; all of them disagree to a level that makes them statistically significantly different than the rankings given by the Euroskeptics. The Euroskeptics, therefore, combine a present refusal to claim European attachment over British attachment with a claim that they could never feel European because Britishness will always be an obstacle to a meaningful European attachment. Therefore, it is not enough to know that someone feels more British than European to determine whether that individual is a Euroskeptic. One must also determine the nature of their British identity. If that individual sees their British identity in such a way that a European attachment is simply incompatible, then that individual will be a Euroskeptic. On the other hand, if an individual claims to be more British than European, yet does not see their British identity as inherently incompatible to a European attachment, then that individual will allow themselves to express some positive feelings about the European Union, European integration and/or Europe.

The effect of Britishness on the level of European attachment is not limited to Euroskeptics. Those with the highest level of European pride (i.e., Scot1’ = +4 and Scot3 = +3) are precisely those who have the highest relative positive scores for the statement “I feel more
European than British” (Scot1’ = +3, Scot3 = 0). Given the fact that Scots1’ and Scots3 agree in terms of the pride that feel as Europeans, yet they differ significantly on the relationship between a British identity and a European attachment suggests that the level of European attachment is not merely a factor of British identity. However, the fact that one needs to see the potential for a European attachment that is compatible with a British identity in order to exhibit pride in being European suggests that one needs to understand something about an individual’s British identity before one can truly understand their level of European attachment.

Observation 2: For Euroskeptics and more positive types of European attachments alike, the most influential factor on the level of European attachment in Britain are attitudes concerning the European integration process.

Once again, the story is easy to tell for the Euroskeptics. As we saw in Section IV, along with seeing British identity as a barrier to European attachment comes with a starkly negative view of the sovereignty implications of the European integration. For Euroskeptics, while rejecting pretty much anything positive to say about Europe, European integration and the European Union, their strongest feelings are expressed on those elements that have clear sovereignty implications. For example, the Euroskeptics in Scotland and Wales most strongly agree with the statement, “The UK must be sure that it does not lose any of its independence and power as a sovereign nation to the EU” (+5). Similarly, in level of agreement and implication of that strong agreement, is the statement, “The European Union’s ban on British beef is a prime example of how the EU works: They tell us what to do without taking into account our needs and concerns.” Furthermore, while there are sovereignty implications for Scotland, and to a lesser extent Wales, due to the creation of devolved assemblies in Edinburgh and Cardiff, the threats that European integration poses for these new political institutions and their ability to pass laws that benefit the citizens of Scotland and Wales, are not accorded the centrality that the Euroskeptics give to the threats that European integration poses for British sovereignty and symbols.²⁰

²⁰ We must remember that the pattern of European attachments that are presented here represent a snapshot of a particular time. The Q-sort experiments that I report here were conducted from April - June 1998. The Scottish
Much of this is due to the fact that attitudes about European integration are a function of 
British sovereignty (thereby making it related to British ID); however, it is also true that, even 
for the more positively-inclined European attachments, concerns about integration in terms of 
British sovereignty impact the level of European attachment that they feel. For example, Scot4 
seems to derive its low level of European pride just as the Euroskeptics do. As they feel that the 
European Union is indeed a threat to British sovereignty (Statement 3; Scot4 = +4), it is not 
surprising that they do not have a strong pride in being European (Statement 33; Scot4 = 0). 

Additionally, sovereignty issues can have a positive impact on the level of European 
attachment as well. One of the strongest Europhiles of the 7 positively inclined European 
attachments, Scot1', can be distinguished from the rest of the positive European types precisely 
for its strong belief that “Pooling our sovereignty with other nations in the EU allows Britain to 
achieve more than it could ever do on its own” (Scot1' = +5, average of other 6 pro-Europeans = 
+2.3). What is also interesting to note is that it is only along this sovereignty dimension (and the 
strength of European pride) on which the Scottish Europhiles stand out. The Instrumental (Econ) 
Europeans (Scot2) show consistently stronger recognition of the economic benefits of European
Union membership than the Europhiles. In fact, the Scottish Europhiles also stand out in their ambivalence to the rather banal claim that “Wherever you go in Europe you will find that people are just like you. They just want a job and a good living for themselves and for their family” (Scot1’ = 0, average of other 6 pro-Europeans = +4.3). Therefore, it seems that the positive sovereignty implications are what lead this type of Europhone to express a strong feeling of pride in being European--a pride so strong that they are willing to say “I feel more European than British” (Statement #13 = +3).

Observation 3: While attitudes about European integration seem to matter the most for the level of attachment that is expressed by an individual, it is not the only factor that influences the level of European attachment.

The second observation indicates that attitudes about the implications of European integration on British political sovereignty play a critical role in determining the level of European attachment that an individual has. The data here also suggests that the impact of European integration alone cannot determine the precise level of European attachment. If it could, then why is it that Wales1 and Wales3 share similar levels of European pride (Wales1 = -2, Wales3 = -3; statistically indistinguishable at the 0.01 level), yet Wales1 and Wales3 view the threats to British sovereignty of European integration rather differently (Statement 3; Wales1 = 0, Wales3 = +5; statistically significant difference at 0.01 level)? Similarly, how could we explain the results that Scot2 and Scot4 also share similar levels of European pride (Scot2 = Scot4 = 0) when they also see the threat to British sovereignty posed by European integration rather differently (Statement 3; Scot2 = 0, Scot4 = +4, statistically significant at 0.01 level)? This relationship between perceived threats to British sovereignty and levels of European pride suggest that there must be other factors that determine the level of European attachment.

For the case of Wales1 the explanation for a low level of European pride despite indifference to the impact of European integration on British sovereignty can be found in the name that I have given to this type of European attachment, Instrumental (Not English) Europeanness. For this type, the importance of Europe and the European Union lies in the fact that it allows this type to distinguish themselves from the English, a group that they view as a
politically and psychological out-group. The fact that Britain includes (and is, in fact, to a large extent dominated by) the English may be a partial explanation as to why they do not concern themselves with the impact that European integration has for British sovereignty. Obviously, further investigation is needed to determine if this is the causal mechanism that is at work, but one thing that is clear is that the instrumental use of Europe leads to much lower levels of European pride than the truer Europhiles in the group (e.g., Wales2, Scot1’ and Scot3).

Wales4 is also instrumental to an extent. This type tends to see the EU as economically beneficial, especially to Welsh communities (i.e., “If noting else, the European Union gives a lot of money to help the economically deprived areas of Wales” = +3 and “If nothing else, the European Union gives a lot of money to help my local community” = +2). They are actually rather ambivalent about the benefits that the EU provides because, in addition to the above statements, they also weakly disagree with the statement, “Britain is wrong to stay out of the single European currency because the Euro would bring economic stability and greater economic growth to Britain” (Wales4 = -1; Average of Welsh non-Euroskeptics = +2). They are less likely reject the notion that Europe might be a potential threat to Welsh culture (Statement 5; Wales4 = -2, Average of Welsh non-Euroskeptics = -3.8). Yet, at the same time, they are less likely than the other more positively inclined Welsh European attachments to reject a European bond because all that the European countries share is centuries of warfare (Statement 16; Wales4 = 0; Average of 6 non-Euroskeptic types = 2.2). It is not surprising that these ambivalent feelings lead to a low level of European pride (-3) for this type of European attachment. However, this most Euroskeptic of the non-Euroskeptics (correlation with Welsh Euroskeptics = 0.06; average correlation with Welsh non-Euroskeptics = 0.474 (significant at 0.01 level)), while sharing a low level of European pride with the Euroskeptics, is able to avoid the other negative implications of Euroskepticism because they do not see Britishness as a barrier to European attachment (Statement 12; Wales4 = -5, Euroskeptics = +5).

Scot2, like Wales1 uses the European Union instrumentally. Unlike Wales1, however, Scot2 sees the European Union as providing important economic benefits to Britain, Scotland and to the economically deprive communities of Scotland. Strong agreement with all of these sentiments is precisely what distinguishes this type from the other types (See Section III). Instrumental (Econ) has a higher level of European pride than the Instrumental (Not English)
precisely because the European Union is designed to provide these economic benefits (Statement 33; Instrumental (Econ) = 0, Instrumental (Not English) = -2).\textsuperscript{21} Therefore, it seems as if viewing the European Union as a source of economic benefits to ones country and communities does have a positive effect on the level of European attachment that an individual has; however, the effect is perhaps not as great as one might hope (given that the level of pride is only a 0). Some of this lower than expected level of pride may come from the fact that these Instrumental (Econ) non-Euroskeptics place considerably less of an importance on the cultural dimension than the rest of the Scottish non-Euroskeptics. For example, Scot2 has only weak support for the claims that “To be European is to share in the inheritance of each of the other European peoples, not to lose the heritage of ones own people” (Scot2 = 1, Average for Scottish non-Euroskeptics = 4.7) and “The fact that the European Union is made up of so many cultures is a good thing” (Scot2 = 2, Average for Scottish non-Euroskeptics = 4.7). These Instrumental non-Euroskeptics obviously differ from the Euroskeptics (correlation between Scot2 and Scottish Euroskeptics = -0.248), yet the level of European attachment does not seem to be so much a function of the sovereignty implications of European integration. Instead, it is a combination of the positive benefits that are seen to accrue from the European Union as well as a weaker attachment to Europe and other Europeans.

Conclusion: If the above hypothesis and three observations hold true, then three of the four components that theoretically affect the level of European attachment can be ranked in the following order (of descending importance on the level of European attachment): European identity (its impact on a British identity), integration (its implications for British sovereignty), and the European Union (the benefits that it is perceived to bring)\textsuperscript{22}

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\textsuperscript{21} This difference does not meet the level of statistical significance at the 0.01 level; however, the sign is in the correct direction.

\textsuperscript{22} The final component—Europe (the worthiness of it as a vessel for territorial attachment, now or in the future)—is important to the type of European attachment expressed by an individual, but, given the data currently available it is not possible to determine where it fits in the ranking of the other three components. However, it seems plausible that its effects will not be greater than that of attitudes about the European Union.
VI. European Attachments and Ernst Haas' "Community Sentiment"

Ernst Haas (1958), in an early and seminal work, The Uniting of Europe, wanted to understand what implications the attempts by West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands to integrate portions of their economic systems had for the system of political, social and economic relations within, between and among these nations (as well as the relations with others who were not part of the EEC). He is clear in his preface that his is not an attempt to judge or evaluate the potential paths that European integration could or should take. Instead, his study "attempts to advance generalizations about the processes by which political communities are formed among sovereign States" (xii). Critical to this type of analysis, Haas claims, is to establish a series of ideal types for the critical aspects of community formation (4). One ideal type that Haas develops at some length is his notion of a "community sentiment." A community sentiment, Haas argues would have six separate, but related, components: 1) endorsement of activity at the supranational level; 2) organization beyond the national level; 3) coalescence over a common ideology that supersedes national ideologies; 4) acceptance of a common doctrine to all within the community ("supranationalism"); 5) rule of law at the international level; and 6) a political system in which groups win and lose graciously without threat of leaving the union (paraphrasing Haas, pp. 9-10). 23

As Haas points out, these are ideal components:

Clearly, only a collection of saints could be expected to display positively all these indicators of community sentiment at the onset of a process of integration. In order to qualify as a true political community, however, all the above indicators must be positively established before the condition defined in our scheme has been met (10).

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23 Haas' definition has much going for it. One aspect that I feel is missing stems from his emphasis on groups, parties and governments. Haas' emphasis on these social groups makes sense given his belief--proven substantially correct over the 41 years since his book was published--that the European integration process would be driven from the top down. Even so, the notion of European sentiment, while obviously influenced by group membership and a political environment supported by the type of group interaction that he discusses in his definition, however, is an individual psychological phenomenon as well. Furthermore, the forces shaping sentiment are complex and only some rudimentary understanding of the forces that shape sentiment are known by the psychologists who dedicate their lives to understanding these relationships. However, if one wants to make the definitions of a "political community" and a "community sentiment" stringent (as Haas implies is his intention), then one must also include individuals and their attitudes, beliefs and desires along with groups, parties and governments in the definition. My comparison of Haas' ideal type European Community sentiments to observed attitudes about the European Union in Wales and Scotland is a first attempt at including individuals in his definition of a "community sentiment."
We, like Haas, then, should not expect to find complete agreement with all of the components of his definition, even 42 years after the Treaty of Rome (and 26 years of British membership in the now European Union). However, his list of criteria do serve as a useful yardstick by which we can judge how the most Eurosceptical member of the European Union measures up to this rather stringent ideal. While he probably did not envision a comparison exactly of the type that I will be making, I believe that he would agree with the underlying logic of the comparison as he argues, “The purpose of using a tight definition of political community is the easier assessment of group conduct with reference to the criteria of an ideal community” (10-11).

What I am proposing to do is rather simple. I will take Haas’ six criteria for an ideal (European) community sentiment and compare them to the consensus items for the Euroskeptics as well as for the 7 positively-inclined European attachments to see how each group fares relative to the ideal standard. To be more precise, I will use the first 4 of Haas’ six criteria as the final two relate to matters beyond the scope of particular individuals. The fifth criterion is a system of international law. While strongly Eurosceptical individual may decide to ignore certain European laws, such individual actions would have very little impact upon the overall system of law that exist within the European Union. Similarly, the sixth criterion refers to a system-level variable as well. Once again, while extreme Euroskeptics might prefer it if their nation state were no longer a member of the European Union, this belief, no matter how strongly held, could not seriously influence whether the nation state of which that individual were a citizen would stay in or leave the European Union. The first four criteria, however, are appropriate to study on an individual level. It is these four criteria, then, that will serve as the yardstick by which I will analyze the pattern of responses by the Euroskeptics and by the less skeptical European attachments uncovered by the Q sorts.

The Euroskeptics fail on all four of Haas’ criteria. Endorsement of policies at the supranational level is clearly rejected by the Euroskeptics. For example, Euroskeptics in Scotland and Wales both reject the claims that the European Union is economically necessary for either Britain or Scotland (data not shown). The Welsh and Scottish Euroskeptics also strongly disagree with the following statement: “Britain is wrong to stay out of the single European currency because the Euro would bring economic stability and greater economic growth to Britain” (Both Euroskeptics = -4).
The second criterion, organization beyond the national level, is explicitly and strongly dismissed out of hand by both types of Euroskeptics: “Pooling our sovereignty with the other nations of the European Union allows Britain to achieve much more than it could ever do on its own” (-4 for both types).

There is also no sense that the Euroskeptics believe any common ideology is present at the moment. We are reminded of this by looking at the scores for the statement concerning the perception of the ban on British beef (Statement 41; See Table 4). For both the Welsh and the Scottish Euroskeptics, there is a strong belief that this ban is an indication of how European Union politics operates. This standard operating procedure from the perspective of the Euroskeptics is that “they” (the European Union) tell “us” (the Brits) what to do. Further support that a common ideology does not exist in the view of the Euroskeptics can be gleaned from their responses to another statement as well: “To be European is to share in the inheritance of each of the European peoples not to lose the heritage of ones own people” (Scottish Euroskeptics = -2; Welsh Euroskeptics = 0; Average for more positive European attachments = 3.7). The Welsh Euroskeptics not only fail to feel that there is a common ideology that exists at the present time, but they do not see one on the horizon: “In the future, all Europeans will feel European because, just as we were taught to be British in school, they will be taught to be Europeans” (-2) and “As contacts among Europeans increase, we will begin to see that we have many things in common with each other. Eventually, we will begin to see ourselves as Europeans” (-2). The Scottish Euroskeptics, on the other hand, distinguish themselves not on the fact that they do not see a common ideology in the future, but rather in an acceptance of a rather anti-German sentiment:24 “The European Union has allowed Germany to win in peace what it lost in WWI and WWII” (+3).

Finally, in terms of criterion 4, a new nationalism, one can simply look at the vehemence with which these Euroskeptics dislike European integration and European Union policies, disavow any common bond with other Europeans and eschew even the possibility of a European attachment to conclude that a European supranationalism is one of the farthest things from these

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24 As Germany is an important member of the European Union, such negative German sentiments are perhaps a barrier to European integration. Furthermore, the statement with which these individuals agree is explicit in its linkage between the European Union and Germany.
Euroskeptics’ minds. Or you can let them tell you themselves: “I am proud to say that I am European” (-5 for both Welsh and Scottish Euroskeptics).

How do those with positive assessments of Europe fare when their responses are compared to Haas’ criteria? A quick look again—see Table 6 below—at the consensus items that all of the Welsh and Scottish positive European attachments share reveals that the first four criteria are met (to some extent) for all 7 of the non-Euroskeptics in Scotland and Wales.

(Table 6 about here)

This is not to say, however, that all 7 of these non-Euroskeptic types have well-developed European sentiments (in the Haas meaning of the term). Only three of 7 types express a level of European pride that one could begin to associate with a true Europhile (Wales2 = +2, Scot1* = +4, Scot3 = +3). The other four, despite their agreement with the consensus items discussed above, have portions of their response pattern that caution one from calling them Europhiles (or possessors of a European sentiment). For example, Wales1 has a level of European pride (-2) that suggests that for all of their positive views of Europe, they have not become Europeans in their own minds.25 Wales3 exhibits rankings that seem to question their commitment to Haas’ criterion 2, desire to organize at a European, rather than a national level: “Britain is wrong to stay out of the single European currency because the Euro would bring economic stability and greater economic growth to Britain” (-4). Scot2 seems to be lacking a strong commitment to criterion 4, a body of doctrine common to all: “To be European is to share in the inheritance of each of the European peoples not to lose the heritage of one’s own people” (Scot2 = +1; Average for other 6 non-Euroskeptic types = 4.3) and “The fact that the European Union is made up of so many cultures is a good thing” (Scot2 = +2; Average for other 6 non-Euroskeptics = 4.3). Finally, Scot4 shares with the Euroskeptics the implications of European integration have for

---

25 Wales1 is the Instrumental European attachment. Positive views towards Europe are primarily used to distinguish themselves from the English outgroup. This instrumental use of a European attachment may in fact lead to the impression of a well-structured, positive European attachment (as seems to be the case here). However, at the end of the day, the instrumentality of the European attachment (and the fact that the use of the European attachment is unrelated to the primary goal of the European Union and of greater European cooperation and integration) is also a barrier to a true European sentiment, as reflected in the low level of pride that the Welsh individual who load on this type of European attachment express,
British sovereignty. They also share with the Euroskeptics a lack of commitment to criterion 3, a coalescing on a common ideology: “The European Union’s ban on British beef is a prime example of how the EU works: They tell us what we are supposed to do without taking into account our needs and concerns” (Scot4 = 2; Average for other 6 non-Euroskeptics = -2.3). The fact that Scot4 tends to see European Union politics as a game of “us” versus “them” suggests that national concerns are not being overridden by supranational concerns. All four of these types also seem to have levels of European attachment, as expressed in being proud to be European, that also makes one wonder if there European attachment is strong enough to be considered even partial Europhiles—as opposed to being simply not Euroskeptics (Wales1 = -2, Wales3 = -3, Scot2 = 0, Scot4 = 0).

There are also some positive European attachment types that seem to have stronger commitments to Haas’ criteria beyond those that are shared by all 7 of the non-Euroskeptics. These three types are Welsh Europhiles (Wales2), Scottish Europhiles (Scot1”) and Scottish Relative Europhiles (Scot3). In the first instance, they all express some pride in being European (Wales2 = +2, Scot1” = +4 and Scot3 = +3; differences insignificant at the 0.01 level). Wales2 also has a strong commitment to Haas’ criterion 2. They strongly agree (+4) that the European Union is needed economically, that Britain would be worse off economically without European integration. This obviously seems to be endorsement of activity at the European level “in order to function more effectively as decision-makers vis-à-vis the separate national governments or the central authority” (Haas depiction of his second criterion; p. 10). Wales2 also seems to accept, or at least rejects less strongly, the notion that “I feel more European than British” (-1). This (almost) neutrality is an important distinction that sets this Welsh type apart from the Euroskeptics (-5) and indeed from the other more positively-inclined Welsh types (Wales1 = -4, Wales3 = -5). This combined with their relative pride in being European, is also an early indication that these individuals have not ruled out of hand “a body of doctrine common to all [Europeans], or a new nationalism (i.e., “supranationalism”)” (Haas’ criterion 4, p. 10).

Scot1” shows an even greater commitment to criteria 1 and 2. Not only do they believe that European activity is the appropriate level of much political activity (Criterion 1); they also believe that such activity allows their nation to achieve more than they ever could on their own (Criterion 2). For example, Scot1” stands out from the rest of the Scottish non-Euroskeptics with
its strong rejection of the notion that European integration threatens the work of the new Scottish Parliament (Scot1' = -4; Average for Scottish non-Euroskeptics = -1.3). More importantly, however, is their overwhelming support for the statement, “Pooling our sovereignty with other nations of Europe allows Britain to achieve much more than it could ever do on its own” (Scot1' = 5; Average for 6 other non-Euroskeptics = 2.3). Such a strong commitment to the need and the utility of European political activity combined with the overwhelming sense of European pride suggests that this type deserves the name, Europhile.26

Whereas Wales2 and Scot1' seem to emphasize a greater commitment to criteria 1 and 2, Scot3 distinguishes itself from the rest by its commitment to criteria 3 and 4. In fact Scot3 is uncertain about the utility of political activity on the European level (and, thus, its commitment to criteria 1 and 2). For example Scot3 believes, “Britain is wrong to stay out of the single European currency because the Euro would bring economic stability and greater economic growth to Britain” (Scot3 = -3; Average for Scottish non-Euroskeptics = 2). Despite this, the Scottish Relative Europhiles believe quite strongly that they share a considerable amount with the rest of Europe: “The people of Europe are very different from the British” (Scot3 = -4; Average for Scottish non-Euroskeptics = 1.3). More than this, they also believe, more strongly than any other Scottish non-Euroskeptic, that further integration will help strengthen Scottish culture (Statement #37; Scot3 = 5; Average for Scottish non-Euroskeptics = 2.3). They also show a commitment to criterion 4 (or at least they see that such a European nationalism is a possibility): “In the future all Europeans will feel European because, just as we are taught to be British in school, they will be taught to be Europeans” (Scot3 = 1; Average for Scottish non-Euroskeptics = -1.7).

As we have just reviewed, there is obviously considerable variation in the response patterns of the non-Euroskeptics across Wales and Scotland. However, the fact that there is some

26 To be completely revealing, there is one statement that might seem to undermine this analysis to an extent. Scot1’ also stands out from the rest of the non-Euroskeptics for its indifference to the statement, “Wherever you go in Europe, you will find that people are just like you. They want a job and a good living for themselves and for their family” (Scot1’ = 0; Average for 6 non-Euroskeptics = 4.3). One might argue that this anomaly (which seems to question the commitment of Scot1’ to criterion 3 and/or 4) is in fact a testament to the strength of European attachment of Scot1’. The fact that Scot1’ has the highest level of European pride, despite the fact that they do not see all Europeans as the same suggests that they have adopted a rather sophisticated notion of European attachment. Unfortunately, there does not seem to be enough data available to test independently this hypothesis. It might
consensus on precisely those aspects upon which Haas argues a meaningful European sentiment rests suggests that there exists a strong foundation for “building” a European attachment. What is particularly interesting is that these results come from what is known as one of the most Euroskeptic of the European partners (Nugent 1992, 179).

VII. Conclusions

What is clear throughout the analysis is that, while the level of European attachment is an important yardstick by which one can judge the Europeanness of an individual or indeed of a group of individuals, one must also be cognizant of the fact that underlying the level of attachment is a structure of attitudes and beliefs about Europe, about European integration, about the European Union and even about the (im)possibility of a European identity. Equally important, therefore, is to know about the type of European attachment that an individual has. Furthermore, the interaction of the type and the level can reveal useful information about the nature of the European attachment. For example the type and the level of a European attachment can be related clear-cut ways (in the case of British Euroskeptics) or perhaps in less obvious ways (in the case of the Welsh Instrumental Europeans who seem to be using their European attachment to distinguish themselves from the perceived Euroskeptical English other). Regardless of the nature of this interaction between type and level, one learns much more by studying both simultaneously than one does from looking only at one of them in isolation.

The Q-sort methodology allows both the type and the level of European attachment to be tested simultaneously. The level of European attachment is assessed by the score that is given to statements concerning European attachment. In this study, I have used the relative ranking of the statement, “I am proud to be European” to assess the level of European attachment of a particular individual. The fact that the Q-sort was designed as a forced distribution actually makes the use of this relative ranking rather powerful. The fact that an individual has but a few slots available for statements to which they strongly agree or disagree means that, should an individual use one of these slots for the general statement, “I am proud to be European,” that individual is indeed a particularly weak or strong European.

simply be the case that this indifference to the role of a shared bond with other Europeans is not important (positively or negatively) to a group that views and assesses Europe in terms of its positive sovereignty components.
The Q-method also allows one to assess the type of European attachment. All of the statements are sorted relative to one another. Not simply does a +5 mean strong agreement; it also means that the agreement with that statement is stronger than a statement that is given a +3 or a -2. This is somewhat true for standard questionnaires, but we cannot be certain that the individual has compared all of their responses with one another. The Q-sort procedure, on the other hand, places such comparisons at the center of the endeavor. Once again the forced nature of the final distribution (in terms of the number of statements that are allowed in each category) helps. A forced distribution encourages the participant to make distinctions that they might not make if they were not forced to make the distinctions.

The interaction of the type and level is also revealed through the use of the Q-methodology. As we discover in the case of European attachments in Scotland and Wales, the level of attachment is directly related to certain types of European attachment. This suggests that, in addition to asking questions about whether individuals are in favor or against attempts to unify Western Europe or (as in Eurobarometer 36.0), “How attached do you feel to [a particular territory—including Europe]?” we must also attempt to ascertain the underlying structure of their attitudes towards Europe. For example, not only do we find that British ID serves as the primary barrier to becoming positively inclined towards Europe, but we also discover that, for Euroskeptics and less skeptical types of European attachment alike, perceived threats to British sovereignty lead to lower levels of pride in being European. We also discover that the only way for an individual to come close to having the ideal European sentiment as Ernst Haas defines the term is for that individual to believe not simply that European integration is not a threat, but also that “Pooling our sovereignty with the other nations of the European Union allows Britain to achieve much more than it could ever do on its own.” Given the current debate in Britain, with the British press and large segments of the Conservative Party expressing doubts about the salutary effects that the pooling of sovereignty can have, it is not surprising that a relatively small number of individuals (only about 4 of the 130 individuals) even come close to a level of pride that we would associate with a true Europhile or an individual with a Haasian European sentiment.

Implicit in this attempt to understand better the underlying structures of different types of European attachment as they are found in a particular time and place—something that I will be
making much more explicit in further work on this topic—is the idea that different types of Europeans will respond different to a given component of the European integration project. If the “creation” of Europeans is at all a goal of those who see greater European integration as the solution to a wide array of socio-political ills, then one needs to know how this might best be achieved. Even if one is not so high-minded about their hopes for European integration, knowing that some individuals see the EU as primarily an economic union (like the Instrumental Scots), while others see it as a mode simply to express difference from an identifiable outgroup (like the Instrumental Welsh), can help Eurocrats prioritize various political options and target those policies accordingly (and not be surprised if an ERDF project in Wales does not lead instantly or uniformly to an increase in support for the European Union). Finally, as researchers and students of the European Union and the impact that it has on the hearts and minds (as well as attitudes, public opinion and voting behavior) of its citizens, by looking at both the type and the level of European attachment we gain a richer understanding of how these two aspects of European attachment function, thereby giving us a more complete picture of how united Europe is indeed becoming.
Table 1: Comparison of Scottish and Welsh Subsamples (Selected Characteristics)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Scotland</th>
<th>Wales</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n = 79)</td>
<td>(n = 56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>34 (43.0%)</td>
<td>17 (30.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>45 (57.0%)</td>
<td>39 (69.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Class (Self-Assessment)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
<td>34 (43.0%)</td>
<td>22 (39.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Middle</td>
<td>12 (15.2%)</td>
<td>11 (19.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>22 (27.8%)</td>
<td>14 (25.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Middle</td>
<td>7 (8.9%)</td>
<td>3 (5.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK/Refused</td>
<td>4 (7.4%)</td>
<td>6 (10.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-25</td>
<td>35 (44.3%)</td>
<td>22 (39.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-35</td>
<td>9 (11.4%)</td>
<td>4 (7.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-45</td>
<td>5 (6.3%)</td>
<td>17 (30.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-55</td>
<td>8 (10.1%)</td>
<td>2 (3.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56-65</td>
<td>11 (13.9%)</td>
<td>7 (12.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66+</td>
<td>11 (13.9%)</td>
<td>4 (7.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I.D.(^1)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish/Welsh only</td>
<td>23 (29.1%)</td>
<td>7 (12.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Scottish/Welsh than British</td>
<td>31 (39.2%)</td>
<td>20 (35.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equally Scottish/Welsh and British</td>
<td>12 (15.2%)</td>
<td>18 (32.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More British than Scottish/Welsh</td>
<td>2 (2.5%)</td>
<td>2 (3.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Only</td>
<td>5 (6.3%)</td>
<td>6 (10.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Something Else</td>
<td>5 (6.3%)</td>
<td>2 (3.6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\)Answer to the question, “Do you consider yourself British, Scottish/Welsh or something else?” Responses are close-ended with the choices as listed. “Don’t Know” was an option, but no one selected it.
Table 2: Responses to Questionnaire Items Concerning European Union and European Integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scotland (n = 79)</th>
<th>Wales (n = 56)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>&quot;In general are you in favor or against attempts to unify Western Europe?&quot;</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For</td>
<td>33 (41.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>24 (30.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>11 (13.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>11 (13.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Generally speaking, do you consider Britain’s membership in the European Union a good thing, a bad thing or neither good nor bad?</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good Thing</td>
<td>43 (54.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad Thing</td>
<td>7 (8.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Good Nor Bad</td>
<td>20 (25.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>9 (11.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Generally speaking, do you think that Britain’s membership in the proposed single European currency would be a good thing, a bad thing or neither good nor bad?</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good Thing</td>
<td>29 (36.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad Thing</td>
<td>28 (35.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Good Nor Bad</td>
<td>14 (17.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>8 (10.1%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: Partial Correlations Between Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Scot1</th>
<th>Scot1'</th>
<th>Scot2</th>
<th>Scot3</th>
<th>Scot4</th>
<th>Wales1</th>
<th>Wales2</th>
<th>Wales2'</th>
<th>Wales3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scot1</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-0.71*</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>-0.58*</td>
<td>0.75*</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scot1'</td>
<td>-0.71*</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.64*</td>
<td>0.78*</td>
<td>0.49*</td>
<td>0.68*</td>
<td>0.87*</td>
<td>-0.69*</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scot2</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>0.64*</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.60*</td>
<td>0.66*</td>
<td>0.82*</td>
<td>0.73*</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scot3</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
<td>0.78*</td>
<td>0.60*</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.55*</td>
<td>0.76*</td>
<td>0.77*</td>
<td>-0.45*</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scot4</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.49*</td>
<td>0.66*</td>
<td>0.55*</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.82*</td>
<td>0.67*</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.62*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales1</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>0.68*</td>
<td>0.82*</td>
<td>0.76*</td>
<td>0.67*</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.78*</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>0.47*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales2</td>
<td>-0.58*</td>
<td>0.87*</td>
<td>0.73*</td>
<td>0.77*</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.78*</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-0.63*</td>
<td>0.47*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales2'</td>
<td>0.75*</td>
<td>-0.69*</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td>-0.45*</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>-0.63*</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales3</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.62*</td>
<td>0.47*</td>
<td>0.47*</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant at 0.01 level.

Euroskeptics: Scot1 (Euroskeptic) and Wales2' (Euroskeptic)
Non-Euroskeptics: Scot1' (Europhil), Scot2 (Instrumental (Econ)), Scot3 (Relative Europhil), Scot4 (Ambivalent), Wales1 (Instrumental (Anti-English)), Wales2 (Europhil) and Wales3 (Anti-EU (Sovereignty), Not Anti-Europe).
### Table 4a: Core Components of Euroskepticism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Scottish Euroskeptics</th>
<th>Welsh Euroskeptics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>The UK must be sure that it does not lose any of its independence and power as a sovereign nation to the European Union.</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40.</td>
<td>The European Union’s ban on British beef is a prime example of how the EU works: They tell us what to do without taking into account our needs and concerns.</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39.</td>
<td>Britain should not join the single European currency because Britain would lose the pound, which is an important symbol of our nation.</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>I will never feel European because I will always feel British.</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41.</td>
<td>Britain is wrong to stay out of the single European currency because the Euro would bring economic stability and greater economic growth to Britain.</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>I feel more European than British.</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.</td>
<td>I am proud to be European.</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4b: Divergence Between Scottish and Welsh Euroskepticism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Scottish Euroskeptics</th>
<th>Welsh Euroskeptics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>European integration threatens British culture.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>European integration threatens Gaelic and the Scots language. / European integration threatens the Welsh language.</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>The European Union has allowed Germany to win in peace what it lost in WWI and WWII.</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36.</td>
<td>The fact that the European Union is made up of so many cultures is a good thing.</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) Differences > 2.39 significant at 0.01 level.
Table 5: Consensus Items of Positively-Inclined European Attachments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Wales1</th>
<th>Wales2</th>
<th>Wales3</th>
<th>Scot1</th>
<th>Scot2</th>
<th>Scot3</th>
<th>Scot4</th>
<th>Avg. Euroskeptic*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. European integration threatens British culture</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Some of the problems that face Scotland/Wales are too big to be solved by Scotland/Wales alone. Sometimes we need an institution the size of the European Union to solve Scotland's/Wales' problems.</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. We cannot be Europeans because there is no common culture that all Europeans share.</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>+1.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42. Closer European integration will allow Britain to adopt the more caring social policies of the other European countries.</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The average is the appropriate measure since all of the following statements (except #2) are consensus items for the Scottish and Welsh Euroskeptics. This means that they differ by no more than 2 on the scores that they give to a given statement. For statement 2, Scottish Euroskeptics = 0; Welsh Euroskeptics = +3.
Table 6: Consensus Items of the Positively-Inclined European Attachments and Haas' European Sentiment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Average Score</th>
<th>Haas' Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. European integration threatens British culture</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>Criteria 3 and 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Some of the problems that face Scotland/Wales are too big to be solved by Scotland/Wales alone. Sometimes we need an institution the size of the European Union to solve Scotland's/Wales' problems.</td>
<td>+2.0</td>
<td>Criterion 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. We cannot be Europeans because there is no common culture that all Europeans share.</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
<td>Criteria 3 and 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42. Closer European integration will allow Britain to adopt the more caring social policies of the other European countries.</td>
<td>+1.6</td>
<td>Criterion 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1The average is an appropriate measure because all 7 types do not differ to a statistically significant level. See Table 6 for scores across individual types.

2Ernst Haas' criteria are

Criterion 1: "Interest groups and political parties at the national level endorse supranational action in preference to action by their national government, or if they are divided among themselves on this issue..."

Criterion 2: "Interest groups and political parties organize beyond the national level in order to function more effectively as decision-makers vis-à-vis the separate nation governments or the central authority and if they define their interests in terms of larger than those of the separate national state from which they originate."

Criterion 3: "Interest groups and political parties, in their efforts at supranational organization, coalesce on the basis of a common ideology, surpassing those prominent at the national level."

Criterion 4: "Interest groups, political parties and governments, in confronting each other at the supranational level, succeed in evolving a body of doctrine common to all, or a new nationalism (i.e., "supranationalism")."

Criterion 5: "Interest groups, political parties and governments show evidence of accepting the rule of law in faithfully carrying out supranational court decisions..."

Criterion 6: "Governments negotiate with one another in good faith and generally reach agreement, while not making themselves consistently and invariably the spokesmen of national interest groups..." (Haas 1958: 9-10).
Appendix A

43 Statements Concerning European Attachment

Below is a list of the 43 statements that each participant in Scotland and Wales was asked to rank on a scale of -5 (most unlike what they think about when they think about Europe) to +5 (most like what they think about when they think about Europe). The statements in Scotland and Wales were identical with the minor modification that in Wales, the references were to the Welsh Assembly (not the Scottish Parliament) and to the Welsh language (not Gaelic and the Scots language). Participants were asked to sort the statements into a rather strict distribution (see page 6). This sorting procedure and a gentle reminder that they should be sure to read through and compare the statements that are given similar rankings to make sure that they have sorted the statements correctly is one important way that the Q-sort methodology will help to reveal the type and the level of a European attachment.

1. The European Union is fine as a trading bloc, but it shouldn’t attempt to become a political union.
2. European integration threatens British culture.
3. The UK must be sure that it does not lose any of its independence and power as a sovereign nation to the European Union.
4. European integration threatens to undermine the success of the new Scottish Parliament because too many of the policies devolved to the Scottish Parliament are really decided on the European level.
5. European integration threatens Scottish culture.
7. Some of the problems that face Scotland are too big to be solved by Scotland alone. There are times when we need an institution the size of the European Union to solve Scotland’s problems.
8. Pooling our sovereignty with the other nations of the European Union allows Britain to achieve much more than it could ever do on its own.
9. The European Union is economically necessary. Scotland would be worse off if it were not part of the EU.
10. The European Union is economically necessary. Britain would be worse off if it were not part of the EU.
11. I will never feel European because I will always feel Scottish.
12. I will never feel European because I will always feel British.
13. I feel more European than British.
14. There are too many countries in the European Union for all of us to get along.
15. A European identity is not possible because there is no common language that all European can speak.
16. The only history that all Europeans share is the centuries of warfare with one another. This is not a solid enough foundation on which to build a European identity shared by all Europeans.
17. We cannot be European because there is no common culture that all Europeans share.
18. If nothing else, the European Union gives a lot of money to help support Gaelic and the Scots language.
19. If nothing else, the European Union gives a lot of money to help the economically deprived areas of Scotland.
20. If nothing else, the European Union gives a lot of money to help my local community.
21. The European Union will eventually "create" Europeans because Europe will eventually replace the nation state as the most important political institution.
22. In the future all Europeans will feel European because, just as we were taught to be British in school, they will be taught to be Europeans.
23. As contacts among Europeans increase, we will begin to see that we have many things in common with each other. Eventually, we will begin to see ourselves as Europeans.
24. The European Union has allowed Germany to win in peace what it lost in WWI and WWII.
25. European integration helps the Scots attain greater autonomy from England.
26. The European Union provides Scotland with the opportunity to become an independent nation.
27. Throughout history, Scotland has always maintained closer ties to Europe than England has. Therefore, it is no surprise that the Scots are more pro-European than the English.
28. Sometimes, the Scots have more in common with the French and other Europeans than with the English.
29. Scots tend to be more positive than the English to the idea of European integration.
30. The struggles of the Gaelic and the Scots languages are similar to those of the Basques and the Catalans in Spain, the Walloons in Belgium and the Bretons in France. This creates an important linkage between Scotland and Europe that simply does not exist in England.
31. The British will never be Europeans because of our geographical location in Europe. Britain is a proud island that has, for centuries, remained outside of European history and politics.
32. The people of Europe are very different from the British.
33. I am proud to say that I am European.
34. Wherever you go in Europe you will find that people are just like you. They just want a job and a good living for themselves and for their family.
35. To be European is to share in the inheritance of each of the European peoples, not to lose the heritage of one’s own people.
36. The fact that the European Union is made up of so many cultures is a good thing.
37. Contact with other European cultures can only enrich our Scottish culture.
38. The European Union should be considered a success because none of its members have ever even thought of going to war with one another.
39. Britain should not join the single European currency because Britain would lose the pound, which is an important symbol of our nation.
40. The European Union’s ban on British beef is a prime example of how the EU works: They tell us what we are supposed to do without taking into account our needs and concerns.
41. Britain is wrong to stay out of the single European currency because the Euro would bring economic stability and greater economic growth to Britain.
42. Closer European integration will allow Britain to adopt the more caring social policies of the other European countries.
43. Regardless of what I feel about European integration, Britain must maintain a strong voice in the negotiations with the other members of the European Union. Britain stands to lose more than it would gain by staying out of these negotiations.
Appendix B: Types of Scottish and Welsh European Attachments

With factor analysis there are a number of criteria by which one can decide on the "appropriate" number of factors. One criterion is to select all factors with eigenvalues greater than or equal to 1. This criterion is meant to ensure that a researcher does not select a factor that does not explain an adequate amount of the variation in the responses of the participants. If I adopted this criterion, I would have had 16 types of European attachment for the Welsh subsample and 20 types for the Scottish subsample. Such a large number of types for a relatively small number of individuals (56 in Wales and 74 in Scotland) suggests that there is certainly a considerable amount of variation in the responses. However, in this analysis, we are more interested in the shared conceptions of European attachment that exist, rather than the idiosyncratic ways in which certain conceptions fit together in the mind of a particular respondent. Therefore, a different selection criterion was used: namely, the Scree Test. Using this criterion, there were 4 Scottish types and 3 Welsh types of European attachment. On further investigation of the data, however, it was discovered that one type in each subsample was bipolar. For these bipolar types, there were some individuals who were positively loaded on the given factor, while others were loaded negatively. Rather than simply assuming that the positive end of this bipolar type was the mirror image of the negative end, I grouped those who were positively loaded on the factor and calculated the ideal type for those individuals. I similarly grouped those who were negatively loaded on the same factor and calculated their ideal type. These types remained remarkably distinct; however, they no longer had a correlation of -1. This judgmental rotation, however, does yield a more meaningful analysis as it better represents the subjective understandings of the actual participants. Brown (1980) and McKeown and Thomas (1988) both discuss the important role that judgmental rotation plays in the factor analysis that underlies Q-sort methodology. The 5 Scottish types together explain 43.3% of the variation and the 4 Welsh types together explain 39.9% of the variation. Furthermore, in each subsample approximately 84% of the respondents are statistically significantly loaded onto at least one of the derived types (at the 0.01 level). Adding further types would increase both the amount of variation explained as well as the percentage of people who load significantly on one of the types; however, these gains come at a price. The derived types, since they would be based on a
smaller number of respondents, become more idiosyncratic and difficult to analyze and to interpret.

5 Types of Scottish European Attachment27

The views of the 7428 Scottish respondents who completed the Q-sort of 43 statements designed to tap their beliefs about European attachment can adequately be broken down into five separate patterns of European attachment. In parentheses following the descriptive title is the variable name as well as the number of individuals who have a statistically significant loading on that given factor.29

1) Euroskeptics (Scot1; n = 15): The first type of European attachment in the Scottish subsample is also perhaps the easiest to recognize. This is the fairly standard Euroskeptical view that is expressed by a large portion of the British press and of a substantial number of Conservative Party politicians. Those individuals holding this view of Europe believe the standard Euroskeptical line that “Britain should not join the single European currency because Britain would lose the pound, which is an important symbol of our nation” (+4) and “The European Union’s ban on British beef is a prime example of how the EU works: They tell us what we are supposed to do without taking into account our needs and concerns” (+5).

This latter statement seems to be pulling double duty because, while anti-European attitudes for this type are driven by negative views of particular European Union policies, this type of European attachment also distrusts the EU and European integration because it poses a threat to British sovereignty and culture. For example, while not alone in this, individuals loaded on this first type strongly believe that “The UK must be sure that it does not lose any of its independence and its power as a sovereign nation to the European Union” (+5). In addition to such overt claims that their fears lie with the threat to sovereignty entailed by European

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27 The scores that appear in the parentheses following a given statement is based on the weighted sum (with the factor loading on the factor as the weight) that determines the ideal ranking for the given type. In other words, the ranking that is listed is the best approximation of the response profile of an individual who is perfectly loaded (f = 1.0) on that given factor. The weighted sum is recalculated into the original distribution such that only two statements are given -5, three statements are given -4, etc. Scores ranged from -5 to +5. Statements are only considered distinguishing if they are at least one standard deviation away from the score of another type.

28 Five of the Scottish respondents did not complete the Q-sort for these statements for various reasons. Therefore, while 79 took part in the research project, there are only 74 respondents mentioned in this section.

29 The total will not add up to the number of respondents because there are some individuals (n = 12 in Scotland; n = 9 in Wales) who did not load onto any factor. Furthermore, there are many individuals who loaded on more than one factor to a statistically significant level.
integration, individuals of this first type also are alone in their rejection of any real positive benefits from or need of European integration (Statements 7-10). In fact, this type is reticent to give any positive evaluation of Europe. They are less likely than the other three types of European attachment found in the Scottish subsample to admit that “Wherever you go in Europe you will find that people are just like you...” (+1) or “The fact that the European Union is made up of so many cultures is a good thing.” (-2).

This type’s rejection of Europe and of European integration does not stop there. This type is alone in believing that Europe cannot be considered a meaningful region in the sense that it is too large, too diverse and has no common culture upon which Europeanness beyond mere geography might be based. More specific than this general rejection of Europe as a meaningful territorial unit beyond geography is the tendency of this type to base anti-Europeness on a protection of Britain (as opposed to Scotland and Britain). People of this type argue explicitly and vehemently that Britain is not European (Statements #31 and #32); they strongly disagree with the statement that “I feel more European than British” (-5) and they see their Britishness as a barrier to becoming European in the future (i.e., “I will never feel European because I will always feel British” is given +4). Interesting for our analysis as well is the fact that these individuals see their British identities as more of a barrier than their Scottish identities. While “I will never feel European because I will always feel British” is given +4, the statement, “I will never feel European because I will always feel Scottish” is given +1.

Given all of these consistently negative views (or positive agreement with negative statements about Europe, the European Union and European integration), it should come as no real surprise that this type distinguishes itself from the other types of European attachment found in the Scottish subsample in its strong rejection of any European attachment (e.g., “I am proud to say that I am European” is given -5 for this type). All in all, it seems safe to call this first type “Euro skeptics.”

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30 This is not to say that the other three types necessarily see Europe as a meaningful nation or quasi-nation. However, this first type is the most explicit in arguing that Europe cannot be a meaningful territorial identity beyond geography.

31 Differences between the scores within a given type greater than 1.2 are considered statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
2) Europhiles (Scot1; n = 11): The Europhiles tend to be the mirror image of the Euroskeptics.\textsuperscript{32} They do not see the European Union as a threat to sovereignty; in fact they chose one of the only two +5 slots for the statement, “Pooling our sovereignty with the other nations of the European Union allows Britain to achieve much more than it could ever do on its own.” Furthermore, this type disagrees strongly with the notion that the EU threatens Scottish sovereignty in the form of the new Scottish Parliament. Equally important to this type is their strong pride in being European. Interestingly, one other statement, perhaps incongruously given our claim that this type is a prototypical Europhile, which distinguishes this type is the indifference to the statement that “Wherever you go in Europe you find that people are just like you.” As we discuss later, this statement seems to represent the fact that sovereignty issues play a greater role in European attachment than other components such as the perceived economic benefits of European integration or the rejection of claims that the peoples of Europe do not have enough in common (besides centuries of warfare and strife) to be considered a quasi-nation.

3) Instrumental Europeanness (Scot2; n = 16): The third type that can be derived from the Scottish subsample is distinguished by basing its view of the European Union and of Europe on the economic benefits that European integration brings to Scotland and to Britain. For example, this type stands out among the four types in its overwhelming support for the following two statements: “The European Union is economically necessary. Scotland would be worse off economically if it were not part of the EU” and “The European Union is economically necessary. Britain would be worse off economically if it were not part of the EU” (+5 for both statements). More specifically than the belief that Scotland and Britain gain economically from membership in the European Union is this type’s belief that “If nothing else, the European Union gives a lot of money to help economically deprived communities in Scotland” (+4). This claim that support for Europe, the European Union and European integration is based primarily on the perceived economic benefits is strengthened by looking at this type’s pattern of response for those statements dealing with the European Union’s economic policies. This type (not uniquely)

\textsuperscript{32} Remembering that they are not the \textit{exact} opposite. The Europhiles are on the negative pole of the factor described as “Euroskeptics” above. Not too much will be made about the Europhiles in this section because there numbers are rather small in the Welsh subsample. Only 4 of the 74 individuals are loaded on this factor. The utility of this factor is primarily theoretical, although it is important to recognize that in Q-sort analysis the number of individuals defining a given factor is not as important as the fact that there are enough individuals for the factor to stand out in the factor analysis.
strongly rejects the claim that “Britain should not join the single European currency because Britain would lose the pound, which is an important symbol of our nation” (-4). This type also (albeit less strongly) agrees with the claims that “Britain is wrong to stay out of the single European currency because the Euro would bring economic stability and greater economic growth to Britain” (+1) and that “Closer integration will allow Britain to adopt the more caring social policies of the other European countries” (+2).33

Such positive assessments of the European Union and the Scottish-based nature of their support for the EU do not necessarily yield an overwhelming sense of Europeanness for this type, though. For example, they (like the Ambivalent Europeans) profess a relatively low level of pride in being European (Statement 33 = 0). Furthermore, this type is less likely than the other two more positive types of European attachment in the Scottish subsample to see European integration as a process that will help strengthen pre-existing cultures and heritage (Statements #35 and #36).

Given the fact that individuals of this type seem to favor the European Union for particular (especially economic) reasons, I call this type of European attachment, “Instrumental (Econ) Europeanness.”

4) Relative Europhiles (Scot3; n = 16): While not precisely being the polar opposite of the Scottish “Euroskeptics,” this type of European attachment shares the same statement rankings as the Euroskeptics on only 11 of the 43 statements (25.5%). Those statements which the Euroskeptics and this type of European attachment tend to be an agreement that certain things are simply irrelevant to their European attachment. For example, both are indifferent on whether the European Union should be praised for its generosity towards the Gaelic language (Statement #18). Similarly, these two types share perfect indifference on whether, “Throughout history, Scotland has maintained closer ties to Europe than England has. Therefore, it is no surprise that the Scots are more pro-European than the English” (Statement #27). Not only do these two types

33 This pattern of responses seems to lend support to Gabel and Palmer’s (1995) analysis, which emphasizes that “level of support [for the European Union] is positively related to her nation’s security and trace in EC membership and her personal potential to benefit from liberalized markets for goods, labour and money” (3). This pattern seems to support their analysis more than it does Eichenberg and Dalton’s (1993) economic voting model of EC support. The results here support Gabel and Palmer’s (1995) contention that “the EC is judged in terms of the policies it enacts” (5), but these results also go beyond their analysis in pointing out that the perceived personal gain might also include the benefits from ERDF money that is given to particularly economically-deprived regions and communities.
agree on a relatively small proportion of statements, but they also differ quite strongly on a large proportion of statements: There are fully 18 statements (41.2%) where these two types differ in the ratings that they give to a particular statement by more than 2 standard deviations.

Despite the fact that Relative Europhiles are quite often diametrically opposed to the views expressed by the Euroskeptics, these individuals can only at best be described as “Relative Europhiles” because there are some views which they hold that preclude designating them as having fully-fledged European identities. Furthermore, they are only Europhiles when their response pattern is contrasted with the Scot1, Scot2 and Scot4, not nearly so much when they are compared with Scot1’. For example, unlike the Scot1’ Europhiles, Relative Europhiles are still jealous of British sovereignty. While they disagree with the statement, “The UK must be sure that it does not lose any of its independence and power as a sovereign nation to the European Union,” their level of disagreement (-1) is not as strong as one might imagine from someone who would consider themselves to be European. What seems to distinguish between the Europhiles (Scot1’) and the Relative Europhile (Scot3) is the fact that the Europhiles actively embrace the pooling of sovereignty, whereas the Relative Europhiles are not as sure about its utility (Scores for Scot3 and Scot1’ respectively):

8. Pooling our sovereignty with the other members of the European Union allows Britain to achieve much more than it could ever do alone (+2, +5).

The Relative Europhiles seem to have a greater affinity to the other people of Europe than the Europhiles do (Scores for Scot3 and Scot1’ respectively):

24. The European Union has allowed Germany to win in peace what it lost in WWI and WWII (-5, -1).

34. Wherever you go in Europe, you will find that people are just like you. They just want a job and a good living for themselves and their family (+4, 0).

37. Contact with other European cultures can only enrich our Scottish culture (+5, +3).

However, while the Relative Europeans seem to share quite a bit with the Europeans (they agree on fully 35 of the 43 statements (82% agreement)) and may even be more positively-inclined towards other Europeans than the Europhiles, the concerns about British sovereignty seem to be the primary barriers to the Relative Europhiles becoming as pro-European as the Europhiles (Scores for Scot3 and Scot1’ respectively):
13. I feel more European than British (0, +3).

Additionally, while this type tends to be one of the more positive of the five Scottish types, there are some notable exceptions. The Relative Europhiles do not seem to be as convinced as the Instrumental Europeans (Scot2) that the European Union is economically and politically necessary (Scores are for Relative Europhiles and Instrumental Europeans, respectively):

9. The European Union is economically necessary. Scotland would be worse off economically if it were not part of the EU (+1, +5).

10. The European Union is economically necessary. Britain would be worse off economically if it were not part of the EU (+1, +5).

19. If nothing else, the European Union gives a lot of money to help the economically deprived areas of Scotland (+1, +4).

5) Ambivalent Europeans (Scot4; n = 16): The final type of European attachment that is observable from this Scottish subsample is what can be described as Ambivalent Europeans. This fourth type of European attachment combines the generally positive view of European integration in terms of its positive impacts on Scottish and British culture similar to the Instrumental Europeans and Relative Europhiles with the concern that integration can also threaten British sovereignty, in a series of responses more like the Euroskeptics.

In terms of sovereignty, this type shares some of the concerns of the Euroskeptics. In general this type tends to be less skeptical than the Euroskeptics, but it is clear that, for several of the responses associated with British sovereignty, this type is closer to the Euroskeptics than it is to the Instrumental Europeans and the Relative Europhiles. For example, this type gives a +4 to the claim, “The UK must be sure that it does not lose any of its independence and its power as a sovereign nation to the European Union.” The +2 that this type gives to the view that “The European Union’s ban on British beef is a prime example of how the EU works: They tell us what we are supposed to do without taking into account our needs and concerns,” is between the strong agreement by the Euroskeptics (+5) and the middling levels of disagreement by the Instrumental Europeans (-3) and the Europhiles (-1). Despite these cautionary views about the negative implications that European integration may have on British sovereignty, this type

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34 For comparison the scores for the other types are: Euroskeptics (+5), Instrumental Europeans (0), Relative Europhiles (-1).
remains ambivalent about whether some transfer of sovereignty to the European Union has not also yield some positive effects as well. This type gives a +3 to both of the following statements, which claim that there are positive benefits that have derived from the transfer of competencies that European integration has entailed: “Some of the problems that face Scotland are too big to be solved by Scotland alone. There are times when we need an institution the size of the European Union to solve Scotland’s problems” and “Pooling our sovereignty with the other nations of the European Union allows Britain to achieve much more than it could ever do on its own.”

How might we go about explaining these seeming contradictions that exist in this type’s analysis of the impact of European integration on national sovereignty? One possible explanation is that this type follows the familiar pattern of one may agree with the general principle (i.e., pooling sovereignty can achieve demonstrable results) but one disagrees with the specific application of this principle (i.e., pooling Scottish/British sovereignty is another matter altogether). This is plausible, however, not simply because it is a rather robust finding in the study of public opinion. A similar pattern can be observed by looking at this type’s rankings of the following two statements: “The fact that the European Union is made up of so many cultures is a good thing” (General statement of principle; +5) and “Contact with other European cultures can only enrich our Scottish culture” (Specific application of principle; +2). This analysis is seemingly undermined by the observation that this type also strongly disagrees with the notion that “Britain should not join the single European currency because Britain would lose the pound, which is an important symbol of our nation” (-4). However, this response makes more sense when it is also noted that this type is also the strongest proponent of the Euro because of the economic benefits that it would provide Britain: “Britain is wrong to stay out of the single European currency because the Euro would bring economic stability and greater economic growth to Britain” (+3). In other words, while it seems as if this type should disagree with the statement concerning the loss of the British pound, the loss of sovereignty that is implied by the loss of the British pound is mitigated by the specific benefits that this type believes would be reaped by Britain if it joined the Euro. Similarly, while this type decries the loss of sovereignty that European integration entails (Statement #3), it is willing to put up with this loss of
sovereignty when it can be shown that there are benefits that accrue in return for the loss of sovereignty (Statements #7 and #8).

How do these conflicting views about European integration influence these individuals’ degree of Europeanness? Not surprisingly, they seem rather ambivalent about their own sense of European attachment. Like the Instrumental Europeans, they do not feel that much pride in being European (Statement #33 = 0); however, this is not because they view Europe as a possible threat to Scottish and British culture as the Instrumental Europeans do. Instead, what seems to be a barrier to a strong attachment to Europe for people with this type of European attachment is its relationship with a British attachment. Unlike the other two types that are favorably disposed towards aspects of Europe—which both strongly reject the notion that they will never feel European because they will always feel British—and unlike the Eurosceptical view that their Britishness will serve as a constant barrier to any meaningful European attachment, this type of European attachment remains ambivalent about the continued relationship between their British attachment and a European attachment. However, they are also very clear that, at the present time, they do not feel European (or at least no more European than British). The -5 that they give to the statement, “I feel more European than British” is identical to the response given by the Euroskeptics (-5) and significantly (statistically and interpretatively) different from the responses given by the Europhiles (+3), the Instrumental Europeans (-1) and the Relative Europhiles (0).

4 Types of Welsh European Attachment

The 56 Welsh respondents completed a Q-sort of the same 43 statements that were sorted by the Scottish respondents—with the obvious exception that the word “Scottish” was replaced with “Welsh.” Using the same criterion for determining the number of factors that best describes the variability of the data (i.e., the Skree Test) and splitting apart the one bipolar type in the Welsh

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35 Their response pattern on questions concerning the impact of European integration on their culture and heritage is more similar to the Relative Europhiles than they are to the Instrumental Europeans (e.g., Statements #35 and 36). The only exception is the response pattern to the statements concerning the impact of European integration on Scottish culture. Like the Instrumental Europeans and rather unlike the Relative Europhiles, the Ambivalent Europeans do not see European integration as a threat to Scottish culture (Statement #5), but they do not necessarily see it as a direct benefit to Scottish culture (Statement #37).

36 Statement #12 (I will never feel European because I will always feel British) = -4 (Instrumental Europeans) and -5 (Relative Europhiles).

37 Statement #12 (I will never feel European because I will always feel British) = +4.
subsample yields four distinct factors that describe 39.9% of the variation. The four Welsh types can be described as:

1) Instrumental Europeans (Wales1; n = 21): The Welsh and Scottish Instrumental Europeans are rather different from one another. For the Welsh Instrumental Europeans, European attachment is primarily a mode of distinguishing themselves from their English neighbors, not a recognition that the European Union is economically useful as it is viewed by the Scottish Instrumental Europeans. The statements which distinguish this type from the other three Welsh types all are related to how Welsh European attachments compare to English European attachments. Furthermore, the Welsh Instrumental Europeans consistently believe that the Welsh are closer to Europeans, have ties to Europeans that do not exist in England and are more favorably inclined towards the idea of European integration than the Euroskeptical English:

28. Sometimes, the Welsh have more in common with the French and other Europeans than with the English (+5).
29. The Welsh tend to be more positive than the English to the idea of European integration (+4).
30. The struggles of the Welsh language are similar to those of the Basques and the Catalans in Spain, the Walloons in Belgium and the Bretons in France. This creates an important linkage between Wales and Europe that simply does not exist in England (+5). Instrumentality is also extended to include acceptance, albeit rather weak, that the European Union might provide Wales with an opportunity to gain more political autonomy from those whom they obviously view as an identifiable “them”:

25. European integration helps the Welsh attain greater autonomy from England (+1).
26. The European Union provides Wales with the opportunity to become an independent nation (+1).

Not surprisingly, given the assessments above, which seem to indicate that they view themselves as sharing important characteristics with other Europeans and given the fact that many of these shared characteristics are precisely those which have been identified by students of nationalism as being important components which make a territory a nation, this type rejects the notion that it is impossible to see Europe as a quasi-nation:

³⁶ Statement #12 (I will never feel European because I will always feel British) = -1.
14. There are too many countries in the European Union for all of us to get along (-4).
15. A European identity is not possible because there is no common language that all Europeans can speak (-2).
16. The only history that all of Europe shares is the centuries of warfare with one another. This is not a solid enough foundation upon which to build a European identity shared by all Europeans (-3).
17. We cannot be Europeans because there is no common culture that all Europeans share (-3).

At the same time, it must be recognized that this type is using European attachment only in an instrumental fashion. While they seem to reject overtly negative statements about the impossibility of Europe being considered a nation, they do not embrace the notion of a meaningful European identity now or in the future. For example, unlike the Europhiles, who express pride in being European, the Instrumental Europeans are not proud to say that they are European (-2). Similarly, the Instrumental Europeans share with the other skeptical types a strong rejection of the statement, “I feel more European than British” (-4). The Instrumental Europeans also reject the notion that “As contacts among Europeans increase, we will begin to see that we have many things in common with each other. Eventually, we will begin to see ourselves as Europeans” (0). It seems, therefore, that instrumentality (as in the Scottish case) does not lead to a very deep sense of European attachment.

2) Relative Europhile (Wales2; n = 13): The Europhiles represent one end of a bipolar type of European attachment (Euroskptic (Wales2'), described below, is the other type). The Europhiles distinguish themselves from the other three types of European attachment in the Welsh subsample in their overwhelming support for the idea of a European Union, rejection of the view that Britain is really not a proper part of Europe and, most importantly, a lack of concern that European integration means (and will continue to mean) a direct loss of British sovereignty:

10. The European Union is economically necessary. Britain would be worse off economically if it were not part of the EU (+4).
31. The British will never be Europeans because of our geographical location in Europe. Britain is a proud island nation that has, for centuries, remained outside of European history and politics (-4).

39. Britain should not join the single European currency because Britain would lose the pound, which is an important symbol of our nation (-5).

40. The European Union's ban on British beef is a prime example of how the EU works: They tell us what we are supposed to do without taking into account our needs and concerns (-4).

These views lead to a relative sense of European attachment. When compared to the other Welsh types of European attachment, one is struck by how different this type is; when compared to some hypothetical standard, however, one is equally struck by the limitations that this type places on its support for the European Union and its strength of European attachment. For example this type only weakly rejects the notion that "I feel more European than British" (-2). Similarly, more than the other Welsh types, but less than one would hope for a full-fledged Europhile, this type gives a +2 to the statement, "I am proud to say that I am a European." This type also rejects--again in a weaker way than one might suppose from a quintessential Europhile--the trade-off that others imply is inherent in European integration: "The UK must be sure that it does not lose any of its independence and its power as a sovereign nation to the European Union" (-2). Finally, although this type plainly sees that there is utility to continued involvement in the European Union, it only weakly (and in a way to make its response indistinguishable from other Welsh types) supports the views that "Britain is wrong to stay out of the single European currency...") (+2) and "Closer European integration will allow Britain to adopt the more caring social policies of the other European countries" (+2). Certainly, these individuals are positively inclined towards Europe, but one must conclude that they remain for the moment only Relative Europhiles.

3) Euroskeptics (Wales2; n = 8): This type, which represents the opposite end of a bipolar type from the Relative Europhiles, is the most negatively inclined towards the European Union, towards Europe and towards European integration of any of the Welsh types. Unlike the Relative Europhiles, the Euroskeptics need no such qualification to their name since they are consistently anti-Europe in attitude. It comes as no surprise, then, that this group strongly
believes that they will never become European because they will always be British (+3) and that they will never become European because they will always be Welsh (+3). Equally unsurprising is the observation that this group particularly strongly rejects the view that they are more European than British (-5) and that they are proud to be a European (-5).

Given that this group sees their Britishness as a barrier to a meaningful European identity, it is also unsurprising that this type also embraces the standard British Eurosceptical line: “Britain should not join the single European currency because Britain would lose the pound, which is an important symbol of our nation” (-5); “The European Union’s ban on British beef is a prime example of how the EU works: They tell us what we are supposed to do without taking into account our needs and concerns” (-4); “Britain is wrong to stay out of the single European currency because the Euro would bring economic activity and greater economic growth to Britain” (-4) and “The UK must be sure that it does not lose any of its independence and its power as a sovereign nation to the European Union” (+5).

What is surprising, however, is how much of a threat European integration and Europe seems to pose to these individuals. For example, according to this group, not only does “European integration threatens the Welsh language” (+4), but “European integration threatens British culture” (+3). The European Union can be given no credit for helping to support the Welsh language, economically deprived communities of Wales or the respondent’s own community (Statements 18-20 = -3). While there is some recognition that “Sometimes the Welsh have more in common with the French and other Europeans than with the English” (+2) and only weak acceptance that “The people of Europe are very different from the British” (+2), it is a testament to the skepticism of these individuals that they are completely indifferent to two of the most general and banal endorsements of Europe: “Wherever you go in Europe you will find that people are just like you. They want a job and a good living for themselves and for their family” (0) and “To be European is to share in the inheritance of each of the European peoples, not to lose the heritage of ones own people” (0).

4) Anti-European integration; not Anti-Europe (Wales3; n = 18): While perhaps deserving a more clever name, these individuals seem to make clear that there is a distinction that can be made between the European Union and its project of European integration and Europe as
a territorial unit to which individuals (at some point, perhaps in the future) can have some attachment.

These individuals do share many of the concerns expressed by the Euroskeptics. For example, they believe that "the European Union is fine as a trading bloc, but it shouldn’t attempt to become a political union" (+1). They are also concerned that the standard operating procedure in the European Union is one in which they (the Europeans) tell us (the Brits) what to do: “The European Union’s ban on British beef is a prime example of how the EU works: They tell us what we are supposed to do without taking into account our needs and concerns” (+4).

While this type is certainly no fan of the European Union, they differ from the Euroskeptics in that they do not see the EU as a threat to everything. The primary threat that these individuals see from the European Union is in terms of a threat to British sovereignty: “The UK must be sure that it does not lose any of its independence and its power as a sovereign nation to the European Union” (+5).

What also differentiates this group from the Euroskeptics is that they are less skeptical than Euroskeptics. For example, while this group and the Euroskeptics have response patterns that are readily recognizable to anyone familiar with the standard British Euroskepticism, this type is consistently less antagonistic towards the European Union.

39. Britain should not join the single European currency because Britain would lose the pound, which is an important symbol of our nation (+4, +1).

41. Britain is wrong to stay out of the single European currency because the Euro would bring economic stability and greater economic growth to Britain (-4, -1).

42. Closer European integration will allow Britain to adopt the more caring social policies of the other European countries (-1, +1).

In fact--and certainly unlike the Euroskeptics who seem to pride themselves on disagreeing with just about every potential positive impact that the EU and European integration may have upon British society and politics--the Anti-EU/Not Anti-Europe Welsh can be pro-Europe and even pro-EU. This type of European attachment allows these individuals to admit that the European Union, despite the qualms that they may have about it in terms of the potential
loss of British sovereignty, does provide obvious financial benefits to deprived Welsh communities (+3) and even to the respondent’s own community (+2).

Perhaps the strongest indication that this group is willing to make a distinction between the negative implications for British sovereignty of European integration and the positive benefits that can be reaped from closer European ties is that this type has a response pattern that is statistically indistinguishable from the Europhile’s response pattern on 70% (30 of 43) of the statements. Most of the statements over which there is such agreement are those which deal with positive views about Europe, rather than those statements that specifically mention the European Union (especially those statements that deal with the sovereignty implications of European integration). For example, the Europhiles and the Anti-EU/Not Anti-Europe both share strong attitudes about the economic necessity of the European Union; a strong rejection of the claim that a meaningful European attachment is not possible because there is no common culture that can be claimed by all Europeans; a strong belief that increased contacts caused by European integration will go a long way in “creating” a meaningful European attachment in the future; and strong acceptance of the beliefs that the diversity of the European Union is not only good, but that it also allows Europeans to share in the customs and heritage of other European cultures without losing one’s own sense of heritage.

However, at the end of the day, these individuals, while recognizing a difference between European Union and European integration and Europe as a territorial unit, use their negative view of the European integration project to determine their level of pride and attachment to Europe. Perhaps this is because they see that, at the moment, European integration is the more prevalent component of a European attachment, but in the future, European attachment will have much more to do with Europe as a territorial unit. In terms of the present, these views are very clear. This group can be distinguished from the other three types in its strong rejection of the claims that the Welsh can be singled out (at least in comparison to their English neighbors) by their strong similarities to the other peoples of Europe:

27. Throughout history, Wales has always maintained closer ties to Europe than England has. Therefore, it is no surprise that the Welsh are more pro-European than the English” (-4).
28. Sometimes, the Welsh have more in common with the French and other Europeans than with the English (-3).

29. The Welsh tend to be more positive than the English to the idea of European integration (-4).

The future, however, is a different matter. This type also stands out in its acceptance (in a level of support similar to the Relative Europhiles) of the belief that a sense of Europeanness will be possible in the future:

22. In the future, all Europeans will feel European because, just as we were taught to be British in school, they will be taught to be European (+2).

23. As contacts among Europeans increase, we will begin to see that we have many things in common with each other. Eventually, we will begin to see ourselves as Europeans (+3).

These set of responses taken together project a rather nuanced view of how this last type views Europe. They are not nearly as skeptical as the Euroskeptics, nor are they as pro-European as the relative Europhiles. They certainly do not see European attachment as a means of distinguishing themselves from the English as the Instrumental Europeans do. Instead what seems to be happening is that this group can make a distinction between European integration and the European Union, of which they are generally skeptical, especially when it implies a threat to British sovereignty and Europe as a territorial unit, of which they do not see as a threat, yet at the moment they do not really see themselves as a meaningful part. In the future, however, this group seems to think that European attachment will be more than simply a function of support (or disdain) for the European Union’s policies. Instead, it will be a meaningful unit that gains acceptance through a two-pronged socialization process: people will be “taught” to be Europeans and people will become European through the increased contact that European integration will bring.
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