"Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical Capability-Expectations Gap"*

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“Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical Capability-Expectations Gap”

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This article identifies relevant explanatory concepts of European foreign policy (EFP) and organizes those concepts into a heuristically useful model that depicts the stimuli, processes, and effects of EFP decisionmaking. A cadre of scholars has worked on conceptualizing the European Union as an international actor, but explanations are still at the pretheoretical stage. Although theorists are developing new and reworking old explanatory concepts, these concepts are not linked in any meaningful way to an overall analytical model. The article begins on a sober note concerning the problems associated with conceptualizing European Union external identity but ends on a more sanguine one about the potential for progress not thought possible a short time ago. Scholars are developing explanatory concepts more balanced, rounded, nuanced, and nuanced than those of their predecessors, and they are moving beyond establishing the existence of EFP to assessing the outcomes of EFP. (1)

Gaps Between Capability and Expectations

The purpose of this article is to identify different theoretical concepts that explain EFP behavior (2) and to link those concepts to a model of EFP decisionmaking. This exercise is timely as scholars continue to lament the theoretical gap between the promise and delivery of their concepts to explain EFP behavior. They also observe a gap between the expectation of a collective foreign policy and the capability of common institutions to meet that expectation (Hill 1993, 1998), although the EU of the late 1990s has lowered its own expectations to meet more modest capabilities and has improved EFP decisionmaking procedures. This article demonstrates that the theoretical capability-expectations gap (CEG) has begun to narrow in the 1990s. Scholars are moving from establishing the existence of the European Union (EU) as an important international presence to testing the EU’s effectiveness as an important international actor, developing more sophisticated explanatory concepts that break free of the debate of an earlier generation over the appropriateness of realist and liberal approaches, and bridging different levels of analysis to achieve a more rounded understanding.

The Europeans have been trying to speak and act with one voice in international affairs since the enactments of the Rome Treaty (1958) and the Single European Act or SEA (1987) and the introduction of European Political Cooperation or EPC (1970). However, by trumpeting a new Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for the EU in the Maastricht Treaty (1993), the EU raised expectations for a collective diplomacy that exceeded the capabilities of its institutions, instruments, and resources. The gap

EFP seemed to have worked better before expectations were raised. Whether through the traditional economic diplomacy of the European Community (EC), intergovernmental cooperation of EPC, or a combination thereof, the pre-Maastricht EC produced a variety of foreign policy actions. (3) Although EPC and EC evolved as two sides of the same coin, EPC and EC activities were not well coordinated: neither was able to exploit a collective weight in international politics and security. Although an aim of Maastricht was to give the EU a new international coherence, consistency, and thus effectiveness by bringing EC and EPC foreign policy activities under a common rubric, old wounds were reopened between those members comfortable with a foreign policy culture based on political integration and those comfortable with one based on intergovernmentalism. The graduation from EPC to CFSP in the mid-1990s was painful and problematic, the distrust between the Commission and the new CFSP edifice was deep, and the democratic deficit so noted in internal EU decisionmaking was also present in EFP decisionmaking.

However, by the late 1990s, the CEG began to narrow as expectations were downsized and CFSP was viewed more properly in evolutionary than revolutionary terms. Since EFP is an evolving and hybrid historical process, the CEG is not unbridgeable. (Feldman: 1998) Indeed the EU continues to play an active role in international affairs regardless of decisionmaking method. The EU executed a number of significant actions after 1993, ranging from the Euro-Mediterranean and EU-Russian Partnerships to the New Transatlantic Agenda and Joint Action Plan; from leading the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Dayton Peace Accords to undertaking global diplomatic initiatives to gain support for the renewal of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and placing controls on antipersonnel land mines; and from facilitating negotiations for peace and stability pacts between Eastern European states with border and ethnic disputes to providing the Palestinian Authority with the world’s largest aid package to help establish conditions for a civil society.

There are healthy correctives to the gloom that pervades EFP in the aftermath of the Gulf and Balkan Wars. “The pendulum of events will swing and it will not be long before there is a renewed
emphasis on interdependence and on collective action...We should take the longer view and expect a
dialectic relationship between the actors and the system to endure.” (Hill, 1996:vi) Critics who equate
CFSP’s fragmentary nature with the “ineffectiveness and illegitimacy obscure its inherent limits, concrete
achievements, and growing international recognition.” (Feldman, 1998:3) The CEG is as old as EFP itself,
but it has begun to narrow as expectations are lowered, capabilities and instruments are improved with
added resources and new members, and habits of cooperation develop within the pillar structure.

The gap between the expectation and capability of EFP is mirrored in the gap between the
expectation and capability of theoretical concepts explaining EFP behavior. Theoretical work on EFP has
been meager compared to work on the internal aspects of integration. Some blame is apportioned to
functionalist theory, which was silent on the external environment just when the EC was forming in the
1950s. Neofunctionalists responded to the sounds of silence on the external dimension, but before their
hypotheses began to trickle into the published literature, they too lost their punch. Integration theory was
either subsumed by broader perspectives of global interdependence and international political economy,
squeezed into the safer and narrow confines of regime theory, or left to mould on the university library
bookshelves for a future generation to rediscover.

By the 1970s, internal integration began to stall. Theorists lost interest in an intergovernmental
Europe. Yet interest in external relations, then in a growth mode, and EPC’s debut at the 1973-75 Helsinki
security and cooperation negotiations triggered a wave of new descriptive works. (4) By the 1980s, passage
of the SEA and the impact of the end of the Cold War on the EC stimulated the first wave of conceptual
interest in EFP (5) and passage of the Maastricht Treaty stimulated a second wave of conceptual works.

(6)

Literature to date yields ambiguous results. Scholars concur that the EU has an international
“presence” (it is visible in regional and global fora) and that it exhibits some elements of “actorness” (it is
an international actor in some areas but not in others). Yet there is much less consensus over how to
measure the inputs, outputs, formulation, execution, causes, effects, progression and regression of EFP.
Despite the renewal of theoretical interest, scholars have remained generally dissatisfied with the state of
the art. Theorists struggle with defining and categorizing EFP behavior. The EU is neither a state nor a
nonstate actor, and neither a conventional international organization nor an international regime. Agreement eludes scholars over which concepts imported from international and comparative politics are germane, which methods of inquiry, evaluative criteria, and levels of analysis are most appropriate, and whether EFP analysis ought to be placed within the context of the study of comparative foreign policy where the emphasis is on single states.

Differences over approaches remind the author of a colleague's witticism: "what you see may well depend on where you sit, but which seats give the best view in the house?" (Hill, 1978:8) Theorists have been trapped for years in a tedious and static debate from which some are beginning to disentangle, i.e., the debate over whether to approach EFP analysis either from liberal or realist perspectives as if only one had a monopoly of insights. Both theories have something to offer. Clearly the problems of theorizing EFP mirror much wider ones in international relations theory.

A Model of European Foreign Policy Decisionmaking

The field of inquiry continues to be at the pretheoretical stage. Theorists are developing new and reworking old explanatory concepts not yet linked in any meaningful way to a larger or even middle range theory of EFP. Yet the old divide between liberalism and realism and their offshoots—neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism—is being bridged by a variety of reformulated concepts that yield much more rounded, finessed, and interesting explanations of EFP. There has been an incremental building of conceptual knowledge. Early neofunctional concepts of EFP were either refuted or ignored, only to be resuscitated and revised at a later date. Similarly, realist notions of the omnipotence of the state as the only driving force of integration have been revised to take into account the impacts of domestic and international politics on national decisionmakers as well as the effect of membership in a community of values and norms. Many of the newer concepts identified in this article enable theorists to examine the impact of EFP on other actors without reference to the cramping debate of an earlier generation.

Chart 1 places EFP decisionmaking within an agent-structure model (Wendt, 1987) that is also inspired by David Easton's classic work on governmental decisionmaking. This model is a useful heuristic tool in—and thus an agenda of research for—categorizing and testing the utility of various explanatory
concepts along the decisionmaking continuum. It depicts the incremental building of conceptual knowledge by EFP theorists and reveals the strengths and weaknesses associated with defining, describing, explaining, and predicting EFP behavior. The agent-structure model is also useful analytically. It focuses attention on the two-way relationship between opportunities provided for by EFP structures and the extent to which the EU has agency—or the willingness of national and EU actors to make use of and shape EFP structures.

National and regional actors influence and are influenced by (a) the European context of norms rooted in interstate reconciliation (Feldman: 1998), a security community (Deutsch: 1957), a democratic (or stable) peace (Russett: 1993), and shared identities (Wendt: 1994; Waever: 1996; Laffan: 1996; Herrberg: 1998) linked to the legitimacy and interests of the EU; and (b) the context of rules and norms (Raymond: 1997) rooted in international society (Jorgensen: 1997); and (c) systemic change rooted in international politics. (Ginsberg: 1989). Decisionmaking inputs are triggered by national and subnational actors and European institutions responding to external and internal stimuli and inspired by indigenous European values and interests and by a politics of scale.

Knowledge of decisionmaking inside the “black box”—what Hill (1988) refers to as the “external relations system” or what Jorgensen (1997) calls “European diplomacy”—requires an understanding of the interplay between national actors (as influenced by subnational, regional, and international stimuli) and European actors and “Europeanized” institutional norms and practices. Concepts that help to explain how central institutions and actors convert inputs into outputs include consociationalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, and two-tier bargaining. Whereas EFP outputs are a measurable empirical matter and are documented in numerous case studies—policy actions, enlargement, diplomatic recognition, sanctions, and summits—the impact of outputs on the outside world will determine the effectiveness for the EU of taking common foreign policy actions. Here the notions of actorness and presence are most helpful and promising for future research.

International Context

The EU, like single state actors, is influenced by the shifting currents of international politics and outside demands for the EU to act internationally whether or not it is ready or capable. Foreign crises—
embargoes, wars, human suffering—impact heavily on the EU and help explain responses. It cannot, nor does it want to, hide from the world. Explanations of EFP require an appreciation of how the outside world causes the EU to respond to such stimuli. (Rummel: 1990)

The currents of global politics influence the EU to respond with actions rooted not in the internal market but in the international system. Clearly the impact of cold war bipolarity affected the EC’s ability to conduct an independent EFP and the impact of the oil cartel actions of the 1970s ultimately forced the EC states to reckon with the Arab world. The EC in the multipolar world had more opportunity to wiggle free from previous systemic constraints to establish lasting influence in former colonies. The development of global interdependence created opportunities for a larger role in international affairs by “giant middle powers” with civilian means at their disposal (Ifestos:1987) and forced the EC to develop mechanisms to manage and respond to new external influences. The development of complex interdependence (Keohane and Nye:1987) placed the EU and other like-minded states into new patterns of cooperation not accounted for by power politics. (Featherstone and Ginsberg:1996) Indeed, the impact of foreign competition on a stagnate EC economy was the most important catalyst to the SEA and its 1992 project, as was the pressure of globalization for the Maastricht Treaty and its goal of European Monetary Union (EMU). The end of the Cold War catapulted the EC into a European Union with enormous responsibilities for supporting and stabilizing the democratic transitions of Eastern Europe.

European Context

Feldman (1998) applies the concepts of interstate reconciliation and stable peace to EFP analysis. These concepts have hitherto been focused on EU internal decisionmaking dynamics. In the face of scholarship critical of notions of common European identity, Feldman holds that peace and reconciliation are still relevant within the EU and are values that inform EFP behavior. The legacy of reconciliation “makes possible external relations in the first place. CFSP represents a common effort grounded in the shared experiences of postwar reconciliation.” (Feldman, 1998:2)

More work needs to be done to explore the relationship between a shared sense of European identity and its impact on EFP decisionmaking and there is ample scope for the application of constructivist approaches in the international relations literature to EFP. Hill is of two minds. The EU rests on a relatively
weak sense of shared history and identity because of the diverse historical experiences of its members, the EU’s lack of influence over education, and the EU’s inability to create and manipulate stated goals which national governments themselves use to strengthen communal identities. The forging of identity and values takes time. Yet Hill urges caution in turning away from notions of common identity and values. Indeed participation in CFSP itself helps foster a sense of shared identity. “EPC stimulates a consciousness of and a debate about what Europe ought to be doing in the world...Where EPC is weak in leverage, it is strong on values...and European diplomacy has steadily become associated in the public mind with a distinct set of principles.” (Hill, 1996:9). Those principles are democracy, soft-edged capitalism, a zone of peace among members, and diplomatic mediation between third parties to undercut the causes of major conflict.

The European context of foreign policy cooperation is also shaped by the acquis communautaire and the acquis politique. Thus no matter what the future holds for the EU’s capacity to act internationally, members are bound to a repertoire of fixed foreign policy positions, there is a floor beneath which the EU as an international actor is not likely to fall and a springboard from which the EU may expand activity, and new members are required to accept the acquis in total.

Inputs

Examination of decisionmaking inputs focuses on the sources of EFP activity. Some of the most important sources of EFP activity that are examined in this section include external stimuli, the logic of collective action, national actors, and indigenous European interests.

External Stimuli

Schmitter was intrigued by the impact of external stimuli on the development of EC foreign relations and tried to inject into neofunctional thought the international dimension that had been missing in its earlier incarnation. Externalization (Schmitter: 1969; Haas and Rowe: 1974; Ginsberg: 1989) explains why nonmembers press the EC to act as a unit; what effect this outside charge has on the EC; and the outcomes of EC actions that are executed in response to outside pressure. The EC responds to outside pressures related to the impact of the internal market and its policies by expanding membership to applicants; offering association and preferential trade accords, development assistance, partnerships, and dialogues with other regional blocs; or opposing external demands that it cannot accommodate.
Despite the explanatory power and parsimony of the concept, externalization has attracted minimal attention. The realists who acknowledge the EU's existence tend to focus only on CFSP, which jibes with their view of the state, and ignore the EC pillar of EFP which is the source of the EU's legitimacy in international trade, diplomacy, and humanitarian affairs. Realists are quick to conclude that the neofunctionalists assume an eventual absolute transfer of sovereignty from the state to the union in foreign and security policy. In truth, Haas and Schmitter foresaw not a single center with overarching authority but a center that included national governments and EC institutions sharing authority, with majority voting as an essential component. (Soetendorp, 1994:118) Critics of the foreign policy aspects of neofunctionalism maintain that the revival of neofunctionalism is "theoretical archaeology" (Jorgensen:1993) and that neofunctionalism does not provide answers to such questions as why, when, and to what extent EFP will develop. (Pijpers:1991) Others argue that persistence of intergovernmentalism in EFP was not predicted by the neofunctionalists (Stoetendorp:1994) and lament that neofunctionalism failed to provide theories of interstate bargaining or of political choice (Caporaso and Keeler:1995).

Externalization and other neofunctional concepts do not explain interstate negotiations that affect how the EU will respond to external stimuli. This is largely because the external stimuli such concepts explain are rooted in the existence of the internal market, where decisionmaking rules are more flexible, rather than in CFSP, where states retain control. Although CFSP has grown in function and scope of activity, has interacted with the EC in ways not previously thought possible, and has become an EU institution itself, it is best explained in conjunction with other concepts.

Politics of Scale

Politics of scale (Ginsberg:1989) refers to the benefits of collective over unilateral EFP action in that members may conduct joint foreign policy actions at lower costs and risks than when they act on their own. Members perceive that they carry more weight in certain areas when they act together as a bloc than when they act separately. Politics of scale is neutral in the neofunctional-intergovernmental debate as it is relevant to all EFP pillars. Collective diplomacy has enabled the EU to pull more weight at international negotiations, conferences, and organizations. Indeed it was at the East-West CSCE negotiations at Helsinki
in the mid-1970s that the world woke up to a unified EC/EPC presence, which had an enormous impact on outcomes.

When the EU speaks with one voice internationally, it has far more resonance than when fifteen separate members speak. When the EU acts as a unit in international politics, it carries the combined weight of 370 million Europeans and the world's richest and most powerful economic and political bloc. It has an enormous impact on the interests and fates of many states with close ties to Europe. The incentives of employing the collective weight to pursue national and European global interests for many of the EU member states are likely to endure even if the EU never more fully develops its actor capacity in or presence on the world scene. Indeed Gordon (1996:5) argues that a criterion for foreign policy integration is whether the potential gains from joint action through "increased scale" are greater than the costs of lost sovereignty. Jorgensen, however, expresses no surprise over a politics of scale at work in EFP because "coalitions and alliances are created with this purpose in mind, so why not expect this to apply to the CFSP?" (Jorgensen, 1997:5)

National Actors

Hill and collaborators (1996) examine CFSP from the perspective not of external stimulus, but of the interplay between national foreign policies and collective diplomacy. They hold that the dialectic between the nation-state and the EU institutions collectively is continually being played out. Governments use CFSP to pursue national interests. For Germany, CFSP is a useful mechanism to assert German foreign policy interests in a convenient multilateral setting so as to avoid impressions of unilateral assertiveness. Schmidt's *ostpolitik* became EPC and EC's *ostpolitik*. Because of Germany's close relations with Israel, it can take a more pro-Arab League stance only through EPC. For France and other members, CFSP is one of the chief means of bridling German power. (Pijpers, 1988:25) For Britain, CFSP is a means to reassert British foreign policy interests after the decline of its empire. For the smaller states, CFSP is perhaps the most important outlet for pursuing their foreign policy interests. What the Hill study does for theory is to provide empirical case studies that document the salience of EPC/CFSP for national foreign ministries and the growing presence of the EU in world affairs on behalf of national and European interests.

European Interests
When the EU initiates policy actions based not on external stimuli but on its own internal dynamic, interests, and instincts, a European interests or "self-styled" logic is at work. (Ginsberg: 1989) Certain EFP actions reflect a unique European brand of diplomacy and foreign policy molded by an internal dynamic of cooperation among members and common institutions. Although Allen (1998) questions the existence of EFP interests, a convincing number of EFP actions reflect an indigenous and unique European quality: e.g., special partnerships with regional blocs or single states; support for regional integration movements; pursuit of human rights as preconditions for association accords; aid to support conditions for the creation of civil society in formerly war-torn lands; and strategies that precondition EU aid to harmonization of laws and markets ahead of accession for applicant states.

External Relations System

EFP as a system of external relations is a collective enterprise through which national actors conduct partly common, and partly separate, international actions. (Hill, 1993) An external relations system offers a useful and neutral characterization of EFP as it breaks free of normative debates over whether or not the EU can have a foreign policy and over whether neofunctionalism or intergovernmentalism is the most appropriate framework for analysis. Indeed the EU is now moving beyond having a modest external relations system to having a more ambitious "foreign policy system" as the acquis communautaire/acquis politique expand and the functioning of the interpillar decisionmaking process improves.

The external relations system depicted in Chart 1 incorporates all three EU decisionmaking pillars, including pillar three, given the growing links between foreign policy and antiterrorism/anticrime. Whereas other approaches tend to lend more weight to the EC or CFSP pillars or instead stress national foreign policies, the notion of an external relations system does justice to "parallel sets of activity which are increasingly intermeshed and easy to confuse but still essentially distinct." (Hill, 1993:322) As Jorgensen's concept of "modern European diplomacy," a variant of the external relations system, refers to the interplay between national and European, EC and CFSP, and EU and WEU levels of decisionmaking, Chart 1 depicts the relationship between pillar two and NATO/WEU.

Although there is no evidence to suggest a fusion of the pillars into a single EFP, Hill suggests that an effective EU global presence would involve collective policies covering all pillars in the external
relations system. There are elements of a collective approach across the pillars, but the degree and extent of states' commitments to cooperation vary considerably. (Hill, 1993: 324) Indeed the inability of the pillar system to meet expectations is a function of the clash of foreign policy cultures represented by EC and EPC traditions.

Consciationalism

Consciationalism refers to a political system dominated by elites who make decisions based on consensus. A form of consensus politics, consciationalism provides for strict rules of representation in government to protect the interests of all groups. (Slater, 1994: 156) Units with cleavages such as language and ethnicity can develop joint and consensual decisionmaking strategies, which can be achieved by establishing coalitions of representatives of each. (Puchala, 1981: 238) Since all interests are accommodated before final decisions are made, outcomes often represent the lowest common denominator. The concept was first developed to describe and explain how a number of small, highly diverse, and fragmented European states managed to maintain governmental stability.

Some scholars have suggested the features of consciationalism have been present since EPC was operated by elites on the basis of consensus, helped to balance cultural diversity, and produced outputs that often represented the lowest common denominator. Weiler and Wessels (1988:243) use the consciational model to explain EPC's relative stability in the face of increased centrifugal forces, equating this stability with the consciational mechanism operating in some of the divided members.

Although consciationalism as an explanation of the inner workings of the external relations system warrants further research, scholars have not pursued it vigorously. Hill (1988: 217) concedes some usefulness in applying the model to EFP but expresses discomfort with the notion of a small group of elites—-not democratically accountable— operating in secret. Slater (1994) argues that consciationalism has not survived intact to the present. Changing political values, increasing cultural and political consciousness, higher education about what governments can do, and greater complexities of government have brought mass publics into a new relationship with the political establishment. New and rival political elites have emerged. Others argue that consciationalism explains only one aspect of EFP—-institutions and political stability. Pijpers argues that cooperation among EFP only concerns areas of international relations that do
not divide the EU and that the EU cannot be a suitable testing ground for the consociational model because it is neither a state with deep cleavage nor a defense actor. (Pijpers, 1991:16) Some scholars do not embrace consociationalism as a relevant explanation of EFP decisionmaking, yet the concept has an enduring appeal to others and requires further testing for salience.

**Intergovernmentalism**

Cousins of realists, intergovernmentalists place national governments—guardians of state power, interests, preferences, and sovereignty—at the center of EU decisionmaking. Intergovernmentalism has two variants: realist and liberal. Some realists virtually ignore the EU as an international player because it is not a state. Neorealist intergovernmentalists acknowledge the EU’s existence but only as a forum in which governments meet periodically to negotiate new compacts that enhance their interests and power. Pijpers (1991:31) argued that EFP is “not a new phenomenon...but an updated version of old-style alliance diplomacy...It is difficult to discover original aspects of EU approaches to world politics. An idealized EU should be avoided and (CFSP) should be put into the framework of realpolitik."

Since neorealist intergovernmentalism is based on the notion of state rationality and treats states as independent actors with fixed preferences for wealth, security, and power, all state actions are purposely directed toward achieving institutionally ordered objectives. Miles (1995:179) concludes that the EU merely represents an advanced forum for negotiations at intergovernmental conferences (IGCs). However, since the EU is more than a forum for periodic interstate bargains, a realist intergovernmentalist perspective has its limits. It assumes national decisionmakers are unitary. It ignores the role of supranational institutions in crafting and facilitating compromises and in overseeing and managing daily EFP processes. The neorealist variant also ignores why, how, and when national interests converge and to what extent they are shaped by domestic and international politics and the ethos of community membership.

Liberal intergovernmentalism also affirms that the principal source of integration lies in the states themselves, although it acknowledges the role of supranational bodies in greasing the axles of cooperation, cementing existing interstate bargains, maintaining the integration process between IGCs, and providing the foundation for renewed integration. Neoliberal intergovernmentalists also downplay the impact of
international politics and systemic change on interstate bargaining. For them, the EU has always evolved as a result of its members’ interstate bargains. Each government looks to the EU through the lens of its own policy preferences. (Moravcsik: 1993) The EU will only adopt a true CFSP when a consensus exists among the EU states that CFSP is in their interests. (Gordon, 1996:12)

Liberal intergovernmentalism also has its critics. (Smith and Ray:1993; Long:1997; Smith:1998) The existence of interstate bargains is one important explanation of EFP decisionmaking. However, the focus on bargains overestimates the role of national actors as unitary decisionmakers and underestimates the impact on national decisionmakers of a shared history of war, the habits and continuity of EU institutional cooperation, external stimuli, domestic politics, and domestic public opinion. Since the liberal variant of intergovernmentalism is more receptive to the impact of institutional norms and values, it has more resonance for theorists than the realist variant. Extensive interest in both neofunctional and liberal intergovernmental explanations exists. A rounded understanding of EFP requires a coupling of the two sets of explanations without losing parsimony. Two-tier bargaining, introduced below, is an example of how EFP may be approached by bridging domestic and international levels of analysis which intergovernmentalists fail to do.

Two-Tier Bargaining

Bulmer applies the notion of a two-tier bargaining game to EFP. Two-tier analysis focuses on the domestic context of international negotiations and on how national decisionmakers appear at the intersection of domestic and international game boards. It is not enough, Bulmer warns, to focus on interstate bargains made by national decisionmakers without grasping the domestic and international constraints under which they operate and with which they fashion policy positions. Two-tier analysis, viewed by some as an alternative to neofunctional and liberal intergovernmental explanations of EU decisionmaking, helps explain the distribution of power and decisionmaking between two tiers of governance: the lower or national tier within which domestic interest groups and political parties seek to influence the making of national “EU” policy and national decisionmakers, who sit at the confluence of domestic and EU currents; and the upper or EU tier where collective decisions based on interstate negotiations are made. (Bulmer:1991)
Bulmer maintains that the nation-state is the EU's basic unit; that the policymaking process follows the logic of domestic politics; and that national governments hold key positions at the juncture of national and EU policies. National governments are often "prisoners of domestic politics" and international circumstances. Each state has a different set of conditions that shape interests and policy content. EU policy represents one facet of national activities. (Bulmer:1991) The pattern of negotiations on EU issues at the domestic level of the members determines progress on individual policy issues and on integration in general. The EU is not, according to Bulmer (1991:151), an autonomous political system. National governments have sought to retain their formal power through EU Council.

Two-tier analysis enables us to conceptualize EFP as part of a political system (Jorgensen, 1993:226) with inputs from national actors and their preferences (in conjunction with domestic politics) and from external sources; and with outputs or foreign policy actions and positions. It seeks to understand why national governments adopt joint foreign policy positions. Bulmer sees the EC and CFSP as the same tier, representing the attempts of member governments to solve some problems they cannot solve separately. When CFSP and the member states are placed in a two-tier context, a two-tier bargaining approach may be used to understand how decisions are made. (Bulmer, 1991:89)

Two-tier analysis has its critics. Smith (1996, 1998), for example, argues that at a superficial level everything points to dominance by governments to the exclusion of EU actors and procedures in CFSP. Yet the focus on interstate bargains ought not to be at the expense of the impact of institutional structures, historical context, and the cumulative impact of deliberations on policymaking. Smith maintains that domestic actors rarely have the opportunity or desire to ratify EPC/CFSP agreements. Since national decisionmakers control the EFP agenda and deliberations remain secret, there is little public knowledge or interest: domestic actors have little involvement in the highly specialized work of diplomats. EFP has not been "used as a forum for making side payments, threatening sanctions against each other, or linking issues into package deals that occurred in other EC policy sectors or during IGCs." (Smith, 1996:9) Governments are not able to monopolize EPC/CFSP to the extent suggested by two-tier game analysis. EFP administrative structures develop in a way to limit the abilities of heads of governments to dominate everyday EFP decisionmaking. EFP outcomes are based less on ad hoc policy discussions than on
socializing of lower level administrative officials in the member governments and their permanent representations to the EU in Brussels. By empowering and involving domestic bureaucrats in the EFP process, EPC/CFSP helps create loyalties among national foreign policymakers.

**Europeanization**

Europeanization refers to the process by which EPC (and later CFSP) moved closer to EC norms, policies, and habits without itself becoming supranationalized. (Smith:1996, 1998). Smith posits that EPC developed as a peculiar European institution among national diplomats by reinforcing norms of behavior largely established through trial and error and by permitting and legitimizing the involvement of EC actors and processes. Informal EPC norms and EC procedures changed EPC from its original design as a forum for sharing information among governments to a more institutionalized, collective, binding, and community-sensitive system. EPC was a system of policy improvisation driven more by group-constructed norms than by power or vague notions of interests, according to Smith. As EPC habits and procedures of political cooperation became institutionalized into a corporate body of European values and norms, they eventually caused member states to change their attitudes and preferences despite the absence of enforcement mechanisms. EPC was institutionalized in such a way as to promote the creation of common interests and eventually the establishment of a common identity in world politics. EPC changed the ways individual states determined and pursued their interests. An increasingly binding set of behavioral standards emerged from a small set of informal guidelines, and states generally considered the opinions of their partners before forming their own. Members’ foreign policies became more transparent and somewhat more predictable to one another, while compliance with positions became more common despite the absence of sanctioning mechanisms.

Institutions such as the EU are viewed by intergovernmentalists as mechanisms to lower transaction costs for interstate bargains. However, this view of institutions is too narrow to understand EPC, according to Smith. Although the EC has developed in part because of the pressures of interest groups, businesses, and a European technocratic elite, these influences played no significant role in EPC’s institutional development. Domestic politics, public opinion, and national elections only have occasionally
intruded on EPC. EPC outcomes have rarely if ever involved bargaining, side payments, issue linkages, or any other mechanisms associated with the mere reduction of transaction costs.

Smith shows how the process of Europeanization allowed EPC to gradually become a part of the EC environment even though deliberations have been conducted as a separate, intergovernmental extra-legal system. It occupied a variable position between the ideal types of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. His work in this area deserves more attention by theorists as they begin to examine more carefully the decisionmaking processes within the “external relations system.” The concept of Europeanization is a healthy corrective to overemphasis on interstate bargaining and opens the door to new, more nuanced theoretical insights into EFP.

**Outputs**

Without outputs there can be no external relations system. Without outputs that are effective in meeting their objectives and influencing international outcomes, the EU would lose internal confidence and outward influence as an international actor. Expectations could fall lower than EU capabilities, a remarkable defeat for the EU given its potential to contribute more widely to international affairs. Examination of outputs, then, is critical to generate the feedback necessary for the initiation of new and improved inputs and for decisionmaking reforms within the external relations system. This article has already listed numerous EFP outputs and depicted examples of them in Chart 1. Given space constraints, this section focuses on two types of outputs—civilian foreign policy actions and decisions regarding EU expansion to include new members.

**Civilian Power Actions**

Duchene (1972; 1973) introduced the concept of civilian power to designate the EC’s unique world role. He envisaged the EU as a model of reconciliation and peace for other regions in the world. Although Duchene expected the EC members to maintain their defensive postures, he maintained that the EC could become the first major area of the old world where war could be transformed. (Hill, 1990:41) Twitchett (1976:8) defined civilian power as an actor that has no military dimension but is able to influence other international actors through diplomatic, economic, and legal means. Indeed all EFP outputs are civilian actions, and although a few are security-related.
Civilian power is discounted by the realists. Even Duchene noted that it was soggy with good intentions. Bull argued that “any idea of the (EC) nations constituting a security-community or area of peace was wishful thinking if it meant that war between them could not happen again, and not simply that it has not happened in recent decades.” (Bull, 1983:163) Hill has argued the need for theorists to rehabilitate the civilian power concept: it “comes closest...to rendering the truth about the EC (as an international actor). Clearly the concept is inadequate...in its strong element of wish-fulfillment, in the assumptions it makes about the changing nature of influence in international relations...Yet it is worth attempting to rehabilitate. It allows that (EFP) is essentially sui generis, an unprecedented development in world history which must not be cramped by forcing it into inappropriate conceptual models derived from the study of states.” (Hill, 1990:54)

Allen and Smith (1990; 1998) suggest that the notion of civilian power is an attempt to give some focus to the uncertainty about the credentials of the EU as an international actor. Civilian power, like other concepts that attempt to describe the EU’s global presence, relies on assumptions about the international context within which the EU is located. The EU as a civilian power could be viewed in positive terms but also in negatives ones as a rationalization of military impotence. (Allen and Smith:1990, 1998). Others maintain that what makes the EU’s impact on world politics so unique is the fact that the EU is not a military superpower. (Smith:1998; Feldman:1997; and Long:1997).

Enlargement

Enlargement—a case in externalization—is the EU’s most significant and far-reaching foreign policy action. It has broad implications for EFP and the role of the EU in the world. Since the EU decides which applicant states join—and under which conditions—and which do not, it has enormous influence over the fates of nations. (Ginsberg:1997b)

As introduced earlier, externalization explains how and why the membership expands, how enlargement itself triggers more foreign policy activity, and how enlargement influences EFP activity. The EU is a magnet for surrounding states, many of whom have determined that the benefits of membership are preferable to the costs of nonmembership. Feldman (1998) maintains that enlargement represents an effort to extend the postwar legacy of reconciliation: it promotes the legitimacy of the EU in the eyes of the
accession states and in the international community as a whole and it has the potential to garner widespread public support. Each enlargement alters the EU relationship with the outside world as the EU changes size, geography, composition, scope, and direction. (Ginsberg:1997b) As the EU grows larger and more diverse, decisionmaking becomes more complicated and common positions are harder to reach. Yet enlargement has made the EU an economic, financial, and monetary superpower and has generally strengthened the EU’s international presence. New members adjust to and mold the acquis. Enlargement strengthens EU institutions because decisionmaking becomes “virtually impossible” under rules of unanimity. (Keohane and Hoffmann:1994) Widening the EU to include applicants from southern and eastern Europe is sustaining the effort to reform EU decisionmaking and institutions, especially in CFSP. Indeed, deepening while widening has been the norm in the EU. Enlargement has been a catalyst for either the creation of new or the reform of existing foreign policymaking procedures, mechanisms, meetings, and institutions as the EU is forced to adjust to the impact that its larger size and more diverse membership have on its foreign relationships. (Ginsberg:1997b) (8)

Feedback

The previous sections identified the existence of the EU as an international actor by identifying the inputs and outputs of the decisionmaking process and by focusing on the external relations system itself for clues that explain how inputs are generated into outputs. Only recently have scholars shifted their attention to the impact of EFP actions on the outside world. (Holland:1997; Regelsberger:1997; Rhodes:1998) Two concepts help explain how the EU may be viewed by the outside world: Sjostedt’s “actorness” and Allen and Smith’s “presence.” Such concepts shed light on the need by EFP scholars and practitioners to evaluate the outcomes of the external relations system.

Actorness and Presence

Sjostedt (1977) introduced—and Taylor (1982), Hill (1993), and Caporaso and Jupille (1998) revisited—the notion of the EU as an international actor and the qualities of, and prerequisites for, international actorness.” The concept of actorness steers away from the neofunctional-intergovernmental debate and from the debate over whether the EC is a superpower, but does enable us to chart the changing EU role in the world. (Hill:1993) Caporaso and Jupille (1998) propose and apply four criteria for
evaluating EU actor capacity in international environmental affairs. They suggest that for actor capacity, and thus for purposes of evaluating EC actorness, the EU needs recognition (outsiders’ acceptance of EU competence); authority (the legal competence to act); autonomy (distinctiveness and independence from other actors); and cohesion (the extent to which it acts in a unitary way externally). Caporaso and Jupille show that at the Rio Earth Summit, the EU received recognition but its effectiveness was stymied by the ability of members to resist EU efforts to agree to and implement international environmental agreements. When legal authority was not firmly established or where voting rules allowed dissenters the right of veto, EU capacity to act collectively was frustrated. The difficulty in achieving autonomy from the members at Rio was more a of the lack of common values than of the limits of common institutions.

Rhodes (1998) warns that if the member states refuse to allow the EU to take responsibility for key external relations and policies, the EU’s capacity to act will be severely constrained and its international role diminished. Heerberg, though, in her study of EU negotiations with Russia for a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement shows that “where the historical imperative is strong and when member states agree, the EU [Commission] can be a highly influential actor.” (Heerberg, 1998:102)

Hill (1996) argues that true actorness requires not only a clear identity and a self-contained decisionmaking system but also the practical capabilities to have effective policies. Although the EU falls short of anyone’s criteria for effective international actorness, member states have established a collective presence in international relations. Allen and Smith (1990) introduce the notion of presence to explain the growing international salience of the EU and to avoid the pitfalls of defining the international activity of an actor that is not a state. They argue that the EU’s presence in the international scene is significant. Although it possesses relatively few of the credentials of a unified actor, it has considerable structure, salience, and legitimacy in processes of international politics. (Allen and Smith:1990) The EU is viewed as having the most tangible presence in the economic sphere. In international politics, the EU is viewed as a shaper or filter, molding perceptions of policymakers and others, shaping collective actions and filtering out certain options, whereas in the military sphere the EU does not have a tangible presence.

Allen and Smith go on to ask, how does the EU make its presence felt? To what extent can it move from presence to purpose? Such a move would require institutional capacities to translate a required
political will into action; to generate and coordinate decisions; and to mobilize resources to pay for actions. (Allen and Smith:1998) To pave the way for future thinking and research, Allen and Smith outline three difficult but necessary questions: to what extent can the EU meet the external demand for its international presence; how far can the EU, limited by not being a state, make its presence felt; and can the EU form the collective will which is a prerequisite for taking responsibility?

Various students have applauded the notion of presence. The concept contributes to a "critical and nuanced analysis of [the EU's] presence in contemporary international politics and avoids both state-centric approaches and traditional concepts of power." (Jorgensen, 1994:221) The notion of presence "gets us off the hook of analyzing [CFSP] in terms of sovereignty and supranationalism, which might lead us to suppose that there was in fact no EFP when common sense and the experience of other states tell us precisely the opposite." (Hill, 1993:309) Presence emphasizes outside perceptions of the EU and the significant effects it has on both the psychological and operational environments of third parties. (Hill: 1993) Although presence is felt many different ways through the wide range of EFP actions previously cited in this article, most scholars maintain that EU presence, while real, is incoherent.

**Narrowing the Theoretical Capability-Expectations Gap and Bridging the Realist-Liberal Divide**

The CEG that exists in practice has spurred scholars in recent years to recognize a gap between their explanations and predictions and EFP outcomes. Scholars over the past decade have begun to move from establishing the EU's existence as an important international phenomenon to evaluating its effectiveness. Before the CEG can be narrowed, it has to be understood. To be understood, CFSP has to be measured. (Hill, 1988:215) For CFSP to be measured, criteria need to be agreed to evaluate CFSP outputs. Hill would consider the relative weights of domestic and external pressure affecting CFSP; the interrelationship between EC and CFSP activities; and changes in procedures and behavior initiated by treaty revisions. He would also ask whether the international system helps or hinders CFSP, the EU integrates economic and political considerations while ruling out military force, the EU can be a model of cooperation for other groups, and a balance can be reached between the objectives of common regional interests and those of international society. (Hill:1988, 215)
Gordon urges analysts to measure the extent to which CFSP contributes to common views; promotes or compels jointly implemented policy even when a single common view does not exist; acts as a binding institutional mechanism; deals with all questions related to EU security; and deals with immediate crises as opposed to pursuit of long-term goals. (Gordon, 1996:8) Although analysis of CFSP based on Gordon’s criteria will ideally follow in the future, he remains skeptical that the EU will be able to meet its CFSP objectives given that CFSP requires a pooling of sovereignty in areas that cut very deeply into statehood. Gordon (1996:6) sets out the conditions under which EU members would be willing to pool sovereignty: when perceived gains outweigh costs of common action; when government preferences and perceived national interests have converged sufficiently; and when particular interests of large states remain protected through the application of strict limits or conditions to the terms of integration. Gordon maintains that his conditions have held in areas such as the internal market, EMU, the Schengen Accord, and commercial policy but not in CFSP.

Whether by offering a line of research questions, a set of evaluative criteria, or conditions for pooling sovereignty, theorists have begun to shift the focus of their attention from identifying the EU as an international presence to evaluating the effectiveness of EFP actions. The effectiveness of EFP will determine the EU’s resiliency not just as an international presence but as an international actor.

In some of the member countries, the debate over the EU’s future is cast in terms of the oversimplified extremes of supranationalism or nationalism when in truth the EU is neither a supranational nor an intergovernmental body but one that combines elements of both. The EU and EFP have always drawn on both the legitimacy and power of the member states and the collective assets and interests of the common institutions in which governments sit. This article has shown that students of EFP are beginning to bridge the old divide between grand single explanations of European integration rooted in liberal (neofunctional, supranational) and realist (intergovernmental) theories by revising and applying older concepts (externalization, civilian power); coupling concepts (Europeanization and liberal intergovernmentalism); bridging domestic and international levels of analysis (two-tier bargaining); developing new concepts that offer alternative insights into what makes EFP “European” (European interests); developing new or reworking older concepts that facilitate investigation into what kind of actor
the EU is and how it is to be evaluated (presence and actorness); and placing EFP in the global environment (international systemic change).

The art of synthesis is difficult: "different theoretical parts are considered compatible and theoretical wholes are constructed from the parts. If, however, the recipe consists of a little neofunctionalism, some realism, and 500 grams of public choice theory, problems lie ahead." (Jørgensen, 1993:213) Jørgensen (1997:4) maintains that to answer the question—what is the impact of national foreign policies on CFSP?—we need both deductive and inductive approaches. Naturally a balance must be struck between a theoretical a la carte approach and an overly general theory. This article has shown that a general theory of EFP cannot be deduced given the historical uniqueness and infinite complexity of EFP. An inductive exercise is preferred. It allows for an incremental building of conceptual knowledge which must precede a full blown analytical-conceptual approach. In the future, a middle range theory or middle range theories of EFP may be induced from what we know of explanatory concepts.

Conclusions

This essay began on a downbeat note about the theoretical state of the art but ends on a more upbeat one. The extent to which theoretical concepts have failed us depends on one's expectations. If a theory of EFP is expected, there will be disappointment. If one views EFP solely through the lenses of a neofunctionalist or realist intergovernmentalist, little will be learned. Given how multidimensional EFP is, it may never lend itself to a general theory. If, however, a pretheoretical perspective is taken, then the field of inquiry looks quite different: there is incremental learning. Selective new and redefined concepts together offer rich explanations of the inputs and outputs and decisionmaking processes of EFP. Efforts to develop conditions for formulating and executing CFSP actions and criteria to evaluate outputs promise to help narrow understanding of the CEG. Although the linking of explanatory concepts into a meaningful analytical framework with a significant following is not yet in evidence, the field has the potential to move in that direction. This article has shown that explanatory concepts, when categorized into various points along an input-output decisionmaking continuum, resonate more fully than when they are examined in isolation. This inductive approach represents value added over single theories which are too general and
single case studies which are too narrow. If EFP analysts can more accurately analyze and evaluate the EU as an international actor, they will go a long way in framing the policy problems facing EFP.

Notes

(1) The author thanks Karl Cerny, Kevin Featherstone, Christopher Hill, Bart Kerremans, John Peterson, Alberta Sbragia, and Michael Smith for their comments on previous drafts.

(2) EFP refers to the formulation and execution of diplomatic and foreign policy actions of the EC and EPC, now CFSP. The SEA gave EPC a permanent secretariat and opened the door to common action on certain aspects of security. The Maastricht Treaty created the CFSP and opened a door to a putative security identity via the WEU. The Treaty of Amsterdam will give the CFSP a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit and a High Representative and will establish more flexible decisionmaking procedures to account for enlargement. EC foreign policy actions—commercial, diplomatic, and humanitarian—are largely integrationist: the founding treaties provide a strong role for common bodies and majority decisionmaking. CFSP actions are largely intergovernmental: decisionmaking is by consensus and may reach into security. Maastricht’s three EU pillars were designed to harness more effectively the variety of available common foreign policy instruments: the EC (Pillar One); the CFSP (Pillar Two); and Justice and Home Affairs (Pillar Three).

(3) Some of these actions include granting full membership, preaccession strategies, association, and special partnerships; offering/rejecting diplomatic recognition and mediation; offering humanitarian assistance to civilians in war zones; organizing multilateral aid to post-communist societies and coupling aid with progress on market and democratic reforms; fostering south-south cooperation in the Mediterranean; including human rights provisions in cooperation accords with ex-colonies; holding presidential summits with third countries; coordinating global problem-solving actions with the United States; and imposing sanctions on states violating international norms.

(4) See von Geusau (1974); Twitchett (1976); Sjostedt (1977); Feld (1977, 1979); Wallace and Paterson (1978); Taylor (1979); Bull (1982); and Hill (1983).


(7) The former is a legal obligation of members to accept EU relationships/agreements with third countries and international organizations. The latter is the obligation of members to respect the body of political agreements, positions, and actions implemented within the context of CFSP.

(8) In the run up to and aftermath of the 1973 enlargement, EC leaders established EPC and the European Council to better handle global challenges. Around the 1981 enlargement, EPC’s scope was extended to the political aspects of security and the troika was established. Around the 1986 enlargement, the SEA codified EPC’s link to the Council. EPC received a secretariat and the European Parliament the power of assent over association accords. The Maastricht Treaty, which entered into force just in advance of the 1995 enlargement, brought EPC into the EU institutional structure, graduated EPC to CFSP, gave the Commission a right of initiative in CFSP, and charged the European Council with the responsibility of speaking for the EU in world affairs.

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