

On the Incongruities of Monnet's Europe

By Frederic J. Fransen
Liberty Fund, Inc.

Presented at the
European Community Studies Association Biennial Conference

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

June 3-6, 1999

On the Incongruities of Monnet's Europe

Following his election defeat last year, Helmut Kohl became only the second man to be given the title, "honorary citizen of Europe." Its other holder is the Frenchman Jean Monnet. Presumably the award is given to individuals who have made an outstanding contribution in the creation of the European Union. Clearly, however, it is politicians who give the award because if political scientists and historians of the European Union were asked to describe the contribution of even Kohl, they would be strongly divided on what difference he, or any other individual has actually made. This is even more so with Jean Monnet. In his case, the responses would span the spectrum from having set the stage for everything that has been achieved to date, to nothing whatsoever.

Evaluating the contribution of Jean Monnet to Europe is not, however, the primary purpose of this paper. What I would like to focus on instead is what I see as a possible cause of confusion in the placement of Monnet, namely the consistency of his thought over the period in which he was actively engaged in working (with whatever degree of success) for the creation of a United States of Europe.

Those who praise as well as those who blame Monnet take as their reference point his own account, primarily found in the *Mémoires*, as well as a few pieces he published, especially the article "A Ferment of Change," in the first volume of the *Journal of Common Market Studies*. The problem with this approach is that it overlooks the possibility that the public version of Monnet's views might be significantly different from that which he held in private. Moreover, it neglects the possibility that Monnet's thinking may have changed in a number of crucial areas between the time of the Schuman Plan, when he was at the center of events, and the period beginning in the sixties when Monnet was engaged in European questions very much from the outside. I propose here, instead, to focus on Monnet's private notes and documents from among his personal papers in which, I believe, one gets a fuller picture of Monnet's thoughts, and, when relying on the

more public documents, to compare them over a longer period of time. I will apply this approach to three issues, each of which exemplifies an incongruity in Monnet's thought over the periods in question. First, I want to explore the way in which Monnet envisioned the role of time in the process of European integration. Second, I would like to look at the lessons which Monnet could reasonably draw from his work with international institutions, and the way in which that might translate into a theory of institutions. Finally, I would like to describe Monnet's understanding of the world situation, and his views on the place that he hoped to create for Europe within it. In each case, I will present Monnet's views in the time leading up to or surrounding the Schuman Plan, that is from roughly 1943-1954, and compare them with the points of view he expressed later, in the period following the Treaties of Rome. In so doing, I hope to demonstrate two things. First, that his own account of the process of European integration in 1950 was different from that which he later put forward. And second, that the Europe Monnet was hoping to achieve at the time of the Schuman Plan differed in several significant respects from that for which he lobbied a decade later. By presenting the issue in this way, I hope to shed some new light on the relation of at least one of Europe's practitioners to the theoretical debates in which he is invoked.

The Factor of Time in European Integration

Perhaps the most significant difference between the early and the late Monnet is in his understanding of the role of time in the integration process. In 1963, he argued that European integration would proceed by "a constant process of collective adaptation to new conditions, a chain reaction, a ferment where one change induces another."¹ "I have

¹ Jean Monnet, "A Ferment of Change," *Journal of Common Market Studies* I: (1963), 208.

always felt,” Monnet wrote, “that the political Union of Europe must be built step by step like its economic integration.” This led, for instance, Michael O’Neill to argue that “Federalism, to Monnet’s shrewd mind, was the culmination of a long and carefully stage managed process.”² Monnet thus gets thrown in with functionalist or neofunctionalist in views of institutional development. Such a view is belied by the way in which Monnet himself worked. Monnet was first of all a businessman, and he had a businessman’s mind. As such, he had a keen sense of the moment, which he tried to take advantage of with whatever connections he could conjure up. Thus in 1914, based upon his prediction that a war in Europe would be a long affair and that shipping would play a significant role in the war effort, Monnet convinced Prime Minister René Viviani to lease a significant amount of British-flagged shipping through his connections with the Hudson Bay Company.³ In 1917, he helped to parlay this into the creation of the Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council (IAMTC), a first, if limited, experience with supranational control of a vital resource.⁴ The moment chosen for its creation, however, was one of eminent political crisis. The ships that France had leased in 1914 were in 1917 vitally needed by the British due to the effectiveness of German unrestricted submarine warfare. At the same time, the French were under great strain due to the occupation of a large part of France’s grain-producing region. The IAMTC arose out of the immediate threat that in order to ameliorate the transport shortage which was strangling the Island, the British would decide to nationalize its shipping, leaving France, in turn, with no way to feed itself.⁵

²Michael O’Neill, *The Politics of European Integration* (New York: Routledge, 1996), 27.

³ 16 May 1915, Hudson Bay Company Archives, AFG5/626.

⁴See Arthur Salter, *Allied Shipping Control: An Experiment in International Administration*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921.

⁵On the general problem of trade and shipping during the war, see Y.-H. Nouailhat, “Français, Anglais et Américains face au problème de la réorganisation du commerce international (1914-1918),” *Relations internationales* 10 (summer 1977).

Such a moment of crisis was even more apparent when Monnet proposed the creation of a Franco-British Union in June of 1940. In this case, there were two vital resources at stake: France's sovereign independence, which Monnet hoped to preserve through the legal transfer of sovereignty to the new Union; and, more immediately important, France's navy, which was believed to be critical for stopping an imminent invasion of the U.K. by Germany.⁶ In the face of this political and military crisis, Monnet saw no reason why the two countries could not merge at once. In 1940, Monnet wrote, "... the indispensable condition of any hope of victory for the two is the real, complete, immediate and enduring unity of the two countries. ..."⁷ Here, at least, the idea of unity always being achieved "step by step" is strikingly absent.

Another example of the importance of the moment was in Monnet's mind as he prepared for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) conference in 1943. Monnet hoped to argue against economic nationalism and in favor of organizing European relief on a regional basis. He saw this as the first step in the creation of a "European economic and political entity."⁸ At the UNRRA conference, he also approached Frederick Leith-Ross about the position of Director-General, but was told that the job would have to go to an American.⁹ Still later, Monnet found his way onto a short list for Secretary-General of the UN.¹⁰ He hoped to use these new

⁶Arthur Salter and Jean Monnet, "Anglo-French Unity," 13 June 1940, AME 8/2/2, (Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, Lausanne: hereafter FJME).

⁷Salter and Monnet, "Anglo-French Unity."

⁸AME 33/1/4 (FJME).

⁹Frederick Leith-Ross, *Money Talks: Fifty Years of International Finance: the Autobiography of Sir Frederick Leith-Ross* (London: Hutchinson, 1968), 301-302. There was also an exchange of notes between Oscar Cox and Edward Stettinius regarding a Walter Lippmann proposal to appoint Monnet Deputy-Director of UNRRA. See Oscar Cox to Stettinius, 12 November 1943, and attachments, "Jean Monnet," Box 23, Oscar Cox Papers, FDR Library.

¹⁰*FRUS 1945*, 1:1506. At the meeting where Monnet's name was raised, the discussion centered around the question of principles in selecting the secretary-general. After the Russians opposed the consideration of Eisenhower, it was agreed that no citizen from one of the "big five" should be considered. Thus Monnet was automatically eliminated, although it is hard to imagine a Frenchman getting the job,

organizations to correct what had gone wrong at the Versailles negotiations, where he had been part of the French delegation. His reasoning was that in order to create new political institutions, it was necessary to take advantage of the fact that despite the variety of juridical states in which Europe's nations found themselves, the war put them all into something of a de novo status. The moment for major projects for European integration was, therefore, in 1945.

No such chance materialized for Monnet in 1945, however, and it was five more years, despite his almost continuous effort, before he found another opportunity in the form of the Schuman Plan. Here, again, Monnet chose a moment in which a major change in international relations was about to take place. The immediate impetus for the Schuman Plan was exceedingly concrete. Following the creation of NATO on 4 April 1949, the three Western allies began regular foreign ministers' meetings to discuss German policy.¹¹ At their meeting in September 1949, in exasperation at the continued foot-dragging of the French, Dean Acheson, the American secretary of state, requested that Robert Schuman, France's foreign minister, initiate a proposal for a new German policy at the next meeting of the three, scheduled for London in May 1950.¹² The implication was clear: France could no longer simply oppose the American attempts to do something positive with Germany; if she failed to do so, The United States would begin taking a stronger stand on the normalization of relations with West Germany.

anyway. Because they had been excluded from the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and the Yalta Conference, where important discussions on the structure of the UN had taken place, France hesitated in sponsoring the San Francisco Conference and thus started out as a lukewarm participant in the United Nations Organization.

¹¹François Duchêne, *Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence* (New York: Norton, 1994), 190.

¹²See Monnet *Mémoires* (Paris: Fayard, 1976), 432, as well as Bernard Clappier, interview by Roger Massip, 11 November 1980, FJME.

Between September and May, Schuman struggled in vain for a solution. In January 1950 he visited Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in Germany, but the visit was a public relations disaster. On 9 and 23 March, during an interview with American journalist Kingsbury Smith, Adenauer made a vague proposal for the unification of France and Germany. This offer, too, was met with suspicion and ridicule. As the date for the London conference approached, Schuman was still without a proposal to lay on the table before Acheson. At the point when Monnet introduced the Schuman Plan, therefore, the important participants were all searching for some way to get them out of a diplomatic quandary. Schuman, Adenauer, and Acheson were asking the same questions. They were all ready to act if they found an acceptable answer. Jean Monnet, who had been pondering this problem for a long time, hit upon the right formula. The problem was that despite the creation of the Federal Republic, Germany had yet to regain full sovereignty in a number of significant areas. The Ruhr industrial basin, and with it Germany's coal and steel production, were controlled by the International Ruhr Authority. Likewise, the Saar and its resources were under the political control of France. Moreover, Germany had not been allowed to rearm. The significance of Schuman's proposal at the time can hardly be underestimated. Had the Schuman Plan not been proposed, in all likelihood the IRA would have been disbanded, and control over its war-making potential returned to Germany. The timing of the Schuman Plan, therefore, was central to its purpose, as well as its success. Once Germany became actually sovereign again, France's influence over her development would be dramatically reduced, and, as viewed at the time, France's security as well.

If such was the state of affairs with regard to the timing of the Schuman Plan, it was even truer with regard to the proposal for a European Defense Community, the formulation of which Monnet played a role in developing. The outbreak of the Korean War introduced, in Monnet's mind, a frenzy of activity. He believed that the consequences would be disastrous for European integration, unless an immediate and

profound response was found. George Ball recalled that as soon as he heard the news of the outbreak of war, Monnet realized that “for America to intervene in Korea would not only jeopardize the Schuman Plan, it might well create panic in Europe and increase American insistence on a larger German role in the West.”¹³

The problem was that the Schuman Plan rested on a subtle shift in the locus of decision-making over Germany's sovereignty. Whereas until 9 May 1950 it had been squarely in the hands of the Americans—with Great Britain and France exerting greater or lesser influence—the Schuman Plan had transferred the locus of decision-making to whatever Franco-German entity was emerging through the negotiations. The Korean War brought on a subtle change.

The Americans, of course, had acquiesced to the Schuman Plan for their own reasons and out of their own interests, but Monnet's real coup was in finding a way to get the Germans and French to agree to such a risky venture. From 9 May until 25 June, France controlled a part of Germany's future.

With the outbreak of the Korean War, however, there was a subtle shift in American interests and consequently a shift in the lassitude with which the United States was willing to treat Germany. The Americans realized that their global responsibilities required more flexibility in troop commitments. The obvious place from which help could come was West Germany. Whereas Germany's coal and steel were of significant, but not vital, interest to the United States, a German army to help defend against a potential invasion from the Soviet Union was. In July 1950 Acheson called on European governments to pledge, by 5 August, their commitment to rearm. On 12 September, at a conference at the Waldorf Astoria, he called for the creation of ten or twelve German divisions in NATO.

¹³Indirectly quoted in George Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern* (New York: Norton, 1992), 91.

Immediately after the American announcement on German rearmament, Monnet sensed a change in the German negotiating position. There were now two ways open to a restoration of Germany's sovereignty -- integration with France or cooperation with the United States. Having a choice had made it easier to bargain hard at the Schuman Plan negotiations, and led eventually to the need for American strong-arm tactics to finish the treaty. In the meantime, however, Monnet concluded that quick action might turn a roadblock into an opportunity. Just as the Schuman Plan had been a means by which France had usurped America's unilateral return of German's sovereignty over heavy industry, Monnet began advocating a similar "European" scheme for the new German army. His reason for doing so was neither just to save the Schuman Plan, nor to create a European army. Rather, Monnet felt his entire supranational Europe slipping away.

Monnet began writing notes about the way to organize Europe's defenses on 1 August.¹⁴ A version from 15 August states that the defense of Europe "must be realized in common, by common organizations, common means, and common contributions."¹⁵ On 3 September Monnet sent a nine page letter to René Pleven, outlining his concerns about French foreign policy.¹⁶ If the present course toward German rearmament continued, Monnet predicted disaster. With "West Germany integrated, not as we would have wanted and is still possible, for Peace, and under the control (conduite) of France, -- but integrated for armament and rapidly under the control of militarists ... France shall be destroyed."

The "greatest danger to Europe," Monnet added two pages later, was the uncertainty of Germany. The solution was to use the inspiration of the Schuman Plan to create a "universal political view" that would "... move beyond the old forms of accords

¹⁴Duchêne, *Jean Monnet*, 227.

¹⁵Jean Monnet, "Observations sur le projet de mémorandum du 12/8 (rédigé par H. Alphand)," 15 August 1950, AMI 4/2/9, FJME.

¹⁶Jean Monnet, letter to Pleven, 3 September 1950, AMI 4/3/6, FJME.

based on sovereignties and to tackle resolutely the question of abandoning sovereignty in order to achieve the creation of a real community of interest managed by a common supranational authority.”

Less than two weeks later, Monnet telegraphed Schuman to warn him that these prophecies were coming true. Since German rearmament in a “national framework” had been proclaimed, the German delegation was tightening its negotiation position. If they got what they wanted, “Europe would become a German market.”¹⁷ Monnet presented the choice as between a European community with France as “the guide,” and the reawakening of a German feeling of power through the creation of a German military.

On 22 September, Monnet drafted another note on the “German problem.” The Schuman Plan had been designed, Monnet wrote, to lead gradually to the “pooling” (*mise en commun*) of the “life” of former enemies.¹⁸ Now, the Korean War risked putting everything in jeopardy by leading to German rearmament. The choice was between Germany or continental Europe. Choosing Europe would automatically solve the German problem; choosing Germany would prevent the constitution of Europe. It was therefore essential to come up with some way of resolving the problem of German rearmament without returning sovereign control of their army to Germany. This was not a matter which could take years to develop, because again, to reclaim control for supranational institutions would be significantly harder once it had been given back to Germany. Timing was critical.

Given the importance that Monnet attached to the timing of his enterprises, one is tempted to ask why, in 1963, he was now willing to take the long view. First, of course, by this time there was hardly any remaining international control of Germany. Thus,

¹⁷Jean Monnet, telegram to Schuman, 14 September 1950, AMI 4/4/2, FJME.

¹⁸Jean Monnet, “note relative au règlement du problème allemand,” 22 September 1950, AMI 4/4/5, FJME.

unlike in the early fifties, there was little leverage left with which to bargain for supranational institutions. Without this source of impetus, the main focus of European cooperation had become the Common Market, which Monnet understood to be an area fraught with possibilities for delay. The long tradition of diplomatic and political bargaining and the extreme detail of the subject matter make it possible to string out negotiations over decades, as we have seen with the start and stop efforts to create a common currency. This was what Monnet feared, and this was the reason, initially, why he preferred the new territory of atomic energy to the entrenched interests of economics in the mid-fifties. It was the *fait accompli* of the Common Market, therefore, made Monnet into a realist, at least as far as the timetable of integration was concerned.

Monnet's view of role of international institutions

A lot is made of Monnet's understanding of the role of institutions in bringing about change at the international level. In the 1963 article he wrote, "...in the European Communities, common rules applied by joint institutions give each a responsibility for the effective working of the Community as a whole. This leads nations, within the discipline of the Community, to seek a solution to the problems themselves, instead of trading temporary advantages. It is this method which explains the dramatic change in the relations of Germany with France and the other Common Market countries."¹⁹ Monnet seems to be arguing here for the kind of spillover effect, so widely touted by the neofunctionalists. One must be careful, however, not to overestimate Monnet's reliance on such spillover in his theory, even here. For Monnet, the central goal was not to set the conditions for a sort of chain reaction in transformed relations to follow, as the second part of the quoted material indicates, but rather to create common institutions with

¹⁹ "A Ferment of Change," 206.

sovereign control of whatever it was they were supposed to manage, as is stressed in the first.

Monnet's insight was not that national policy could be transformed through supranational institutions, but rather that the interests which individual bureaucrats defended could be easily transformed from the national to the supranational level. Thus, the IAMTC easily and quickly created a cadre of managers for allied shipping. The main "spillover" was that staff members of the IAMTC, Monnet included, became the leading members of the secretariat of the League of Nations. The sense of cooperation created by the IAMTC did not, however, translate into changed points of view on the part of officials not acting within it. Indeed, it can be argued that the IAMTC created a backlash within the UK that led to the reemphasis of the old national policy through the transformation of the Empire into the Commonwealth.²⁰

Even the negotiations for the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty were marked by a difference among those committed to the negotiations themselves, and the leaders of the Six themselves. When the foreign ministers came together to sign the treaty on 25 July 1952, Schuman, seemingly without informing Monnet or anyone else, resurrected the idea of creating a federal district to house the Community organs. He proposed that Saarbrücken be made the permanent seat of the ECSC, with the Saar becoming a federal district.²¹ In the meantime, Strasbourg would act as provisional capital.²²

Adenauer was so taken aback that he almost walked out. In the confusion, what should have been a cordial meeting to wrap up successful negotiations turned into a

²⁰ See H. Duncan Hall, *Commonwealth: A History of the British Commonwealth of Nations* (London: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1971), 159-162.

²¹Dunn to Secretary of State, 25 July 1952, 850.33/7-2552, box 4948, RG 59.

²²Ibid.

nationalistic tug-of-war. The Dutch foreign minister, Dirk Stikker, used this incident to comment on the shallowness of a feeling of “Europeanness” at the Council:

On the signing of the EDC Treaty I had few illusions about the real will of the members to build a supranational structure and to work for federation. I still had vividly in my memory our last, and very disappointing, meeting in 1951 [sic] on the Coal and Steel Community. For many months we had based our discussion on high principles of supranationalism and the exclusion of selfish, purely nationalistic interests. The last meeting, held in the Quai d'Orsay, had before it only decisions to be reached on the composition of the different institutions ... and on the seat of the Community's headquarters. ... When we came to the question of the seat, the fight began. Questions of national prestige began to rise in importance. ... Europe was lost sight of.²³

The importance Monnet put on common institutions, as opposed to cooperative arrangements, derives from the frustration he felt with the lack of progress in the Council of Europe, and for which reason he worked so hard to keep the British out of the Schuman Plan negotiations. This can be seen in his response to two attempts by the British to destroy the institutional independence of the Coal and Steel Community through its incorporation into the Council of Europe. In August 1950, Monnet wrote an angry note to Macmillan, in which he exclaimed that:

I feel I must say quite frankly that it is misleading to refer to this document as a version of the Schuman proposals. The document seems in fact to represent the denial of those distinctive principles which make the Schuman proposals a decisive step towards the building of a united Europe and a peaceful world. ... The document which you and your friends are putting forward does not offer the creation of a new economic community but merely a mechanism for coordination among national states ... under voting arrangements which would give the overwhelming voice to Great Britain. ...²⁴

²³Dirk U. Stikker, *Men of Responsibility, a Memoir* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 304.

²⁴Jean Monnet, letter to Macmillan, 8 August 1950, 81/AJ/158, Paris, Archives Nationales.

Finally, in a note cautioning the members of the Ad Hoc Committee working to draft the institutional arrangements for the European Political Community in the early fifties, Monnet was explicit about the vital importance of the kind of common institutions necessary for the Europe he hoped to see emerge. His critique put this in strong terms:

It is certain that if it must be so, rather than the political community being supranational, conforming to the mandate of the Ad Hoc Assembly, rather than it accomplishing a new step forward, it would mark the halt of the unification of Europe. In this intergovernmental system, there would be no European authority capable of deciding and acting following the fixed rules of a common accord, in the interest of the Community, and if there is not such a European Authority, there is [nothing]. ... there would only be compromise between national interests. ... The consequences could be so grave that I wanted to draw your attention to them without delay. ...²⁵

Monnet's views on the role of institutions, therefore, were precise. In order to be effective, such institutions needed to be driven by common rules, with supranational authority held by common institutions. As Monnet's experience showed, however, there was no necessary spillover into new common institutions. The one real possibility, in the extension of the ECSC into the EDC, was proving to be a step in the wrong directions. The failure of even this watered down version of the EDC, however, made this a moot point.

Monnet's world view

A final part of the difference in Monnet's presentation of his European project can be attributed to a substantial change in his worldview from the early fifties to the early sixties. In the late forties and early fifties, there were two principal reasons why Monnet

²⁵Jean Monnet, letter to "my dear Minister," 5 January 1953, AMJ 5/7/1b, FJME.

was working for European integration: Although the prevention of war between France and Germany was certainly important, even more important for Monnet was to reestablish the independence of Europe vis-à-vis the United States. Although Monnet does not clearly fit into the category of a “Third Way” protagonist—he wanted Europe to and the United States to be associated through NATO and the OEEC—he was also not satisfied with the direction relations between the US and Europe were developing. The most important element in this was his belief that the Americans were misinterpreting world developments. This view was strikingly evident in the background of his efforts to start the negotiations for a European Defense Community. Monnet, who had lived for many years in Asia, was particularly opposed to the American interpretation of the outbreak of the Korean War. In August of 1950, Monnet wrote, “Regarding what it is to ‘contain communism,’ the current ‘Atlantic’ methods are the best to implant it definitively; the current movement in Asia is Asian. It is against foreigners, whoever they might be, Americans, Europeans, or Russians.”²⁶

This sense of reluctance to follow the Americans wherever they might lead goes back even further. In 1948, Monnet wrote a letter to Robert Schuman, then prime minister, outlining his perception of Europe's problems. First, he argued that the kind of effort at modernization going on in France under the Monnet Plan needed to be expanded for all of Europe. But he also foresaw the need for another kind of effort. His worry was that unless relations between European states were radically changed, Europe would be left in a position of dependence vis-à-vis the “*grand pays dynamique*,” the United States.²⁷ The solution, Monnet wrote Schuman, was clear:

²⁶ Jean Monnet, “Observations sur le projet de mémorandum du 12/8 (rédigé par H. Alphand),” 15 August 1950, AMI 4/2/9, FJME.

²⁷ Jean Monnet, “lettre de Jean Monnet à Robert Schuman, 18 April 1948,” in *Jean Monnet Robert Schuman, correspondance 1947-1953* (Lausanne: FJME, 1986), 37.

All my reflections and my observations lead me to one conclusion which is now for me a profound conviction: the effort of the countries of western Europe, in order to match up to the circumstances -- both the danger which threatens us *and the American effort* -- must become a true European effort which alone the existence of a *Federation* of the West will render possible.²⁸

That federation would be made up of three members, the United States, the British Empire, and a united continental Europe, led by France, or a Franco-German federation.

By 1960, however, Monnet seems to have accepted, at least for the foreseeable future, the leadership of the United States. In 1959 Monnet had supported the OECD as another possible way to organize his three-way association of the West. In 1960 he began to replace his Federation of the West with the American proposal for an Atlantic partnership. The Action Committee called for association of Europe, including Great Britain, and the United States on an "equal footing" in 1960.²⁹ In 1962 it adopted Kennedy's use of the term "partnership" and the words of the NATO mantra, "peace through strength."³⁰ Throughout the sixties, this theme would dominate his occasional public pronouncements. This transformation of Monnet's European views from independent into another version of the American program can be especially seen with relation to Monnet's views on British membership in his European Union. For most of the period of his active work for European integration, Monnet's success had been built around the exclusion of the British from his architecture, and more importantly, from the negotiations for the Europe he was trying to build. This was in contrast to American policy on the kind of integrated Europe Washington wished to see emerge. As the fifties

²⁸Ibid, emphasis on "and the American effort" added.

²⁹Action Committee for the United States of Europe. *Statements and Declarations of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, 1955-67* (London: Chatham House, 1969), 47.

³⁰Ibid, 62.

came to an end, American pressure to include the British in European integration plans began to build.

In 1959, as a result of a review of Alliance policy ordered by the NATO Council, Secretary of State Christian Herter asked Robert Bowie to write a report to assist the State Department with the NATO evaluation.³¹ In his report, he called on the United States and Europe to develop a more balanced relationship. Bowie wrote that “a Europe able to act as an effective entity would deserve and could exercise comparable influence on common policy and action. Disposing resources much nearer to those of the US, such a Europe could join in the genuine partnership of equals.”³² Although Bowie did not say so outright, he implied that such a partnership would only be possible if the British joined the European Community. If they chose not to do so, he wrote, there would be “adverse effects on the Alliance. Consequently, a reappraisal of the British relation to the Community would be in the common interest.”³³

In January 1960 Kennedy had also begun giving foreign policy speeches calling for a reinvigorated American relationship with Europe.³⁴ On the floor of the Senate in June he called on the U.S. to help “overcome schismatic economic rivalries between the continent and Britain, and the Common Market and the “Outer Seven ...”³⁵ The main architect of Kennedy's European policy was George Ball. For Ball, “the missing piece in

³¹Robert Bowie, *The North Atlantic Nations Tasks for the 1960s* (University of Maryland: College Park, 1991), ii-iii.

³²*Ibid.*, 98.

³³*Ibid.*, 99.

³⁴An excellent study on Kennedy's policy is Denise Artaud, “Le grand dessein de J.-F. Kennedy, proposition mythique ou occasion manquée?” *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* 29 (April-June 1982). The above would seem to bear out Artaud's thesis that it was Kennedy who influenced Monnet, and not vice-versa, although Artaud fails to recognize the *change* which this implied in Monnet's conception of Europe.

³⁵Quoted in John F. Kennedy, *The Strategy of Peace*, Allan Nevins, ed. (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1960).

the European jigsaw map was Great Britain. ...”³⁶ Although Monnet had for a long time heavily influenced Ball's thinking on Europe, it appears that the pupil had finally begun to instruct the master. A year later, Ball played a pivotal role in encouraging the British to apply to join the Communities.³⁷

After years of trying and failing to thwart European integration beyond the inter-governmental level, in 1961 Macmillan reversed the British policy and asked to join the three European Communities.³⁸ In a confidential note on the eve of Macmillan's House of Commons announcement, Edward Heath asked that Monnet embrace their attempt.³⁹ Monnet was a quick convert and continued to push for British membership throughout the sixties. The extension of the Community to include Great Britain, therefore, was another sign of the end of Monnet's Europe, as he had conceived it in the days of the Schuman Plan.

Conclusion

In studying the thought of Jean Monnet over the period from the mid-forties to the early sixties, it becomes apparent that although his commitment to European unity was steadfast throughout, the specifics of what a united Europe should look like, and how it should come about, changed in dramatic ways. Although I am not in a position to give a detailed account of why this happened, I would like to conclude with some possible explanations. First, Monnet was a practitioner. As is often the case with practically minded people, however, he had great respect for those who found their views upon deep

³⁶Ball, *Past Has Another Pattern*, 209.

³⁷See *ibid*, 212.

³⁸On the American role in the British application, see FRUS 1961-1963, 13:1-249.

³⁹Pascaline Winand, *Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe* (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), 291.

theoretical systems. I suspect, therefore, that Monnet was taken by the logic of the neofunctionalism and adapted his own understanding of what was happening to it. Moreover, because Monnet rarely if ever actually wrote the material for publication that is attributed to him—including his *Mémoires*—it may be even more the case that his followers became enamoured by explanations of spillover and long-term evolution, and he did not think through the nuance of such theory. Finally, by the time Monnet quit acting and began lobbying, he had little direct influence on events. I suspect—and this may simply be a prejudice—that especially in the case of the history of European integration, explanations of change which rely on impersonal forces are often relied upon to maintain morale during times of actual stagnation or even setback. As one of Europe's most prominent cheerleaders during the de Gaulle era, Monnet would have been attracted to any tool he could find to keep up the spirits of the Community's "Europeans."