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Abstract

The paper we address themes of continuity, change and adaptation in European policy under the Jospin administration. We begin the paper by situating the Jospin government in relation to the separate legacies of national context, party traditions and policy styles. We then consider the impact of social-democratic political agendas on European policy formulation. We appraise the impact of 'Europeanisation' upon internal political processes, and assess how well the French polity is equipped to deal with the new challenges it faces. We conclude that, while prominent features of 'Europeanisation' go against the grain of the traditional model of French politics and policies, the Jospin government has embraced Europeanisation as a project of government whose prime objective is to modernise French democracy.

There is common agreement that European integration has called into question many features associated with the traditional model of French politics and policies (Cole 1998, Ladrech 1994, Tiersky, 1994). This process has not been limited to France. Indeed, there are comparable forces driving change across European countries. These include global economic change, the impact of European integration, pressures for economic convergence, a calling into question of certain types of political institution and of political mores, and the changing role of the state. It is difficult to disentangle the impact of European integration from other causes of policy change, such as economic globalisation, changing policy fashions and endogenous political reforms. Our aims in this paper are two-fold. First to provide a case study of this process of political and policy change as it affects one of the leading European Union (EU) member-states. Second, to observe the management of Europeanisation by the plural left Jospin government, paying particular attention to the obstacles and opportunities provided by national contexts, party traditions and the policy inheritance.

The challenge of Europeanisation.

The best working definition of Europeanisation remains that offered by Ladrech (1994, p. 70): 'Europeanisation is an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making'. There is a growing literature on the impact (or non-impact) of 'Europeanisation' upon the domestic political management of EU member states (See, inter alia, Dyson, 1997; Kassim, 1997; Kassim and Menon, 1996; Lequesne, 1993, 1996; Radaelli, 1997; Thatcher, 1997, Schmidt, 1996, 1997a, 1997b). Rather than engaging
in an exhaustive literature review, we will identify four uses of ‘Europeanisation’ as it relates to the aims and objectives of this paper. ‘Europeanisation’ can be considered as an independent variable, as a form of emulative policy transfer, as a smokescreen for domestic reform, and as an imaginary constraint.

As an independent variable, it can be demonstrated that the European Union has produced policy change in specific policy sectors. This is the case in the examples of industrial policy and public services that are considered below. The regulatory policy style (Majone, 1996) of the European Union can conflict with the policy norms prevalent in member-states. The role of individual commissioners as policy entrepreneurs, such as Leon Brittan or Karel van Miert in the sphere of competition policy, has highlighted the tension between EU regulatory norms and the dirigiste political traditions of a country such as France.

As a form of emulative policy transfer, Europeanisation is perhaps a misnomer. The process whereby member-states are influenced by strong national models within their midst is demonstrated clearly in the monetary sphere, with the German model of monetary policy management acting as a benchmark for others. Best practice and a desire to imitate the most successful can produce a type of institutional isomorphism (Radaelli, forthcoming). Insofar as this involves importing models from a non-native political culture, this can also be considered as a form of Europeanisation. In a more indirect sense, the European perspective has affected cognitive assumptions about national and European models. French public policy has become less self-sufficient, far more embedded in interdependent structures. French elites have been more willing to engage in policy learning and to experiment with new discursive forms.

‘Europeanisation’ has been used as a smokescreen for domestic political strategies. Dyson and Featherstone (forthcoming) demonstrate very convincingly how an advocacy coalition of conservative economic liberals in the French Trésor and central bank officials promoted economic and monetary union in the 1980s as a means of pursuing an orthodox liberal economic policy and modernising the French economy. Others have established how the European ‘constraint’ made it easier to implement difficult domestic reforms. Administrative modernizers in France, Italy and elsewhere used Europe as a powerful domestic political resource for driving through change (Lequesne, 1993, 1996, Radaelli, 1997). Conforming with the Maastricht convergence criteria provided an opportunity to cut public expenditure and raise taxes; the Italian case was exemplary in this respect. Overdue reforms could be laid
at the door of the European Union. When used as a dependent variable, Europeanisation can become a smokescreen for endogenous change.

As an *imaginary constraint*, the lineage with the European Union is even more tenuous. In the sphere of industrial privatisations and the liberalisation of certain public services for example, Thatcher (1997) argues strongly that the EU provided a changed climate, rather than a precise set of recommendations and regulations. The national level remains the crucial sphere of regulation. Indeed, following the Moravsik argument that state actors can be strengthened by European integration, the negotiation and allocation of structural funds has empowered state actors such as regional prefects.

We will return to these linked interpretations of Europeanisation in the conclusion. In the main body of the paper we address themes of continuity, change and adaptation in European policy under the Jospin administration. We begin the paper by situating the Jospin government in relation to the separate legacies of national context, party traditions and policy styles. We then consider the impact of social-democratic political agendas on European policy formulation. We appraise the impact of ‘Europeanisation’ upon internal political processes, and assess how well the French polity is equipped to deal with the new challenges it faces. We conclude that, while prominent features of ‘Europeanisation’ go against the grain of the traditional model of French politics and policies, the Jospin government has embraced Europeanisation as a project of government whose prime objective is to modernise French democracy.

**Europeanisation, French socialism and the political and policy inheritance**

When considering the inheritance of the incoming Jospin government (or any other), we need to distinguish between three related but separate contextual variables. There is, first, a national context within which European policy is formulated; governments operate according to norms, traditions and codes of appropriate institutional behaviour. Second, there is a party context within which policy choices need to be justified ideologically. Third, there is a policy inheritance; governments do not shape policy on a *table rase*, but inherit a mesh of past commitments. These three independent variables - national context, party context, policy inheritance - can be internally consistent, but it is more likely that they will conflict in certain
respects with each other. Navigating between the conflicting demands of national and party traditions and pressures for change is a measurement of political skill.

*Europeanisation and national context.* Each incoming government most obviously must operate within a precise national context. France’s relationship with Europe has often seemed a paradoxical one. The European Union appears simultaneously as a powerful constraint on domestic public policy, and a source of unrivalled opportunity for contemporary French governments to exercise influence on a wider world stage. Throughout France’s membership of the EU European integration has always been a constraint and an opportunity. The balance and perception of constraints and opportunities have depended on circumstances and political choices. Membership of the EU has been variously experienced and portrayed by French political leaders as an opportunity (the ‘golden age’ referred to by Kassim (1997); a constraint (‘la contrainte exterieure’ of the early-mid 1980s); a further opportunity (to modernise and rationalise socialist government in the mid to late 80s); a threat (the public scepticism of the early 1990s); and latterly as an opportunity to rebuild social and elite consensus around a positive French role in European integration. Europeanisation, therefore, has been seen by French leaders as both a positive and negative source of change, depending on circumstances and leadership goals. The discourse of Europeanisation offers a range of choices to political leaders regarding their ‘use’ of Europe as a policy tool (as a shield, an alibi, an opportunity, a constraint...).

To a considerable extent, French policy towards the EU has always, since the early days, consisted in using the European level as a vehicle for French interests and as a level of governance which could suit France. This was most obviously the case of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and in the nature of the initial Franco-German bargain. European integration rested upon a reconciliation of France and Germany; co-operation between these hereditary enemies underpins the history of the European Union. In the terms of the initial bargain, France would offer political leadership, while recognising Germany’s economic primacy. Underlying the supranational discourse of French leaders, the European Union (EU) has always been regarded as a means of enhancing French national prestige. To this extent, Europe was a French invention, and served French interests as much as those of any other nation. Through its privileged - and uneven - alliance with Germany, France used the European arena as a means of exporting ideas, policies, and administrative styles. The European institutions were modelled along French lines; hence the role of *cabinets*, and directorate generales. The
resignation of the European Commission in March 1999 caused such embarrassment because a French style of public administration and administrative secrecy was openly called into question.

National context is an amorphous construction, however. In the French case, there are influences pulling in opposing directions, from the supranational idealism of the founding fathers, to the neo-Realism of de Gaulle. French governments in the Fifth Republic have generally respected the Gaullist inheritance. First, the Gaullist legacy was one of a (potentially) strong Europe with weak political institutions. Underlying the Gaullist vision lay the implicit construction of a European model of society, with the real possibility of state-like action at the EC/EU level. At the same time, the Gaullist paradigm refused any concurrent reduction of nation-state autonomy and sovereignty. The Gaullist legacy can be summarised by six principal features: a cultural attachment to European values and civilisation, notably as embodied by France; a Europe prepared to protect its industry and agriculture; the promotion of common European policies where these do not endanger French interests; a marked anti-Americanism and advocacy of a more independent Security and Defense identity; a tight Community based on a Franco-German directorate, rather than a looser more nebulous grouping of nations; and a preference for intergovernmental over supranational institutions. The attitude adopted by individual Presidents is explored in detail elsewhere (Cole, 1998). Though their personal styles varied considerably, none ventured too far from the central tenets of the Gaullist paradigm. Thus, the principal initiatives of the Giscard d’Estaing presidency (1974-1981) could be interpreted in accordance with the Gaullist lineage, in spite of a contrasting political style.

Transcending the Gaullist legacy was a feature of the Mitterrand presidency (1981-1995) (Cole, 1997). In symbolic and substantive terms, Mitterrand’s Europe was far more integrationist than that espoused by de Gaulle or his two successors (Lemaire-Proscie, 1990). In the broader interests of European integration, Mitterrand proved more willing to sacrifice elements of national sovereignty than any of his precursors had been, though arguably incapable of making the discursive break that such a shift implied (Schmidt, 1997b). In the Single European Act of 1986, the French President accepted that majority voting should become the norm for many EC decisions. In the Maastricht treaty, further provisions for majority voting were enacted, along with some strengthening of the powers of the European parliament and the European Commission, traditionally anathema to French Presidents. Mitterrand’s successor Chirac initially maintained an ambiguous attitude towards further European integration after
fighting a euro-ambivalent election campaign in 1995. Any lingering doubts over France’s commitment to the single European currency were forcibly dispelled in a press conference in October 1995. Chirac undertook bold initiatives in the sphere of European defence (Bosnia) and institutional reform (negotiating the Amsterdam treaty) before his government slumped to defeat in the snap June 1997 National Assembly elections.

The Maastricht Treaty (1992) represented an important staging post of Europeanisation in other respects. The idea of a European citizenship enshrined in the Maastricht treaty broke the organic link between the nation and legal citizenship in the French jacobin tradition (Ladrech, 1994). The Maastricht treaty also made timid moves towards redressing the ‘democratic deficit’ both at French and EU levels. At the EU level, the powers of the European parliament were strengthened in important respects. In the case of France, the constitutional amendment of 1992 allowed the National Assembly and the Senate to vote ‘resolutions’ on European laws, rather than merely expressing ‘opinions’, although the French constitutional council subsequently adjudged that parliament could not undermine the government’s prerogatives in negotiating European laws. These provisions were strengthened during the prolonged parliamentary debates on the Amsterdam treaty, finally ratified (after constitutional amendment) in March 1999.

By the end of the Juppé premiership (1995-97) a form of pressurised policy convergence had emerged amongst French elites. For better or for worse, Europeanisation was conceived as a form of semi-voluntary policy transfer; in order to preserve its European influence, France had, where necessary, to emulate best practice. This was most apparent in the sphere of economic policy. French economic policy has been driven by a determined effort to match Germany in terms of economic performance, a precondition for preserving French rank as a pre-eminent European power. The traditional French model - based on centralism, state intervention in economic management, high inflation, and growth - was progressively modified by key elements of the German model, with its insistence on low inflation, high productivity, central bank independence and a strong currency. Initially contested by President Chirac, la pensée unique ultimately prevailed during the first two years of the Fifth President’s first term-in-office. The institutional and political heritage provided the single currency by is a very powerful one, framing the policy choices available to the Jospin government.
The Party context. The Jospin government operates within a specific party context. Insofar as Jospin has made the respect for political choices a benchmark of his governing method (Cole, 1999) the ethic of the party has provided a powerful reference for Jospin’s government activity.

Politics matters, hence parties matter. Parties not only organise political competition, but they embody generations of tradition. The party reference is more important for Jospin than for Mitterrand who took European policy decisions either against or aside from party. Finally, the ambivalence towards the European construction fits in well with Jospin’s own measured approach.

We can demonstrate the importance of a party context by briefing retracing the French Socialist approach to Europe. This approach has been subject to cross-cutting pressures. Europe was traditionally valued insofar as it prolonged the internationalist traditions of French socialism, but it was feared because of the diminution of national sovereignty it implied. The French Socialists were internationalists (rather than mere Europeanists) by tradition, proudly claiming the heritage of Jean Jaurès and the Second International. During the interwar period, the SFIO (Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière) had supported the League of Nations; this was transformed into support for the United Nations (UN) in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. When the UN proved itself incapable of providing a genuine mechanism of collective security with the onset of the cold war, the Socialists declared themselves resolutely pro-European. The unification of Europe was portrayed by SFIO leader Guy Mollet as a means of strengthening the West against the Soviet threat: Europeanism and Atlanticism were mutually self-reinforcing (Prosch, 1991). In fact the party was split between federalist Europeans, fervent Atlanticists, and those occupying a median stance, such as Mollet. During the Fourth Republic (1946-1958), the SFIO declared itself an enthusiastic supporter of Europe, aligning itself with the main initiatives culminating in the Treaty of Rome of 1957. Beneath the veneer of the SFIOs supranational discourse, however, there were ambiguities and inconsistencies. Mollet’s Socialist-led government of 1956-57 performed a leading role in negotiating and ratifying the Treaty of Rome, and yet Mollet was instrumental in writing safeguards into the treaty to limit transfers of national sovereignty. And while the SFIO stressed the economic advantages to be gained from a free market, there remained a feeling of unease at being affiliated with a liberal, capitalist association of nations (Gerbet, 1975).
The firmly pro-EC, pro-Atlantic stance of Mollet's SFIO gradually gave way in the early 1970s to a tougher anti-Americanism, and a more reserved attitude towards the European Community. This reflected both gradual Socialist acceptance of the Gaullist foreign policy legacy, and a tactical accommodation by the Socialist Party (PS) leader Mitterand to reach an agreement with the French Communist Party (PCF). A reluctant acceptance of the European Community by the PS was combined with a primordial emphasis on the national character of the future French socialist experience, and, most revealingly, with a gaullien-style belief in the superiority of the French experience over those of its European counterparts.

The celebration of French exceptionalism was toned down during the long Mitterrand presidency (1981-1995). Indeed, there was an underlying sense of malaise for most of the period. The PS generally portrayed Europe in terms of a conflict between the forces of progress and the Right, a conception which had arguably been transcended by Mitterrand's espousal of the European cause in key speeches such as that to the German Bundestag in January 1983, or that to the Strasbourg Assembly in May 1984. The Single European Act was accepted without any real public debate within the PS, through solidarity with President Mitterrand before the 1988 presidential election. In various later policy documents the PS denounced the ‘liberal’ interpretation of the Act, which sought to transform the EC into an arena for ‘naked deregulation'. In its 1989 European manifesto, for instance, the party specifically criticised certain measures introduced by the Act, such as the ending of exchange controls, and certain effects of fiscal harmonisation (Parti socialiste, 1989). The 1989 manifesto argued that the effects of the single market ‘could be negative in the short term’, and urged that the single market be accompanied by measures to combat unemployment. The party was adamant upon the need for the social charter to accompany moves towards the single market. In essence, the PS was unwilling to allow the EC to be reduced to an ‘extended free trade zone’ of the type advocated by Mrs Thatcher, an interpretation vigorously rejected by Mitterrand as well. As a counterpart to the Single European Act, the PS called for increased social and economic coherence between member-states, embodied by coordinated EC programmes to promote growth and employment, and for a range of new common policies. The party's official support for the Maastricht treaty stemmed in part from the belief that the ‘social chapter’ rectified the free market excesses of the single European Act. The French Socialists thus insisted upon the imperative of social, economic and industrial counterweights to a predominantly liberal and capitalist European Community.
There is much continuity between the policy positions adopted by the Socialist Party in its 1989 European manifesto and its platform for the 1999 European elections. The Socialist electoral platform was drawn from the European Manifesto, agreed by the PES at its Milan congress of March 1999. The Milan congress was the first formal meeting of the PES since Malmo in June 1997. The PES manifesto was drawn up jointly by British foreign minister Robin Cook, and Jospin’s confidant Henri Nallet. The Germans maintained their distance. PS spokesmen claimed the manifesto kept the European party anchored ‘to the left’ and resisted the temptations of Schröder’s New centre, or Blair’s Third Way. The French PS claimed satisfaction across a broad range of areas: the commitment for a European Employment Pact; support for the reduction in the working week; the defense of public services; campaigning for a public works programme; the acceptance of the need for institutional reform before further enlargening and the increased use of QMV within the European council (Noblecourt, 1999b). On the other hand, the European manifesto called for respect of budgetary discipline, as required by the Stability Pact. Moreover, the agreement with J-P Chevénement’s Citizen’s Movement (MDC) subsequently forced the PS to backtrack on important issues of principle, such as extending the scope of QMV.

As we shall see, the register adopted by the French delegation within the PES reflected the ambivalent stance of Jospin himself. This ambivalence underlined that Mitterrand’s principal achievements (of Europeanisation, marketisation, and modernisation) were difficult to reconcile with a traditional social-democratic political agenda. The Maastricht Treaty imposed a monetarist vision of an ever closer union, a logic which arguably had little in common with Keynesian reflationary policies or the left’s traditional social objectives. To this extent, the party context thus provided an alternative reference frame to the prevailing neoliberal agenda underpinning the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty. It was one resource upon which Jospin drew for inspiration.

European integration has consistently been revealed as an issue which cuts across traditional party lines, and divides public opinion. Each of the main French parties is divided on the issue, some more than others. The Socialist Party has contained the full range of positions along the supranational - national continuum. This included avowed federalists in the tradition of Jean Monnet, such as Jacques Delors, who favoured strengthening the Community’s supranational institutions; and avowed opponents of the Amsterdam and Maastricht treaties such as Interior Minister Chevénement. The PS is less divided than most other French parties, however. It is
certainly more cohesive than its main rival, the Gaullist RPR. As measured in terms of PS deputies, the Socialists were resolutely favourable to ratifying the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999.

*The policy inheritance.* The extent of France’s economic and institutional interdependence was fully driven home by the integrationist agenda of the 1980s and early 1990s. Changes in EU laws and treaties have modified national traditions of policy-making, and the freedom of manoeuvre of national decision-makers. This can be demonstrated in a direct sense in the sphere of monopoly public services and industrial policy. In a more indirect manner, Europeanisation came to be regarded by economic and administrative modernisers as an opportunity to help modernise an ossified French administration, an over-protected economy and a conservative society. At the same time, national traditions reassert themselves strongly in the form of strategies for resisting change and in details of implementing EU directives.

The process of European integration directly challenges powerful aspects of the French state tradition, most especially in the sphere of public services. There is a widespread positive connotation of the state as an instrument of public service, as an agent of economic development and as a guarantor of equality between French citizens. As we observed above, French socialists vigorously contested what they perceived as the prevailing neo-liberal interpretation of the Single European Act within the European Commission. The implementation of competition policy posed the starkest challenge to the tradition, interest and ideology of the French left.

The ambiguities of the notion of public service are explored elsewhere (Cole, 1999b). The French notion of public service (*service public*) has traditionally gone well beyond that of universalist welfare to include a high degree of interventionism in the industrial sphere, and the defence of monopoly utility providers such as the Gas and Electricity conglomerate EDF-GDF. Traditional French conceptions of public service were based on the delivery of essential services by public sector monopolies (gas, electricity, rail, postal and telecommunication services, air transport) which benefited from protection against domestic or foreign competition and which were recognised with a public service mission in French administrative law. From 1946, many industrial activities were also vested with a public service mission (Gugliemi, 1994). The CGT, the Communist-dominated trade union
federation, occupied a strong position within many of these public sector firms (EDF-GDF, SNCF).

As it evolved during the 1980s, this model of delivering public services ran against the grain of EU competition policy. The legal basis of the European treaties is against state aids, public monopolies, and assisted sectors. In practice, however, until the mid-1980s the Commission intervened only very rarely in national practices of industrial management. This changed with the Single European Act (SEA). Strengthened by the tough competition regulations of the SEA, the Commission developed several mechanisms to break-up monopolies. The model was that of US anti-trust legislation, backed up by independent regulators. Favoured measures included privatisation, the strict regulation of state subsidies, the opening up of specific industrial sectors to competition and the creation of independent competition agencies (Thatcher, 1997).

There was a strong belief that the emerging EU regulatory model was incompatible with the French public service mission. This belief was particularly strongly held on the French left, but formed part of a broader national consensus. The complex policy mix that emerged in the sphere of public services was informative of the complexities of the EU policy process. The activism of the Commission and of individual commissioners ran against the determined resistance of the French government, which eventually dampened the liberalising drive of the European Commission. The outcome has varied according to sector involved. The main Commission achievement was to open up the telecommunications market from January 1998. Air Transport was also liberalised, in spite of French government opposition. Resistance in the spheres of electricity and postal services was more widespread. After France had managed to rally Germany to its position, the Commission agreed that postal services were to be exempted from liberalisation until 2003. France had to agree to a limited opening of the electricity market in 1999 (see below).

Public service reform illustrated the complex interplay between the persistence of ingrained national traditions, and the strains produced by exogenous and endogenous policy change. Though the challenges to service(s) publique(s) have been confronted in manners consistent with French political traditions, the French polity has mutated under the combined impact of internal and external pressures for change. While macro-economic and monetary policy represent a plausible case of emulative policy transfer (with France formally aligning itself
with the German model) this is less the case in service(s) publique(s), or in related areas such as Employment policy, where the French social model is perceived to be under attack.

The public policies, political agendas and governing styles of French political actors have therefore been modified by the processes of Europeanisation. We have seen that in so far as Europeanisation is a definable process with tangible consequences, neither its pace nor its direction is entirely predictable. The policy choices emerging from closer European integration have been variably handled by successive governments; our interest in the next section is in the response of the Jospin government.

**European integration, social-democracy and the Jospin government.**

With the return to office of centre-left governments in Britain and France in 1997 and Germany in 1998, social-democratic governments were in power simultaneously in London, Paris and Bonn for the first time in the history of the European Community. The emergence of a strong social-democratic political majority in the EU provided a supportive environment for a French Socialist administration. The critical event in this European realignment was the election of Schröder as German Chancellor in October 1998.

Of the multiple constraints faced by the new Jospin government, the most obvious were those relating to EMU and the convergence criteria, which were in a real sense the legacy of Mitterrand and Kohl. The Jospin government elected in June 1997 had to make immediate choices. The new Treaty (negotiated by Juppé and Chirac) was to be finalised at the Amsterdam summit only three weeks after Jospin’s election. During the 1997 election campaign, the left had insisted upon four new conditions before accepting the single currency (a broad membership, including Spain, Italy and the UK; a renegotiation of the Stability Pact, a European economic government to oversee the future European central bank, and a competitively priced euro against the dollar and the yen). These conditions were tantamount to a renegotiation of the Maastricht Treaty. Notwithstanding the PS election campaign, the new French government did not have any real possibility of unravelling the single currency, or of changing the conditions of engagement. On the main issues, the French were isolated. There was little support in Amsterdam for a renegotiation of the Stability Pact, and traditional French demands for an ‘economic government’ were resisted by Germany in particular. But the French saved face by obtaining the creation of an economic committee (Euro-X1) to
monitor the work of the European central bank. The embedding of Euro X1 as a new institutional structure demonstrated that other countries shared French views of the importance of creating political counterweights to the operation of the single European currency. The traditional French distrust of monetary policy technocrats resurfaced in the new discourse of the Jospin government—though EMU had been driven by a strong advocacy coalition within France since the 1970s (Dyson and Featherstone, forthcoming).

The French demand for a European Growth Fund—following on from Delors' White Paper of 1993—was rebuffed. On the positive side, a new employment clause was inserted into the Amsterdam Treaty, and a special Employment summit was organised for later in the year. Though the Luxembourg employment summit of November 1997 came nowhere near imposing the rigorous employment criteria that Prime Minister Jospin had been seeking, Jospin had placed the idea of an Employment and Growth Pact on the EU agenda. The Luxembourg summit gave rise to quantified employment plans and to increased training opportunities, but there was as yet no binding equivalent of the pluriannual stability pact deficit reduction plans (Moscovici, 1998).

From his election as premier, Jospin made clear his intention to balance the French commitment to EMU with the quest for a social Europe, one more ideologically attuned to French conceptions of public service, social regulation, and state economic interventionism. Fighting unemployment was the number one European and domestic priority. The Jospin government has insisted upon the need to develop and defend the European social model, under attack from neo-liberalism and the invisible forces of globalisation. Since 1997, the French government has been espousing a high measure of political direction of the European project, as well as new forms of intervention in the social sphere. The Luxembourg Employment summit and the proposals for an Employment pact are good examples of this.

The Jospin government has demonstrated less of a missionary zeal in favour of abstract European integration than previous Socialist-led governments, but has undertaken stronger efforts to coordinate its actions with its partners. This apparent paradox can be explained by the confrontation between a social-democratic political majority and a neo-liberal economic paradigm. As Dyson (1999) points out, with the participation of Social-democratic parties in 13 out of 15 EU governments, there was 'the coincidence of an ascendent social-democracy in the EU with a system of institutional governance for EMU that was rooted in the neo-
liberal values of 'sound' money and public finances'. For a short period after Schröder's election, political and economic legitimacies appeared on collision course. The strong alliance of French Finance Minister Strauss-Kahn with his German counterpart Lafontaine signalled a new departure. The social-democratic political majority declared its determination to seize political control over the management of the single currency. At the Portschach summit in October 1998, a new growth agenda emerged, and reference was made to using Article 103 of the Maastricht Treaty to allow closer co-ordination of economic policies. This would involve strengthening the Euro-X1 committee of Finance ministers, and according this body a stronger oversight role over the central bank. Whether this new orientation is sustainable has been sharply called into question by Lafontaine's resignation and the diminishing stature of the German administration.

As the domestic policy autonomy of the nation-state has been challenged by the dynamics of capitalism and the operation of the international political economy, there is an argument that social-democratic parties in the late 1990s can at best adapt to common externally driven convergence pressures. This is essentially the position of the Blair administration in the UK. It is not shared by Jospin. Strengthening the European arena as a level of concerted public policy action has been an important aspect of the Jospin government's effort to 'positivise' the European debate. While globalisation introduces a new form of macro-economic regulation, European integration provides a political arena whereby European governments (those led by social-democratic parties in particular) can combine their governance capacity to create (or strengthen) a European political, social and economic model. The European arena is the only arena where politics can reinvent new forms of political regulation faced with economic globalisation. This belief sustains the pan-European activism of the French plural left government, which has called for a Keynesian relaunch at the European level and a concerted European effort against unemployment. It underpins the efforts of the Jospin government to strengthen social and employment policies at the European level. It explains developments such as Jospin's proposals for EU borrowing for capital investment purposes and the re-emergence on the political agenda of the withholding tax, a French idea given credibility by German support. While the Jospin government is inventing a new European discourse (see below) the government's stance on many issues forms part of a broader French consensus based on an underlying distrust of the institutional design of European central bank (in spite of emulative policy transfer), and a demand for a tighter political direction of monetary policy and more coordinated economic policies.
The best example of national context and party traditions going against the grain of Europeanisation lies in the defence of public services evoked above. The de-regulation of the Energy sector met with the stiffest resistance and provides a good case study of French resistance. The opening of the electricity market to competition was resisted by the Juppé and Jospin governments, which delayed implementing the Commission’s 1996 directive until 19 February 1999 and then adopted the minimal provision compatible with it (Fabre and Gallois, 1999). The French state worked hard to preserve the opposition of EDF-GDF, the nationalised energy firm. Only one-third of the electricity market was opened to competition, and only 400 eligible clients would be able to shop around. The French government managed to retain the public service statute of EDF-GDF workers (a matter of critical political importance for the cohesion of the plural left alliance) and impose public service conditions on EDFs competitors.

Defending EDF-GDF was a major French priority. EDF was the symbol of the social-Colbertist conception of French public service. Moreover, the CGT, traditionally close to the Communist party, occupied a powerful position within the firm’s works council. Quite apart from being an envied social model, EDF-GDF was the preserve of the Mining and Bridges corps, the most powerful of the technical grands corps. It could rely on imposing state resources to finance the visions of its technocratic governing elite (Cohen, 1998). The EDF-GDF example demonstrated the determination of the Jospin government to safeguard the French model of public services as far as possible, but also to adapt to irresistible external pressure.

While party traditions gave succour to the Jospin’s government stance on public services, this and many other European issues formed part of a broader national consensus shared with President Chirac. The national consensus on issues of European policy was strengthened by the nature of the cohabitation exercise itself, as we will demonstrate below. When required to do so, the Jospin government demonstrated itself to be a stubborn advocate of French national interests. The French negotiators in the Agenda 2000 budget discussions proved particularly tenacious, forcing the German presidency to accept a compromise over the CAP which fell far short of its initial intentions. This firmness was revealed in spite of a common social-democratic identity and a ritualistic celebration of the solidity of Franco-German relations in the aftermath of Schröder’s election. In the opinion of sources close to the negotiations,
Agenda 2000 demonstrated the efficacy of French networks throughout the European institutions and the rapid learning process forced upon the German government.

Equally significant as these details of the constraints imposed and opportunities provided by Europeanisation were the conscious efforts undertaken by the Jospin government to ‘positivise’ its European message.

The Management of European Issues under Cohabitation

The development of the European Union has challenged the policy style and political capacity of existing institutional actors (Cole and Drake, forthcoming). French European policy has become less obviously the domain of the French presidency than traditionally described. In domestic politics, presidential pre-eminence in European affairs was so pronounced that Europe was considered to form part of a ‘reserved sector’. The main European decisions have been taken by French Presidents. Thus, President de Gaulle launched the Fouchet plan, decreed the ‘empty chair’ policy and negotiated the Luxembourg compromise. President Pompidou agreed to the accession of Britain, Ireland and Denmark to the Community. President Giscard d’Estaing accepted direct elections to the European Parliament and the creation of the European Council. President Mitterrand agreed the reduced British budgetary contribution, and played a major role in negotiating the Single European Act and the Maastricht treaty. The EMU decision was brought about as a result of strong political leadership on behalf of President Mitterrand while President Chirac ensured that France signed the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. Presidential pre-eminence, however, does not imply that French Presidents determine French policy towards Europe in isolation from other French political actors and institutions. The President of the Republic might be the most important actor, but others are also influential: the Prime minister, individual ministers, high-ranking civil servants, local and regional authorities, representatives of French companies. Always overstated, moreover, the hyper-presidentialist thesis has become less tenable with the changing political environment since the 1980s (the push to more supranational forms of decision-making and closer integration), the inherent fragmentation of the EU policy process, and repeated instances of ‘cohabitation’.

France’s third period of ‘cohabitation’ (1997- ) has to date demonstrated that an institutional arrangement which was once an exception to the French exception (and an affront to de
Gaulle’s reading of the 1958 Constitution) has now become an institutional norm with its own rules and routines. Cohabitation has provided the current government with the legitimacy and confidence to reject the false dichotomy between ‘foreign’ or ‘European’ policy as the President’s so-called reserved domain, and domestic policy as the government’s duty and responsibility. The French Foreign Minister, Hubert Védrine, has publicly stated that where European policy is concerned, he takes responsibility, acting on Prime Minister Jospin’s authority, with the assistance of Pierre Mosocovici (the Minister delegate for European Affairs), and with President Chirac’s agreement.¹

This claim to governmental responsibility in EU affairs is borne out by fact in a number of ways. First, the two parts of the executive, the presidency and the government, have consistently worked in close co-operation, strategically and technically, on European affairs, with President Chirac stating in April 1998 that there was a ‘common understanding’ on European affairs within cohabitation.² Second, Hubert Védrine has sought on several occasions to persuade the French public that the traditional form of presidential authority and rhetoric associated with French foreign and European policy is increasingly outdated in the multipolar world of the 1990s, and that the more realistic tones of the French government are in keeping with the new world order.³ Indeed, where President Chirac has publicly intervened over European affairs (such as in the ‘Trichet affair’), he has appeared increasingly anachronistic, as the arch defender of the grander and least sustainable aspects of French exceptionalism. The French public, moreover, according to recent opinion polls, appear content with the emasculated role of the President in this domain. Invested with a new quotient of legitimacy, the French polity during the third ‘cohabitation’ has thus appeared far better equipped to deal with Europeanisation than under the ‘normal’ circumstances of a hyper-presidentialised regime. Prime ministerial leadership removes the functional requirement for a policy active president. The absense of fundamental conflict between Chirac and Jospin has also facilitated cooperation in this domain.

The plural left governmental experiment commenced in June 1997 has been described as a ‘dual cohabitation’ in the French press. Alongside potentially conflictual relationships within the French executive, Jospin has had to manage the differing European sensitivities of the five coalition partners (Socialists, Communists, Radicals, Greens and Citizens). Jospin’s leadership is a key factor in ensuring that the divisions over Europe within the plural left government do not prove too detrimental to the overall cohesion of his administration.
Consistent with his pedagogic governing style, the Socialist premier has made a virtue out of necessity and allowed for the expression of differences over Europe as an exercise in the democratic confrontation of ideas. The role of the French Communist Party (PCF) coalition partner exemplifies this. Though the PCF opposed the single currency during the 1998 parliamentary vote, and voted against the Amsterdam Treaty in March 1999, party leader Robert Hue has been unable to convince premier Jospin of the need for a referendum on EMU. Engaged in an effort to reposition one of the few remaining European Communist parties, the Communist leader has been anxious to continue governmental participation without supporting the government on this particular issue. Managing diversity has been one of the greatest strengths of Jospin’s political leadership.

The French public have expressed approval of such political pluralism on the left and, specifically, of Jospin’s leadership (after two years in office, his popularity was higher than any other Fifth Republican Prime Minister at any time). The pluralism of the Left in government pales when compared to the disarray of the Right on Europe (and on many other policy objectives, political values and principles). This is particularly the case since the government has devoted considerable effort to developing a credible and timely discourse on Europe’s implications for France.

Since the onset of the third period of cohabitation, there have been various attempts by the French Foreign Minister (faintly echoed by President Chirac) to counter-balance traditional presidential visionary rhetoric about ‘ever closer union’ with a pragmatism more in tune with the costs and benefits of European integration. The specific challenge for French leaders in 1999 is how to appeal to both hearts and minds, how to combine the emotional and rational reasons why the French must support, if not initiate, further European integration. Such a response much include a rational discourse of interest, and an authoritative vision of the future to sustain confidence in the leap of faith into EMU and beyond.

There are several recent examples of such a rhetorical departure. First, Hubert Védrine has sought to redefine France’s European and global context in terms he deems more appropriate for the post-Cold war order. In an article entitled l’autre grandeur Védrine (1998) claims for France the label of a national ‘power of world influence’ (puissance d’influence mondiale), and for Europe, a status of regional power (Europe-puissance) in comparison to the ‘hyperpower’ (hyperpuissance) that is the USA. According to this new terminology, state
power is no longer to be measured in purely military terms, but on the basis of commercial, industrial and cultural strengths, domains in which France’s world standing is high and rising.

On Védrine’s initiative, the French government has therefore gone about deconstructing Gaullist conceptions of French power and status in Europe and the world in an attempt to bring French expectations more in line with French realities. In this respect, the Socialist government has adopted a more instrumentalist - and realistic - approach to France’s role in Europe than did either Mitterrand or de Gaulle. A further example of this is the government’s willingness to acknowledge the existence of ‘Euro scepticism’ amongst the French public, responding to it with information campaigns (such as on the Euro, the single currency) and the admission that the French have, in the past, been required rather too often to take blind leaps of faith into further integration.

This reconstructing of the leadership message about the realities of Europeanisation is also visible in the readiness of the government to embrace themes which were previously taboo in French discourse on Europe, foremost of which is the notion of federalism. Since the 1950s, French leaders have largely avoided describing the type of polity the EC/EU constituted, principally because this would entail exposing the contradiction which lies at the heart of Gaullist (and Mitterrandist) European policy, namely the desire for a strong Europe, but with weak European institutions. In this respect too, the current French government is again proving to be an exception to the rule, although it still has some way to go to present an entirely convincing rationale.

The dominant representation of European integration in France has been largely synonymous with pure Gaullism, that is to say, a state-centric notion of a strong (meaning decisive) Europe, with power channelled through national institutions and delegated where appropriate to weak European institutions (Bouvet, 1998). Hence the intellectual tradition of the Fifth Republic applied to Europe has been based on the primacy of national sovereignty in opposition to doctrines of federalism. Gradually, however, and particularly during the Mitterrand years, the logic of such a stance has been eroded by successive transfers of French decision-making authority to the European level (such as in competition policy and EMU). Although this has tended up until now to be rationalised by French leaders in terms of a ‘sharing’ or ‘pooling’ of sovereignty with other member states and the European institutions themselves, rather than as a net loss of sovereignty, there is no escape from the contradiction
ever at the heart of such positions. Successive French leaderships have come to accept a European Union empowered to take collective, majoritarian decisions in domains traditionally constitutive of national sovereignty, such as monetary policy. But have proved themselves incapable of formulating this position into an honest rationale, or of systematically translating this acceptance into initiatives for institutional design and reform which are acceptable to its EU partners.

We saw above how federalism has re-entered governmental discourse, and so we can suggest that there are signs of development. The context to this is that the government has embarked on a redefinition of the term, to express, in essence, the view that a federal EU will not resemble any existing national federal regimes (meaning, principally, Germany), but will be something different, specifically, a ‘Federation of Nation States’. The commitment to a ‘European Federation of Nation-States’ was first made at the PS National Convention on Europe is April 1996 and was restated in the party’s 1999 European manifesto (Noblecourt, 1999a). For the authors of this manifesto, the ‘European Federation of Nation-States’ was an attempt to bridge the ‘necessary federalism’ encouraged by European integration with the ‘essential competencies of nation-states’. The equilibrium of Jospin’s domestic political appeal is thus extended to the European level. There are other examples of this attempted new synthesis. Thus, the plural left government has repeatedly indicated a willingness to trade subsidiarity for sovereignty. For key political actors such as Hubert Védrine, increased subsidiarity - the taking of decisions at appropriate levels of power – is both the pre-requisite and the reason for further transfers of power to Brussels. To the extent that European integration has spawned new political concepts and categories, then we can consider current French attempts to shape the terminology as reasonably positive. It signals a willingness to step beyond the sterile dichotomy of stato-nationalist versus federalist choices for Europe’s institutions and policy-making regime. It demonstrates a recognition by French leaders of the need to invent new paradigms, as memories of Gaullism in action fade ever further into the recesses of collective memory.

There are elements of continuity, as well as change, in the Jospin government’s discourse. The traditional French stance of exporting French (i.e. ‘universal’) values to the rest of the world via Europe remains a French Socialist ambition. It is reaffirmed in the 1999 Socialist manifesto. But alongside these traditional rituals, we observe a greater willingness by the Jospin government to adopt concepts such as subsidiarity which are devised to improve
democracy at the EU level. This is an intellectual sea-change indeed, and one which is almost exclusively the preserve and property of Jospin’s team, President Chirac’s contribution to the re-modelling of integration having been inconsistent, and suggestive of a President far removed from the pragmatic visionary role that France requires at present of its leadership.

Conclusion

Upon achieving office in June 1997 the Jospin government was faced with the cross cutting pressures of a specific national context, a party tradition and a policy inheritance. Jospin’s leadership has proved more adept than most in achieving a synthesis between these forces pulling in different directions. A real effort has been made to wield these centrifugal forces into a more coherent whole. We observed above how attempts to positivise the European constraint involved importing concepts such as subsidiarity that do not take root easily in French political traditions. On the other hand, the activism of the Jospin government on the European stage demonstrates its ambition to perform a leading role within the ascendent European centre-left majority.

The consistency of the Jospin government’s approach to European policy stems form the close linkage between domestic and European politics. At the domestic and EU levels, the discursive basis of Jospin’s method is that politics matters. In the permanent compromise between politics and markets, economic imperatives must be counterbalanced with a respect for social equilibrium and political choice. As the party is a vehicule for refining political doctrines and mobilising support, the party matters. Herein lay a strong differences between Jospin and Mitterrand. This discourse retains a strong faith in voluntaristic EU and state-level action to combat unemployment.

The ambiguities of the concept of ‘Europeanisation’ were outlined in the introduction. Four usages were identified (independent variable, emulative policy transfer, smokescreen, imaginary constraint) and there is evidence to support each interpretation. The two strongest definitions were as an independent variable, and as a source of policy transfer and learning. As an independent variable, the European Union imposed policy orientations on French governments in ways which against the grain of French policy traditions. This was the case in public services and (to a lesser extent) industrial policy. On the other hand, national
traditions were reinforced at the implementation stage and French governments demonstrated the capacity to innovate and to recodify in accordance with national traditions.

Our second definition of Europeanisation was as a form of policy learning. This has the most relevance for understanding the Jospin government. Traditionally expansive French views of Europe depended upon a vision of Europe as an extension of France; hence the emphasis placed on exporting features of the French model for the benefit of others (Harmsen, 1996). There was evidence, however, not only that French elites were willing to incorporate external models, but also that important efforts were being undertaken to invent new discursive forms of legitimisation. This process has been developed furthest under the Jospin government, which has come the furthest in attempts to ‘positivise’ and optimise the European ‘constraint’ as being a opportunity for modernising French democracy. Moreover, the modesty at the heart of Jospin’s domestic political project has extended to a new realism concerning France’s role in Europe and the real world. This explains the pertinence of ideas and concepts such as those of swapping sovereignty for subsidiarity, and new definitions of federalism. While there remains much continuity in French European policy, there is therefore timely innovation and adaptation as well, as is required in a post-Gaullist and post-Mitterandist France.

In manners consistent with national traditions and changing political circumstances, similar problems of policy adaptation and ideological redefinition have presented themselves to center-left parties in office in Germany, Britain, France, Italy and elsewhere. Evolving in a manner consistent with party traditions, the French Socialist Party has adopted a position of pan-European activism. It has called for Keynesian relaunch at the European level, a concerted European effort against unemployment and tight political direction of the single currency through a powerful Euro XI committee. At the Malmo and Milan meetings of the PES, the French party occupied a more central position than the British. There was little stomach for the proselytising neo-liberal flexibility of the Blair administration. A resurgent French Socialist party has been reluctant to accept the cultural or ideological reference frames in vogue amongst certain other social-democratic parties (notably the mantra of labour flexibility), to the extent of being seen as ‘archaic’ by Anglo-Saxon commentators enamoured with Tony Blair and new Labour.
The Franco-British comparison could be pushed further. Attempts to define a new equilibrium for the European centre-left have sparked fraternal rivalries between Blair and Jospin in particular. In response to Blair’s ‘third way’ between the old left and the new right, Jospin has pointedly refused to define a new orientation between social-democracy and liberalism. While the new Labour enterprise was intended to demarcate the party from the perceived defeats and bankruptcy of traditional social-democracy, the French Socialist administration is in the process of discovering and refining a familiar social-democratic political style. While Blair looks to the international centre-left (to Clinton and the new Democrats in particular), and advocates reforming the policy environment to adapt to globalisation, Jospin’s activity has been focussed more firmly on reorientating the European centre-left towards a new equilibrium less favourable to globalised international exchanges and more resolutely favourable to EU-level and state public policy intervention. While the landmark reforms of the Jospin premiership have been implemented in the face of fierce business opposition, Blair appears more wary of espousing anti-business policies for fear of damaging a sustained effort at repositioning and repackaging an old party. Acting on the environment, embracing globalisation and increasing labour flexibility and employability are the key cognitive codes of the Blair universe. They find little echo in France.

While globalisation introduces a new form of macro-economic regulation, European integration provides a political arena whereby European polities (Social-democratic parties in particular) can combine their governance capacity to create (or strengthen) a European political, social and economic model. Given the weakness of the nation-state, the European arena is the only arena where politics can reinvent new forms of political regulation faced with economic globalisation. This underlies mainstream French perceptions of the single currency. It underpins the efforts of the Jospin government to strengthen social and employment policies at the European level. The credibility of such a perspective has increased with the dysfunctionning of the global economy and international financial markets in particular. Although the Jospin government is attempting to refine a new synthesis between national context, party tradition and policy evolution, it lies recognisably on the old left of the European centre-left spectrum.

Notes

1 Védrine’s speech on the Gouvernement’s European policy to the National Assembly on 2 December 1997.
2 Chirac's statement on Europe 1, 16 April 1998.
3 In the Nouvel Observateur of 28 May-3 June 1998, p. 45, Védrine explains in an interview that France can henceforth only continue to make its voice heard and shape major developments if it is 'more convincing, less declamatory, more determined and more realistic.'
Bibliography


