

# How supranational is supranationalism? National and European socialisation of negotiators in the Council of Ministers\*

by

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## Abstract

The central purpose of this paper is to explain why some officials involved in Council working groups have a more positive disposition towards European integration than others. The paper is inspired by the fact that many studies on European integration deal only occasionally with the attitudes and the ideas of the men and the women involved in daily negotiations. Consequently most studies employ member-states or European institutions (e.g. the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament) as central units of analysis and the description of European policy-making is therefore often based on a limited number of observations (small-N-analysis). In this paper we propose to disaggregate the Council in multiple observations, the officials involved in the Council working groups. In doing so we hope to obtain a more profound understanding of the Council negotiator's attitudes. This systematic empirical analysis leads to the conclusion that the interaction between domestic and transgovernemental experiences explains a significant proportion of the variance along the supranational-intergovernmental continuum.

## I. Introduction

The central aim of this paper is to explain why some officials involved in the Council working groups are more in favour of European integration than others. There are several reasons for this attention towards the origins of the negotiators' attitudes. First of all, in earlier contributions we showed that these attitudes are to some degree collectively held. We know that Northern European negotiators were less supranationalist than South Europeans and that the founding nations were more supranationalist than the newer member states (Beyers and Dierickx 1997). These succinct findings and descriptions of attitudes towards integration call, however, for a deeper and more thorough analysis. Are the factors north/south and founding member-state/newer member-state the only factors that explain the negotiators' position vis-à-vis the integration process? Or do we need to consider other factors as well? And more importantly *why* are some officials participating in the Council working groups more supranational than others?

Attitudes towards regional integration concern the level of governance (international, European, national, regional or local) considered to be the most appropriate for managing contemporary policy-problems. Roughly speaking, two groups will be distinguished: on the one hand those restraining extensive common policies and solutions and on the other hand those stimulating these policies by strengthening the role of EU-level policy-making. The first group can be considered as more intergovernmental, the second group as more supranational. Supranationalism is an attitudinal disposition

dealing with the question of whether or not supranational institutions are primordial to policy-makers or of 'how political authority should be organised within the European Union' (Hooghe 1999). The central dependent variable is thus where officials place supranational institutions in the policy-making process (Sinnott 1995).

There is one important assumption on which this paper rests: that attitudes are important for understanding human behaviour. This is not the same as positing a deterministic relation between attitudes and behaviour. In real life many other factors affect behavioural choices as well, however, a better insight in the origins of ideas, beliefs and attitudes can result in a better conception of policy-making behaviour itself. Moreover, as our data will show, the positioning of nations on the supranationalism-intergovernmentalism axis strongly conforms to what well-informed observers of EU-policy-making perceive as trends in the member states' behaviour. There seems to be at least a substantial correlation between attitudes and behaviour<sup>1</sup>. Since the central units of analysis are officials and more specifically their individual disposition vis-à-vis the integration process, this paper does not claim to render a better understanding of a concrete policy-events or the policy-making process itself. It is the variation of these individual attitudes on an intergovernmentalism-supranationalism scale which we intend to explain.

The intention of this contribution is not the construction of yet another integration theory or a new approach to studying European policy-making. Its objectives are much more limited and modest. In order to understand the reasons why some negotiators are more supranational than others two well-known approaches of studying EU-politics, liberal-intergovernmentalism and new-institutionalism are contrasted. From these approaches some hypotheses have been chosen and put to an empirical test. Basically two processes emerge as possible explanations: the principal-agency model viewing officials as member-states' agents and a socialisation perspective which posits that preferences, attitudes and interests are endogenously shaped and remoulded by the institutional setting to which officials belong. Firstly we will delve deeper into these two theoretical tracks. The third section presents the hypotheses to be tested. The fourth section describes the data and the variables to be used and finally, the aforementioned theoretical ideas are confronted with the relevant evidence.

## II. Explaining attitudes towards integration

### II.A. Officials as agents of the member-states

Previous research has shown that nationality is an important factor within the Council working groups (Beyers and Dierickx 1997; Beyers and Dierickx 1998). That officials

participating in Council working groups use nationality is not surprising in itself, since these officials prepare the decisions to be taken by their ministers. The Council itself therefore imposes the importance of nationality and formally the officials are delegated negotiators representing mainly national interests. Thus the attitudes of officials are related to the national institutions by which they are employed.

Within liberal intergovernmental thought this conceptualisation has been elaborated extensively (Moravcsik 1991; Moravcsik 1993). It claims that the actors involved in the Council working group work basically under a mandate of their state and that European negotiations evolve in two stages. This reasoning of state-centric models fits very well in a principal-agent logic; member-state governments are the principals instructing the agents, the national negotiators. The national interest is first determined and fixed in a domestic political game and then enters the fray of European negotiations only in a second phase. National representatives are involved in two different games: the domestic game and the European game. Putnam's two-level game has been used extensively to model this complex interaction between European and national decision-making (Putnam 1988).

Consequently the positions vis-à-vis European integration and the attitudes officials hold should be largely a function of some member-state characteristics. Liberal intergovernmentalists, for instance, claim that big countries and countries that hold outlier preferences on public good provisions are relatively reluctant about further integration (Moravcsik 1993). Smaller countries are considered to be more pro-integration oriented than larger ones, since smaller countries are more intensively affected by the consequences of internationalisation. Within the group of the bigger countries the case of the United Kingdom supports this view, but the case of Italy, however, traditionally a very pro-European member-state, refutes it. The Benelux countries have been given as a clear confirmation of the liberal intergovernmental small state hypothesis, though the case of Denmark rejects this view.

Socialisation is considered to be weak in liberal-intergovernmentalist thought. Participation in Council working groups will have no or only a little impact on the officials and it has no significant effect on the attitudes of negotiators. Their positions are determined at the national level and it is this level that functions as their primary source of socialisation; it is there that attitudes are formed. Furthermore national affiliations, interests and preferences are supposed to dominate the attitudes of officials and the strengthening or the prevalence of national identities should result in less supranational attitudes.

This paper will not reject the importance of national identities, neither will it claim that the participation in EU-settings results in national officials 'turning native'. We will show that national identities are important, but that these could strengthen supranationalism as well. One of the conclusions will be that the sign of the relationship between national affiliations and supranationalism as put forward by liberal-intergovernmentalists has to be reconsidered.

### II.B. A strong socialisation logic

Two strands in the research on European integration stress the importance of socialisation within a new emerging supranational polity. According to early neo-functionalists participation in this new polity causes actors to develop new perspectives and definitions of the situation (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). Several authors argue that the national civil servants involved in the working group meetings are exposed to a spirit of co-operation and mutual understanding, to an *esprit de corps* (Hayes-Renshaw, Lequesne, and Mayor-Lopez 1989; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1995; Pag 1987; Wessels 1991; Westlake 1995). Thus, member-state representatives are being socialised as European actors. They internalise the Community's decision-making norms and enhance their disposition towards more integrative decisions.

More recently neo-institutionalists have elaborated on socialisation. The central idea behind all neo-institutional thought is that the strategies and behaviour of actors are shaped by organisational and institutional settings. Neo-institutionalists differ on how preferences, interests, attitudes and identities originate and change. This paper fits within the so-called 'sociological' institutionalism which claims that norms and values are embedded within institutions and that individuals learn from their environment what their preferences ought to be (the logic of appropriateness) (March and Olsen 1984). Actors follow 'scripts' and 'templates' and delineate from this the most appropriate behaviour.

Important within a neo-institutional reflection on the EU is the idea that attitudes are dynamic rather than fixed; they change as a result of participation in political decision-making. The questions then are: does participation in the new polity lead to changing perceptions, and, how do institutions trigger these changes? Another important feature of recent conceptualisation is the idea that contemporary developments result in numerous horizontal and vertical relations between state and non-state actors and that different levels of governance interpenetrate and relate to each other. Thus the institutional setting in which actors operate lack a clear and well-defined hierarchical power centre (Schmitter 1996).

The neo-institutional conception, however, differs from the neo-functionalist view in several ways (Bulmer 1994; Bulmer 1997; Kerremans 1996; Pollack 1996). Contrary to the neo-functionalist view on socialisation, neo-institutionalists emphasise also the incapacity of institutions to shape the values, attitudes and political orientations of social actors. Institutional learning and socialisation takes time; individuals do not necessarily shift loyalty in response to a functional need<sup>2</sup>. Diverse institutional settings account for the influence over political values and it could be that various institutions affect values and orientations simultaneously. Officials do not behave in a purely national or supranational fashion and one single individual can have different roles and identities. Especially within the European Union with its fragmented multilevel governance, the diversity of institutional settings to which political actors belong makes it rather complicated to disentangle the sources of socialisation (Hooghe 1997; Marks 1996; Marks, Hooghe, and Blank 1996; Risse-Kappen 1996).

We will illustrate that national and European socialisation processes do not necessarily contradict each other and that on some occasions some national socialisation processes contribute to a positive disposition vis-à-vis supra-nationalism. The neo-functional idea that an increased participation in EU-affairs results in supra-nationalism will be relaxed, while the neo-institutional notion on the importance of socialisation as such will be confirmed. It is especially on the importance of national socialisation that we will focus, but contrary to the intergovernmental argumentation it will be shown that national socialisation does not necessarily result in intergovernmentalism.

### III. Hypotheses

These theoretical tracks enable us to test several hypotheses, which are summarised in table 1. First, it is hypothesised as to whether a variable has a positive or a negative effect on supranationalism. Second, the logic behind these supposed effects has to be disentangled; is there a strong socialisation logic, a weak one or a mixed one, that is a logic in which both socialisation and agency processes might be at work. Three sorts of variables will be distinguished: 1) transgovernmental experiences at the European level, 2) variables referring to the national political and administrative context of officials and 3) variables referring to individual experiences within the national political and administrative setting.

#### III.A. Experiences in Council working groups

Two sorts of experiences can be distinguished, both focusing on experiences in transnational settings: transgovernmental experiences and the more specific experience

which negotiators had with EU-affairs<sup>3</sup>. This variable is the workhorse for the proponents of the strong socialisation logic. In general it is supposed that transgovernmental experiences have a positive impact on supranationalism.

There are, however, different sorts of transgovernmental experiences, which could have a different impact on supranationalism. On the one hand, an official could have career experiences within an international organisation or a European institution and we can imagine that such experiences result in a positive disposition towards supranationalism<sup>4</sup>. On the other hand, an official could have worked within a diplomatic representation or an embassy. Consequently we can question whether such experience is really transgovernmental and whether it will strengthen supranationalism. One could equally presume that these experiences strengthen intergovernmentalism since diplomats are officially assumed to be experts in representing and defending national interests abroad.

Furthermore one could argue that transgovernmental experiences as such are not that important because the transgovernmental setting of the European Union is so manifestly different from other transgovernmental settings that the unique experience of being involved in European affairs counts more than any other factor. By the time one gets more involved in the peculiarities of European policy-making, one learns that political processes within the European Union are substantially different from proceedings going on in traditional international organisations or from the policy-making processes in domestic settings. The consequence is that the traditional implementing role of diplomats and civil servants transforms gradually into a policy-making role and that the definition of 'national interest' becomes more dependent on interactions taking place within the working groups than being uniquely dependent upon domestic interactions.

### III.B. The national context of officials

#### **North South**

A reading of recent and less recent articles on European policy-making points to the fact that many authors employ implicitly or explicitly the North-South distinction as a tool for understanding EU-politics<sup>5</sup>. One question closely related to the North-South issue concerns whether perceived economic benefits stimulate supranationalism. In essence the European integration project is still heavily an economic project for which support can be evaluated in the light of the benefits which participants receive from it. The Internal Market Program and EMU originated from a bargain between countries benefiting from a large free trade area and those benefiting from the extension of redistributive structural policies<sup>6</sup>. The fact that the importance of supranational integration in the sense of an increased redistribution between the 'haves' and 'have-nots' is to the advantage of the

Southern states (e.g. regional and structural policies) should stimulate an overall positive disposition towards supranationalism. This positive effect of being South-European points to a conception of negotiators representing hard-edged national economic interests and a weak socialisation logic.

Nevertheless, it is possible to understand the North-South hypothesis from a strong socialisation logic as well. Egeberg, following Hofstede, hypothesises that Northern Europeans are culturally more adapted to Weberian forms of administration, which implies that they are more capable of making an abstraction of idiosyncratic socio-cultural characteristics (Egeberg 1996; Hofstede 1991; Hofstede 1994). Southerners are more attached to group norms and define themselves more as members of collectives, which could imply that they assign more weight to the preferences of their mother country and to solutions that are successful at home. This leads to a less supranational position and reflects a strong socialisation logic.

### **Size**

Following Hooghe we hypothesise that negotiators coming from small polities may favour supranationalism more than negotiators representing the bigger member-states (Hooghe 1999). Smaller states' representatives know that their country is more intensely affected by the consequences of internationalisation and therefore they adapt themselves more to the fact that national policy alternatives are largely constrained. Consequently supranationalism is an option for these countries. Socialisation implies then that officials coming from smaller states have learned that supranationalism is an adequate adaptation to externalities. A positive effect of size on supranationalism means that size constrains the range of national options and leads to a limited esteem for sovereignty.

The logic at work behind this supposed effect of size is less obvious. A positive effect of size is also expected within liberal-intergovernmentalism, which focuses on the fact that 'national interests would lead one to expect large, self-sufficient and uncompetitive countries... to be relatively unwilling to accept stronger supranational institutions...' while 'smaller countries might be expected to support strong supranational power.' (Moravcsik 1993). To conclude, despite its interpretation (socialisation or defending the national position) the expected effect of size should be positive for both approaches.

### **Length of membership**

Another hypothesis to be found in the literature is that the general public of founding member states has a more supranational attitude than that of the newer member-states (Anderson and Shawn Reichert 1996; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993). Similarly one could

argue that the longer a state is a member of the European Union, the more experiences its civil service has had with it and that this makes the internalisation of supranational values and norms more feasible.

The weakness of such a simple dichotomous concept is that it abstracts the time spirit and the motivation of the candidate at the moment of entrance (Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996; Hooghe 1999). The founding member-states (Benelux, France, Germany and Italy) founded the European institutions during a period characterised by a permissive consensus and they had more socialisation opportunities or years to learn the peculiarities of European policy-making. States that entered in the first wave (United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark) were at the moment of their entrance reluctant about supranationalism and we assume, therefore, that these member-states did not appoint supranational officials in the working groups. On the contrary, there are good reasons for assuming that they charged the most intergovernmental ones with representation and negotiation tasks. Although these officials had more time to become socialised than those whom entered the EU at a later stage, they started off as more intergovernmental than the Southern states (Spain, Portugal and Greece) which became members in the second wave. The latter favoured supranational policies (e.g. the extension of social and structural policies) from the very beginning.

Also in this case the logic is mixed. On the one hand there is the time of experience with the European Union; this refers to a strong socialisation logic. On the other hand it is possible that different member-state governments appointed different sorts of officials and in doing so constrained socialisation opportunities by purpose.

### **National elite orientations**

Hooghe hypothesises that the views of Commission officials may be a reflection of values shared by the respective national elites (Hooghe 1999). Indeed most officials received their training and political education within national political systems. Thus, national civil servants and diplomats learned the appropriate values and orientations within the national elite to which they belong.

A national negotiator can also be considered as an agent to whom national politicians have delegated the competence to perform tasks, in accordance with orientations around which a national political elite has found a national elite consensus. Also Hooghe situates her hypothesis concerning national elite orientations within a principal-agent logic, which implies that national governments (the principals of the European Commission) will try to constrain the power of the European Commission

(the agent of the national governments) (Hooghe 1999).

Again, whether we interpret this effect as a socialisation effect or as that of purposive negotiators' instructing, the sign of the effect should be positive, that is the more a national elite favours supranationalism, the more negotiators with the same nationality are pro supra-national integration.

### **The structure of the national polity**

Finally, the structure of the national polity and whether constitutional features, territorial decentralisation and the role of regions in the central government affect the officials' view will be analysed. The hypothesis is that negotiators representing federal polities have fewer difficulties in adapting themselves to a supra-national way of policy-making, because they are used to operating within a multilevel governance system at home. Hooghe says: 'EU governance merely adds another protective layer of structuring, which pushes back the uncertain external environment.' (Hooghe 1999). As a consequence, socialisation takes less time and effort. This variable refers to a strong socialisation logic.

There is another reason why federalism could stimulate supranational attitudes. One could assume that negotiators representing federal systems are more dependent on complex domestic co-ordination procedures than those representing more unitary systems. The former have the difficult task of taking multiple interests into account. In such a situation supranationalism eases the negotiators' work since it expresses a good deal of diffuse support for the initiatives and proposals of the European Commission. As a result, less co-ordination with, and control by, the various domestic authorities is needed (Dierickx and Beyers 1999). After all, a defensive stance against European integration, such as the British or the Norwegian one, requires more effort, more co-ordination and more control, a situation that officials from federal polities might try to avoid (Egeberg and Trondal 1999).

### III. C. Officials' individual experiences with national politics

#### **Work experiences within the national polity**

In contrast with the hypothesised positive effect of EU-experiences on supranationalism, we suppose that the longer officials served in a national administration, the lower their supranational disposition. Service in a national administration increases the chance that a negotiator internalised the values inherent to a domestic administrative and political system (Hooghe 1998).

## **National political and administrative culture**

The final hypothesis to be tested is the innovator/escapists hypothesis (Martinotti and Stefanizzi 1995). The idea is that some negotiators are critical about the deficiencies of their own political system and that they therefore develop a positive expectation vis-à-vis European integration. This idea has been explored in public opinion research and it has appeared in other studies as well (Anderson 1995; Hoffmann 1966; Hooghe 1999; Martinotti and Stefanizzi 1995). A traditional example in this respect is Italy, where both the elite and public opinion are largely supportive of European integration and where the state is relatively weak and considered to be unstable<sup>7</sup>.

## IV. Data and research design

### IV.A. Sample

In the first half of 1994 Belgian civil servants representing their country in, at that time, about 170 working groups of the Council of Ministers, were interviewed<sup>89</sup>. About 110 Belgian civil servants from specialised ministries participated in the working groups on a part-time basis, which implies that they only occasionally dealt with the Council working groups. To this should be added a total of 21 diplomats and 13 civil servants who were part of the Belgian Permanent Representation, and also some 15 diplomats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in all 49. At the time of the interviews the 13 civil servants belonging to the Belgian Permanent Representation functioned as liaison officials for the federal ministries of Agriculture, Finance, Transport, Development Aid, Foreign Trade, Economic Affairs, and Environment. These 49 diplomats and civil servants of the Permanent Representation and Foreign Affairs are involved in Council working groups on a full-time basis. With respect to European policy-making the full-timers have been more exposed to the peculiarities of the European policy-making setting than part-timers. Of this estimated population of 159 Belgian civil servants and diplomats (110+49) a sample of 65 part-timers and 30 full-timers was drawn. The total number of diplomats and civil servants in the Permanent Representations of the (then) 12 member states can be estimated as 300. Moreover 108 respondents representing the other member states of the European Union were interviewed.

The subsequent multivariate analyses will be carried out on two sub-samples: on the one hand we consider a multinational group sampled on the basis of their involvement in some working groups and on the other hand the Belgians are considered as a separate sample. The first sub-sample matches the first column and the second sub-sample is composed of the first row of table 2. Both sub-samples enable us to make two important comparisons. In the Belgian sample we can compare full-timers with part-timers, while in the multinational sample North and South Europeans, small and large member states,

older and newer member states can be compared. From a data-analytic viewpoint both comparisons are independent from each other. However the theoretical perspective makes a look into two different samples an interesting enterprise.

INSERT TABLE 2 HERE

#### IV.B. Measuring supranationalism

Three items (see table 3) were employed in order to measure supranationalism. They deal mainly with the proceedings within the working groups of the Council and imply the strengthening of European policies and the European institutions in general. An objection could be that these items do not refer to the role and the functioning of other institutions as for instance the Commission or the Parliament. However, we assume that since these items concern the concrete task and mission that a Council official has to perform, they fit well within the concept that we intend to measure.

The stimuli all appeal to the willingness and preparedness to strengthen EU-level policy-making and the relative autonomy of the EU-level vis-à-vis the member-states. This measurement instrument does not assume à priori that the Council is by definition something intergovernmental. Indeed some elements in the Council proceedings are more intergovernmental (e.g. when unanimity voting is required) than others (e.g. when qualified majority voting is possible). Whether the Council functions in a more intergovernmental or a more supranational way is, according to our viewpoint, also dependent on the national representatives' attitudes. Some are in favour of more extensive common policies, while others oppose this.

A first look at the univariate distributions in table 3 shows a rather high degree of dissensus among the non-Belgians concerning proceedings within the working groups. Roughly speaking two groups can be distinguished: on the one hand those restraining extensive common policies and solutions and on the other those stimulating these by strengthening the role of EU-level policy-making. The Belgians clearly belong to the second group. A principal factor analysis was carried in order to find out whether the three items belong to one dimension<sup>10</sup>. Table 4 shows for the two sub-samples the loadings of a principal factor analysis resulting into one factor.

INSERT TABLE 3 AND 4 HERE

#### IV.C. Operationalising the independent variables

*Transgovernmental experience:* The number of years a respondent was involved in the

various working groups is taken as an indicator of transgovernmental experience. For the non-Belgians this is on average 9 years, for the Belgian full-timers 12 year and the Belgian part-timers 11 years.

*Size:* Size is measured by a simple dichotomous variable dividing the multinational sample into small and large countries. Respondents representing a country with a population smaller or equal to 15 million were labelled small (Ireland, Denmark, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Portugal and Greece, N=63), others were labelled large (France, Germany, United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, N=57).

*North-South:* For North-South we have chosen the distinction of Hofstede (Hofstede 1991; Hofstede 1994), which divides the multinational sample into 'North Europeans' (Germans, Danish, Dutch, British, Irish and Luxemburgers, N=55) and 'South Europeans' (Belgian, French, Portuguese, Spanish, Italian and Greek, N=65).

*Length of membership:* We construct a theoretical variable which posits a priori that supranationalism should decrease in the following way: the founding member-states should express themselves as the most supranationalist, the states that entered in the second wave are less supranationalist than the founding members, but considerably more supranationalist than the states that entered in the first wave. Concomitantly, the original members received a code 1, those belonging to the second enlargement were coded 2 and the first wave received a 3, indicating the rising level of intergovernmentalism to be expected.

*National elite orientation:* For testing whether the views expressed by our respondents are similar to those shared by the national elite we propose, in order to make results comparable, exactly the same indicator as Hooghe, which is based on the Eurobarometer elite survey of 1996 (see table 7) (Eurobarometer 1996; Hooghe 1999). A high score on this index points to a supranationalist nation, while a low score refers to an intergovernmental attitude.

*Federalism:* The last aggregate variable is again similar to the variable Hooghe employed for describing the extent to which a polity is federalised (Hooghe 1999). With this index (see table 8b) countries are coded on basis of constitutional characteristics, territorial decentralisation and the role of regions in the central government. A high score (7) indicates an extensive level of federalism, while a low score (0) describes more centralised and unitary states.

*Organisational self-esteem*: The disposition vis-à-vis the national polity is made operational with the help of the scale organisational self-esteem. The relevant items and factor-loadings are presented in table 5. Elsewhere the semantics of this scale and its relation with administrative culture were discussed more fully (Beyers and Dierickx 1997; Dierickx and Beyers 1999). From previous research we know that the organisational self-esteem is very low among the Belgians and especially among the Belgian part-timers.

*Work experiences in the national polity*: Finally we take the number of years a respondent served the national administration as a measure of domestic career experiences. Non-Belgian negotiators served their state on average 16 years, while for the Belgian full-timers the average is 21 years and for the Belgian part-timers it is 19 years.

INSERT TABLE 5 HERE

### I. Testing the hypotheses

The proposed hypotheses are examined in two steps. First, we look at the bivariate relations between the independent variables and supranationalism. For the multivariate analysis we propose to employ an analysis of co-variance (ANCOVA) which takes interaction-effects more explicitly into account.

#### V.A. Bivariate Analysis

It turns out that within the Belgian sample transgovernmental experiences are not a factor to be considered. In both sub-samples the relation is weak and not significant. This points to the fact that negotiators' attitudes are, at least in the Belgian case, not necessarily shaped by long experiences in EU-affairs.

In the multinational sample national factors proved to be the most predictive. Southern Europeans are more favourable towards supranational solutions ( $\bar{x} = -0.09$ ) than their Northern European colleagues ( $\bar{x} = 0.68$ ). And as expected the founding member-states' representatives ( $\bar{x} = -0.12$ ) are still more attached to the ideal of European integration than the newcomers ( $\bar{x} = 0.60$ ). The hypothesis that the point of entrance has an impact is confirmed by a strong correlation. Representatives of states that entered in the second wave are considerably more supranational ( $\bar{x} = 0.18$ ) than those that entered in the first wave ( $\bar{x} = 1.02$ ).

INSERT TABLE 6 AND 7 HERE

Also the relationship between national elite orientations and the respondents' attitudes is

strong. Table 7 gives an overview for all nationalities in the multinational sample and relates the data to the point of entrance. In general most nationalities fit within the general trend to be discovered by our bivariate data-analysis. The Belgians and Italians belong to the most convinced supporters of supranationalism and the British and the Danish are strongly attached to intergovernmentalism. There are two deviations for which we do not have a clear explanation. The less pro-European stance of the Portuguese national elite is not reflected in our sample, in which the Portuguese belong, as expected by some of our hypotheses, to the supranational camp. The opposite holds for the Germans. The German national elite belongs, as supposed by several of our hypotheses, to the supra-national group, but this is not the case for the German officials<sup>11</sup>.

The bivariate relations with organisational self-esteem and experiences in the national civil service confirm that national socialisation experiences are important. But the sign of the relations is not always what we expected. The analysis shows, as hypothesised, that a low organisational self-esteem stimulates supranationalism. This is especially the case for the Belgian sample. However, the multinational sample shows that the longer an official has worked within national settings, the more he favours supranationalism, a result which runs counter to our expectations.

Finally, before we turn to a co-variance analysis we would like to focus the readers' attention on two variables, federalism and size, that had a significant and substantial effect in Hooghe's research on Commission officials (Hooghe 1999). In our sample, these variables are insignificantly associated with supranationalism.

There is a difference between respondents negotiating on behalf of small states and those representing bigger state, but the difference is not statistically significant. So size seems to be less important than hypothesised. Furthermore supranationalism should increase as the level of territorial decentralisation increases. The data do not confirm this idea though. Tables 8a and 8b show the levels of supranationalism for diverse levels of federalism. It is clear that the three most federal polities (Germany, Spain and Belgium) express themselves as the most supranational, but there are considerable differences among these three. Furthermore, respondents of some non-federal polities (France and Italy) situate themselves more on the supranational than on the intergovernmental side and unitary systems are barely more intergovernmental than non-unitary polities.

INSERT TABLE 8 HERE

## V.B. Analysis of Co-variance

### **The misleading character of bivariate analysis**

Before we turn to the results of a co-variance analysis we will show with some simple examples the misleading character of the previous analysis.

First of all, interaction effects must be taken into account. Remember that we concluded, on the basis of bivariate statistics, that territorial decentralisation or federalism and size are not related to supranationalism. It could be, however, that the overall relation between territorial decentralisation and supranationalism fades out as a consequence of the fact that the strength of this relationship is affected by the size of the respondents' polity. The smaller a country, the more its decentralised character will affect supranationalism and the larger a country the less decentralisation will be related to supranationalism. This means, we hypothesise, an interaction-effect of size and federalism on supranationalism. A first glance at the correlations between federalism and supranationalism within the subgroups of larger and smaller countries confirms the idea that federalism is positively related to supranationalism ( $r=0.36$ ,  $p=0.0041$ ) within the former subgroup and that it has no importance in the latter ( $r=0.08$ ,  $p=0.5443$ ).

INSERT TABLE 9 HERE

Second, disaggregating aggregated data has the disadvantage that it can lead to misinterpretations of results. In table 9 we compare the correlations of the 5 macro-variables for aggregated and disaggregated data. Part A shows the association of a measurement at the respondents' level ( $N=120$ ) and part B the correlations for the aggregated data ( $N=12$ , which is the real measurement level). In general, correlations in the multinational sample are higher than in the aggregated sample. Even more important are the decreasing p-values; the lower p-values in the multinational sample are a consequence of the lower standard errors, which are, in turn, a result of the fact that the number of observations is artificially increased by disaggregating data. We tend to accept, therefore, relations between contextual variables at the respondents' level too easily, relations which do not exist in a similar magnitude at the real measurement level of these variables. To put it differently, there is a danger of overestimating the effect of nation-specific variables while underestimating individual level variables<sup>12</sup>.

Finally, the use of aggregate data leads to the danger of measuring very similar empirical aspects with different operationalisations. In table 9 the national elite-orientations are strongly related to the period of entrance. In the founding member states the national

elite is still more supranationalist than in the newer members states. Among the latter a distinction can be made between the first wave and the second wave of which the latter are more supranationalist than the former. This is the case for both aggregate and the disaggregated data and it implies that we have to be careful with an analysis carried out with these two independent variables since they risk to create collinearity. The same observation can be made for the North-South distinction, which is strongly associated with the point of entrance and national-elite orientations. The second enlargement was only composed of Southern European states and the first consisted only of northern countries. These features of the data force us a) to limit our ambitions for the multinational sample to carefully chosen independent categorical variables, namely size, federalism and point of entrance, and b) to be cautious with the interpretation of effects.

### **An analysis of co-variance**

#### The Belgian sample

It is important to keep in mind that the variance on supranationalism is substantially lower within the Belgian sample than in the multinational sample. The standard deviation equals 1.07 in the multinational sample, while the same coefficient is only 0.79 in the Belgian sample. Because of the relative pro-European and homogenous character of the Belgian sample the proportion of explained variance is not expected to be very high.

For the Belgian sample we also make a distinction between full-timers and part-timers, two groups that are substantially different with respect to their working group experiences. Consistent with the hypothesis on transgovernmental experiences we expect that full-timers are more pro-European than part-timers.

Two models were tested (see table 10). The significance of model 1 and 2 does not differ very much, so we will interpret the interaction effect of involvement and organisational self-esteem. Table 11 displays the average supranationalism by working group involvement and organisational self-esteem.

INSERT TABLES 10 AND 11 HERE

The importance of a national socialisation factor, namely organisational self-esteem is confirmed. This factor has a bivariate (see table 6) and a first order effect on supranationalism (see model 1 table 10). In general a low organisational self-esteem stimulates supranationalism. For a profound substantive interpretation, however, we have to take the experiences with EU-affairs into account. The involvement within the working groups as such does not explain supranationalism, but the relation between

organisational self-esteem and supranationalism changes as a consequence of involvement in the working groups. As can be seen in table 11 the less an official was involved in the working groups, the more his low self-esteem goes together with supranationalism.

### The multinational sample

For the multinational sample two models were tested; one without interaction terms and one with. In model 1, without interaction terms, only two factors had an effect: work experience in national settings and period of entrance. According to the second model we have to interpret two interaction terms of which one is a third-order-effect. For the interpretation of the results we turn to table 13, parts A to C.

INSERT TABLE 12 AND 13 HERE

The effort of the interaction of size and federalism on supranationalism is rather complicated because the interaction-effect does not follow a clear linear trend. On the one hand, the data show that federalism as such does not necessarily fit with supranationalism. Representatives of smaller polities are more supranational if they belong to a federal system (the Belgians) but this result is mixed for the unitary systems: the Dutch, Luxemburgers, Greek and Irish are more supranational but Danish respondents are, despite the size of their country, more intergovernmental. The bigger non-unitary member-states show a more supra-national disposition than British respondents. So here it seems that territorial decentralisation strengthens supranationalism. However, the Germans and the Spanish express themselves as less supranationalist than was expected on theoretical grounds.

Then there is a rather complex third-order-effect. In order to keep the interpretation accessible we concentrate on the two second-order-effects, which are encapsulated in the third-order effect. The third-order-effect simply points to the fact that the two effects do not contradict each other.

The hypothesis of the founding member-states as the most supranationalist, the states that entered the EU in the second wave as holding an intermediate position and the first wave as the most intergovernmentalist is confirmed. However, within the three waves there are considerable differences when it comes to national career experience. A long experience as a national civil servant stimulates supranationalism for the founding member states. For respondents belonging to the second wave the difference is less outspoken. The opposite is observed for negotiators belonging to the first wave: less experience in domestic administrations attenuates intergovernmentalism. We obtain a

similar picture when we look at the working group experiences. For those belonging to the first wave, working group involvement does not relax their intergovernmentalism, while it stimulates the supranationalism of the founding member states and the second wave.

This leads to two conclusions. Firstly, our hypothesis concerning the point of entrance is confirmed. Founding member-states have had more socialisation opportunities in European affairs and their representatives are consequently convinced of supranationalism. For representatives of the first wave, a limited exposure to the national administration weakens intergovernmentalism, but extensive involvement in the working groups does not stimulate more supranationalism. This confirms the hypothesis that the transgovernmental socialisation opportunities of those belonging to the first wave are constrained. In comparison to the first wave, socialisation turns out to be more successful for the second wave.

Secondly, we need to reformulate the initial hypothesis concerning the negative impact of domestic career socialisation on supranationalism. To start with, involvement in the working groups is related to national career socialisation. This points to the fact that transgovernmental socialisation opportunities in EU-affairs are likely to depend on career socialisation within national polities<sup>13</sup>. Only for negotiators of the first wave does experience in national settings attenuate intergovernmentalism. National socialisation matters, but it does not necessarily matter in the sense that was hypothesised.

Furthermore, the strength of involvement in the working groups should not be overestimated. This can not be directly inferred from our analysis of the multinational sample. Within the Belgian sample, however, we observe the importance of a national socialisation factor in the form of organisational self-esteem. This factor stimulates supranationalism among those who are less exposed to EU-affairs (the part-time officials). Thus a negative disposition towards the national apparatus has a positive effect on supranationalism, and this effect is more outspoken among those with less European experience.

## VI. Conclusion and discussion

Supranational attitudes are substantially affected by an interaction between domestic and transgovernmental experiences. The analysis shows that an extensive career within the national administration does not necessarily have a negative effect on supranationalism. On the contrary, we found that in some occasions the officials with more domestic

administrative experience proved to be more supranational than those with less national experience. This effect interacts with the point at which a member state entered the European Union and the socialisation opportunities this created for negotiators. For the founding member-states a long experience in the national civil service strengthens the transgovernmental socialisation opportunities in EU-affairs, which in turn has a positive effect on supranationalism. The respondents belonging to the first wave (the Irish, British and Danish) are still affected by a negative mood towards integration and consequently intense involvement in working groups does not have the expected positive effect. On the contrary, in this case those with limited national experience are a bit less intergovernmentalist. Finally, negotiators belonging to the second wave are positively affected by transgovernmental socialisation opportunities. In their case, experience in national settings does not matter very much and the higher the number of years they have been involved in working groups the more supranationalism is stimulated.

In order to understand supranationalism fully we have to conclude that the national political and administrative culture has to be taken into account. This is reflected convincingly in the Belgian sample where a negative disposition vis-à-vis the national polity results in more supranational positions. This observation points to a socialisation logic that is at work and it fits within the neo-institutional view that socialisation is not necessarily a functional process. It is not only because Belgians consider the EU as more efficient or effective that they are supranational. It is also a matter of their socialisation within the national political and administrative apparatus.

We cannot conclude that those used to less centralised decision-making within their home countries are more attracted by supranational decision making. This observation, however, does not imply that the formal institutional structure of the national polity does not matter. We infer this from considerations about the national polity made extensively by Belgian officials in 23 qualitative interviews. These Belgians emphasised that the constitutional reforms in Belgium had the most pervasive impact on their work. In contrast, the increasing impact of the European institutions was mentioned in only one interview. These qualitative interviews also showed that constitutional reforms are experienced negatively. Especially in the Belgian federal administration complaints about the increased complexity of the administrative and political system prevailed; the interplay between different agencies is not efficient or absent; the involvement of a large number of ministries 'increases the probability of bad instructions'. Another indication of the impact of the structure of national polities on views about EU-governance comes from our Italian respondents. Italians belong to a large, non-federal state, and they should therefore be disposed to intergovernmentalism. Together with the Belgians, however, the

Italians belong to the most supranational group and although their constitutional systems are very different, both belong to very fragmented polities characterised by many cross-cutting cleavages.

The non-interpretable effect of federalism implies that the hypothesis concerning federalism needs careful reconsideration. Are negotiators belonging to federal polities indeed convinced that multilevel governance is more effective and are they really more accustomed to policymaking at multiple levels? The scale of organisational self-esteem is a good starting point for elaborating on this. Belgians belong to one of the most decentralised and federalised polities of Western Europe. However, they are not unanimously convinced that their national multilevel system is efficient and effective and we cannot conclude that their political culture is well adapted to policymaking at multiple levels (Dierickx and Beyers 1999). Equally we can hypothesise that Italian respondents, for instance, are more supranational, not in spite of the absence of federalism, but because they consider their system as too centralised and thus, according to their views, as lacking efficiency and effectiveness.

In fact the problem with measuring federalism is also linked with the complications of using aggregate data. Is the federalism index an adequate operationalisation of polity-fragmentation? And more importantly, does it say something about how negotiators perceive their domestic polity? For fragmented (or small) polities, supranationalism could be an option in order to structure an uncertain environment (Hooghe 1999), but it remains unclear whether individual negotiators are also convinced about this. Are officials from federal polities really used to rule making at multiple levels? Hence, federalism is not necessarily a sufficient indicator of fragmentation. In fact when we employed federalism as an indicator we considered this contextual feature as an individual attribute of a respondent. The question however must go deeper and concentrate on the intervening mechanism between social structure and individual attitudes.

Finally, we must admit that our inquiry has still an explorative character and that probably more data is needed in order to confirm or falsify the proposed hypotheses. It would have been formidable if we disposed a similar sample of about 60 part-timers for all member-states. Comparisons and measurement would have been more elaborate and from a data-analytic viewpoint more sophisticated testing would become possible. Of course every research undertaking is partly an individual effort, but we think that more transnational links and talks could stimulate progress. For the sake of comparability we borrowed extensively from Hooghe's very interesting paper, but while doing this we

regretted that we did not employ the same items and measurements in order to make results even more comparable. We did not include the variables that Hooghe used for testing principal-agency hypotheses, although this factor could have been more important for our sample (member-state officials) than for her sample (Commission officials). In a similar manner we employed factors as organisational self-esteem which could have been promising for Hooghe's sample. Let these final words not only be a regret or a critique, but rather a plea for more cumulative empirical research by strengthening transnational co-ordination and co-operation.

## TABLES

Table 1: Summary of the main hypotheses and operationalisation of independent variables

Independent variables	Supposed Effects	Logic	Operationalisation
<b>Transgovernmental experience</b>			
Experience in the working groups	Positive	Strong socialisation	Years of participation in the Council
<b>National contextual factors</b>			
South-European	Positive/negative	Mixed	Hofstede's distinction
Size	Positive	Mixed	Dichotomous variable based on a population criterion
Point of entrance	Positive	Mixed	Member-states divided in three waves
National elite attitude	Positive	Mixed	Eurobarometer Elite Survey (1996)
Federal polity	Positive	Strong socialisation	Indicator employed by Hooghe
<b>National experience</b>			
Low organisational self-esteem	Positive	Strong socialisation	Seven items in table 5
Work-experience in national settings	Negative	Strong socialisation	Years spent in the domestic state sector

Mixed: these effects are interpretable from both a strong and a weak socialisation (principal-agency) logic.

Table 2: Distribution of respondents (N)

	13 Working Groups	Other Belgian Full-timers	Belgian Part-timers
Belgium	12	18	65
Great Britain	11		
Denmark	10		
Germany	12		
France	12		
Greece	8		
Eire	10		
Italy	11		
Luxemburg	4		
Netherlands	8		
Portugal	11		
Spain	11		
Totals	120	18	65

Table 3: Attitudes towards European integration, univariate statistics (percentages, means and standard deviations)

	Agree..... disagree						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	
GUIDE. In the working groups, the European Commission and the national representatives should take an active part in drawing up guidelines for the policies of Member States.	26.1	17.5	18.4	10.5	11.4	15.8	Multinational sample ( $\bar{x} = 3.40, s = 1.78$ )
	48.4	22.1	14.7	5.3	6.3	3.2	Belgian sample ( $\bar{x} = 2.08, s = 1.39$ )
DIREC. In the working groups the representatives should develop a strong common policy and lay down clear directions for the national governments.	21.2	15.9	15.0	12.4	20.4	15.0	Multinational sample ( $\bar{x} = 3.41, s = 1.66$ )
	36.2	27.7	20.2	7.4	4.3	4.3	Belgian sample ( $\bar{x} = 2.29, s = 1.36$ )
EXECU. In my opinion, in the working groups we should work towards a strongly united policy which strengthens the executive role of the European Institutions.	18.9	13.5	18.0	18.0	19.8	11.7	Multinational sample ( $\bar{x} = 3.41, s = 1.66$ )
	30.9	18.1	27.7	11.7	8.5	3.1	Belgian sample ( $\bar{x} = 2.59, s = 1.42$ )

Table 4: Supra-Nationalism (factor-loadings)

	Belgians (N=95)	Multinational sample (N=120)
GUIDE	0.63	0.56
DIREC	0.60	0.79
EXECU	0.49	0.76
Eigenvalue	1.00	1.52

Table 5: Organisational Self-Esteem (all 5-point scales, factor-loadings)

	Belgians (N=95)	Multinational sample (N=120)
1. The internal co-ordination of the viewpoints of the different ministries in our country is chaotic.	0.68	0.76
2. In the administrations of my country there is not sufficient training for officials who have to take part in negotiations at a European level.	0.59	0.48
3. It often happens that I am not quite certain what point of view I should put forward in the working groups.	0.68	0.71
4. For officials it is very important that the preparation of a policy is easily surveyable. The structure of the administration in our country does not always add to this effect.	0.69	0.60
5. Most Member States prepare themselves more thoroughly for the negotiations in Brussels than we do.	0.52	0.56
6. I only learnt how I had to deal with complicated European dossiers as I went along.	0.49	0.56
7. I always get very clear instructions from my ministry or my department as to what position I should take up.	0.59	0.61
Eigenvalue	2.60	2.68

Table 6: Bivariate correlations of independent variables with supranationalism (correlations,  $p < 0.05$ ; ns = statistically not significant)

Independent variables	Multinational sample (N=120)	Belgian sample (N=95)
<b>Transgovernmental experience (individual level data)</b>		
Experience in the working groups	Ns	Ns
<b>National experience (aggregate level data)</b>		
South-European	0.37	No variance
Size	Ns	No variance
Length of membership	0.43	No variance
National elite positive towards integration	-0.47	No variance
Federal polity	Ns	No variance
<b>National experience (individual level data)</b>		
Low organisational self-esteem	-0.19	-0.29
Work-experience in national settings	-0.22	ns

Table 7: Nationality, enlargement, elite orientations and supra-nationalism

Nationality	Point of entrance	Average elite attitude (Eurobarometer Elite Survey of 1996)	Averages multinational sample (rank)
Belgian	Founder	1.74	-0.91 (1)
Italian	Founder	1.24	-0.27 (2)
Greek	Second Wave	0.96	-0.19 (3)
German	Founder	0.71	0.67 (8)
Spanish	Second Wave	0.52	0.59 (7)
Dutch	Founder	0.33	-0.19 (3)
French	Founder	0.08	0.25 (6)
Luxemburgian	Founder	-0.17	-0.04 (4)
Britain	First Wave	-0.33	0.95 (10)
Irish	First Wave	-0.52	0.69 (9)
Portuguese	Second Wave	-0.71	0.04 (5)
Danish	First Wave	-1.74	1.47 (11)

Table 8a. Federal, Non-Unitary, Unitary Polities and Supra-nationalism (multinational sample, N=120, averages)

Federal polities (Belgium, Germany and Spain)	0.07
Decentralised polities (Italy, Denmark, France and Portugal)	0.32
Unitary polities (Netherlands, Luxemburg, Greece, Ireland, and the UK)	0.35

Table 8b. Supranationalism by Federalism

7 (Belgium)	-0.91
6 (Germany)	0.67
5 (Spain)	0.59
2 (Portugal, Denmark, Italy and France)	0.32
1 (United Kingdom)	0.95
0 (Netherlands, Luxemburg, Ireland and Greece)	0.12

Table 9: Aggregated and disaggregated data (correlations,  $p < 0.05$  ; ns = statistically not significant)

Part A: Desaggregated (multinational sample, N=120)

	Entrance	Elite-orientations	Size	North-South
Elite-orientations	-0.71 ( $p=0.0001$ )			
Size	0.21 ( $p=0.0189$ )	-0.24 ( $p=0.0096$ )		
North-South	0.40 ( $p=0.0001$ )	-0.50 ( $p=0.0001$ )	0.10 ( $p=0.2553$ )	
Federalism	-0.41 ( $p=0.0001$ )	0.51 ( $p=0.0001$ )	-0.26 ( $p=0.0045$ )	-0.27 ( $p=0.0024$ )

Part B: Aggregated (N=12)

	Entrance	Elite-orientations	Size	North-South
Elite-orientations	-0.66 ( $p=0.0185$ )			
Size	0.30 ( $p=0.3409$ )	-0.27 ( $p=0.3868$ )		
North-South	0.30 ( $p=0.3409$ )	-0.50 ( $p=0.0936$ )	0.00 ( $p=1.0000$ )	
Federalism	-0.31 ( $p=0.32661$ )	0.46 ( $p=0.1360$ )	-0.18 ( $p=0.5814$ )	-0.32 ( $p=0.3119$ )

Table 10: Co-variance analysis on the Belgian sample

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2
Experience in the working groups	Ns	Ns
Organisational self-esteem	9.54	Ns
Work experience in national settings	Ns	Ns
Full-timers/part-timers	Ns	Ns
Interaction effects		
Interaction: organisational self-esteem and level of involvement	Not tested	4.84
Model evaluation		
	F=2.90 (df=4, $p=0.0266$ ) $R^2=0.12$	F=2.90 (df=4, $p=0.0266$ ) $R^2=0.12$

N=95,  $p < 0.05$ ; ns = statistically not significant

Table 11: Supra-nationalism by involvement and organisational self-esteem (Belgian sample, z-scores)

	Organisational self-esteem		
	High (N=33)	Middle (N=29)	Low (N=33)
Full-time involvement (N=30)	-0.47	-0.06	-0.68
Part-time involvement (N=65)	-0.16	-0.26	-0.82

Table 12: Co-variance analysis on the multinational sample

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2
Experience in the working groups	Ns	Not tested
Organisational self-esteem	Ns	Ns
Work experience in national settings	4.91	Not tested
Size	Ns	Not tested
Point of entrance	9.52	Not tested
Federalism	Ns	Not tested
<b>Interaction effects</b>		
Federalism and size	Not tested	3.11
Period of entrance, work experience in national settings and experience in the working groups	Not tested	6.23
Model evaluation	F=4.58 (df=10, p=0.0001) R <sup>2</sup> =0.32	F=4.99 (df=11, p=0.0001) R <sup>2</sup> =0.36

N = 120, p < 0.05 ; ns = statistically not significant

Table 13: Interpretation of effects with the help of averages (Multinational sample, z-scores)

A. Supra-nationalism by size and territorial decentralisation			
Size	Territorial decentralisation		
	Federal polities (N=35)	Decentralised polities (N=44)	Unitary polities (N=41)
Big (N=55)	0.63	-0.02	0.95
Small (N=65)	-0.91	0.68	0.12
B. Supra-nationalism by period of entrance and experiences in national settings			
Entrance	Experience in national settings		
	Low (N=63)	High (N=57)	
Founder (N=59)	0.14	-0.39	
First wave (N=31)	0.89	1.24	
Second wave (N=30)	0.21	0.15	
C. Supra-nationalism by period of entrance and involvement in working groups			
Entrance	Working group experience		
	Low (N=65)	High (N=50)	
Founder (N=59)	-0.06	-0.16	
First wave (N=31)	1.02	1.01	
Second wave (N=20)	0.22	-0.01	

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## ENDNOTES

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<sup>1</sup> The positioning of member-states on our scale corresponds, for instance, fairly well with the record of no-votes and abstentions listed in the *European Voice*, 15-21 October 1998.

<sup>2</sup> Neo-institutionalists reject the implicit notion of institutional efficiency in neo-functionalism (March and Olsen 1984). The latter posit that regional integration creates new policy problems (functional spill-over) which encourage the shifts of political loyalties to the supranational level (political spill-over) (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). For neo-institutionalists institutions often lead to inefficient outcomes.

<sup>3</sup> Transgovernmental relations are conceived as a subset of transnational relations, which include multinational organisations, international non-governmental organisations and transgovernmental networks among state officials (Risse-Kappen 1997). Transgovernmental relations concern networks among governmental actors deviating from the traditional image of inter-state relations between heads of state and governments. The concept covers governmental sub-units that handle relatively autonomously because national decisions, and or instructions are incomplete, imperfect or in some cases even absent. Thus, the actions of transgovernmental networks take place rather independent from national policy-making.

<sup>4</sup> In our sample it is even a very small minority that had previous experiences within the European Commission (Belgians = 3, non-Belgians = 3). This small number prevents us from testing this hypothesis.

<sup>5</sup> The distinction North South is linked with issues such as deregulation and compensation of dislocation costs and structural policy-making (Garrett 1992), cultural heterogeneity (Egeberg 1996; Metcalfe 1994), variance in power resources (Moravcsik 1991) and differences in policy-making styles (Christoph 1993; Mazey and Richardson 1995).

<sup>6</sup> The distinction between net-receivers and net-payers could be an interesting independent variable as well. The disadvantage of this indicator is its very strong relation with the North-South dummy, an association that will create serious problems of collinearity within a multivariate analysis ( $r=0.68$ ,  $p=0.00001$ ). Consequently we propose to drop an explicit reference to the cleavage between net-payers and net-receivers and to employ the North-South distinction as a proxy for it.

<sup>7</sup> About Italy Gabel and Palmer say: '... the positive image of EC membership as responsible for Italy's economic resurgence coupled with public frustration over political reform, has been credited with Italians' widespread support for a more federal European integration' (Gabel and Palmer 1995). Also Deflem and Pampel mention the Italian case: '... because of many scandals involving Italian politicians, Italian citizens may be expected to express less nationalistic and more pro-European sentiments' (Deflem and Pampel 1996).

<sup>8</sup> Unfortunately, we do not have more recent and similar quantitative data at our disposal. However, from extensive feedback we received from the Belgian Permanent Representation and the Belgian Foreign Office we believe that the picture we sketch in the paper is quite stable over time. Thus, recent, more qualitative, information confirms the quantitative analysis. Moreover, one has to keep in mind that the data concern political culture and attitudes. It is well known that this type of data is rather stable over time and that it is generally not directly connected with the content of the policy agenda of a particular moment. To put it differently, cultural features are quite enduring. This brings us to a third comment. Despite the fact that the data itself was collected in 1994, the paper deals with a *problematique* which is not very time bound, namely the consequences of socialisation of national officials, civil servants and politicians within a European polity.

<sup>9</sup> For several reasons it was not possible to interview all officials (estimated population of 300) involved in Permanent Representations (PR). Because these officials have very busy schedules it was decided to draw a sample. To ask a complete PR to be interviewed would not have been accepted. To interview about one third of a PR was more reasonable. And even then several officials were unable to meet with us or refused to do so. For the multinational sample 142 officials were asked for an interview and 120 ultimately participated (response rate of 85%). At the Belgian level 105 officials were contacted and 95 interviews were carried out (response rate of 90%). Besides refusals there were some other important reasons for non-participation. Only 8 Dutch officials appear in the sample. The Dutch capital is within a few hours from Brussels and so they can afford to send 'national' officials to the working groups. Only five Greek officials could have been interviewed because the Greeks took over the Council Presidency during the period of our fieldwork. We tried to contact them again after their 6 months in office, but their personnel had been changed to a considerable extent (this was the result of the election held in Greece at

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the beginning of 1994). Only a few respondents from Luxemburg were available since Luxembourg has only a very small PR and cannot attend all working groups. For the composition and the functioning of working groups we refer to the specialised literature on the Council of Ministers (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997; Westlake 1995).

<sup>10</sup> To retain robust solutions the analysis was carried out for the two sub-samples separately. All scales in this paper were analysed also with the help of non-linear, namely alternating least squares techniques or ALS (PROC PRINQUAL procedure in SAS) (Kuhfeld, Sarle, and Young 1985). This technique takes the ordinal character of the data into account and estimated missing values. The results presented in this paper are based upon traditional factor analysis which reveals virtually exactly the same results as the ALS-technique. For the further analysis we deal with composite indices. Missing values on an item were replaced by the overall mean of that item (which leads to virtually the same result as the ALS-approach). This does theoretically not affect the mean, but it could lead to an underestimation of the variance. In our data the variances were not affected.

<sup>11</sup> An ad hoc hypothesis to explain the deviance of the German respondents could be that their responses were significantly more error prone than those of other nationalities. German responses behaviour was more affected by missing values and were less consistent.

<sup>12</sup> These observations point to a multi-level problem in the data-set. However the small-sample size does prevent us from employing more advanced multi-level analysis.

<sup>13</sup> The correlation between both variables for the multinational sample is 0.46 ( $p=0.0001$ ). This causes some problems for variance analysis which assumes orthogonal or non-correlated independent variables (Tacq 1992). In case of experience in working-groups and national experience these tolerances proved to be 0.70, meaning that these two independent variables are not completely orthogonal. The tolerances for other variables were higher (0.80 or more).