

Third-Party Inclusion in ESDP: Form and Substance – A Case Study of Russia

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(Dr Julian Lewis, MP) 'What do you think the Russians make of this scheme? What do you believe their perception is of the desirability or otherwise for the creation of this EU rapid reaction force?'

*(Rt Hon Geoffrey Hoon, Secretary of State for Defence) 'I honestly do not know.'*¹

The initial development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) of the European Union (EU) has been variously described as 'dramatic', 'momentous' and 'a remarkable expression of collective political will'.² Two years on from the Cologne European Council, which committed the EU member states to the development of ESDP, the rhetoric has subsided. It has been replaced by much more sober assessments relating to questions of implementation - what French Premier Lionel Jospin has referred to as the 'practical phase' of European defence.³ In this regard, the issues are by now well-known: defining the objectives of European security and defence, matching capabilities with intentions, laying down an effective

¹ House of Commons, Select Committee on Defence, Minutes of Evidence, 28 March 2001, paragraph.87.

² A.J.K. Bailes, 'The EU's Future Role in Defence: Issues for the Baltic Region', *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*, 1(5), 2000, p.20; J.B. Collester, 'How Defense "Spilled Over" into the CFSP: Western European Union (WEU) and the European Security and Defense Identity', in M.G. Cowles and M. Smith (eds), *The State of the European Union, Vol.5* (Oxford etc.: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.370; P. van Ham, 'Europe's New Defense Ambitions: Implications for NATO, the US, and Russia', *The Marshall Center Papers*, No.1, 2000, p.1.

³ Speech to the Institute for Higher Defence Studies (Paris), 22 September 2000.

institutional structure, clarifying the relationship with NATO (and by extension, the US), and associating 'third parties' outside the EU's formal membership.⁴ This paper focuses on the last, and probably the least noted, of these issues and deals with one particular dimension of the inclusion issue – that of Russia.⁵

Before we consider Russia in detail, however, it is worth making some general points as to why the issue of association or inclusion is to be regarded as significant. There are at least three points to be made in this connection. In the first place, the issue has to be seen within the broad political context of the EU's recent situational evolution. ESDP has unfolded within a context of new forms of interaction with NATO, movement toward a further enlargement of the Union's membership, and the development of forms of partnership and association with states throughout the length and breadth of the continent. All this is suggestive of the increasingly dynamic role of the EU as a political and, indeed, a security actor. Further, it suggests that the EU in this policy realm, as in others, is capable of extending governance beyond its formal membership to neighbouring states.⁶

Second, and more practically, the development of forms of association adds to the difficulties of institutionalising ESDP. In short, the EU has had to deal with the challenge of associating non-EU members in ESDP procedures while not making an already complex and politically-charged process that much more complicated.⁷ This process, moreover, is not made any easier by the diversity of states involved. This has resulted in the delineation of practical arrangements for association with three sets of states: the non-EU European NATO members ('the six'); these six states and partly overlapping with them, the EU accession candidates ('the fifteen'); and those states 'with which the Union maintains political dialogue' (i.e. Russia and Ukraine) 'and other interested states' (i.e. Canada).⁸

Third, the necessity of association is, in part, a consequence of the geographic location of the likely missions to be undertaken by a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) acting under ESDP auspices. Some mission scenarios will be noted below, however, for now we can consider it a strong possibility that EU-led crisis management operations could occur in areas that fall within the strategic purview of associated third parties and thus benefit from (or indeed, actually require) the active cooperation of the state in question.

EU - Russia

Contextual issues of the sort noted above apply with good measure to Russia. It would be banal to suggest that the EU has an interest in good relations with Moscow. The obvious facts of geographic proximity and increasing economic interdependence, coupled with concerns relating to the effects upon European states

⁴ See T. Terriff, M. Webber, S. Croft and J. Howorth, 'European Security and Defence Policy after Nice', *Briefing Paper*, No.20 (The Royal Institute of International Affairs), April 2001.

⁵ A longer piece considering ESDP in relation to the six non-EU NATO states and the US along with Russia is currently being written by the author and colleagues on the 'Security Governance' project of the 'One Europe or Several?' programme funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council.

⁶ L. Friis and A. Murphy, 'The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe: Governance and Boundaries', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.37(2), 1999.

⁷ F. Heisbourg et al, 'European Defense: Making it Work', *Chaillot Paper*, No.42 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union), September 2000, p.52.

⁸ See French Presidency Report on the European Security and Defence Policy, December 2000. Press Release: Brussels (04-12-2000) – Nr: 14056/2/00

of environmental degradation, organised crime and migration have long been seen as necessitating an active engagement with Russia. That said, during the first half of the 1990s at least, the EU's approach to Russia was characterised by reactivism and even incoherence.⁹ Leaving aside the structural weaknesses of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), such attributes were, in part, forgivable. Russia did, after all, throw up policy challenges of the first order. Here was a state in the early traumatic stages of post-communist state consolidation and marketisation; a state, moreover with a restive military, a nuclear weapons' stockpile of superpower proportions and a foreign policy which after 1993 became much more clear-headed in its pursuit of Russian interests in areas of the former Soviet Union (the Baltic region notably) where EU member states too had a vested interest. Challenges of this sort were recognised, but policy within the CFSP framework (and to a large degree among the member states) was initially geared to primarily economic and technical issues exemplified by the initiation of the TACIS programme in late 1991. The signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Russia at the Corfu European Council in June 1994 did not change this approach fundamentally. The PCA did have the effect of converting the EU-Russia relationship into 'a continuous political process',¹⁰ and the document does contain some good political intentions ('the commitment of the Parties to promote international peace and security ...' etc.). Its principal focus remained, however, upon economic issues.

This rather narrow perspective could lead one to brand the EU as lacking in strategic vision. It should be remembered, however, that the PCA was an agreement *with* Russia. Its contents required, therefore, Russia's active consent. The rather bland, economically-centred tone of the document reflects as much the leading conception of the EU as an economic body in Russia as it does blinkered thinking in the EU itself. Furthermore, even while the PCA was being signed moves were afoot within the EU to frame a more strategic approach. Annex 8 of the Presidency Conclusions presented at the Madrid European Council in December 1995 outlined a 'Strategy for Future EU/Russia Relations' in which Russian political reform, security issues and foreign policy dialogue occupied equal place with economic cooperation. This, moreover, was accompanied by reference to the need to integrate Russia fully into 'the European security architecture'¹¹. The Action Plan for Russia adopted in May 1996 put some flesh on these areas of cooperation although its scope was limited by the absence of specific policy instruments and budget lines.¹²

Indeed, in practice, EU policy toward Russia lumbered on in traditional, incremental fashion. The technical provisions of economic cooperation through TACIS continued to make some marginal difference to the Russian economy, negotiations proceeded on trade disputes and a variety of grassroots projects were supported as part of the TACIS Democracy Programme on Russia. The war in Chechnya, meanwhile, led to a delay in the ratification of the PCA. It finally entered into force in December 1997 and allowed for a certain institutionalisation of the EU-

⁹ D. Allen, 'EPC/CFSP, the Soviet Union, and the Former Soviet Republics: Do the Twelve Have a Coherent Policy?', in E. Regelsberger et al (eds.), Foreign Policy of the European Union. From EPC to CFSP and Beyond (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1997), pp.219-35.

¹⁰ H. Haukkala, 'The Making of the European Union's Common Strategy on Russia', The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Working Paper, 28 (2000), p.7.

¹¹ Presidency Conclusions, Madrid European Council, 15-16 December 1995, via <<http://ue.eu.int/presid/conclusions.htm>>

¹² J. Gower, 'Russia and the European Union', in M. Webber (ed), Russia and Europe: Conflict or Cooperation? (New York: St Martins Press, 2000), p.80.

Russia relationship in the shape of the Cooperation Council and the Cooperation Committee.¹³

Among the member states there was a recognition that these instruments alone were insufficient to anchor Russia strategically in the manner hinted at in the 'Strategy for Future EU/Russia Relations'. According to some observers, the financial crash in Russia in 1998 provided some urgency to rectify this situation.¹⁴ However, this was, in a sense, only a proximate cause. The deeper underlying reason for attending to Russia was progress on the enlargement issue.¹⁵ The decision of the Luxembourg European Council in December 1997 to open accession talks with six candidate countries (including Estonia and Poland) opened up the very real possibility that the EU would within a decade share further direct borders not just with Russia (one such a border had existed since 1995 with the accession of Finland) but also with states such as Belarus and Ukraine which Russia considered as laying within its sphere of 'vital interests'.¹⁶ This had some obvious practical implications regarding Russia (relating to trade and population movement) but also had an underlying political significance. Unless managed with sympathy toward Moscow, EU enlargement could be seen as further confirmation of Russia's loss of status in eastern Europe, a slight to its ambitions as a European power and an insult added to the injury of NATO enlargement. As such it threatened to undermine whatever progress had been achieved in constructing a meaningful cooperative relationship since 1991.

Considerations such as these informed the framing of the 'Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia' and this document was adopted by the Cologne European Council in June 1999. The importance of the Common Strategy lies not only in its lengthy listing of 'instruments and means', 'areas of action' and 'specific initiatives' (these have not given rise to any new budgetary allocations and are, in the main, a consolidation of existing initiatives). As important is the fact that it 'raises the profile of political and security-related aspects of the relationship with Russia'.¹⁷ The rationale for this is plainly stated at the outset of the document (the EU's 'vision' of partnership with Russia) given its reference to the need to firmly anchor Russia 'in a united Europe free of new dividing lines', with all the implications which follow from this statement concerning Russia's status outside of an enlarging EU.¹⁸

What this suggests, therefore, is that the logic of association which had attended EU approaches toward Russia throughout the 1990s had by the latter part of the decade found an expression in the security sphere. While a dialogue in this regard did not begin at this point (see below), the simultaneous development of ESDP has provided an opportune vehicle in which to give it material expression. The inclusion of references to Russia in the EU documentation on ESDP noted below cannot,

¹³ The former comprises senior ministers from Russia and the member states (usually foreign ministers), the Secretary General of the Council/High Representative CFSP and the EU Commissioner for External Relations. It first met in February 1998. The latter is made up of senior officials from Russia, the Commission and the member states and first met in December 1997.

¹⁴ Haukkala (note. 10), pp.22-23.

¹⁵ L. Friis and A. Murphy, 'Enlargement: A Complex Juggling Act', in Cowles and Smith (eds) (note. 2), pp.199-200.

¹⁶ The phrase is that of former Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev (Moscow News, 24 January 1994). Similar statements are a commonplace of official Russian commentary.

¹⁷ 'Report on the Implementation of the Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia' (European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy [rapporteur: Arie M. Oostlander] Final A5-0363/2000, 29 November 2000), p.15.

¹⁸ 'Common Strategy of the European Union of 4 June 1999 on Russia', Official Journal of the European Communities, 24 June 1999, L 157/1.

therefore, be regarded as gratuitous or the product of afterthought. Even though the more pressing preoccupations in the development of ESDP have concerned capabilities and the link to NATO, Russia has not been lost sight of. In addition to specific ESDP documentation such sentiments have been expressed by Javier Solana, the Secretary General of the European Council/CFSP High Representative,¹⁹ within the Commission²⁰ and by the member states.²¹

The ability to see the importance of Russia and the ability to act upon it are, however, two different things. The practical involvement of Russia in ESDP is replete with difficulties. Before we consider these, however, Russia's own attitude needs examining.

Russia-EU

Moscow's position on ESDP cannot be seen as separate from its broader views toward the EU and, indeed, toward Europe in general. In Russian foreign policy discourse, the EU occupies an increasingly prominent position. There are some obvious reasons for this. In the first place, attention to the EU is part and parcel of Russia's constant search for a European vocation in foreign policy. The long, historical ambivalence generated by Russia's Eurasian location and consequent debates over political identity and foreign policy priorities has not been eradicated by either Presidents Yeltsin or Putin. However, under both post-communist leaders, Russia has staked out a clear European direction.²² The EU, moreover, enjoys a somewhat favoured position in this setting owing to the problematic nature of relations with NATO and the increasingly difficult bilateral relationship with the US. This, in turn, is reinforced by certain practicalities. In economic terms, the EU accounts for the single largest share of Russian trade, it is a provider of a modest but not insignificant programme of financial and technical assistance (principally through the TACIS programme), it is supportive of Russia's bid to join the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and its member states are significant sources of FDI.²³ Russia is also an interested party in the energy dialogue with the EU, which could see an increase in deliveries of Russian oil, gas and electricity on the one hand, and of European capital investment in Russian infrastructure on the other.²⁴

These types of economic issue have, of course, been constant features of the Russia-EU relationship and an economic imperative has informed policy under both Presidents Yeltsin and Putin. The former during his first term was clear in outlining a commitment to integration with 'the civilised community' in order 'to enlist

¹⁹ See Solana's comments at the Feira European Council as reported in S. Castles, 'Russia to Get New Role in European Defence Policy', *The Independent*, 20 June 2000.

²⁰ 'The EU and Russia – the Way Ahead', speech by Chris Patten (Commissioner for External Relations), Diplomatic Academy, Moscow, 18 January 2001.

²¹ Comments of French Defence Minister Alain Richard at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations as reported by ITAR-TASS, 16 January 2001 (World News Connection via <<http://wnc.fedworld.gov>>; comments of Swedish premier Goran Persson as reported by ITAR-TASS, 20 March 2001 (World News Connection via <<http://wnc.fedworld.gov>>).

²² See V. Baranovsky, 'Russia: a Part of Europe or Apart from Europe?', *International Affairs*, Vol.76(3), 2000.

²³ L. Pagrotsky (Sweden's Minister of Trade) and G. Gref (Russian Minister of Economic Development), 'Economic Link with Russia is Key to EU Future', *International Herald Tribune*, 29 March 2001.

²⁴ N. Paklin, 'Vladimir Putin's French Dialogues', *Rossiyskaya gazeta*, 1 November 2000 via World News Connection <<http://wnc.fedworld.gov>>

maximum support for our efforts to transform Russia'.²⁵ The somewhat idealistic flavour of this early formulation subsequently disappeared, however, a 'foreign policy [designed] to serve economic interests' has remained in being.²⁶ This is a policy that is driven by considerations relating to trade, currency stability and integration in, or cooperation with, international economic bodies (the IMF and the WTO as well as the EU)²⁷ and one underpinned in Russia by the considerable influence of energy lobbies, Gazprom in particular. Such a stance does not rule out friction in relations. Indeed, economic considerations are as likely to give rise to dispute as are political and security issues. However, in relation to the EU at least, what it means in practice is that issues of tension (over trade restrictions, for instance) occur within a generally cooperative and increasingly institutionalised framework.²⁸ The development of this framework means that Russia has had to pay attention to the broader political relationship with the EU.

The EU has undoubted political attractions to Russia. These exist to some degree at the policy-level. The EU is an important interlocutor of Russia on matters ranging from organised crime, democratic development and the rule of law, through to the status of Kaliningrad and the whole gamut of activities within the Northern Dimension and the EU's 1999 Common Strategy on Russia. Russian support of these initiatives may not be as enthusiastic as in European capitals and important points of contention (over Chechnya notably) have on occasion soured the relationship.²⁹ However, these initiatives have acquired a 'practical, routine' quality which owes as much to Russian efforts as to those of the Union.³⁰

Overarching these practical initiatives, Russia has also attached an increasing importance to the EU as an international political actor. There is a certain instrumentalism to this which reflects Russia's promotion of a 'multi-polar' world (that is, attention to centres of power other than the US in order to undermine American global leadership) and even the longer-standing Soviet position of welcoming European integration insofar as it is a project that might balance US influence in Europe and beyond.³¹ However, such instrumentalism reflects an increasing recognition of the importance of the EU itself. This is something of a departure from Russian foreign policy thinking which has traditionally tended to view international relations in terms of concerts of great powers and has consequently been fixated – even in European affairs – with the US first and foremost, and secondly with

²⁵ *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, No.4-5, 1992, p.70.

²⁶ This phrase is taken from President Putin's annual address to the Russian Federal Assembly as carried on Johnson's Russia List <davidjohnson@erols.com>, No.5185, 4 April 2001.

²⁷ C. Wallander, 'The Economization, Rationalization, and Normalization of Russian Foreign Policy', *PONARS Memorandum*, No.1, July 1997 via <<http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~ponars>>

²⁸ For an overview of this framework see Gower (note. 12)

²⁹ For a rather indifferent Russian assessment of the relationship with the EU see V. Pozdniakov (sector head of the Department of European Cooperation of the Russian Foreign Ministry), 'The European Union's Strategy on Russia', *International Affairs* (Moscow), Vol.45(5), 1999.

³⁰ A. Shishaev (Second Secretary of the Economic Cooperation Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry), 'Russia's Relations with the European Union', *International Affairs* (Moscow), Vol.45(6), 1999.

³¹ The very first paragraph of the Russian 'Medium-Term Strategy for Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the EU' (October 1999), refers to the fact that Russia's approach to the EU 'stems from the objective need to establish a multipolar world ...'. See also I. Ivanov (Russian Foreign Minister), 'Russia and the World at the Boundary of the Millenniums', *International Affairs* (Moscow), Vol.46(3), 2000, pp.1-6.

individual EU member states (Germany and to lesser degrees France and the UK).³² That this position has shifted toward greater engagement with the EU as such is, in part, a consequence of the formal development of the CFSP and ESDP, but equally it stems from a belated but growing perception that the EU is exerting a powerful influence on the continent (independent of the US) through enlargement and economic integration.³³ These processes may not always been seen as in Russia's best interests³⁴ but overall they constitute the development of what one prominent Russian diplomat has described as a European 'pole ... in the modern world order',³⁵ and thus by necessity require Russia's engagement.

Consistent with this position, Russia has given some attention to the development of ESDP. In many respects, the Russian position has been positive, albeit for reasons which reflect different institutional interests within Russia. The position of the military is perhaps the least ambiguous. Speaking in December 1999 just after the Helsinki European Council, Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov of the Russian General Staff suggested that an EU military capability was to be welcomed if it was politically autonomous of NATO and did not add to Alliance military capabilities.³⁶ Following this logic, the Russian military has gleefully commented upon the disputes surrounding the operational and political relationship between the EU and NATO, has talked up the ability of a future ERF to deploy in areas such as the Balkans and has welcomed the possibility, however slim, that ESDP will emasculate NATO and with it US influence in Europe.³⁷

The Presidential leadership and the Russian Foreign Ministry, meanwhile, have viewed ESDP against a much broader canvas. For them the development of ESDP reflects what then Secretary of the Russian Security Council Sergei Ivanov referred to in January 2001 as 'the ever more appreciable role [of the EU ...] in the domain of international politics and security'.³⁸ This is a role that Russia has been prepared to welcome on the grounds that ESDP (unlike Russia's chief bête noir, NATO) does not involve a traditional defence dimension. Russian support is, however, conditional on ESDP developing a partnership with Moscow - a partnership which, it is hoped, will involve 'the organisation of a pan-European security system based on European forces' that while not 'isolating the US and NATO' denies the

³² Boris Yeltsin's enthusiasm for the trilateral meeting with the leaderships of France and Germany in March 1998 was reflective of this thinking.

³³ 'Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation' (July 2000), *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, No. 8, 2000, p.8. This theme was also taken up by President Putin in an interview with the Swedish newspaper *Svenska Dagbladet* shortly before his appearance at the European Council in Stockholm in March 2001 (Interfax, 23 March 2001 via World News Connection <<http://wnc.fedworld.gov>>).

³⁴ Russia's reaction to EU enlargement, for instance, has been mixed. Some of the possible deleterious consequences (trade diversion and an end to visa-free entry for Russian citizens) are outlined in V. Pozdniakov and S. Ganzha, 'New Countries on the EU's Doorstep', *International Affairs* (Moscow), 45(3), 1999. President Putin in the *Svenska Dagbladet* interview noted above referred to EU enlargement as 'a manifestation of growing processes of integration processes in Europe and this is to the benefit of all European countries [...] But we want to be sure that Russia's interests will not suffer and [that] new artificial barriers will not appear tearing Europe's common political, social and economic space apart'.

³⁵ V. Likhachev (Russia's Permanent Representative to the EU in Brussels), 'Russia and the European Union: A Long-Term View', *International Affairs* (Moscow), Vol.46(2), 2000, p.117.

³⁶ *Monitor* (The Jamestown Foundation), 23 December 1999 via <<http://www.jamestown.org>>.

³⁷ *Krasnaya zvezda*, 7 April 2001.

³⁸ Statement released following a meeting with Richard Wright, Head of Delegation of the European Commission in Moscow (29 January 2001) via <<http://www.in.mid.ru>>. In April 2001 Sergei Ivanov was appointed the first civilian Minister of Defence in Russia.

latter 'a monopoly [...] on the continent'.³⁹ Following this logic, Russia has expressed a readiness to forge 'closer relations of dialogue and cooperation [with the EU ...] on political and security matters in Europe'⁴⁰ and, more specifically, to cooperate within the ESDP framework.⁴¹

Form and Substance

The precise format of this cooperation has begun to take shape. Statements of good intention on both sides have been matched by the development of institutional dialogue between the EU and Russia. The momentum behind this is, in part, separate from ESDP and can be traced back through the EU-Russia Political Declaration of November 1993, references to political dialogue in the PCA, the 1996 EU 'Action Plan for Russia' (which established a 'Security Working Group') and the 1999 'Common Strategy'. This latter document proposed a 'strategic partnership [...] within the framework of a permanent policy and security dialogue' and the creation of 'a permanent EU-Russia mechanism' to carry this dialogue forward. Further, with the adoption of the Common Strategy, the European Council decided that successive Presidencies would draw up a work plan on activities regarding Russia and these have included statements on furthering security dialogue with Russia. EU-Russia summits inaugurated in 1993 have also involved security-related discussions. In practical terms, the EU has pledged assistance to Russia in implementing the Chemical Weapons' Convention; in December 1999 a Joint Action was adopted by the Council on a cooperation programme on non-proliferation and disarmament; and recent joint EU-Russian summit declarations have contained 'discrete joint positions' on key foreign policy issues such as the Middle East peace process and stability in the Balkans.⁴²

Turning to ESDP more specifically, the Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki and Feira European Councils both suggest that Russia 'may be invited to take part in [...] EU-led operations'. At the Nice Council Russia was offered (along with Ukraine and Canada) a framework of consultation with the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC) on matters relating to ESDP and military crisis management during the 'routine phase'. During a 'crisis situation', this framework (or, alternatively, direct consultations with the Secretary-General/High Representative) would permit the sharing of views and the consideration of possible participation by Russia in a crisis-management operation. Should such participation materialise, then Russia would have the right to appoint liaison officers to EU

³⁹ Then Prime Minister Putin speaking in October 1999 as cited in *The Wall Street Journal*, 30 November 2000. See also I. Ivanov (Russian Foreign Minister), 'Russia, Europe at the Turn of the Century', *International Affairs* (Moscow), Vol.46(2), 2000, p.107.

⁴⁰ See the 'Joint Declaration by the President of the Russian Federation, V.V. Putin, the President of the European Council, J. Chirac, assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council of the EU/High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, J. Solana, and the President of the Commission of the European Communities, R. Prodi, on Strengthening Dialogue and Cooperation on Political and Security Matters in Europe' (Paris, 30 October 2000), via <<http://europa.eu.int>>.

⁴¹ President Putin's remarks during a meeting with British Prime Minister Tony Blair in Moscow as reported in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), SU/4005 B/3, 23 November 2000.

⁴² This is in line with the Common Strategy which foresees the 'development of joint initiatives in support of common foreign policy objectives'. See C. Portela, 'EU-Russia Cooperation in the Security Domain: Problems and Opportunities', Berlin Information Centre for Transatlantic Security (BITS) *Research Note*, 01.2, May 2001, p.4.

Planning Staff and to attend the Committee of Contributors 'with the same rights and obligations as the other participating states as far as day-to-day management of the operation is concerned'.⁴³ While these mechanisms have yet to be activated, dialogue has occurred over ESDP. Since 1999, EU-Russia summits have considered the issue. A joint declaration issued at the Paris summit in October 2000 contained a commitment to 'institute specific consultations on security and defence matters at the appropriate level and in the appropriate format'.⁴⁴ At Moscow in May 2001, the EU pledged to 'inform Russia on developments in ESDP matters', and Russia, meanwhile, suggested it would 'inform the EU on the development of its (own) security and defence policy'.⁴⁵ In addition, the EU troika (Solana, Commissioner Patten and the Presidency Foreign Minister, Anna Lindh of Sweden) visited Moscow in February 2001 for consultations with the Russian Foreign Minister and Secretary of the Russian Security Council, and Solana visited once more in April.

This brief overview does suggest a progressive development of EU-Russia political and security dialogue over the last ten years or so. There remains a certain pro forma quality to this process - an outlining of grand principles and a cursory treatment or even omission of security matters from important joint bodies (security themes have not figured to any degree in the business of the EU-Russia Cooperation Council).⁴⁶ Yet in some respects a concrete dialogue has occurred (on arms control, nuclear safety and non-proliferation), and it also appears that ESDP has provided a fillip to discussing the practical mechanics of EU-Russian security engagement in situations of crisis management and ERRF intervention. That said, it is clear that a permanent streamlined mechanism with a specific security remit has yet to take shape. In this sense, one Commission official's judgement of the broader structures of EU-Russia consultation as a 'triumph of process over substance'⁴⁷ could also be applied specifically to the EU-Russia security dialogue. Responsibility for this state of affairs cannot simply be laid at the door of the EU, however. A bureaucratic and process-driven culture is as evident in Russian government as it is in the EU. Similarly, Russian foreign policy is just as guilty as the CFSP of issuing declarative statements with little ability or will to back them up. These points are worth making for they suggest that concrete EU-Russia cooperation within ESDP is first and foremost an issue of political will. Beyond this certain other political and, indeed, military issues lurk.

Taking military matters first, here, the Russian position may be described as ambiguously helpful. On paper, Russia does have a military capability capable of filling some of the gaps in the projected ERRF. These gaps are by now well known. The Capabilities Commitment Conference held in November 2000 identified assets available for the projected ERRF force and the deficiencies that remained. The latter includes heavy air-lift and strategic satellite communications.⁴⁸ These are assets which one might normally expect the US to provide and European deficiencies in these regards symbolise the over-dependence on the Americans which ESDP in the long-run is designed to rectify. In this regard, some recourse to Russian assets might,

⁴³ French Presidency Report on the European Security and Defence Policy (December 2000), Section VI, 'Arrangements for the Consultation and Participation of Other Potential Members'.

⁴⁴ See note. 40

⁴⁵ EU-Russia Summit, 17 May 2001, Joint Statement, paragraphs 9-10.

⁴⁶ The press release of the 4th Cooperation Council of April 2001 made no such reference to this topic.

⁴⁷ Cited in D. Gowan, *How the EU Can Help Russia* (London: Centre for European Reform, 2000), p. 10.

⁴⁸ 'Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration' (Council – General Affairs), Press release No. 13427/2/00, Brussels, 20 November 2000.

at first sight, seem attractive. Russia does, after all, possess ample numbers of Antonov and Ilyushin transport aircraft and a long-established satellite reconnaissance programme. The Russian armed forces also possesses considerable experience in deploying and maintaining peacekeeping personnel in the field of operation.

This background notwithstanding Moscow has so far been circumspect on the specifics of cooperation within ESDP. It has made some allusions to a willingness to commit personnel to EU-led peacekeeping⁴⁹ but how useful such an offer would be, even if seriously made, is an open question. On the positive side, Russia's ability to provide peacekeepers has proven relatively fruitful in both IFOR/SFOR and KFOR.⁵⁰ And in the event of comparable ESDP crisis-management mission in the Balkans, a Russian contingent would seem a possibility and a potential benefit to the EU given the good reception accorded to Russian personnel in parts of the region. It may even be the case that because such a mission would not involve the *political* oversight of NATO (although NATO would have an *operational* role) that Russia would not indulge in the protracted wranglings over chains of command that preceded deployments to IFOR/SFOR and KFOR. Further, Moscow could well make participation on the ground a *quid pro quo* of its political support, should the EU need recourse to the UN (see below). Such participation, however, could only ever be marginal to the success of an ESDP operation. Recent experience in the Balkans suggests that Russia's material contribution to peacekeeping will not be substantial.⁵¹

As for Russian participation elsewhere, this is likely to be unforthcoming or problematic. In the post-Soviet period, Russia has pursued a role in international peace missions in areas being mooted as potential sites for ERRF deployment (Africa or the Middle East). This has, however, been small-scale owing to financial and operational deficiencies.⁵² Russia has been more active in some of the Soviet successor states and should an ESDP mission be contemplated here for a variety of political and logistical reasons it could only conceivably occur with Russia's active agreement and participation. However, that very fact could act to deter action under ESDP, precisely because EU states would consider the operational environment too heavily predisposed toward Russia. Further, Moscow has, in any case, been clear in its unwillingness to permit international peacekeeping operations in areas of the former Soviet Union. Leaving aside observation missions of the UN and the OSCE, peacekeeping proper where it has occurred (in Tajikistan, the Dniester region of Moldova, and in Georgia) has been either exclusively Russian or Russian-led under the formal auspices of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

Concerning other potential military contributions on Russia's part, nothing formal has so far been proposed by Moscow, although consultations have been ongoing.⁵³ As already noted, the two areas in which Russia could be of assistance are satellite reconnaissance and heavy air-lift. The first is arguably, a non-starter. Even

⁴⁹ Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov made such an offer during a visit to Berlin in November 2000. See *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 27 November 2000.

⁵⁰ K-P. Klaiber, 'The NATO-Russia Relationship a Year after Paris', *NATO Review*, Vol.46(3), 1998, pp.16-19; D. Trenin, 'Russia-NATO Relations: Time to Pick up the Pieces', *NATO Review*, Vol.48, Spring/Summer 200, pp.19-22.

⁵¹ At the end of 2000 Russia was contributing some 3,600 troops to the 42,5000-strong KFOR; and in early 2000 it was contributing some 1,300 to the 24,500-strong SFOR.

⁵² The International Institute of Strategic Studies (London) recently put Russia's contribution to UN missions outside of the former Soviet Union at just 72 personnel. See *The Military Balance 2000-2001* (Oxford etc: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.126.

⁵³ See Solana's talks with newly-installed Russian Minister of Defence Sergei Ivanov in early April 2001.

though Russian suppliers have since 1995 supplied the WEU's Torrejon Satellite Centre with satellite imagery on a commercial basis, there is little likelihood of an ESDP mission using this resource owing to problems of intelligence sharing. The Russian reconnaissance satellite programme is, in any case, in a run-down and unreliable condition.⁵⁴ As for heavy air-lift, a first aspect in this regard is not related to ESDP as such and concerns the prospect (seemingly a live one up to 2000) that long-term EU-Russian cooperation would develop through purchases by some EU member states of the Ukrainian-Russian Antonov AN-70. In the event, seven EU member states (Belgium, the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Luxembourg) as well as Turkey, have committed themselves rather to joint procurement of the French-made A-400M airbus. This decision suggests that steps are being taken to close the heavy-lift deficiency in European military capabilities. However, the A-400Ms are not expected to come into service until 2007, four years that is after the target date of 2003 for meeting the Headline Goal.⁵⁵ In the meantime, contingency plans have been announced. The UK is to lease four Boeing C-17s to supplement its ageing Hercules aircraft.⁵⁶ Germany, meanwhile, is to purchase a number of Lockheed Martin's S-130-J prior to the A-400M coming on stream.⁵⁷ France has decided against leasing alternative craft up to 2007 even though it intends to withdraw some of its Transall C-160s from service during this period. Defence Minister Alain Ricard announced in September 2000 that this would mean that French heavy-lift capabilities would see no improvement until 2010 at the earliest.⁵⁸ This suggests that for at least the next decade EU heavy-lift capabilities will remain limited and certainly insufficient to mount Kosovo-type operations.⁵⁹

In this light, the case could be made that some recourse to Russian heavy-lift ought to be pursued if a potential ESDP mission required it. There also exist precedents of sorts in this regard. During the mid 1990s negotiations were launched between the WEU and Russia with a view to an agreement on WEU access to Russian large-capacity air transport assets.⁶⁰ At this juncture Russia also let it be known that it was prepared to provide military assets to the WEU in the event of an appropriate mission under the Petersburg tasks.⁶¹ Nothing came of these talks, however. Cooperation in air-lift has also occurred within the Russia-NATO relationship. Russia along with Germany and Turkey have via the Partnership for Peace programme conducted joint heavy-loading tests and air-to-air refuelling exercises.⁶² That said,

⁵⁴ P.S. Clark, 'Russia Has No Reconnaissance Satellites in Orbit', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 9 May 2001.

⁵⁵ The Headline Goal was set at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 and requires an ability to deploy a rapid reaction force of 60,000 troops by 2003 (with appropriate air and naval elements) within 60 days and sustainable for a year.

⁵⁶ *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 26 May 2000; *Defense News*, 21 August 2000.

⁵⁷ *Russia Today*, 31 May 2000 via <<http://www.russiatoday>>

⁵⁸ AFP, 13 September via World News Connection <<http://wnc.fedworld.gov>>

⁵⁹ Oral evidence by the Rt Hon Geoffrey Hoon MP, Secretary of State for Defence to the House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, 28 March 2001, paragraphs 7 and 15. via <http://www.parliament.the-stationary-office.co.uk>

⁶⁰ WEU Ministerial Council, 'Rome Declaration', 17 November 1998, paragraph 9.

⁶¹ 'WEU's Relations with Russia', WEU Assembly Report (Document 1603, 28 April 1998); D. Danilov and S de Speigeleire, 'From Decoupling to Recoupling. Russia and Western Europe: A New Security Relationship', *Chaillot Paper*, No.31 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, April 1998).

⁶² L. van der Laan, 'NATO-Russia Cooperation in Air Defence', *NATO Review*, Vol.47(1), 1999, p.17. Similar exercises were also planned with France and the UK but these fell victim to Russia's withdrawal from the PFP programme following NATO's Operation Allied Force in the spring of 1999.

these exercises have been very small in scale and European enthusiasm for recourse to Russian air capabilities is, in any case, likely to be tempered by the declining reliability and serviceability of the Russian air force.⁶³ Other precedents which exist for military cooperation between Russia and European states (over the Kursk submarine incident in 1999, for instance), moreover, hardly provide an experience of constructive Russian involvement.⁶⁴ Interestingly, and in light of such factors, it appears that the EU may be prepared to turn to Ukraine rather than Russia in order to fill the gap in air-lift capacity.⁶⁵

The marginal operational usefulness of Russia suggests that the main considerations for the EU are, in fact, political. In this regard, a first issue concerns the significance of institutional mechanisms for consultation with Russia under ESDP relative to those with other states. As outlined above, these mechanisms offer Russia a less commodious form of engagement than that offered to 'the six' and 'the fifteen'. Provision for dialogue with these two groups is much more detailed and developed than that with Russia.⁶⁶ There are, of course, good reasons for this. Arrangements for 'the six' have to be seen in terms of the EU's probable recourse to NATO in the event of an ESDP-framed mission, while 'the fifteen' have a distinct position owing to the EU candidate status of most of this number. That said, there are rumblings of disquiet in Russia that its 'special status' ought to be recognised also. This is a common demand from Moscow. To give some examples, Russia only signed up to NATO's Partnership for Peace arrangement once it was offered recognition of its 'weight and responsibility as a major European, world and nuclear power' in a joint declaration with NATO outside of the standard Framework Document offered to all other PFP partners.⁶⁷ Its feeling of being affronted in the face of NATO enlargement, meanwhile, resulted in calls for special consultation with the Alliance (in turn, granted in the shape of the Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council). Outside of relations with NATO, in the mid 1990s, Russia proposed the creation of a Russia-WEU Consultative Council⁶⁸ and with regard to the OSCE, Moscow has on occasion called for the

⁶³ C.J. Dick, 'Military Reform and the Russian Air Force', Analytical Paper (B56), Conflict Studies Research Centre (Royal Military College, Sandhurst), November 1999.

⁶⁴ M. Kramer, 'The Sinking of the Kursk', PONARS Memorandum, No.145, September 2000 via <<http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~ponars>>

⁶⁵ During a visit to Kiev in February 2001, Solana and Patten held talks with Ukraine on leasing Ilushin and Antonov aircraft. See A. Evans-Pritchard, 'EU Force May Rent Ukraine Planes', The Daily Telegraph, 14 February 2001.

⁶⁶ At the Nice Council it was agreed that meetings on ESDP matters in EU+15 and EU+6 format would occur twice each during each Presidency. There would, in addition, be one ministerial meeting bringing together the 15 and the 6 during each Presidency, meetings at the level of EU Military Committee representative and exchanges of military experts. Each partner country would also be permitted to appoint a contact officer to the EU Military Staff and a representative to the PSC.

⁶⁷ See M. Mihalisko, 'European-Russian Security and NATO's Partnership for Peace', RFE/RL Research Report, Vol.3(33), 1994, pp.44-45.

⁶⁸ This was first proposed in October 1995 and repeated in May 1997 but turned down by the WEU Council of Ministers. From March 1996 regular meetings were held between the WEU Secretary-General, the Permanent Representative of the Presidency and the Russian ambassador to Belgium. In December 1997 the WEU Council of Ministers agreed to ad hoc meetings between the Russian ambassador to Belgium and the 28 members of the WEU Permanent Council. This was not the sort of privileged consultation Russia had in mind, however as it would have preferred a direct dialogue with the Council of Ministers. See 'Russia and European Security', Report submitted on behalf of the Political Committee, Assembly of the WEU, Document C/1722, November 2000, paragraphs.195-99.

formation of an inner group modelled on the UN Security Council and containing Moscow as a member.⁶⁹

Moscow has so far been cautious in advocating any similar special liaison with the EU on ESDP beyond the arrangements contained in the Nice Presidency Conclusions. This may be because the broader dialogue with the EU on security-related issues since 1999 has, in some senses, compensated for the rather lowly position accorded to Moscow in ESDP consultative mechanisms. That said, once ESDP acquires a more operational profile one can expect Russia's political demands of it to sharpen. Indeed, discrete signs of this have begun to emerge. Through diplomatic channels Russia has suggested, for instance, the convening of regular meetings between the PSC and the ambassador attached to the Russian Permanent Mission to the EU in Brussels. This fairly modest suggestion has not yet been followed through as the EU seems to be devoting its energies to clarifying the institutional relationship with NATO before it embarks upon a similar exercise with the Russians.

A second political issue in the ESDP-Russia relationship concerns the link between the EU and NATO. In institutional terms, if, as seems likely, the operational stage of an ESDP mission should require recourse to NATO assets and planning capabilities certain questions arise as to the standing with NATO of non-EU states in operational planning and execution. In this regard, specific procedures have been outlined with regard to Canada and 'the six' non-EU NATO states. While nothing as specific is noted for the non-NATO EU candidates, their involvement in the PFP Planning and Review Process (PARP) and for many a simultaneous candidate status with NATO would probably ensure some informal standing in operational matters vis-à-vis NATO. The position of Russia (and, for that matter, Ukraine), however, is more uncertain and potentially more fraught. The reference to liaison with EU Planning Staff for Russia during the operational phase of ESDP was noted above, but how this would translate into a Russian link with NATO is not clear. In this regard, Russia could well demand a role for the PJC in any ESDP mission that relies on Alliance assets and capabilities. This is a role, however, that would be resisted both within NATO and the EU. Such a state of affairs, moreover, need not only arise should Russia be seeking an involvement in the mission in question. Even if reluctant to participate as a military contributor (or having not been invited to do so by the EU) a demand for political consultation could well be levelled because of Russia's self-declared status as a European power.

A further dimension of the NATO link relates to the broader question of the long-term status of ESDP. NATO has persisted as the main security reference for the eleven EU states within the Alliance. The leading interpretation of ESDP within the EU is that the initiative is intended to complement not undermine NATO and this interpretation has been impressed upon Russia by European leaders. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, for instance, stated bluntly in April 2001 during a summit meeting with Putin that European security and more specifically crisis-management could 'only be discussed within the framework of NATO'.⁷⁰ In this light, should the advantages of an EU military dimension as an alternative to NATO

⁶⁹ S. Croft, J. Redmond, G. Wyn Rees and M. Webber, *The Enlargement of Europe* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), p.131.

⁷⁰ 'Schroeder Tells Putin Europe's Security in NATO's Hands' (AFP, 10 April 2001).

become less apparent to Russia one can consequently expect Russian opinion of it to become increasingly reserved.⁷¹

A third political issue relates to the authority under which ESDP operations are mandated. There is a strong argument to suggest that no operation could go ahead without express authorisation from the UN Security Council (UNSC). This argument is based, in part, on pragmatic concerns relating to the EU's own membership. Finland and Austria as neutrals within the EU have suggested that they would not participate in any crisis-management mission that did not enjoy such a mandate and French president Chirac has also suggested that the UNSC ought to retain its primary role in sanctioning the use of force.⁷² Further, the history of the EU's own development as an organisation embedded in law, would suggest a requirement on its part to defer to the UNSC as the commonly accepted legitimator of international intervention.

These considerations are powerful. However, it should not be taken as axiomatic that the EU would always act via the UN. Relevant EU documentation (for instance, Articles 11 and 17 of the Treaty on European Union and documents of the Cologne, Helsinki, Feira and Nice European Councils) contain no express commitment in this regard.⁷³ The reason for this omission is clear, if controversial. Whatever the view among certain member states on the sanctity of the UN, the EU has avoided binding itself to this body simply because this renders it dependent on the goodwill of UNSC veto-wielding powers, Russia, China and, indeed, the US. This is not to say that the presumption would be against obtaining a UN mandate. However, in situations of controversy it could well be circumvented. As far as Russia, is concerned, however, this would most likely be extremely damaging to relations. Not for nothing has Moscow made its support of ESDP contingent upon respect for 'UN Charter principles' and 'recognition of the main responsibilities of the UN Security Council'.⁷⁴

As well as the UN, issues might also arise concerning the role of the OSCE. Since the mid 1990s Russian diplomacy has proposed the elevation of this body to the position of Europe's principal security organisation. This is a stance largely motivated by a desire to counterbalance NATO. However, it also has implications for the EU. The basis of Russian proposals is that important security-related organisations should be placed in a hierarchy of coordination. In the European context this would position the UN at the top and the OSCE second with NATO, the EU and the CIS somewhere below.⁷⁵ Interestingly, in the same week (in May 2001) that President Putin was referring to the 'significant role that the EU is playing in European and global policy' he was also noting the position of the OSCE as 'the key organization in ensuring European security', and making a case for an expansion of its activities.⁷⁶ The

⁷¹ M. Light, J.Löwenhardt and S. White, 'Russia and the Dual Expansion of Europe', Policy Paper, No.02/00 (Economic and Social Research Council, 'One Europe or Several?' Programme, 2000), pp.11-12.

⁷² D. M. Groves, 'The European Union's Common Foreign Security and Defence Policy (sic)', Research Report, No.00-3 (Berlin Information Centre for Transatlantic Security, November 2000), p.16.

⁷³ See M. Ortega, 'Military Intervention and the European Union', Chaillot Paper, No.45 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, March 2001), Chapter 6.

⁷⁴ See references to the views of President Putin in the Joint Statement of the EU-Russia summit, May 29, 2000.

⁷⁵ Ivanov (note.39), p.105.

⁷⁶ J. Boyle, 'Russia-EU Summit Opens with Focus on Security Issues', Reuters, May 17th 2001; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Newsline Vol. 5, No. 91, Part I, 14 May 2001.

practical realisation of Russia's preference for the OSCE is, of course, a political non-starter. What it does suggest, however, is that Moscow is likely to demand some sort of OSCE role in the run up to an ESDP operation, in much the same manner that Russia emphasised the importance of the OSCE in Kosovo in 1998 despite the creeping realisation that NATO was likely to intervene in the province.

Considerations relating to the UN and the OSCE lead us to a fourth political issue regarding Russia, namely its significance as a potential diplomatic player in facilitating an ERRF deployment or, indeed, disengagement. The instructive parallels here are the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo. Russia played a role, albeit marginal, in influencing Belgrade toward a settlement at Dayton in 1995 but a much greater part in impressing upon the Milosevic regime the need to settle over Kosovo in 1999. These political settlements, in turn, laid the ground for the deployment of IFOR/SFOR and KFOR. In both cases Russia also backed the necessary UNSC resolutions that provided the political frameworks for ending the conflicts and the mandates for peacekeeping. While Moscow's diplomatic stock in the Balkans is presently at a low ebb following the removal of Milosevic, it retains an ongoing significance as a permanent member of the UNSC and the Contact Group. Further, precisely because Russia is not a member of the EU or NATO, it enjoys the credentials of a counterbalancing or neutral arbiter. Any ERRF deployment in say Macedonia, Montenegro or, indeed, in post-KFOR Kosovo would, therefore, in all likelihood benefit from Russian diplomatic facilitation

Conclusion

EU-Russian interaction within the framework of ESDP is at present fairly limited. This, in a sense, reflects other political and practical priorities for the EU. Member states and those tasked with developing ESDP within the Council (including Solana) are certainly sensitive toward Russia, but this concern falls below more pressing matters such as fulfilling the Headline Goal, elaborating working relations with NATO (and, connected to this, addressing the anxieties of states such as the US and Turkey) and associating the EU candidates. Once the Headline Goal is achieved and ESDP obtains a concrete quality that permits the deployment of the ERRF Russia could, in certain circumstances, be important politically if not militarily. Just how important remains an open question. Russia would always be a factor of some importance owing to its position on the UNSC and, in certain circumstances, its ability to perform the role of diplomatic facilitator. However, other than in the Soviet successor states, its ability to determine the decision of whether or not any deployment goes ahead is not crucial.

Notwithstanding the quotation at the head of this paper, Russia's own perception of ESDP is by now a matter of record or can be inferred from its broader relations with the EU (and to some extent NATO and the UN) and its attitudes toward crisis management and peacekeeping both in Europe and in areas of the former Soviet Union. Furthermore, Russia's position on ESDP mirrors two trends in Russian foreign policy toward Europe. This has involved, on the one hand, a desire to cooperatively engage with prominent states and international bodies, preferably through privileged forms of institutional consultation, in order to preserve the vestiges of Russian influence on the continent and to prop up the domestic economy. On the other hand, the necessity of cooperation has not prevented Russia from defining its interests often in opposition to these same states and bodies, the logic here being that it is as much

through opposition as through cooperation that Russia can continue to claim possession of the attributes of a great power.⁷⁷ What the reconciliation of these two trends has meant in practice is a Russian foreign policy which declares an interest in any development of significance in Europe, but which does so in a qualified manner such that an identifiable Russian position can be staked out. This has meant initial indifference and sometimes hostility but ultimately a willingness to cooperate even if this is begrudging and qualified. ESDP has broken this pattern to a degree insofar as Russia from the point of ESDP's very inception has been welcoming and amenable. This may reflect certain misguided hopes on Moscow's part about the autonomy of ESDP from NATO and of a rift between the EU and the US, but it is a position, which if cultivated properly, could be beneficial to both Moscow and the EU.

⁷⁷ A.C. Lynch, 'The Realism of Russian Foreign Policy', Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.53(1), 2001, pp.7-31.