Voting in the European Parliament: The Conditional Influence of Policy Type

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I: Introduction

The European Parliament is approaching its 50th anniversary, yet studies of the European Parliament as a legislature with substantive influence over policy have really only come into their own in about the last ten years. The EP research literature has grown in terms of sheer quantity, the variety of research approaches adopted, and in the sophistication of the theories and methods employed. This growth in the EP literature has coincided with the evolution of the EP from a “minimal legislature” with little influence over policy and little public support to an “active legislature” with significant legislative power and greater public support (Mezey 1979). The major events in the EP’s development have been the granting of budgetary power in 1970 and 1975, the beginning of direct elections in 1979, the “isoglucose” ruling of the European Court of Justice which confirmed the EP’s power of delay, the Single European Act of 1986, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, and finally the yet-to-be-ratified Nice Treaty of 2001. At each stage the EP gained new legislative powers in European-level legislative process and/or greater democratic legitimacy. In addition to new powers, the treaties also grant the EP influence over successively more policy areas. The result has been the transformation of the EP from a talking shop and half-way house for politicians to a legislature every bit as worthy of study as, and in so many ways more interesting than, the US Congress.

Like the students of the US Congress, however, students of the EP are interested in much of the same phenomena, though these can take different forms. This paper is focused upon one specific political phenomenon, the voting behavior of MEPs. This differs most notably from the US case in that the EP is a supranational legislature in
which 15 countries are represented and in which scores of national political parties sit. It is most similar to the US congress in that there is both a territorial and partisan aspect to MEP representational behaviors. There are, of course, other considerable differences and noteworthy similarities, but these should suffice to demonstrate that concepts, theories, and methodologies designed for the study of national legislatures can be brought to bear on the study of the EP.

I use some of these concepts and theories to develop a new theory of MEP voting behavior that posits that one of the key conditioning influences upon whether MEPs vote according to their national identity or their party group identity is the policy content of the legislation under consideration. In particular, I borrow somewhat from the idea of ‘pork-barrel’ politics developed in the US to argue that MEPs vote according to their national identity when the question is one of the EU distributing money and according to their party group identity when the legislation being voted upon is regulatory in character.

In the next part of the paper, I present a very brief overview of the relevant literature. In the third part, I outline my theory of MEP voting behavior. Fourth, I discuss the data and my sampling technique while in the fifth part I discuss the methodology employed. In the sixth part I review the findings and in the seventh I consider additional variables that need to be taken into account. Finally, I briefly present my conclusions.

II: Literature Review

Numerous aspects of the EP have been subjected to rigorous study both from a theoretical and methodological viewpoint. Research into the relationship between the EP and the European public has examined the representational connection (e.g. Bowler and
Farrell 1993; Blondel, Sinnott, and Svensson 1998; Katz and Wessels 1999; Schmitt and Thomassen 1999), the sources and conditions of public opinion about the EU (e.g. Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel 1998), and the politics of the EP elections (e.g. van der Eijk and Franklin 1996; Carrubba 2001). The relationship between the EP and the other EU institutions has produced a burgeoning literature and lively debates. These studies tend to adopt a rational-choice institutional approach and have led to a reevaluation of the EP's legislative influence (e.g. Tsebelis 1994; Garrett 1995; Tsebelis/Garrett and Garrett/Tsebelis 1996...2001; Crombez 1996; Scully 1997; Moser 1999; see Dowding 2000 for review and critique). The internal organization of the EP has been well described (see especially Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton 1995; Westlake 1994) and is beginning to be analyzed (Bowler and Farrell 1995; Williams 1995). Related to this is the study of the EP party groups from a power indices approach (e.g. Hosli 1997; Lane, Maeland, and Berg 1995; Dowding 2000 for review and critique). Finally, and most relevant for this paper, the political behavior of the MEPs in the EP has been subjected to several studies.

MEPs engage in different types of behavior within the EP in addition to the self-organization mentioned above. Both the effect of legislative influence on attendance (Scully 1997) and the conditions and content of parliamentary questions (Raunio 1996) have been subjected to investigation. It is the most political of MEP behaviors, however, that is the focus of this paper: votes on legislation. Previous studies of MEP roll-call voting tend to have several things in common. First, the dependent variable is almost always an aggregate measure, usually a version of Rice's (1928) cohesion index, though at least two studies of coalition formation do differ from the trend (Kreppel and Tsebelis
1999; Kreppel 2000) and a study of a single vote using tabulations (Hix and Lord 1996). Secondly, most studies use the aggregate party group as the unit of analysis, though sometimes sub-divided by country. Thirdly, most studies fail to take into account the content, though not necessarily procedure (see Kreppel 2000) of legislation when investigating voting behavior. Two exceptions include Attiná’s (1990) early study which took into account whether the legislation was a budgetary act or own initiative and Raunio’s (1997; 1998) investigation of major foreign policies votes in the EU.iii

The present study differs in three important respects. First, I present a theory of MEP behavior conditioned by national electoral politics, the EP party groups, and the policy content of the legislation being voted upon. Secondly, I examine the micro-level of MEP behavior instead of the aggregate level behavior of the party groups. I do so by creating legislator dyads in which each legislator is paired-off with every other legislator creating a new unit of analysis, the legislator dyad. Third, I employ a new methodology that allows me to examine the effect of the key independent variables--the national identity, party group identity, and policy type--on the conditional probability that any given pair of legislators will vote similarly on any given piece of legislation.

III: Theory

MEPs operate within a highly complex institutional environment.iv All members of the EP are elected in national elections and must therefore first contend with the national electoral strategic environment. This differs between each member state according to the electoral rules, though there is a growing convergence toward PR systems. Nevertheless, MEPs run nationally and the elections themselves are shaped by
national politics, making the European elections so-called “second-order” elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980). Prior to the elections, however, the individual MEPs must navigate the politics within their national parties in order to even be considered as candidates (Raunio 2000b). If the candidates are elected, then upon moving to Brussels they must adapt to the EP’s party groups which are the key organizational principle in the EP (Bardi 1994; Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton 1995; Hix and Lord 1997). Finally, the MEPs, nested within the national party delegations (NPDs) that are in turn are nested within the EP’s party groups, are actors within one institution in the multi-institutional EU political system.

Although the strategic environment is challenging, I argue that the motivations of MEPs are little different from politicians at any level of government. They desire to get re-elected, or perhaps do well enough to get elected elsewhere, and pursue policies to that end. That is, MEPs behave purposively. In so doing, MEPs seek first to please their national political parties, which, in turn, are looking to please voters (Hix, Raunio, and Scully 1999; Raunio 2000). The goal of re-election is undoubtedly related to policy goals and office goals. Politicians must be elected to pursue certain policies or to gain office and must pursue certain policies to get re-elected and retain their office. Thus, I assume that MEPs sitting in the EP pursue policies that will gain them re-selection/re-election. Furthermore, I assume that they do so within the context of national political party competition.

The responsible party model assumes that national political parties compete by occupying different positions on any given policy dimension. Since the politics of EP elections are primarily fought within national contexts, this leads to the further
assumption that MEPs compete at the European level with other MEPs from the same country, but different national political parties, based upon their policy positions within the European context.

Before going further, there is a potential objection which should be addressed. The European public’s apathy toward and misunderstanding of the EU’s political institutions has been much commented upon. There can be little doubt that European level politics are mediated by national political competition and are viewed through the prism of national politics (van der Eijk and Franklin 1996). This would seem to suggest that MEPs are “free agents” without monitoring principals that can do as, or as little as, they wish without having to be concerned with electoral sanction. Studies of public opinion, however, demonstrate that individual members of the public tend to form opinions on the EU, and presumably on actors within the EU, that are quite utilitarian. Individuals who perceive themselves to have benefited from the EU are more supportive (Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel 1998; Carruba 2001) and this is influenced by partisan identity. This suggests that MEPs are not entirely “free agents,” but rather must consider how their behavior will be perceived by their national parties (Raunio 2000b) and by the public at large (Carruba 2001).

What then will MEPs do when confronted with policy alternatives in the EP? The MEPs choose the alternatives that are most likely to further their political career by voting for legislation that they believe will most benefit their national party and by extension their electoral supporters. The basic actor in my theory remains the individual MEP, but each MEP is constrained by his or her national political party which competes at the national level and by his or her party group which competes within the EP. This
suggests the possibility of divided loyalties or ‘competing principals’ especially between the national party delegations and the party groups. I argue that the potential for conflict between different principals is a matter of legislative content.

The assertion that different types of legislative issues produce different patterns of political conflict is not new. Lowi (1966) categorized policies as distributive, redistributive, and regulatory and argued that each different issue-area or policy type gives rise to different political actors that adopt different tactics and choose different arenas to pursue their favored policies. While I do not accept Lowi’s notion of different actors (it is the MEPs) or different arenas (it is the EP) coming into play, I do echo the argument that different types of policies, or issue-areas, can result in different political dynamics. Specifically, I argue that whether a piece of legislation is distributive or regulatory in content has a substantial influence on the probability that any individual MEP will vote according to his or her national identity or whether they vote ideologically with their party group.

First, I will consider distributive policies within the context of the EU. Lowi (1966) defines distributive policies as “pork barrel” legislation in which budgetary outlays are given to many different specific groups, but the character of which does not engender competition among groups. That is, distributive policies do not take from one group and give to another, which is redistributive, but rather give to many different specific groups from a general budget. According to Lowi this leads to log-rolling in which “there are as many ‘sides’ as there are tariff items, bridges and dams to built…etc.” and in which these “uncommon interests” form an alliance to ensure that each groups gets their share along with their allies (Lowi 1966, 38-9). The EU, however,
is very limited in its ability to pay for distributive policies. The EU’s budget is currently capped at about 1.1 percent of the combined GDPs of the EU member states (Laffian and Shackleton 2000, 212) and is roughly equal to one hundred billion euros. While this is not an insignificant sum, it is a relatively small budget. An examination of budgetary expenditures shows that the majority of money is spent on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and structural funds. Both areas of spending correspond with Lowi’s (1966) notion of distributive spending in that both are accumulations of individual, non-competitive spending programs in which many different specific groups are the beneficiaries. CAP funds are not allocated lump-sum to “farmers” as such, but rather are allocated to crop- or livestock-specific groups, within the member states. When ‘farmers’ descend on Brussels, as in the large demonstrations in 1999, it is a log-rolling coalition of dairy farmers, farmers that raise beef cattle, sheep herders, pig farmers, olive growers, cereal growers, etc., etc. that are allied with one another. Similarly, the second major item in the EU’S budget, structural funds, are allocated to specific regions within the member states, not lump sum to the central government of the member states. Although the negotiations associated with the structural funds occur at the national level, the politics of the structural funds are also characterized by log-rolling coalitions or “side-payments” (see Carrubba 1997).

Where is the political conflict in distributive policies? Budgets are finite and ultimately budgetary items are zero-sum. The log-rolling character of distributive politics leads to ascending ‘bids’ which eventually meet the limits of the budget. At this point, choices have to be made between budgetary items. Both the CAP and the structural funds have been the subject of repeated, and conflictual, negotiations as the different EU
institutional actors attempt to address the growth of budget items within the limit on spending that is formally imposed upon the EU.

Spending decisions also occur within the EP on budgetary votes, agricultural prices, etc. The question here is what decides how individual MEPs will vote on legislation that allocates funds to different spending items. Recall that MEPs seek re-election/re-selection so they vote in a manner that benefits their constituency. The question of constituency can differ, however, depending upon the policy in question. MEPs from socialist parties may not think of business managers as an essential group in their constituency, even if from their country. MEPs from liberal parties may not think of union members as the principal group in their constituency, and so on. When it comes to distributive policies, however, MEPs are unlikely to think of their constituency in such functional terms. Since distributive policies in the EU involve funds allocated geographically to producer-groups within the member-states and regions within the member-states, MEPs are much more likely to think of their constituency in geographic terms. Recalling the responsible party model, parties and their representatives in legislatures compete by adopting different positions on policy dimensions. How would two MEPs from the same country compete on distributive legislation? Both would want to make sure that 'their country' received its 'fair share' regardless of each MEPs ideology. That is, two MEPs from the same country will look at distributive legislation as a potential benefit to their geographic constituency, country, and will not compete.

1st Hypothesis: When considering distributive legislation, MEPs will vote according to their national identity, not ideologically.
Examine regulatory legislation and the political dynamics change substantially. Regulatory legislation involves rules that organize, influence, and limit various markets. Regulations can, for instance, set common manufacturing standards or determine what is and is not acceptable business practice. Regulations also often formalize the rights of individuals within a market system. Political conflict often occurs between supporters of the "neoliberal project" that want to minimize the role of governments in the market and supporters of "regulated capitalism" that wish to address market failures and the socio-economic costs of a market system (Hooghe and Marks 1999, 75). Most of the political conflict associated with regulatory legislation therefore occurs on the standard left-right dimension.xi

Whereas the EU has a very limited budget that constrains the number of possible distributive issues that arise, the EU has been quite prolific in the realm of regulations. The vast majority of EU legislation and policy is regulatory in nature (Majone 1994, 1997; Tsoukalis 1997); regulation is the primary means used by the major actors in the EU system for pursuing "positive integration" (Scharpf 1996). Thus, unlike Hix (1995) who argues that the territorial dimension is dominant, I see the potential for a substantially greater amount of ideological conflict due to the abundance of regulatory issues that are considered at the European level.xii

These changes in the political dynamics, I argue, are reflected in the voting behavior of MEPs. Whereas consideration of distributive legislation produces concerns for a geographic constituency, I assert that consideration of regulatory legislation creates pressures on the MEP to pursue policies that benefit a functional constituency. That is, an individual MEP that is socialist is more likely to ask whether a proposed piece of
legislation is beneficial or not to labor interests than he or she is to ask whether it is beneficial or not to his or her country.

MEPs are elected nationally as members of national political parties. I expect them to continue the national political party competition in the EP by adopting positions on European level legislation that are consistent with their national party's position in the national arena. However, the national parties are members of party groups in the EP. These groups reflect the major party families present in western Europe and each national party delegation (NPD) generally finds a place within the party groups (see Hix and Lord 1997). To borrow from Duverger (1954), the party groups are essentially intra-parliamentary parties. Therefore, the revealed political contest is not between the various national party delegations but rather between the different party groups. It is within the party groups that we should see the responsible party model at work.

2nd Hypothesis: When considering regulatory legislation, MEPs will vote ideologically with their party group rather than according to their national identity.

The null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between the policy content of legislation being voted upon and the MEP's vote.

IV: Data

Most previous studies of the voting behavior of MEPs have used a--somewhat--random sample of roll-call votes that meet certain criteria like minimum participation and minimum disagreement. It has been noted by others that the infrequency with which formal roll-call votes (RCVs) are called could cause a selection bias problem (Carruba
and Gabel 1999). According to Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton (1995, 160), RCVs are called by party groups for three reasons: to advertise publicly the party group's stance on an issue, to embarrass publicly other party groups for their stance on the issue, and to enforce some discipline on the party group's members on floor votes. Therefore, I think the selection bias is towards sampling from votes that are more political in nature. For many research questions, including the one of this paper, this bias does not pose a problem for the results.

More problematic is the practice of disregarding data because it does not meet criteria on the rate of participation or on the degree of disagreement. The EP has been notorious for the rate of absenteeism. This is meaningful information. If, for a given day during plenary there are one hundred RCVs but on 30 of them less than 1/3 of the MEP's voted, these 30 votes are not, prima facie, any less meaningful than the other 70. Likewise, unanimity and near-unanimity is meaningful information as well. It may, and does, make it more difficult to tease out the possible influences on a MEP's vote, but to discard these votes would inflate the effect of the causal variables.\textsuperscript{xiv}

There are forms of selection bias that are acceptable depending upon the research question. In this study, I selected RCVs based upon the policy content of the legislation.\textsuperscript{xv} I specifically chose legislation that had clear distributive or regulatory content. For the distributive votes, I use budgetary votes and votes on agricultural prices. For the regulatory votes, I chose votes on gender policy (e.g. sexual discrimination), environmental policy (e.g. emissions), and transportation (e.g. air transport). A list of the legislation used in the present study is included in Appendix A. If there were multiple votes on a single piece of legislation, then all votes on that piece of legislation were
included. For the present study, only votes from the 2nd parliament for the years 1984 and 1985.\textsuperscript{xvi}

\textbf{V: Method}

As mentioned in the introduction, this study presents an innovation in method that substantially differs from previous studies of MEP voting behavior. Rather than examine an aggregate measure such as the cohesion index, I pair each legislator, their country identification, their party group identification, and their vote with every other legislator, their country identification, etc. into a dyad.\textsuperscript{xvii} This would mean that a legislature with 10 members would have 36 unique dyads and thus 36 observations. In addition to greatly expanding the number of observations—434 MEPs produces 93, 961 potential observations—using dyads allows for an examination of the influence of the independent variables on the probability that any given pair of MEPs will vote the same. That is, given a set of observations, what is the effect of the independent variables on the likelihood of MEPs voting similarly.

The design is analogous to a pooled binary time-series--cross-section (BTSCS) design in which the legislator dyads form the cross-section and the votes across pieces of legislation are the equivalent of time. Due to the binary dependent variable—did MEP1 vote the same as MEP2—and time-series--cross-sectional data, a logit specification is used. The possibility of non-independence of sequential votes within a piece of legislation is considered and corrected for using the fixed-effects approach. Additionally, cross-sectional dependence is corrected for by specifying each dyad as a group and using Huber's robust standard errors.\textsuperscript{xviii} Put somewhat differently, identifying each piece of
legislation with a unique tag, whether it has one vote or multiple votes, allows for correction of both cross-sectional and time-serial problems.

My model is:

\[ \text{Probability } |Y_{ik} = Y_{jk}| = X_{1ijk} + X_{2ijk} \]

Where:

- \( Y_{ik} = \) Vote of Legislator i on vote k. Coded 0, 1, and 2 for no, yes, and abstain
- \( Y_{jk} = \) Vote of Legislator j on vote k. Coded 0, 1, and 2 for no, yes and abstain
- \( Y_{ik} = Y_{jk} = \) 1 if yes, else 0
- \( X_{1ijk} = \) National Identity of Legislator i and j on vote k. 1 if i = J, else 0
- \( X_{2ijk} = \) Party Group Identity of Legislator i and j on vote k. 1 if i = J, else 0

When either legislator in a dyad did not vote, that dyad was discarded as missing data.

**VII: Findings**

The results are presented in Tables A and B. As can be seen in Table A, the coefficients for the Same Country and Same Party Group are statistically significant. This is hardly surprising since \( N = 3,131,983 \)! What is at first surprising, however, is that the variable for Legislative Type is not significant. I will discuss this further below.

Interpreting these coefficients is not straightforward because unlike the units in ordinary regression analysis, the units (“log-odds”) in logit analyses are not intuitively interpretable. The logit coefficients need to be transformed into more meaningful information. First, a baseline predicted probability that a given pair of legislators will vote the same is calculated when the pair is from different member states, the same party group, and the legislation under consideration is regulatory. This predicted probability is
.83. I then recalculated the probability by changing the different country condition to the same country condition; the corresponding change in probability is from .83 to .87. When I keep the baseline but change the shared party group condition to not shared, the predicted probability decreases from .83 to .64. These substantive results strongly suggest that on regulatory issues, altering the condition of a pair of legislators from shared country to not shared country has a small influence on the conditional probability that the two will vote the same, though it is positive. Changing shared party group to not shared, however, substantially reduces the likelihood that a pair of legislators from different countries on regulatory issues will vote similarly. That it is still positive is indicative of the high degree of consensus in EP votes. The second hypothesis is supported by the results.

Likewise, a baseline probability was calculated for distributive issues with the conditions that a pair of legislators were from the same country, but different party groups. This baseline predicted probability is .71. Changing the conditions from same country and different party group to different country and different party group decreases the predicted probability of voting the same from .71 to .64. Changing the conditions from same country and different party group to same country and same party group increases the predicted probability from .71 to .87. This .87 is quite high, but and at first glance runs counter to my hypothesis that party groups do not substantially influence the vote choice of MEPs on distributive issues. It is important to recall the conditions, same country and same party group—probably same national party delegation as well, two legislators meeting these conditions would be expected to vote the same regardless of the type of legislation under consideration.
The non-significance of the legislative type is probably due to the interaction effect of legislative type, regulatory or distributive, with the other conditions and should be controlled for in future studies using interactive terms.

**VIII: Further Research**

There are, of course, several possibilities for improving upon the work presented here. First and foremost, I want to extend the data to all votes—that meet my selection criteria—for at least the 1984-1994 time period. This would include two separately elected parliaments as well as the addition of Portuguese and Spanish MEPs in 1987. Secondly, I would like to add a number of control variables which should increase the confidence I have in the findings here as well as use the considerable number of observations to test additional hypotheses. For instance, controlling for which party group requested the RCV might have an obvious influence on the probability that two MEPs from the requesting group vote similarly. I would also like to control for committee membership and the committee reporting a particular piece of legislation to see, as some theories of the US Congress suggest, whether or not committee membership has a mediating effect on voting behavior. Some studies (e.g. Kreppel 2000) have found that legislative procedure can be an important influence on voting behavior since different majority requirements may facilitate larger majority coalitions. Once the data is extended over more years, variation in legislative procedure should be taken into account.

While this study analyzes distributive and regulatory votes, the most numerous in the EP, there are other votes that are amenable to this approach. I hope in the near future to analyze votes on European foreign policy, with the additional control for the
government or opposition status of NPDs within the party groups. This would allow for a
test of whether or not "politics stop at the water's edge" in European politics. Likewise,
an investigation of votes on intra- and inter-institutional EU issues would grant a test of
various theories of institutional design.

IX: Conclusions

I began by offering a theory of MEP behavior that posited that the voting behavior
of MEPs in the EP is conditioned by national electoral politics, the EP party groups, and
the content of the legislation being voted upon. I then hypothesized that MEPs will vote
according to their national identity on distributive issues and ideologically with their
party groups on regulatory issues. A new measure was developed to test these hypotheses
that paired each legislator, and attending information, with every other legislator creating
legislator dyads. A logit specification was used to examine changes in the predicted
probabilities that any pair of legislators would vote the same on a given piece of
legislation given changes in their national identity and party group membership. These
changes in conditional probabilities were examined across both regulatory and
distributive issues. The results clearly supported my hypotheses though a future version
of this study will control for the interactive effects of legislative type with the other
independent variables.

2 Tellingly, these fields of research share in common what Hix (1994) has termed the “EU Politics” approach as opposed to the EU integration approach. In essence, this approach adopts and adapts existing political science concepts, theories, and methods to the study of the EU instead of attempting to formulate unique concepts and theories.

3 Other studies of MEP voting behavior include: (Hurvitz 1983; Brzinski 1995; Hix and Lord 1997; Hix and Lord 1998; Raunio 2000)

4 Indeed, I cannot think of any political-institutional environment more complex than that presented by the EU political system.

5 Although, where the EP is positioned in terms of ‘ambition theory’ (Schlesinger 1991) is uncertain at best. Former heads of state have won seats in the EP as well as heads of state-to-be.

6 Even if the goal is election outside the EP, sitting MEPs must still pursue acceptable policies in the EP to maintain their electability.

7 Though these “positions” may be obfuscated on particular policies, there is, in the main, differences between political parties, especially on traditional left-right issues (Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994). I also highly recommend Hix (1995, 539), Hix and Lord(1997, 50), and Hix (1999, 79).

8 Maltzman (1998) argues that members of the US Congress are ‘agents’ acting on behalf of three ‘principals’—electoral constituency, party, and chamber. The analogy seems equally appropriate to the EP in which MEPs seek to please electorates, national parties, and their party groups. My approach is thus somewhat different from Hix, Raunio, and Scully (1999; see also Strom 1990), though it seeks to address much the same question.

9 Fenn’s Homestyle (1978) discusses the notion of different constituencies at length.

10 I am reminded of the US system in which those members of Congress that bemoan the size of government are often found to be major supporters of ‘pork-barrel’ for their district.

11 There is also a Liberal-Authoritarian dimension (see Hix 1995 and 1999) that can involve regulatory issues.

12 Granted, the money issues and the farmers do tend to receive more media attention and do engender more conflictual politics.

13 Because European elections usually do not correspond with national elections, a greater number of smaller fringe parties are elected than would otherwise be expected. Some of these are unable to find allies with which to form a political group with the requisite number of MEPs. Also, it is not uncommon for a party group to have more than one NPD from the same country. These, however, do tend to represent similar ideologies.

14 While studies that use the cohesion index do not involve statistical estimation, the problem is conceptually the same.

15 RCVs are taken from the Official Journal - C Series: Information and Notices.

16 As will be seen, my methodology poses considerable problems related to computer memory.

17 While dyads are unusual in comparative studies, they are commonly used in quantitative IR research. I used Tucker’s (1998) very useful STATA program to generate the dyadic data.

18 I am most grateful to Bernadette M. Jungblut for her very considerable and very considerate help on the methodology and computer programming. STATA 7.0 was used for generating the dyads and running the analyses.
## TABLE A

| Variable              | Coefficient | Robust Standard Error | Z     | Significance P > |z| |
|-----------------------|-------------|-----------------------|-------|------------------|---|
| SAME COUNTRY          | .309707     | .0679331              | 4.56  | 0.000            |
| SAME PARTY GROUP      | 1.026155    | .1145369              | 8.96  | 0.000            |
| LEGISLATION TYPE      | -.0224596   | .2437641              | -0.09 | 0.927            |
| CONSTANT              | .579988     | .1538953              | 3.77  | 0.000            |

N = 3,131,983  
Wald chi² (3) = 95.35  
Prob > chi² = 0.0000  
Log Likelihood = -1879119.7  
Pseudo-R² = 0.0293

## TABLE B

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<th>New Condition</th>
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### Appendix A

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References


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