Small States and European Integration:

The Case of Cyprus

Neill Nugent

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Comments are most welcome

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Department of Politics and Philosophy
Manchester Metropolitan University
Manton Building, Rosamond Street West
Manchester, M15 6LL

n.nugent@mmu.ac.uk
Introduction

Academic analysis and commentary on Cyprus and the EU has focused primarily on the (many possible) relationships between the so-called ‘Cyprus Problem’ and the Republic of Cyprus’s movement towards EU membership. That is to say, attention has been mainly taken up with the implications for both Cyprus and the EU arising from the drive of the Government of the Republic – which claims sovereignty over all of Cyprus but which, in practice, controls only the Greek Cypriot, southern, part – to join the EU in the name of the whole island when the Turkish Cypriot, northern, part of Cyprus, which claims to be a separate state and in practice operates as one, is unwilling to join the EU as part of a single Cypriot state. (The academic literature on the Cyprus Problem and the EU includes Baier-Allen 1999, Neuwahl 2000, Nugent 1997 and 2000, and Tocci 20000. For an account that is sympathetic to the Greek Cypriot viewpoint see Joseph 1999, whilst for one that is sympathetic to the Turkish Cypriot viewpoint see Brewin 2000).

This concentration on the Cyprus Problem implications of Cyprus becoming an EU member state has resulted in other implications of Cyprus’s probable participation in the next EU enlargement round – which seems likely in 2003/04 – being somewhat under-explored. This paper seeks to help rectify this situation by focusing on the ‘small state’ dimension of Cyprus’s EU accession.

It is a dimension that merits exploring for two main reasons. First, although all states naturally have their own individuality in terms of such factors as history, political and economic structures, level of development, social and ethnic composition, and culture, there are characteristics that small states share. There is a wealth of academic literature testifying to how the fact of being a small state does much to shape and influence both the outlooks and behaviour of small states in the international system and the outlooks and behaviour of international actors towards them. Much of the more recent of this literature is focused on small states and the European integration process (see, for example, Goetschel 1998, Griffiths and Pharo 1995, Kelstrup 1993, and Thorhallsson 2000). Second, enlargement rounds over
the years have increased the number and proportion of small states that are members of the EU, and this process will be further advanced when Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) and Cyprus and Malta accede. As Pace (2000a) has pointed out, if a very low population cut-off point of 1.5 million is taken as the criterion of being a small state, then once all states currently negotiating membership terms have acceded the number of small EU member states will increase from one (Luxembourg) out of fifteen to four (with Cyprus, Malta and Estonia) out of twenty-seven, whilst if a cut-off point of 15 million is taken the number will increase from nine out of fifteen to nineteen out of twenty-seven. This prospect of a greatly increased number of small states has been a matter of considerable concern to the EU’s existing large states, as was evidenced at the December 2000 Nice summit where there were sharp differences between large states and small states on the post-enlargement national representations in the EU’s main institutions and national voting weights in the Council of Ministers.

The focus of this paper is on three aspects of the small state dimension of Cyprus’s prospective EU accession: the nature of Cyprus’s smallness; smallness as a reason for Cyprus seeking EU membership and the likely benefits and drawbacks of EU membership for Cyprus as a small state; and the challenges for the EU in incorporating the small state of Cyprus.

What follows is very much a working paper, written as part of a broader and ongoing study on Cyprus and the EU. More work and thinking on the nature and implications of Cyprus’s smallness doubtless needs to be undertaken.

Cyprus as a Small State

In the relevant academic literature there is no commonly accepted definition of what constitutes a small state. There are, essentially, two definitional approaches.

One approach is to define small states in objective terms, with reference most commonly to population and often also to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and geographical size, Kelstrup (1993:140) is an example of those who are in this camp, defining small states
simply as 'states with a very limited resource base'. Commentators taking such an approach take different benchmarks when deciding how limited must be 'limited' to qualify being regarded as small. To take, for example, just two recent and contrasting examples of studies of small states and European integration, Goetschel (1998) takes a population of less than 10 million as his 'qualification' whilst Pace (2000a) takes less than 3 million. Neither of these cut-off points is, of course, either right or wrong, since the term small state is inherently relative, but the taking of different cut-off points naturally results in analysts of small states differing significantly in their focus and, often also, their research findings.

The other approach is rely less on quantitative, and therefore measurable, criteria for identifying small states, and make more use of qualitative criteria. Baechler (1998: 271) is one of those who takes such a view, asserting that '(t)he term small state characterizes a specific state's position towards its environment which is characterized by a certain deficiency in influence and in autonomy relative to large powers'. Clearly using this sort of definition involves evaluation of a state's relationship to its wider environment – with the EU being the environment in which we are most interested here. This evaluative approach inevitably makes categorisations and comparisons of small states more difficult, but it is helpful in building into our perceptions and understandings of small states the fact that a state that is small in resource terms may not necessarily be so in influence and power terms. Careful and astute use of diplomatic, mediating and brokerage skills may, for example, enhance the international position a state may be expected to occupy and the international roles it may be expected to exercise by virtue of its resources alone.

But whether quantitative or qualitative criteria are taken, there can be little doubt that Cyprus is indisputably a small state. It would perhaps be erroneous to describe it as a micro state – in Europe that description is best restricted to Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and San Marino, all of which have populations of less than 70,000 and all of which have at least partially integrated political, economic and security arrangements with larger neighbouring and surrounding states. But if Cyprus is not quite a micro state, it most certainly is a very small state. Taking the three most used quantitative criteria of smallness: the population of the
Republic is 667,000, with about another 200,000 in the north (excluding Turkish troops, but including Turkish settlers); the 1999 GDP of the Republic totalled 8.5 billion euro (reliable figures are not available for the north, but the amount is likely to be around 1 billion euro); and the land area of the whole island is 9,251 sq.km. The degree of Cyprus’s smallness in resource terms may be seen by comparing these figures with those of Belgium, a state customarily regarded as being one of the EU’s existing small member states: Belgium’s population is 10.3 million; its 1999 GDP was nearly 250 billion euro; and its land area is 30,528 sq.km. As for applying qualitative criteria of size to Cyprus, it would be difficult to make out a case that it has exerted influence and power on the international stage that is significantly greater than its size (although, of course, it has attracted a disproportionate amount of international attention).

Smallness as a Reason for Cyprus Seeking EU Membership, and the Likely Benefits and Problems of EU Membership for Cyprus as a Small State

Countries seeking membership of the EU do so for a mixture of reasons. Two sets of reasons are invariably present. First, there are economic reasons. The most important of these is the advantages to be gained from being part of a large market, though for many applicants – including all CEECs – the expectation of being a net recipient of EU funds is also important. Second, there are political reasons. Of particular importance here is the ability to influence decisions which affect European states whether they are EU members or not. Being part of the emerging European superpower, and helping to shape its relations with the rest of the world, is an additional political attraction for many EU applicants. A third set of reasons for seeking EU membership is also sometimes present, and certainly is so in the current enlargement round, in the form of security considerations. The EU does not, of course, provide hard security in the manner of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), but it is seen by most, if not all, current applicants as offering useful soft security protection and comfort.
Cyprus's attempt to become an EU member is influenced by each of these three sets of reasons, but in a manner that is very much unique to it. It is a uniqueness that stems from a combination of Cyprus's smallness on the one hand and its special security position on the other. The nature of the uniqueness will now be shown, through an examination of each of the three sets of reasons for seeking EU membership coupled with observations on the associated likely benefits and problems of EU membership for Cyprus as a small state.

*The Economic Dimension*

Because of the small size of their productive capacities and domestic markets, small states normally have a higher ratio of trade in goods and services than large states. This heavy dependence on external trade - and in particular the dependence on external outlets for (usually specialised) domestic output - results in small states usually being very interested in preferential trading arrangements with trading partners.

With the EU being Cyprus's largest trading partner - accounting for around 52 per cent of its exports and 54 per cent of its imports - better trading access to the EU has thus naturally long been a key goal of Cypriot economic policy. However, this has not necessarily required EU membership, for Cyprus has been moving towards the creation of a customs union with the EU since 1972, when an Association Agreement was concluded between the two. This progression was suspended for a while following the 1974 Turkish invasion, but was re-activated in 1987 and, prior to being overtaken by the accession negotiations, was scheduled to be completed in 2002.

Unlike CEEC applicants to the EU, trade preferences in themselves are thus not critical for Cyprus in its attempt to become an EU member. Much the same goes for other claimed economic advantages of EU membership. There certainly are likely to be some such economic advantages for Cyprus - including EU funding, participation in EU programmes, increased foreign direct investment and location by overseas businesses, and heightened pressures to tackle structural economic problems and to develop growth-promoting economic
policies. Use of such advantages has resulted in existing EU small states – most notably Luxembourg and Ireland – very much benefiting economically from their EU membership. However, for Cyprus it is not all a matter of advantages or of risk-free gain. One reason why it is not so is that in recent years Cypriot economic growth has been faster than average EU growth, so there is the possibility of spillover from the EU economy having a dampening effect. Another reason is that the (mandatory) adoption of EU regulatory policies and practices could endanger the growth in financial services and in the location of offshore companies which, along with the expansion in tourism, have been at the heart of Cypriot economic dynamism.

The economic balance sheet in terms of Cyprus’s accession to the EU is thus probably in the black, but not overwhelmingly so.

*The Political Dimension*

Cyprus may be located at the very eastern end of the Mediterranean, with Turkey only 75km to the north and Syria 105km to the east, but most of its citizens regard themselves as being European. EU membership would confirm and strengthen this European identity.

As for the political impact Cyprus can have in the EU, over thirty years ago Robert Keohane (1969) made a useful distinction between system-determining, system-influencing, system-affecting, and system-ineffectual states. On many issues Cyprus will doubtless be in the third and fourth of these categories. The fact is that as a small state there are many EU policy areas in which Cyprus has little direct interest and in which it does not wish to be, and indeed does not have the political/administrative resources to be capable of being, much involved. There are, however, a number of core policy areas in which it most certainly does wish to be an active policy player and can aspire to being in at least the second category. Prominent amongst these areas are: agriculture as it affects the Mediterranean; the environment, which is crucially important for tourism; regulation of services, especially
financial services and tourism; and aspects of external policies, most particularly in respect of Euro-Med- and Cyprus Problem-related issues (on which more below).

What are the prospects of Cyprus being able to significantly influence such policies? Adapting a framework advanced by Baillie (1998) to argue that all small states have the potential to exercise at least some significant influence in the EU, it can be suggested that the nature and extent of Cyprus's political influence over EU decision-making will primarily be a consequence of three factors:

1) *Characteristics specific to Cyprus.* All EU member states have characteristics of some sort that are specific to them. These can have the effect, or can be used to have the effect, of increasing political influence. So, for example, as Baillie notes, Luxembourg's political standing in the EU is enhanced by virtue of its position as an EU founding member. For Cyprus, special characteristics that might well assist it include its historical ties with Greece and the UK and its geographical position in the eastern Mediterranean - from which it could act as a bridgehead to neighbouring Middle Eastern and North African countries.

2) *The institutional arrangements that are advantageous to small member states.* All small states are advantaged in EU institutions and decision-making processes. Regarding institutional representation, membership of the College of Commissioners and of the EU's three Courts - of Justice, of First Instance, and of Auditors - is on the basis of one per member state, whilst in the European Parliament (EP) small states have proportionately more Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) than large states. Regarding decision-making weight in the European Council and Council of Ministers, virtually all of the decisions of the former and many of the more important and sensitive decisions of the latter are taken by unanimity, whilst even where qualified majority voting (QMV) is possible it tends only to be used when a consensus is not possible, and when it is used small states are proportionally over-represented in voting allocations.
3) The negotiating positions and behaviour of Cyprus. Several academic commentators have demonstrated that small states have a potential to take advantage of their smallness in EU negotiations. For example, Thorhallsson (2000: Chapter 5) notes that the relatively limited number of people involved in representing small states in EU negotiations can result in them often having more room for manoeuvre than their counterparts from large states and being able to operate on a more flexible basis. Baillie (1998: 201-05) notes that small states can take advantage of the fact that they are not usually seen as being competitors by large states and also of the fact that making concessions to them does not normally involve giving up very much in relative terms.

Cyprus’s smallness will thus not result in it being without political influence in the EU, especially on issues that are important to it and where unanimity applies in the European Council and Council of Ministers. Indeed, Cyprus is in a position to use its smallness to its negotiating advantage: being weak will help it in certain situations, especially if this is allied with adroit use of negotiating skills and being seen to be non-confrontational.

The Security Dimension

Put simply, small states traditionally have two broad options in respect of their security policies: attempt to be neutral and independent on the one hand or find protective friends and be dependent on the other. Between these two 'polar positions' are various possibilities that can nuance basic stances, including being given/seeking multi-power constitutional guarantees and being neutral in security terms whilst being closely linked with a larger country or a group of countries for economic purposes.

In the early years of its existence after its foundation in 1960 Cyprus leaned towards the neutrality option, by becoming a founding and active member of the Non Aligned Movement. This position was, however, always overlain – and somewhat undermined – by the fact that the independence of the island was supposedly guaranteed by Greece, Turkey and
the UK – the three countries who, in effect, negotiated and decided the 1960 constitutional settlement. This guaranteeship arrangement weakened Cyprus’s claimed neutrality because the two main ethnic communities living in Cyprus – Greek Cypriots, comprising just over 80 per cent of the population, and Turkish Cypriots, comprising just less than 20 per cent – looked to the historical enemies of Greece and Turkey as their mother countries.

The extent of Cyprus’s security problem was demonstrated, but also made much more complicated and politically dangerous, when Turkey invaded the northern part of the island in 1974. It did so in response to a coup - against the (Greek Cypriot) government of Archbishop Makarios - which was sponsored by the then military government in Athens and which was interpreted by Turkish Cypriots and Turkey as not only a threat to Turkish Cypriots but also a move to incorporate Cyprus within Greece. Large numbers of Turkish troops – currently estimated at around 30,000 – have remained in northern Cyprus since 1974, and since an independent state, with the name ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (‘TRNC’), was declared in the north in 1983, northern Cypriot authorities have shown little interest in the concerns that have since dominated security policy in the Greek Cypriot zone: removal of the Turkish military presence in the north; removal of the perceived Turkish military threat to the south; and reunification of the island.

Until the late 1980s the government of the Republic sought to deal with these pressing security problems mainly through the United Nations (UN) – which has consistently supported the Republic’s position that Cyprus should be a bi-communal and bi-zonal sovereign state – and through diplomatic support from friendly governments in the West. As, however, the division of the island and the problems and tensions associated with it have continued then so has Greek Cypriot security thinking shifted. One way in which it has done so is that hard security options have been more actively sought. The most important outcomes of this have been a defence pact agreed with Greece in 1994, and a decision taken in 1997 to purchase the Russian S-300 air to ground missile system – a decision that was later reversed under EU pressure. Another way in which security thinking has shifted, and of most interest to us here, is that progression to, and eventually realisation of, EU membership has come to
be seen as having security attractions. There are two – inextricably interconnected - aspects of this.

First, EU membership is seen as offering Cyprus soft security protection from Turkey. Greek Cypriots perceive Turkey as posing a very real potential military threat: a perception that is stoked periodically by beligerent and uncompromising pronouncement from Ankara. The assumption in Nicosia is that Turkey would not dare to take military action against an EU member state.

Second, it is hoped that movement to EU membership by the Republic could act as a catalyst for a resolution of the Cyprus Problem. One way in which it has been thought this might occur is by persuading the Turkish Cypriot side to become more flexible in negotiations on the Cyprus Problem so as to open the way for the economic regeneration of the north via EU membership for Turkish Cyprus. (Per capita wealth in the north is about one quarter that of the south, despite the north having been richer than the south at the time of the 1974 invasion.) Since 1994 the EU has sought to pressurise Turkey and the ‘TRNC’ to move in this direction, in part via progressively more explicit statements from the European Council, Council of Ministers and European Commission to the effect that, on the one hand, non resolution of the Cyprus Problem will not in itself be a barrier to the membership of the Republic and, on the other hand, the ‘TRNC’ cannot hope for EU membership either as a single state or as part of Turkey (see, for example, the 1999 Helsinki summit declaration [European Council, 1999] and Enlargement Commissioner Günter Verheugen’s speech in January 2001 [Verheugen, 2001]). Another way in which progression to EU membership has been seen as possibly helping with the Cyprus Problem is by persuading Turkey that it is in its own interests to see the Problem resolved. In this context the EU has made it clear that a resolution would be beneficial to EU-Turkey relations and would help Turkey to realise its own ambitions of EU membership.

It has to be said that to date there is no evidence that the movement of the Republic towards EU membership is advancing the possibility of a resolution of the Cyprus Problem. The positions of the three key sets of actors remain unchanged: the Greek Cypriot government
wants a unified Cyprus, with a single sovereignty and citizenship; the ‘TRNC’ authorities want two sovereign Cypriot states to exist and to be internationally recognised; and the Turkish government is unwilling to pressurise the ‘TRNC’ to negotiate away its claimed sovereignty.

Security considerations loom larger in Cyprus’s progression to EU membership than they have done for any other EU applicant since the European Community was founded in the 1950s. This is because of the island’s highly developed sense of vulnerability vis a vis Turkey and its associated inability to resolve its internal security problem – both of which are explained in large part by Cyprus’s smallness.

Though lack of progress in resolving the Cyprus Problem might appear to indicate that EU membership for the Republic will do little to advance Cyprus’s security position, this is not the case. Certainly the soft security hopes seem realistic, with Cyprus certain to feel psychologically safer inside the EU and with Turkey having to be more careful about threatening an EU member state. As for the Cyprus Problem, it seems inconceivable that Turkey can fulfil its EU membership ambitions without promoting, or at least agreeing to, a resolution of the Problem: after all, by 2004 or soon after it is highly possible that not only Greece but also Greek Cyprus will have the power of veto over the opening of Turkish accession negotiations.

Challenges for the EU in Incorporating the Small State of Cyprus

Cypriot membership has potential benefits for the EU. Like the membership of Malta it will, as both Melakopides (2000) and Pace (2000a and b) have noted: demonstrate ‘the authentic motives of the Barcelona Declaration, regarding peace, stability and prosperity in the Basin’ (Melakopides, 2000: 307); provide links to the Mediterranean’s southern shores and the Middle East (especially the former in Malta’s case and the latter in Cyprus’s case); provide
links to Commonwealth and non aligned countries; and provide symbolic demonstration of the EU’s resolve to include the whole continent.

Attention in EU circles on Cyprus’s hopes for EU membership has, however, focused not so much on the potential benefits for the EU as on the difficulties. The principal difficulty has consistently been seen to be the Cyprus Problem. Notwithstanding the Helsinki summit decision that continued partition of the island will not in itself be a barrier to Cyprus’s accession, there continues to be considerable concern in many EU quarters about the implications – especially the security implications – of admitting a still divided Cyprus. Granting Cyprus membership will, it is feared: further entrench positions on both sides of the Green Line (which separates the two parts of the island) and so make a resolution of the Cyprus Problem more difficult; place further strains on Greek-Turkey relations; and damage the EU’s relations with Turkey – in the short term because Turkey’s insistence that the Government of the Republic should not take decisions on behalf of the whole island will be seen to have been ignored, and in the longer term because upon Cypriot accession the Government of the Republic will help to frame EU policy towards Turkey and will have a veto over Turkey’s EU membership ambitions.

But the shadow of the Cyprus Problem should not disguise the fact that Cyprus’s accession also brings with it other challenges for the EU. Prominent amongst these challenges is Cyprus’s position as a small state, for from the EU’s viewpoint small applicant states can potentially create at least four challenges arising from the fact of their smallness:

1) **They must be incorporated into the EU’s institutions in a manner that respects the principle of equality of states on the one hand and proportionality of representation on the other.** This challenge does, of course, apply when dealing with all applicant states, but it does so particularly with small member states because large states can be somewhat resentful of the equality principle whilst strict application of proportionality would result in small states – especially very small states such as Cyprus – being swamped in Council voting allocations and in the EP.
Much of the debate at the 2000 Nice summit on preparing the EU institutions for enlargement was focused precisely around these competing principles and the balance that should be struck between them. After exhaustive negotiations an agreement was eventually concluded that was broadly acceptable to both existing and prospective member states, large and small alike. Cyprus emerged reasonably well in the final deal: until such time as the EU numbers twenty seven member states all states are to have one Commissioner; for the foreseeable future the membership of the three Courts is to consist of one national per member state; in the Council of Ministers Cyprus will, with four votes, have 1.2 per cent of the total QMV vote for its 0.2 per cent of a twenty seven member EU population – one more vote than Malta (for its 0.4 million inhabitants) and the same as Latvia (2.4 million), Slovenia (2.0 million) and Estonia (1.4 million); and in the EP Cyprus will have six MEPs – 0.8 per cent of the total of 732 MEPs - one more than Malta and the same as Luxembourg (0.4 million inhabitants) and Estonia (Treaty of Nice, Declaration 20).

2) They may give rise to concerns in large member states about the possibility of being outvoted and/or thwarted by small states. The current enlargement round, with its considerable number of small member state applicants, has greatly increased the anxieties of large member states about the potential power of small member states in EU decision-making processes. Largely because of these anxieties, the Nice Treaty made two significant changes to Council QMV procedures that will advantage large member states: a) on the current voting system, the voting share of the six largest member states would have reduced from 55 per cent to 42 per cent in an EU of 27, but at Nice this was amended to give them just under 50 per cent (Ludlow, 2001); b) a demographic safety-net was introduced enabling a QMV majority to be challenged and not to stand if the size of the majority does not represent at least 62 per cent of the EU’s population.

In all probability, large states need have few concerns about the political power of small states in an enlarged EU. Apart from the special case of institutional representation, there is no evidence that the EU’s current small member states strike alliances with each other
any more than do any other group of states. The fact is that small states have significantly different political, economic and security interests and so have no reason to be part of a small member state bloc.

Insofar as Cyprus may be part of a bloc of any sort it will be as part of a Mediterranean bloc, though even that – as the often differing voting behaviour of Spain and Portugal has shown – will be a very loose bloc. There will, of course, be a close working relationship with Greece on certain issues – 'the two Greece's problem' as some EU practitioners put it – but that is because of the ethnic and historical ties between the two countries rather than their shared position as small states (Greece's population is 10.5 million).

3) They may not have the political and administrative resources to be able to manage a Council presidency. As the EU has grown in size and assumed increasing policy responsibilities so has the Council presidency become increasingly burdensome. Very small states just do not have the political and administrative capacity to be able to undertake by themselves everything a presidency involves – hence Luxembourg's reliance on assistance from its neighbour Belgium when it holds the presidency. Anticipating the difficulties that could arise for both presidency states and the EU as a whole with the accession of several new small member states, the rotation of the presidency has been changed from the former arrangement by which it rotated in the alphabetical order of the states in their own languages to a negotiated order designed to ensure that each troika contains at least one large member state. Whilst this will not remove all the difficulties very small states such as Cyprus will have when occupying the presidency, it should mean that they will be able to make use of their troika partners to ensure they have access to the resources running a presidency requires.

4) They may not have the political, administrative and legal capacity to be able to conduct an effective accession process and to be able to implement EU policies. Becoming and then being an EU member state is a major undertaking for, and imposes great burdens on,
the political, administrative and legal systems of applicants. This may be evidenced by citing four of the sets of measures applicant states must address during the accession process: 20,000 or so EU laws covering some 80,000 pages of the Official Journal must be incorporated into the national legal framework; economic structures and working practices must be changed so that the national economy functions in accordance with Single European Market rules; national officials must familiarise themselves with the (often highly technical and complex) aspects of the EU acquis as it impinges on their work; and administrative and judicial structures must be modernised and strengthened so that on accession the acquis can be fully and properly applied.

Satisfying the EU’s membership conditions is thus highly demanding on national political, administrative and legal systems. Being able to make the necessary changes and produce the necessary resources can cause particular difficulties for small states, with their sometimes rather entrenched public sectors and their comparatively small number of appropriately qualified and trained public officials.

Cyprus has indeed experienced some such difficulties, but not they have not been insurmountable. This may be illustrated by taking, for example, Cyprus’s administrative capacity to implement the acquis, which was identified in 1998 in the Commission’s first annual progress report on Cyprus’s progress towards accession as being a potential problem: ‘As concerns Cyprus’ administrative and judicial capacity to apply the acquis, it seems that major problems will not be encountered. However, administrative capacities remain to be strengthened in a number of areas, including the internal market, maritime transport, telecommunications, environment and justice and home affairs’ (European Commission, 1998: section 3.20). Subsequent annual reports have made similar – in truth, relatively mild – observations, with the 2000 report, for example, praising Cyprus for further strengthening its administrative capacity in many areas, whilst emphasising that more needed to be done by way of creating new regulatory authorities and recruiting additional staff in areas such as company law, transport, taxation, and (as in 1998) environment and justice and home affairs (European Commission, 2000: section 3.2).
There appear to be three main reasons why Cyprus's political, administrative and legal systems have been able to cope, if not easily at least relatively smoothly, with the EU accession process. First – and this is in marked contrast to the CEECs - as an established functioning democratic and market-based country, Cyprus had relatively modern and efficient political, administrative and legal systems in place before the accession process began. Second, the 'normal' workload of adjusting to the EU has been lightened by virtue of much of the acquis already having been incorporated as part of the movement towards the EU-Cyprus customs union. Third, it seems that Cypriot public servants are well versed in the strategies that officials of small states customarily use to cope with the demands made on them (see Thorhallsson 2000 for a review of these strategies). It is, for example, certainly the case that much of the preparatory work on Cyprus's accession arrangements has undertaken within corporatist and networking frameworks in which representatives of the major political parties and of the public and private sectors have worked closely together, and it is also the case that politicians and officials have worked on more informal and flexible bases than is customary in large states.

The accession of small states thus poses challenges for the EU, mostly of an institutional nature. The large number of such states that are likely to join in the next enlargement round(s) makes the challenge all the greater. Arrangements have, however, been made that should enable the EU to cope with most anticipated problems. Cyprus is, of course, one of the prospective acceding small states. The extent of its smallness has raised a number of particular difficulties, but these have not proved to be insurmountable.

Concluding Remarks

Cyprus is the most advanced of those countries currently negotiating EU membership: it is the '1' of the 5 + 1 'first wave' group of countries that have been involved in membership negotiations since April 1998; in each of the annual sets of reports issued by the Commission
since 1998 on the progress of applicants in preparing for accession it has been identified as being the most prepared state (for the most recent report, see Commission 2000); and it has consistently ‘led the pack’ in the provisional closure of negotiating chapters – with 18 of the 29 chapters being closed by April 2001. On the basis of this advanced position and of the European Council’s promise not to make resolution of the Cyprus Problem a condition of Cyprus’s accession, it seems almost certain that Cyprus will join the EU in the next enlargement round. Most probably it will do so along with five or six other states, all of which bar one – Poland – will have relatively small populations (the Czech Republic, with 10.3 million inhabitants, is likely to be the largest of these small states).

This paper has sought to demonstrate that Cyprus’s past, current, and future relations with the EU, and the EU’s relations with it, are not to be viewed solely through the prism of the Cyprus Problem. Cyprus’s smallness in another important dimension in the relationships between the two. Cyprus has been motivated to seek EU membership in no small part because of its smallness, that smallness is likely to condition its interests and behaviour in the EU, and the EU has had - and will continue to have – to prepare for Cyprus’s accession, and more broadly for the coming wave of enlargement(s), with the small state dimension very much in mind.

References


