WHAT DO SUBNATIONAL OFFICES THINK THEY ARE DOING IN BRUSSELS?

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Not for quotation.
The past decade-and-a-half has seen an explosion in the number of offices established by subnational governments at the heart of the European Union. The first such offices were set up by English local authorities and German Länder in 1984, and for several years they went virtually unnoticed. In 1988 there were 15 such offices. By the end of 1993, the time of the first systematic survey of such offices, there were 54 (Nielsen and Salk 1998; Marks et. al. 1996). Today there are more than 160. Such offices serve no official EU function. They are not mentioned in the treaties; they play no formal role in the policy process. They are part of the subterranean political world of multi-level governance that lies beneath and beyond EU treaties.

Are subnational offices decorative or are they substantively important? What do subnational governments hope to gain by funding offices in Brussels? Are they listening posts to detect upcoming legislation? Are they means to situate particular regions and localities in European networks of similar (or different) actors? Finally, and for our purpose most importantly, are they intended to influence policy making in the EU?

Answers to these questions promise to deepen our understanding of the politics of multi-level governance in the EU. We know that supranational institutions exert real authority in EU decision making, and we also know that the authority of subnational governments has grown to significant proportions across several EU countries (Hooghe and Marks 2001). We know far less, however, about how subnational and supranational actors connect.

**Overview of the Survey and Data**

This paper analyzes the activities and goals of subnational offices in the European Union with the help of a new data set collected in 1999 by a working group led by Gary Marks and François Nielsen on "regions in the EU" at the UNC-Chapel Hill Center for European Studies.
The survey, which partially replicates a survey conducted by Jane Salk in 1993 (Nielsen and Salk 1998, Marks et al. 1996), was sent to all 161 EU regional offices with formal representation in the European Union. Seventy-seven offices responded to the questionnaire—a response rate of 48 percent. Regional offices from all member states, with the exception of Portugal (which has only one regional office) responded to the survey. Austria, with 10 of 12 offices responding, and Denmark, with 9 of 10 offices responding, stand out as particularly compliant. Less accommodating were the regional offices from Belgium (1 of 7 offices), Italy (3 of 13 offices), and the United Kingdom (11 of 34 offices). Table 1 provides the response rate for each country. Appendix A lists the offices that responded to the survey.

[Table 1 about here]

Subnational offices are as diverse as the regions and localities they represent. In federal and federalizing political systems, representation in Brussels is dominated by regional governments. Thus one finds every German and Austrian Land and all three Belgian regions represented in Brussels along with most Spanish comunidades autónomas. In countries with a weaker regional tier, representation usually consists of a mixture of local and regional units. In France, most offices represent régions, but several départements also have offices. In the United Kingdom, local authorities, regional quangos, regional enterprise organizations, national local authority organizations, universities, and elected regional assemblies fund offices representing individual local authorities, regional groupings of local authorities, a national local authority organization, alongside offices representing the North of England, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales. Since July 1999, the newly elected Scottish executive shares a new location, Scotland House, with Scotland Europa, a conglomerate of Scottish public and private organizations that has represented Scottish interests in Europe since 1992. In unitary systems such as the
Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands, local governments (or organizations of local governments) predominate.

Table 2 shows that roughly two-thirds of regional offices represent a region rather than a smaller territorial unit, and two-thirds represent a single subnational government rather than two or more subnational governments. Single regional offices predominate. Most offices representing more than one government represent subregional governments.

[Table 2 about here]

Table 3 demonstrates that offices responding to our survey do not differ much from the universe of all regional offices. Single regional offices form a slightly smaller majority of the total, and the ratio of regional and subnational offices in the "two or more" column shifts somewhat. However, the overall pattern is similar, and a Goodman goodness-of-fit test, which measures how well our sample matches the distribution of offices in the universe of cases across these two variables, confirms that the difference between respondents and the universe of subnational offices are not statistically significant.

[Table 3 about here]

Our survey of subnational offices provides detailed information on the size, expenditure and staffing of subnational offices. The survey also asks a battery of questions concerning the goals and activities of subnational offices. For example, each office is asked to assess the importance of gaining information about upcoming EU legislation relevant to their home region or locality on a five-point scale from "not at all important" to "very important." In addition to information-gathering, we ask each office to evaluate the importance of other goals, such as forging ties with other regions, acting as a liaison between their region and the EU, influencing decision-making in the EU, and increasing the influence of regions generally in the EU. These
questions are listed in Appendix B. A second set of questions assesses the importance of eleven
discrete policy areas to the office (e.g., competition, agriculture, the environment, citizenship). A
third set of questions asks each office to rate its effectiveness in playing certain roles in the EU.
Finally, each office is asked to detail the level and frequency of its interaction with other
organizations within the EU, including all 23 EU Directorates, COREPER, the European
Parliament, the Committee of the Regions, the permanent representations of member states, and
the other 161 EU regional offices.

Gathering, exchanging, mediating, and providing information

Why should a subnational government expend resources to sustain an unofficial embassy
in Brussels? The bread and butter work of a normal embassy, representing its citizens in a
foreign land, does not apply. Few of these "embassies" help home companies export their
services or products. The main functions that have been ascribed to subnational offices in the
literature have to do with information: they gather information concerning EU legislation; they
exchange information in subnational networks; they mediate information to their respective
home territories, and they provide information to EU decision makers.

Information Gathering

Most previous analyses have argued that information gathering is the prime goal of
Subnational governments have a strong incentive to be informed about EU legislation in order to
incorporate into their own laws and practices and in order to monitor compliance in their own
territories (John 1994b). In addition, a subnational government is likely to have a strong interest
in knowing what is in the policy pipeline. This cannot be gleaned by reading the newspapers.

Coordinated information gathering is particularly important in the European Union because the legislative process is complex and murky. Legislative proposals may originate in unexpected places within the Commission; the European Parliament is relatively unstructured by parties and is difficult to read; the Council of Ministers debates behind closed doors.

Peter John observes that information gathering is at the base of a "ladder" of subnational office participation that includes seeking funding opportunities, participating in trans-national networks, and seeking political influence (1994b). At minimum, subnational offices are expected to be listening posts, or early warning stations, for their sponsors (John 1994a). Information gathering is the *sine qua non* of subnational office activity in the European Union.

**Networking**

Opening an office in Brussels places governments representing diverse territories throughout the EU (and beyond) in close proximity (Salk, Nielsen, and Marks 2001). This lowers the transaction costs of informational exchange and facilitates dense cooperative networks. Association among regions takes many forms: there are, for example, numerous networks encompassing regions with similar economic profiles (e.g. the Four Motors), regions with similar political or geographical situations (e.g. Association of European Frontier Regions), and neighboring regions (e.g. the three Alps associations) (Benz 1998; Bachtler 1997; Leonardi and Nanetti 1990).

Regions also form consortia to apply for and administer EU cohesion funding, including multi-regional Community Initiatives such as RESIDER (steel-making areas), RETEX (textile
and clothing industry), and RECHAR (coal-mining regions). The Commission’s INTERREG programs are specifically intended to encourage regional networks across different countries.

Networks among subnational offices tend to be flexible and problem-oriented. They routinize informational exchange, and thereby diffuse best practices among connected regions. As Arthur Benz has noted, the fluidity of subnational networks suggests that they are more oriented to ad hoc information-sharing than exercising political muscle (Benz 1998, 120). Yet networks can be more than sites for information-sharing. As in the case of the association of Objective 2 regions, which in 1992 mounted a campaign for Objective 2 funding, such networks can serve as transnational political lobbies.

Liaising Between the Region and the EU

Subnational offices mediate between their home territories and the European Union. The flip side of gathering information from European actors is conveying information to the people that subnational offices serve in their home territory: elected subnational representatives, civil servants, firms, public organizations, and citizens. Officers of subnational offices often think of themselves as intermediaries between their region or locality and the European Union, and they realize that one way to show value for money is to locate and inform those at home. Their job often takes them to their region as well as to Brussels (John 1994a).

As the “single biggest meeting point of commercial and other economic interests outside Washington, DC,” Brussels is a major lure for private and public interests (Jeffery 1996, 195). A vast amount of EU legislation bears directly on regions and localities. Subnational offices access information about the EU policy process and assist home constituencies in using it. In addition,
subnational offices help those at home negotiate the complex European policy terrain and channel them to relevant Commission officials or parliamentary representatives.

**Influencing Policy**

Finally, subnational offices may seek to influence EU policy making. Information gathering and the exercise of political influence are not entirely different activities. They lie on a single continuum describing the direction of informational flow. Van Schendelen (1993a), basing his model of lobbying in the EU on Lester Milbrath's (1963), *The Washington Lobbyists*, argues that stimulation and transmission of information are at the core of political influence (Van Schendelen 1993a, 2; Zeigler and Baer 1969, 11). As Van Schendelen (1993a, 3) concludes, "The lobbyist's need to inform public authorities indicates his fear that, otherwise, formal decision-making will be based on insufficient information, i.e. on misconceptions and false interpretations."

Charlie Jeffery has observed that the "core function" of British and German regional offices "is to act as an information channel between the home base and . . . European institutions" (1996, 192). But this, as Jeffery stresses, covers a host of possibilities from a "reactive" strategy of passive information gathering to a proactive strategy of feeding information to relevant policy makers early in the decision making process "to shape policy in favor of the region concerned" (1996, 192).

In general, scholars of subnational politics have been cautious about attributing political influence to regional offices. In his evaluation of the politics of EU regional policy, Ian Bache emphasizes the continued gatekeeping role of national governments, and stresses the variability of regional influence across different issues and different stages of the policy process. Bache
observes that "On occasions, the consequence of national government gatekeeping is a political arena characterized less by multi-level governance than by multi-level participation: actors from subnational and supranational levels participate, but do not significantly influence decision-making outcomes" (1998, 155, author's italics; Bache et al. 1996). Martin and Pearce conclude their survey of Scottish, Welsh and English subnational governments by noting that "Rather than seeking to shape policies, most see their role as ensuring that they are sufficiently well informed to be able to respond to future policy initiatives" (1999, 47). However, there are grounds for expecting variation in the extent to which subnational offices attempt to influence EU policy. Charlie Jeffery finds that offices representing German Länder are politically proactive on account of their resources and entrenched domestic position, their clear European mission, and their precisely delineated role in a strong regional government (1996).

**Evidence from a Survey**

Table 4 presents a factor analysis of responses to ten questions about the objectives of subnational offices. Our expectation that there are a limited number of distinct objectives is amply confirmed. The first factor we identify, accounting for 23.3 percent of the variance, loads heavily on responses to three questions that tap political influence: influencing decision making in the EU; explaining subnational positions to EU decision makers; and gaining influence for regions generally in the European political process. Pearson correlations among these three items are distinctively high, ranging from 0.43 (sig>0.001) to 0.72. Variation in the responses of subnational offices for these questions is greater than that for any others listed in Appendix B. The mean importance attached to gaining influence over EU decision making is 4.0 on our five-point scale, with a standard deviation of 1.2. The only other item with a standard deviation
greater than one is the importance of gaining political influence for regions generally (sd=1.2; mean=3.3). Hence, if one is interested in how regional offices vary, the place to begin is with the importance they place on gaining political influence. This was the variable that we were most interested in when we designed the survey, and it is more powerful than any other in distinguishing the goals of subnational offices.

The second factor we identify, accounting for 19.9 percent of the variance, concerns the role of an office in liaising between the home region and Europe--by providing people in the region with information or assistance, by facilitating contacts for local actors at the European level, and by increasing knowledge of the EU in the region. The third factor taps basic objectives having to do with information-gathering and networking. These are the bread and butter activities common to almost all subnational offices--finding out about upcoming legislation, networking with other regions, finding out about funding opportunities, and promoting the region in the EU. The importance attached to these goals ranges from 4.4 to 4.8.

Our factor analysis reveals that the most powerful sources of variation among the goals pursued by subnational offices are related to political influence. Generally, items across, as well as within, the three factors we have identified are positively correlated, but there is a noteworthy exception. We find weak, negative associations between importance of political influence and some other items in Appendix B. Offices that emphasize the goal of political influence are somewhat less likely to say that finding funding opportunities is important to them, less likely to say that building ties with other regional or local representations is important to them, and less likely to say that responding to requests from people in their region is important to them.

[Table 4 about here]
In the remainder of this paper we will focus on variation in the importance of political influence for subnational offices. The pattern of responses we elicited from subnational offices concerning political influence is distinct from that for other goals we identified, and an explanation of this phenomenon has basic implications for our understanding of multi-level governance.

Explaining Variation: Which Kinds of Offices Pursue Political Influence?

To what extent do subnational offices pursue political influence? Is variation on this dimension of activity structured in an intelligible way?

We have two expectations. First, we expect that larger, better funded, offices will be best placed to take on the goal of influencing EU policy. Several recent studies have investigated the effectiveness of regions and regional offices to affect outcomes in EU policy-making (e.g., Bache and Jones 2000; Martin and Pearce 1999; John and McAteer 1998; Smyrl 1997; Jeffery 1996; McAteer and Mitchell 1996; Bomberg 1994). McAteer and Mitchell (1996) and Bomberg (1994) argue that resource-rich offices will be able to afford a larger, more professional staff and, hence, will lobby more effectively. Along similar lines Jeffery (1996) suggests that larger offices can exploit economies of scale and specialization in seeking political influence.

There are wide variations among subnational offices in funding, office space, and number of employees. The bottom quartile of subnational offices are located in offices smaller than 720 ft$^2$ (80 meters$^2$) and have budgets less than Euro150,000. The largest quarter inhabit offices of at least 2457 ft$^2$ (273 meters$^2$) with budgets exceeding Euro337,000. Are larger, richer offices more likely to be shapers as well as takers of policy?
Our second expectation is that offices representing regions that are entrenched in their
domestic polities will be more likely to try to influence, not just respond to, European policy
making. Charlie Jeffery makes the connection between the influence exerted by a subnational
government within its member country and the influence it exerts in the EU (2000). In prior
research on an earlier survey of subnational offices, Marks, Nielsen, Ray, and Salk found that the
greater the scope of a region's policy competence in its national arena, the more likely a region
was to be represented in Brussels (1996). A survey of subnational governments in Britain
undertaken by Steve Martin and Graham Pearce found that first tier authorities--Scottish regional
councils, English and Welsh county councils--were much more confident of their ability to
influence EU policies than smaller, weaker second tier authorities--shire districts and London
boroughs (1999).

Strong regions have both more to gain by trying to influence EU policy and more to lose
if they do not. They have more to gain because many EU policies lie within their competence.
They have more to lose because if they are unable to operate effectively in Europe they face the
prospect of being outflanked by national governments. While subnational governments in many
EU countries have established prerogatives in their respective national arenas, they are not
entrenched at the European level.

European integration is both an opportunity and a threat for regions, and especially for
regions that exert considerable competencies in their national polities. Chris Ansell, Craig
Parsons and Keith Darden have pointed out that European integration has expanded the
coalitional possibilities of subnational and national actors beyond the national state (1997).
Either national or subnational actors can be outflanked. Our hypothesis is that the resources of a
subnational government in the national arena underpin its ambitions in Europe. Hence, we expect
that 1) offices representing regions will be more oriented towards gaining political influence than those representing sub-regional tiers of government; 2) offices representing more powerful regions will be more oriented towards gaining influence than those representing less powerful regions.

Our two lines of hypothesizing describe a single causal model in which powerful regions establish large, well financed, offices in Brussels which a) have the resources and b) have the clout to influence EU policy making. So, to summarize, we expect to see the relationships indicated in Figure 1.

[Figure 1 about here]

Evidence

Let us take the elements of Figure 1 in turn.

Tables 5, 6, and 7 reveal that the resources available to an office depend on the kind and number of governments it represents. There is a sharp contrast between offices representing regions and offices representing subregions. On average, regional offices employ twice as many staff as subregional offices; they have offices close to triple the size and they control budgets more than twice as large. Offices representing single regions are by far the most well-endowed of the four categories represented in Tables 6, 7, and 8. These include the offices of the most powerful regions in Europe--German Länder and Spanish comunidades autónomas. Regions in Germany, Spain, Belgium, and Austria are large enough to fund single regional offices, and these tend to be larger and better financed than pluri-regional offices, and much more impressive than any kind of subregional office.

[Tables 5, 6, and 7 about here]
The same story can be told by examining the effects of variations in authority among regions for office resources. We estimate the power of a subnational government by adapting an index of regional governance covering all EU countries for 1950 to 2000, which was developed independently of our regional office survey (Hooghe and Marks 2001). The index measures the authority of a region in its domestic policy by scoring the character and scope of policy competencies exercised by the regional government, the extent to which it shares legislative and executive power, and whether the regional government is responsible to a directly or indirectly elected legislature. The index is detailed in Appendix C.

The more powerful the formal position of a region in its national polity, as measured by the index, the larger and better financed the office. Figure 2 summarizes the bivariate associations.

[Figure 2 about here]

Figure 3 shows the effects of the resource base of a subnational office on the importance it attaches to influencing EU decision making. As one would expect, the elements of that resource base--budget, full-time staff, and size--are closely related. Each of them bears on our dependent variable. But the strength of the association almost certainly borrows from the fact that the resources available to a subnational office reflects the domestic clout of the government that sustains it. This consideration is built into Figure 4, which presents our model of regional power, resources and EU influence. The association between the index of regional governance and the importance attached to influencing EU decision making is a highly significant 0.33 (sig>0.01). The associations presented in the figure are simple correlations. At this point, our ambitions are limited to establishing the plausibility of a simple model explaining one salient feature of multi-level governance.
[Figures 3 and 4 about here]

We can probe further when we compare means for the importance of EU lobbying across the four types of office we identified earlier (see Table 8). Our expectation is that we should see a contrast between regional and subregional offices, and this is what we find. On a five-point scale, the mean response of regional offices is 4.3, while that for subregional offices is 3.3. There is no significant difference between single-government offices and joint-government offices in the aggregate. But combining these categories isolates the single subregional office (mean score = 2.2) as significantly different from joint subnational offices (mean score = 3.9). So we must refine our initial hypothesis. It is not the case that regions, and regions alone, are intent on pursuing political influence in the EU. Subregional offices often do the same if they gain through strength of numbers what they lack in individual strength. The finding is confirmed when we turn to individual cases. Several offices representing collections of subregional governments, such as the Association of Danish County Councils, the Europe Bureau of Bavarian Communes, and the Association of Netherlands’ Municipalities, regard political influence over EU decision making as extremely important (scoring five on our five-point scale).

[Table 8 about here]

Conclusion

Are subnational offices primarily listening posts—to alert regional decision makers to upcoming legislation, to gain information about funding opportunities, and promote awareness of their region? Or are regional offices something sterner, part of an attempt to steer, as well as react to, EU decision making? Do they try to shape policy as well as gain information about it? In their own estimation, many subnational offices do both.
If the yardstick for political influence is shaping the European Union's constitutional structure, then there can be little doubt that subnational offices are rarely, if ever, decisive actors. But if one is interested in the flow of policy, including authoritative decision making in environmental policy, cohesion policy, social affairs, and telecommunications--areas that subnational offices single out as important to them--then large subsets of subnational offices aim to shape decision making.

The aggregate resources devoted by subnational governments to representation in the EU are commensurate to those committed by national governments. While individual subnational offices are puny in relation to the representations of national governments in Brussels, an aggregate picture tells a different story. The ten German offices that responded to our survey employ 77 full-time staff, and the seven Spanish offices that responded employ 60 full-time staff. Assuming a random distribution of respondents among all 16 German and 17 Spanish offices, we would expect to find a total of around 120 full-time staff employed by German offices, and around 145 employed by Spanish offices. In 1999, Neil Nugent estimated that the permanent representations of the larger member states were staffed by 30 to 40 officials, plus back-up support (1999, 149).

Subnational offices do not have formal competencies in the EU, so to the extent that they exercise influence, it will be "soft." Rather than examine particular policy decisions, we have approached the offices themselves. Our analysis shows very clearly that many do regard gaining influence over EU decisions as an important goal and that variations are structured in an intelligible way. The larger and better funded an office the more likely it is to assert political influence as a goal. Regions that are entrenched in their respective national polities are most
intent on influencing European decision making. But offices representing associations of subregional governments also aim for influence.

One must pay detailed attention to the national position of subnational governments in order to explain variations in the goals of the offices they fund in Brussels. Subnational governments are institutionally determined in their respective domestic arenas. What matters to them is how the European Union impinges on their authoritative competencies, and these competencies find their meaning in national polities. There is no overarching framework for subnational governance in Europe. This is one of the distinctive features of the EU and the goals and activities of subnational offices reflect this very clearly. If, as Tip O'Neill once said, all politics in the United States is local, one should not be surprised that multi-level governance in the EU is equally "local." The action for subnational offices is rooted in their respective domestic polities where we find subnational governments operating alongside—and sometimes against—national governments to increase their resources, to gain greater political autonomy, or to avoid being outflanked by the imposition of EU policies that national governments have bargained over their heads.
Appendix A: List Of Subnational Offices Responding To Survey

Austria
Burgenland Verbindungsbüro
Representation of the Länder
Land Kärnten Verbindungsbüro
Land Niederösterreich
Oberösterreich Verbindungsbüro
Österreichischer Städtebund
Land Salzburg Verbindungsbüro
Steiermark Büro
Vienna Business Promotion Fund
City of Vienna Business Promotion Fund

Belgium
Ministry of the Flemish Community

Germany
Beobachter der Länder
Informationsbüro Baden-Württemberg
Europabüro der Bayerischen Kommunen
Verbindungsbüro der Freien Hansestadt Bremen
Verbindungsbüro Niedersachsen
Vertretung Nordrhein Westfalen
Vertretung Rheinland-Pfalz
Verbindungsbüro Saarland
Informationsbüro Sachsen
Verbindungsbüro Sachsen-Anhalt

Denmark
Aalborg E.U. Office
Aalborg Development Agency
Aarhus E.U. Office
Association of Danish County Councils
Copenhagen City
Eura Ringkøbing Amt A/S
Frederiksborg E.U. Office
Odense Denmark E.U. Office
South Denmark

Spain
Instituto de Fomento de Andalucía
Gobierno de Aragón
Oficina de Asuntos Europeos del Principado de Asturias
Patronat Catala Pro Europa
Fundación Galicia Europa
Instituto de Fomento de la Region de Murcia
Euskadiren Ordekaritza (Delegación del País Vasco)

France
Bureau Alsace
Centre Atlantique
Association de la Coopération entre la Bretagne et les Pays de la Loire
Association des Régions Françaises du Grand Est
EURODOM
Délégation de la Région Île de France
Bureau de la Délégation Lorraine
Antenne Basse-Normandie
Région Haute-Normandie
Conseil Régional de Picardie
Délégation de la Polynésie Française
Délégation Générale de la Région Rhône-Alpes
Association Grand Sud

Greece
Region of Epirus

Italy
Regione Liguria Ufficio di Bruxelles
Unioncamere Piemonte
Veneto

Ireland
Dublin European Representative Office
NASC – West Ireland EU Liaison

Netherlands
Oost Nederland
Regio Randstad

Sweden
East Sweden
Mid-Sweden
North Sweden
West Sweden

Finland
Helsinki Office in Brussels
Association of Finnish Local Authorities

United Kingdom
Birmingham and West Midlands Brussels Office
Essex County Council
Association of London Government
Merseyside Brussels Office
East Midlands Regional European Office
Reading and Thames Valley
West of England in Europe
Scotland Europa
West of Scotland European Consortium
Wales European Centre
Yorkshire and Humberside European Office
Appendix B

Q-1. Using the following list of activities/objectives, please rate the **importance of each activity for your organization** on a scale of 1 (not at all important) to 5 (very important).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Importance of your activity (Circle your answer)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 = NOT AT ALL IMPORTANT</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To gain information about upcoming EU legislation relevant to your region</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>To gain information about funding opportunities for your region</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To build ties with other regional or local representations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To act as liaison between groups in your region and EU institutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To explain your region’s position on issues to EC decision-makers</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>To promote awareness of your region in Brussels</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>To increase knowledge of the population of your region about the European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>To respond to requests for information or assistance from people in your region</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To influence decision-making in the EU in favor of your region</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To gain more influence for your region more generally in the European political process</td>
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Appendix C: Regional Governance in the European Union, 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Constitutional federalism (0-4)</th>
<th>Role of regions in central government (0-4)</th>
<th>Regional elections (0-2)</th>
<th>Summary score (0-12)</th>
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<td>Austria</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corsica</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Ireland</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madeira and the Azores</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain (Régimen ordinario)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain (Régimen extraordinaire)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland and Wales</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix C measures regional governance along two dimensions: the extent to which a regional government exercises authority independently from central government, and the extent to which a regional government participates in national or European decision making. We apply Daniel Elazar’s notion that federalism combines self rule (autonomy) with shared rule (power sharing) (Elazar 1987). We evaluate self rule by scoring constitutional federalism and regional elections. We evaluate shared rule by scoring the role of regions in central government.

I. Constitutional Federalism

Constitutional federalism taps the formal scope of regional government within the state as a whole. We assign one point for each of the following characteristics:
existence of a functioning regional tier of government
extensive authoritative competencies, including two or more of the following: authority to tax; control over police; education policy (including tertiary education); cultural policy; transport and communications policy; economic development; local government; and authority to determine regional political institutions (e.g. administrative hiring, budget process, timing of regional elections)
specific regional competencies that are constitutionally guaranteed
federal state in which constitutional change is co-decided by the central state and regions. These features are usually, but not always, cumulative. That is to say that the first characteristic is a requisite for the second, the second a requisite for the third, and the third a requisite for the fourth.

II. Role of Regions in Central Government

We distinguish two kinds of power sharing. First, regions can share rule because they collectively constitute a national legislature, usually a second chamber composed of representatives of regional parliaments or regional executives. Second, regional governments may share executive power to the extent that regional ministers and civil servants regularly negotiate legislation or executive decisions with their counterparts in central government.

- legislative power sharing:
  1 = a chamber in the national legislature composed of representatives of regional governments or parliaments without wide-ranging legislative veto power
  2 = a chamber in the national legislature composed of representatives of regional governments or parliaments with wide-ranging veto power

- executive power sharing:
  1 = regular intergovernmental meetings between central state and regional executives without authority to reach binding decisions
  2 = regular intergovernmental meetings between central state and regional executives with authority to reach binding decisions

III. Regional elections

We distinguish between indirect and direct elections:

- 1 = the regional assembly is indirectly elected
- 2 = the regional assembly is directly elected
### Appendix D: European Regional Divisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUTS 1</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>NUTS 2</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>NUTS 3</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bundesländer</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Gruppen von Politischen Bezirken</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td></td>
<td>Provincies/ Provinces</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Arrondissements</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>―</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Amter</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Suuralueet</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Maakunnat</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Régions + DOM</td>
<td>22+4</td>
<td>Départements + DOM</td>
<td>96+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Regierungsbezirke</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Kreise</td>
<td>543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Development regions</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Nomoi</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>―</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Regional authority regions</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Regioni</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Provincie</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>―</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>―</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Provincies</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>COROP-regio’s</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Comissaoes de coordenação</td>
<td>5+2</td>
<td>Grupos de Cancelhos</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>regional + Regioes autnomosas</td>
<td>17+1</td>
<td>Comunidades autnomas + Ceuta y Melilla</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Riksområden</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Län</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Groups of counties</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Counties/local authorities areas</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EU                               | 77 | 207 | 1030 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Response Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>48%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Types of Subnational Offices with E.U. Representation, 1999 (N = 161)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Governments Represented in Office</th>
<th>Regional Level</th>
<th>Sub-regional Level</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Single Government Office</em></td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Combined Government Office</em></td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Total</em></td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Governments Represented in Office</td>
<td>Single Government Office</td>
<td>Combined Government Office</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Level</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-regional Level</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4: Rotated Component Matrix For Subnational Office Objectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exerting Influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence EU decision making</td>
<td>.839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explain subnational position to EU decision makers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gain influence for regions generally</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide knowledge/assistance to people in region</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaise between subnational and EU actors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase knowledge of EU in region</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gain information about funding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Build ties with other regions or localities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gain information about upcoming legislation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote awareness of region in Brussels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Variance explained 23.3% 19.9% 18%

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
All factors with an Eigenvalue equal or greater than 1 are listed.
All factor loadings greater than .4 are shown.
Table 5: Staff by Type of Office

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office Type</th>
<th>Regional Level</th>
<th>Sub-Regional Level</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single Government Office</td>
<td>5.1&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2.2&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Government Office</td>
<td>2.7&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2.1&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> n=39  
<sup>b</sup> n=10  
<sup>c</sup> n=12  
<sup>d</sup> n=15
Table 6: Budget by Type of Office, in Euros

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office Type</th>
<th>Regional Level</th>
<th>Sub-Regional Level</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single Government Office</td>
<td>384,000&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>141,000&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>323,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Government Office</td>
<td>275,000&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>188,000&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>224,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>356,000</td>
<td>171,000</td>
<td>288,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> n=28  
<sup>b</sup> n=8  
<sup>c</sup> n=10  
<sup>d</sup> n=14
Table 7: Size of Bureau by Type of Office, in meters$^2$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office Type</th>
<th>Regional Level</th>
<th>Sub-Regional Level</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single Government Office</td>
<td>336 m$^2$ $^a$</td>
<td>138 m$^2$ $^b$</td>
<td>285 m$^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Government Office</td>
<td>224 m$^2$ $^c$</td>
<td>83 m$^2$ $^d$</td>
<td>142 m$^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>310 m$^2$</td>
<td>106 m$^2$</td>
<td>245 m$^2$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*$^a$ n=39  
*$^b$ n=10  
*$^c$ n=12  
*$^d$ n=15
Table 8. Political Influence of Each Type of Office

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office Type</th>
<th>Regional Level</th>
<th>Sub-Regional Level</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single Government Office</td>
<td>4.4&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2.2&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Government Office</td>
<td>4.2&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.9&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> n=39, standard deviation = .91  
<sup>b</sup> n=10, Standard deviation = .97  
<sup>c</sup> n=12, standard deviation = 1.2  
<sup>d</sup> n=15, standard deviation = 1.2
Figure 1. Basic Model

Influencing EU Decision-making

Regional Power

Budget

Full-time Staff

Office Size
Figure 2. Regional Power And The Resources Of Subnational Offices

Regional Power

- 0.45*** to Budget
- 0.48*** to Full-time Staff
- 0.34*** to Office Size

*** Significance > 0.01

Note: Scores represent Pearson correlations
Figure 3. Office Resources and Political Influence as a Goal

** Significance > 0.05
*** Significance > 0.01

Note: Scores represent Pearson correlations
Figure 4. Basic Model

** Significance > 0.05
*** Significance > 0.01

Note: Scores represent Pearson correlations
Bibliography


We wish to thank Liesbet Hooghe for comments and advice and François Nielsen for the title.

1 One of the offices, the office for the government of French Polynesia, does not fit these categories all that well. This one office is included as part of the 77 respondents, but it is not included in analyses that rely upon the categorization of offices as regional or sub-regional or as single or multiple governments.

2 The goodness-of-fit test produces a test statistic, $G^2 = 3.35$. This statistic has a $\chi^2$ distribution, with three degrees of freedom. At all standard levels of significance, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that our sample is similar to the distribution of all 161 subnational offices across these two variables.

3 In 1999, Community Initiatives were redesigned under an enlarged INTERREG program with three strands--to encourage the creation of cross-border social and economic centers; to promote European integration through the formation of large groups of European regions, and to improve the effectiveness of regional development through large-scale information exchange (Inforegio 2001).

4 In its outline for a regional office (Scotland Europa), the Scottish Development Agency summarizes the logic of networking from this angle: "Networking with contacts made through the other regional representative office is likely to be a significant part of the activities of many participants, particularly in the light of the Commission's propensity to fund transnational collaborative projects" (quoted in Mitchell 1994).

5 We define as "regions" as the most authoritative tier of intermediate government. Intermediate level governance is equivalent to NUTS 1 and NUTS 2 regions in the European Union's categorization (Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques), which we reproduce in Appendix C. Regions in our analysis range from Valle d'Aosta with a population of 119,000 to
the 17.9 million in the case of North Rhine-Westphalia—a range that is similar to that among
states in the United States. The regional level may shift over time in a country if regional
institutions are reformed. This is the case for Belgium, where the region replaced the province in
the early 1980s as the dominant meso level of government.