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Abstract

Nearly 50 years ago the six original Europe community partners signed an abortive European defence and security treaty. Two and a half years have elapsed since European leaders launched the current effort to establish a European security and defence policy (ESDP). What if anything distinguishes ESDP from earlier failed attempts to unify defense and security policy? What progress has been made so far in launching ESDP? What are the prospects of ESDP providing a meaningful contribution to security and stability in Europe and beyond, adding value to the transatlantic alliance? What are the risks of the new initiative faltering? Will it undermine rather than enhance Atlantic defence and security, leading to recriminations among European partners and their North American allies, rather than reinforcing their collective capacity to address 21st Century security and defence threats? Is sufficient attention being paid to the non military components of ESDP?

ESDP arose in the context of calls for more burden sharing by Europeans in transatlantic defence and security, the growing external role of the EU, the internal logic of European integration, and specific threats to security and stability in Europe arising from the wars of Yugoslav succession. Sifting through the various motivations behind ESDP helps illuminate the critical factors in the new policy course for Europe and may shed light on its prospects of success. The four primary impulses noted above - greater burden sharing in the transatlantic alliance, growing willingness and capacity of the EU to assert itself abroad, the internal logic of European integration, and tackling security problems on the EU's borders - are not mutually exclusive. In many respects they are mutually reinforcing. How much weight to attribute to each motivation will suggest the strength of political conviction behind ESDP. Different member states have different interests and convictions in and ambitions for ESDP and will attribute greater or lesser weight to these various rationales. This raises questions in some minds as to the credibility of ESDP. How much unity of purpose underpins the new policy? Is a common defense and security policy truly viable in the absence of a firmer constitutional substructure for the Union and deeper

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1 The views expressed in this paper are personal and not intended to represent official European Commission policy.
political integration? All this relates in turn to the ultimate and perhaps overriding factor – for how long will European leaders sustain the political will which has propelled ESDP so rapidly and impressively in its infancy?

Paving the Way

To appreciate how rapidly the EU has moved in the direction of establishing a European Security and Defense Policy in the last two and a half years requires at least a cursory look at how slowly and haltingly European integration in this policy sector took shape before – a half century of abortive or at best timid efforts to forge European unity in foreign policy, security, and defense. It would not require a professional historian to see that the seeds of ESDP's most challenging problems in the months and years ahead lie both in the long and tortuous path to St Malo, as well as in the surprisingly rapid sprint to Nice and beyond. But a quick march through history is a necessary first step.

EDC, EPC, Fouchet fail. Different EPC rises from the ashes.

The collapse of efforts to forge a European Defense Community in the early 1950s2 led European leaders to turn to economic integration as the only politically viable approach at the time to reconciliation among the former warring nations of Europe. The proposed European Political Community went down with the wreckage of the EDC, and another effort, the Fouchet Plan (1961-62) to forge an intergovernmental union to closely integrate foreign and defence policy among the community member states, was also aborted.

Against this background it is not surprising that the first real steps in the 1970s at foreign policy coordination were cautious, circumspect, limited, and pragmatic. Tackling foreign policy in the context of European integration was still so politically painful and sensitive that it took place outside the community institutional framework. The so-called Davignon process of European Political Cooperation (EPC)3 was mainly limited to declaratory statements by foreign ministries on the issues of the day and involved little or no commitment to community action nor any legally binding process among the member states or the community institutions. Its historical relevance is that it nurtured patterns of communication and habits of cooperation among foreign ministries and of course filled the archives with declarations and statements documenting European approaches to foreign policy issues. Cooperative reflexes acquired by foreign ministries eased the way when the time came to ratchet up to closer integration. Electronic communication processes, COREUs, linking the foreign ministries, were in place, and a structure of working groups, troika consultations with the external world, and other bureaucratic

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2 In August 1954 the French National Assembly voted against ratification of the far-reaching EDC treaty signed in 1952 by the six members of the European Coal and Steel Community, effectively scuttling it.
3 The Hague summit of December 1999 instructed foreign ministers to report on “the best way of achieving political unification” and on “paving the way for a united Europe capable of assuming its responsibilities in the world”. The foreign ministers subsequently recommended cooperation in the field of foreign policy as the way to achieve such progress, and a committee under Etienne Davignon, later a European Commissioner, tackled procedural issues. Cited in Encyclopaedia of the European Union, Desmond Dinan, editor, Rienner, 1998.
practices grew up by trial and error. Security, not to mention defense, remained largely taboo in EPC, even more so in the community institutions.

Within fifteen years EPC acquired statutory authority in the Single European Act⁴, although EPC remained a purely intergovernmental process. This first statutory step in foreign policy coordination was to have far reaching implications for the eventual shape of common foreign policy making in the Union, though the decision to find a home in the treaty for EPC, like much of the rest of the SEA, was seen as a hesitant and compromise response at the time by proponents of bolder new steps towards European unity.

**Political Earthquakes in the East rouse a sleeping giant in the West.**

Europe began to assert itself more vigorously as a political player in the world during the last decade. To do so, European leaders steered a middle course between giving up control of the most sensitive sectors of national power, defense and security, and responding to the widely felt need to assert a more pronounced collective European political presence on the world stage in the new geopolitical environment after the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe and the demise of the Soviet Union. Thus the Common Foreign and Security Policy launched in the Maastricht Treaty⁵ is primarily an intergovernmental process, though seated in the single institutional framework of the new European Union. The three pillar structure devised in that treaty enables member states to forge common foreign policy under an intergovernmental process in Pillar Two. The traditional community institutions and processes in Pillar One are umbilically linked to CFSP through the single institutional framework. Thus the European Commission is fully associated with CFSP and has a right of initiative, but not the sole right of initiative as in Pillar One. For the first time the Maastricht treaty provided some meaningful instruments to pursue a common foreign and security policy, limited though they were to joint actions, and nourished - or malnourished some would say - by not very explicit methods of funding.

Building on five years experience of CFSP the next intergovernmental conference created new instruments, new ambitions, and a new post, the High Representative for CFSP⁶. The appointment of Javier Solana as the first incumbent was a clear sign that the member states meant business.

The Amsterdam treaty provides for common strategies decided at EU summit level. The EU adopted its first common strategies on Russia and the Balkans. Once a common strategy is adopted, foreign policy decisions which are legally binding on EU Member States can be made in the Council by qualified majority vote. The decision to rapidly lift sanctions against Yugoslavia after President Kostunica’s election was an example of such an EU common foreign policy action.

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⁴ Title III, Article 30, Single European Act, agreed 1985, ratified 1986. This amended the Treaty of Rome to formally recognize foreign policy cooperation, hitherto a purely informal process as far as the European Community was concerned, and codified EPC consultation procedures.


Thus common foreign and security policy lagged behind other aspects of European integration for 40 years. As Commissioner Chris Patten has said, "it's still like Shakespeare's dragon, a creature feared and talked of more than seen." But in the last decade the animal has emerged from the realms of myth. It may remain a slower and less elegant beast than some would like. Limits remain on how far the Member States want to pool capacity, and on how much they want to spend on European rather than national policy. The US must still call more than one phone number in Europe (just as foreigners must ring numerous bells in Washington even though the US has a written constitution with a single President and Commander in Chief responsible for the conduct of foreign and security policy).

But the EU has moved beyond mere rhetoric in foreign policy to the field of action, with money and a range of instruments at Union level deployed in pursuit of EU external goals. Projecting stability to the Balkans has become one of the EU's early top foreign and security policy strategic actions.

**Beginning to Talk about Defense**

The Amsterdam Treaty also enhanced the provisions of Common Foreign and Security Policy under Title V of the Treaty on European Union to contribute toward the progressive formation of a common defense policy:

> "The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide. ...

Provisions shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. ....

The Union will avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and Actions of the Union which have defence implications. ....

The language was still tentative. It didn't go much beyond the reactive and declaratory on security and defence matters. But significantly it made statutory provision for defence and security action, to be taken up if and when the European Council should decide to move in that direction. So it would not require a new Treaty to authorize ESDP when the time came.\(^7\)

The incremental approach to building a Union and codifying unified foreign, security and defense policymaking in successive treaties from the Single European Act (1986) to the Treaty of Nice (2000) is in striking contrast to the abortive effort in 1952-54 to move in one step to a fully integrated EDC. The more gingerly approach to CFSP and ESDP reflects a Union come of age – intent on moving ahead to project a serious EU presence in

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\(^7\) Treaty on European Union as amended at Amsterdam, Article 17, ratified 1999.

\(^8\) The Nice Treaty, agreed in December 2000 and awaiting ratification at the time of writing, incorporated the WEU into the EU (Article 17), and gave a statutory base to the Political and Security Committee (Article 25) to enable it, under the Council's supervision, to exercise political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations. Pending ratification ESDP is operating with the structures agreed at and developed since the Helsinki Council in December 1999.
the world, but battle scarred from decades of resistance to political integration in the most sensitive areas of policymaking. Jean Monnet, pragmatist as well as visionary, would surely not have disapproved.

**Political Traction**

As indicated, the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties in the early and late nineties contained the holding language, against the day when the EU might decide to bite the bullet, so to speak, on security and defense. The turning point came at the end of 1998, with the St Malo Declaration by Prime Minister Blair of the UK and President Chirac of France. This called for strengthening CFSP by creating a European Security and Defence Policy. The main significance of the political breakthrough was that until that point the UK had effectively blocked progress on security and defence in the EU. In St Malo and beyond it led the charge with its EU partners. Soon after St Malo, matters began to change decisively.

Various factors have been cited by observers as instrumental in propelling the member states to take the plunge in ESDP. Some suggest that Tony Blair saw in security and defense policy a natural opportunity for the UK to take a leadership role in the EU while UK membership in the Economic and Monetary Union was out of reach. Some have seen an opportunity for France and other EU partners to strike a blow for a more multipolar world with less dependence on the US in defense and security affairs. Some of the smaller member states are believed to have seen in ESDP an opportunity to amplify and improve the impact through the EU of their own longstanding contributions to peacekeeping and conflict prevention work around the world. Unquestionably a unifying factor for the member states, however, was the looming Kosovo crisis. European leaders were frustrated at the failure of Europe to respond adequately to the challenge of the Balkan crises, especially the Bosnian war. The lack of cohesion in EU foreign policy and security making and the extremely slow and loose structures for decisionmaking were widely perceived to be inadequate to cope with fast moving crises. There was a strong impulse to try to rapidly build more appropriate structures to address the urgent security challenges on the EU’s eastern borders.

In June 1999, with the Kosovo conflict raging in the background, the European Council declared:

"In pursuit of our Common Foreign and Security Policy, we are convinced that the Council should have the ability to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union, the 'Petersberg Tasks.' To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO. The EU will thereby increase its ability to contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter."  

Significant as this statement was, it was still declaratory rather than operational. It gave rise to some transatlantic friction. The US felt the language was at odds with NATO

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9 Presidency Conclusions, European Council, Cologne, June 3-4, 1999
summit decisions in Washington in April 1999 welcoming the arrival of European defense and security integration. Language more palatable to NATO and the US was chosen in Helsinki six months later. Since then both the Clinton and Bush Administrations have said they support ESDP as long as it reinforces, rather than undermines, NATO.

The Cologne European Council set an 18-month timetable to put in place the decision-making framework and operational capabilities of ESDP. The Helsinki Council marked an important step forward. The leaders decided to create

- a Rapid Reaction Force to conduct EU-led operations. Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks;

- new political and military bodies and structures established within the Council to enable the Union to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to such operations, while respecting the single institutional framework;

- modalities for full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO, taking into account the needs of all EU Member States;

- arrangements to allow, while respecting the Union’s decision-making autonomy, non-EU European NATO members and other interested States to contribute to EU military crisis management;

- a non-military crisis management mechanism to coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and resources, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the Union and the Member States.¹⁰

Evidently with Washington’s concerns about the “three d’s” of duplication, decoupling and discrimination in the minds of some of the summiters, the Helsinki summit chose carefully crafted language:

"The European Council underlines its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army."

The Helsinki decisions were specific and action-oriented, the moment in effect when the EU crossed the Rubicon. What are known as the Military Headline Goals, the challenge of creating, within 3 years, a Rapid Reaction Force of 50-60,000 troops capable of being deployed within 60 days, requires in practice a commitment of some 200,000, to provide for rotation, and considerable backup commitments in terms of operational capabilities. Strategic lift, intelligence, logistics, command and control, technology gaps – these are among the issues, rather than the raw troop numbers, that many observers consider will determine whether or not the EU will meet its targets by 2003.

**Military Capacity**

The most visible stocktaking so far of progress towards achieving the military headline goals was the Capabilities Commitment Conference of the 15 EU member states in November 2000 in Brussels, followed by a meeting the following day with non EU European states also offering commitments to participate in ESDP. European states claim

both quantitative and qualitative improvements to the capacity of European defense commitments. In qualitative terms, EU countries' pledges to improve their capabilities for crisis management include availability, deployability, sustainability, and interoperability of their forces. They also include collective capabilities goals in key areas such as command and control, intelligence, and strategic lift. In quantitative terms several European countries claim to be increasing defense spending. Most European countries also claim to be shifting the balance of their budgets to increase the proportion spent on equipment. Improved capabilities are also credited to a combination of restructuring, armed forces reforms, procurement and multinational co-operation. These developments, combined with an increasing number of multinational cooperation projects, are intended to create synergies, enhance interoperability, and over time result in increased capabilities.

Armed forces reforms are another part of the equation in terms of improving European defense capabilities. Several EU members, including Belgium, France, Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, UK and Sweden, are implementing strategic defense reviews to make their forces more deployable, mobile and capable. Others, including Denmark and Greece, are planning the reorganization of their armed forces. Several countries are reducing conscription, and in some cases, like Italy and Portugal, are moving toward wholly professional forces.

Improving strategic lift capability is the focus of a great deal of attention on both sides of the Atlantic. Washington regards progress on the 400M transport aircraft as a bellwether for how serious the EU (and the Alliance) are about improving their capabilities. Western Europe's 400 military transport aircraft currently in service are seen as too small and too old to meet projected requirements of rapid reaction forces.

Funding and fielding the Airbus A400M is the litmus test for how serious the EU is about putting muscle behind what is still only a goal. EU governments must be ready to pay the costs that come with developing key airlift capability if they want to be able to act independently. 11

At the November capabilities commitment conference 12 and in reports published since, the EU specified other fields in which European countries individually or in various groups are proposing to upgrade strategic lift, for example leasing C-17s, upgrading medium air transport fleets, new maritime transport and amphibious shipping, provision of merchant vessels, planned procurement of a new generation large amphibious carriers, coordination and management of military air transport and air-to-air re-fuelling by the European Air Group, development of a deployable air tactical force, more air-to-air refuelling capacity, development of NH 90 troop transport helicopters, new armored vehicles, and a deployable air task force.

In the area of mobility member states point to new deployable joint HQ's, new optical and radar satellites, and development of secure aircraft communications. In terms of dynamic engagement and precision strike capabilities they point to the joint strike fighter, Rafale.

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11 Ambassador Sandy Vershbow. US Permanent Representative at NATO, remarks at a symposium in Barcelona, Spain, March 15, 2001
12 Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration, Council of the EU, Brussels, November 20, 2000
combat aircraft, Eurofighter, Jas Gripen, Scalp/Storm-shadow, Taurus cruise missiles, and a new class of multirole anti-aircraft frigate.

However the US continues to tie its support for ESDP to improvements in capabilities which Washington claims fall well short, so far, of agreed alliance goals:

The quality of the forces that NATO needs for effective crisis management is exactly what the EU needs to successfully fulfill its Headline Goal. In fact, it is fair to say that U.S. support for the ESDP...is tied directly to our understanding that it will lead to improved European capabilities.

Fulfilling the Headline Goal means tackling a variety of broad force characteristics... these forces must be credible... well-trained and equipped...international in reach... able to go anywhere European interests may be threatened and require a military response... possess sufficient strategic lift assets to project their forces into theater and provide for regular rotations and reinforcements as needed...sustainable... munitions, fuel, spares, and other supplies and materiel must be sufficient and there must be an efficient logistical system... able to engage an opponent effectively...weapons on target and real-time battlefield surveillance and intelligence collection...getting humanitarian supplies delivered to the right place at the right time under adverse conditions.

Meeting many of these requirements to make the EU crisis response capability fully operational will take years. However, the EU's success in creating a credible, capable Headline Goal force will be a success for NATO as well. It will improve NATO's collective capacity and increase the range of options available to the transatlantic community for solving European security problems. This is a classic "win-win" for the transatlantic relationship. 13

Institutions

Despite periodic exhortations to the Europeans from this side of the Atlantic to focus on building up defense resources rather than creating new institutions, the institutional structure of ESDP is of course a crucial factor in the ability of the EU to forge new approaches to peace and security. The structure includes:

■ a Political and Security Committee (PSC) under the Council, to monitor the international situation, propose policy options, and monitor the implementation of agreed policies "without prejudice to the responsibility of the Presidency and the Commission".

■ A Military Body composed of Member State Chiefs of Defence Staff or their representatives

■ A Military staff, drawn from Member State service personnel

The PSC is the fulcrum, assessing a common information base14 on foreign crises, reporting directly to the Council for decisionmaking, and remitting decisions to a coordinating mechanism for implementation.

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13 Ambassador Sandy Vershbow, US Permanent Representative at NATO, remarks at a symposium in Barcelona, Spain, March 15, 2001

14 The Policy Unit under HR/SG Solana provides the EU for the first time with a common information base to analyse and assess potential foreign crises and to consider pre-decisional options for crisis intervention.
The Commission exercises control and strategic direction of civilian crisis management operations, under the oversight of a Council Committee on civilian crisis management.

Although the military headline goal target is to become operational in 2003, the declared aim at Nice is to achieve interim ESDP operational capacity during the Belgian presidency. Work is expected to be completed during the Swedish presidency in the first half of 2001 on establishing the permanent institutional structures described above. In the second half of 2001 attention will turn to exercise policy, the exercise programs, and the crisis management procedures now on the drawing board. The remaining issues relating to relations with NATO must also be resolved. It can be assumed that diplomatic channels are humming in order to reach an agreement on operational planning mechanisms that will satisfy the various concerns of EU members and NATO partners including the US who do not wish to duplicate current NATO operational planning arrangements, EU members who wish to preserve EU capacity for autonomous decisionmaking, Aegean partners in NATO who see their security interests at stake, and members of the EU reported to have larger ambitions for ESDP than reflected in the Nice conclusions, though such ambitions are not officially confirmed. The Nice conclusions, spelled out in a detailed presidency report with annexes, constitute agreed EU policy:

The aim... is to give the EU the means of playing its role fully on the international stage and of assuming its responsibilities in the face of crises by adding to the range of instruments already at its disposal an autonomous capacity to take decisions and action in the security and defence field... As regards the member states concerned, NATO remains the basis of the collective defence of its members.

The presidency report at Nice deals with military and civil crisis management capabilities; permanent political and military structures; participation of non EU members who are members of NATO, and candidates for EU membership; participation of other potential partners such as Russia, Ukraine, and Canada; arrangements for EU-NATO consultation; incorporating certain WEU functions in the EU; and conflict prevention.

Pending interim operational capability, which the Nice summit decided should occur by the end of 2001, the EU is in practice already actively involved in political crisis management, partly using the new procedures. This was clearly evident during the insurgency crises which flared up in the first half of 2001 in Southern Serbia and subsequently in FYROM (Macedonia). The Political and Security Committee meets at least twice a week and is also in frequent contact with the North Atlantic Council, dating from the first such meeting on September 19, 2000. CFSP High Representative Solana, Presidency Foreign Minister Lindh, and Commissioner Patten have made frequent visits to the area during the recent crises and it is clear that EU influence, along with other international partners including the US, has played a significant role in containing these crises so far this year.

Conflict Prevention and Civilian Crisis Management

Though it rarely makes the news headlines, a non-military headline goal for civilian police was established at the Feira summit in June, 2000. By 2003 Member States committed themselves to provide up to 5000 civilian police officers for crisis situations, with 1000 of these able to be deployed within 30 days. Similar goals are being developed in the areas of civil protection and support for the rule of law. A Rapid Reaction Facility was also agreed in principle at Feira. To avoid confusion with the Rapid Reaction Force this was subsequently renamed a Rapid Reaction Mechanism. Commissioner Patten's proposal to establish the RRM was adopted by the Council in February 2001 and is now in the process of being staffed up and implemented. It will enable limited emergency civilian aid to flow immediately to help stabilize a crisis. Commissioner Patten is pressing the Council and European Parliament to agree to better procedures for the disbursement of longer-term aid as another step to improve crisis management and conflict prevention instruments. Also in Feira a committee for civilian aspects of crisis management was approved, and priority areas for targets in civilian aspects of crisis management identified. This has been pursued as one of the top ESDP priorities of the Swedish presidency in the first half of 2001.

Although most public and academic attention is understandably focussed on the military headline goals, which constitute a totally new departure for the EU, it is important not to overlook the fact that ESDP is not only about military capability. On the contrary the initiative is intended to harness the full spectrum of instruments and resources, including civilian and military, to contain crises, prevent conflict, and pursue all the Petersberg tasks. Conflict prevention and crisis management actions cover a broad spectrum including humanitarian aid, election monitoring, police deployment and training, border controls, institution-building, mine clearance, arms control and destruction, combating illicit trafficking, embargo enforcement and counter-terrorism.

As noted above, in contrast to its millennial baptism of fire in military matters, the European Union has long established and well honed skills and capacities in the fields of civilian crisis management and conflict prevention. In many ways these goals have long been at the heart of the community agenda. The 15 member states individually have enormous potential civilian resources - police, customs officials, administrators, judicial and prosecutorial personnel, health workers etc - which, given political will, can be tapped for use in external crises on behalf of the EU if the right mechanisms can be found to identify, coordinate, and deploy them abroad. Marshalling them in a coherent, efficient, and effective way to serve broad EU intervention strategies along with other instruments including military forces is one of the challenges facing ESDP planners.

The European Commission also has considerable experience throughout the world in deploying a vast array of instruments in a wide variety of settings to manage crises and temper the root causes of civil, political, ethnic, racial, national and social conflict. Much of this work, especially throughout the African, Caribbean and Pacific regions, is not

17 The widely credited success of the emergency EU aid package for Serbia immediately following Kostunica's election and installation as President in October 2000 in time to help the population and the new authorities cope with acute social and economic needs in the winter, and to have an impact before the December 23 Serbian Republic elections to help the reform oriented democratic parties consolidate the democratic transition, is cited as an example of the need for immediate short term aid to stabilize crises or consolidate reform-oriented democratic authorities grappling with acute disorder inherited from a discredited predecessor regime.
specifically encompassed in ESDP. Experience gained in crisis management throughout the world, however, is often directly applicable to the new ESDP processes now being designed in Brussels. European experience in institution-building, promoting civil society, repairing failed states, and providing administrative and judicial infrastructure and basic social needs throughout the world is directly relevant to much of the security and instability challenges faced by the Western community in the European region and in other nearby regions such as the Mediterranean and sub Saharan Africa.

Conflict prevention and civilian crisis management closer to home, notably in the Balkans, is explicitly part of the fabric of ESDP. One of the major tasks ahead will be to find ways of coherently and efficiently latching the military and non-military components of ESDP together. Experience of military intervention and efforts to restore civil order in Bosnia and Kosovo is especially relevant. Lessons learned in Bosnia about the relationship between the military and civilian components of international intervention were later applied in Kosovo, and the international community is now at a point where it can draw lessons from both episodes on how to improve coordination of military and civilian components of peacekeeping and peacemaking. How to set up structures at the outset that enable military and civil forces to complement each other, and how to manage the transition from a peace making military intervention towards a stable civil peace, are among the greatest challenges facing the architects of ESDP. Achieving these aims would help alleviate domestic pressures on both sides of the Atlantic militating against long term or open-ended troop commitments in unstable regions. Managing the relationship between the military and civil instruments in restoring and enforcing peace and gradually building a stable civil authority and civil society remains one of the toughest challenges in the Balkans.

The non military components of ESDP are, for understandable reasons, a priority of the Swedish Presidency, which has put flesh on the bones of the broad goals in civilian crisis management and conflict prevention outlined at Feira a year before. Under the Swedish Presidency the EU has focussed in particular on capacities to meet the non-military headline goal of 5,000 civilian police, and in providing resources to strengthen the rule of law, strengthen civilian administration, and provide civil protection. In the area of civilian crisis management the EU also attaches importance to cooperation with international organizations such as the UN, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe.

More Europe? – Finalité Politique and ESDP

The history of half a century of hitherto faltering efforts to build a European security and defence policy is one of the essential backcloths to understanding what the EU is now trying to accomplish. European leaders try to steer a course, as always, between the desire on the one hand of its nation states to control their own destiny in the most sensitive sectors of national policy - security and defense - and the pressing need on the other hand to improve the Union's capacity to project security, a need vividly highlighted in the failure to rise to the "hour of Europe" when conflict erupted in the Balkans.

The latent resources of the Union and its member states to provide such security are enormous, in terms of military hardware, personnel, expertise, funds, and an abundant
array of political, diplomatic, economic, judicial, and social instruments. Moreover, the Union as an entity has certain unique attributes which can enable it to exert influence for peace with less propensity to arouse national resentments typical triggered by national powers: it has the weight and economic might of a superpower with few of the negative attributes historically associated with balance of power politics such as national aggressiveness, hegemonic proclivities, and cultural assertiveness. By its very nature the Union suppresses such proclivities by virtue of its own diversity and its constitutional fragility. The Union thus tends to present a less threatening face to the world than a superpower of such size and weight otherwise might. And as a Union, particularly through effective deployment of the community institutions and resources, it has built an impressive record of contributions to global and regional conflict prevention and civilian crisis management.

Therein lies one of the fundamental dilemmas of ESDP. The fragility of the Union's constitutional superstructure is one of its assets as a force for peace and stability especially on the European continent. That very fragility - the loose to non-existent constitutional underpinnings of the European Union, constrains its capacity to deploy its armory effectively. In a nutshell, it is hard to imagine in present circumstances a counterpart to the President of the United States and Commander-in-Chief in the EU. The inherent contradictions of a three pillar structure, reflecting the ambivalence of the member governments and the European population about pooling their sovereignty in the area of security and defence while demanding more effective action at the Union level, poses fundamental challenges for the architects of ESDP. Opting for intergovernmentalism rather than the traditional community method, while trying to bind the two methods together through a somewhat tenuous common institutional framework, is a test of the Union's capacity to devise pragmatic solutions to intractable dilemmas – again, perhaps Monnet is beaming at the effort from his grave.

The effort to establish a viable and credible ESDP while pirouetting among the pillars is the essence of the challenge the Union is now taking on - how to marshal its security and defense resources effectively for peace, with little support and no political consensus for consolidating or deepening political union. Control of the resources is scattered throughout the member states and the community institutions. The member states are reluctant to cede control over such policies and resources to "Brussels". They want and need effective Union action. The ESDP blueprint at Nice - with its seven annexes on military issues and an eighth on civilian crisis management, is the product of these centrifugal forces, pressure to deliver in the area of security and defense, resistance to handing over control to the conventional community institutions.

European integration has proceeded since the 1950s by pragmatic adaptation to seemingly impossible constraints against sometimes daunting odds. History and political experience was strongly against the Founders in seeking to launch a durable community against the background of centuries of internecine warfare, national rivalry, and ethnic hatred in Europe. Sceptics have invariably proclaimed that the community would founder on efforts to overreach, whether by dismantling hallowed barriers to commerce, abolishing national currencies, or admitting disparate and poor neighbors to the Union. The community came close to the edge of the precipice in its early years over efforts to devise a way of appropriating and spending a community budget. Many would say that the Union, warts
and all, has succeeded in many respects beyond the Founders’ wildest dreams, sometimes by surmounting these seemingly insuperable hurdles. The challenge of forging a viable ESDP without a prior constitutional settlement is not inherently tougher than previous hurdles that the Union has more or less successfully surmounted.

The early development of ESDP is proceeding in tandem with a continuing debate on the “finalité politique” of the Union. Many European leaders have made their contributions to this debate, among them the President of the European Commission:

...we cannot go on building Europe through a succession of "constructive" ambiguities, leaving important things left unsaid. That approach has passed its "sell by" date. The basic questions about Europe have to be faced, and faced now18.

Earlier Prodi told the European Parliament that the intergovernmental model can lead to only two possible outcomes, both undesirable: either it will turn the Community into an international talking shop, or it will deceive people by constantly creating new bodies which are exempt from any form of democratic scrutiny. Criticising the fragmentation of decisionmaking processes, he called for the function of the High Representative to be integrated into the Commission with a special status tailored to the needs of security and defense19.

German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s leaked draft paper to the SPD conference calling for a federal European Union with strong central executive powers in foreign, security and defense policy is one of the latest contributions to the ongoing debate about the future of the Union:

The further development of the CFSP must be on the agenda of the next Intergovernmental Conference. In the mid-term, we must strive to bring this area of policy into the jurisdiction of the European Union.20

While there is some common ground in the “thinking aloud” of European leaders launched by Joschka Fischer at Humboldt University21, French and British leaders have shown little or no inclination to contemplate a federal structure with strong central executive powers. Tony Blair’s Warsaw speech picked up on many of the calls to improve cohesion in policymaking and democratic accountability, and strengthening the Union’s role on the world stage, but called for a “superpower not a superstate”22. Jacques Chirac endorsed Fischer’s call for greater cohesion but highlighted the nature of the Union where nations link their destinies without giving up their identities, where the desire for deeper integration must be reconciled with full respect of member states’ competences in the remaining areas23.

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21 From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration, speech by Joschka Fischer, Berlin, May 12, 2000.
22 Prime Minister’s Speech to the Polish Stock Exchange, October 6, 2000 www.number-10.gov.uk
23 Allocution prononcee par Monsieur Jacques Chirac, President de la Republique, devant le Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, Berlin, June 27, 2000
So it is too early to say whether the broad debate and eventual IGC on the future of the Union would lead to any fundamental change in the current predominantly intergovernmental architecture of ESDP. The outcome of Nice clearly shows that the member states are determined, at least for now, to retain firm control of security and defense policy, while reaching for a more effective European presence in the world, backed by a credible Union military capacity. The Union is formally committed to a new IGC in 2004 with an interim declaration in 2002 to outline the scope of the agenda to be tackled two years later on the future of the Union.

It is neither a foregone conclusion that ESDP will succeed under these circumstances, nor that it will fail. The goals are relatively modest and clearly attainable, given sustained political will. Territorial defense is not at stake, and remains clearly and undeniably in the hands of NATO for the members of the alliance. The challenges are in fact subtler than the frequently cited problems of low defense budgets, the American three d's, etc. As in previous hurdles along the path of European integration, the fundamental ingredient will be political will. Ingenious institutional constructions are a necessary but insufficient component of successful ESDP. Given the Union's tenuous constitutional underpinnings, ESDP requires sustained political leadership to establish its credibility and viability. So far, since St Malo, that is the force that has been driving it. The challenges ahead are sufficiently daunting that it is safe to say that without similar sustained political will in the future ESDP's prospects will be problematic. On the other hand, if ESDP succeeds in achieving the relatively modest goals the Union has set and in particular if the EU persuades sceptical observers that it is indeed intent on achieving credible military capabilities to undertake the declared tasks, the problems of relations with NATO, transatlantic ambivalence, scepticism within the ranks at home, even divergences of view among the member states, will tend to become more manageable as the credibility of ESDP becomes accepted and its place in the European firmament is gradually cemented.

**American Appraisals**

Despite the limited aspirations of the headline goals and repeated affirmations that territorial defence and the bedrock role of NATO are not at stake, political comment and scholarly literature focuses on the implications for NATO and the future role of the US in European security.24 Understandably American policymakers and scholars focus ("fixate" according to one scholar) mainly on the military headline goals. Some Washington analysts welcome it as portending the end of NATO. The alliance is regarded in some quarters on the right as a "relic", which should be supplanted by European responsibility.

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for security and defence on their own continent and a redeployment of US military power and resources elsewhere to regions of greater instability and strategic importance to US interests.25

The Atlantic Council of the United States encapsulates a middle of the road NGO view in a newly published report:

"The establishment of regular institutional links between NATO and the EU should help allay concerns about the emergence of the ESDP as a rival to, or substitute for, NATO. These links will also facilitate crisis coordination and obviate creation of two separate security organizations, competing for scarce assets. The role of the non-EU members, notably Turkey, needs to be resolved so that those in Europe who would like a more autonomous ESDP are not encouraged to move in that direction because of concern that they may not be given "assured access" to NATO assets. At the same time, the new Administration needs to work with Congress as well as with its allies, for transatlantic acrimony could revive if concerned members of Congress perceive increased European political assertiveness without commensurate increases in defense capacity."26

While officially welcoming ESDP, American officials have worried aloud about EU decisionmaking procedures (will the US have to contend with a European caucus in NATO?), whether the EU will procure the necessary military resources, and if so will this be at the expense of NATO, and whether a suitable role will be provided for non-EU European members of NATO in the new policy mechanisms. These concerns are encapsulated in the admonition of the successive Clinton and Bush Administrations to the Europeans to avoid the "three D's" - decoupling, duplication and discrimination.

The ancillary features of ESDP attract less attention in the US, in particular Europe's growing interest in and capacity to deploy a range of instruments in the field of "soft security". Yet paradoxically it is the overall contribution of the EU to security that has the most interesting implications for EU-US political partnership in managing regional crises, and may have lessons for international approaches to conflict resolution in the 21st Century. As the Secretary General of the United Nations has said:

"Europeans should ask themselves whether they are satisfied with the world as it is, or with the way it is going. If not, they surely should do something to make their influence more effective. Without sacrificing their distinct national identities and institutions, could they not develop a stronger capacity for acting as one in their external relations".27

The EU already has the ability to project its political and economic weight through the use of a wide range of instruments, including diplomatic, trade policy, political dialogue and sanctions, development aid, technical assistance, humanitarian relief, policing, sanctions monitoring, judicial resources, civil society and democracy-building. The development of a credible military force and the creation of decisionmaking machinery to conduct military operations in real time could bring into much sharper relief the soft security instruments which the EU has been developing for some time.

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25 See, for example, Christopher Layne, Death Knell for NATO? The Bush Administration Confronts the European Security and Defense Policy, Policy Analysis No.394, Cato Institute, April 4 2001.
27 Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General, in a speech in Berlin, April 1999.
Nowhere is this more evident than in EU policy towards the Balkans. A decade of complex challenges posed by the consequences of the break-up of Yugoslavia, including attempts to contain or settle the successive conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, with mixed results, and the prospect of continuing instability and the possibility of further armed conflict, have led Europeans to conclude that "Balkan issues now constitute Europe's paramount stability concern." This academic judgement is shared by political leaders and officials at EU and nation state levels, and accounts in part for the determination to forge ahead with ESDP at uncharacteristically rapid speed for the EU.

While Americans understandably focus on the implications for NATO, Europeans are concerned first and foremost with how to devise approaches to tackle the economic, social, and political instability and security challenges in Europe's immediate neighborhood and beyond. Although the rapid reaction force is intended for deployment only in the immediate vicinity of the EU, no such geographical limits are placed on the broader Common Foreign and Security Policy in deploying the EU's armory of "soft security" instruments. The EU's new-found interest in defence and security policy also springs from the internal logic of European integration as well as from the externalities of conflicts on EU borders pressing to be resolved. Perceived bids for autonomy in decisionmaking are perhaps not as high on the scale of European preoccupations as American commentators often suggest.

The institutional and policymaking machinery of ESDP has evolved impressively rapidly. Until a consensus forms that actual military capabilities can be marshalled the jury remains out on both sides of the Atlantic. Exercises planned for later this year will be a dry run, but the first test of the new machinery will have to await a real external crisis. It may be some time therefore until we can determine the potential dividends and likely limitations of Europe's defense and security capacities, and of the opportunities and pitfalls of European collective crisis management in the realm of peacekeeping, conflict prevention, stabilization, and peacemaking in the European theatre and beyond.

Europe remains America's most important global partner in addressing a spectrum of global and regional challenges, including traditional and "new" security concerns as well as a host of economic and social issues. But there are legitimate concerns about whether the Europeans are yet assuming a sufficient share of the transatlantic burden of maintaining security and stability. There are concerns about whether ESDP will undermine, rather than reinforce, NATO. The launching of ESDP coincides with reviews by the Bush Administration of US defence strategy and foreign policy commitments in numerous regions around the world. It is against this background that ESDP will have its impact on transatlantic security relations. The new US Administration seems to be impressed with the size and capacity of the European commitment to stabilizing the Balkans and appears to have determined to remain as a partner in this long term challenge. But the US Administration will presumably continue to try to assess what will be the impact of ESDP on shared challenges in Southeast Europe and other unstable regions.

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In addition to shedding new light on the capacities of the EU to assume a larger share of the transatlantic security burden, especially in the realm of conflict resolution, this paper seeks to explore the assets and limitations of ESDP in relation to remaining areas of instability in Europe. With ever present, perhaps growing pressures in the US for a stringent review of US overseas engagements, there is a need for realistic appreciation of what European partners may or may not bring to the table in the shared interest of maintaining regional peace and security in SE Europe and other regional hotspots.

The EU is consulting with the UN in its own efforts to review international peacekeeping following the Brahimi report. Lessons must be drawn from the experience of peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, and numerous other crises around the world, in fashioning international intervention to restore peace and civil order. ESDP will have a role to play in this context too.

It remains to be seen whether the EU will achieve coherence in the sensitive sectors of defence and security policy as it has in other sectors such as trade, or whether divergent national interests of EU member states will eventually undercut efforts to deploy military force at the Union level. EU coercive and incentive instruments (sticks and carrots) of trade and economic policies, diplomatic tools, sanctions, humanitarian relief, policing and monitoring, and economic development and technical assistance clearly need to be backed by the credible threat of military force if Europe is to project its latent power effectively. It is conceivable that an astute mix of “hard” and “soft” security instruments driven by a careful balance of civilian and military, community and intergovernmental monitoring and decisionmaking institutions could offer the world innovative models of power projection.

As a system of governance generally and as a work in progress, the EU is evolving, *sui generis*, a model quite well equipped to reconcile conflicting needs for common and community policymaking in an era of interdependence and globalization, while maintaining a union of sovereign national states, rich in cultural, ethnic, and political diversity. There is no intrinsic reason why such a subtle, ingenious and innovative political creation should not succeed in forging a viable approach to security and defence policy, given sustained political will.