THE EUROPEAN UNION:
TELEOLOGY AND SOME CHALLENGES OF THE EASTERN ENLARGEMENT

GABRIELA MARIN THORNTON
ABOUT THE CEPS-SITRA NETWORK

CEPS, with financial assistance of the Finnish SITRA Foundation, embarked at the end of 2000 on a programme to examine the impact of Justice and Home Affairs access on an enlarged European Union, the implications for the candidate countries and for the states with which they share borders. The aim of this programme is to help establish a better balance between civil liberties and security in an enlarged Europe.

This project will lead to a series of policy recommendations that will promote cooperation in EU JHA in the context of an enlarged Europe as well as institutional developments for the medium- to long-term in areas such as a European Public Prosecutors Office, re-shaping Europol and a developed system of policing the external frontier (Euro Border Guard). These must be made within a balanced framework. There are two key issues:

First of all, to prevent the distortion of the agenda by “events” – some items are being accelerated and other marginalised. This risks upsetting the balance, carefully crafted by the Finnish Presidency, between freedom, security and justice. The current ‘threat’ is that security issues, at the expense of the others, will predominate after the catastrophic events of 11th September. These have resulted in a formidable political shock, which served as a catalyst to promote certain initiatives on the political agenda, such as the European arrest warrant, and a common definition of terrorism. The monitoring of items, which could be marginalised and the nature of the institutional/political blockages that could distort the Tampere agenda, is our priority.

Secondly, how to look beyond the Tampere agenda, both in terms of providing a flexible approach during the period of completion of the Tampere programme as well as what should come afterwards. Much detail remains to be filled in about rigid items on the Tampere agenda and CEPS will continue to work in three very important areas:

- Arrangements for managing and policing the external frontier
- Judicial cooperation leading to the development of a European Public Prosecutor
- Strengthening of Europol, particularly in the field of serious trans-frontier violence and moves towards a more federalised policing capacity

The CEPS-SITRA programme brings together a multi-disciplinary network of 20 experts drawn from EU member states, applicant countries as well as neighbouring states: the European University Institute in Florence, the Stefan Batory Foundation (Warsaw), European Academy of Law (ERA Trier), Academy of Sciences (Moscow), London School of Economics, International Office of Migration (Helsinki), Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques (CERI) in France, Universities of Budapest, Université Catholique de Louvain-la-Neuve, University of Lisbon (Autonoma), University of Nijmegen, University of Burgos, CEIFO in Stockholm, University of Tilberg and University of Vilnius, as well as members with practical judicial and legislative backgrounds.
THE EUROPEAN UNION:
TELEOLOGY AND SOME CHALLENGES
OF THE EASTERN ENLARGEMENT

CEPS POLICY BRIEF NO. 19

GABRIELA MARIN THORNTON*

Introduction

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, quickly followed by German reunification, scholars of the European Union have emphasised that one of the most salient consequences of these events would be the enlargement of the European Union. Many have claimed that enlargement would mean galvanising the German power within the European Union, by placing Germany at the geographical heart of Europe. Enlargement was perceived either as undermining the Franco-German relationship, or even more, as replacing it by increased German connections with Eastern European countries (Braun, 1996, p. 158). The IGC in Nice struggled to reform the EU institutions in order to accommodate future members. The Treaty of Nice has generated fear within certain Western circles. Some political analysts already announced the end of Jean Monnet’s “Europe”, the triumph of Germany, and with the future inclusion of Central and East European countries (CEECs), the birth of a “Europe” less “European”. Since Nice, a sea of metaphors has sparkled over the Western European newspapers with regard to “the return to Europe” of the CEECs. Nonetheless, many scholars seem to agree with Stanley Hoffman who points out that the expansion toward the east is seen as necessary in order “to provide stability in the more troublesome part of the continent and in order to protect fledgling democracy there” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 196).

In the beginning of 1990s, as many as ten Central and Eastern European countries, plus Malta and Cyprus, were queuing at the door of the European Union, seeking integration into the European Union. Some of them did it with the impatience and boldness of a Don Quixote fighting some windmills, having winds blowing sometimes from the West, sometimes from the East. Meanwhile, diversity in the CEECs seems to have increased in the last decade rather than decreased, a process which creates several methodological and empirical difficulties in trying to assess the precise impact of the EU (Fowler, 2001). That is not to say that previous to 1990, there were not differences among CEECs. For instance, at the beginning of 1990, when some countries such as Romania or even Czechoslovakia were still blinking their eyes in the aftermath of the “revolution” – “revolutions” very different in essence – Hungary was far on its way to consolidating its evolution toward democracy (Brown, 1994). After more than 10 years, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovenia have received signals that they could very well join the EU, possibly by 2004, or even sooner and “the EU says it will be in a position to welcome those member states which are ready as from the end of 2002, in the hope that they will be able to take part in the next European Parliament elections (mid-2004)” (Enlargement – Weekly, Newsletter, 2000). However, the rest of the

* Ph.D. Candidate, School of International Studies, University of Miami, Coral Gables (Miami), Fl, USA. This paper is a part of a draft of a larger project presented at the Graduate Student Colloquium, Challenges of the European Union’s Eastern Enlargement/ Défis de l’élargissement de l’Union Européenne à l’Est, Montreal, 14 September 2001, (University of Montreal).
candidates fear more or less that their integration into the EU would remain the story of “an eternal and essentially defeated Don Quixote”.

Scholars and politicians agree with the fact that there are great variations among candidate countries. Countries such as Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia have been far more successful than Southern European countries such as Romania or Bulgaria in implementing democratic reforms, as well as in their efforts in complying with the *acquis*. To explain the causes of those differences is far beyond the scope of this essay. However, an interesting question that comes to mind is whether EU membership will widen this gap further and antagonise relations amongst candidates (Berglund et al., 2001). That issue deserves attention since it might generate instability in the area, as some scholars and even policymakers claim. However, the Swedish Presidency stated in its Conclusions at the Göteborg European Council (June 15-16, 2001) that “special efforts will be devoted to assisting Bulgaria and Romania”, which lag behind the other candidate countries. Needless to say, that as different as their progress is, all candidate countries hold hopes that sooner or later they will join the European Union.

Member states’ perspectives on enlargement are different. Germany and Great Britain support enlargement for obviously distinct reasons. As John K. Glenn points out for some, such as the German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, enlargement presents an opportunity to move forward boldly to a new federal Europe based on a constitution and shared rights. For others such as the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, enlargement highlights the reality that the European Union is already too diverse to be based on shared political sovereignty and should remain based on common markets (Glenn, 2001). At the Luxembourg Council, Italy, Denmark and Sweden argued for full accession negotiations to begin simultaneously with all ten applicants, and Greece and France proposed full negotiations with Bulgaria and Romania (Mannin, 1999, p. 55). In 1991 the EC strongly supported the Baltic States’ independence, an issue which created the first friction between Brussels and Moscow (Herrberg, 1998). The signing of the association agreements with Bulgaria and Romania in 1993, was, to some extent, received negatively by the Visegrad countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia). The event was perceived as marking “the end of their special relation with the Community, a relation which they had assumed, would lead to rapid accession” (Mayhew, 1998).

This essay argues that the enlargement process of the European Union is teleological driven. The European Union in response to the desire of CEECs to integrate, especially crafted certain programmes, such as PHARE, which by the end of 1999 had spent 11 billion ECU in pre-access development aid, and certain institutions such as the White Paper and the Agenda 2000, a set of budgetary, farm and systemic reforms targeting the preparation for EU enlargement. This paper will also focus on some challenges that enlargement has brought about such as migration, security and issues of identity.

**Teleology and the Eastern Enlargement**

The accomplishment of the *acquis communautaire*, an established institutional framework of the EU, has become an issue of high salience for many CEECs. However, the enlargement process holds strong challenges for both parties: the EU and the CEECs. From agricultural and environmental problems to issues of identity and migration, a myriad of invitations to competitive actions lie ahead for political and economic actors involved in one way or another in the enlargement process. It is very true what Hans van den Broek, who used to run the

---

1. This essay conceptualises institutions as a set of rules and procedures.
enlargement process as an external affairs commissioner, once said: “The European Union is not trying to join the Czech Republic” But since then things have changed. As Martin Walker wrote, targeting the institutional reform, “the irony of Europe’s planned enlargement into Eastern Europe in that – despite howls of pain from redundant Polish steelworkers and downsized Czech business – by the end of 1999 it was already having more impact on the European Union than on the candidate countries” (Walker, 2001, p. 58). The post-Nice European Union challenges have considerably increased and the tremendous amount of time and work invested by the Union into the enlargement process might make one think that sometimes things are looking like the Union is trying to join Hungary, Poland or the Czech Republic, so to speak. Even if one wants to think only in economic costs, in the EU’s long-term budget for the period 2000-2006, approximately 80 billion euro (in terms of 1999 prices) have been earmarked for expenses in connection with and in preparation for enlargement (Swedish Presidency of the European Union).

For academics, the study of the European Union has become probably one of the most interesting and intricate issues. Neo-realists, neo-liberals, as well as constructivists of different orientations have offered distinct explanations for enlargement. Enlargement adds a new burden on scholars too by amplifying the quest for clear theoretical and methodological approaches. Many scholars have pointed out that we do not have an “enlargement theory”, and some of them even came to the conclusion that “we might not need, or even want, a theory of enlargement, for mid-range theories of institutions, domestic politics, inter-state bargaining, norms, or Europeanisation, might allow us to understand the enlargement process and its impact on the candidates” (Sedelmeier, 2001).

However, some institutions and policies within the Union, as well as in candidate countries, carry an interesting teleological flavour and the enlargement process seems to be driven, to some extent, by teleology, a philosophical doctrine which broadly states that all of nature, or at least intentional agents, are goal-directed or functionally organised. Even if enlargement is not in itself a teleological process, it does give rise to functionally organised systems and intentional agents and theorists.

In order to be teleological, the enlargement process does not need necessarily to achieve its goal, but it needs to be, to some extent, progressive and evolutionary. Assuming that teleology means something such as “inevitably in achieving a particular end (telos)”, as many scholars do, it seems very puzzling. Simply defined teleology means the explanation of phenomena by the purpose they serve rather than by postulated causes – which in theory matches some sort of functionalism more than an inevitable fate. Andreas Schedler uses in his works on democratic consolidation a very sensible definition of teleology. In Schedler’s words “there is nothing inherently wrong with teleology, provided that three conditions are met: First, we have to avoid veiling or obscuring it; hidden teleology is indeed bad teleology. Second, we have to dissociate teleology from any belief in inevitable progress; supporting some telos, some normative goal or practical task, is one matter; assuming some kind of automatic or natural progression toward that goal is quite another…” (Schedler, 1998). Explaining enlargement by the need of stability in Eastern Europe is, to some extent, a teleological display. The acquis clearly outlines criteria for EU membership and is certainly for the CEECs a matter of supporting normative goals and practical tasks. The acquis has been from time to time criticised by different political groups in candidate countries who felt the burden of being asked to meet its requirements without too much room for negotiations. Enlargement, some claim, disadvantage candidates countries by excluding them from the decision-making process, by requiring them to accept the institutional framework for European laws and procedures in full, and by placing the onus of change on candidates
countries (Glenn, 2001). If one regards the *aquis* as an inflexible institution, then an interesting question arises from that, namely, to what extent one should expect that the institutional arrangements in CEECs should replicate Western models and generate some kind of path-depending effects? Michelle Egan, studying transitional processes in the Czech Republic, argues that there is room for the malleability of institutional choices and the possibility of institutional change and adaptation to meet market pressures and conditionality demands of “returning to Europe” (Egan, 2001).

However, after assuming that the fulfilling of the *aquis* is a goal-oriented process, so it is teleological, the real question that rises is whether or not the accomplishment of the *aquis* is a sine qua non condition for obtaining full membership into the EU? Taking into consideration the way we defined teleology in this essay, the answer will be “not necessarily”. Moreover, James Caporaso argues that the advent of “variable geometry”, or a “multi-speed Europe”, in which subsets of member states can move forward in given areas without their EU partners, may alter this conception of the *aquis* and may lead to new criteria for membership in the Union (Caporaso, 2000, p. 109). On the other hand, David Phinnemore comes to the conclusion that it is misleading to view association agreements with the EU as some form of stepping-stone to membership. Whether the association will be followed by membership depends on the EU and the dynamics of enlargement. Association will become not a stepping-stone but the alternative to membership if the dynamics of enlargement do not allow for states to be admitted (Phinnemore, 1999, p. 133).

At the summit in Helsinki in December 1999, the European Council decided not to treat anymore the candidate countries as two separate groups. Despite this decision there is no question that the progress in building democratic institutions, establishment of a functional market-economy, and the implementation *aquis* differs from country to country. The statement of the Swedish Presidency in Göteborg: “The enlargement process is irreversible” shows that goal-oriented institutions and the work of different agents favourable to enlargement have done their homework. However, one can suspect that this unequivocal statement had something to do with the result of the Irish referendum – a result that may indicate for some analysts that the European Union goes through a crisis. For the EU that has committed itself already through institutions and policies toward enlargement, an exit strategy, i.e. abandoning enlargement, is difficult to imagine and above all might be extremely damaging for its whole image. Bargaining and negotiations around the Treaty of Nice appear to be the only solution and sub-optimal outcomes are not to be ruled out. Despite the result of the Irish referendum, the Eurobarometer opinion poll shows that a majority of citizens of the member states are in favour of enlargement. The initial results of the study, carried out in November and December 2000 among 16,000 subjects show that 44% approve of enlargement and 35% disapprove of it. member states in which the population most favours enlargement are Greece, Italy, Spain, Sweden and Denmark. The greatest reticence was recorded in the United Kingdom, Austria and France (Enlargement Weekly, 2001).

**Some Challenges of the Eastern Enlargement**

*Security and Migration*

In 1993, Paul Kennedy asked a question that has remained until today partially unanswered. He wondered whether the adoption of strict “Fortress Europe” policies – essentially, using the armed forces to prevent illegal migration by land, sea, or air – would really address a much larger problem, namely that Europe’s overall population is stagnating while those of neighbouring continents are forecast to double and treble by early next century (Kennedy, 1993, p. 276). As a threat to societal security, migration could be defined under the following
lines: “X people are being over-run or diluted by influxes of Y people; the X community will not be what it used to be, because others will make up the population; X identity is being changed by a shift in the composition of the population”. (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 121). A Europe in the full process of enlargement faces different types of migration at different levels. If one takes out of the picture the Eastern countries, then the EU has to face the same type of migration to which it has been exposed for some time mostly coming from the African shores and mostly affecting countries such as Spain, France, and Italy. If we define Europe as the European Union plus its candidates, in addition, one has to deal with three levels of analysis. Migration from the Eastern candidates into the European Union, migration from neighbouring countries such as Russia or Ukraine into the European Union as well as into candidates countries, and migration from “second-wave” candidates into “first-wave candidates”.

Migration from what we will still call, despite the official abolishment of the term, “second-wave” candidates into “first wave candidates”, presents important challenges. Citizens of the “second-wave” candidate countries may very well adopt a “rational choice perspective” and calculate that it will be in their best advantage to reside in one of the first-wave countries than in the second group. Therefore, countries such as Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, for instance, while still facing problems of transition and concomitantly of harmonising their legislation with that of the EU, have to cope with migration from the east too. Theorists will immediately ask: What is this an instance of? Is this a phenomenon caused by the simple fact that some people tend to migrate toward richer countries when economic conditions become worse in their own or is a more complex phenomenon accelerated by the EU enlargement? If high levels of illegal immigration into some candidate countries will be detected, that, arguably, could interfere with the process of enlargement, creating patterns of dissociation rather than favouring integration.

One aspect of migration within the European Union and candidate countries is the Roma migration. Little attention was paid to this minority until it began seeking asylum in Western Europe, and the EU member states began to recognise that indeed the Roma pose a potential threat to cross-border stability and to their own countries in a united Europe if their rights are not protected at home (Ram, 2001). Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria all have Roma minorities of several hundred thousand people –minorities who often live under the worst conditions. Discrimination against this minority exists, in respect to differences from country to country. Some see the recent flow of Roma to western countries as a natural consequence of these problems (Berglund et al., 2001, p. 33). It is questionable that this explanation tells the whole story of Roma population migration, however, the Commission requirements that, for instance, Romania and Bulgaria must develop a positive strategy toward integrating the Roma population are quite clear.

Nonetheless, for policy-makers the crux issue is how to build better institutions in order to control migration. It is worth remembering that institutions may make cooperation possible, by facilitating coordination, without succumbing to the fallacy of believing that for every problem there is an institutional solution (Caporaso, 2000, p. 114). Building safe borders in order to prevent illegal immigration, arms and drug trafficking may not be very simple in some cases, regardless of the EU and candidates commitment in this area. For instance, the Commission Regular Report on Cyprus states “in the area of justice and home affairs, Cyprus has made progress with the adoption on asylum and also with a view to judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters. However, attention should be paid to the enforcement of border control, with special regard to the fact that Cyprus will be an external border of the EU, as well as to the efficient implementation of existing legislation on money laundering....” (Conclusions of the Regular Reports, 2000). The 2000 Regular Report on Turkey, contains
special section on Cyprus in which the Commission points out that Turkey had committed a continuing violation of the rights of a Greek Cypriot, Ms. Loizidou, by preventing her from going to her property in the north”, and states that “there are around 150-200 similar cases brought by Cypriots against Turkey now pending before the Court of Human Rights”. Regardless of the fact that the Regular Report points out that in Turkey no major progress has been made in the field of Justice and Home Affairs, as well as in other areas, many Turkish politicians will continue to accuse the European Union of excluding Turkey from Europe due to religious and cultural differences. As John Van Oudenaren said the Turks charged that the EU was relegating them to “third class” status (Van Oudenaren, 1999, p. 420). Moreover, Ankara’s frustration has grown since Romania and Bulgaria are ahead of Turkey in their application to join the Union (Barber, 2001, p. 100). The security issue between Cyprus and Turkey has remained a dangerous and controversial problem, which the European Union needs to address more vigorously. Due to a number of other international actors involved in the matter, the situation has been getting further complicated. However, the Swedish Presidency reaffirmed its commitment to promoting freedom, democracy, and security, and in Göteborg stated “the Commission, in line with the Nice conclusions, will shortly present a communication on the question of the frontier regions to strengthen their economic competitiveness”.

From another perspective, Ben Rosamond is once again, bringing a very interesting issue in regard to the relation between the study of EU and of security communities up front. Rosamond proposes the use of the EU as an independent variable in order to explain the absence of war, rather than the conventional theoretical twist of EU studies, which is to explain the EU (Rosamond, 2000, p. 170). Rosamond brings to attention Ole Waever’s argument (1998) that the achievement of a security community was fulfilled through a process of “desecuritisation”. The deepening of the formal European integration has brought “security” back onto the agenda, pre-eminently with the aspiration to create a truly Common Foreign and Security Policy. This could become a threat to the stability of the security community because it “re-securitisises” the agenda, which in turn, may be the source of insecurity (Ibid., p. 170). On theoretical grounds this could be related to a whole range of particular understandings of the “security” concept, on one hand. On the other, practically, it increases the number of areas where the European Union should take much stronger action, such as for instance the Balkans. Christopher Patten argues “The Balkan experience was perhaps the main driving force behind the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties of the 1990s. At the 1999 European Council meetings in Cologne and Helsinki, heads of government took a further step by deciding to develop a military capacity for crisis management in the framework of a European security and defence policy” (Patten, 2001, p. 80). Moreover, with enlargement on the way, divergent courses between members and non-members in the Balkans, by which the latter would be marginalised in a “grey zone” of conflicts, instability and economic underdevelopment, major threats to the EU security could increase (Avery and Fraser, 1998, p. 149). The recent efforts of the EU to appease the situation in Macedonia before it is too late proves a deeper EU commitment to security issues and clearly a “re-securitisation” of its agenda. However, on another line, the “re-securitisation” of the EU agenda by identifying threats such as new technologies, unemployment, and U.S. and Japanese competition has become increasingly central to the motivation for the necessity of deeper integration (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 188).

The Irish Referendum: Democracy and the Fight for Enlargement

Building “trust” among EU member states and the candidates is not an easy task. The notion of trust is a normative one. It does require at least two partners and easily it could be argued
that it should be founded on the existence of some common values that in turn will foster better understanding and cooperation. Selling an enlarged Union to member states citizens is not simple for policy makers of the European Union. The result of the Irish referendum is very telling in this sense. Irish citizens were apparently more concerned about how the Union’s money will be used, than about security (a lesser concern about security issues among Irish citizens could be related to Ireland’s geographical position) or identity issues, the “shared common values of Europe” that some scholars use in order to make the case for enlargement. The “common European identity”, which values go back to the Greco-Roman world: “the shared European cultural heritage emanating from Greece and Rome” (Huntington, 1996, p. 158), as Samuel Huntington writes, seems to evaporate when economic factors are at stake, at least for some segments of population in Ireland. member states citizens are aware of the economic impact of the enlargement. The admission into the EU of the poor easterners would dramatically modify the way the Union would finance its budget and pay out its structural funds, which were designed to level out regional inequalities (Walker, 2001, p. 61). The Swedish Presidency stated in its Conclusions that: “In respect to the Irish referendum, the European Council confirms the conclusions adopted by the General Affairs Council in Luxembourg on 11 June, including willingness to contribute in every possible way to helping the Irish government find a way forward. It reaffirms its commitment to enlargement and to sustaining the good progress in the accession negotiations” (Presidency Conclusions – Göteborg European Council).

However, on theoretical grounds, if one interprets the divergence in opinions between the Commission’s commitment toward enlargement and the present result of the Irish referendum, as some sort of “clash” between a member state and a supranational institution such as the Commission, then stretching Paul Pierson’s theory of integration which draws on both neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism, one may speculate that the Commission will win the battle since such “clashes” appear to lead to an increased responsibility for supranational institutions which will keep their fight on and on. If the present result of the Irish referendum is reversed by a new referendum, that could be translated into what Pierson calls “a gap” in a member state control. Once those gaps emerge, member states find it hard to regain lost control in particular because of one important barrier that Pierson identifies, namely the resistance of the supranational actors (Pierson, 1998).

Beyond the positive part of Brussels’ commitment to enlargement, if the result of the Irish referendum is reversed by a future referendum, and we step back and analyse how the whole process has been conducted, the question is whether or not we run again and again right into Robert Dahl’s argument, who in a very critical manner, claims that: “In EU… crucial decisions mainly come about through bargaining among political and bureaucratic elites. Limits are not set by democratic processes but mainly by what negotiators can get others to agree… Bargaining, hierarchy, and markets determine the outcomes. Except to ratify the results, democratic processes hardly play a role.” (Dahl, 1998)

However, we note that without paying too much attention to the fact that democracy has been mostly defined within the limits of the nation state, the “democratic deficit” has become one of the most seminal points for critics of the European Union. The two dimensions of the European Union, the supranational one, as well as the intergovernmental one, complicate the picture of “democracy” greatly. The stretching of the concept of democracy over the border of a nation-state, could imply a redefinition of the concept itself, and from this point of view the idea of a “democratic deficit”, as presently understood by scholars may be proven meaningless. Useful could be David Held’s “cosmopolitan model of democracy”, that claims that the modern theory of the sovereign democratic state, liberal and radical, is
challenged fundamentally by the nature of the pattern of global interconnections. Basically Held argues that the meaning of democracy in general, and of the model of democratic autonomy in particular, has to be rethought in relation to a series of overlapping local, regional and global structures and processes (Held, 1998). In developing his argument Held talks more about the United Nations than about the European Union. However, it is our strong belief that if anything in the world could make “democracy beyond the state” work, despite the enormous amount of challenges that this new concept presents, then that will be solely the European Union.

**Different identities in the same Europe?**

Turning back to the West-East “trust” issue, it is worthy to note that, the need for explicit normative thinking comes down to the question to what extent the EU could use in front of its citizens arguments such as “common identity”, shared historical and religious values among Western and Eastern Europe in order to obtain more favourable attitudes toward enlargement in the member states. This type of discourse, no question helping East-Central Europe, could raise suspicions in the Balkan candidate countries and arguably foster unrest in a moment when there is a strong need for conciliation and cooperation in the area. Consequently, the political discourse has been playing on issues such as: democracies, respect of human rights, and market economy, while displaying a sense of moral obligation mostly toward East-Central European countries and the Baltic states. If one has to explain why that is so, then arguably there are two avenues hat should be taken into consideration: the fight against communism and religious issues. The “Polish October” and the fight put up by the Solidarity, Nagy’s counter-revolution in Hungary (1957) when thousands of young Hungarians were burned alive in the streets of Budapest by the Soviet troops, as well as the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968, tell the story of those countries’ resistance against communism. The incorporation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into the Soviet Union was another tragic event in the history of Eastern Europe. These events give countries, such as Hungary or Poland, a much higher profile in front of the Union in comparison with Bulgaria or Romania, where no pre-eminent events of resistance were to be found during the communist times. Some scholars explain those differences among countries in Eastern Europe in cultural terms. Others focus on types of political regimes, while a third group builds on a combination of the two factors: culture and the type of communist political regime, pointing out that Bulgaria emerged from a “totalitarian” communist regime, and Romania had to face in 1990 even a worse legacy: the legacy of a communist regime qualified as “sultanistic”, a generic style of regime ruler ship, that is, as Weber says, an extreme form of patrimonialism (Linz and Stepan, 1996).

The controversy over Western Christianity versus Orthodox Christianity and their impact on political regimes has been going on for a while. Western scholars are not too divided in this battle. Western Christianity is more beneficial on its impact on political regimes. The Catholic Church, since the birth of Vatican II, has been acting in Europe more and more as a promoter of human rights and individual liberties, fulfilling its role as a beneficial transnational organisation. Protestantism is seen by many as fundamentally rooted in individual liberties. The Eastern Orthodox Church, by contrast, has been charged for a while with “inseparability” from the state and deleterious nationalist-populist tendencies. Culturalists and constructivists claim that the enlargement of the European Union with largely Catholic and Protestant countries is justified by a “common European identity”, that such has nothing to do with the Orthodox Christianity. To the contrary, Christopher Dawson argued, “The Holy Roman Empire – sancta respublica romana – was the creation, not of Charlemagne, but of Constantine and Theodosius” (Dawson, 1956, p. 105). Dawson pointed out that “it is to the Byzantine civil service that we owe not only the preservation of Roman law, but also the
completion of its development… It is to the bureaucracy of Theodosius II and Justinian that we owe the great codes through which the inheritance of Roman jurisprudence was handed on to the medieval and modern world” (Ibid., p. 106). Since then, time has passed and things have dramatically changed.

Lionel Barber points out that a century ago, the Austro-Hungarian Empire fulfilled its role, offering a “European roof” over a region caught between western democratic states and eastern Orthodox Christianity. Today, with the inclusion of largely Orthodox countries among the candidates, the President of the European Commission speaks of offering a “European roof” to the Balkans (Barber, 2001, p. 99). To a large extent, by doing so, the Commission commits itself to playing a conciliatory role into the “civilisation” debate and takes in the enormous challenge of “reinventing” a new Europe, truly founded on common values such as democracy, and respect for human rights and minorities.

Nonetheless, looking at the future, Walker argues “the Europe of the twenty-first century would be based in Mitteleuropa, with an inherent tendency to look to the east. It would remain essentially Christian in culture, one whose roots lay in Rome and the Reformation rather than in the Orthodox Christianity from ancient Byzantium that prevailed in Russia, Serbia, and most Ukraine” (Walker, 2001, p. 65). So being, the diversity already existing in the European Union will increase with new members joining, and the European Union will be confronted with more and more challenges, for which it has to prepare itself.

**Conclusion**

Some scholars argue that present-day Europe cannot claim a monopoly on the idea or the reality of freedom, democracy, and the social welfare state. The distinction between the European Union and the rest of the world is seen more in practical than in normative terms, and arises from the use of trade and immigration policy to construct a “fortress Europe” (Offe, 2000, p. 81). Well, the construction of a “fortress Europe” may be very useful, if thought to gain time in order to protect new political processes already in progress in the Union, as well as to protect the Union against illegal immigration or drug trafficking. No question that, a “fortress Europe” while maybe successful in defending itself from immigration or arm trafficking, still has to face the challenge of globalisation and to appease the rise of right-wing populist-nationalist sentiment in some member states. Some scholars claim that if the EU is to play its original role – if it is to mount a coherent defence against the disintegrating pressures of globalisation and rejuvenate the scope for political action – it will first have to reconstitute itself purposively as an effective and legitimate structure for governance (Ibid., p. 84).

The Eastern enlargement of the European Union is a call for redefining democracy and “European identity” and addressing security problems that may arise at its border, in a much more articulated way than in the past years. The creation of a common structure of action and the preservation of the democratic good, have to remain the overall collective imperatives for the European Union.
REFERENCES


Caporaso, James A. (2000), The European Union: Dilemmas of Regional Integration, Westview Press, A Member of the Perseus Books Group, USA.


Dawson, Christopher (1956), The Making of Europe: An Introduction to the History of European Unity, A Meridian Book, New American Library, First Meridian printing August, USA.


*Presidency Conclusions – Göteborg European Council*, (June 15-16), internet available on the website of the European Union.


MISSION
The Centre for European Policy Studies is an independent policy research institute founded in 1983:

- To produce sound policy research leading to constructive solutions to the challenges facing Europe.

GOALS
- To achieve high standards of academic excellence and maintain unqualified independence.
- To provide a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process.
- To build collaborative networks of researchers, policy-makers and business across the whole of Europe.
- To disseminate our findings and views through a regular flow of publications and public events.

ASSETS AND ACHIEVEMENTS
- Quality research by an international staff of 30 drawn from fifteen countries.
- An extensive network of external collaborators, including some 35 senior associates with extensive experience working in EU affairs.
- Complete independence to set its own priorities and freedom from any outside influence.
- Ability to anticipate trends and to analyse policy questions well before they become topics of general public discussion.

PROGRAMME STRUCTURE
CEPS is a place where creative and authoritative specialists reflect and comment on the problems and opportunities facing Europe today. This is evidenced by the depth and originality of its publications and the talent and prescience of its expanding research staff. The CEPS research programme is organised under two major headings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Policy</th>
<th>Politics, Institutions and Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Macroeconomic Policy</td>
<td>Political Institutions and Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Network of Economic Policy</td>
<td>The Wider Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Institutes (ENEPRI)</td>
<td>South East Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Markets and Institutions</td>
<td>Caucasus and Black Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Credit Research Institute (ECRI)</td>
<td>EU-Russian Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Developments and Policy</td>
<td>The CEPS-ISS Security Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy for the 21st Century</td>
<td>South East European Security Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency in the Pursuit of Collective Goals</td>
<td>Justice and Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to these two sets of research programmes, the Centre organises a variety of activities within the CEPS Policy Forum. These include CEPS working parties, the lunchtime membership meetings, network meetings abroad, board-level briefings for CEPS corporate members, conferences, training seminars, major annual events (CEPS International Advisory Council and the awards ceremony of the Bentick Prize) and internet and media relations.

Centre for European Policy Studies
1 Place du Congrès
1000 Brussels
Tel: 32(0)2.229.39.11 Fax: 32(0)2.219.41.51
E-mail: info@ceps.be Website: http://www.ceps.be