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**THE WIDER EUROPE
AS THE EUROPEAN UNION'S
FRIENDLY MONROE DOCTRINE**

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The 'Wider Europe' may, and certainly should, become one of the big next issues on the policy agenda of the European Union following the enlargement decisions to be taken in Copenhagen in December. Indeed the practical concerns raised by the forthcoming enlargement for the EU's periphery to the North, East and South are already crowding in. A new vocabulary is sprouting up in Brussels, call it as you wish: 'Wider Europe', or 'Proximity Policy', or 'Neighbourhood Policy'.¹ What is certain is that the Wider Europe will not go away.

US policy is another reason why. The new US security strategy, published on 20 September, declares:

It is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength. ... America will act against [such] emerging threats before they are fully formed. ... In exercising our leadership we will respect the values, judgement and interests of our friends and partners. Still we will be prepared to act apart when our interests and unique responsibilities require.

Thus the Bush doctrine is military, pre-emptive and unilateral. This is the language and method of the main strategic ally of the EU, but it is not the language or the method of the EU. The differences have been captured by Robert Kagan in a recent, instantly famous but questionable article:

Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a little differently, it is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Kant's 'Perpetual peace'. The United States, meanwhile remains mired in history, exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws

* Senior Research Fellow, CEPS. This paper was first presented at the Baltic Sea Forum on the Future of the Enlarged European Union, Mariehamn, Åland Islands, 3-4 October 2002. The author is grateful to Elizabeth Naucmér, for sources of information and advice on the Åland Islands, of which she is Head of Administration.

¹ The EU foreign ministers Council, meeting on 30 September, added to the lexicon with an agenda item entitled 'New Neighbours Initiative'. This session discussed in particular relations with Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, with a view to the European Council in Copenhagen in December adopting conclusions. The Council ... 'also underlined that, beyond the question of Eastern neighbours, the broader question of 'wider Europe' deserved consideration' – which is less than sensational diplomatic language.

and rules are unreliable and where true security and the defence and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might. That is why on major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and European are from Venus (Kagan, 2002).

The EU has to set out where it stands in the world. Its first concern is the stability of its own neighbourhood, the Wider Europe. If the Bush global doctrine has been laid out with brutal clarity, what is EU doctrine for the Wider Europe?

It is suggested that the European Union regards the Wider Europe as its area of vital concern. This may be defined in two ways: geographically and normatively.

Geographically the Wider Europe starts with the whole of the Council of Europe map, which includes all the European states of the former Soviet Union except Belarus. This has both political and geographic clarity and coherence. However our area of vital concern must be extended to include also the whole of the Mediterranean basin, Arabia and the Persian Gulf, which needs now a single name, such as the Greater Middle East.

Normatively the idea of 'vital concern' is intended to mean exactly what the words suggest. The point is that this is different from the idea of 'vital interest', which has connotations of geo-political or hegemonic ownership, and which is not intended here.

Today the European Union is a powerful integrating force in the Wider Europe, but a weak foreign policy actor. It is quite obvious that this foreign policy performance has now to be upgraded. The EU aspires to global influence also, and has some already, but it first needs to get better organised for the Wider Europe. This will require institutional changes. Then the normative difference that Kagan refers to should lessen. In the Wider Europe, the EU would not be seeking to expel the US global power as a crude copy of the Monroe doctrine.² Rather, it would seek to cooperate with the US to the point of taming those of its wilder and idiosyncratic aspects that objectively give rise to European concerns. The Wider Europe could therefore be the subject of a friendly kind of European

² On December 2nd, 1823, President Monroe's message to Congress included the following statement: '... the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers ...'.

Monroe Doctrine,³ suited of course for a 21st century Europe, which is not only post-colonial but also post-modern.

Before going into these matters of high principle, let us keep our feet firmly on the ground, and begin with a rapid *tour d'Europe*, or more precisely of the borderlands of the Wider Europe. Let us look at the issues as they jump out at us on this journey.

Tour d'Europe

Like any well-planned journey, it should proceed geographically, and let us start where we are now, in the middle of the Baltic Sea.

(1) So here we are on the *Åland Islands*. I have admired for some time from afar this jewel in the crown of post-modern Europe. What do we mean by that? More precisely – for those who do not yet know – Åland Islands are a model case of an *autonomous, unilingual, demilitarised, neutralised, externally guaranteed and otherwise potentially irredentist entity in an asymmetric, dyadic, bi-cultural, quasi-federative state embedded in Europe's integrative system of multi-tier, post-modern governance, epitomising the 21st century Europe of the regions*. Would it be easier just to say the Åland Islands model? Yes, maybe, but that would be too parochial. To say *multi-cultural, post-modern Europe* would be a better if not very precise abbreviation. This broad model is more relevant to the Wider Europe outside than may be immediately obvious, especially when taken together with other examples such as the Belgian model to which I return later.

The Åland Islands model has several interesting features, beyond many details that are rather standard regional autonomy provisions (see Annex A for some details). One is the history of how the Åland Islands question was settled by the League of Nations in 1921 as a model case of conflict prevention, for what otherwise could have seen Finland and Sweden at war over a classic case of irredentist secession (one can make a painful comparison with how the OSCE has not been able to resolve the Nagorno Karabakh conflict – see below). A second is the formulation of the role of the guarantor powers over demilitarisation, which is reproduced in Annex B (the proposed draft agreement for resolution of the Moldova-Transnistria dispute could draw inspiration here – again see below). A third is how regional citizenship is legally formalised, beyond the familiar but often fuzzy notions of regional identity. Regional citizenship (right of domicile) is only granted at the discretion of the Åland authorities. This is recognised in the passports of Åland citizens, which show

³ I am grateful to Kemal Kirisci for making available to me the remarkable book by Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi published in 1926, *Pan-Europe*, in which the author makes an early plea for a European Monroe doctrine: 'A hundred years later than America, Europe must proclaim to the world its own Monroe doctrine: Europe for the Europeans!'

three identities listed on the cover: European Union, Finland and Åland. To the best of my knowledge there is no other case in the European Union of this formal recognition of three-level official identity. This detail might prove politically useful in conflict resolution formulas elsewhere, such as Montenegro, well as for some constitutional regions of the European Union. *The general issue here is how the European system can accommodate ethnic diversity within and across national-cultural frontiers.*

(2) We take a short flight now to nearby *Norway, which shares with Iceland and Liechtenstein the European Economic Area.* The European Economic Area was invented to keep the almost-member states of the Nordic area content outside. It did not, as Finland and Sweden showed. But also in our recent study *Navigating by the Stars* (Emerson et al., 2002), we doubt whether it is going to be politically sustainable for Norway and Iceland either, since the system is not static. As the EU system develops, these two countries find themselves increasingly policy-takers, but not policy-makers, which is rather undemocratic. It seems that Iceland may jump ship next, and apply for full membership. *The issue is the lack of democratic legitimacy of the status of close associate or 'virtual' member state.*

(3) We now sail along the *Arctic Circle in the Barents Sea and on to the Yamal peninsula.* The potential here for diversifying EU's oil and gas supplies is important, as with other parts of Russia. Let us take North-West Russia region as standing for the overall potential for expanded oil and gas production from Russia. New estimates are beginning to circulate among sector experts, suggesting that the recent rise in Russian oil production is not just a blip due to the 1998 devaluation, but the beginning of a profound new trend that could lead to a tripling or more of Russian (plus Kazakh and Azeri) net exports over the next 20 years. This leads into the rules of the game for huge new investments in this sector. Here the EU-Russia energy dialogue has just scratched the surface. *The issue is the EU's possible diversification away from the Gulf oil supplies, which would massively deepen the EU-Russian strategic partnership.*

(4) Back down into the Baltic, we stop in *St. Petersburg.* Peter the Great's window on Europe approaches its 300th birthday next year, exactly when the EU is signing its Treaties of Accession with the three Baltic states. The Baltic Sea becomes an EU lake, with just two small Russian windows onto it. How ironic if the windows become more closed at the time of this 300th anniversary. The structure and purpose of Baltic Sea cooperation is probably already being rethought. The Russian side has for its part much to reflect upon. St. Petersburg has glittering attractions, and all the world is delighted to see the Marinsky ballet there at the height of artistic achievement. But the city has not generated a good enough reputation as an international business environment. *One issue is how*

make the best of sub-regional cooperation across the EU's new borders, but the bigger issue for Russia is how really to get St. Petersburg moving.

(5) We drive down the Baltic coast, and pause at the crossing into Estonia between Ivangorod and Narva. We admire the two fortresses, one very Russian, the other very Germanic, glaring at each other across the Narva river. This brings us to reflect on the future status of the *ethnic-Russian communities in the Baltic states*. These people now divide into three categories, those that have acquired Baltic citizenship, those that have Russian citizenship, and those who remain stateless persons. The accession of the three Baltic states poses questions that are not unique, but are here present on a large scale. The general issue is the rights of non-EU citizens, notably for travel, residence and employment, not only in their host country but in the whole of the rest of the EU. According to a recent draft directive of the EU all legal, long-term residents of the EU that are not EU citizens will have full rights of travel, residence and employment throughout the EU (the text explicitly includes stateless persons, not just foreign nationals, in this category).⁴ This seems an enlightened approach and opens up the entire enlarged EU space for this substantial Russian population. They may come to be known as the EU's 'new Euro-Russians', like the million 'new Russians' in Israel. *The issue is the rights of non-citizens legally resident in the EU, which now acquires heightened importance in the context of EU enlargement and the Wider Europe.*

(6) We drive further down the road to *Kaliningrad*, for whom the imminent impact of Schengen rules has risen to the top of the EU-Russian agenda at summit level. After a year of talks over Russian demands the Commission came up on 10 September with a set of ideas, including: opening of discussions on the conditions for visa-free travel between the EU and Russia as long-term objective; in the meantime a special 'Facilitated Transit Document' for travel by road or rail between Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia; study of the feasibility travel by visa-free non-stop high-speed trains between Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia.⁵ The Council of the EU on 30 September showed support for the Commission proposals. *The issue here is adaptability of Schengen policies, so as not to become a new Berlin Wall.*

(7) We may take the train now to Minsk, thinking ahead for the non-stop, high-speed, visa-free train service, passing the EU's direct frontier with *Belarus*,

⁴ This proposal seems to bear out Dmitri Trenin's perceptive remark in his book 'The End of EurAsia': '... from a Russian point of view, supporting Baltic membership of the EU and letting Europe ... take care of the minorities problem in the Baltic states is the most sensible approach' (Trenin, 2000).

⁵ See a detailed set of proposals for a 'Friendly Schengen Border Regime' in 'The Elephant and the Bear', (Emerson, 2001).

Europe's only serious dictatorship.⁶ Two trends are at work: deteriorating economic, societal and humanitarian conditions there, and Lukashenko's continuing attempt to re-integrate with Russia and, apparently, to become president of the Union. So far these tendencies have not posed acute issues for EU foreign policy. Maybe the EU should cooperate with Russia to encourage a regime change there. The Belarus file may just be sleeping. It could turn nasty. We can discuss whether the Arab world is ready for democracy, but for Belarus the question is both ridiculous and tragic. *The issue for the EU is how to deal with a near 'pariah' regime on its borders.*

(8) Driving now down the road into *Ukraine*, here we find a leadership that wants the opposite, namely EU membership for the long-run, and associate membership of the EU in the medium-term. The new EU member states bordering Ukraine will certainly request the EU to put relations with Ukraine high up on the priorities. The EU does not want today to encourage premature aspirations for full membership, nor accidentally enhance the standing of its present dubious leadership. However it will need to work harder at finding an effective incentive and dignified European perspective without offering premature membership hopes. Given the huge importance of Ukraine on the European map, there is a solid case for working out a specific association agreement model, with a perspective of ultimate EU membership. This ought now to be taking shape at the level of policy planners. CEPS joins with think tanks of Ukraine and Poland to work up such ideas. EU foreign ministers begin to discuss the future of relations with the new neighbours – Ukraine as well as Belarus and Moldova – under their 'Wider Europe' agenda heading. *The issue is how to develop concepts, mechanisms and road-maps suited to the aspirations of states of the Wider Europe that have the long-run objective of EU membership.*

(9) We now drive on the short distance to the *Balkans*. Great progress has been made in the last few years. US military power was needed to stop Milosevic, but since then the European model of progressive integration has taken over and seems to be working. The Stability Pact was not of the essence in this. It was and is only a secondary mechanism. More important is the Stabilisation and Association Process, which is now working as pre-pre-accession method. The general issue for the EU strategy for the region is how to sustain the momentum and credibility of this pre-pre-accession process, when the time horizon for full accession is many, many years ahead. Croatia, for example, plans to open formal procedures requesting full membership early next year, as soon as the Copenhagen decisions are made. With several further years of transition and reform work – maybe five to ten – Croatia could become an entirely eligible

⁶ Belarus' application for membership of the Council of Europe was suspended at the request of the EU in 1998, following suspension of its special guest status in 1997.

candidate, a natural extension of the EU down the Adriatic coast from Slovenia. But so will other states of the former Yugoslavia become plausible candidates in due course too, but probably over a longer time horizon. *Two issues here of general significance: first, how the EU could give sufficient substance to the association process to remain politically motivating, when the time horizon for full membership is distant (a variant of the same question arising for Ukraine); whether and how the EU constitution and institutions can be made capable of absorbing many more small states, with the total rising maybe to 30 or 35?*

(10) The different Balkan cases highlight some more sharply pointed issues. Let us look first at a new state called *Serbia and Montenegro*. It is a thin federative, two-entity, asymmetric structure. Many have doubted that it has enough substance to hold together. However it seems to be one of several examples of a new type, sometimes called a 'common state', because neither the words federation nor confederation fit. The 'common state' has the prospect of EU membership in due course, with EU policies serving to re-unify the initially more decentralised state. This is also a specifically European conflict resolution model. The 'common state' survives inter-communal tensions because it is very decentralised; but it holds together because of the overarching structures and policies of the EU, and perspectives accession to the EU only as a single member state. *The issue is identification of a European 'common state' model, which can serve to resolve or avoid conflict, and becomes part of the EU integration and enlargement process.*

(11) Similar issues arise in *Bosnia and Kosovo*, but with the difference that today's starting points consist of international protectorates regimes. In both cases the ultimate destination of full integration into the EU is seen as the only way ethnic diversity can be maintained peacefully. In due course these systems will have to graduate out of their only semi-democratic condition into proper democracy. But will they become normal modern states before jumping into the post-modern world of EU? Or, on the contrary, may the more plausible strategy for them to become increasingly integrated into EU policy regimes before dropping the high representative. Various models exist for not-yet-members to join EU policies, such as the customs union (Turkey), the single market (Norway), and the euro monetary area (Kosovo, Montenegro), before full membership. In the policing and judiciary also, for example, the EU can buttress the still weak state regimes. The general idea could be to move quite fast into virtual EU membership in many areas of policy, well before the ultimate step of full political membership. But only the perspective of full membership provides sufficient motivation and democratic legitimacy to sustain the process. These are ideas CEPS has advocated for several years.⁷ *The issue is identification of variants of the European 'common state' model of ethnic conflict resolution, in*

⁷ See *The CEPS Plan for the Balkans* (Emerson et al., 1999).

which the EU (with the UN and the NATO for a time) supply the overarching power under temporary trusteeship arrangements in the expectation of accession later.

(12) We make a slight detour out of the Balkans now into *Moldova*. The same general issue is posed as with Ukraine, namely that of a future EU borderland state that aspires to a European vocation. As for Ukraine the issue is how to devise appropriate incentives without premature expectations.⁸

Across the Dniester River, Tiraspol has all the hallmarks still of an outpost of the Russian empire, to be defended against the Ottoman Turk. On a recent visit there we heard the foreign minister of the unrecognised secessionist republic of Transnistria show surprising knowledge of the Åland Islands model, as well as the new Serbia and Montenegro and the current negotiations over Cyprus. There is a new proposal from Russia, Ukraine and OSCE to federalise Moldova and regularise the situation of Transnistria. The present draft sets out very wide-ranging but poorly specified powers of three guarantors – Russia, Ukraine and OSCE (it is not even clear whether they can act individually or only collectively).⁹ One may think of this proposal as an intra-CIS variant of the ‘common state’ models we have been discussing, with the overarching powers of the guarantors standing by to hold together a thin or fragile federative structure. One may also bear in mind the old Cyprus constitution that gave poorly specified powers to the three guarantors, which resulted in unilateral invasion by one of them. *One issue for Moldova is the search for a ‘common state’ solution to a secessionist conflict most plausibly within an OSCE framework, as for the secessionist conflicts in the Caucasus. In addition there is the issue of appropriate incentives from the EU to a future EU borderland state that asserts its European vocation.*

⁸ Moldovan foreign minister Nicolae Dudau has reacted strongly to Romano Prodi’s remarks in *La Stampa* of 15 October: ‘As far as Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and countries of the southern Mediterranean are concerned, including Israel, you can link together many things – but not institutions’. To which Minister Dudau replied, inter alia: ‘We expect from the EU at present more political support in identifying the best solution to the Transnistrian problem and more assistance for the stabilisation and post-conflict recovery of the country. We consider that the decision to draw a new division line on Prut River between the European Union and other part of Europe would be a regrettable political mistake. We are concerned about the fact that the EU could adopt an unfavourable position regarding its future relationship with the republic of Moldova. We express our hope that the assertions of Mr Prodi do not reflect the official position of the EU’. The present author sympathises with the view of Minister Dudau on this point.

⁹ For the text of this proposal and a critique of it, see B. Coppieters and M. Emerson, *Conflict resolution for Moldova and Transnistria through federalisation?*, www.ceps.be, ‘CEPS Policy Brief No. 25’. Annex B below gives the text of the more sophisticated guarantee clause adopted by the League of Nations for the Åland Islands in 1921.

(13) Crossing the Black Sea, we reach *Turkey*. Despite its apparently chaotic politics and unstable economics, this country seems to be making a pro-European choice, which will be confirmed or otherwise in the elections on November 3. This may not be so surprising, given the palpable risks of war, turmoil, fundamentalist Islam and chaos in prospect for the Arab world next door. Turkey thus presents the most dramatic need for the EU to devise operational ideas in the 'virtual membership' category, in order help Turkey's consolidate its secular, Westernising Islam – a programme of 21st century Kemalism, as a colleague has put it.¹⁰ A possible agenda can be sketched. First could be upgrading of the customs union towards full participation in the single market (as in European Economic Area). This would raise the major issue of free labour movement, with the EU facing in any case the need to accept more immigrants soon, because its own demographic trend is so weak. Second could be consideration of full euroisation of the Turkish monetary system before accession, which Mr Dervis has shown interest in (and reasonably so when one compares Ecuador's successful dollarisation versus Argentina's sovereign monetary agonies). Here also EU doctrine should become more open. Third would be active association with the EU's foreign, security and defence policies (with resolution of course of the current impasse over EU access to NATO assets). Fourthly could be a programme of association with the EU's Justice and Home Affairs policies for evidently important reasons (to assure conditions for free movement of labour, help in the fight against terrorism, etc.).¹¹ Fifthly could be co-sponsorship of activity to promote the cause of secular Islam and harmony of the cultures, both within the EU and the Arab and Judaic worlds. *The issue is yet another need for the EU to devise powerful pre-accession incentives and political structures, and so in the case of Turkey to consolidate the major south-eastern flank of the Wider Europe.*

(14) This would fit perfectly of course with resolution of the *Cyprus* problem, for which CEPS recently published detailed proposals, which would be another variant in the family of 'common state' constitutions.¹² Here the particularity is that EU accession should happen simultaneously with conflict resolution and adoption of a new constitution. Again the model should be neither a classic federation nor confederation. Instead it would be a kind of double-decker federation, with the EU tier serving to hold together a deliberately thin federative structure, which otherwise would blow apart. The actual model to build on is that of Belgium, as a bi-communal, decentralised, federative member state of the EU. The negotiating parties have acknowledged the interest of this Belgian model, and it is to be hoped that there will be a rapid move towards

¹⁰ See Tocci, 2001.

¹¹ See Kirisci, 2002.

¹² See Emerson and Tocci, 2002.

agreement in the next months. At CEPS we have just had a workshop of the independent representatives of the parties to try to identify ways of how to manage without political disaster, if agreement is not possible before the Copenhagen European Council in Copenhagen. In fact there is time until March 2003, since the Treaty of Accession is only due to be signed in April. *In general terms this is a case where adoption of an advanced European 'common state' constitution (drawing on the Belgian model), when introduced simultaneously upon accession to the EU, could become a model case of conflict resolution.*¹³

(15) We now navigate back into the *Black Sea*, but stop for a while at an elegant mansion on the shores of the Bosphorus, which happens to be the headquarters of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). This is a sub-regional organisation with very developed cooperative structures (intergovernmental, parliamentary, a development bank, a secretariat, a think tank etc.) but has difficulty in using its potential. The EU is not participating in its work but has been invited to do so. Since half the Black Sea coast line is now taken by EU candidate states, the EU could make a gesture in favour of BSEC, and offer it some resources, to see whether it could do something more valuable in such areas as transport, energy, environmental, fisheries and soft security cooperation.¹⁴ The task is not so easy, when the domains such as those just listed are subject of legally binding policies of the EU. The Baltic Sea provides experience. *The general issue is whether or how to make use of sub-regional structures, where the region in question is clearly defined in geographic and historic terms, but today straddles the borderlands of the EU and its neighbours.*

(16) We continue by sea and reach the Georgian coast. And so into the *Caucasus*, beautiful land of terrible conflicts. In 2000 CEPS proposed a Stability Pact for the Caucasus, in order to resolve the Nagorno Karabakh and Abkhazia secessionist conflicts and establish a new cooperative regional order.¹⁵ This was in response to the calls of all the leaders of the South Caucasus states and the president of Turkey. Nothing has been done. These conflicts remain unresolved. The situation deteriorates in Georgia, with Putin now threatening to strike at the Pankisi Gorge district, which has been and may be still a haven for Chechen refugees and guerrillas. Russia seems even to mimick the language used in the UN by US over Iraq. It is time for the great powers to work better together, for

¹³ Encouragingly, in early October President Denktash made a charming addition to the terminology of the 'common state' by suggesting that he and President Clerides should have a 'common child' together. This imagery leads on to the extremely important question about who would be the father and who the mother. The best answer would be to opt for an immaculate conception, which would solve the present negotiating hiatus over the successor state question.

¹⁴ See Adams et al., 2002.

¹⁵ See Celac, Emerson and Tocci, 2000.

example establishing a new Quartet of Russia, EU, US and OSCE to launch a new comprehensive initiative for the Caucasus. Final solutions to the Nagorno Karabakh and Abkhazia conflicts are elusive, but interim and partial solution for both could help. There have been recent proposals for some of the territories south-east of Nagorno-Karabakh, presently occupied by Armenian/Karabakh troops to be ceded back to Azerbaijan so permitting some return of refugees. In exchange the Armenian-Azerbaijan frontier would be opened, including the railway line that passes through the Azeri exclave province of Nakhichevan. Similarly there have been proposals for an interim and partial solution for Abkhazia, with the southern Gali district ceded back to Georgia, which would permit the return of many refugees, with an opening also of the Georgian-Akhazia frontier, including the railway line that goes on to Armenia. *The general issue for these areas of overlapping concern of Russia and the EU is how the major powers might engineer cooperative solutions to the unresolved conflicts, back off outdated geo-political games, and support instead cooperative regional initiatives.*

(17) Of course the most dreadful conflict in Europe today is on Russian territory, in *Chechnya*. The Islamic fanatics that spearheaded the second war with their huge terrorist acts inside Russia put themselves in the same category as the Palestinian suicide bombers and the Al Qaida. But there also have been all too many reports from reputable NGO sources of terrible behaviour by the Russian forces in Chechnya, which European public opinion and the member states of the Council of Europe cannot and should not ignore. There are signs now that some at least of the leaders of Chechnya, and maybe the most important ones, no longer insists on absolute independence. Unless that were the case, there would indeed seem to be no hope. However if the Chechen position is changing in this crucial respect, then there must be possibilities. For example, according to one recent proposal by Ruslan Khasbulatov, Chechnya would have a special status backed by international guarantees. It would be demilitarised and its external borders would be patrolled by Russian and Chechen border guards together. Chechnya would remain part of Russian 'legislative territory', but not as a Russian region, etc. *The issue here is for Russia and Chechnya to find the way to draw this painful episode to a close, given that there exist constitutional solutions for near-independence, with the possibility that the international community might at some stage be able to help in its implementation.*

(18) And so on to *Jerusalem*, or does it have to be *Baghdad* first? The European Union was used to leaving the *Middle East* to the US, be it under the Republicans or Democrats, from Kissinger to Clinton. Now this can no longer be the case. The Arab-Muslim world is the source of both the new mortal enemy of the US and West – the global terrorist – and of the EU's largest minority communities. The danger to Europe of a creeping deterioration of relations with

its Muslim minorities at home is a vital concern, just as the old problem of insecurity of energy supplies from the Middle East remains. Europe observes deeply worrying tendencies in US foreign policy. The Israel-Palestine conflict is pushed to the back burner, to make way for Iraq first. Interest group pressures, notably the growing 'biblical' alliance between the new Christian evangelists and the old Zionist lobby, defend Sharon to the point of giving him a free hand, thus allowing the continuing construction of settlements and destruction of the Palestinian Authority on the way (for parts of the Israeli right) to the ultimate goal of the Greater Israel. With an Iraq war seemingly imminent, the US strategy of Baghdad before Jerusalem is, for Europe, the wrong way round. *The present issue is how the EU, Russia and the moderate Arabs might coordinate to press the US to return to the peace process at least concomitantly with an Iraq campaign (by analogue with the launch of the peace process in 1991 a few months after the first Gulf War).*

(19) *The Arab world and Iran* is going to be hugely shaken in the event of a war over Iraq. Maybe there will be street unrest threatening one or more of the Saudi, Jordanian and Egyptian regimes. Beyond the immediate impacts the West will have to come to terms with the question whether it seriously promotes the democratisation of the Arab world or not. The answer should be yes, since the present regimes are ultimately unsustainable, and today they offend the most basic human rights. The Arab world does not prosper.¹⁶ There is no evidence of some 'cultural essentialism' to deny democracy and human rights there. There is no Chinese model here, of economic development first, and democracy later. On the contrary, the evidence is that these failures of civil society impede economic progress. The EU will have reason to rethink its Barcelona process in any case, as Malta and Cyprus accede to the EU and Turkey's candidacy is upgraded. Barcelona then becomes a set of meetings with the Mediterranean Arabs and Israel.

A revised and strengthened architecture for the EU and the Arab world seems needed. With a Middle East peace settlement there might be a fresh regional cooperative initiative, from Turkey to Egypt with not only the core countries of the region (Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria) but also Saudi Arabia and post-Saddam Iraq. This group would go way beyond the old Mashrek idea and would need a new name (Greater Mashrek?). That could stimulate re-animation of the dormant Arab Maghreb Union as a sub-regional grouping that embraces Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. Further to the East, the EU has already a promising relationship with the Gulf Cooperation Council. Could it be, post-conflict, that Iran might in due course accede to the GCC? These could then be for the EU three sub-regional modules – Maghreb, Greater Mashrek, Gulf – of an extended Barcelona process for the Greater Middle East. *The essential*

¹⁶ See UNDP, 2002.

issue will be for the EU to work for the harmony, not clash of civilisations, and with a more direct approach in favour of modernisation and democratisation of the Greater Middle East.

(20) *Back to Jerusalem* again, this time post-conflict. With a sustainable two-state final agreement, *EU-Israel* relations could improve dramatically. Israel might request accession to the European Economic Area, for which it could easily qualify, with many variants of the association model open for consideration.¹⁷ At the same time, the new Palestinian State could also profit from a more advanced relationship, possibly quite close to the Stabilisation and Association Agreements of the Balkans. Looking much further into the future, a new movement led by a group of members of the Israeli Knesset and the European Parliament is now promoting the idea of ultimate membership by Israel of the EU. Even if this initiative can be regarded today as hardly more than a thought experiment, it has a certain logic. Israel would be choosing to move closer to the model of a normal, modern European state. *The issue for the medium-term future would be how to organise the increasingly deep association, post-conflict, of both Israel and the future Palestinian state with the European Union, and to foster a normalisation of the state of Israel in relation to 21st century Europe.*

A Wider Europe doctrine

How might one order this huge collection of apparently miscellaneous issues? The clue lies in the fact that all the places of the Wider Europe that we visited are strung out like a long chain – from Murmansk down to Jerusalem and round to Marrakesh. The chain is continuous, and so the European Union's policies have to be a coherent whole. The building up of these policies into a Wider Europe doctrine should now be one of the European Union's major objectives. *The whole of Europe, together with the Greater Middle East, should be recognised as the EU's area of vital concern.*

The term vital interest is deliberately avoided since it has proprietary and *Realpolitik* connotations, reminiscent of the original Monroe doctrine. The normative foundation is indeed the Kantian notion of eternal peace, which the European Union itself seems almost miraculously to have achieved over the last half century, as never before. The Wider Europe doctrine has to aim at extending these achievements to the European Union's neighbouring area of vital concern. The means for pursuing this objective could be based on five axes.

First, the bedrock of the Wider Europe would be the continuing process of expansion of the European Union and the perspectives and incentives inherent in candidacy for full membership, even when the time horizon is long. This implies

¹⁷ See Emerson, Vahl and Woolcock, 2002 for a detailed analysis.

that the EU confirms the principle of eligibility of all European democracies for full membership, as enshrined in the Treaty of Rome. In practice, however, beyond the Copenhagen criteria that candidates have to fulfil, this now means improving the absorptive capacity of the EU's own system of governance as a further condition of continuing expansion. Ultimately there could be up to 35 member states, including all the Balkans and Ukraine. The present Convention has the task of addressing this issue, and is at least generating ideas that could point the way (see Box 1, drawing from one of several model constitutions now being discussed).

Box 1. European Constitution: Extracts from the proposal to the Convention by Robert Badinter

- President of the European Union chosen by its members for 5 years (not renewable).
- Prime Minister chosen by the European Council for 5 years (renewable once); presides the Council of Ministers and the Commission.
- European Council decides by consensus or reinforced qualified majority (two-thirds of the member states, representing at least half of the population).
- Commission limited to 15 members; also there are deputy members.
- High Representative for foreign and security policy is member of the Commission.
- Council of Ministers decides by double majority of its member states and population.
- Working languages limited to English, French and German.
- Three-pillar structure abolished.

Source: Le Monde, 27 September 2002.

However the procedures and incentives for future candidate states need clarifying. Three categories already exist – ‘candidates in negotiation’ (the next 10, then Bulgaria and Romania), ‘candidates not yet in negotiation’ (Turkey) and those ‘future candidates with a perspective of membership’ (Balkans). The key point of principle is that the countries in all these three categories are freely choosing to take on the obligation to adopt in due course the whole of the *acquis communautaire*, and thus the EU model at large. Since the time horizon for the ‘perspective’ category may be many years, especially given the time the EU will need to digest its next new members, there should be a fresh look at the possible content of association agreements in order to sustain the incentive for their

convergence on EU norms. The array of actual or conceivable association possibilities is very extensive (see Box 2). What is lacking at present is a sufficiently systematic and positive articulation of the association incentives offered to the three categories. In particular there is a need to review systematically which areas of EU policy do need objectively to be restricted to full member states, and which areas could beneficially be extended to associates, given a strategic choice to maximise inclusion and incentives for all three categories of candidates (maybe there should be only two categories, with 'candidates not yet in negotiation' opened to include 'future candidates with the perspective of membership').

A further aspect of the EU enlargement process lies in the conflict resolution properties of the Union's multi-tier governance and integration process, which is especially relevant for the ethno-secessionist conflicts of south-east Europe. This is a reason why the incentive of EU accession needs to be vivid, even for long-run candidates. It is also a reason why the institutional aspects of association arrangements need reconsideration, opening up fuller 'virtual member' possibilities, such as observer members of the agencies of the European Union (see Box 2), the European Parliament, Economic and Social Committee, and Committee of the Regions.¹⁸ The common feature from the conflicts of the south-east Europe through to the Middle East is that they have all resulted from the end of empires – Soviet, Yugoslav, Ottoman, British – and the explosion of ethnic tensions formerly controlled by the overseeing power. The most encouraging cases of conflict resolution are emerging where these complex societies are fitting in to the new post-modern, multi-tier Europe, with at least a perspective of EU membership. Thus the new overarching power comes in to suppress ethnic conflict, fragmentation and multiplication of micro-states.

Second, the EU should seek to give strong content to its strategic partnership with Russia, as the main European democracy not seeking accession. Prioritisation and real achievement are required amidst the unmanageably long agenda of the partnership. Three suggestions for priority are: (1) freer movement of persons, including the medium-term objective of visa-free travel, (2) energy sector development and (3) cooperation over conflict resolution in regions that are both members of European organisations and have close links with Russia.

¹⁸ As an example of how EU practice has been evolving for the accession candidates, see *Participation of candidate countries in Community programmes, agencies and committees, Commission Communication of the Council, 20 December 1999 [COM(99)710]*.

Box 2. Models and sectors for possible association with the European Union

Trade and markets

- Tariff free trade
- Customs union
- Single market

Monetary regimes

- Semi-fixed parity with euro
- Fixed exchange rate with euro, currency board regime
- Euro as parallel currency in private sector
- Full euro-isation

Sectoral policies & agencies

- Scientific research
- Environment
- Transport
- Energy
- Education and culture

Justice and Home Affairs

- Visa-free travel, with re-admission agreement
- Schengen area participation
- Additional associations, e.g. with Europol, Eurojust.

Foreign and security policy

- Declaratory association
- Operational partnership, e.g. in donor activities

Security and defence policy

- Exporters of security – e.g. non-EU NATO member states
- Importers of security – e.g. Balkan protectorate regimes

Institutional

- Political dialogue
- Participation in decision-shaping, but not decision-taking
- Observer status in EU bodies

Present categories of association agreement:

- Europe Agreements for candidates in negotiation
- European Economic Area
- Stabilisation and Association Agreements (Balkans)
- Partnership and Association Agreements (C.I.S.)
- Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Agreements

Agencies of the European Union (selected)

- European Environment Agency
- European Training Foundation
- European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug-Addiction
- European Monitoring centre on Racism and Xenophobia
- Office for the Harmonisation in the Internal Market
- Agency for Safety and Health at Work

Recent summit meetings of the EU and Russia have given a prominent place to the idea of a Common European Economic Space (CEES), but taken literally this belongs to the Pan-European domain discussed below, whereas the actual content of EU-Russian discussions under this heading are much more limited in scope at present. The objectives are not yet clear. It seems that study of the potential harmonisation of economic regulations and technical standards is the main activity for the time being, without even approaching the issue of free trade. Since the discussions are entirely bilateral, it makes the name 'Common European Economic Space' hardly appropriate. However at the same time Russian ministers are making speeches that open up wider horizons, mentioning an interest in the bilateral Swiss model for multiple sectoral agreements with the EU instead of the EEA model (as for Norway), as well as the possible 'all-European dimension of the CEES', and even the idea of linking the CEES with the Barcelona process. These last ideas are indeed in the realm of Pan-European.¹⁹

Third, the EU has to restructure, reprioritise and reinforce its approach to the Mediterranean and Arab-Muslim world, with links to the Muslim minorities within Europe, given the dramas and turmoil that follow from 11 September, and after many years of little or no developmental progress in the region. Economic, political and social progress, and harmony of the civilisations, has to be the long-term therapy for its own sake, as well as for the fight against terrorism. The Barcelona process should be rethought. It might be transformed into some new overarching structure and doctrine for the Greater Middle East to embrace not only the Mediterranean but all of Arabia and Iran, with huge new openings and needs likely to follow the confrontation with Iraq.

Fourth, there is some scope for enhancing Pan-European mechanisms of policy in selected fields, especially trade, and some sub-regional organisations. Together these might be quite appropriately branded the Common European Economic Space (CEES). Of course the Council of Europe and OSCE already exist as Pan-European organisations, and have significant activity in the political, human rights and security domains. The question is what domains of policy might usefully see further development at the Pan-European level, rather than just at the level of bilateral association arrangements with the EU. The cornerstone of the Common European Economic Space there could be a Pan-European Free Trade Area (PEFTA), leading eventually to a Pan-European Single Market (PESIMA). The existing jungle of free trade and market arrangements in the Wider Europe would thus be given a unifying framework (see Box 3 for some details).

¹⁹ Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Denisov on 'Russia's integration into the world economy and establishment of the CEES', Moscow, 20 September 2002, *MID Daily News Bulletin* (27.09.02).

Box 3. Common European Economic Space (CEES)

The EU could propose a real Common European Economic Space (CEES), even though the name has been somewhat inappropriately hijacked for bilateral EU-Russian talks. This could have several stages and components: a Pan-European Free Trade Area (PEFTA), to which should be added Pan-European Rules of Origin (PERULO), and for the most advanced cases the Pan-European Single Market (PESIMA). These mechanisms would be inviting a consolidation and multilateralisation of the present jungle of bilateral or sub-regional free trade agreements, which include EFTA, the European Economic Area (EEA), CEFTA, proposed bilateral free trade between the EU and Russia and Ukraine, the Balkan matrix of bilateral free trade agreements, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership/Barcelona Process and the Gulf Cooperation Council. PESIMA would subsume the present European Economic Area, making that open-ended for new applicants. The CEES would also embrace the existing Pan-European Transport Areas (PETRAs) and European Energy Charter, which would retain however their own organisational structures.

Under a PEFTA proposal it would be open for any Wider European participant in a free trade arrangement with the EU to elect to enter into multilateralised free trade with all other participants. Such ideas might be launched already now, in anticipation of the EU's forthcoming enlargement and Russia's accession to the WTO. The initiative would be a partial move away from the EU's present hub-and-spoke bilateralism. The predominance of the EU's economic weight, and the huge legal infrastructure of its single market, would mean that such a construction would effectively be an extension of the EU economic space. There is no chance that the Council of Europe or a similar organisation would be mandated to take on these economic responsibilities. However more subtle institutional arrangements could be devised, drawing on the innovations of the EFTA Surveillance Authority and Court as institutions of the European Economic Area. These bodies are led by nationals of EEA states, and are charged with the implementation of the EU Single Market law by Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. These institutional arrangements represent a serious effort to find a middle ground between the polar cases of full EU membership versus association arrangements simply governed by the EU (see Emerson et al., 2002).

The so-called European Conference, which the EU convenes to bring together virtually all European countries, could be the forum to discuss such policy ideas.

Institutionally, however, there seems to be no chance for the old idea of a 'Common European House', through merging such economic functions with the political competences of the Council of Europe or OSCE, for well-known reasons.²⁰ However more subtle institutional arrangements are conceivable, for

²⁰ The EU accession candidate states are against anything that would distract from their priority objective of EU accession, which a Common European House would do by lumping

example building on the model of the EEA (see Box 3 for detail). On the other hand the Council of Europe and OSCE could both be given new tasks to work with the Greater Middle East in the areas of democracy, culture, human rights and security.

Fifth, the EU needs to co-opt the United States more effectively into support for its vital concerns, particularly to form with Russia a stronger cooperative Troika for conflict resolution in the south-east segment of the Wider Europe. This follows naturally up to a point, in view of shared values, but the EU also needs categorically to shape up its own foreign policy capacities in order to curb some of the dangerous idiosyncrasies that flow from monopoly of power (e.g. in the US case excessive militarism and unilateralism, and bias over the Israel-Palestinian conflict). In this way it may turn out that the EU and US are not exactly from different planets after all, since extreme differences between the West's two main polities would prove unsustainable.²¹

3. Conclusions

The borderlands of the enlarging European Union are strung out like a long chain – from Murmansk down to Jerusalem and round to Marrakesh. As our *tour d'Europe* showed, every link in that chain throws up concrete policy challenges for the EU. These are the places where the enlarging European Union will find either its security or its insecurity. 'Arc of instability' is one expression that has tended to be used for the EU's periphery. But the attack on the US on September 11 showed that the region harbours security risks that now rank at the level of existential threats.

These are the reasons why the European Union needs now to shape its strategy for the Wider Europe. *It is proposed that the EU declares the whole of the Wider Europe as an area of vital concern.* The area consists of three huge regions, each having categorically different political characters: (1) the enlarging EU space, defined as all countries that are, or want to be full members, even if only in the long-run; (2) Russia, as the outstanding European state that does not seek EU membership, and (3) the Greater Middle East, which we take to include the south and east Mediterranean states of the Barcelona process, plus Arabia and Iran.

them all together, and by presenting an alternative design. Russia does not like the idea in practice either, because it seems to mean all too many irritating meetings of the OSCE or Council of Europe type, where they have to listen to long queues of critical speeches by small countries. Nor does the EU find these organisations convenient either, because the Commission and member states find themselves in an awkward position institutionally vis-à-vis each other.

²¹ See Asmus and Pollack (2002).

This could be styled as the EU's new Monroe doctrine. In any case the EU's conception of its vital concerns must be clearly defined in normative terms. Vital concern is to mean what the words say, avoiding the ambiguity of the term *vital interest*, which smells of hegemonic possession and old-style *Realpolitik*. The normative principles of the Wider Europe doctrine are clear if one looks at its three big zones for their differences.

- The European Union's space is defined as its member states and any other European democracy that freely chooses to identify its destiny as a future member state. All these countries are choosing the EU model in the most fundamental sense – economics, politics, society, identity. Concretely it means accepting sooner or later the whole of the *acquis communautaire*. Nobody is pressurised to do this. On the contrary the EU fears dilution through excessive expansion, and if anything discourages long-term membership expectations. But for those countries that do seriously wish to aim at long-term membership, a more explicit and positive set of policy and institutional relationships for the next years needs now to be worked out.
- Russia sees itself as the other big European power. It identifies with Europe, but is too big and at least for the time being too different to be just another candidate for EU accession. Therefore special relations have to be worked out. The two strategic partners are highly complementary and have much to offer each other. The EU can now view Russia as a huge potential source of security, both concretely in terms of diversified energy supplies, and politically. The EU wishes to draw Russia into its own philosophy of international relations which is heavily influenced by the principles of its own integration process, and stresses the value of a rules-based international order. This is especially so now, since EU and Russian peripheries are so close together, even overlapping in some instances.
- The Greater Middle East, post-11 September, has to be viewed as an area of vital concern like never before. But this largely Arab and Muslim area, from Morocco to Saudi Arabia, cannot be sent the Copenhagen criteria textbook as the standard model for their future. Their progressive modernisation and democratisation, according to their own model, needs helping along the way by Europe, so also to facilitate the harmony of civilisations. But these are the long-term issues of societal evolution. In the meantime there are the dramatic, existential threats to be curbed. Al Qaida struck New York and Washington last year, but if the homeland defences of the US are hardened up, Brussels, London or Paris might be next. These are the soft and hard security reasons for the EU to work out a freshly structured and prioritised strategy for the Greater Middle East.

But there is then the question what common factors may join together these three very different zones, apart from geographic proximity.

- There is some room for truly Pan-European policies and organisations. Trade policy could ultimately embrace three zones, the EU space, Russia and Greater Middle East all together. In other domains the member states of the Council of Europe will constitute a more conventional Pan-European space. The scope for these Pan-European policies needs now to be worked out much more systematically and with positive prejudice. But even where there should be no formal Pan-European policy mechanism, there are a vast number of lines of policy cooperation in the several classes of association agreements between the EU and its neighbours, which will now deserve a systematic review, having in mind the forthcoming enlargement, and with a view to giving detailed substance to a Wider Europe doctrine.
- The US – global superpower – is the final common factor. The US fades away as an actor within the EU space, which is the natural end of the post-World War epoch. However the US is crucial in relation to both Russia and the Greater Middle East. The EU's Wider Europe policy has therefore to be completed by strategic cooperation with the US over the common threats, post 11-September. The EU has to work up its own policy performance with respect to all the four above headings partly to be a more effective partner of the US, and partly at the same time to be better able to curb some of those worrying traits in US policy towards the Wider Europe that come through a monopoly of power, and are of real concern to EU.

The EU must now swallow hard to take in the ten new member states, and then move on to the Wider Europe.

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Annex A

Some notes on the Ålands Island model

The Åland Islands are an archipelago occupying the narrow straits between Sweden and Finland, with a population today of 26,000.

History. For 600 years the Åland Islands were, together with the rest of Finland, part of Sweden. In 1809 Finland, including the Åland Islands, was ceded by Sweden to Russia. In 1854, as part of the Crimean war, the British and French navies attacked and destroyed the Russian fortress on Åland. In the subsequent Treaty of Paris of 1856 '*Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, pour repondre au désir qui lui a été exprimé par Leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande et l'Empereur des Francais, déclare que les Iles d'Åland ne seront fortifiés, et qu'il n'y sera maintenu ni crée aucun établissement militaire ou naval*'. Åland was thus demilitarised, unlike the rest of Finland.

In 1917, because of instability caused by the Russian revolution, the Åland people took the initiative in November to request secession from Finland to join Sweden, shortly before Finland itself declared its independence from Russia in December. In the winter of 1918 the Swedish army occupied Åland, but withdrew when Finland sent in its troops. However the Åland separatists maintained their campaign, which Sweden supported. Finland refused to accept the demand of secession, but did in 1920 pass an Autonomy Act. On a British initiative the case was brought to the League of Nations. A Committee of Jurists was set to work and they proposed a formula that was adopted unanimously by the Council in June 1921 as a resolution, and had four essential features:

- Sovereignty would remain with Finland.
- Åland would be demilitarised and neutralised, backed by international guarantees.
- Åland autonomy would be constitutionally entrenched.
- The Swedish language would be protected, as also the property rights of the islanders.

The Swedish government greeted the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations with 'profound disappointment'. Its representative went on to say: '*In supporting the cause of the people of the Åland Islands before Europe and the League of Nations, Sweden was not influenced by the desire to increase her territory. She only wished to support noble and just aspirations and to defend the right of an absolutely homogeneous island population to reunite itself to its mother*

country, from which it had been detached by force, but to which it is still tied by the ties of common origin, a common history and a common national spirit'. However he ended: 'Sweden is ready loyally to recognise that the decision of the Council has the force given to it by the Covenant', thus inaugurating maybe the first example of post-modern conflict resolution.

The Autonomy Act of 1920 was updated by new acts in 1951 and 1991, and the special status of Ålands was also further entrenched in Finland's Treaty of Accession to the EU in 1994.

Kompetenz Katalog. The 1951 Autonomy Act gives the following competences to Åland:

- Ålands Flag and use thereof;
- Municipal government affairs;
- Public order and security;
- Real estate affairs, building regulations, nature, environment;
- Education, sport, culture;
- Public health, social welfare and employment;
- Hunting, fishing, farming and forestry;
- Postal services (own stamps), telecommunications;
- Industry, trade and mineral resources;
- Right to levy additional income and excise and other taxes;
- An equalisation procedure calculates the amount of tax revenues collected by the central Finnish government that are ceded to Åland.

Foreign policy Treaties of Finland. If a Treaty entered into by Finland is to apply to Åland, the authorities of the Islands have to give their consent.

Regional citizenship, right of domicile. This may be granted by the Åland authorities according to the following criteria:

- Descendant of someone with right of domicile, or
- Five years residence and
- Knowledge of Swedish language.

Only persons with right of domicile can acquire property, be a civil servant or exercise various trades and professions.

Passports carry the triple identification: European Union, Finland and Åland.

Source: 'International Treaties and Documents Concerning Åland Islands, 1856-1992', Ålands kulturstiftelse, Mariehamn, 1993.

Annex B

**Convention concerning the non-fortification and neutralisation of the Åland Islands, adopted by the League of Nations, 20 October 1921
(extracts)**

Article 7

En vue de donner efficacité à la garantie prévue dans le préambule de la présente Convention, les Hautes parties Contractantes s'adresseront, soit individuellement soit conjointement, au Conseil de la Société des Nations, afin qu'il décide des mesures à prendre soit pour assurer le maintien des dispositions de cette convention, soit pour en réprimer la violation.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à contribuer aux mesures que le Conseil de la Société des nations décidera à cet effet.

.....

Si l'unanimité ne peut pas se former, chacun des Hautes parties Contractantes sera autorisé à prendre les mesures que le Conseil aurait recommandés à la majorité des deux tiers

Dans le cas où la neutralité de la zone serait mise en péril par un coup de main dirigé soudainement, soit contre les îles d'Åland, soit à travers celles-ci contre la territoire finlandaise, la Finlande prendra les mesures nécessaires dans la zone pour contenir et repousser l'agresseur

La Finlande devra en référer immédiatement au Conseil.

Source: 'International Treaties and Documents Concerning Åland Islands, 1856-1992', Ålands kulturstiftelse, Mariehamn, 1993.

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