

**EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY:
TAKING STOCK**

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WITH CONTRIBUTIONS BY

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**SUMMING UP BY
FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG**

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EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY: TAKING STOCK

WORKING PAPER No. 8
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CHAIRMAN'S SUMMING UP

FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG*

When the eighth meeting of the European Security Forum was organised, Robert Kagan had not yet published his landmark article¹ on US-European relations in the July issue of the journal *Policy Review*. Not surprisingly, the propositions set forward in that piece were at the centre of a particularly lively discussion, after the presentations given by:

- Madame Nicole Gnesotto, Director of the EU Institute for Security Studies
- Dr. Viktor Kremenyuk, of the Russian Academy of Sciences
- Mr. Robert Kagan, Senior Research Fellow at the Carnegie for International Peace.

The presenters and the participants in the discussion were invited by the Chairman to bear in mind the following questions:

- What is the most relevant response to the emerging threat of terrorism of mass destruction? Are the traditional tools of military power the most relevant vis à vis what looks less like a Hobbesian jungle (where power goes to the big and the strong) than a fight against mutating viruses in which small is both ugly and powerful? Following, are military capabilities, and the readiness to use them, the primary benchmark for measuring power?
- Is NATO condemned to play an essentially regional role in managing a Kantian Europe (“OSCE in uniform”); or will it play a global role? And wouldn't the latter option imply that the US military be fully part of NATO, not simply the comparatively small US European command (EUCOM): is such an evolution likely?
- Is the EU as feckless as it is sometimes portrayed? Are we all Woodstock-era flower children, despite the fact that most EU members have an imperial legacy and notwithstanding the recurring use of force by a number of European countries in recent years as well as in the previous decades?
- Conversely, is the US as ready to act decisively as we are sometimes invited to believe? More specifically, what does the US refusal to assault Tora Bora tell us about the US military's readiness to run risks?

The Chairman also made two points, directed at Mr. Kagan:

* Chairman of the Geneva Centre for Security Studies and Chairman of the European Security Forum.

¹ “Power and Weakness”, *Policy Review*, June-July 2002

- The choice of multilateralism is not a mere reflection of weakness. From 1941 onwards until the 1990s, the US chose the multilateral road whenever possible, with unilateralism being chosen if there was no other option. Multilateralism is not simply for wimps.
- To portray Europe as Kantian is largely correct; but it's a double-edged depiction: Kant was not pursuing the quest for Perpetual Peace out of pacifism; he was the philosopher of the categorical imperative. Indeed, he was widely read in Prussian military academies. Kant is not for wimps either.
- To these points Robert Kagan made the following remarks in his presentation:
 - US instincts are not currently more unilateralist than they were at the beginning of the Cold War. Current unilateralist trends predated the Bush administration. However, 9-11 put "unilateralism on steroids".
 - Concerning military interoperability within NATO, the US is not going to make itself weaker in order to cater to European military insufficiencies.
 - Europe has an ambitious worldview which calls for more expenditure on the means of power. Being upset with the US is not providing enough of a motive for the European to spend more money on defence. Indeed, a prominent European participant endorsed this view in the subsequent discussion.

In the ensuing debate, a participant made a vigorous set of comments:

- The US overemphasises the military component of power.
- Is Russia the most dynamic element in the current international landscape, as was put forward by V. Kremenjuk, or is it simply an unstable one?
- The US needs to take into account the burden represented by the reunification of the European continent for the EU.
- To quote Guillaume Appolinaire, the Europeans need to learn from America's ability to "dare and simplify": there is a different US relation to power, with the EU not having the same sense of global responsibility.

Along similar lines, a number of participants queried the nature of Europe's identity: is it simply "not America" or is it (as tended to be the view around the table) more than the negative definition? This query led in turn to the issue of the generation of an EU strategic culture.

This brought the comment from a European that it is through actions that a strategic culture would be generated. More generally, he pointed out that ESDP was motivated by reference to the US, albeit not in a negative sense: ESDP was established to do what the US wouldn't do, as well as to work with US. As for EU introversion, the fact is that there has been no major debate on the EU's

global role in world affairs, because it hasn't - until now - needed to have one: the Convention would have to work on this.

On the degree of divergence between the US and Europe, several European and American participants suggested that synthesis was more likely than incompatibility: the US is actually more engaged in soft power than is often acknowledged (and indeed sometimes more so than the EU, notwithstanding the latter's unique contribution to Development aid); nor is the US unhappy at being a single superpower rather than being part of the more benign European vision; in any case, a Europe at peace is seen in Washington as a strategic asset for the US.

To this was added by an American participant the suggestion that the relative and absolute increase of US power during the last 20 years was probably slowing down, with information technology no longer driving economic growth, while the costs of homeland defence are rising: the US should be in the market for partners. Paul Kennedy has ceased to make his "strategic overstretch" argument: he was wrong at the time he made it, he may be wrong again by no longer making it...

These benign remarks drew some European ripostes: the US was acting in an aberrant, largely unpredictable manner, as an autocrat who didn't care about the views of others. Indeed, notwithstanding US exhortations that the Europeans should spend more on defence, the US didn't really want the Europeans to spend more: the US was quite content to see the Europeans confined to peace-keeping tasks, while making the point that it is the "mission which makes the coalition" (a form of denial of the relevance of permanent alliances), and shooting at European attempts to build up their aerospace and defence-industrial base (with US moves against 'Galileo' being a recent example).

As for the Europeans, the point was made notably from a Russian participant, that they had no reason to be unduly proud of their soft power role: the US was leading the field in the former Soviet Union whether in the Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme, or in nation building in the Caucasus or on migration issues on the Chinese-Russian border. Similarly, Europeans deplored the EU's incapability of "self starting" on the simple, obvious moves: there was no European-wide action during operation Alba in Albania or the recent deal on the evacuation of Palestinians from the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem. Nor had there been a European-wide initiative to meet the obvious requirement to increase defence spending after 9-11: unfortunately, it looks as if nothing short of a 911 type attack against Europe itself would trigger a serious European response.

In closing the three speakers made the following points:

- The focus is on military power, because this is what divides the American and the Europeans most, not because it is the only measure of power (R. Kagan).
- The two forces which determine the current direction of Russian foreign policy are the quest for security – with the US being the prime interlocutor – and economic development, where Europe should play a major role (V. Kremenjuk).
- Soft security or so-called low intensity tasks are neither easy nor risk free: indeed, they can be costly and high risk – but Europe thus tries to avoid the creation of “future jungles”. As for transatlantic disagreements, the debate on role of military power is not the most important divergence. The biggest disagreement is on global governance and democracy in international affairs (N. Gnesotto).

François Heisbourg

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY:

A EUROPEAN VIEW

NICOLE GNESOTTO*

As of mid-2002, taking into account the impact of 11 September, the prospect of EU enlargement and the emerging work of the Convention on the Future of the EU, most commentators tend to believe that the momentum for ESDP has been lost: the Europeans appear to be as divided as ever, the technological “gap” between European and American military forces is supposedly increasing every day, the NATO-EU relationship is still in limbo and, except for the Balkans, where the EU is showing real political involvement, the Europeans are suspected of being unwilling to tackle any security issue seriously.

There is no doubt that the Europeans are having some difficulty in adapting to the new international context created both by the terrorist threats and by political and military developments in the US after the attacks. Over-militaristic and hyperunilateralist, the United States has somehow become a destabilising factor in traditional European security thinking.

1. New world, new rationale, more ESDP

But it would be a mistake to conclude that the momentum for implementing a European Security and Defence Policy within the EU framework is dead. The momentum is changing, simply because the rationale for ESDP is today totally different from what it was in 1999.

Back to Saint-Malo, there were two main reasons why the 15 decided to include defence among the EU’s normal competencies. The first related to internal European debate and policy : a defence dimension was felt necessary in order to complete CFSP and give the EU more coherence in its foreign policy; the lessons from the Balkans crisis, and, moreover, the weakness of the EU during the military campaign in Kosovo, played an essential role in the EU’s new determination. The second rationale had to do with transatlantic relations and the future of NATO: a European military capability was considered necessary to compensate for the new uncertainty over US military involvement in crisis management in Europe (both the French and the British learned this from their experience in Bosnia). It would also be a way for the Europeans to influence seriously US military strategy, in cases where the US decides to be involved.

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And finally, it could help to strengthen NATO by strengthening European military capabilities, once it was clear that NATO itself had failed to create, within the old rules of its ESDI, any European political or military momentum.

What has changed in 2002? On the EU side, the issue is not so much ESDP as how to improve the EU's CFSP. The real issue is the functioning of CFSP itself via the questions raised by the Convention: how can the EU define a common foreign policy with enlargement approaching? What do the 15, and later the 23 or 27, want to do in common vis-à-vis the rest of the world? What might be the international role of the EU, especially in crisis prevention and crisis resolution, once it has become the leading economic and demographic power? How will an enlarged EU be able to decide and to act? In other words, it is now policy, and not defence, that is (rightly) at the heart of the European debate. Defence has reverted to its normal role as a technical instrument at the service of a common policy.

On the transatlantic side, the issue is no longer NATO but the US itself. There is no point, in this short paper, in listing all the drastic changes that President Bush has imposed in US military and political thinking. But there is little doubt, in Europe, that the United States has become a totally new and different actor. Actually, three conclusions can be drawn from this new US policy. First, regarding peacekeeping, there is no US uncertainty any more: we *know* that the US has other priorities than peacekeeping in the Balkans, Afghanistan or anywhere else. The US is even more explicit on its refusal to accept this burden. But we also know that somebody has to do it. So the Europeans *will* have to do the job, whether they like it or not, more and more, and increasingly by themselves. Second, US aversion to multilateral constraints, including within NATO, will change the ways and means the Europeans will have to find if they still wish to influence any US policy: this can be done through bilateral relations, or by creating greater European capabilities. If the US understands only military criteria, then the EU will have to do more in that area too. Third, if NATO moves from being a collective constraining organisation to a flexible reservoir of ad hoc coalitions, then strengthening this new – and enlarged – lego-type NATO may become problematical: whatever the Europeans decide to do, it could appear more and more irrelevant to the future of NATO.

The result of this new security context is clear : the paradoxical effect of terrorism is to make the Petersberg tasks more urgent and more necessary. For the EU, ESDP is no longer an option but a necessity, whether the Europeans like it or not:

- Firstly, for security reasons: either because they will be the only ones able to carry the future burden of peacekeeping and crisis management, at the request of the US (it was the Americans who first asked the EU, in December 2001, to take the lead in Macedonia after the end of NATO's Operation

Amber Fox). Or, because the Europeans will feel more and more exposed and unprotected, if the US is so concerned by other strategic issues, in Asia notably, that European security becomes the last of its priorities.

- Secondly, for political reasons, because of the US obsession with military counting. If the Europeans want to remain capable of operating with the US in a military coalition, and if they want to be relevant to America in order to influence US policy, the EU will have to demonstrate that it can speak the same (military) language as the Americans.

Less America in Europe, more ESDP: this could be the defining formula in Europe post-11 September.

2. National sovereignty, still

Since Maastricht (which established the CFSP) and Cologne (ESDP), European security and defence policy has been implemented within the limits of two essential constraints: the national sovereignty of member states on the one hand, the US role and the Atlantic Alliance on the other. The two basic dilemmas have been how to reconcile national sovereignty and political integration, and how to reconcile a strategic and political Union with a strong and permanent NATO. ESDP has been created and implemented in the room for manoeuvre left by these two issues.

In 2002, these two factors still help to explain both the progress and the limits of ESDP. But there is now a marked difference between these two traditional constraints:

- the US/NATO factor has drastically changed since 11 September. One of the consequences of this evolution is that the United States is now pushing (more than preventing) the Europeans to take the lead in crisis management. The US today acts more as a driving factor than as a limitation on future EU military responsibility.
- However, national sovereignty is still, or is still perceived to be, an essential constraint on future European political integration. The veto right in CFSP and ESDP remains unquestionable for most of the member states.

The result is that national sovereignty remains the main obstacle to the development of a military Europe. Implementing CFSP and ESDP depends more upon the political will of member states than upon the state of the Alliance. This does not mean at all that ESDP is becoming easier. The problems are well known: first, the discrepancy in the EU between interventionist and abstentionist states, and between the specific military strength of each of them. Second, the different perceptions of power among the member states. Third, the question of big and small, which can be a kind of red flag in all debates on the future organisation of a more political EU.

These are the main questions the Convention will have to address. 2003 will be the moment of truth both for ESDP and for the EU: by the end of the year, the headline goal will have to have been met (for the time being, the member states have fulfilled more than two-thirds of the 144 capability requirements identified in the Helsinki Catalogue). Equally, at the same date, the Intergovernmental Conference will have been completed under Italy's presidency, with the obligation to adopt the new rules, institutions, and decision-making processes which will enable the larger EU to work, decide and act, including in security and defence matters.

3. Military power, but for what?

But all future developments of ESDP and CFSP will depend on the common vision that the Europeans arrive at, or not, of the proper international role of the EU, and thus on the objective and use of power. No doubt the European view and practice of power are markedly different from America's.

- The Europeans seem more convinced than the US about the structural limits of military power, and the al-Qaeda attacks have reinforced this conviction for at least two reasons: first, it is precisely because of the unquestionable US superiority in the military and technological fields that the terrorists have chosen to engage in asymmetrical warfare against the US, killing civilians and using civilian assets; the attack against the World Trade Center has been perceived in Europe as an example of the (unfortunately) successful circumvention of traditional military power. Second, despite all the new billion of dollars that the US has decided to spend to increase even more its strategic superiority, Bin Laden is reportedly still alive and the situation in the Middle East is getting worse and worse.
- Equally, dealing with "jungles" using military means alone does not seem to be the most successful strategy. The Europeans do not contest that the attack against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was necessary and maybe successful. But what about future or virtual jungles, such as the dozen or so failed states which exist in Africa, Asia, and even on the fringes of Europe? The Europeans have the feeling that they are the ones who are trying to deal with them, with their aid and development strategy, giving priority to this policy of prevention before these states become new sanctuaries for terrorist networks. Insisting on non-military means of crisis management will therefore remain one of the main European differences. "Soft" security is not an easy thing to deal with, no more, anyway, than all the "hard" wars that the US claims to be the only one to fight. And this is also a reason why the EU is so concerned by the priority the Bush administration is giving to military solutions to Iraq.

- Needless to say, the Europeans are also upset by the series of contradictions in the US obsession with military statistics when it tries to evaluate its European allies: why should the Europeans be convinced that they should increase their defence efforts if the US repeatedly shows a preference for unilateral military actions and ad hoc coalitions where they pick up ad hoc allies (and often the same ones)? How can the EU take military warfare seriously if the US proposes task-sharing in which it assigns to Europe the peacekeeping and peacebuilding burden? Moreover, the Europeans cannot but notice that every time they try to coordinate their industrial and military efforts (see the aeronautic or Galileo projects), the US launches a vigorous industrial campaign against them. Does the US really want the Europeans to fill the gap, or does it simply want the Europeans to buy American? In the same way that military power cannot be the alpha and omega of power, the military gap is not and cannot be, in European eyes, the only criterion for the future transatlantic partnership.
- Finally, and maybe most importantly, the Europeans are more concerned by the cultural gap increasing every day between themselves and their American counterpart. The so-called “transatlantic community of views” has disappeared from almost all international issues, from Iraq to the Middle East, from environmental questions to arms control, from the International Criminal Court to the status of detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, etc. Thus, the serious Euro-American debate is not between military or soft power, but between unilateralism and international law, between power and democracy. The Europeans will definitely stick to the latter.

CHANGES IN THE EUROPEAN SECURITY LANDSCAPE: A RUSSIAN VIEW

VICTOR KREMENYUK

In the process of preparing for this meeting I studied some related publications, including among them the Chaillot Paper 42 (September 2000) *European Defence: Making It Work*. A group of well known and, very possibly, the best European experts headed by François Heisbourg has done it. And it was not so much the contents of this publication that impressed me, although what was written there was good. What made me pay special attention to the subject was the title: “Making it work.” As if the authors writing about such an important subject had doubts on will it work or not.

A seemingly simple question of defence. Evidently, nations and groups of nations must defend themselves as well as the principles according to which they live. But why should one “make it work”? For me it meant that something important and sophisticated was behind it, that was understood but not said. And, while preparing a paper on what Russia can, will and should see in European security for itself, for the preservation of Europe as the source of the modern civilisation, for the global balance, I continued to ask questions: what “European defence” means in the wake of the end of the Cold War and continuing existence of NATO? Does it mean only “there is no more relevant enemy” or does it means “we should get prepared for totally different security challenges”?

And in both cases, what should Russia think about it since it lives next door to Europe, has China at its backdoor, Islamic world under the window and global USA somewhere around?

Two things are at least clear: first, to look at Russian–European relations, because so far they have not been probed at full length (and will not be probed for another decade before the whole paradigm of “Russia” and “Europe” cease to be what they have been for last 80 years) and, second, to try to put this dichotomy into a larger context of the current international system. And from there to get back to the Russia-ESDP issue.

Some Basic Facts

The whole period of the Cold War has strengthened the traditional Russian view of Western Europe as the source of vital threat. Put together, the age-old memories of European forays into Russia (Polish, Swedish, French, German) and ideological idiosyncracies as a result of the Marxist-Leninist view of Europe have produced an effect on both Russian thinking and Russian strategy, leading

to deep mistrust, suspicion and hostility. Equally, Russian forays into Europe, starting with early 18th century, have forged European mistrust and suspicions towards Russia. Anti-Communism has also worked. Both sides seemed to be doomed to eternal confrontation.

So far, nothing has happened of a magnitude that would change this tradition completely. Russia and Europe continue to be two major neighbours on the continent (added by some US presence), both have developed security strategies and capabilities and both are capable of taking short-sighted decisions which may lead to a resumption of their conflicts. Equally, they may take some decisions based on a longer-term perspective but that would be contrary to their habits and nature. At the same time, it would be fair to say that a lot has changed that may break this traditional European setting.

On the one hand, Russia has ceased to be a super-power, an "evil empire" as it was perceived by many in the West during the Cold War. It is far from having become a "democratic state" as some observers believe but it is definitely not that absolutist monolith it was under the Czars or the Commissars. It is evolving into a regional power still strong enough to deal with any enemy but at the same time weak economically and incapable of securing its domestic stability through the prosperity of its population. It vacillates between attempts to build a democracy following the standards and examples of developed nations and necessity to adhere to some sort of police regime because of shaky grounds of its political and economic systems. But, what matters from the security point of view, it has ceased to be a powerful contender for Europe in fighting for space and influence.

Equally Europe has ceased to be a traditional arena of rivalries and competition. In the economic area, it still has giants which compete for markets. It has some strong cultural differences but not of the scope and type that may be rated as "conflicts of civilisations". What matters greatly is the fact that in the political area due both to the impact of the US and demands of technology, Europe has become a more homogeneous rather than a heterogeneous entity and is moving quickly towards becoming a union. This fact has also greatly contributed to the changes in the field of security and to the relations with Russia.

So, there are evident shifts in the security landscape in the relations between Russia and Europe and it would be useful to identify, at least, two groups of issues in this respect: where do these changes go in the foreseeable perspective (5-10 years) and what impact they may have for Europe both in the EU format and in a bigger geographical dimension, i.e. including Russia.

New Developments

Much has already been said about recent changes in Europe. The evolution of European affairs in the 1990s has been studied many times and the conclusions seem sometimes suspiciously similar: first, Europe continues to move towards something which was labelled in the early 20th century as "the United States of Europe"; second, that its security agenda changes in the direction of the search of some new specifically European identity; third, that in this regard it runs into some structural problems with NATO which until recently was the pivot of European defence and security; fourth, that Europe is approaching the point of bifurcation at which it will have to decide on its relations with US, Russia, the Islamic world and China. While all these questions are in the heads of policy makers, the reality evolves around with almost no open crises or confrontations.

But, this fact and those suspiciously similar conclusions do not touch upon some really fundamental questions. Among them are included the division of labour between NATO and European defence and security policy, relevance of existing security doctrines and structures.

To begin with, NATO besides solving the issue of confronting the Soviet Union and its allies, has also played a distinguished role in keeping old European rivalries, first of all German-French, under control. To a large extent, primarily by keeping Germany "down". This was the second, if to quote Lord Eassey, task which NATO has carried out. Security policies in Europe have not become "nationalised" which helped to avoid a possible race between individual European nations. Rather, security policy was an instrument of forging cohesion among the Europeans.

Now, with the changes in relations between East and West, to what extent do these elements continue to play the role? Does it really matter under the conditions of "no more enemy" to continue the collectivist approach to security with all those huge bureaucratic structures? The policy of enlargement helps only not to answer this question but it is definitely not the answer.

Second, by virtue of a deterrent capacity in nuclear weapons, open hostilities in Europe (not counting periodical Soviet forays into the territories of its dissident allies) were a probability and never a reality. The whole security concept developed as a "possible scenario", although it has never been regarded as a subject for immediate action. Both sides – Soviet and Europeans – developed scenarios based not so much on their real doctrines but rather on the assessment of their mutual capabilities. Disregarding some impressive facts of the mutual desire to avoid hostilities (as during the Berlin wall crisis in 1961), they still pretended to believe that their official doctrines were relevant and, hence used them as basis for security planning. This has helped to the growth of a certain dichotomy in the Western security planning in the 1990s: on one side,

continuation of a "search for strategy" (war in Yugoslavia, NATO enlargement); on the other side, attempts to make security policy more relevant and closer to real world issues (ESDI).

Equally, it may be detected in the Russian security doctrine: on one hand, statement of loyalty to the nuclear deterrence, on the other – search for relevant military tasks in the conventional area. And all this through hot debates within the Russian military on the priorities and distribution of resources.

Third, Russia has ceased to be an enemy but has not become a friend. So far, there was no serious effort to evaluate this aspect. There were and are numerous propagandistic statements declaring Russia a "partner". There are meetings with Russian authorities both within NATO and EU at which sweet words are said. But in reality, as an identifiable fact Russia is kept at a distance: it is not (and will not be) invited to join NATO; it is not invited to join the EU (although there may be a change on that front). And although it has developed economic ties with some European nations, Germany and Finland in the first row, it still has only a chance to become a full member of the WTO and of some other important institutions.

And this is not simply an explosion of a Russian ego. This is a fact to be understood for further planning: distance between Russia and Europe may become a crucial element of the future relationship. If, due to different reasons, it becomes less, there is a strong hope that Russia will turn into an integral part of Europe (at least in de Gaulle's understanding: "Europe from Brest to the Urals"). If it continues to be as it is, Russia will drift away looking for partners in the East and South. Then after some time a possibility of new confrontation will come again.

Two Strategies: Where to go?

The real picture of Europe in the beginning of the 1990s was as follows. On the Western "front" no serious changes. The alliance survived the Cold War. Only a few things hinted that there may have been a profound reappraisal of the existing order: mainly the words that "there was no more enemy" which meant doubt whether the arrangement of NATO should have survived. On the Eastern "front" the changes flooded the terrain. The Warsaw Treaty disappeared. The Soviet Union collapsed. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as a substitute to the USSR was raising more questions than giving answers.

The whole concept of security in Europe collapsed. First, it was no more bloc to bloc confrontation. Second, it was no longer two hostile worlds facing each other. Third, instability and disintegration (USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia) became the obsession of the policy-makers. It was an extremely important period.

From the point of view of the Russian interest, the whole problem was revolving around a central question, what will be the role of Russia in the future European order. It ceased to be an enemy, it has demobilised its armies; it agreed to the freedom of both former Soviet allies and former Soviet republics. Now, what will be its future role in the continent where it had almost half of its legitimate interests: security, economic, cultural, social.

Abstractly, there could have been two answers to this question and two relevant strategies. One meant that Russia will be accepted by the Europeans as a full-size ally and member of the family. In essence, the situation was returned to the Geneva Conference of 1922 where the issue of ties between Russia and Europe had to be discussed and ended in isolation of Russia (which in turn turned to Rapallo Agreement with Germany which to a great extent devalued the Versailles *diktat*). Now, after almost 70 years of confrontation, the issue again has returned to the initial point: Will Europe open its company for dissident Russia and thus help it to overcome another hard period in its history or will it abstain, leaving the answer to the moment when Russia will overcome its problems by its own effort and will no more need European contribution.

The other meant that further European development will go along the way of incorporating all former Soviet allies and subjects, leaving Russia aside for some distant future. In the meantime the Central and Eastern Europe will be absorbed by Western Europe and the continent will re-unite as an anti-Russian or not-friendly-to-Russia entity. Something like traditional schemes of "Grand Armeé" strategy; Europe versus Russia.

Both strategies and approaches have a right for existence. "Europe versus Russia" is more traditional, "Europe and Russia" is less traditional and more doubtful. And, as it seems, there are the questions which loom large in the air in the current situations to which NATO has almost no answers while the ESDP may have a profound and perspective approach.

Why ESDP?

It seems strange to make such statements in the wake of NATO-Russia agreement "at 20". Formally it may seem that this idea, once put into practice, may find a solution to two different sets of issues: first, Russian-US relationship on the basis of quasi-alliance (and thus help Mr. Putin to avoid forthcoming criticism of having "sold" Russia on ABM, Caucasus, and other important issues) and, second, to install a basis for Russia-European rapprochement on security and cooperation.

But in reality the solution is much more complex and multifaceted. The NATO-Russia agreement signed in Rome has outreached the scope of traditional NATO responsibility and overshadowed in that the area of "Petersberg tasks". NATO under the strong influence of Washington has decided to pursue two different

sets of goals: on one hand, to continue the traditional NATO policy of enlargement and war preparations (in the Balkans and in the Persian Gulf) without any changes whatever the Russians say; on the other hand to borrow some ideas from the ESDP and turn them into the basis for NATO-Russia cooperation. The herald of this idea was British Prime Minister Tony Blair.

This move has permitted to try to kill two birds with one stone: to pacify Russia, to help Mr. Putin to hush his domestic critics, and to press the ESDP out from the fruitful field of security policies which it has identified as realistic, promising and capable of pulling together Europeans without necessarily alerting the Americans.

This is the area which in the Soviet times would be typically called “inter-imperialistic controversies”. In our times it may be labelled as search for security identities without separation: USA has found it in unilateralism, Europe – in ESDP, in “Petersberg tasks” which, as it happened, coincided in time with the American search of a new global enemy (China) and thus helped to the Europeans to understand that they needed a distinct security policy which will not drag them into unnecessary conflicts. Both efforts, unilateralism and ESDP were directed towards Russia. What role it could play if it moves towards Europeans and absorbs their format? Evidently, there will be a highly promising entity where both Europe and Russia could largely help each other without asking assistance from Washington. Cooperation between the two ‘Petersberg subjects’ will help to solve challenges to the European security and leave the USA to its own global tasks.

What would happen if Russia responds to the “at 20” idea and absorbs US embraces? Evidently, US would strengthen its inclination to deploy NMD, to act unilaterally in crisis zones (Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, Central Asia, India-Pakistan) leaving thus Europe to its narrow margin. In a way the situation is unique and unforeseen. Both transatlantic allies have given to Russia the key to their relationship in security area. All three actors are in a sort of stalemate. Neither the US nor Europe wanted it. Russia did not expect it.

What Russia could have done if finally it grasps the situation and tries to use it for its benefit?

First, it may think of some sort of “triangular” relationship putting all the three in the area where they can be indeed useful to each other and thus serve its great-power status in Europe, in CIS, in Asia, in relations with both India and China. Second, it may go further and try to sort out areas of cooperation which may help both to its own security and to its economic reform through new investment into the Russian defence and space industries. Third, it may even think of playing a certain role between the two strategic allies, lubricating or, on the contrary, exploiting their differences. Finally, fourth, it may think of a sort of

“triumvirate” in other areas: Mediterranean and Balkans, Middle East and the Persian Gulf, the Indian subcontinent.

In any way the security landscape in Europe and in the neighbouring areas changes. It is not that threatening, it has much less challenges to the all-European order. But it exists and may hit Europeans into their weakest points: terrorism, proliferation of weapon of mass destruction, other similar tasks. They will not be of the scope which will necessarily demand the US involvement but may still be an overburden for European security efforts if not accompanied by Russian participation.

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POWER AND WEAKNESS*

ROBERT KAGAN

It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world. On the all-important question of power — the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the desirability of power — American and European perspectives are diverging. Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a little differently, it is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Kant’s “Perpetual Peace.” The United States, meanwhile, remains mired in history, exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might. That is why on major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: They agree on little and understand one another less and less. And this state of affairs is not transitory — the product of one American election or one catastrophic event. The reasons for the transatlantic divide are deep, long in development, and likely to endure. When it comes to setting national priorities, determining threats, defining challenges, and fashioning and implementing foreign and defense policies, the United States and Europe have parted ways.

It is easier to see the contrast as an American living in Europe. Europeans are more conscious of the growing differences, perhaps because they fear them more. European intellectuals are nearly unanimous in the conviction that Americans and Europeans no longer share a common “strategic culture.” The European caricature at its most extreme depicts an America dominated by a “culture of death,” its warlike temperament the natural product of a violent society where every man has a gun and the death penalty reigns. But even those who do not make this crude link agree there are profound differences in the way the United States and Europe conduct foreign policy.

The United States, they argue, resorts to force more quickly and, compared with Europe, is less patient with diplomacy. Americans generally see the world divided between good and evil, between friends and enemies, while Europeans see a more complex picture. When confronting real or potential adversaries, Americans generally favor policies of coercion rather than persuasion,

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emphasizing punitive sanctions over inducements to better behavior, the stick over the carrot. Americans tend to seek finality in international affairs: They want problems solved, threats eliminated. And, of course, Americans increasingly tend toward unilateralism in international affairs. They are less inclined to act through international institutions such as the United Nations, less inclined to work cooperatively with other nations to pursue common goals, more skeptical about international law, and more willing to operate outside its strictures when they deem it necessary, or even merely useful.¹

Europeans insist they approach problems with greater nuance and sophistication. They try to influence others through subtlety and indirection. They are more tolerant of failure, more patient when solutions don't come quickly. They generally favor peaceful responses to problems, preferring negotiation, diplomacy, and persuasion to coercion. They are quicker to appeal to international law, international conventions, and international opinion to adjudicate disputes. They try to use commercial and economic ties to bind nations together. They often emphasize process over result, believing that ultimately process can become substance.

This European dual portrait is a caricature, of course, with its share of exaggerations and oversimplifications. One cannot generalize about Europeans: Britons may have a more "American" view of power than many of their fellow Europeans on the continent. And there are differing perspectives within nations on both sides of the Atlantic. In the U.S., Democrats often seem more "European" than Republicans; Secretary of State Colin Powell may appear more "European" than Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Many Americans, especially among the intellectual elite, are as uncomfortable with the "hard" quality of American foreign policy as any European; and some Europeans value power as much as any American.

Nevertheless, the caricatures do capture an essential truth: The United States and Europe are fundamentally different today. Powell and Rumsfeld have more in common than do Powell and Hubert Védrine or even Jack Straw. When it comes to the use of force, mainstream American Democrats have more in common with Republicans than they do with most European Socialists and Social Democrats. During the 1990s even American liberals were more willing to resort to force and were more Manichean in their perception of the world than most of their European counterparts. The Clinton administration bombed Iraq, as

¹ One representative French observer describes "a U.S. mindset" that "tends to emphasize military, technical and unilateral solutions to international problems, possibly at the expense of co-operative and political ones." See Gilles Andreani, "The Disarray of U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy," *Survival* (Winter 1999-2000).

well as Afghanistan and Sudan. European governments, it is safe to say, would not have done so. Whether they would have bombed even Belgrade in 1999, had the U.S. not forced their hand, is an interesting question.²

What is the source of these differing strategic perspectives? The question has received too little attention in recent years, either because foreign policy intellectuals and policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic have denied the existence of a genuine difference or because those who have pointed to the difference, especially in Europe, have been more interested in assailing the United States than in understanding why the United States acts as it does—or, for that matter, why Europe acts as it does. It is past time to move beyond the denial and the insults and to face the problem head-on.

Despite what many Europeans and some Americans believe, these differences in strategic culture do not spring naturally from the national characters of Americans and Europeans. After all, what Europeans now consider their more peaceful strategic culture is, historically speaking, quite new. It represents an evolution away from the very different strategic culture that dominated Europe for hundreds of years and at least until World War I. The European governments—and peoples—who enthusiastically launched themselves into that continental war believed in *machtpolitik*. While the roots of the present European worldview, like the roots of the European Union itself, can be traced back to the Enlightenment, Europe's great-power politics for the past 300 years did not follow the visionary designs of the philosophes and the physiocrats.

As for the United States, there is nothing timeless about the present heavy reliance on force as a tool of international relations, nor about the tilt toward unilateralism and away from a devotion to international law. Americans are children of the Enlightenment, too, and in the early years of the republic were more faithful apostles of its creed. America's eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century statesmen sounded much like the European statesmen of today, extolling the virtues of commerce as the soothing balm of international strife and appealing to international law and international opinion over brute force. The young United States wielded power against weaker peoples on the North American continent, but when it came to dealing with the European giants, it

² The case of Bosnia in the early 1990s stands out as an instance where some Europeans, chiefly British Prime Minister Tony Blair, were at times more forceful in advocating military action than first the Bush and then the Clinton administration. (Blair was also an early advocate of using air power and even ground troops in the Kosovo crisis.) And Europeans had forces on the ground in Bosnia when the United States did not, although in a un peacekeeping role that proved ineffective when challenged.

claimed to abjure power and assailed as atavistic the power politics of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European empires.

Two centuries later, Americans and Europeans have traded places — and perspectives. Partly this is because in those 200 years, but especially in recent decades, the power equation has shifted dramatically: When the United States was weak, it practiced the strategies of indirection, the strategies of weakness; now that the United States is powerful, it behaves as powerful nations do. When the European great powers were strong, they believed in strength and martial glory. Now, they see the world through the eyes of weaker powers. These very different points of view, weak versus strong, have naturally produced differing strategic judgments, differing assessments of threats and of the proper means of addressing threats, and even differing calculations of interest.

But this is only part of the answer. For along with these natural consequences of the transatlantic power gap, there has also opened a broad ideological gap. Europe, because of its unique historical experience of the past half-century — culminating in the past decade with the creation of the European Union — has developed a set of ideals and principles regarding the utility and morality of power different from the ideals and principles of Americans, who have not shared that experience. If the strategic chasm between the United States and Europe appears greater than ever today, and grows still wider at a worrying pace, it is because these material and ideological differences reinforce one another. The divisive trend they together produce may be impossible to reverse.

The power gap: perception and reality

Europe has been militarily weak for a long time, but until fairly recently its weakness had been obscured. World War II all but destroyed European nations as global powers, and their postwar inability to project sufficient force overseas to maintain colonial empires in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East forced them to retreat on a massive scale after more than five centuries of imperial dominance — perhaps the most significant retrenchment of global influence in human history. For a half-century after World War II, however, this weakness was masked by the unique geopolitical circumstances of the Cold War. Dwarfed by the two superpowers on its flanks, a weakened Europe nevertheless served as the central strategic theater of the worldwide struggle between communism and democratic capitalism. Its sole but vital strategic mission was to defend its own territory against any Soviet offensive, at least until the Americans arrived. Although shorn of most traditional measures of great-power status, Europe remained the geopolitical pivot, and this, along with lingering habits of world leadership, allowed Europeans to retain international influence well beyond what their sheer military capabilities might have afforded.

Europe lost this strategic centrality after the Cold War ended, but it took a few more years for the lingering mirage of European global power to fade. During the 1990s, war in the Balkans kept both Europeans and Americans focused on the strategic importance of the continent and on the continuing relevance of nato. The enlargement of nato to include former Warsaw Pact nations and the consolidation of the Cold War victory kept Europe in the forefront of the strategic discussion.

Then there was the early promise of the “new Europe.” By bonding together into a single political and economic unit — the historic accomplishment of the Maastricht treaty in 1992 — many hoped to recapture Europe’s old greatness but in a new political form. “Europe” would be the next superpower, not only economically and politically, but also militarily. It would handle crises on the European continent, such as the ethnic conflicts in the Balkans, and it would re-emerge as a global player. In the 1990s Europeans could confidently assert that the power of a unified Europe would restore, finally, the global “multipolarity” that had been destroyed by the Cold War and its aftermath. And most Americans, with mixed emotions, agreed that superpower Europe was the future. Harvard University’s Samuel P. Huntington predicted that the coalescing of the European Union would be “the single most important move” in a worldwide reaction against American hegemony and would produce a “truly multipolar” twenty-first century.³

But European pretensions and American apprehensions proved unfounded. The 1990s witnessed not the rise of a European superpower but the decline of Europe into relative weakness. The Balkan conflict at the beginning of the decade revealed European military incapacity and political disarray; the Kosovo conflict at decade’s end exposed a transatlantic gap in military technology and the ability to wage modern warfare that would only widen in subsequent years. Outside of Europe, the disparity by the close of the 1990s was even more starkly apparent as it became clear that the ability of European powers, individually or collectively, to project decisive force into regions of conflict beyond the continent was negligible. Europeans could provide peacekeeping forces in the Balkans — indeed, they could and eventually did provide the vast bulk of those forces in Bosnia and Kosovo. But they lacked the wherewithal to introduce and sustain a fighting force in potentially hostile territory, even in Europe. Under the best of circumstances, the European role was limited to filling out peacekeeping forces after the United States had, largely on its own, carried out the decisive phases of a military mission and stabilized the situation. As some Europeans put

³ Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” *Foreign Affairs* (March-April 1999).

it, the real division of labor consisted of the United States “making the dinner” and the Europeans “doing the dishes.”

This inadequacy should have come as no surprise, since these were the limitations that had forced Europe to retract its global influence in the first place. Those Americans and Europeans who proposed that Europe expand its strategic role beyond the continent set an unreasonable goal. During the Cold War, Europe’s strategic role had been to defend itself. It was unrealistic to expect a return to international great-power status, unless European peoples were willing to shift significant resources from social programs to military programs.

Clearly they were not. Not only were Europeans unwilling to pay to project force beyond Europe. After the Cold War, they would not pay for sufficient force to conduct even minor military actions on the continent without American help. Nor did it seem to matter whether European publics were being asked to spend money to strengthen nato or an independent European foreign and defense policy. Their answer was the same. Rather than viewing the collapse of the Soviet Union as an opportunity to flex global muscles, Europeans took it as an opportunity to cash in on a sizable peace dividend. Average European defense budgets gradually fell below 2 percent of gdp. Despite talk of establishing Europe as a global superpower, therefore, European military capabilities steadily fell behind those of the United States throughout the 1990s.

The end of the Cold War had a very different effect on the other side of the Atlantic. For although Americans looked for a peace dividend, too, and defense budgets declined or remained flat during most of the 1990s, defense spending still remained above 3 percent of gdp. Fast on the heels of the Soviet empire’s demise came Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the largest American military action in a quarter-century. Thereafter American administrations cut the Cold War force, but not as dramatically as might have been expected. By historical standards, America’s military power and particularly its ability to project that power to all corners of the globe remained unprecedented.

Meanwhile, the very fact of the Soviet empire’s collapse vastly increased America’s strength relative to the rest of the world. The sizable American military arsenal, once barely sufficient to balance Soviet power, was now deployed in a world without a single formidable adversary. This “unipolar moment” had an entirely natural and predictable consequence: It made the United States more willing to use force abroad. With the check of Soviet power removed, the United States was free to intervene practically wherever and whenever it chose — a fact reflected in the proliferation of overseas military interventions that began during the first Bush administration with the invasion of Panama in 1989, the Persian Gulf War in 1991, and the humanitarian intervention in Somalia in 1992, continuing during the Clinton years with interventions in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. While American politicians talked

of pulling back from the world, the reality was an America intervening abroad more frequently than it had throughout most of the Cold War. Thanks to new technologies, the United States was also freer to use force around the world in more limited ways through air and missile strikes, which it did with increasing frequency.

How could this growing transatlantic power gap fail to create a difference in strategic perceptions? Even during the Cold War, American military predominance and Europe's relative weakness had produced important and sometimes serious disagreements. Gaullism, Ostpolitik, and the various movements for European independence and unity were manifestations not only of a European desire for honor and freedom of action. They also reflected a European conviction that America's approach to the Cold War was too confrontational, too militaristic, and too dangerous. Europeans believed they knew better how to deal with the Soviets: through engagement and seduction, through commercial and political ties, through patience and forbearance. It was a legitimate view, shared by many Americans. But it also reflected Europe's weakness relative to the United States, the fewer military options at Europe's disposal, and its greater vulnerability to a powerful Soviet Union. It may have reflected, too, Europe's memory of continental war. Americans, when they were not themselves engaged in the subtleties of *détente*, viewed the European approach as a form of appeasement, a return to the fearful mentality of the 1930s. But appeasement is never a dirty word to those whose genuine weakness offers few appealing alternatives. For them, it is a policy of sophistication.

The end of the Cold War, by widening the power gap, exacerbated the disagreements. Although transatlantic tensions are now widely assumed to have begun with the inauguration of George W. Bush in January 2001, they were already evident during the Clinton administration and may even be traced back to the administration of George H.W. Bush. By 1992, mutual recriminations were rife over Bosnia, where the United States refused to act and Europe could not act. It was during the Clinton years that Europeans began complaining about being lectured by the "hectoring hegemon." This was also the period in which Védérine coined the term *hyperpuissance* to describe an American behemoth too worryingly powerful to be designated merely a superpower. (Perhaps he was responding to then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's insistence that the United States was the world's "indispensable nation.") It was also during the 1990s that the transatlantic disagreement over American plans for missile defense emerged and many Europeans began grumbling about the American propensity to choose force and punishment over diplomacy and persuasion.

The Clinton administration, meanwhile, though relatively timid and restrained itself, grew angry and impatient with European timidity, especially the unwillingness to confront Saddam Hussein. The split in the alliance over Iraq

didn't begin with the 2000 election but in 1997, when the Clinton administration tried to increase the pressure on Baghdad and found itself at odds with France and (to a lesser extent) Great Britain in the United Nations Security Council. Even the war in Kosovo was marked by nervousness among some allies — especially Italy, Greece, and Germany — that the United States was too uncompromisingly militaristic in its approach. And while Europeans and Americans ultimately stood together in the confrontation with Belgrade, the Kosovo war produced in Europe less satisfaction at the successful prosecution of the war than unease at America's apparent omnipotence. That apprehension would only increase in the wake of American military action after September 11, 2001.

The psychology of power and weakness

Today's transatlantic problem, in short, is not a George Bush problem. It is a power problem. American military strength has produced a propensity to use that strength. Europe's military weakness has produced a perfectly understandable aversion to the exercise of military power. Indeed, it has produced a powerful European interest in inhabiting a world where strength doesn't matter, where international law and international institutions predominate, where unilateral action by powerful nations is forbidden, where all nations regardless of their strength have equal rights and are equally protected by commonly agreed-upon international rules of behavior. Europeans have a deep interest in devaluing and eventually eradicating the brutal laws of an anarchic, Hobbesian world where power is the ultimate determinant of national security and success.

This is no reproach. It is what weaker powers have wanted from time immemorial. It was what Americans wanted in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when the brutality of a European system of power politics run by the global giants of France, Britain, and Russia left Americans constantly vulnerable to imperial thrashing. It was what the other small powers of Europe wanted in those years, too, only to be sneered at by Bourbon kings and other powerful monarchs, who spoke instead of *raison d'état*. The great proponent of international law on the high seas in the eighteenth century was the United States; the great opponent was Britain's navy, the "Mistress of the Seas." In an anarchic world, small powers always fear they will be victims. Great powers, on the other hand, often fear rules that may constrain them more than they fear the anarchy in which their power brings security and prosperity.

This natural and historic disagreement between the stronger and the weaker manifests itself in today's transatlantic dispute over the question of unilateralism. Europeans generally believe their objection to American unilateralism is proof of their greater commitment to certain ideals concerning

world order. They are less willing to acknowledge that their hostility to unilateralism is also self-interested. Europeans fear American unilateralism. They fear it perpetuates a Hobbesian world in which they may become increasingly vulnerable. The United States may be a relatively benign hegemon, but insofar as its actions delay the arrival of a world order more conducive to the safety of weaker powers, it is objectively dangerous.

This is one reason why in recent years a principal objective of European foreign policy has become, as one European observer puts it, the “multilateralising” of the United States.⁴ It is not that Europeans are teaming up against the American hegemon, as Huntington and many realist theorists would have it, by creating a countervailing power. After all, Europeans are not increasing their power. Their tactics, like their goal, are the tactics of the weak. They hope to constrain American power without wielding power themselves. In what may be the ultimate feat of subtlety and indirection, they want to control the behemoth by appealing to its conscience.

It is a sound strategy, as far as it goes. The United States is a behemoth with a conscience. It is not Louis xiv’s France or George iii’s England. Americans do not argue, even to themselves, that their actions may be justified by *raison d’état*. Americans have never accepted the principles of Europe’s old order, never embraced the Machiavellian perspective. The United States is a liberal, progressive society through and through, and to the extent that Americans believe in power, they believe it must be a means of advancing the principles of a liberal civilization and a liberal world order. Americans even share Europe’s aspirations for a more orderly world system based not on power but on rules — after all, they were striving for such a world when Europeans were still extolling the laws of *machtpolitik*.

But while these common ideals and aspirations shape foreign policies on both sides of the Atlantic, they cannot completely negate the very different perspectives from which Europeans and Americans view the world and the role of power in international affairs. Europeans oppose unilateralism in part because they have no capacity for unilateralism. Polls consistently show that Americans support multilateral action in principle — they even support acting under the rubric of the United Nations — but the fact remains that the United States can act unilaterally, and has done so many times with reasonable success. For Europeans, the appeal to multilateralism and international law has a real practical payoff and little cost. For Americans, who stand to lose at least some

⁴ Steven Everts, “Unilateral America, Lightweight Europe?: Managing Divergence in Transatlantic Foreign Policy,” Centre for European Reform working paper (February 2001).

freedom of action, support for universal rules of behavior really is a matter of idealism.

Even when Americans and Europeans can agree on the kind of world order they would strive to build, however, they increasingly disagree about what constitutes a threat to that international endeavor. Indeed, Europeans and Americans differ most these days in their evaluation of what constitutes a tolerable versus an intolerable threat. This, too, is consistent with the disparity of power.

Europeans often argue that Americans have an unreasonable demand for “perfect” security, the product of living for centuries shielded behind two oceans.⁵ Europeans claim they know what it is like to live with danger, to exist side-by-side with evil, since they’ve done it for centuries. Hence their greater tolerance for such threats as may be posed by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq or the ayatollahs’ Iran. Americans, they claim, make far too much of the dangers these regimes pose.

Even before September 11, this argument rang a bit hollow. The United States in its formative decades lived in a state of substantial insecurity, surrounded by hostile European empires, at constant risk of being torn apart by centrifugal forces that were encouraged by threats from without: National insecurity formed the core of Washington’s Farewell Address. As for the Europeans’ supposed tolerance for insecurity and evil, it can be overstated. For the better part of three centuries, European Catholics and Protestants more often preferred to kill than to tolerate each other; nor have the past two centuries shown all that much mutual tolerance between Frenchmen and Germans.

Some Europeans argue that precisely because Europe has suffered so much, it has a higher tolerance for suffering than America and therefore a higher tolerance for threats. More likely the opposite is true. The memory of their horrendous suffering in World War I made the British and French publics more fearful of Nazi Germany, not more tolerant, and this attitude contributed significantly to the appeasement of the 1930s.

A better explanation of Europe’s greater tolerance for threats is, once again, Europe’s relative weakness. Tolerance is also very much a realistic response in that Europe, precisely because it is weak, actually faces fewer threats than the far more powerful United States.

The psychology of weakness is easy enough to understand. A man armed only with a knife may decide that a bear prowling the forest is a tolerable danger, inasmuch as the alternative — hunting the bear armed only with a knife — is actually riskier than lying low and hoping the bear never attacks. The same man

⁵ For that matter, this is also the view commonly found in American textbooks.

armed with a rifle, however, will likely make a different calculation of what constitutes a tolerable risk. Why should he risk being mauled to death if he doesn't need to?

This perfectly normal human psychology is helping to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe today. Europeans have concluded, reasonably enough, that the threat posed by Saddam Hussein is more tolerable for them than the risk of removing him. But Americans, being stronger, have reasonably enough developed a lower threshold of tolerance for Saddam and his weapons of mass destruction, especially after September 11. Europeans like to say that Americans are obsessed with fixing problems, but it is generally true that those with a greater capacity to fix problems are more likely to try to fix them than those who have no such capability. Americans can imagine successfully invading Iraq and toppling Saddam, and therefore more than 70 percent of Americans apparently favor such action. Europeans, not surprisingly, find the prospect both unimaginable and frightening.

The incapacity to respond to threats leads not only to tolerance but sometimes to denial. It's normal to try to put out of one's mind that which one can do nothing about. According to one student of European opinion, even the very focus on "threats" differentiates American policymakers from their European counterparts. Americans, writes Steven Everts, talk about foreign "threats" such as "the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and 'rogue states.'" But Europeans look at "challenges," such as "ethnic conflict, migration, organized crime, poverty and environmental degradation." As Everts notes, however, the key difference is less a matter of culture and philosophy than of capability. Europeans "are most worried about issues . . . that have a greater chance of being solved by political engagement and huge sums of money." In other words, Europeans focus on issues — "challenges" — where European strengths come into play but not on those "threats" where European weakness makes solutions elusive. If Europe's strategic culture today places less value on power and military strength and more value on such soft-power tools as economics and trade, isn't it partly because Europe is militarily weak and economically strong? Americans are quicker to acknowledge the existence of threats, even to perceive them where others may not see any, because they can conceive of doing something to meet those threats.

The differing threat perceptions in the United States and Europe are not just matters of psychology, however. They are also grounded in a practical reality that is another product of the disparity of power. For Iraq and other "rogue" states objectively do not pose the same level of threat to Europeans as they do to the United States. There is, first of all, the American security guarantee that Europeans enjoy and have enjoyed for six decades, ever since the United States took upon itself the burden of maintaining order in far-flung regions of the

world — from the Korean Peninsula to the Persian Gulf — from which European power had largely withdrawn. Europeans generally believe, whether or not they admit it to themselves, that were Iraq ever to emerge as a real and present danger, as opposed to merely a potential danger, then the United States would do something about it — as it did in 1991. If during the Cold War Europe by necessity made a major contribution to its own defense, today Europeans enjoy an unparalleled measure of “free security” because most of the likely threats are in regions outside Europe, where only the United States can project effective force. In a very practical sense — that is, when it comes to actual strategic planning — neither Iraq nor Iran nor North Korea nor any other “rogue” state in the world is primarily a European problem. Nor, certainly, is China. Both Europeans and Americans agree that these are primarily American problems.

This is why Saddam Hussein is not as great a threat to Europe as he is to the United States. He would be a greater threat to the United States even were the Americans and Europeans in complete agreement on Iraq policy, because it is the logical consequence of the transatlantic disparity of power. The task of containing Saddam Hussein belongs primarily to the United States, not to Europe, and everyone agrees on this⁶ — including Saddam, which is why he considers the United States, not Europe, his principal adversary. In the Persian Gulf, in the Middle East, and in most other regions of the world (including Europe), the United States plays the role of ultimate enforcer. “You are so powerful,” Europeans often say to Americans. “So why do you feel so threatened?” But it is precisely America’s great power that makes it the primary target, and often the only target. Europeans are understandably content that it should remain so.

Americans are “cowboys,” Europeans love to say. And there is truth in this. The United States does act as an international sheriff, self-appointed perhaps but widely welcomed nevertheless, trying to enforce some peace and justice in what Americans see as a lawless world where outlaws need to be deterred or destroyed, and often through the muzzle of a gun. Europe, by this old West analogy, is more like a saloonkeeper. Outlaws shoot sheriffs, not saloonkeepers. In fact, from the saloonkeeper’s point of view, the sheriff trying to impose order by force can sometimes be more threatening than the outlaws who, at least for the time being, may just want a drink.

When Europeans took to the streets by the millions after September 11, most Americans believed it was out of a sense of shared danger and common interest: The Europeans knew they could be next. But Europeans by and large did not

⁶ Notwithstanding the British contribution of patrols of the “no-fly zone.”

feel that way and still don't. Europeans do not really believe they are next. They may be secondary targets — because they are allied with the U.S. — but they are not the primary target, because they no longer play the imperial role in the Middle East that might have engendered the same antagonism against them as is aimed at the United States. When Europeans wept and waved American flags after September 11, it was out of genuine human sympathy, sorrow, and affection for Americans. For better or for worse, European displays of solidarity were a product more of fellow-feeling than self-interest.

The origins of modern European foreign policy

Important as the power gap may be in shaping the respective strategic cultures of the United States and Europe, it is only one part of the story. Europe in the past half-century has developed a genuinely different perspective on the role of power in international relations, a perspective that springs directly from its unique historical experience since the end of World War II. It is a perspective that Americans do not share and cannot share, inasmuch as the formative historical experiences on their side of the Atlantic have not been the same.

Consider again the qualities that make up the European strategic culture: the emphasis on negotiation, diplomacy, and commercial ties, on international law over the use of force, on seduction over coercion, on multilateralism over unilateralism. It is true that these are not traditionally European approaches to international relations when viewed from a long historical perspective. But they are a product of more recent European history. The modern European strategic culture represents a conscious rejection of the European past, a rejection of the evils of European *machtpolitik*. It is a reflection of Europeans' ardent and understandable desire never to return to that past. Who knows better than Europeans the dangers that arise from unbridled power politics, from an excessive reliance on military force, from policies produced by national egoism and ambition, even from balance of power and *raison d'état*? As German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer put it in a speech outlining his vision of the European future at Humboldt University in Berlin (May 12, 2000), "The core of the concept of Europe after 1945 was and still is a rejection of the European balance-of-power principle and the hegemonic ambitions of individual states that had emerged following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648." The European Union is itself the product of an awful century of European warfare.

Of course, it was the "hegemonic ambitions" of one nation in particular that European integration was meant to contain. And it is the integration and taming of Germany that is the great accomplishment of Europe — viewed historically, perhaps the greatest feat of international politics ever achieved. Some Europeans recall, as Fischer does, the central role played by the United States in solving the "German problem." Fewer like to recall that the military destruction of Nazi

Germany was the prerequisite for the European peace that followed. Most Europeans believe that it was the transformation of European politics, the deliberate abandonment and rejection of centuries of *machtpolitik*, that in the end made possible the “new order.” The Europeans, who invented power politics, turned themselves into born-again idealists by an act of will, leaving behind them what Fischer called “the old system of balance with its continued national orientation, constraints of coalition, traditional interest-led politics and the permanent danger of nationalist ideologies and confrontations.”

Fischer stands near one end of the spectrum of European idealism. But this is not really a right-left issue in Europe. Fischer’s principal contention — that Europe has moved beyond the old system of power politics and discovered a new system for preserving peace in international relations — is widely shared across Europe. As senior British diplomat Robert Cooper recently wrote in the *Observer* (April 7, 2002), Europe today lives in a “postmodern system” that does not rest on a balance of power but on “the rejection of force” and on “self-enforced rules of behavior.” In the “postmodern world,” writes Cooper, “raison d’état and the amorality of Machiavelli’s theories of statecraft have been replaced by a moral consciousness” in international affairs.

American realists might scoff at this idealism. George F. Kennan assumed only his naïve fellow Americans succumbed to such “Wilsonian” legalistic and moralistic fancies, not those war-tested, historically minded European Machiavels. But, really, why shouldn’t Europeans be idealistic about international affairs, at least as they are conducted in Europe’s “postmodern system”? Within the confines of Europe, the age-old laws of international relations have been repealed. Europeans have stepped out of the Hobbesian world of anarchy into the Kantian world of perpetual peace. European life during the more than five decades since the end of World War II has been shaped not by the brutal laws of power politics but by the unfolding of a geopolitical fantasy, a miracle of world-historical importance: The German lion has laid down with the French lamb. The conflict that ravaged Europe ever since the violent birth of Germany in the nineteenth century has been put to rest.

The means by which this miracle has been achieved have understandably acquired something of a sacred mystique for Europeans, especially since the end of the Cold War. Diplomacy, negotiations, patience, the forging of economic ties, political engagement, the use of inducements rather than sanctions, the taking of small steps and tempering ambitions for success — these were the tools of Franco-German rapprochement and hence the tools that made European integration possible. Integration was not to be based on military deterrence or the balance of power. Quite the contrary. The miracle came from the rejection of military power and of its utility as an instrument of international affairs — at least within the confines of Europe. During the Cold War, few Europeans

doubted the need for military power to deter the Soviet Union. But within Europe the rules were different.

Collective security was provided from without, meanwhile, by the *deus ex machina* of the United States operating through the military structures of nato. Within this wall of security, Europeans pursued their new order, freed from the brutal laws and even the mentality of power politics. This evolution from the old to the new began in Europe during the Cold War. But the end of the Cold War, by removing even the external danger of the Soviet Union, allowed Europe's new order, and its new idealism, to blossom fully. Freed from the requirements of any military deterrence, internal or external, Europeans became still more confident that their way of settling international problems now had universal application.

"The genius of the founding fathers," European Commission President Romano Prodi commented in a speech at the Institute d'Etudes Politiques in Paris (May 29, 2001), "lay in translating extremely high political ambitions into a series of more specific, almost technical decisions. This indirect approach made further action possible. Rapprochement took place gradually. From confrontation we moved to willingness to cooperate in the economic sphere and then on to integration." This is what many Europeans believe they have to offer the world: not power, but the transcendence of power. The "essence" of the European Union, writes Everts, is "all about subjecting inter-state relations to the rule of law," and Europe's experience of successful multilateral governance has in turn produced an ambition to convert the world. Europe "has a role to play in world 'governance,'" says Prodi, a role based on replicating the European experience on a global scale. In Europe "the rule of law has replaced the crude interplay of power . . . power politics have lost their influence." And by "making a success of integration we are demonstrating to the world that it is possible to create a method for peace."

No doubt there are Britons, Germans, French, and others who would frown on such exuberant idealism. But many Europeans, including many in positions of power, routinely apply Europe's experience to the rest of the world. For is not the general European critique of the American approach to "rogue" regimes based on this special European insight? Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya — these states may be dangerous and unpleasant, even evil. But might not an "indirect approach" work again, as it did in Europe? Might it not be possible once more to move from confrontation to rapprochement, beginning with cooperation in the economic sphere and then moving on to peaceful integration? Could not the formula that worked in Europe work again with Iran or even Iraq? A great many Europeans insist that it can.

The transmission of the European miracle to the rest of the world has become Europe's new mission *civilisatrice*. Just as Americans have always believed that

they had discovered the secret to human happiness and wished to export it to the rest of the world, so the Europeans have a new mission born of their own discovery of perpetual peace.

Thus we arrive at what may be the most important reason for the divergence in views between Europe and the United States. America's power, and its willingness to exercise that power — unilaterally if necessary — represents a threat to Europe's new sense of mission. Perhaps the greatest threat. American policymakers find it hard to believe, but leading officials and politicians in Europe worry more about how the United States might handle or mishandle the problem of Iraq — by undertaking unilateral and extralegal military action — than they worry about Iraq itself and Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction. And while it is true that they fear such action might destabilize the Middle East and lead to the unnecessary loss of life, there is a deeper concern.⁷ Such American action represents an assault on the essence of "postmodern" Europe. It is an assault on Europe's new ideals, a denial of their universal validity, much as the monarchies of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe were an assault on American republican ideals. Americans ought to be the first to understand that a threat to one's beliefs can be as frightening as a threat to one's physical security.

As Americans have for two centuries, Europeans speak with great confidence of the superiority of their global understanding, the wisdom they have to offer other nations about conflict resolution, and their way of addressing international problems. But just as in the first decade of the American republic, there is a hint of insecurity in the European claim to "success," an evident need to have their success affirmed and their views accepted by other nations, particularly by the mighty United States. After all, to deny the validity of the new European idealism is to raise profound doubts about the viability of the European project. If international problems cannot, in fact, be settled the European way, wouldn't that suggest that Europe itself may eventually fall short of a solution, with all the horrors this implies?

And, of course, it is precisely this fear that still hangs over Europeans, even as Europe moves forward. Europeans, and particularly the French and Germans, are not entirely sure that the problem once known as the "German problem"

⁷ The common American argument that European policy toward Iraq and Iran is dictated by financial considerations is only partly right. Are Europeans greedier than Americans? Do American corporations not influence American policy in Asia and Latin America, as well as in the Middle East? The difference is that American strategic judgments sometimes conflict with and override financial interests. For the reasons suggested in this essay, that conflict is much less common for Europeans.

really has been solved. As their various and often very different proposals for the future constitution of Europe suggest, the French are still not confident they can trust the Germans, and the Germans are still not sure they can trust themselves. This fear can at times hinder progress toward deeper integration, but it also propels the European project forward despite innumerable obstacles. The European project must succeed, for how else to overcome what Fischer, in his Humboldt University speech, called “the risks and temptations objectively inherent in Germany’s dimensions and central situation”? Those historic German “temptations” play at the back of many a European mind. And every time Europe contemplates the use of military force, or is forced to do so by the United States, there is no avoiding at least momentary consideration of what effect such a military action might have on the “German question.”

Perhaps it is not just coincidence that the amazing progress toward European integration in recent years has been accompanied not by the emergence of a European superpower but, on the contrary, by a diminishing of European military capabilities relative to the United States. Turning Europe into a global superpower capable of balancing the power of the United States may have been one of the original selling points of the European Union — an independent European foreign and defense policy was supposed to be one of the most important byproducts of European integration. But, in truth, the ambition for European “power” is something of an anachronism. It is an atavistic impulse, inconsistent with the ideals of postmodern Europe, whose very existence depends on the rejection of power politics. Whatever its architects may have intended, European integration has proved to be the enemy of European military power and, indeed, of an important European global role.

This phenomenon has manifested itself not only in flat or declining European defense budgets, but in other ways, too, even in the realm of “soft” power. European leaders talk of Europe’s essential role in the world. Prodi yearns “to make our voice heard, to make our actions count.” And it is true that Europeans spend a great deal of money on foreign aid — more per capita, they like to point out, than does the United States. Europeans engage in overseas military missions, so long as the missions are mostly limited to peacekeeping. But while the eu periodically dips its fingers into troubled international waters in the Middle East or the Korean Peninsula, the truth is that eu foreign policy is probably the most anemic of all the products of European integration. As Charles Grant, a sympathetic observer of the eu, recently noted, few European leaders “are giving it much time or energy.”⁸ eu foreign policy initiatives tend to

⁸ Charles Grant, “A European View of ESDP,” Centre for European Policy Studies working paper (April 2001).

be short-lived and are rarely backed by sustained agreement on the part of the various European powers. That is one reason they are so easily rebuffed, as was the case in late March when Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon blocked eu foreign policy chief Javier Solana from meeting with Yasser Arafat (only to turn around the next day and allow a much lower-ranking American negotiator to meet with the Palestinian leader).

It is obvious, moreover, that issues outside of Europe don't attract nearly as much interest among Europeans as purely European issues do. This has surprised and frustrated Americans on all sides of the political and strategic debate: Recall the profound disappointment of American liberals when Europeans failed to mount an effective protest against Bush's withdrawal from the abm treaty. But given the enormous and difficult agenda of integration, this European tendency to look inward is understandable. eu enlargement, the revision of the common economic and agricultural policies, the question of national sovereignty versus supranational governance, the so-called democracy deficit, the jostling of the large European powers, the dissatisfaction of the smaller powers, the establishment of a new European constitution — all of these present serious and unavoidable challenges. The difficulties of moving forward might seem insuperable were it not for the progress the project of European integration has already demonstrated.

American policies that are unwelcome on substance — on a missile defense system and the abm treaty, belligerence toward Iraq, support for Israel — are all the more unwelcome because for Europe, they are a distraction. Europeans often point to American insularity and parochialism. But Europeans themselves have turned intensely introspective. As Dominique Moisi noted in the *Financial Times* (March 11, 2002), the recent French presidential campaign saw “no reference . . . to the events of September 11 and their far-reaching consequences.” No one asked, “What should be the role of France and Europe in the new configuration of forces created after September 11? How should France reappraise its military budget and doctrine to take account of the need to maintain some kind of parity between Europe and the United States, or at least between France and the uk?” The Middle East conflict became an issue in the campaign because of France's large Arab and Muslim population, as the high vote for Le Pen demonstrated. But Le Pen is not a foreign policy hawk. And as Moisi noted, “for most French voters in 2002, security has little to do with abstract and distant geopolitics. Rather, it is a question of which politician can best protect them from the crime and violence plaguing the streets and suburbs of their cities.”

Can Europe change course and assume a larger role on the world stage? There has been no shortage of European leaders urging it to do so. Nor is the weakness of eu foreign policy today necessarily proof that it must be weak tomorrow,

given the eu's record of overcoming weaknesses in other areas. And yet the political will to demand more power for Europe appears to be lacking, and for the very good reason that Europe does not see a mission for itself that requires power. Its mission is to oppose power. It is revealing that the argument most often advanced by Europeans for augmenting their military strength these days is not that it will allow Europe to expand its strategic purview. It is merely to rein in and "multilateralize" the United States. "America," writes the pro-American British scholar Timothy Garton Ash in the *New York Times* (April 9, 2002), "has too much power for anyone's good, including its own." Therefore Europe must amass power, but for no other reason than to save the world and the United States from the dangers inherent in the present lopsided situation.

Whether that particular mission is a worthy one or not, it seems unlikely to rouse European passions. Even Védrine has stopped talking about counterbalancing the United States. Now he shrugs and declares there "is no reason for the Europeans to match a country that can fight four wars at once." It was one thing for Europe in the 1990s to increase its collective expenditures on defense from \$150 billion per year to \$180 billion when the United States was spending \$280 billion per year. But now the United States is heading toward spending as much as \$500 billion per year, and Europe has not the slightest intention of keeping up. European analysts lament the continent's "strategic irrelevance." nato Secretary General George Robertson has taken to calling Europe a "military pygmy" in an effort to shame Europeans into spending more and doing so more wisely. But who honestly believes Europeans will fundamentally change their way of doing business? They have many reasons not to.

The U.S. response

In thinking about the divergence of their own views and Europeans', Americans must not lose sight of the main point: The new Europe is indeed a blessed miracle and a reason for enormous celebration — on both sides of the Atlantic. For Europeans, it is the realization of a long and improbable dream: a continent free from nationalist strife and blood feuds, from military competition and arms races. War between the major European powers is almost unimaginable. After centuries of misery, not only for Europeans but also for those pulled into their conflicts — as Americans were twice in the past century — the new Europe really has emerged as a paradise. It is something to be cherished and guarded, not least by Americans, who have shed blood on Europe's soil and would shed more should the new Europe ever fail.

Nor should we forget that the Europe of today is very much the product of American foreign policy stretching back over six decades. European integration was an American project, too, after World War II. And so, recall, was European weakness. When the Cold War dawned, Americans such as Dean Acheson

hoped to create in Europe a powerful partner against the Soviet Union. But that was not the only American vision of Europe underlying U.S. policies during the twentieth century. Predating it was Franklin Delano Roosevelt's vision of a Europe that had been rendered, in effect, strategically irrelevant. As the historian John Lamberton Harper has put it, he wanted "to bring about a radical reduction in the weight of Europe" and thereby make possible "the retirement of Europe from world politics."⁹

Americans who came of age during the Cold War have always thought of Europe almost exclusively in Achesonian terms — as the essential bulwark of freedom in the struggle against Soviet tyranny. But Americans of Roosevelt's era had a different view. In the late 1930s the common conviction of Americans was that "the European system was basically rotten, that war was endemic on that continent, and the Europeans had only themselves to blame for their plight."¹⁰ By the early 1940s Europe appeared to be nothing more than the overheated incubator of world wars that cost America dearly. During World War II Americans like Roosevelt, looking backward rather than forward, believed no greater service could be performed than to take Europe out of the global strategic picture once and for all. "After Germany is disarmed," fdr pointedly asked, "what is the reason for France having a big military establishment?" Charles DeGaulle found such questions "disquieting for Europe and for France." Even though the United States pursued Acheson's vision during the Cold War, there was always a part of American policy that reflected Roosevelt's vision, too. Eisenhower undermining Britain and France at Suez was only the most blatant of many American efforts to cut Europe down to size and reduce its already weakened global influence.

But the more important American contribution to Europe's current world-apart status stemmed not from anti-European but from pro-European impulses. It was a commitment to Europe, not hostility to Europe, that led the United States in the immediate postwar years to keep troops on the continent and to create nato. The presence of American forces as a security guarantee in Europe was, as it was intended to be, the critical ingredient to begin the process of European integration.

⁹ John Lamberton Harper, *American Visions of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson* (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 3. The following discussion of the differing American perspectives on Europe owes much to Harper's fine book.

¹⁰ William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation, 1937–1940* (Harper Bros., 1952), 14.

Europe's evolution to its present state occurred under the mantle of the U.S. security guarantee and could not have occurred without it. Not only did the United States for almost half a century supply a shield against such external threats as the Soviet Union and such internal threats as may have been posed by ethnic conflict in places like the Balkans. More important, the United States was the key to the solution of the German problem and perhaps still is. Germany's Fischer, in the Humboldt University speech, noted two "historic decisions" that made the new Europe possible: "the USA's decision to stay in Europe" and "France's and Germany's commitment to the principle of integration, beginning with economic links." But of course the latter could never have occurred without the former. France's willingness to risk the reintegration of Germany into Europe — and France was, to say the least, highly dubious — depended on the promise of continued American involvement in Europe as a guarantee against any resurgence of German militarism. Nor were postwar Germans unaware that their own future in Europe depended on the calming presence of the American military.

The United States, in short, solved the Kantian paradox for the Europeans. Kant had argued that the only solution to the immoral horrors of the Hobbesian world was the creation of a world government. But he also feared that the "state of universal peace" made possible by world government would be an even greater threat to human freedom than the Hobbesian international order, inasmuch as such a government, with its monopoly of power, would become "the most horrible despotism."¹¹ How nations could achieve perpetual peace without destroying human freedom was a problem Kant could not solve. But for Europe the problem was solved by the United States. By providing security from outside, the United States has rendered it unnecessary for Europe's supranational government to provide it. Europeans did not need power to achieve peace and they do not need power to preserve it.

The current situation abounds in ironies. Europe's rejection of power politics, its devaluing of military force as a tool of international relations, have depended on the presence of American military forces on European soil. Europe's new Kantian order could flourish only under the umbrella of American power exercised according to the rules of the old Hobbesian order. American power made it possible for Europeans to believe that power was no longer important. And now, in the final irony, the fact that United States military power has solved the European problem, especially the "German problem," allows Europeans

¹¹ See Thomas L. Pangle and Peter J. Ahrens Dorf, *Justice Among Nations: On the Moral Basis of Power and Peace* (University Press of Kansas, 1999), 200–201.

today to believe that American military power, and the “strategic culture” that has created and sustained it, are outmoded and dangerous.

Most Europeans do not see the great paradox: that their passage into post-history has depended on the United States not making the same passage. Because Europe has neither the will nor the ability to guard its own paradise and keep it from being overrun, spiritually as well as physically, by a world that has yet to accept the rule of “moral consciousness,” it has become dependent on America’s willingness to use its military might to deter or defeat those around the world who still believe in power politics.

Some Europeans do understand the conundrum. Some Britons, not surprisingly, understand it best. Thus Robert Cooper writes of the need to address the hard truth that although “within the postmodern world [i.e., the Europe of today], there are no security threats in the traditional sense,” nevertheless, throughout the rest of the world — what Cooper calls the “modern and pre-modern zones” — threats abound. If the postmodern world does not protect itself, it can be destroyed. But how does Europe protect itself without discarding the very ideals and principles that undergird its pacific system?

“The challenge to the postmodern world,” Cooper argues, “is to get used to the idea of double standards.” Among themselves, Europeans may “operate on the basis of laws and open cooperative security.” But when dealing with the world outside Europe, “we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era — force, preemptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary.” This is Cooper’s principle for safeguarding society: “Among ourselves, we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle.”

Cooper’s argument is directed at Europe, and it is appropriately coupled with a call for Europeans to cease neglecting their defenses, “both physical and psychological.” But what Cooper really describes is not Europe’s future but America’s present. For it is the United States that has had the difficult task of navigating between these two worlds, trying to abide by, defend, and further the laws of advanced civilized society while simultaneously employing military force against those who refuse to abide by those rules. The United States is already operating according to Cooper’s double standard, and for the very reasons he suggests. American leaders, too, believe that global security and a liberal order — as well as Europe’s “postmodern” paradise — cannot long survive unless the United States does use its power in the dangerous, Hobbesian world that still flourishes outside Europe.

What this means is that although the United States has played the critical role in bringing Europe into this Kantian paradise, and still plays a key role in making that paradise possible, it cannot enter this paradise itself. It mans the walls but cannot walk through the gate. The United States, with all its vast power, remains

stuck in history, left to deal with the Saddams and the ayatollahs, the Kim Jong IIs and the Jiang Zemins, leaving the happy benefits to others.

An acceptable division?

Is this situation tolerable for the United States? In many ways, it is. Contrary to what many believe, the United States can shoulder the burden of maintaining global security without much help from Europe. The United States spends a little over 3 percent of its gdp on defense today. Were Americans to increase that to 4 percent — meaning a defense budget in excess of \$500 billion per year — it would still represent a smaller percentage of national wealth than Americans spent on defense throughout most of the past half-century. Even Paul Kennedy, who invented the term “imperial overstretch” in the late 1980s (when the United States was spending around 7 percent of its gdp on defense), believes the United States can sustain its current military spending levels and its current global dominance far into the future. Can the United States handle the rest of the world without much help from Europe? The answer is that it already does. The United States has maintained strategic stability in Asia with no help from Europe. In the Gulf War, European help was token; so it has been more recently in Afghanistan, where Europeans are once again “doing the dishes”; and so it would be in an invasion of Iraq to unseat Saddam. Europe has had little to offer the United States in strategic military terms since the end of the Cold War — except, of course, that most valuable of strategic assets, a Europe at peace.

The United States can manage, therefore, at least in material terms. Nor can one argue that the American people are unwilling to shoulder this global burden, since they have done so for a decade already. After September 11, they seem willing to continue doing so for a long time to come. Americans apparently feel no resentment at not being able to enter a “postmodern” utopia. There is no evidence most Americans desire to. Partly because they are so powerful, they take pride in their nation’s military power and their nation’s special role in the world.

Americans have no experience that would lead them to embrace fully the ideals and principles that now animate Europe. Indeed, Americans derive their understanding of the world from a very different set of experiences. In the first half of the twentieth century, Americans had a flirtation with a certain kind of internationalist idealism. Wilson’s “war to end all wars” was followed a decade later by an American secretary of state putting his signature to a treaty outlawing war. fdr in the 1930s put his faith in non-aggression pacts and asked merely that Hitler promise not to attack a list of countries Roosevelt presented to him. But then came Munich and Pearl Harbor, and then, after a fleeting moment of renewed idealism, the plunge into the Cold War. The “lesson of Munich” came to dominate American strategic thought, and although it was supplanted for a

time by the “lesson of Vietnam,” today it remains the dominant paradigm. While a small segment of the American elite still yearns for “global governance” and eschews military force, Americans from Madeleine Albright to Donald Rumsfeld, from Brent Scowcroft to Anthony Lake, still remember Munich, figuratively if not literally. And for younger generations of Americans who do not remember Munich or Pearl Harbor, there is now September 11. After September 11, even many American globalizers demand blood.

Americans are idealists, but they have no experience of promoting ideals successfully without power. Certainly, they have no experience of successful supranational governance; little to make them place their faith in international law and international institutions, much as they might wish to; and even less to let them travel, with the Europeans, beyond power. Americans, as good children of the Enlightenment, still believe in the perfectibility of man, and they retain hope for the perfectibility of the world. But they remain realists in the limited sense that they still believe in the necessity of power in a world that remains far from perfection. Such law as there may be to regulate international behavior, they believe, exists because a power like the United States defends it by force of arms. In other words, just as Europeans claim, Americans can still sometimes see themselves in heroic terms — as Gary Cooper at high noon. They will defend the townspeople, whether the townspeople want them to or not.

The problem lies neither in American will or capability, then, but precisely in the inherent moral tension of the current international situation. As is so often the case in human affairs, the real question is one of intangibles — of fears, passions, and beliefs. The problem is that the United States must sometimes play by the rules of a Hobbesian world, even though in doing so it violates European norms. It must refuse to abide by certain international conventions that may constrain its ability to fight effectively in Robert Cooper’s jungle. It must support arms control, but not always for itself. It must live by a double standard. And it must sometimes act unilaterally, not out of a passion for unilateralism but, given a weak Europe that has moved beyond power, because the United States has no choice but to act unilaterally.

Few Europeans admit, as Cooper does implicitly, that such American behavior may redound to the greater benefit of the civilized world, that American power, even employed under a double standard, may be the best means of advancing human progress — and perhaps the only means. Instead, many Europeans today have come to consider the United States itself to be the outlaw, a rogue colossus. Europeans have complained about President Bush’s “unilateralism,” but they are coming to the deeper realization that the problem is not Bush or any American president. It is systemic. And it is incurable.

Given that the United States is unlikely to reduce its power and that Europe is unlikely to increase more than marginally its own power or the will to use what

power it has, the future seems certain to be one of increased transatlantic tension. The danger — if it is a danger — is that the United States and Europe will become positively estranged. Europeans will become more shrill in their attacks on the United States. The United States will become less inclined to listen, or perhaps even to care. The day could come, if it has not already, when Americans will no more heed the pronouncements of the eu than they do the pronouncements of asean or the Andean Pact.

To those of us who came of age in the Cold War, the strategic decoupling of Europe and the United States seems frightening. DeGaulle, when confronted by fdr's vision of a world where Europe was irrelevant, recoiled and suggested that this vision "risked endangering the Western world." If Western Europe was to be considered a "secondary matter" by the United States, would not fdr only "weaken the very cause he meant to serve — that of civilization?" Western Europe, DeGaulle insisted, was "essential to the West. Nothing can replace the value, the power, the shining example of the ancient peoples." Typically, DeGaulle insisted this was "true of France above all." But leaving aside French *amour propre*, did not DeGaulle have a point? If Americans were to decide that Europe was no more than an irritating irrelevancy, would American society gradually become unmoored from what we now call the West? It is not a risk to be taken lightly, on either side of the Atlantic.

So what is to be done? The obvious answer is that Europe should follow the course that Cooper, Ash, Robertson, and others recommend and build up its military capabilities, even if only marginally. There is not much ground for hope that this will happen. But, then, who knows? Maybe concern about America's overweening power really will create some energy in Europe. Perhaps the atavistic impulses that still swirl in the hearts of Germans, Britons, and Frenchmen — the memory of power, international influence, and national ambition — can still be played upon. Some Britons still remember empire; some Frenchmen still yearn for *la gloire*; some Germans still want their place in the sun. These urges are now mostly channeled into the grand European project, but they could find more traditional expression. Whether this is to be hoped for or feared is another question. It would be better still if Europeans could move beyond fear and anger at the rogue colossus and remember, again, the vital necessity of having a strong America — for the world and especially for Europe.

Americans can help. It is true that the Bush administration came into office with a chip on its shoulder. It was hostile to the new Europe — as to a lesser extent was the Clinton administration — seeing it not so much as an ally but as an albatross. Even after September 11, when the Europeans offered their very limited military capabilities in the fight in Afghanistan, the United States resisted, fearing that European cooperation was a ruse to tie America down. The Bush administration viewed NATO's historic decision to aid the United States

under Article V less as a boon than as a booby trap. An opportunity to draw Europe into common battle out in the Hobbesian world, even in a minor role, was thereby unnecessarily lost.

Americans are powerful enough that they need not fear Europeans, even when bearing gifts. Rather than viewing the United States as a Gulliver tied down by Lilliputian threads, American leaders should realize that they are hardly constrained at all, that Europe is not really capable of constraining the United States. If the United States could move past the anxiety engendered by this inaccurate sense of constraint, it could begin to show more understanding for the sensibilities of others, a little generosity of spirit. It could pay its respects to multilateralism and the rule of law and try to build some international political capital for those moments when multilateralism is impossible and unilateral action unavoidable. It could, in short, take more care to show what the founders called a “decent respect for the opinion of mankind.”

These are small steps, and they will not address the deep problems that beset the transatlantic relationship today. But, after all, it is more than a cliché that the United States and Europe share a set of common Western beliefs. Their aspirations for humanity are much the same, even if their vast disparity of power has now put them in very different places. Perhaps it is not too naïvely optimistic to believe that a little common understanding could still go a long way.