Common Policy of the Member States of the EEC

on Southern Africa

Oral Question by Debate by Mr Waltmans (Doc. 450/76)

A. Action by Nine on Namibian Independence

General Assembly Resolutions on Namibian Independence

1. On 26 November 1975 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 3399 on Namibia by a vote of 110 in favour, none against and seven abstentions (see Annex A). The Resolution condemned South Africa for its persistent refusal to withdraw from Namibia and for its attempts to prolong its illegal occupation by organising a false 'constitutional conference'. In the debate, speakers were divided as to whether peaceful measures or force should be used to achieve Namibian independence. The creation by the South African Government of Bantustans in Namibia was universally condemned.

2. On 30 January 1976 the Security Council of the UN unanimously demanded in Resolution 305(1976) that South Africa should withdraw from Namibia, in accordance with Resolutions 264(1969), 269(1969) and 366(1974), its illegal administration there, and that free elections should be held in Namibia. This was the first Resolution which had called for elections there. No statement was made in the debate on behalf of the Nine.

3. On 20 August 1976 the UN Council for Namibia rejected the so-called proposals of South Africa on Namibia as ambiguous, equivocal and lacking in legitimacy. The proposals were contained in a statement of 18 August issued by the Constitutional Committee of the South-West African Constitutional Conference. The Committee agreed that 31 December 1978 could be fixed as the date for independence for Namibia.
4. This Conference was described by the UN Council for Namibia as one in which South African sponsored tribal elements and National Party supporters of apartheid were claiming to speak for the Namibian people. Representatives of SWAPO were completely excluded, but in any case had boycotted the Conference.

Action by the Nine

5. On 24 February 1976 the Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Nine Community Member States adopted a statement on Southern Africa, which dealt principally with Angola. The statement included the following passage:

'The Ministers confirmed the basic position of the Nine Member States of the Community:

- readiness on the part of the Nine to develop cooperation to the extent that such relations are desired by African States, and the rejection of any form of action by any State aimed at the creation of a sphere of influence in Africa,

- respect for the independence of all African States and the sovereign right of these States to define their national policy without foreign interference,

- support for OAU measures to promote African cooperation,

- the right of the Rhodesian and Namibian peoples to self-determination and independence,

- condemnation of the apartheid policy of South Africa.'

6. Mr Gaston Thorn, President-in-Office of the Conference, stated at a colloquy with the Political Affairs Committee of the European Parliament on 16 June 1976 that this declaration had met with general acceptance in Africa, and its terms had indeed been strongly influenced by the views of the Organisation of African States (OAU).
In August 1976, the then President-in-Office of the Nine, Mr van der Stoel, in a letter to Mr Waldheim, Secretary General of the UN, said that all political groups in Namibia (including the South West African Peoples' Organisation (SWAPO)) must be represented at negotiations on independence for Namibia. The Nine were also, the letter continued, 'concerned by the South Africans' refusal fully to apply Security Council Resolution 385 of 1976, and to accept UN control in/process of Namibian's self-determination. In addition, the Nine believed that all political groups in Namibia should be free to express themselves; political prisoners should be freed; and exiles should be permitted to return.

On 12-13 September 1976, the Nine Foreign Ministers stated that they supported Dr Kissinger's efforts in favour of Namibian independence. On 28 September, in a major speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations, Mr van der Stoel summed up the attitude of the Nine as follows:-

'...the UN should, in our view, focus its own contribution to the solution of the question of Namibia on the promotion of self-determination by the Namibian people in a manner both democratic and peaceful.'

**Efficacy of Nine's action on Namibia**

Although the South African Government has in principle agreed to withdraw from Namibia, and that the country should gain its independence by the end of 1978, SWAPO, which has been fighting guerrilla actions against South African forces in Namibia for 10 years, may be driven by African opinion on Namibia to seek independence earlier by force. Mr van der Stoel warned the Political Affairs Committee of the European Parliament of this danger in October.

While on the one hand the acceptance by the OAU of the Nine's policy on Namibia marks a success for the Nine, their unwillingness to bring other than diplomatic pressure to bear on South Africa regarding Namibia may undermine the effectiveness of their policy. Nevertheless the Nine have on Namibia acted in unity and in step with the wishes of the majority of black African States.
8. Action by Nine on independence for Zimbabwe

11. In early March 1976 the Mozambique Government announced that it had closed its frontier with Rhodesia. This stimulated an appeal by the Secretary General of the UN for economic aid for Mozambique, which was immediately answered by the Commonwealth countries' decision to aid that country.

12. On 2 April 1976, the European Council adopted the following declaration, which in part referred to the Foreign Ministers' declaration of 23 February 1976 (see paragraph 5 above):

Declaration on Rhodesia:

'The nine countries of the European Community reaffirm the principles stated in the ministerial declaration of 23 February 1976 and particularly the right to self-determination and independence of the Rhodesian people. They also expressed regret that the recent events have made a peaceful transfer of power to the majority in Rhodesia more difficult.

The nine strongly support the objectives set out by the British Government on 22 March and its efforts to attain them.

They address a solemn appeal to the minority which at the present time in Rhodesia opposes a majority system, to accept a swift and peaceful transition to such a system. They confirm that they will continue to strictly apply the decisions of the Security Council concerning Rhodesia.'

13. On 6 April the Nine formally decided to give their support to the policy of sanctions against Rhodesia hitherto applied formally only by the United Kingdom and African countries. In addition, to alleviate the effect on African countries bordering Rhodesia of the blockade of its frontiers, the Nine agreed to give emergency aid of 25m. u.a. to Zaire, Zambia and Malawi, they being signatories of the Lomé Convention. In addition, aid would be given to the other bordering countries of Mozambique and Angola.
14. On 19 October 1976, the Conference of Foreign Ministers adopted the following statement on Rhodesia, welcoming -

'the British Government's speedy action in convening a conference in Geneva to discuss the formation of an interim Government in Rhodesia, which would pave the way for majority rule within two years'.

They appeal solemnly to all the parties concerned to seize this opportunity to achieve a just and peaceful solution to this longstanding problem by bringing about an orderly and peaceful transfer of power to the majority in Zimbabwe.'

They confirm that they will meanwhile 'continue to comply strictly with their obligations relating to sanctions'.

15. On 20 December, the UN General Assembly approved a resolution reinforcing economic sanctions against Rhodesia and calling on the Security Council to hold an urgent meeting to examine the question. 124 countries voted for and 7 abstained, of whom Belgium, France, Germany and the United Kingdom were of the Nine.

16. The Nine have therefore succeeded in public statements in achieving reasonable solidarity in support of the formation of a black majority government in Zimbabwe as a step towards independence. The acceptance by the British Government of a continuing responsibility for achieving majority rule on acceptable terms as to free elections, timing, etc. has led to the convening of the Geneva Conference by the British Government. Britain's position as a leading member of the Nine has obviously greatly assisted them in seeking to realise their policy in Rhodesia. But there are various measures which the Nine could take to hasten the achievement of this policy (see paras. 21ff).

C. Economic boycott of South Africa

17. On 28 September 1976 the President-in-Office of the Conference of Foreign Ministers, Mr van der Stoel, speaking to the UN General Assembly, recalled the declaration of 23 February and said that
until fundamental changes come about, there can be no peace in Southern Africa'. The Nine, he said, 'welcomed the present efforts to find peaceful solutions to the problems of the area', and remained willing to contribute to them.

18. On 9 November 1976 the UN General Assembly voted on a series of resolutions on South Africa. Of the 10 resolutions voted upon, two were adopted with unanimity, the Nine voted together on two, and split their votes on six. The Nine voted together against a resolution condemning the 'illegitimate colonialist' government of South Africa and urging the nations to give insurgents all the help they needed to seize power by force (Annex B). The Nine were also united against the Arab-sponsored resolution condemning Israeli collaboration with South Africa on arms sales and economic agreements; this was seen by the Nine as being too close to the 1975 resolution on Zionism and racism (Annex C).

19. The pattern of voting of the Nine on the other six resolutions was as follows -

- a mandatory arms embargo of South Africa: Denmark for, Ireland abstained the rest against.

- economic sanctions against South Africa: Denmark, Ireland and Netherlands abstained, the rest against.

- ban on foreign investment in South Africa: Denmark, Ireland and Netherlands for, the rest abstained.

- ban on sports matches with non-integrated South African teams: Denmark, Ireland, Italy and Netherlands for, the rest abstained.

- action programme against apartheid - Denmark and Ireland abstained, the rest against.

- holding of world conferences on apartheid: no information.

Britain, France and Germany voted as a block throughout.
20. Although the Nine achieved solidarity on the two most important political votes, their record otherwise was poor. Mr Kaufman (Netherlands) made a statement on 9 November in the General Assembly debate on behalf of the Nine, which clarified their stand on the resolution describing South Africa as a 'colonialist' power. He said that the Nine sought equal rights for all races and colours in South Africa, not black dominance, and that they believed that apartheid could be ended peacefully. They would have liked to be able to support the resolutions, but deplored the terms in which some were drawn.

Conclusion

21. In January and February 1976, the Nine succeeded in reaching close agreement with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) over Angola. The fact that the aims of both bodies happened to coincide as regards foreign intervention in Angola was the basis of this agreement. But such intervention remains a strong possibility as regards Namibia and Rhodesia. It is therefore imperative for the Nine to reinforce their position on Southern Africa by close cooperation with the OAU.

22. Another necessary measure which the Nine should take is to politicise the Euro-Arab Dialogue, so as to win at least the acquiescence, if not the active support of, the African members of the Arab League. Their acquiescence or support would be of great value in seeking to moderate the terms of UN resolutions on Southern Africa, in deterring foreign intervention in Rhodesia and Namibia, and in winning Third World understanding of the Nine's policies in Southern Africa. The Nine believe that peaceful solutions are still possible to the problems of majority rule in Rhodesia, of apartheid, and of withdrawal by South Africa from Namibia. The Third World countries often interpret this policy as one of weakness, or even of collaboration with the South African Government and its policies. The active politicisation of the Euro-Arab Dialogue by the Nine could serve to convince some of the Third World countries of the true aims of the Nine's policies - and, incidentally, could assist in making progress in the difficult negotiations with the North-South Dialogue.
23. It is open to doubt whether the Nine have been sufficiently active in seeking the support and understanding of the OAU and of the Arab League countries for the Nine’s policies in Southern Africa. It is equally doubtful whether the Nine’s relations with these two groupings in relation to African and Euro-Arab matters are adequately coordinated with the Nine’s stance in the UN and in the North-South Dialogue. It would be useful therefore to press the President-in-Office to describe the machinery for such coordination, if any there be; to explain the further measures he proposes to take to achieve the Nine’s policies in Southern Africa; and to seek his views on the inter-action of the Nine’s policies with those of the Third World countries, in the framework of relations with the OAU, and of the Euro-Arab Dialogue, the North-South Dialogue and the UN.