

Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung  
Center for European Integration Studies  
Rheinische Friedrich Wilhelms-Universität Bonn



Günther Joetze

# **The European Security Landscape after Kosovo**

**Discussion Paper**

C 64  
2000

Dr. Günter Joetze, born 1933, was President of the Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik from 1995-1999. He studied at the Universities of Munich, Freiburg, Erlangen, Bologna, and London. Dr. Joetze then joined the German Foreign Service in 1963. There he had a distinguished career serving at the embassies in Moscow, Phnom Penh, Saigon, and Niamey. From 1975-1984 he participated as director for East-West relations in all GSCE meetings. After three years as Consul General in Los Angeles he became head of the German delegation at the MBFR- and various other Arms Control negotiations. In 1987 he was made Permanent Representative to the OSCE in Vienna.

Publikationsauswahl: "Conflict Prevention and Crisis Resolution - The Role of the CSCE", in: Reimund Seidelmann (ed.), *Crisis Policies in Eastern Europe - Imperatives, Problems and Perspectives*, Baden-Baden: Nomos 1996, pp-205-213; "The OSCE Mission in Moldova", in: S. Neil McFarlane/Oliver Thänert (eds.), *Balancing Hegemony - The OSCE in the CIS*, Center for International Relations, Queen's University Kingston, Ontario 1997, S. 133-144; "The Relations between Turkey and the EU - Stocktaking and Prospects", in: Hüseyin Bağcı/Jackson Janes/Ludger Kühnhardt (eds.), *Parameters of Partnership: The U.S. - Turkey - Europe*, Baden Baden: Nomos 1999, pp. 69-77 (Schriftenreihe des ZEI, Bd. 14).

*Günter Joetze*

## **The European Security Landscape after Kosovo**

Operation "Allied Force" was a decisive new element in European security. Some may call it a watershed—or "Wegscheide" (crossroad, Foreign Minister Fischer's expression before the UN General Assembly on September 22, 1999). The general consequences of the Kosovo events, will first be analyzed, following then, the consequences for the Security and Foreign Policy of the European Union.

### **1. *General consequences of the Kosovo events***

#### **1.1 *Military enforcement of humanitarian aims: a new doctrine or a doubtful precedent?***

In an interview on June 20, President Clinton stated as "an important principle...that whether within or beyond the borders of a country, if the world community has the power to stop it, we ought to stop genocide". He repeated this idea in a speech before NATO troops in Macedonia in more solemn terms.<sup>1</sup> This led observers like Jim Hoagland<sup>2</sup> to assume the development of a "Clinton Doctrine" of humanitarian warfare.

At the Munich Wehrkunde Convention in February 1999, Chancellor Schröder would not exclude Germany's participation in further military

1 White House Press Release of June 20, 1999 (Interview of the President by Wolf Blitzer CNN late edition).

2 "Developing a Doctrine of Humanitarian Warfare", in International Herald Tribune, June 28, 1999.

interventions with the aim to prevent "extraordinary humanitarian catastrophes" if need be again without a UN mandate.

Do these spontaneous remarks by NATO leaders initiate a new doctrine, or does Operation "Allied Force" rather present, in the words of a British analyst, a "questionable model of humanitarian intervention"<sup>3</sup>? The operation could not prevent the expulsion of the Kosovars, so it did not achieve its humanitarian aim in a first phase. True, it enabled the Kosovans to return but in doing so it could not prevent additional bitter contest and further attempts at ethnic cleansing. Above all, it leaves the intervening states with a political responsibility for which they have no political concept: there is no clarity about the future of Kosovo. These are hardly propitious conditions for a new doctrine. The outcome of the UN-operation in East Timor will be crucial for the development of a practice of humanitarian intervention. Still the continuing abstention from humanitarian intervention in Africa<sup>4</sup> argues against the assumption of a new practice, at least a world-wide one.

## 1.2 *The rediscovery of diplomacy*

At the beginning of Operation "Allied Force", NATO had a position of unconditional surrender: the bombing would be stopped only after Milosevic had accepted NATO's five conditions. In particular, NATO requested a "Framework Agreement" on the basis of the Rambouillet draft Agreement (i.e. without UN control, and an "International Military Presence", again without a UN umbrella). According to the NATO Summit Declaration on Kosovo, (Washington, April 24/25), there was no room for concessions on these demands, hence no possibility for negotiations.

This position proved less and less tenable as public support eroded in key countries, and Intra-Alliance consultation problems increased. A "peace

3 Adam Roberts, "NATO's Humanitarian War over Kosovo", in *Survival*, Autumn 1999 (vol. 41/No. 3) pp. 102 ff. (120).

4 C.f. for the latest development in this close low-profile practise of the International Community see "UN takes low key role this time in Kongo" in *Financial Times*, September 17, 1999, P. 5.

plan" elaborated by Germany met first with sceptical reactions from the British and American governments at the Washington NATO summit. The turning point came soon after. Starting the second week of May, Moscow became the mecca of European and American diplomacy, with German State Secretary (Staatssekretär) Ischinger and his American counterpart Strobe Talbot as protagonists. It had become clear that not only allied unity was at stake but also the chances for a moderate future development in Russia. From this time on, hectic activities of coordination and persuasion between the Alliance, the European Union, and Russia started. The special envoys, Finnish President Ahtissary and former Russian Prime Minister Tchernomyrdin started their shuttle diplomacy between Western capitals and Belgrade. Clearly a "second track" was established.

Should there be future enforcement missions by NATO, they are likely to follow this model. After all the "dual track" approach meets with historic experiences of NATO. The Harmel report of 1963 identified a dual strategy against the Soviet challenge consisting of military defence plus political co-operation and dialogue. The NATO Ministerial Meeting of December 1979 issued a "dual decision" to meet the threat of Russian intermediate nuclear missiles: a decision to deploy corresponding weapon systems on the territory of the Alliance and an offer to negotiate, on the systems of both sides.

### *1.3 A new appraisal of NATO's role in peace enforcement*

In the eyes of some, NATO's role is reinforced by its ultimate victory over Serbia in particular because it was able to maintain its internal cohesion. For Secretary Cohen this was "the most important lesson" from Kosovo.<sup>5</sup>

This evaluation corresponds to powerful interests of the Alliance yet it calls for differentiation. NATO simply could not afford to lose this conflict between the most powerful military Alliance of history against a state "the size of Maine" (Cohens expression). NATO's victory has prevented severe damage to its international position, cohesion, and, above all, credibility.

5 In his September 9, 1999 speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in San Diego, Security Issues Digest from the same day, US Mission to NATO.

But NATO has not achieved its essential war aim, the prevention of a humanitarian catastrophe. And it reached a political solution only after involving Russia and by giving the UN the control over the interim administration of the province. Thus NATO had to accept important compromises after its summit had excluded such an outcome six weeks before.

In the wake of Operation "Allied Force", large parts of Western public opinion considered NATO the only remaining pillar of the European security architecture—the only one "capable of action". The ambition to make NATO the center of the European system is reflected by a sentence in paragraph 2 of the Washington Summit Communiqué:

This new Alliance will be larger, more capable and more flexible, committed to collective defence and able to undertake new missions including contributing to effective conflict prevention and engaging actively in crisis-management including crisis response operations.

The Kosovo experience does not confirm these optimistic predictions: there were severe interallied differences, notably about infrastructure targets (not a tactical but a strategic issue since it involved the choice between purely military efficiency and long-term political considerations).<sup>6</sup> Public support in some countries was at times shaky.

Only history will resolve the question of which factors were decisive for Milosević's surrender. Possible answers include NATO firmness, the change in the attitude of Russia, Serbian fear of an impending NATO

6 C.f. above all the commentary in *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, August 23, 1999: "Schädliche Plaudereien nach dem Krieg" and the corresponding news item at p. 2 of the same issue. Only for the latest revelation: Karl Feldmayer, "Schweigen nach dem Vorfall" in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, October 5, 1999: On a dispute on whether to stop the Russian commando advancing to Prishtina airport. More far reaching were the differences between SACEUR and the political authorities of most NATO countries on the notification of NATO troop movements to Macedonia. Although mandatory under the Vienna Document of 1994 these notifications were postponed and Russian demands for inspections denied for security reasons which would have made this important instrument of military confidence building a fair weather document. Luckily, later troop movements to Albania were duly notified and Russian inspection admitted (information given to the author from Vienna Arms Control circles).

ground attack, or the damage inflicted by the air campaign. Concerning air damage, it has been discussed whether losses of the Serbian armed forces or the destruction of civilian infrastructure, (notably bridges and power plants) were decisive. Losses in Serbian equipment are now defined at 93 tanks, 153 armored personnel carriers, 339 military vehicles and 389 artillery pieces. "Those totals amounted to a crippling loss to Serbia's regular armed forces".<sup>7</sup> Military leaders may use these figures to prove the effectiveness of an exclusively airborne campaign. But this argument opens a political dilemma: if so, why did some of them insist, and indeed risk conflict about, additional targeting of civilian infrastructure?

When mediation began to complement military action it turned out that NATO had no political consultation mechanism which included Russia (the NATO-Russia Council not being sufficiently developed). It was an incredibly lucky coincidence that a country with an able and efficient diplomacy, Germany, held the presidencies both of the European Union and the G7/G8, and that both bodies had summits scheduled for a point in time decisive for the resolution of the crisis (end of May/beginning of June). This constellation is not likely to repeat itself. In the absence of a political crisis-management mechanism NATO should not embark on military enforcement in the future. Instead it needs a close co-operation with bodies of co-operative security as the United Nations and, in some cases, OSCE. NATO should seek the involvement of such bodies at the beginning of future crisis-management efforts and not at the end, as in the Kosovo crisis.

### *1.4 More attention for Russia in future crisis-management*

This implies the involvement of Russia, regardless of its present chaotic state. Russia will be needed because of its permanent seat in the Security Council. It still makes use of some residual influence in many problem areas. It follows that there is a need for a consulting mechanism. In this regard the G7/G8 will probably replace the Contact Group. This will

<sup>7</sup> C.f. Joseph Fitchett, "NATO lowers its tally of tanks hit in Kosovo" in *International Herald Tribune*, September 17, 1999.

amplify the range of consultation from the Balkans to all crisis areas, and will ensure the participation of Japan, and later China (as member of a future Group of "G9"), and you arrive at an informally reformed Security Council which might prepare the decisions of the official UN body according to the Cologne model (where the G8 Foreign Ministers prepared outlines of Resolution No. 1244 of the Security Council on Kosovo, which were informally consulted over bilateral channels with the only absent permanent member, China).

### *1.5 The position of the UN and the role of its Security Council are reinforced*

At the beginning of Operation "Allied Force" there was a clear trend in the West to consider it as a precedent for future self-mandated enforcement action. The feeling that a humanitarian catastrophe cannot be allowed in the heart of Europe "just because" Russia or China would not agree to a Security Council mandate was widespread. Yet, in practice, Russia turned out to be indispensable in achieving a settlement; so were discrete efforts to engage China. It worked and this will be one of the lessons learned. It is ironical but logical that Operation "Allied Force" was started without a Security Council resolution but ended with one. Foreign Minister Fischer stressed the need of a Security Council Mandate in his UN speech of September 22, 1999 in strong terms.

### *1.6 The EU will concentrate on Europe and its near surroundings*

Halfway between the Berlin and Washington NATO summits some European chancelleries were concerned about American tendencies to "globalize" NATO's role. Some voices from Congress claimed a new burdensharing between Europeans and Americans, this time by common action rather "far out" of area. To the surprise—and relief—of some European allies the American negotiators on the NATO Strategic Concept did not press the issue hard. The issue was settled in the text of the Strategic Concept by the flexible term "Euro-Atlantic area" which implies that NATO's sphere of activities is not worldwide. At the time of the

Washington NATO Summit (end of April) a German observer remarked that this term leaves room for political flexibility:

It would probably exclude South East Asia. But a crisis in the Gulf area would be a case for political discussion and assessment of interest.<sup>8</sup>

Such discussions would certainly be marked by caution after recent experiences. True, there remain some neuralgic spots in the Balkans such as the unrest in Macedonia or Northern Albania, or a pro-Serbian putsch in Montenegro. In such cases additional military engagement by NATO would seem inevitable for reasons of continuity and contiguity, and would seem feasible because of their limited nature. There might be a need for military intervention elsewhere, such as in crises in the Southern Mediterranean, but the more likely platform for them would be "coalitions of the willing" led by the US, or by a European country with predominant regional interest, but probably not by NATO as an Alliance and certainly not by the EU which will lack the prerequisites for such action for the foreseeable future.

### *1.7 For the European Union, a shift of attention from North to South*

Balkan issues now constitute Europe's paramount stability concern. This will probably lead to a shift of financial support from East Central Europe to South East Europe, a trend already manifest in the funds provided by the German Ministry of Co-operation and Development for German party foundations. The various EU funds for preparing for or inducing countries to EU membership might suffer similar changes.

Such a trend will not go undisputed. Scandinavian EU members will challenge it. Already, the Finnish EU Presidency has convened a Conference of Foreign Ministers on the Nordic Dimension of the EU to Helsinki on November 12. The possible consequences of such a trend will be discussed below under Chapter 2.3.

8 Frankenberger in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, April 30, 1999.

### *1.8 A drastic demonstration of American military superiority*

For the experts, Operation "Allied Force" brought nothing new in this field. But to the broad public and to political leaders the extent of American superiority came as a shock. "The US conducted two-thirds of all supply sorties and about half of all combat sorties" said Secretary Cohen in his San Diego speech already quoted. The Secretary goes on in cautious language designed to spare Allied feelings:

Because we are the only nation with precision-guided ammunitions that can operate in all kinds of weather, heavy cloud cover in the early phases of the campaign at times made it an almost exclusively American operation. Moreover, not all of our Allies possessed interoperable communications equipment.

Many European armed forces are still equipped with weapons designed for conventional defence against a Soviet land attack in an all-out war where the political requirements of "no friendly casualties" and "no collateral damage" would not apply. Military enforcement action in future ethnic conflicts will always be guided by these two principles. Hence the need for European governments to thoroughly restructure and re-equip their armed forces if they want to prepare themselves for this type of conflict.

Unavoidably, the American superiority led to tendencies of unilateralism. In the last period of the campaign General Clark apparently disregarded French and German objections against civilian targeting.<sup>9</sup> There were two lines of command, one purely American for US sorties and an interallied one for others. Satellite information was not always shared as the German defence minister experienced when he needed documentation on recent Serbian atrocities to keep his party left in line. European military inferiority entailed incompatibility in communication and command.

In the longer run, these developments could lead to a diminished European influence with the Alliance. To a foreign observer, European participation

9 C.f. above note 7.

in the Gulf War, but certainly in Operation "Allied Force" appeared largely symbolic.<sup>10</sup>

American superiority did not mean American infallibility. Information dominance as an aim of the "revolution in military affairs" is not achieved by technical means alone but also requires an up-to-date city map of Belgrade, as we now all are aware of. The accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy nearly ruined the chances of a political settlement by antagonizing a permanent member of the Security Council. After the accidental death of a group of Kosovans mistaken for a Serbian army unit and of passengers of a train hit by bombs when passing a railway bridge, one more human tragedy might have caused the break-down of popular support in member countries of the Alliance. One of the basic differences between humanitarian enforcement actions and a traditional war conducted for central national interests is this: only in the latter case is a democratic nation prepared to suffer and to make others suffer.

### *1.9 A profound disappointment in Russia about the West*

Operation "Allied Force" achieved what four decades of Soviet and communist propaganda failed to achieve: to make the Russians believe that NATO is an aggressive block".<sup>11</sup> This new attitude towards NATO and the West is expressed by the commentator of Moscow's independent television station Alexej Pushkov as an "enforced partnership". These feelings are widespread in Russia. They are certainly not confined to elites or to the political class. Several reasons exist for this development:

- The awareness of a hopelessly inferior position of Russia vis-à-vis NATO and the West in general in all spheres including the conventional military.

10 The noted commentator of the Russian private television Jury Pushkov in a discussion at the Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik, reported by Wolf Bell in "Noch keine Lehren, aber viele Fragen", Generalanzeiger, August 23, 1999

11 Aleksej Arbatov in a discussion at a seminar of the Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik in Moscow, May 5, 1999.

- Consequently, the fear of being exposed to similar action by NATO in another case like in Chechnya.
- Experiences like the recent events in Dagestan and Chechnya which demonstrate to the average Russian that he is indeed exposed to this kind of danger.
- A deeply rooted legal tradition of legal positivism, hence, scepticism vis-à-vis all those concepts that the West evokes to justify what in technical terms amounts to a violation of the United Nations Charter such as: natural law, a developing humanitarian International Law, or the specifically German concept of "over-constitutional law".

Under Primakov's tenure as Prime Minister, these sentiments determined the official position of Russia towards NATO. In a later development, President Yeltsin changed this course, appointing Tchernomyrdin as his special envoy, and shortly afterwards deposing Primakov as Prime Minister. These steps reinforced Russia's international position as they emphasized its key role for a political settlement. However, feelings of anger and resentment have not faded away. They will have after-effects for a long time to come. Inside the country the credibility of the President has suffered another, possibly fatal, blow. While co-operation with the West is widely accepted as a pragmatic necessity, Western economic order and Western economic advice, will for a longer period remain discredited as a model. Moreover, since a strong section of the Russian public now considers NATO as an "aggressive block", the accession of the Baltic republics to NATO will be met by even deeper resentment. This effect will, in turn, not be lost on NATO policy makers.

#### *1.10 An increase of Third World scepticism about the West*

In a limited way NATO's image has improved in some Muslim circles because NATO defended a Muslim population. But this could change if the relations between the Albanians and the KFOR troops deteriorate. Seen globally, preoccupations prevail, not only because of the original neglect of the UN system by the West, but also because of a widespread fear of a precedent of intervention in similar cases of internal ethnic conflict. From a

Western point of view, the difference between internal and interstate conflicts may seem obsolete; such a perception would seem justified in the OECD hemisphere where globalization leads to the development of civil societies, which recognize ethnic tolerance, even ethnic diversity, as a governing principle. In many parts of the Third World things are different. States are weak, have mostly artificial borders and consequently are beset by minority problems. Military interventions in these problems from outside are thus bound to be seen as a dangerous precedent and only acceptable under a Security Council mandate.

The concept of humanitarian intervention is mostly considered a unilateral act in which the West applies double standards. The Western argument that "NATO's 19 democracies" are representative for new and more human trends in International Law is unacceptable to the average Third World politician. In the eyes of analysts from countries exposed to dangers from Islamic societies (Russians, but also Israelis) the precedent of a unilateral action based on strongly held convictions is doubly dangerous: What about similar actions by the countries of the Islamic Conference, possibly acting on the strength of a *fatwa*?

For these reasons, the Kosovo affair increased the malaise already existing in Third World countries. It may reinforce the already existing trends towards proliferation in nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in this area.

## **2. Consequences for the European Union**

### **2.1 Military Security**

It would seem natural that the military inferiority of the Europeans evidenced by the Kosovo affair should strengthen their determination to reinforce both the European Defence Identity within NATO and the European Defence and Security Policy within the European Union. The Cologne Declaration "On strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence" (Annex III to the Presidency Conclusions of the Cologne European Council of June 1999) would suggest such a

determination. The document is full of strong declarations of intent. So is the Defence Capabilities Initiative which was issued at the NATO summit in Washington. The latter document specifies potential threats to Alliance security as resulting from "regional conflicts, ethnic strifes or other crises beyond Alliance territory". Correspondingly it asks for leaner forces, capable of rapid deployment and of interoperability, with improved Command and Control, in particular through technologically advanced information systems.

These are limited goals. If Alliance members achieved them they would at least be capable of cooperating with American forces but still with inferior firepower. The technological gap between the American and European forces would still be wide (c.f. above chapter 1.8). France and the United Kingdom are working on structural reforms corresponding to the Defence Capabilities Initiative. The German defence budget, however, has recently been cut by no less than 7,6%. Without a drastic structural reform probably affecting conscription, Germany could not follow suit. At present, no political will is recognizable in Germany to take the decisions necessary to this end. They are, however, unavoidable: In a time of dramatic shortage of revenues, no responsible Minister of Finance could give priority to defence spending over vital civilian needs without cogent reasons. Such reasons are not discernable, as there simply is no credible military threat justifying large forces for territorial defence.<sup>12</sup> Nor is there room for additional large-scale peacekeeping operations: The Balkan enterprises (SFOR and KFOR) will absorb German and European capabilities for a long period so that in other cases a more symbolic participation will be the only option (c.f. the

12 There, certainly, is no more conventional threat from Russia. Should Russia ever regain the financial means to rebuild a conventional force capable of attacking NATO and the political will to do so as some analysts still will not exclude, the confrontational line would be advanced from the river Elbe to the river Bug about a thousand kilometres to the East, and it would take seven to ten years to rebuild corresponding Russian forces. No responsible planning could be based on such assumptions. Insofar as there is a residual nuclear threat from Russia this would not be a subject for common European action of any kind but a reserved domain for the three nuclear powers. Ballistic missiles from a rogue state are a remote contingency, not to be dealt with by a conscript army.

## The European Security Landscape after Kosovo

British contingent of 250 Gurkhas to the operation in East Timor and the German medical unit dispatched to Northern Australia to assist this operation). There are, of course, plausible scenarios of ethnic conflicts in the "Euro-Atlantic area". But few, if any, of them would call for independent European military action under German participation.<sup>13</sup>

To sum up: In terms of military structures, a Common European Defence Policy is having a bad beginning. This is bound to lead to disagreeable differences within the Alliance as well as between Europeans. Germany is likely to be identified as the main culprit for slow progress in this field.

Let us now turn from force structures to structures of the decision-making process. In this respect, high hopes are placed in the future High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, Javier Solana. However, an analysis of the relevant treaty provision demonstrates the difficulties he will meet:

According to the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) as amended in Amsterdam, the Union could introduce a Common Defence Policy if the European Council so decides. Such a decision would take the form of a "recommendation" from the Council to member states, which they would have to implement "according to their own constitutional provisions". This indicates that implementation is not around the corner. Paragraph 2 of article 17 of the TEU includes "combat missions and crisis-management including peace enforcing missions" into the possible tasks of an European defence policy. The Cologne declaration stresses to this end that "the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so in order to respond to international crises". The authors hastened to add: "without

13 For a long time there will remain a need to station forces in the Balkans (Bosnia, Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia). This need will absorb most European countries. In the Southern Caucasus, action plans have been prepared. This planned most imaginable crisis in the Persian Gulf, the Greater Middle East or in North Africa would require American participation and American command. Crises in this area which the United States consider a purely European affair are difficult to imagine. It follows that there is very little room for European military actions, be it under the NATO umbrella or even less so under an independent EU/WEU command.

prejudice to actions by NATO". This text provides a useful guide through various problems:

- As to "the capacity for autonomous actions", the Union has not reached it as long as there is no basic agreement on a common defence policy (see above). It has not created the institutional framework. The WEU would provide such a framework once it were in a position to prepare and execute actions of the European Union of a defence nature (paragraph 3 of article 17). This would require, according to the same paragraph, a set of "practical arrangements" notably on the relations between the original WEU members and the Non-NATO members (Austria and Ireland) of this organization, as well as its "Associated Members" and "Associated Partners". The present author admires the intellectual capacity of those who are able to penetrate this messy conglomerate of overlapping memberships between NATO, EU and WEU with a view to make common military actions possible, in particular in cases where NATO assets would be used, and Non-NATO and WEU-members could participate.
- "Backed by credible military forces": This is a political aim for the mid-term future. At present the forces of EU members do not constitute a credible armed force capable of more than post-conflict interposition (as presently in the Balkans), and certainly not for independent European military enforcement.
- "The means to decide to use them": if this somewhat vague term refers to voting procedures, the answer is in the treaty: Its article 23 requires unanimity for decisions with military or defence policy implications.
- "A readiness to do so": As stated, a series of complicated negotiations would be needed before the EU would be able to lead military operations, indeed with or without NATO assets in capabilities. These negotiations will prove highly sensitive as they imply sacrifices in traditions and in sovereignty, cost money and above all, require political willpower—another scarce commodity which will also be needed in important other fields, such as enlargement negotiations, and structural reform.

In conclusion, in spite of an impressive amount of paperwork both on the official level with its high-sounding declarations and on the analytical level with its abundance of sharp-witted analyses, only extremely slow progress can be expected towards the goal of a Europe capable of military action, be it under the NATO umbrella or, even less, on its own. This will disappoint public opinion in many countries, given the expectations raised by the official rhetoric, and Germany risks exposing itself as the scapegoat for the deficits.

### *2.2 Foreign Policy of the EU – non-military elements*

Let us first state in passing that long-term, the EU is unlikely to develop into the role of a power broker in major crisis areas such as the Middle-East. In Iraq, France and Britain pursue opposite policies. The Middle East peace process is the most notable example of the "Sarajevo syndrome". Just as the Sarajevo airport was built with EU money and inaugurated by the US Secretary of Defence, the EU too often assumes the role of the paymaster and leaves the political control to the United States. In spite of the unhappiness expressed by politicians and public opinion about this division of labour, the European Union has continued to accept it, again in Dayton for Bosnia, and recently in Cologne for Kosovo where, again, the EU has the task only of rebuilding the infrastructure of the province. The general public accepts a broader activity of EU institutions in supporting regional co-operation with the aim of stabilizing certain areas. Such efforts are underway in the Baltic Sea co-operation, or in supporting the co-operation between Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Moldova (GUUA). In the latter case, the support goes into co-operation in the field of transport and oil and gas pipelines. This could contribute to a stabilization of the areas of making its member states less dependent on Russia, induce them to co-operation and improve their infrastructure.<sup>14</sup> A widely unknown example of such

14 C.f. instead of many: A. Missiroli, "Towards a European Security and Defense Identity?", in Matthias Jopp and Hermann Ojanen (Eds), *European Security Integration: Implications for Non-alignment and Alliances*, Programme of the Western European Union, Northern Dimension of the SFSP, vol.3, Helsinki et al. 1999, p. 21.

stabilizing efforts by the EU is the meeting of the Presidents of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaidjan in Luxembourg in June 1999 at the occasion of these countries' respective co-operation agreements with the EU. This was the first common declaration by the three Presidents. The declaration could of course not solve the existing political problems, in particular not the conflict of Nagorno-Kharabagh but it declared co-operation in economic and infrastructure issues possible, in particular with new pipelines. In this context the declaration contains an important political statement, namely that the tracing of such lines should be guided by economic considerations. With these principles, the three Presidents have distanced themselves from American efforts to plan new pipelines through South East Turkey to prevent cheaper transit through Russia and, above all, Iran.

### *2.3 The Stability Pact for South-East Europe*

This "Pact" is the most ambitious project of these regional efforts. It is not a legal instrument but a political initiative which unites all states of the area and the European Union as its sponsor and player of a "leading role". The Founding Document of 10 June 1999, is also signed by the Non-EU Members of the G-8, i.e. the United States, Canada, Japan and Russia. The aims of the Pact are described in broad terms and include everything to make the area an island of happiness. The restoration of stability in Kosovo is to be part of a wider strategy.

The document contains a pledge by the countries of the area to co-operate closely. It is the first time that all countries of the region have entered into such a pledge. This is a new and promising element. Regional stability can only be achieved if all states between the Alps and the Aegean Sea conduct continuous political consultations and co-operate together in various economic fields. It probably was this wide extension of the area which enabled all states, notably Croatia and Slovenia, to associate themselves.

It remains to be seen whether the States of the area implement their commitments in good faith and whether the main sponsor, the European Union, will carry out its "expressed determination". This would mean to elevate regional stability in South-East Europe to one of the central tasks for the European Union for the years to come. It would rank as high on the

## The European Security Landscape after Kosovo

EU agenda as a new comprehensive Intergovernmental Conference on the structures of the Union as proposed by the new President of the Commission, Prodi, as the current and future enlargement negotiations, and the preparations for a Common Security and Defence Policy.

The mechanisms of this Stability Pact provide for a Special Co-ordinator which is the German politician Bodo Hombach. There are to be three Working Tables—one on the human dimension, one on economics, and one on security issues. These tables should work out "arrangements" between the participants. This institutional framework is flexible and leaves room for interpretation. This could be an advantage if the process gains momentum. This, however, cannot be taken for granted as the following short discussion of the possible programs of the three "Tables" demonstrates:

- As to Table 1, problems of democratisation and human rights, in particular those of minorities, were also in the centre of negotiations initiated by the first Stability Pact proposed by the European Union in Copenhagen and culminating in the Paris Conference in 1994. It brought progress for the position of certain minorities, in particular between Hungary and its neighbours Slovakia and Romania. So far there is a need for constant survey of implementation of the existing obligations. The remaining minorities in Serbia (Hungarians in Vojvodjina and Bosnians in the Sandjak) can only be addressed after Serbia is admitted as a participant to the Pact. This is made dependent on the end of the Milosevic era. The problems in the two international protectorates (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo) will mainly be dealt with by the respective administrations. It is difficult to see how their solution could be promoted by the activities of a "Table" of the Stability Pact. At best, this Table would replace the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna as a debating place and clearing house for problems in this field.
- Similar considerations apply to the Working Table on Security Issues. Insofar as there is a concrete need for regional arms control, this has already been dealt with in the respective provisions of the Dayton agreement. Under article III of Annex 1b of this Agreement, a

satisfactory set of confidence— and security—building measures was worked out. The new Table "could be used to reanimate this set of rules after the end of the hostilities in and around Kosovo". Measures for subregional arms control under article IV of Annex 1b were under active consideration by the partners before the war broke out. Their present state is unclear. It is unlikely that Serbia is presently prepared to continue in negotiations. A broader regional arms control agreement according to article V of Annex 1b would be good subject for future activities of this "Table" but not before Serbia is admitted. Pending this, the table could render useful services as a day-to-day permanent debating forum for security issues. Here again, the problem of duplicating work done in the OSCE exists. Apart from military security, this Working Table will also form a subgroup on "democratic policing" which is meant to acquaint regional leaders with Western-style political correctness in police methods—an arduous task indeed.

- The second Table on economic issues should develop into the central element of the initiative. It is a long-term task, given the already-existing deficits in infrastructure and the additional massive damage to infrastructure notably in Serbia. A long-term engagement of all donors, in particular major EU countries, is a prerequisite. The Vienna European Council of 1998 tasked the Commission to elaborate a Common Strategy for the Western Balkans. This document will allow to judge whether the EU has a feasible concept. The Cologne European Council provided for the creation of a Special Agency for implementing such reconstruction programs. This agency was supposed to start its work before the end of this summer, a deadline which has already proved unrealistic. However, such an agency is badly needed: International assistance in administering aid is necessary. At present, the funds under the PHARE and TACIS programs of the EU in many cases could not flow into the region because of the incapacity of countries to elaborate projects and to administer their execution.
- The greatest hope opened by the Stability Pact Initiative is not material reconstruction. Efforts in this field would only provide a framework and the incentive for a change in deeply rooted habits in the area. The

countries of the Balkans could, by working and discussing together on a permanent basis, establish broad contacts and become used to concrete co-operation. The prospect of EU membership may be an incentive. At the forthcoming European Council in Helsinki, Romania and Bulgaria will have their negotiations opened, although the economic and administrative realities will not allow concrete discussions on the "acquis communautaire" in any field. With the exception of Serbia and Moldova, all other countries have at least obtained a recognition of the possibility to become a member—no mean achievement for a country like Albania. To be sure, their EU perspective is still extremely dim. The terminology used in the respective passages of the Cologne Council Conclusions and the Stability Pact Initiative is guarded and highly conditional ("closer to the perspective of full integration of these countries into its structures", point 20 of the Stability Pact document). Yet, the recognition of eligibility might serve as an encouragement. The exclusion of Moldova, whose structural and economic problems are comparable to those of Albania is intriguing. Apparently, the old concept of former Commission President Delors of the two pillars of European stability —EU and CIS — still looms around. It has passed its time: the EU is already an efficient provider of "soft security" in the post Soviet space, notably in the South Caucasus area.<sup>15</sup>

To sum up: the most promising activities of the EU in the field of Security are of "soft" but efficient nature: in conflict prevention and post-conflict co-operation by providing material resources and inspiring regional co-operation. The Balkan Stability Pact gives the EU a chance to develop from a mere provider of money and advice into a political player that co-

15 C.f. Friedemann Müller/ Claude Zullo (Eds), "The European Union and the Caucasus Region: Oil, Interests, and Influence", Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik; c.f. also: Detlev Wolter "Die Kaukasus-Politik der Europäischen Union", *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B42/99, pp 32-39. Wolter gives a detailed resumé of the various programs and activities, stresses their stabilizing effects and their potential, both for the area and the EU's international role. He, too, emphasizes the Meeting of the three Caucasian Presidents on June 22, 1999, and their common Declaration, to which he ascribes "historic relevance".

determines the political shape of an area. However, the outcome is uncertain. The initiative still runs the risk of ending in confusion<sup>16</sup> or coming under American political control (for which there are preliminary indications<sup>17</sup>). Should it be positive, the political profile of CFSP would be much enhanced, and Mr Solana's chances improved.

### **3. Conclusions**

Operation "Allied Force" has brought some clarifications and has changed certain trends. The Balkans will absorb a good deal of European political energy and even more of Europe's military capacities. Several European NATO Members may be more prudent to resort to military intervention. Such actions will be more likely to be reinforced by diplomatic efforts from the outset. Global institutions like the United Nations and OSCE have proved to be more useful than anticipated. NATO survived its first war intact but may be used less frequently in the future for limited military intervention. The shock and disappointment among European politicians about their countries' military inferiority that became evident during the war will probably not lead to a radical change and the quick establishment of a European defence identity within and even less outside of NATO.

Though being a watershed in several security developments, Operation "Allied Force" did not open a new era in regional history. More likely, it opened the concluding chapter of a former period, that of the wars of succession between the Republics of the former Greater Yugoslavia, by the establishment of an international protectorate over the Serbian province of Kosovo. Although it is categorically excluded in all existing international documents this could lead to the independence of the province, with the possible formal maintenance of nominal Serbian sovereignty.

16 So drastically Erhard Busek, "Die Kosovo-Hilfe ist ein Pfusch" ("The Help for Kosovo is a botched-up job") in *Die Welt*, October 12, 1999.

17 There is a strong American influence on the substance matters to discuss in the Third Working Table. In particular the concept of "democratic policing" is advanced.

## The European Security Landscape after Kosovo

Three more military conflicts are possible in the future: A first one about the status of Kosovo, a second one (which could be part of the former) about the separation of areas inhabited by Serbians from the main part of Kosovo, and another, much later, about the formation of a Greater Albania. Before it comes to all this, Europe should have acquired the "capacity for autonomous action" as discussed above in part 2.1 of this essay. Europe may have a couple of years to develop the region. If it fails to do so, two scenarios are possible:

- Either, the US will again act as the sole peacemaker and political arbiter, or,
- there will be no effective outside intervention and mediation, and the Balkans will end in chaos.

In both cases, the EU would have lost its last chance to establish itself as a political factor.

---

ISSN 1435-3288

ISBN 3-933307-64-3

---



**Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung**  
**Center for European Integration Studies**  
*Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn*

Walter-Flex-Straße 3  
D-53113 Bonn  
Germany

Tel.: +49-228-73-1880  
Fax: +49-228-73-1788  
<http://www.zei.de>