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Shades of Multilateralism
U.S. Perspectives on
Europe’s Role in the
War on Terrorism
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I. Introduction

Europe has long had a pivotal role in American foreign policy. The catastrophic terrorism that came to America on that sunny Tuesday morning in September 2001 is unlikely to change this. Transatlantic relations will remain at the core of world order, even as the American giant concentrates its might on the prevention of another September 11th. Pursuing the perpetrators of that dark deed, and more importantly, thwarting those who would do so again, will top the American political agenda for a long time to come. An unusual mood of determination has settled across the land; nine months on, the flags still fly; the public still gives the President unprecedented support in his “war on terror.” This is an American public that sees the biggest challenges in the war as yet to come.¹

¹ “Americans have no illusions about the difficulty of the battle ahead. Nine in ten say the country has yet to face the most difficult part of the overarching war on terrorism. But that concern has not dampened support for a broader military campaign, including one against the Iraqi president.” Claudia Deane and Dana Milbank, “Public Backs Expanded War but Wants More Attention at Home,” Washington Post, December 21, 2001, p. A28.
It is a people ostensibly ready to do battle with Iraq.² It is an America that sees the challenge of terrorism as long-term and complex.³ Domestic and foreign policies alike have been infused with a new urgency: concentrating the capacities of the shaken nation on warding off the next attack. If others, if Europe, can help in this quest, so much the better.

America’s new determination does not mean America is uninterested in partners. It does mean America is more serious about foreign policy than it has been in a long time. Americans will want to cooperate with partners in Europe and elsewhere — where possible — but Americans will also condone acting alone when necessary. Americans, especially within the broad and diverse foreign policy community, have long debated how much “multilateralism” is possible, how much “unilateralism” is necessary. Operationalized, the abstract opposites “multi” or “uni” most frequently refer to cooperation between the United States of America and the less than united states of Europe. The United States is a global power; all the same, when it talks about international cooperation, it is almost always also talking about cooperation with Europe.

This debate over the value of the transatlantic partnership will go on, in a changed context certainly, but by no means bereft of the many underlying continuities that have come to constitute relations across the Atlantic. U.S. perspectives on Europe’s role in the unfolding war against terrorism must thus be seen in the shadow of this larger, older discourse.

² According to a January, 2002, poll by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, “A solid majority (73%) favors taking military action against Iraq to end Saddam Hussein’s rule there, and as many as 56% support using force even if it means the United States might suffer thousands of casualties.” “Americans Favor Force in Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, and…” www.cfr.org, www.people-press.org

I. Terms and Topic

Speaking of “U.S. perspectives” on any subject inevitably involves a filtering of the roiling discussion that is American politics. A spectrum of contending and coalescing views within the Administration, on Capitol Hill, and across the country — whether in the media, business, the non-profit sector or academe — leave policy often difficult to pin down, subject to much ambiguity and not a little inconsistency.

Interestingly enough, “Europe” has moved this way as well, at least as manifested in Brussels, within the context of an evolving (enlarging) EU presence on the world stage. Checks and balances abound when trying to get 15 (and soon 25 + states) to agree on how to play an active world role. All the same, the states of the European Union are players with a specific presence and a specific profile around the world. The Europeans will never duplicate the United States across the board, nor should they. They will, however, have the capacity to make their uniquely European contribution to global peace and progress. Europe may not be number one on this planet, but is certainly number two in terms of global influence. Moreover, number three, whether China, India or Russia, is a long way behind. Europe counts, but how much it counts is at least as much up to the Europeans as the Americans. As they say, Europe’s problem is not an overly strong America, but an overly weak Europe.

Speaking of a European “role” means assuming that Europe’s states are part of some larger community where role is seen in the context of common objectives. Role, one reads, is a “position, or status, within a social structure that is shaped by relatively precise behavioral expectations (norms).”4 The transatlantic “structure,” is, at any rate, a very important component of Europe’s role and Europe’s world. Norms, as constructivists persuasively argue, do play some large though indefinite part of this evolving transatlantic structure.

Europe thus has a role in the transatlantic community, but also, more specifically, in what has been declared by President Bush as the “war” on
terrorism “that will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.” It is war because of the disaster imposed upon America; because of the urgency of not letting it happen again; because of the sacrifices that may be necessary — whether in terms of blood, treasure, or the right to privacy. As such, and in contrast to Europe, Americans have largely accepted the use of the term „war.” Writing five months after September 11th, Washington Post columnist David Ignatius argued: “Americans feel that they are at war. They feel vulnerable. They want to destroy the enemy before the enemy destroys them. Europeans may find that kind of thinking naive and simplistic, but they can't wish it away.” Though attacked at Pearl Harbor and vulnerable to Soviet ICBMs, American territory had come away from the 20th century’s horrific wars unscathed. The American continent seemed to offer a certain insular protection.

It was this notion of American insulation, so deeply rooted in the nation’s psyche, that was so utterly shattered on September 11 and the weeks thereafter. It is uncertain whether Europeans, so accustomed to their mutual dependencies, really understand how much America was changed by September 11. It is in part this profound challenge to American national consciousness, and the differing historical experiences that underlie it, that account for why Americans have felt as comfortable using the term “war” to describe the anti-terror campaign as Europeans have felt uncomfortable.

War it may be, but war in an American context — where presidents have also been known to declare “war” on things like poverty, crime and drugs.

Not that criticism of the term “war” is entirely absent from the American debate. It is, however, more a reflection of concern about the implied

7 Daniel S. Hamilton, German-American Relations and the Campaign Against Terrorism, (Washington: The American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 2002), http://www.aicgs.org
strategy than the term as such. There is little disagreement about urgency; Americans take this problem seriously. Debate in the U.S. revolves more around the question of whether America can sustain such a war indefinitely. Observers have warned that while war connotes a great sense of urgency, it also implies a struggle of finite duration. Wars end, often with great drama and destruction, often also with a peace agreement and a process of reconciliation. War on terrorism, if that is what it is to be, will not end — at least not if such a war means a constant and continuous effort to ensure that the multiplying means of mass destruction are not used against Americans — or anyone else for that matter. The semantic quibble about “war” is perhaps less important than the underlying reality that the different sides of the Atlantic have a different sense of urgency when it comes to terrorism.

Terrorism itself is a term in search of a definition. The legitimacy of violence is always subject to debate; the legitimacy of terrorism, it seems, is not. In one sense, this does involve a question of who is using violence, and to what end. Washington treats the Palestinian Authority differently than the Taliban. Yet both were governments of a sort; their acts might thus be defined as war crimes. The label „terrorism” tends to fall on non-state actors, which in turn raises the question of balance between law-enforcement and military. Importantly, this definitional issue is not just a question of whom, and to what end; it is also about what kind of violence, and at what level.

Perhaps it is better to approach the problem of definition by recognizing this: the novelty of today’s terrorism is not so much in the motives for violence — which have always been trouble — as in the means of violence. The onward march of technology will bring ever-cheaper, ever-more available, ever-more varied means of mass destruction. In the past, cities and nations were only vulnerable to the many, now they are also vulnerable to the few. Once it was the massed hordes, the commandeered state, that wielded the sword of Damocles, now it can be the terrorist cells that permeate our networked world.
Terrorism, including the use of terror for political purposes, implies a philosophy and strategy of violence. Terrorism can see mass destruction and mass murder as a statement — or as a potent form of leverage against the powers that be, particularly when it can also provoke mass hysteria. Terrorism, Clausewitz would surely say, is also about imposing one’s will on the opponent — whether to extract concessions or effect eradication. Terrorism and the means of mass destruction are inextricably linked — whether talking about states or non-states, about the “axis of evil” or the Al Qaeda. This is the plague of our age: the technologies of mass destruction and those that would seek to use them.

Terrorism rendered in this manner leaves Europe, like America, moving into a dangerous new era of complexity and unpredictability, of connectivity and vulnerability. It is a brave new world where counter-terrorism will be a central part of any foreign policy — and where the network nature of terrorism will leave no choice but to cooperate. The Toffler adage, “the way we make war reflects the way we make wealth,”

implies the anti-terror war will very much be a globalizing endeavor. „The formation of a global coalition against terrorism means that we are now moving beyond the globalization of the economy to the globalization of politics,” writes Wolfgang Ischinger, Germany’s Ambassador to the United States. On this front, too, the civilized world must seek to exploit the efficiencies of comparative advantage: network against network,

modern societies as a multitude of actors arrayed against those who would seek to tear their world asunder.

It will be a world, nonetheless, that will demand more of foreign policy than counter-terrorism. Survival is not enough; extending a helping hand

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10 Network is part of today’s Zeitgeist. RAND analysts David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla have done much to bring this term into the strategic discourse. See their Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (Rand Report, 2001), www.rand.org
11 Germans might see this as Wehrhafte Demokratie plus Zivilcourage.
also has its merit. Sustaining development, democratization and peace—in other words, making globalization sustainable—will, nonetheless, require a significant degree of success in the war on terrorism. For the United States and for Europe, the question of relative roles — whether in helping out or rooting out — will be an important one. Its importance is also clearly reflected in the US discussion of Europe’s role in the war on terrorism.

2. Assumptions and Analysis

Putting a number of this study’s operating assumptions on the table is an appropriate place to begin. The main arguments are as follows:

- Europe’s role is both important and contentious for the United States.
- More enduring geopolitical issues structure current transatlantic debates.
- Europe’s role in the war on terrorism must be multifaceted and rooted in its own comparative advantage.

Europe’s significance in this effort is clear, not only because of its capabilities, but also because of its vulnerabilities. Most US observers clearly recognize that Europe is very much a part of the war on terrorism; Europe is simply too linked to the United States and the democratic, open-market world not to be. Europe also offers an attractive alternate target set. “If America raises its defenses and its friends do not follow suit swiftly, softer European targets will become attractive to the terrorists,” writes

former Clinton National Security Council counter-terror expert, Daniel Benjamin. Indeed, where would Europe turn if the Vatican were hit, or the Frankfurt Messeturm, or the House of Commons?

Cooperation may thus be essential, but this does not make it any easier. New challenges mean renegotiating roles. Being an integral part of the intertwined and vulnerable “civilized” world means having to deal with a host of potentially contentious international issues. Europe and America need to address these issues; a new set of understandings needs to be worked out.

These contentious issues are a function of U.S. and European hopes, expectations and concerns about the other’s role. Counter-terror strategy, including homeland defense, is a new (and newly defined) priority. New substance and new forms have come to the transatlantic debate, but underlying and older patterns persist as well. September 11th adds a new appliqué to what was already a very big and complicated world. It seems appropriate to start by briefly examining what U.S. counter-terror strategy is. Next, the larger, older question of Europe’s place in America’s world deserves brief mention.

With the stage thus set, we can move to identify the implications of all this for U.S. views of European roles. Using a debate-based model of transatlantic relations can help to understand these implications. Certain fissures have long characterized transatlantic relations — at least in their geopolitical guise. Europe and America — operating within a community of interests and values reinforced by an increasing density of interaction — do have their differences. Unending but not unraveling, debates have long revolved around three basic geopolitical issues.

First, what is the relationship between power sharing and burden sharing? Many say that America wants Europe to bear more burden, while Europe wants America to grant more influence. Certainly, Europe wants influence in Washington, and at a good price. This should not, however, detract from the other side of the equation. American wants influence in Europe, and also at a good price. Deals regarding burden and influence are the fabric of transatlantic relations, a fabric that is continually rewoven.
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Second, what is the relationship between Europe and the world? Standard wisdom is that Europe wants America to focus more on Europe and America wants Europe to focus more on the world: for example, the “globalization” of European foreign policy, the involvement of NATO in distant „regional conflicts.” In reality, relative balance varies from issue to issue — from Kyoto to the World Trade Organization to the Taiwan Straits. The Europe-or-the-world debate comes in many manifestations, all the more so in today’s ever more interdependent world.

Third, what is the relationship between the carrot and the stick? Here, observers hold that America is quick to the stick, while Europeans savor the carrot. Americans win wars, Europeans win the peace. True, Europe will not equal American military might any time soon, but that reality must not imply that views totally diverge on the appropriate balance between force and diplomacy. Divergence in outlook can come from divergence in capability. All the same, equal capabilities will not be forthcoming anytime soon (at least in terms of autonomous military action). Europeans and Americans must thus address the challenge of diverging outlooks in other ways. An open exchange of ideas, a concerted exploration of roles and options, can help to ameliorate the divergences. If the problem (and nature) of terrorism is a given, then common strategies should not be impossible to achieve, whether in terms of burden and influence, Europe and the world, and last but not least, carrot and stick.

Geopolitics is not everything. Clearly, the dramatic increase in transnational and transgovernmental interaction has added a new dimension to transatlantic concert and controversy. Issues like consumer protection or environmental protection, child custody rights or the death penalty, anti-trust or agriculture subsidies, health care or education, immigration schemes or pension reform — all these are of increasing international political importance. Numerous points of contact mean numerous points of potential friction. Debates about standards and „level playing fields”, debates based on values about domestic order, clearly make today’s transatlantic discourse both richer and more complex.
Older, more geopolitical questions nevertheless continue to shape the transatlantic relationship. As noted above, these questions relate to power and influence in a changing world, a world changed by the terrorism of September 11th. Terrorism, by its nature, will increase the crosscurrents of exchange between the global and geopolitical and the transnational and domestic. The “tactical level” of counter-terrorism is not only about the hunt in far off lands, but about the vulnerability of one’s own society as well. Homeland defense — in an age of openness — is one of terrorism’s big new challenges. Linking the “first responders” on both sides of the Atlantic, whether immigration officials or fire fighters, will also be a transnational affair. Counter-terrorism, at least at the tactical level, will very much parallel the globalization model of production. Nor are such networks immune to controversy. Even in a network, coordination is also a question of who is coordinating whom. Counter-terror networks will rub up against each other in numerous and unpredictable ways, sometimes generating positive synergy, sometimes intense debate. This will not make the geopolitical issues of territorial influence and order go away, it will simply make them more complex.

With the political landscape ferreted out, the study concludes with an examination of the various policy proposals that have emerged from the American discussion of Europe’s role in the war on terrorism. Needing to be both politically possible and strategically effective, such proposals can be grouped under seven themes:

- Political Solidarity
- Military Capability
- Intelligence Sharing
- Counter-Terror Law Enforcement
- Regional Conflict Resolution
- Homeland Security and Border Affairs
- Reality Check

These proposals need to be seen against the backdrop of a US counter-terror strategy that will be multidimensional and thus, multilateral. Transatlantically, integrative capacity will count as much as individual
capacity. Making war like one makes money, it will be network vs. network and Europe will need to put particular emphasis on its areas of comparative advantage. Transatlantic cooperation will spread into new, as yet uncharted territories, but it is hard to imagine it will be any less necessary during the next 50 years than it was during the last 50 years.

II. High Noon? U.S. Counter-Terror Strategy

“Chase ‘em down,” “smoke ‘em out,” “take ‘em, dead or alive” — even President George W. Bush was talking this way. The world as the Wild West writ large — an American metaphor that captured well the mood across the country in the fall of 2001. It was clear that strategy would have to adapt to a fast, open and lawless world of diffusing technology and complex interdependence, where the dividing line between foreign and domestic policy had just grown a lot less clear. Novel threats would require novel responses. In a networked age, it would be network vs. network. Counter-terrorism, like all strategies, would be about finding the right mix of policies — the right box of tools — to achieve the intended objectives in the face of the specific challenges. While the strategy that has developed since September 11th has many shades, three bear mention; the strategy is American, it is multidimensional, and it is multilateral.

I. American – “United We Stand”

The body blows that came on September 11th saw the Administration, the Congress, and the country pulling together in a remarkable showing of unity and determination. Seldom had this optimistic, pragmatic materialistic, post-modern and self-absorbed nation experienced such a

15 It was hunting season and High Noon to boot. Americans critical of Europe’s timorous role, like former CIA Director, James Woolsey, drew a more specific parallel, namely to Hollywood’s classic Western, High Noon, where the marshal (USA) gets no help from the cowardly townspeople (Europe). See R. James Woolsey, “Where's the Posse? It's high noon for the civilized world. Let timorous Europeans go home to their kids,” Wall Street Journal, February 25, 2002.
sobering moment. The roaring 1990s came to a screeching halt. The world suddenly looked a lot more dangerous — and a lot more complicated. All the same, it was clear early on, and this was reflected in the polls, that the novel nature of the enemy called for an equally novel response. Americans may not consider themselves sophisticated, but they do believe in being smart, quick thinking, innovative, even imaginative. United, they would stand up to this new challenge, and united they would stand it down. Everyone doing their part also meant everyone talking about strategy and ethics and what to tell children — the Internet was a froth with American and global discussion about what to do. When it came to strategy, it seemed everyone had an opinion. It would have to be broad ranging but focused, forceful but diplomatic, multilateral but unencumbered, at home and abroad. At any rate, to “prevail” America would need to find an American mix of policies, a mix politically sustainable at home and strategically effective abroad.

Government by debate would not go away — even in this time of national unity. The Bush Administration has had much to debate — both within its ranks and outside them — since those intensely dramatic weeks of September. Big decisions have had to come fast but they have not always come easy. Wide-ranging deliberation, if not controversy, has been a part of strategy formulation since the moment the planes struck. As the initial shock wears off, policy debates will grow more open, more partisan, and more normal. Still, the new intensity and focus of foreign policy, in a

nation very suddenly concerned about world affairs, will likely continue well past the one-year anniversary of the September 11th attacks.\textsuperscript{21}

Partisanship is a part of America’s political landscape, but today’s differing views also reflect the terra incognita in which the country finds itself. The anthrax assault and the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon showed a new side to conflict. Americans recognize that a faceless global enemy will be a tricky one to track down. The novelty of the threat is one of strategy’s biggest challenges. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld gets a hearing when he says: “We ... are going to have to fashion a new vocabulary and different constructs for thinking about what it is we're doing.” And his Commander-in-Chief, President George Bush, reads from the same page: “Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign unlike any other we have ever seen.”\textsuperscript{22}

Strategy will be tentative and testing, open minds will need to prevail.\textsuperscript{23} A concerted and determined nation will still need a flexible, adaptable, “upgradeable“ strategy. All the same, in contrast to the 1990s, “where policies proliferate(d) without strategy,”\textsuperscript{24} America is suddenly more focused. The special interests, above all those on the fringe, are having a tougher time pushing through their narrow agendas.\textsuperscript{25} Economic turbulence, Enron, November’s 2002 mid-term elections, and a host of other potential surprises will divert the attention of this angered America, but the urgency of repelling the next attack will not fade soon.

\textsuperscript{23} “Americans Open to Dissenting Views on the War on Terrorism; September 11 Shock Slow to Recede - 42% Still Depressed,” The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, October 4, 2001 http://people-press.org/
\textsuperscript{24} “It is therefore not a promising sign that after 1989, as in 1919, the American foreign policy debate appears to be subsiding again into a standoff, while policies proliferate in the absence of strategy.” Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World, (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2001), p. 320.
\textsuperscript{25} Jackson Diehl, “Pendulum Shifts In Foreign Affairs; Special interests lose their grip,” Washington Post, October 1, 2001. See also “The Mood of America: What September 11\textsuperscript{th} really wrought,” The Economist, Jan. 10, 2002.
Opinion polling shows a determined public, willing to make sacrifices, willing to fight.26 “But the same polls that indicate public support for both air and ground action in the fight against terrorism also show that Americans would much rather engage in conflict as part of an international alliance than unilaterally.” Clay Ramsey, of the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland continues, “Americans don't want to be the world's policeman, but they do want a more orderly and livable world and are ready to participate in creating that.”27 This multilateral preference has long been seen in public opinion polls in regard to the use of force.28 A green light from the UN Security Council (Gulf War) or the 19 veto powers on NATO’s North Atlantic Council (Kosovo War) can tip the scales domestically into support for military action. Even in the case of a causus beli as clear as that against Taliban and Al Qaeda, the White House was surely quite happy to get unanimous support from the UN and NATO. The impression of international acquiescence, if not support, will likely remain a precondition for getting the U.S. public to back assertive, even violent action against perceived threats — including that posed by Iraq. On this, a transatlantic gap of sorts has emerged: the American public seems to be satisfied that the campaign is being conducted


28 Speaking of “sustained internationalism,” a 1999 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations report concludes: “As in all previous surveys, support for an active role for the United States in the world remains strong, with 61% of the public and 96% of leaders favoring such activism.” And speaking of a “preference for multilateralism,” the report stated, “Seventy-two percent of the public and 48% of leaders think the United States should not take action alone in responding to international crises if it does not have the support of allies.” American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1999, www.ccrf.org
by a “coalition;” the European public, by contrast, is not so much of this opinion, instead continuing to see Bush as a unilateralist.

Two-thirds of the American public has long held that the U.S. must be internationally engaged, with vital interests existing around the globe. This internationalist inclination among the broader public has risen since September 11th. More importantly, however, Americans now take foreign policy much more seriously. Support for multilateral internationalism was a ‘mile wide and an inch deep’ on September 10th—in other words, it had no salience. The Gallup polling organization has noted that the number of those saying foreign affairs “extremely important” has risen from 17 percent in January 2001 to 52 percent in October, 2001. Selling international partnership to this public should not be too difficult. What to do with this pronounced new interest in foreign policy and the high levels

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29 Speaking on the occasion of the six-month anniversary of September 11th, President Bush focused squarely on the “coalition.” See “President Thanks World Coalition for Anti-Terrorism Efforts. Remarks by the President on the Six-Month Anniversary of the September 11th Attacks,” Office of the Press Secretary, March 11, 2002, www.whitehouse.gov

30 “Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Bush Administration has stressed the importance of Allied contributions to the war on terrorism. In particular, the Administration has made clear the need for help from scores of countries around the world to hunt down terrorists, cut their communications, eradicate their financial networks, eliminate their bases of operations, and dry up their recruiting pools. The Pew/CFR/IHT findings suggest that while the Administration’s public diplomacy campaign may be playing well in Peoria, it isn’t doing as well in Paris.” “Americans and Europeans Differ Widely on Foreign Policy Issues; Bush's Ratings Improve But He's Still Seen as Unilateralist,” Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, April 20, 2002, www.people-press.org

31 op cit, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.

32 “The terrorist attacks and the war in Afghanistan have created a new internationalist sentiment among the public. There is much more support for a multilateral foreign policy than before Sept.11, with roughly six-in-ten (59%) now saying that the interests of allies should be taken into account by U.S. policymakers. By about a two-to-one margin (61%-32%) the public thinks that taking an active role in the world, rather than becoming less involved, will be a more effective way of avoiding problems like terrorism in the future. And support for assertive U.S. leadership also has grown, with as many as 45% saying that the United States should either be the single world leader or at least be the most active of leading nations.” “America’s New Internationalist Point of View,” op cit.

of support for President Bush’s performance is a more vexing question. Political capital can only be spent so many times; one must hope that President Bush will use his wisely.

Accompanying the determination, unity, sophistication, and multilateralism of America’s understanding of the war on terror are a few more idiosyncratic elements. To start with, visitors to America can hardly fail to notice the flags — symbols of patriotism, determination, sorrow. The flags are hung, it seems, as a personal act of remembrance and respect, and also as a showing of spirit and unity. Writing the flags off as simple American jingoism would be unfair and incorrect. Indeed, there is a strikingly multi-ethnic face to America’s mourning, an almost reflexive reach for tolerance and empathy — not least in regard America’s 2 million-strong Arab community.  

There are also the more dysfunctional traits. America, argues Washington Post columnist, E.J. Dionne, is “bipolar” (a gentler synonym for “manic-depressive”). He says “…yes, the United States, like all powerful countries throughout history, can become arrogant in its might and self-deluding when it assumes that everyone wants to be like us. But the real danger lies in what might be seen as a national bipolar syndrome. This entails a tendency to ignore our virtues entirely at some moments, and to see ourselves as the only virtuous nation on earth at others. Oscillating wildly between self-doubt and hubris is a bad idea for nations, as for individuals.”  

Others have warned of national “attention deficit disorders,” i.e., that a proliferation of policies with no overarching strategy is still America’s default setting.

The United States’ sudden awakening to “catastrophic terrorism” will, nevertheless, leave a deep mark on the American mind. September 11th’s brutal corroboration of yesterday’s Cassandras will also reinforce a more


35 Ibid.

fundamental realization: “if you don’t do the world it will do you.” Americans can also be expected to recognize something else: counter-terrorism is a necessary, but not sufficient component of foreign policy. Survival is not enough. America, if history is any guide, will also seek to inject a little “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness” into the affairs of the world.


Multidimensionality is not headline grabbing. The CNN camera teams may not portray it as dramatically as bunkers being blown apart around Bagram airbase; as U.S. Special Forces on horseback, with laser designators unleashing lightning bolts from the sky; or even as a Kabul of kite-flying children and women, walking the streets, unveiled and smiling. Nevertheless, counter-terror strategy is nothing if it is not multidimensional — the perspective of the television camera notwithstanding. Military force certainly has its part, and it, too, is newly multidimensional in the context of its own Revolution in Military Affairs — but the military is only one piece of the larger strategic mosaic.

When it comes to this mosaic’s many pieces and to their relationships and relative relevance to one another, opinions will be many — in America and across the Atlantic. So will questions: What is the connection between winning wars and winning the peace? Between precision-strike and nation-building? Between information dominance and peacekeeping? Between commandos ambushing Al Qaeda fighters and financial cyber-sleuths trapping money launderers? When do law-enforcement officers talk to intelligence officers? Should more money go to “first responders” like firefighters and policemen or to public health and civil defense or to the

37 Following terrorist money trail is one area where network strategy is particularly important. Dan Hamilton writes: “Outside the glare of headlines that routinely focus on transatlantic squabbling, the United States and its European allies have been forming their own complex, almost invisible and somewhat unconventional network of cooperation that has become the foundation of joint efforts to freeze terrorist funds, toughen financial transparency measures, and bring aggressive threats of sanctions to those not cooperating.” Daniel S. Hamilton, op cit.
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(soon to be defunct) U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service? Neither can one ignore the need to come down one way or another on a multitude of related international questions, for example, India and Pakistan, or Israel and Palestine.

In today’s globalized world, open borders are both a blessing and a curse. A Revolution in Border Affairs is thus every bit as important as a Revolution in Military Affairs. This is as true of the enlarging European Union\(^\text{38}\) as it is of the United States. The White House web site on responding to terrorism puts it this way: “Each year, more than 500 million people are admitted into the United States, of which 330 million are non-citizens. On land, 11.2 million trucks and 2.2 million rail cars cross into the United States, while 7,500 foreign-flag ships make 51,000 calls in U.S. ports annually.”\(^\text{39}\) Close relations and increasingly open borders between Mexico and Canada imply, in particular, the need for a North American border management system.\(^\text{40}\) Border affairs are also about bankers agreeing on new multilateral measures to deprive the world’s Aum Shinrikyos and Medelins of their financial sustenance — and doing so without clogging the arteries of global investment. Border affairs are about local police working together in new ways with federal law-enforcement, immigration and intelligence officials to develop new rules of engagement for tracking and trapping terrorists. Border affairs are also, and very fundamentally, about a nation’s information space, its information infrastructure — and here, there are an infinite number of border crossings.\(^\text{41}\) Sophisticated filters and firewalls, global webcams, pervasive


\(^\text{39}\) See www.whitehouse.gov/resonse

\(^\text{40}\) ”Although the United States has renewed its focus on homeland defense following the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, true security will require the United States to implement a continental defense system with Canada and Mexico.” See, “War Plan Series Part 3: North American Theater of Operations,” Sep 26, 2001, www.stratfor.com

computing — it will be a world made more transparent in defense of a world more open. \(^42\)

The complexity of the challenge is a reflection of the complexity of our world. It is a world more connected, but by no means more monochrome. Globalization does not mean homogenization, much less Americanization. Instead, it is driven by the eclectic search for comparative advantage, for synergy and symbiosis in what is, fortunately, more often than not a positive-sum world. Globalization, at its core, is about interconnected diversity – e pluribus Unum. The Information Revolution, the Age of Internet, complex globe-spanning networks, systems of systems. To take down the bad guys, you have to understand them; you also have to understand the terrain: „to degrade, defeat and destroy twenty-first century terrorist networks, we must learn to fight as a network ourselves, one with global reach and an ability to bring to bear at the right time the right tool for maximum effectiveness.”\(^43\)

If “network vs. network” is one defining characteristic of counter-terror, “at home and abroad” is another. Harvard political scientist Stanley Hoffman’s assertion that “nothing is purely domestic or purely international anymore,”\(^44\) holds true for much of our world, but particularly for terrorism. In addition to portions of the supplemental $40 billion Emergency Response Fund appropriated by Congress in September, 2001, the FY 2003 “war” budget Bush submitted to Congress in January 2002 puts $38 billion into Homeland Defense, almost doubling what had already been steep increases on national infrastructure protection and homeland defense during the Clinton Administration.\(^45\) Consolidating this task under a single authority was initiated with the designation of Governor Tom


Ridge as Director of a new Office on Homeland Security on September 20, 2001; some nine months later, the President asked Congress to create a new department, tasked with pulling some 100 different government agencies under one roof, the Department for Homeland Security, while retaining the independence of both the CIA and the FBI. Homeland defense is also a military/non-military mix — culturally, if not constitutionally — with uncertain new domestic roles for America’s soldiers, including for example, 8000 National Guardsmen keeping watch on airports across the land.46

U.S. counter-terror strategy is multidimensional in another key aspect. It focuses on both state and non-state actors, on Taliban and Al Qaeda, on the government of Iran and Uzbekistan’s Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO). President Bush’s January 2002 “axis-of-evil” State of the Union speech sought to show the connection between problematic (if not evil) governments, technologies of mass destruction and globe-spanning, non-state terrorist networks. The relative importance of the elements of this triangle — and their relationship to each other — is debated within the United States, and more so across the Atlantic. The strategic forecasting outfit in Austin, Texas, stratfor.com, puts it like this: “the issue of state sponsors of terrorism, [is] a key source of disagreement between Washington and Brussels. The United States and Europe are close allies in the war against terrorism. They have expanded efforts to share intelligence, collaborate on tracking the financial networks of militant groups and arrest alleged terrorists. But as Washington attempts to bully or coerce suspected state sponsors of terrorism in political and security matters, Europe is less likely to want to help.”47

Addressing this gap would be easier, some would say, if the United States would be a little less “unilateralist.” Phil Gordon and Nicole Gnessetto, of the Brookings Institution in Washington and the European Union’s Center for Security Studies in Paris, teamed up to make the following argument:

One key drawback of the re-emergence of American unilateralist and military instincts is that it provides a pretext for Europeans to ignore the very real problem – the potential nexus between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction – that the Americans are worried about. The more the Europeans concentrate on U.S. attitudes and statements, the more they avoid seriously assessing the threat. 48

The “nexus between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction” is also clearly a function of the way particular states position themselves vis-à-vis certain terrorist groups, whether those states are within an “axis of evil” or outside of it. Iraq may top the most-wanted list, but other states can make trouble as well.

However much controversy reverberates back and forth across the Atlantic when it comes to Saddam Hussein and Iraq, the matter remains a cluster of tough unanswered questions in the United States as well. It is not so much the need for “regime change” as the when and how: Before the mid-term elections or after? Before UN inspections have failed or after? Following six months of intense build up in the theater, or twelve months of slower movement? With a coup or without? With the Kurds and the Shiites or without? With airpower and Special Forces or with an occupying army?49 With peacekeepers or without? With nation building or without? With casualties or without? And more geopolitically: with Palestine burning or not? With Saudi Arabia and Egypt or not? With Russia and China or not? With Europe or not? Debate on Iraq revolves around the reality that there are no easy answers50 and the reality that the debate has been going on for long while.51 The importance of keeping the Europeans (or at least Britain) abreast and on board also moves with the larger currents of U.S. debate on

the future of Iraq. This will continue; the Mideast and its problems will not go away; America and Europe will sometimes disagree over how to engage terrorist challenges the newly formed multilateral Mideast fire brigade, the “Quartet” (United States, European Union, Russia, United Nations) notwithstanding.

Counter-terror strategy is also multidimensional in its larger implications for the evolution of world order. Henry Kissinger speaks of novel opportunities on this front in arguing that: “[t]he war on terrorism is not just about hunting down terrorists. It is, above all, to protect the extraordinary opportunity that has come about to recast the international system. The North Atlantic nations, having understood their common dangers, can turn to a new definition of common purposes.” Jim Hoagland, two-time Pulitzer Prize winning foreign policy columnist at the Washington Post echoes this sentiment, saying, “the way in which the campaign is conducted, and the long-term goals it serves, can establish new organizing principles and priorities for international relations for years or decades to come. The roles that democracies and dictatorships will be called on to play in the American agenda of the 21st century will be made clearer by this conflict.”

That counter-terror strategy must consist of a new and complex mix of elements is clear in the United States. It is not just a military problem; on this there is no doubt. All the same, much is in need of debate. The right mix of multidimensionality needs to be found and it needs to be kept up to date. Competing goals need to be reconciled. A multidimensional strategy across a broad front, harnessed to America’s new determination, and seeking a global coalition of coalitions whether at home or abroad, must thus also be multilateral.

3. Multilateral: Mission or Coalition?

“We will rally the world,” said President George Bush.55 Ground zero was still a smoldering, fiery mountain of twisted steel as US coalition building went into overdrive. The world’s leaders passed solemnly through Washington and New York; Bush administration point men fanned out across the globe. Donald Rumsfeld and Colin Powell, the ying and yang of American diplomacy, landed in one capital after the other, seeking to construct a global coalition against terror. The world did truly rally, at least for a short while. In this way, the world also became a smaller place — American unilateralism notwithstanding. Americans have many reasons for not wanting to be overly “entangled” by international commitments and institutions. To say that September 11th is one of these would be to misunderstand the impact of that event on American foreign policy and public opinion.

In the immediate aftermath of the attack and still reeling from the shock of what had transpired, the Bush national security team set out to build a broad front against terrorism; to put the political pieces into place before going on the warpath (the turning of Pakistan being a particularly notable achievement). But it was more than just the impending war in Afghanistan. America’s bilateral relations with most states suddenly found new definition. Knowing who is doing what in all of the world’s 200 sovereign states has just become a lot more important for the United States — and the State Department is keeping score in what it calls the “mother of all matrixes.”56 With Al Qaeda cells suspected in some 70 countries, America will seek to engage the world’s governments with new intensity. If preventing imminent attack means acting in lieu of those governments, America will be so inclined. Nor is this engagement limited to today’s suspects. A new level of international engagement does not (yet) mean a new agreement on the nature of that engagement. How much to rely on

others to prevent the next attack has not been uncontested within the administration’s ranks. It has been one of the central questions of strategy formulation since the attacks. Indeed, it has long been a central controversy of American foreign policy.

Something in America’s nature seeks global partnership — also in war — whether for good or bad. America’s desire for limited government, for foreign policy on the cheap, and for averting causalities explains this in part. The inclination also has a down side: “pacts with devil,” the U.S. alliance with Stalin’s Russia to win World War II being the prima fascia case. The United States has usually gotten the better side of the deal in the wars it has collectively fought over the last two-and-a-half centuries, whether compared to Lafayette and his fellow French during the American Revolution or to the Triple Entente and the Allied Powers of the 20th century’s two world wars. Alliance with Stalin was a heavy price to pay, but the United States was the war’s only real victor. In the ensuing Cold War, many a shady character again joined America’s campaign, doing America’s dirty work. Yesterday’s friends have often become today’s enemies. Washington once ostensibly helped Bin Laden against the Soviets, now Washington relies on the Northern Alliance. Tomorrow, it will be someone else.

Of late, the less dirty work of peacekeeping and nation building is something Washington would also rather leave to others. Equally important, allies are a valuable source of political legitimacy. This kind of burden sharing has its preconditions though, at least according to the editorial line of the New York Times.

Washington still expects other nations to participate in such vital tasks as economic reconstruction and peacekeeping and to help confer diplomatic


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and political legitimacy on governments secured by American military action. For those practical reasons, the interests of other countries cannot be ignored. A stable world order must be built on a broad international consensus, not American military action alone.\(^{60}\)

Multilateralism may be more American than commonly assumed, but multilateralism, particularly in the sense of commitment to international institutions and treaty making, has not always had a popular place in the government of George Bush, or in some quarters of Congress.\(^{61}\) All the same, responding to the September 11th attacks, the United States, joining with Great Britain as senior ally,\(^{62}\) sought and received United Nations and NATO endorsement for a very broad range of military action under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Already on the morning after the attacks, George Bush and Tony Blair “…agreed it was important to first move quickly on the diplomatic front to capitalize on international outrage about the terrorist attack. If they got support from NATO and the United Nations, they reasoned, they would have the legal and political framework to permit a military response afterward.”\(^{63}\) With Tony Blair attending the President’s September 20th war speech to a joint session of the United States Congress, George Bush would also say of Great Britain, “America has no truer friend.”\(^{64}\)

President Bush’s speech set an important first marker of where American strategy was going and why. Widely regarded as a very significant moment in the Bush presidency, the speech drew strong praise across the political spectrum. It was there that Bush also laid down his famous dictum: “with

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61 A Democrat Senate, with Joseph Biden instead of Jesse Helms chairing the Foreign Relations Committee, also gives the United States a new multilateralist hue.
63 Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, “We Will Rally the World,” op cit.
Andrew B. Denison

us or against us.”\textsuperscript{65} While some might interpret this formulation as too black-and-white, it is still very much in line with Bush’s desire to „rally the world.” There is an “us” that is more than the United States of America, an “us” that comes in many forms. Secretary of State Colin Powell, testifying before the Senate, put it thus in regard to the “coalition”: “We have said let each contribute according to your ability to contribute, your willingness to contribute, and the situation you face within your country.”\textsuperscript{66}

The Rumsfeld corollary to Powell’s flexible coalition adds the controversial “the mission will define the coalition.” Rumsfeld, writing in the New York Times at the end of September, 2001, put it this way: “This war will not be waged by a grand alliance united for the single purpose of defeating an axis of hostile powers. Instead, it will involve floating coalitions of countries, which may change and evolve. Countries will have different roles and contribute in different ways. Some will provide diplomatic support, others financial, still others logistical or military. Some will help us publicly, while others, because of their circumstances, may help us privately and secretly. In this war, the mission will define the coalition — not the other way around.”\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{65} President Bush: “Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in success. We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. (Applause.) From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.“ Ibid.


\textsuperscript{67} Donald H. Rumsfeld, “A New Kind Of War,” New York Times, September 27, 2001. In May of 2002, Rumsfeld was still making the case: “So what we did was we fashioned a concept of floating coalitions, recognizing that people ought not to be required to agree to every single thing that gets done, and that we’ll end up with an awful lot more support if we let the mission determine the coalition than we would if we forced the coalition to determine the mission.”
Still, there would be a coalition. Indeed, calls for a new multilateralism were heard all around. Former President George H.W. Bush said: “Just as Pearl Harbor awakened this country from the notion that we could somehow avoid the call to duty and defend freedom in Europe and Asia in World War II, so, too, should this most recent surprise attack erase the concept in some quarters that America can somehow go it alone in the fight against terrorism or in anything else for that matter.”

Brent Scowcroft, George H.W. Bush’s National Security Advisor, and now head of the National Intelligence Council, urged America to “build a coalition” and model the Gulf War’s diplomatic accomplishments. Henry Kissinger proclaimed a new opportunity, if not imperative, for international cooperation: “The attack on the United States has produced an extraordinary congruence of interests among the major powers. None wants to be vulnerable to shadowy groups that have emerged, from Southeast Asia to the edge of Europe. Few have the means to resist alone.”

Indeed, it was precisely the nature, duration and magnitude of the threat that left so many Americans in an almost reflexively multilateral mode.

Catastrophic terrorism is very much a long-term problem. In decades hence, America may no longer be “Mr. Big,” with a fifth of the world’s economy, or half of its Internet users, as it was at the turn of the Millennium. Better the world’s rising powers be America’s friends than not. Daniel Benjamin, once counter-terror expert on the Clinton National Security Council, now at the Center for Strategy and International Security, speaks of this long-term perspective: “…as President Bush and those around him have said repeatedly, the fight against terror will take 20, 30, even 50 years. America needs to keep an eye on that horizon, which means

making the case for international order in the company of the international community.”  72 Some, understandably, remain concerned that the United States is not making that “case” actively enough. A variation of the multilateralist argument comes from those wanting a leaner (if not Libertarian) foreign policy: “The United States will be more secure, and the world more stable, if America now chooses to pass the buck and allow other countries to take care of themselves.” If treating America’s allies like “adults” cuts America’s current global expenses, so much the better, they argue. 73

Criticism of U.S. unilateralism, heard so often before September 11th, was briefly dormant in the aftermath of the attacks; it soon returned, both in the United States and abroad. Specific complaints about the Administration not doing enough to bring in the European allies were clearly part of this critique. The Washington Post’s Jim Hoagland was one key voice, his columns again and again bemoaning “our underutilized allies.” Notably, Hoagland has not only called for more efforts to bring the allies in but also for early military action against Iraq. 74

Responding to this outbreak of multilateralism, a chorus of more unilateralist voices countered that much of the fight against terrorism had to be done alone or it would not be done at all. 75 Getting bogged down in consensus building is their fear — especially when the consensus is not seen as bringing any plus in capabilities. A strong current of thought in the United States has long been concerned about the country getting tripped up

73 Benjamin Schwarz and Christopher Layne write, “For more than fifty years American foreign policy has sought to prevent the emergence of other great powers—a strategy that has proved burdensome, futile, and increasingly risky,” A New Grand Strategy,” The Atlantic Monthly January 2002.
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by European foot dragging.76 This rendition of the world resonates particularly well with the more conservative, more Republican constituencies across America.77

A variation of this theme argues that a muscular “go-it-alone” attitude is actually, paradoxically, an essential catalyst of international cooperation. This is a particularly good argument for winning over the more multilateralist spirits. The Carnegie Endowment’s Robert Kagan suggests that father Bush’s war against Iraq is very much such a model: “It was a policy of multilateralism, but preceded, as effective multilateralism must always be, by a unilateral determination to act.” 78 Leadership issues are very much a part of the American foreign policy discourse. Many Americans see international cooperation flowing from strong leadership, that is, from the United States’ willingness to take initiative and risk. A Pax Americana, if not a Pax Atlantica, is not an entirely foreign idea to many an American. America may be a “reluctant sheriff”79 or a “reluctant imperialist,”80 but it leans that way nonetheless.

76 The New York Times quotes a “senior” administration official: "The fewer people you have to rely on, the fewer permissions you have to get." Elaine Sciolino and Steven Lee Myers, “Bush Says ‘Time Is Running Out’ as Forces Move Into Place,” New York Times, October 7, 2001. Even the ‘liberal’ Washington Post editorial page warned about coalition compromises: “…the greatest danger to the war on terrorism is not that the Bush administration will resort to unilateralism. It is that the United States will fail to act aggressively and creatively enough, over time, to break the current coalition apart.” See “The Coalition and the Mission,” Washington Post, October 21, 2001.

77 Steven Mufson and Thomas E. Ricks of the Washington Post write: “Some conservatives fear that simply maintaining the coalition of allies will become an end rather than a means for accomplishing anti-terrorism goals, and they fret that efforts to keep a variety of countries together will cripple the administration's ability to take bold action beyond Afghanistan.” “Debate Over Targets Highlights Difficulty Of War on Terrorism; Call for Broad Action by Some Officials Runs Into Concerns About Diplomatic Fallout,” Washington Post, September 21, 2001.


There is an underlying American confidence that the U.S. political process is capable of generating good decisions and that with such decisions, the world in general, and the Europeans in particular, can be brought around to supporting them. Not that this will be easy. “President Bush, and the American public he leads, should not assume that our allies see the world in the same way we do. Hearts and minds in Europe are winnable, but they must, in fact, be won day after day after day.”81 In sum, U.S. thinking on the role of international cooperation might be described as an ambiguous mix of caution and enthusiasm. Or as the Economist writes: “…the reality is that America will likely remain torn between pressure to be a global policeman and accusations that it is thus a global bully.”82 The debate endures, even as the terms change. Americans will continue to be uncertain about how strongly they should commit themselves to intimate and entangling relationships with other states. Nevertheless, they will engage, often actively.

If there is an underlying American reluctance to get entangled, then perhaps it is best to make a virtue of this necessity. This reluctance can be seen as a reality check on Washington’s more imperial instincts. In a world that daily generates new reasons to cooperate both internationally and transnationally it might not be bad to see America’s reticence as a way to leverage a little economy, a little selectivity, a little “strategic elegance”83 into the foreign policy of this 21st Century hyperpuissance. “The War on Terrorism will require a form of ultra-engagement by the US in the world. The 'hyper-intervention' that the initial battles on terrorism will demand, will potentially impose on America a pro-consular role to which it is unaccustomed.”84 If this forecast, made by the prestigious annual conclave of London’s International Institute for Strategic Studies, is accurate, then

82 This point made in “Genocide: How to stop the killing,” The Economist, March 21, 2001.
83 As Walter Russel Mead advocates in Special Providence, op cit.
America’s cautioning voices might indeed be a valuable guard against excess.

4. The Politics of Bush’s Post-September 11th Multilateralism

Within days of the September attacks, one of the Bush Administration’s must vexing conundrums would become this: finding a proper balance between international cooperation and effective action. In the unfolding campaign against terrorism, Bush would need to “triangulate” between a fickle public and a stubborn world. With passions running high on both fronts, finding the right balance was and remains no easy task.

At home, Bush faces a US public, traditionally capricious if not disinterested in foreign policy, now engaged and resolute. Sober determination — but of uncertain duration. How to use this opportunity, how not to squander it on endeavors that run-aground, whether because of too much international cooperation or not enough, this is thus the challenge for Bush and his Administration. Too many “Black Hawk Downs” and America’s current multilateralist internationalism could quickly fade. Even worse, Bush could see multilateralism going from a source of legitimacy for assertive action, particularly regarding the use of force, to a scapegoat for the inevitable setbacks.

85 Dan Balz of The Washington Post identified early on the type of challenge President Bush would face: “President Bush enjoys the support of a broad international coalition and an extraordinarily united country as he launches a war against terrorism. But as the campaign unfolds, almost every decision he makes could risk unraveling that coalition and eroding his political support at home. “As he moves from rhetoric to action, Bush faces an enormously difficult job managing the multiple aspects of the crisis, according to diplomatic, military and political analysts. They said he must balance the need to show progress in pursuing the terrorists with the patience required to preserve a coalition of countries with competing interests and their own internal pressures.” Dan Balz, “Many Decisions, Many Risks; Maintaining Global Coalition, Public Support Poses Big Challenge for Bush,” Washington Post, September 25, 2001.

Putting together an international coalition is no easy task, especially if you happen to be the Hyper Viper. September 11th, it seems, has not made the world any less wary of American preponderance. The Unipolar Moment, noted almost a decade ago, seems to be becoming more unipolar by the day — by pretty much whichever standard of power you use (other than keeping airplanes out of buildings and Sharon out of Palestine). Many Americans have nevertheless also observed that not all the consequences of such a unipolar world are beneficial. Advocates of the “blow back” theory warn that America might be needlessly provoking other states to cooperate in their opposition to American aims. Many Americans would agree with Stanley Hoffmann: “A determined project of ridding the world of all rogues and terrorists is a dream that would be seen abroad as a demonstration of rabid imperialism. The US has to be more modest in its goals.”

These sentiments have not gone unnoticed within the Bush team. During the 2000 presidential campaign, candidate Bush even used them to poke at the Clinton-Gore foreign policy. Bush’s call for a “humble” US foreign policy gained notoriety. “I don't think they should look at us with envy,” said candidate Bush of the rest of the world. “It really depends upon how our nation conducts itself in foreign policy. If we're an arrogant nation, they’ll resent us. If we're a humble nation, but strong, they’ll welcome us. And our nation stands alone right now in the world in terms of power. And that's why we’ve got to be humble and yet project strength in a way that promotes freedom.”

Ten months in office and contending with the deadliest attack America had ever experienced — one that could have easily taken out the White House and the Capitol instead of the Twin Towers and the Pentagon — the President took time to talk with Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward, also about the charge of unilateralism: “People respect us, but they like to

tweak us. People respect America and they love our values, but they look for every excuse in the world to say that, because we didn’t do exactly what, you know, the international community wanted, we became unilateralist.”

Bush’s plain talk about the rest of the world is the subject of much interpretation, both at home and abroad. Even within his own cabinet, his words mean different things to different people. Bob Woodward’s account of the first big post-September 11th strategy session shows some of the dynamic within the administration when it comes to the role of allies.

Powell noted that everyone in the international coalition was ready to go after al Qaeda, but that extending the war to other terrorist groups or countries could cause some of them to drop out.

The president said he didn’t want other countries dictating terms or conditions for the war on terrorism. ‘At some point,’ the president said, ‘we may be the only ones left. That’s okay with me. We are America.’

Powell didn’t reply, but going it alone was precisely what he wanted to avoid if possible. In Powell's view, the president's formulation was not realistic. The United States could not launch an effective war in Afghanistan or worldwide without a coalition. He believed the president made such statements knowing they might not withstand a second analysis. The tough talk might be necessary but it was not policy.

In contrast, Cheney took the president at his word, and was convinced the president was absolutely serious when he said they would go it alone if necessary.

Since September 11th, many in the United States have criticized Bush for not putting enough multilateralism into his foreign policy. Simultaneously, others have praised him for seeking greater international cooperation — provoking others to criticize him for doing the same. Sometimes Bush gets

91 Cited in Woodward and Balz, “Rally the World…” op cit.
good marks, sometimes bad, though his popularity in the polls has held at the unprecedented 80 percent plus range since the attacks.) Five weeks after the attack, Time held forth: “There has rarely been such a sudden and dramatic shift in American policy and tone. An Administration that just a month or two ago emphatically believed in going it alone — walking away from treaties, pushing its missile-defense scheme no matter who said what — has thrown open its arms to embrace the pleasures of multilateralism.”

Bush’s November decision to involve European troops more directly in Afghanistan was another such intimate embrace that found wide praise.

The New York Times welcomed the move, arguing that, “the addition of these forces, some of which may be involved in combat operations, will render military decision-making more cumbersome. That is an acceptable price for ensuring the diplomatic solidarity needed to sustain an extended and difficult armed campaign.”

Others were less ready to pronounce a new era of multilateralism, especially in Europe. Prime Minister Tony Blair’s efforts to be involved were seen by some Brits as behavior more fit for a poodle. The Financial Times spoke more soberly of “Doubts over Bush’s policy conversion.”

In Washington, Brookings Institution analysts, Ivo Daalder and James


94 “Despite resistance in the Pentagon, the White House concluded — with a nudge from Colin Powell and Britain’s Tony Blair — that it needed to involve more NATO troops in Afghanistan in order to sustain European support for the campaign against the Taliban. The Europeans, for their part, wanted in so as to gain more leverage over the war’s conduct.” Jackson Diehl, “Big Plans — and Obstacles — for a Fraying Alliance,” Washington Post, November 12, 2001; Page A25.


Lindsay, writing in the International Herald Tribune, criticized Bush for being only “tactically” multilateral, and thus “shortsighted.” “In seeking to eliminate potential constraints on U.S. freedom of action, the administration gains a free hand today at the likely cost of losing needed partners tomorrow.” Three months later, the same Daalder and Lindsay would write in the Financial Times: “Sometimes it pays to complain. When European officials denounced George W. Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ speech, US commentators and officials dismissed the criticisms as another case of ‘euro-whining’. Yet in the intervening weeks something odd has happened: the US has moderated its policies in several areas to accommodate European concerns.”

The back and forth will continue, buffeting the Bush Administration this way and that. Sometimes one current predominates in America, sometimes another. In the same way, the world will call America one way one day, and another way the next. Whatever the prevailing shades of multilateralism, one should not forget the big picture: multidimensional problems require multidimensional solutions. The nature of terrorism as a threat, if not the nature of the interdependent world on which it feeds, will often confront George Bush with what Iron Lady Margaret Thatcher referred to as TINA: There Is No Alternative. Parts of the country might be dragged kicking and screaming, but there seems little choice but more multilateralism. As American Arabist Fouad Ajami observes, “It is both heartbreaking and ironic that so quintessentially American a figure as George W. Bush — a man who grew up in Midland, Texas, far removed from the complications of foreign places — must be the one to take his country on a journey into so alien, so difficult, a world.”

III. Europe’s Place in America’s World

While the American debate over Europe’s role in U.S. strategy is often framed in terms of “unilateralism” and “multilateralism,” America is not and has never really been a unilateralist power — at least by any simple historical standard of great power behavior.101 “In the end, what is historically unique about American leadership is not its power but its ultimately self-denying purpose.”102 The United States has sought international partnership more often than not. A preference for pluralism explains part of this, a preference rooted in a conception of state that sees limited government as good government; that sees checks and balances on power as the key to preventing power’s abuse; that sees the avoidance of monopolies as important in all walks of life. As such, it is a preference also rooted in the fear that a predatory policy abroad would lead to a police state at home. Americans have long sought a foreign policy on the cheap, not just to save a buck but to preserve basic liberties, to preserve America’s fragile democratic experiment.103 More positively put, Americans do not believe they have a monopoly on truth, only that they seem to have found the best system to approximate it. A liberal political philosophy that sees truth as tentative, but progress as possible, should be open to partnership and pluralism.

Young for a country — but old by the measure of continuous constitutional government — the United States has now stood as the world’s strongest nation for almost a century. But it has not stood alone. During this American 20th century, as in the less American 19th century, and indeed since the Declaration of Independence in 1776, America’s fate has very much been tied to that of Europe. Certainly, Asia, Africa, and Latin America have all had their importance, but they have never eclipsed Europe in significance. As democracy has taken hold on the old continent — first in Western Europe, and with the end of the Cold War, deep into Europe’s eastern reaches — this transatlantic bond has only deepened.

101 Walter Russel Mead, op cit.
103 Walter Russel Mead, op cit.
It is hard to see how this will not also hold true in the coming decades of the 21st century, a century begun with the rude awakening of September 11th. Europe and America share the challenge of surviving and flourishing in this unfolding age of rapid globalization. They find themselves together in a world of connectivity and vulnerability, a world of awesome wealth and burgeoning poverty, a world of overpopulation and underdevelopment. It is a world of borders ever more open to the multiplying factors of wealth and production, and a world of borders ever more open to the multiplying means of mass destruction.

A world of millions of private actors means a world of virtually unlimited vulnerability. This is, paradoxically, especially frightening for the United States, the country that has done most to destroy borders and walls, to shape a world market, to promote freedom of communications, information, and movement. The enticing opportunities of this ever-smaller world — whether it be making a buck or saving a soul — inspire cooperation. The dangers of this ever-smaller world demand it. Cooperation across borders will often be profitable; it might well also be existential. It is hard to imagine Europe and America not cooperating in the face of what the future seems likely to hold — both good and bad. More proactively, it is hard to imagine how global order could depend on anything else but a Pax Atlantica.

Whatever one makes of the long litany of transatlantic troubles, when searching for partners, the United States has most often turned to Europe. There is indeed some logic to this. Common interests grow out of common political ideals and institutions, and out of integrating open-market economies. Common interests also grow out of common vulnerabilities and threats. In today’s world, the threat of mass destruction is shared. This was true on September 10th and it will remain so for many decades to come. A fundamental unity on substance thus outweighs the many differences over style, strategy and tactics. America, on balance, can accomplish more with Europe than without it; thus, America, on balance, prefers a stronger Europe to a weaker Europe. Full stop.
Europe can empower America when its political support adds to the legitimacy of American action; when it generates the political will to pay the price of its own international engagement; and when it fields its own effective (military and non-military) global order and crisis-management capabilities. Europe will certainly ask a price for such contributions; Americans will understandably complain that this price is too high. But in the end, the two are more likely to strike a deal than not.

The onset of the 21st century sees America and Europe growing together, not apart. Investment and information flows; tourism and trade; educational exchange and scientific collaboration; all the linked interest groups that constitute the crazy quilt of international civil society (including the globalized anti-globalization movement); these and much more make for an ever-denser web of transatlantic relations. Europe and America are the core of globalization, their respective societies tightly networked across a broad array of ever wider ranging activities. This impetus will persist; the ties will multiply. Open borders and open societies are at the heart of democratic civilization; they are the source of its wealth and its identity. Defending this openness is the common challenge.

**IV. The Atlantic’s Geopolitical Rifts**

America is not Europe. Common interests should not be confused with identical interests. Strife abounds. Differences are as natural an element of this partnership as of any other. The ongoing debate between America and Europe has long run along basic fault lines. An understanding of the more enduring geopolitical rifts within the transatlantic relationship can help put current conflicts into proper perspective. The transnational has not (yet) superceded the geopolitical, only made it more complicated. Geopolitical differences continue to underlie the relationship, issues that in many ways pattern those of yesterday. These can be divided into three overarching themes: burden sharing and power sharing; Europe and the world; carrot and stick.

I. Burden Sharing and Power Sharing

The central issue of the transatlantic partnership revolves around the question of burden sharing and power sharing. As in any other partnership, reaching agreement on relative roles and influence is essential. Such agreement often comes with a good deal of creative ambiguity. Each side naturally wants to carry less burden and enjoy more influence. New political challenges continually reopen the debate, so too in regard to the war on terrorism. Nevertheless, given the choice between a strong Europe and a weak Europe, Washington would, as noted above, clearly choose a strong Europe. Indeed, many Americans express frustration, even ridicule, when Europe cannot agree amongst itself on security issues, as was the case at the Laeken European Union Summit in December 2001.¹⁰⁵

Friction often arises out of the need to agree on a fair sharing of burden and influence. Another part of the debate is caught up in differences over the definition of burden and influence. Contributions to common goals can take many forms: precision ground strikes flown off distant aircraft carriers—or rolling up a cell of Al Qaeda operatives about to poison the US embassy water supply in Rome.¹⁰⁶ Influence can be perceived or real, latent or manifest. Often exercised discreetly, a discrete variable it is not.

Burden Sharing: Who Does What?

Three general categories nevertheless suggest themselves when thinking about burden sharing in the pursuit of international peace and security. These revolve around the provision of legitimacy, will, and effectiveness.

**Legitimacy**

Fundamental to the democratic process is the quest for legitimacy. In today’s globalized world, accountable government needs to be accountable not only to its own citizens, but also in some way to international partners. If a nation or a group of nations wants to impose its will — particularly by force — upon another nation, it will tend to seek international legitimacy for this act (whether the nations be democratic or not). The average American, at any rate, is much less reluctant to use military forces if close allies are also in support.\(^{107}\) A green light from the UN Security Council is not essential, but it certainly helps. If it can be 15-0 as it was on September 12, all the better.\(^{108}\) A green light from NATO’s 19 + veto powers (democracies the entire lot) is also an important source of legitimacy.\(^{109}\)

For America, Europe thus bears a significant burden when it provides political support, thereby lending greater legitimacy to American actions, both in the United States and among other international audiences, particularly in the Arab world.

**Will**

Legitimacy is in turn related to political will. Legitimacy can generate political will, but legitimacy alone is not enough. Governments and publics must see an action as urgent; they must be willing to pay the price — in political capital, if not in blood and treasure — to achieve the objective.

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107 In an accompanying analysis of the Pew poll on America’s new internationalist point of view cited above, Kenneth M. Pollack, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, writes: “The greater popular interest in allied participation suggests that the public believes in the necessity of a coalition effort and so may become concerned if the U.S. government begins moving in a direction that causes key allies to break with us. Having convinced the American people that the war against terrorism will require a team effort, the administration may find it hard to go it alone at a later date.” “America’s New Internationalist Point of View,” The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press,” October 24, 2001, www.people-press.org/102401rpt.htm, op cit

108 UN resolution on 12 Sept, Resolution 1368 (2001).

One reflection of relative political will in regard to international affairs is what the respective partners spend — on diplomacy, defense and development. Another might be the openness of their markets to foreign goods, or the activity of the non-governmental organizations. In whatever guise, bearing the transatlantic burden is very much related to expending political capital to generate political will.

**Effectiveness**

Finally, legitimacy and will are in some way a function of the effectiveness of the means at hand. Are the strategies and the crisis reaction capabilities (whether military nor non-military) up to the job? Is there a match between means and ends? How good is one at bringing peace to war zones? Can the transatlantic engagement in the Balkans be considered a success? (Germany’s role in Amber Fox looks good, but how many more Balkan stabilizations are the Europeans up to?) Alternately, how effectively can one engage the world’s other powerful capitals, whether Moscow, Beijing, Delhi, or Jakarta, to support a world order conducive to transatlantic interests and values? In sum, what kinds of products are on offer? Does their effectiveness make them worth the price?

A great deal of friction arises out of the need to agree on a fair sharing of the burden, whether defined in terms of, legitimacy, will, effectiveness, or in some other manner. But burden is only one side of the coin, influence is the other.

**Power Sharing: Which Way and How?**

Who has what role in defining the common objectives? What kind of say do Europeans and Americans have when it comes to how the objectives are pursued? Generally, the Americans are dissatisfied with the “limited” burden the Europeans are carrying, and the Europeans are unhappy about the “limited” influence they wield in Washington. Americans know
Europeans fret about their lack of leverage. Americans also suspect a European desire to exercise influence disproportional to the burden borne. To turn an old slogan on its head, Americans want to give Europe “no representation without taxation.”

**Institutions**

The pattern of influence across the Atlantic has come to be defined by international institutions. Such institutions tend to be (among other things) one-state, one-vote affairs, thereby giving weaker states proportionately greater influence. Luxembourg has more say inside NATO than outside. Policy makers in Washington hear Europe’s concern about a lagging U.S. commitment to international institutions. They also know such institutions give European governments greater leverage in Washington than they would otherwise have. All the same, Washington plays an active role in such institutions. Its commitment to them has been long and broad.

The legitimacy, consensus and norm-building role of institutions is not without value to America. The United States fathered many of today’s most important international organizations. A multilateralist streak runs deep in the American body politic. NATO remains central to America’s war on terrorism, if not always directly, then still through its ability to foster the “human interoperability” that makes multinational operations possible (whether in NATO or outside it), its role in bringing peace to the Balkans, its relationship with Russia and its Partnership for Peace program extending into the eastern reaches of Europe and Central Asia. NATO’s consultative bodies will play an increasingly important role in managing multilateral missile defense and all the other proliferation problems that need to be commonly addressed. NATO will remain a wellspring of expertise on peacekeeping. Finally, NATO is also an important forum for

Shades of Multilateralism

the United States to pressure the Europeans into putting a lot more effort into building (i.e., buying) 21st century crisis management capabilities.\textsuperscript{112}

Foreign-policy-through-institutions nevertheless poses a dilemma for Washington. There is a tradeoff between inclusivity and effectiveness. There is also a strong unilateralist current in America that maintains that inclusiveness is overrated, that the price in effectiveness of achieving it too high. They see multilateralism, and the commitment to international institutions and agreements it implies, as an unnecessary constraint on American action, as tying the Republic down like a Gulliver among Lilliputians. Multilateralism is for „wimps.“\textsuperscript{113} Here, too, Europeans enjoy pride of place. Never willing to pull punches, conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer puts it such: „If the Europeans refuse to see themselves as part of this struggle, fine. If they wish to abdicate, fine. We will let them hold our coats, but not tie our hands.”\textsuperscript{114}

\textit{Old Habits in a New World}

America may not always live up to Europe’s expectations when it comes to multilateralism; some speak of the U.S. as an \textit{a la carte multilateraliste}. But by the historical standards of great-power politics, America is uniquely multilateral.\textsuperscript{115} For the United States, diplomacy has very much been ‘defining one’s own interests such that other states see them as in their interest as well.’ American influence, argues Joseph Nye Jr., Dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, is based on its “soft” power, on its ability to get others to want what it wants.\textsuperscript{116} This component of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{112} See Vernon Loeb, “Rumsfeld Presses NATO To Focus on Terrorism,” Washington Post, December 19, 2001.
  \item \textsuperscript{116} For an introduction to the notion of “soft power,” also see Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of America’s Power, (New York: Basic Books, 1990).
\end{itemize}
American foreign policy is also rooted in traditions of state (and strategic) restraint.\textsuperscript{117} In a country where limited government is good government, getting other countries involved can also be a way to keep one’s own government less involved. Pluralism, pursued in the aim of reconciling competing interests while limiting government’s central authority, does not stop at water’s edge. The American system of government is open to outside influence; there are numerous points where lobbies can exert leverage, whether on Capitol Hill or in the White House. Access is available — but it is not entirely free.

Influence, at any rate, is still a function of the „product” Europe can contribute — however much potential (market) access there might be.\textsuperscript{118} Such a European-made “application” or “solution” (to use today’s parlance) does not have to be “identical” or “equal” to that of the United States — nor should it be. That lesson was learned with Ricardo and ideas like “gains from trade” and “comparative advantage.” Europe’s box of policies and capabilities will be of greatest value to Washington if it provides a complementary kit — not just a low quality copy. Niches abound where Europe could play a valuable role and win commensurate influence. These span a broad spectrum of military and non-military contributions. Wherever they may be found, it seems clear that more influence can be won in Washington with complementary capabilities that generate synergy, than with those autonomous capabilities that simply allow one to “go it alone.”

Today’s world increases the demand for these synergies. Interdependence increases the premium on cooperation. Fighting terrorism, whether foiling a planned attack, or combating broader causes, is by nature a challenge that requires an unprecedented degree of international teamwork. The United States will continue to seek this teamwork; it will want close partners; it will be willing to extend them influence; but it won’t want to sell itself short. The nature of burden and influence in an increasingly interdependent

\textsuperscript{118}This recalls a saying from the Old West: You can lead a horse to water; you can’t make ‘m drink.
world will not be static. Interpenetrating societies and their internationally linked interest groups broaden and complicate political decision-making. International politics becomes a „three-dimensional chessboard”\(^{119}\) where burden and influence are constantly redefined. Questions of burden and influence will nevertheless remain at the center of transatlantic relations. The relative amount of attention given to Europe and to the world will continue to play a particular role in the debate over these two issues.

2. Europe and the World

A second central issue of transatlantic relations revolves around the geographic focus of foreign policy. To generalize: the United States seeks to involve Europe around the world; Europe seeks to involve the United States in Europe and around its periphery. Certainly, the United States has long seen Europe as its primary partner and as the most important piece of real estate on the planet — outside the territory of the United States. And, as argued above, the ties multiply by the day. There are nevertheless those Americans who see Europe as too concerned with itself to be concerned about the world. They see Europe as parochial and provincial, as unwilling to consider global stability as its bailiwick. Europe, for them, is not so much empowering as encumbering. Transatlantic relations will benefit if Europe can more successfully counter this caricature, if it can demonstrate that its horizons are both global and broad.

Another dynamic also plays into America’s perceptions of Europe relationship with the larger world. The European Union, if at a tortoise pace, is extending its reach into Europe’s East, from the Baltics to St. Petersburg, from Kiev to Tbilisi to Tashkent. The European Union is an open club — in theory, if not in practice. Open borders and the accompanying diffusion of political and economic practices imply the possibility of a Greater Europe extending far beyond the current 15

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119 The top board is military, perhaps the purview of America alone; the second board is economic, where Europe can also hold its own; the third board is the transnational, where it is increasingly difficult to speak of national at all. See Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go it Alone, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 39-40.
members of the European Union. Europe could prove to be a very large magnet indeed, and this would attract America’s attention as well. The open-ended character of the European project thus also leaves open the nature of the relationship between an ever-larger Europe and an ever-smaller world. At the same time, and perhaps because of the complexity of ordering Greater Europe and its volatile periphery, Europe often seems out of breath and at odds with itself when it comes to foreign policy. Whether it is the fault of an overloaded agenda or just a bad case of political gridlock, Europe has yet to live up to its ambitious foreign policy aspirations. Limping along as it does, Europe nevertheless seems to have no choice but to become a “global player.” Europe’s own material well-being, if not its security and demography, are increasingly tied up in global developments. And it just so happens that Europe’s closest partner, the United States, has the globalization game down pretty well.

The Atlantic agenda remains essential, but the United States will want to frame it in more global terms — all the more so now that counter-terrorism has risen to the top of the U.S. political to-do list. Whether on EU or NATO enlargement, or the Partnership for Peace, or the Korean Energy Development Organization, the United States hopes Europe’s capitals will globalize their foreign policy, so as to share in the global burden. NATO’s geographic reach, already contested before September 11th, will once again be the subject of transatlantic debate. The US leans toward a globally capable NATO despite concerns about the veto power of NATO’s increasing numbers. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld lays down a global marker for NATO in saying: “The only way to deal with a terrorist network that is global is to go after it where it is.” The nature of the terrorist threat may push the United States to give the Europeans a better listen, but it should also push the Europeans to see security in more serious and more global terms.

Across the board, local developments are increasingly conditioned by the global context. Law enforcement and immigration policy, international commerce and border controls, banking regulations and insurance liabilities—all of these underline how domestic and foreign policy are two sides of the same coin. The demands of domestic policy will thus increasingly push Europe into a global role. This role will not be one equal to the United States, but it will be one unequaled by any other country in the world but the United States. Superpower or not, Europe is clearly a global power. Europe’s 20th century isolationism (and its bloody civil wars) will hopefully come to be seen as an aberration of what has otherwise been a significant contribution to global civilization.

3. Carrot and Stick

A third major issue of transatlantic relations concerns the proper balance between force and diplomacy. In its simplified version, the Americans are quicker to reach for the stick; the Europeans tend to prefer the carrot. Recent history has much to do with this. Europe’s postwar peace was based on reconciliation and rapprochement, first in Western Europe and then across the Iron Curtain. Interdependence and integration, not balance of power and military might, have come to be seen by much of Europe as the building blocks of international order. This leads some Americans to conclude that Europe is overly wary of confrontation and overly inclined to buy off adversaries (i.e., give in to extortion and thereby motivate more of it).

The uproar in Europe following George W. Bush’s designation of Iraq, Iran and North Korea as an Axis of Evil, whose development of weapons of mass destruction might justify preemptive military action, is one reflection of this underlying carrot-and-stick difference. There is much argument in Washington about the wisdom of using force to remove Saddam Hussein, but the gap across the Atlantic is wider. At another level, this is a debate (and a dilemma) about whether to focus on the immediate threat or the underlying cause. Should Al Qaeda be ruthlessly pursued, even at the

expense of alienating Arab populations? Should one work with the
governments of Egypt and Saudi Arabia to round up suspects, or should
one seek to bring about a replacement of those governments with more
democratic alternatives? What is the proper balance “between prevention
and preemption?” Europeans and Americans tend to differ on this.
Americans feel more vulnerable. Draining the swamp takes time; those
coiled to strike have to be stopped now.

At another level, this transatlantic rift reflects itself in American and
European views (and roles) in regard to the winning of wars and the
winning of the peace. The assumption has established itself that Americans
are better at taking states down and Europeans are better at building nations
back up. In theory, one could hope that both would be equally involved
in each aspect of crisis reaction. The concern is not invalid that a “good
cop, bad cop” division of labor leads to diverging strategic perspectives,
and in turn, to the erosion of common objectives. America could do

124 In this context, Charles Krauthammer wants the United States to stay out of
peacekeeping: “Americans make lousy peacekeepers — not because they are not
great soldiers but precisely because they are. Being the best, and representing the
strongest country in the world, they automatically become prime targets.” “We
Don't Peacekeep,” Washington Post, December 18, 2001. See also William
Drozdiak, “EU Leaders Back Attacks on Afghanistan; Massive Support Pledged for
Rebuilding Country Once Taliban Is Overthrown,” Washington Post, October 20,
125 Jackson Janes and Jeffrey Anderson put the argument like this: “Alliance
partnerships presume not only a convergence of interests, but also a basic equality
in capabilities. For Americans, Germans, and other Europeans, this means steering
clear of any notion of a strict division of labor in the war on terrorism, in which the
U.S. fights the wars and the Europeans clean up the mess, keep the peace, and build
the nation. The U.S. commitment on the ground must be from start to finish,
shoulder to shoulder with its allies. If public opinion will not support such a
comprehensive approach, then the administration needs to do its homework before
embarking on a truly global campaign.” “Germany and The United States:
Considerations for the Schroeder Government and the Bush Administration,” The
German-American Dialogue Essay Series, An AICGS At Issue Report, February
126 Michael R. Gordon, “United States and Britain Have Different Visions of How to
better at seeing the need for taking an active part post-conflict stabilization. “We should learn a lesson from the previous engagement in the Afghan area, that we should not just simply leave after a military objective has been achieved,” said none other than President George Bush, much to the chagrin of the anti-nation-building wing of the Republican Party. Yet the Pentagon seems reluctant to put ground forces into a policing, peacekeeping, nation-building role in Afghanistan — or Iraq for that matter. Whether President Bush will also endorse the good-cop role, and keep the United States engaged „after a military objective has been achieved” remains to be seen. But the question is also whether Europe can do better on the bad-cop side of the balance sheet.

At one level, this Euro-American difference is about strategy and style, but at another, it is about capabilities. Simply put: America can do more diplomacy, Europe cannot do more force. Even if Europeans were to become more willing to endorse the use of force, their overall capabilities would still lag behind those of the United States. Even if European defense spending were to rise significantly, a decade of under-funding (particularly for investment) and hefty US spending increases, mean that the gap will continue to widen for a number of years. When it comes to burden and influence in regard to fielding modern forces, the European terms of trade are not that good. All the same, better capabilities can only add to European influence in Washington and — one could imagine — to American multilateralism around the world.

For now, a certain division of labor, and a clear difference in scale, is thus unavoidable. The challenge is to manage this asymmetry. Part of such management means making a virtue out of necessity: Europe may regret its “cleanup role,” but right now this role happens to be its comparative advantage. Role specialization is not an entirely foreign idea in today’s


globalized world. Sometimes it leads to isolation; more often it is an incentive for cooperation. Synergy arises out of differences as much as similarities. Increasing defense spending is one thing, increasing it intelligently to maximize synergies is another. On military matters, Europe will need to bring certain specialized cards to the table if it wants to stay in the game, but it won’t have to show up with a full deck.\textsuperscript{129} Dispute will continue over the relative role of force; military cooperation will remain necessary but contentious. The transatlantic debate over the carrot and the stick will endure.

**V. American Expectations**

The United States clearly seeks a stronger, not a weaker Europe. In the words of Richard Haass, Director of Policy Planning in Colin Powell’s State Department: “We understand that a more capable and independent Europe will sometimes disagree and go its own way, but this is a small price to pay compared to the benefit of having a strong partner to help us meet regional and global challenges.”\textsuperscript{130} This also means the United States trusts Europe to pursue compatible and complementary policies more often than not. How might America define such a cluster of compatible and complementary European policies in the war on terrorism? What might such expectations imply for Europe’s role and partnership with the United States in the larger, more global project of securing liberty, prosperity and peace in a world of growing vulnerability?

These expectations would above all reflect the predominant American view that the Atlantic Community remains as imperative in the first half of the 21st century as it was during the second half of the 20th century. At this level, most in the American foreign policy community would agree that “…transatlantic cooperation is relevant to every aspect of the fight against terrorism. Together, the United States and the EU possess most of the

economic, technological, military and diplomatic resources for waging this global campaign, and are the two reliable pillars of stability in the world.”¹³¹ Transatlantic unity and strength of purpose is the preferred option.

At a lesser level of generality, the American landscape of hopes and expectations becomes more complex. For one, American hopes for Europe vary with hopes for America and its own role in the world (e.g., is insularity or overextension the greater danger?). The subtleties and shades of American multilateralism move with the times; the multidimensionality of counter-terrorism has multiplied the possible policy combinations out of which an optimal strategy can be made. As such, one thing is clear: Europe cannot satisfy all the expectations of all of America’s competing political agendas. In trying to make every American constituency happy, Europe would only anger them all.

There will always be sniping — from both sides of the Atlantic. Beneath the crossfire, there will also be concurrence on basic fundamentals. America’s political class, it seems, also agrees on certain benchmarks when it comes to Europe’s role in this new war on terrorism. President Bush, for one, has said he is keeping score: “All the time, we're reminding people that this is a performance-oriented world — if you want to win the war on terror, you must perform… You asked a very interesting question: Do you keep a scorecard? And the answer is, I do. I do, because I'm an old baseball guy and I like to keep the score. I like to see who’s performing and who's not performing. It's a part of being a coalition.”¹³² Whether keeping score or identifying benchmarks, Americans have certain expectations about Europe’s role in the anti-terror coalition.

Europe’s role must be multifaceted and rooted in its own comparative advantage. It should less mimic than complement America’s role. A “smart” division of labor between Europe and America is something Americans would largely want — recognizing as they do, that Europe and

America are not identical. As Simon Serfaty of CSIS said in testimony before the European Parliament, „Granted that doing nothing is not an option, the goal is not to do everything together but to make sure that together we do everything.”¹³³ Specific European contributions to make sure together everything gets done, and gets done as effectively as possible, suggest themselves in seven different areas.

- Political Solidarity
- Military Capability
- Intelligence Sharing
- Counter-Terror Law Enforcement
- Regional Conflict Resolution
- Homeland Security and Border Affairs
- Reality Check

1. Political Solidarity

Political solidarity stands at the top of many priority lists. Debased, such solidarity would be little more than fawning acquiescence, but Americans do not see solidarity as vassal-like deference. They see it as legitimacy in a more pluralist context. Europe’s political solidarity only really counts if it is voluntary, or at least based on more refined notions of “soft power” and common agendas. While the United States may enjoy a surfeit of strength, the legitimacy of its application is another matter — and not just abroad. America is more willing to take initiative in the world when Europe lends its political, if not moral, support. Some, like Anthony Cordesman, even argue that right now, this is more important than any military contribution. “It is transatlantic political unity and support that will be most important in

this contingency (Afghanistan), rather than the levels of force Europe contributes.”

Americans also broadly realize that this political solidarity will not be forthcoming unless the “urgency gap” on terrorism and the threat of mass destruction can be rectified. It is widely held in the United States that the Europeans do not take the danger of today’s terrorism seriously enough, thinking instead that it is a mere variation of the kind of terrorism Europeans have known and lived with for decades. The Washington Post, commenting on the outcome of the annual Munich Security Conference, in February 2002, put it this way: “The biggest surprise… may have been the clear disconnect between the two sides about the urgency of the situation.”

Jackson Janes, Director of the American Institute of Contemporary German Studies, thus calls on Europeans to give heed to the seriousness of America’s concern, if not to the problem of terrorism itself: “Germans and Europeans should acknowledge the degree to which Americans’ perception of the world has changed owing to September 11. “…just as in the EU, where member states are inclined to accommodate the

Robert Hunter, former US ambassador to NATO also makes this point: “Instead, the United States was primarily concerned about having the full political support of the allies — the true import of Article 5, from its inception… As President George H.W. Bush had done in 1990–91 in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the most important objective of the overall coalition — NATO and beyond — built for prosecuting the campaign against Osama bin Laden was political—to demonstrate to peoples of the Islamic world that (1) the United States was not acting alone and (2) it was also gaining the support of legitimate Islamic countries and leaders. In the Persian Gulf War, this political tactic was designed to counter Saddam Hussein’s claim that he represented the “Arab Street” against the “Zionists and imperialists.” Coalition with NATO countries also shows the American people that they are not alone in this effort, but have the support of critical allies for whom the United States has done so much and who share fundamental humane and democratic values.”

one that frames an issue in terms of vital national interests, so too should the allies concede the intensity of American interests on this issue.”

Political solidarity means more than political leaders acknowledging the gravity of America’s position. It means European leaders bringing their publics along as well. Daniel Benjamin warns: “The leaders of America's NATO allies understood the magnitude of the moment and the reality, to paraphrase Article V of the alliance's charter, that this attack against one is an attack against all. For their own safety and the defense of our common civilization, Europe's peoples must see this as well.” Some would deride this as simply helping the US engage in multilateralist “window dressing,” but it still counts among most Americans. Moreover, this “window dressing” occurs at a time when many Americans would see the nature of today’s terrorism as a strong argument for not going it alone.

There are, of course, those who see the autonomy forsaken as a price too high, who would ask Europe not to “tie America’s hands.” Richard Perle, Chairman of the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board, speaks for them when expressing wariness over bringing the Europeans into any military action against Iraq. Some do see European solidarity as consisting of little more than staying out of America’s way. “No more Kosovos.” These rejectionists remain in the minority, at least if measured by the intensity of transatlantic cooperation that has developed since September 11th. This intensification has occurred in spite of the Bush Administration’s rejection of many of the new treaty-based forms of cooperation preferred by the other Atlantic allies. And even Americans sympathetic to the land-mine treaty or the International Criminal Court might argue that it is better that the Bush administration focus finite political capital on Israel and Palestine,

137 Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, “Shoulder to Shoulder: Terrorism is not just America’s problem, and neither is the war against it, Time International, September 24, 2001.
or India and Pakistan, or nuclear weapons in the hands of madmen. In this sense, many Americans would have some sympathy for Kagan’s pointed question to the Europeans: “Can a more liberal international order be built by hobbling the most powerful defender of that order? That's a question our European allies might want to start asking themselves.”

Such requests to refrain from “hobbling” the United States may not fall on welcome European ears. European solidarity may not come easy, but in the end, it can also contribute to giving the kind of multilateralism Europe wants a better name in the United States. According to Jackson Janes and Jeffrey Anderson: „The German and European preference for multilateralism cannot be allowed to manifest itself largely in elliptical processes that perpetuate inaction or irresolution. Multilateral processes must lead to effective outcomes. Put another way, Germans, and by extension Europeans, must convince the U.S. that acting multilaterally is in its interest.”141 This is better done by being a strong partner than a weak critic.

2. Military Capability

Europe’s ostensible weakness is most often associated with its military capabilities, which seem increasingly dwarfed by those of the United States. Americans want a stronger Europe — particularly on the military front. The complaint, moreover, goes beyond the question of deployable (and interoperable) forces. Many Americans hold the impression that Europeans are much less willing to endorse the use of force (or at least American force), which gets back to the question of European political solidarity. These complaints somehow coexist with the recognition that

141 The authors go on to say: “Germans and Europeans should realize that if and when they criticize the American approach as unidimensional, stressing only military solutions to the problem of Al Qaeda and related terrorist organizations, their points ring hollow if they are not accompanied by concrete proposals for alternative and effective, non-military responses. Above all, critics need to explain how entrenched terrorist infrastructure around in the world can be neutralized using non-military means.” Jackson Janes and Jeffrey Anderson, op cit.
Europe has lots of forces deployed in difficult overseas duty. As such, low levels of high-tech combat power and low levels of spending also seem to be a more symbolic problem. For European „neglect“ of its defenses could also imply that the Europeans do not think military force important, or even legitimate. This would be a problem if Americans read it as such: ”our closest friends don’t think we have a right to defend ourselves.” By the same token, many Americans express concern that differing military capabilities will lead toward differing strategic worldviews; that the good cop and the bad cop will not see eye-to-eye. As such, the symbolic value of certain European military policy decisions should not be underestimated.

Those Americans that call for higher European defense spending are motivated at least in part by their desire for Europe to curb America’s unilateralist temptations. It is not the American unilateralists that want the European posse armed. Increased European defense spending, argues Jackson Janes, “…will be expensive and politically controversial at home, but if the initiatives are not undertaken, there can be no mystery about U.S. desires to 'go it alone’.”

American entreaties for a more militarily capable Europe also go beyond calls for higher defense spending, with U.S. observers acknowledging Europe’s fiscal conundrum. George W. Bush, speaking on May 23, 2002, before the German Bundestag in Berlin, called for the required “financial commitment,” but he also put his finger on concrete efforts the Europeans could make: “mobile and deployable forces, sophisticated special operations, the ability to fight under the threat of chemical and biological weapons.”

Americans urge Europe to increase military effectiveness (and signal political will) in innovative and collaborative ways. “…it is critical

142 Charles Krauthammer puts it like this: “If Europeans want to rearm and join the posse, fine. But we should not be pressuring them. America neither resents nor inhibits European strength. On the contrary. For a half-century, we supported the project of European integration and enlargement. For almost as long, under the rubric of "burden sharing," we urged the Europeans to increase defense spending.” “Re-Imagining NATO,” Washington Post, May 24, 2002.

143 Jackson Janes and Jeffrey Anderson, op cit.

144 “Remarks by the President to a Special Session of the German Bundestag,” May 23, 2002, Berlin, www.whitehouse.gov
that our allies succeed in refocusing their defense efforts – if need be by pooling their resources to do collectively what they are unable to do individually.”\textsuperscript{145} Europe should also place greater emphasis on special niche capabilities and priority improvements as a way to get more for their money: “…while Europeans cannot hope to match American defense expenditure, they will need to spend more on secure communications, air lift, special operations and dealing with chemical and biological battlefields. Not all these tasks require the vast expenditure on weapons platforms that are in the American budget.”\textsuperscript{146} In other words: think European, close bases, shut down assembly lines — rationalize the production of European security.

Finally, one should remember that Europe will not only be asked to help win wars, but also to help win the peace. European experience in the Balkans, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and elsewhere is something American observers can also appreciate. This ‘other side’ of military capabilities flows directly into the task of regional conflict resolution addressed below. Military capabilities, however employed, are nevertheless but one aspect of a much broader effort to defeat terrorism.

3. Intelligence Sharing

Military capabilities are of little value if you do not know who the enemy is or where to find him. Intelligence is the essence of counter-terrorism — and that means getting the right information to the right place at the right time. Revamping intelligence capabilities thus implies greater emphasis on sharing and networking and interoperability. This is important domestically, in the context of homeland defense, as US Congressional investigation into the intelligence failure that was September 11\textsuperscript{th} has shown. Sharing and networking is equally important with the intelligence capacities of other countries. Europe, where the operational planning for the September 11\textsuperscript{th} attacks took place, is no exception. Stratfor.com, the

\textsuperscript{145} Richard N. Haass, “Charting a New Course in the Transatlantic Relationship,” op cit.
\textsuperscript{146} Joseph S. Nye, “NATO remains necessary,” op cit.
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hard-nosed strategic forecasting company based in Austin, Texas, underlined the importance of such cooperation, writing a week after the attacks:

The views of these countries carry enormous weight in the war the United States is planning to wage. A critical part of that war will be the covert operations that will be virtually global in scope and will rely heavily on cooperation from the intelligence and security services of other countries. The wholehearted cooperation of Germany, France and Egypt are indispensable for such an intelligence war.147

Not that intelligence sharing is easy. Mistrust abounds, even among allies.Leaks can be political bombshells. Still, certain practices have developed, particularly in the context of NATO, that could be significantly expanded upon. “NATO exists as an effective framework for coordinating preparations in the security area,” maintains Joseph Nye, arguing that, “(m)ore will need to be done in coordinating intelligence, preparing defenses against cyber attacks and sharing best practices in making homeland security more robust in NATO member nations.”148 NATO itself could evolve into a homeland defense organization, starting as an information exchange, but also taking a hand in coordinating the myriad of transnational domestic defense tasks that will come to comprise a significant part of NATO’s new Article V responsibilities. This would also involve tighter coordination with the EU in a range of new areas, particularly law enforcement.

4. Counter-Terror Law Enforcement

Law enforcement, increasingly tasked with preventing as well as prosecuting terrorism, is a national but also very much a European Union responsibility. Americans have become very aware of the way in which terrorists moved in Europe.149 "Now… there is a direct organic relationship

148 Steven Erlanger, “Missed Signals on Sept. 11: Militant’s Story in Europe Came Too Late,” New York Times, December 29, 2001. See Peter Finn and Sarah Delaney,
Shades of Multilateralism

between European and American security. Europe was used as a launching pad for the worst terrorist attack in history. Securing its territory against terrorist infiltration would shrink that option.\textsuperscript{150} One could even go so far as to say, “…it is by now accepted on both sides of the Atlantic that the global counter-terrorism campaign will hinge far more on vigilant law-enforcement and intelligence than on the rare headline-grabbing military campaign à la Afghanistan.”\textsuperscript{151} Americans see Europeans bringing with them a different kind of terrorist experience, and certain ingrained law enforcement habits for dealing with it. Threat perceptions differ as does the price of action; European governments will tread carefully in view of large Arab populations. All the same, Americans expect much of the Europeans when it comes to rolling up terrorist networks across the expanding European Union.\textsuperscript{152} They will also want the Europeans on board when efforts are undertaken to make international norms and legal foundations compatible with combating terrorism.\textsuperscript{153} Europeans also have to think about the juridical status of terrorists in terms of domestic law and the international law of war — are they criminals or combatants?

5. Regional Conflict Resolution

Regional conflict resolution is sometimes about winning wars. More often it is about winning the peace. How many more Balkans could the Europeans do? Whatever an ideal state of affairs might be in southeastern Europe, it seems fair to say that things are a lot better than they were in 1995. Much was learned in the Balkans that will be of value in any number of other global hotspots, whether on the European periphery or further a field. Not that the consolidation of peace and prosperity in greater Europe is by any means complete.

“Al Qaeda’s Tracks Deepen in Europe,” Washington Post Foreign Service Monday, October 22, 2001; Page A01

151 Ibid.
153 Kurt M. Campbell and Michele A. Flournoy, To Prevail… , op cit, p. 54.
This consolidation remains a core American interest; the Europeans have much here to contribute. America will expect Europe to continue stabilization efforts in the Balkans, well aware that any kind flare up there would severely hamper counter-terrorism efforts elsewhere. Blessed was NATO that the attack on New York and Washington did not occur in May of 1999, a time at which the Alliance was engaged in a major air war over Kosovo. More generally, if the Europeans were to develop additional capacity to carry out the kind of post-conflict stabilization seen in the Balkans, Washington would clearly welcome it. Numerous regional crises call for attention; Afghanistan is only the latest in a long list. Mainstream American foreign policy thinking would agree with the following: “We welcome an increasingly strong and effective EU…and development of a successful European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) that is closely coordinated with NATO and includes a crisis management and civilian policing capability available for international deployment.”

Nation building in Central Asia would be high on the list, making the most of close coordination with an ever-more European Russia. Americans have a clear interest in the Europeans tending to their ever-larger periphery. The European periphery overlaps to a large degree with the “Greater Southwest Asia” that has become America’s strategic focus. When it comes to pacifying the conflicts between Israel and Palestine and India and Pakistan, America is clearly not beyond the need for help.

Iraq is perhaps the most contentious regional problem, if not nation-building challenge, now debated across the Atlantic, and “(w)hat to do with Saddam Hussein's regime is… likely to remain the most divisive transatlantic strategic issue.” The debate is sometimes shrill; overreactions and misperceptions abound. Phil Gordon of the Brookings Institution would ask the Europeans to do more than wring their hands over

America’s ostensible plans for Iraq: “If America's friends and allies want to dissuade the United States from unilaterally attacking Iraq, they will have to do more than wring their hands and point out all the dangers that would be involved. Instead, they will have to take concrete actions to stop or slow the pace of Iraq's development of weapons of mass destruction, deter it from supporting terrorism, and hasten the day when a new and better regime will come to power.”\(^{157}\) At the same time, it is clear to the White House that domestic support for an attack against Iraq will be easier to maintain if the European allies are on board.\(^{158}\) If the ‘coalition’ approach used in Afghanistan is any indication, the Bush Administration will be very interested in having Europe on board for any invasion of Iraq. For the Europeans, this may be a problem, but it is also an opportunity.

\(^{157}\) Philip H. Gordon, “Iraq: The American Message to the Allies,” Le Monde, February 7, 2002, English version on Brookings Institution web site. www.brookings.edu. This sentiment is echoed by a Washington Post editorial on transatlantic troubles: “There may be more angry rhetoric, and it may even be necessary. With their vested economic and political interests in the status quo, European and Arab governments are unlikely to be moved without a fight. Like some past arguments between the allies, this one will be worth it if it succeeds in creating a new and more solid front of resistance to a common enemy – in this case, anti-democratic regimes that pursue nuclear and biological weapons. For that to happen, European governments must drop their pointless rhetoric about unilateralism and make their own proposals for countering the threat. Bush, for his part, must be prepared to fulfill his promise to listen as well as lead.” “Cross talk among allies,” Washington Post, February 21, 2002.

\(^{158}\) A Pew poll concluded the following in January 2002: “The public’s support for military action against Iraq comes with a condition: of those willing to threaten military attack in order to force Saddam Hussein to accept weapons inspections in Iraq, 53% say we should attack only if our major allies agree to join us, while 41% are willing to go it alone. This view is held particularly strongly by older Americans. By more than two-to-one (62%-30%) Americans age 65 and older who say force is an option feel we should follow through only with allied support. Those under age 29 are divided on whether allied support is necessary (49%-49%). “Americans Favor Force in Iraq, Somalia, Sudan and…,” January 22, 2002, www.people-press.org
6. Homeland Defense and Border Affairs

Interdependence across the Atlantic — “thick globalism”\textsuperscript{159} as Joseph Nye would put it — makes homeland defense much more than a mere domestic or national issue. A myriad of mutual vulnerabilities and the public policy dilemmas that come with addressing them (while maintaining an open society and relatively open borders) characterize today’s North Atlantic world. Europe’s vulnerability is also America’s vulnerability — and vice versa.

Americans want Europe safe — if for no lesser reason than Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, which, as of September 12\textsuperscript{th}, 2001, also applies to non-state actors. The aircraft and anthrax attacks of 2001 have focused attention on larger and more enduring vulnerabilities that were already a problem on September 10\textsuperscript{th}. The scope of concern is broad. The nature of the threat heightens interest in respective domestic arrangements, in more active collaboration. Anthony Cordesman provides an example of the various vulnerabilities that could be better addressed through greater transatlantic cooperation:

- Biological attacks
- Information warfare and defense
- Transportation, hazardous material, high risk facility, and critical infrastructure security
- Insurance laws and regulations
- Immigration and human rights
- Arms control agreements and export controls — looking at the CBRN and advanced technology threat as a whole\textsuperscript{160}

Generally speaking, the United States would prefer that the European Union play a significant part in such transatlantic coordination. A confusion of national European policies will only undermine transatlantic openness. The EU could bring greater efficiency to transatlantic efforts —

\textsuperscript{159} Nye, The Paradox of American Power, op cit, p. 87.
\textsuperscript{160} Anthony H. Cordesman, op cit.
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again, assuming there is trust that the European Union and the United States will be pulling in the same direction. A Revolution in Border Affairs, at any rate, would have to be transatlantic to deserve such a name.

7. Reality Check

A composite of American expectations would not be complete without a discussion of Europe as a corrective. Political solidarity thus construed would demand balance between validation and legitimacy on the one hand, and creative contribution and constructive criticism on the other. For Americans who think limited government good government, distrust monopolies in all walks of life, and believe democratic principles to be universal, Europe provides a valued set of checks and balances. The idea of a European counterweight to American excess, if not unilateralism, is widespread in U.S. foreign policy circles. “I think we Americans are too powerful for our own good as well as for that of the rest of the world… Until the members of the European Union become willing to give up sovereignty in favor of significance — in reality, not just by proclamation — the United States will continue to act unilaterally” proclaims Robert Levine.¹⁶¹ Americans may want a counterweight, but they also know a counterweight has to weigh something to tip the scales. A Europe without influence will not provide the reality check these Americans want.

This also means Europe will have to cultivate relations with Washington more intensely than Washington does with Europe. The American political process is an open one — or so the vast army of lobbyists encamped on the Potomac would seem to attest. Europe can play this give-and-take game as well — with its own set of roadmaps, strategy inputs, and operational capabilities. Americans might in the end support the use of force against Saddam Hussein, but they would want to be certain that all other alternatives had also been vetted. “If (the Europeans) do not want us to go in with guns blazing, they need to get behind a diplomatic strategy — one that could well involve Chalabi and the INC — to accomplish our

Europe has to shed the dynamic of not getting attention, perceiving no influence, building up resentment, then claiming it wants less attention and influence. Autonomy is a state of mind, but not much more. Independence in a networked world is largely a function of the way one manages one’s own interdependence.

Europe should hold America true to its principles, but it should not abandon America when America cannot be. In a Hobbesian world, America will sometimes have to play dirty — or at least tolerate dirty bedfellows. There will be a double standard, but there is also a historical standard. America’s political principles are ultimately its primary strength — and its difference from past great powers. Keeping the tension of this double standard in context will be a challenge for Europe. America is what it is and the world is as it is; the rules inside the wall are different than those outside. Contending with this while remaining a close partner of the United States may indeed be one of Europe’s biggest challenges — except for the corollary. Outside the wall, Europe, too, must play by a more pernicious set of rules.

8. Europe and America in Tomorrow’s World

The Atlantic civilization that arose out the ashes of Europe’s 20th century wars is going global — not least because of its openness, an openness that is also the source of its greatest vulnerability. It is precisely this vulnerability to ever-more accessible means of mass destruction and mass

164 Robert Cooper, a sage British diplomat, gives this advice to post-modern (i.e. European states): “Those who have friendly, law-abiding neighbors should not forget that in other parts of the world the law of the jungle reigns. Among ourselves, we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle, we also must the laws of the jungle. In the coming period of peace in Europe there will be a temptation to neglect our defenses, both physical and psychological. This represents one of the great dangers for the post-modern state.” Robert Cooper, “Europe: the post-modern state and world order,” New Perspectives Quarterly, Summer 1997, pp. 46-58; Special Issue 1997, pp. 48-56, p. 50.
disruption that a transformed Atlantic Alliance must address. America expects much of Europe — but a new Alliance will also require a new America — a requirement to which the old Republic is not entirely indisposed. America, too, will again need to nurture the garden of change.

New policy challenges generate new institutional blueprints. The U.S. executive branch will soon have another department; a Secretary of Homeland Security — Congress willing — will soon sit at Bush’s cabinet table. Some would say the Atlantic institutions are in need of similarly dramatic redesign. America must, according to Stanley Sloan, proponent of the New Atlantic Initiative, “(r)evitalize the Atlantic community or risk its growing irrelevance.” The Atlantic, not just Europe, needs a “wise men’s” committee to draft an ”Atlantic Community Treaty” that will put a new roof over NATO and US-EU ties. “The treaty should include political, economic, and other areas of cooperation that go beyond NATO's mandate. The new Atlantic Community Organization would embrace, not replace, NATO and US-EU bilateral ties, and provide a new foundation for the future of transatlantic relations.”

The opportunity of the moment, if not the threat of tomorrow would, it seems, forgive such grand thinking.

Starting from the assumption that America cannot do everything in today’s world, Europe will need to ask itself where it can make the most significant contribution to a new construct. Managing the connectivity and vulnerability of today’s global dispensation will call for more than winning wars. If winning the peace is indeed the challenge of the day, Europe could certainly do more. A European World Peace Corps of teachers and engineers and bankers and policemen and magistrates — and soldiers — might be a place to start. The Europeans also have a colonial legacy — and a commensurate obligation.

165 Sloan would go on to suggest NATO set up a spearhead force and a new command: “In addition, NATO should create a Standing Counter-Terrorism Combined Joint Task Force Command. This command should bring together the military services of allied countries, along with intelligence assets and civilian finance and police expertise, to provide a pivot point for NATO's support of future counterterrorist operations.” Stanley R. Sloan, “Toward a new transatlantic bargain,” The Christian Science Monitor, May 17, 2002. See also the web site of the Atlantic Community Initiative, www.atlanticcommunity.org
The two powers straddling the Atlantic can do more to make globalization sustainable. The Atlantic allies can come up with a bigger, better toolbox. The planet’s networks of cooperation, its alliances and mergers and acquisitions, can take many forms. Being a little smarter and a little more magnanimous about the world to come should not be so hard. The unity in diversity of Atlantic civilization is a broad and good foundation upon which to build.

**VI. Conclusions**

American counter-terror strategy, like its Atlantic counterpart, will be multidimensional and thus also multilateral. Americans want counter-terrorism that works. The nature of terrorism means that effective counter-terrorism cannot be a one-country operation. Effective counter-terror strategy implies a network-versus-network mode, going global and waging war like the New Economy creates value, market researching the world’s trouble spots to better root out terrorists while providing the appropriate peace and prosperity product. In this, Europe and America could very much benefit from a carefully calibrated set of complementary and compatible counter-terror strategies. In facing down the vulnerabilities to come, the United States can do more with Europe than without—all the rumbling and grumbling about the proper balance of burden and influence, about the proper strategy and tactics notwithstanding.

The roots of America’s multilateralist proclivity are deep and broad, and Europe has always played a special role in America’s world. Many other regions have vied for pride of place, but the bonds across the Atlantic remain the most fundamental. Transatlantic cooperation will be as necessary in the next 50 years as it was in the last 50 years — it will probably also be as contentious. Putting current disagreements in proper historical and geopolitical perspective can help to mitigate them. Burden and influence, Europe and the world, carrot and stick, these themes can serve as a useful set of reference points by which to assess the controversies that continually come up in transatlantic affairs.
The process and pursuit of multilateralism finds a different reception in American than in Europe. Institutionalized cooperation and dialogue — and the political and normative strictures thereby imposed — cast a different shadow across America than across Europe. This is no reason to lose heart. American multilateralism comes in many shades, but taken together they form an intense impetus to global cooperation. The picture is of enthusiasm, but also of caution, caution deeply rooted in the American polity and its historical experience. Different perspectives do not rule out cooperation. Indeed, there is, despite all the American ambivalence about foreign entanglements, many a reason to believe that the United States — at least as great powers go — is uniquely conducive to global cooperation. Many shades of multilateralism also mean many points where Europeans can effectively engage their American interlocutors. Common values and common interests will continue to compel cooperation. Disagreements over process should not prevent cooperation on substance. The fundamentals count and they speak for partnership.

America has its expectations of what a strong Europe should do. Constituted and situated as it is, Europe is clearly in the global game whether it wants to be or not. Nor is the hand it holds all that bad. Across a wide spectrum of policy areas, the Europeans have the potential to make significant contributions to the American, and thus the Atlantic, effort to counter-terrorism. Europeans can offer political solidarity and military capability; they can share intelligence and carry out effective counter-terror law enforcement; they can engage in regional conflict resolution and coordinate homeland security and border affairs; finally, the Europeans can be a reality check for an American body politic often prone to distraction but nevertheless showing a new sense of urgency about the world in which it lives.

Americans want a global order where the vulnerabilities to mass destruction are minimized, where the open society is defended. All the same, no power has infinite stamina and focus. Like a marathon runner, America’s war on terrorism will sometimes hit ‘the wall,’ foundering on indecision, if not division. A sometimes self-absorbed America will be preoccupied, as the New Economy retrenches, and fall 2002 elections leave
politics more local. Europeans could thus do well to promote American engagement and focus. Europeans, it would seem, tend to suffer more when America is disengaged than when it is engaged (e.g., the Balkans from 1991 to 1995). Europeans serving sometimes as a reality check also means Europeans sometimes serving as a force of continuity: a fly-wheel with a predilection for predictability and all the institutional machinery this implies. Counter-terror strategy has to be selective and smart; economies need to be maximized. Still, American and Atlantic ad hocery will impose its costs. Jean Monnet, that great European, that great Atlanticist, was not completely wrong in saying “Nothing is possible without men: nothing is lasting without institutions.” Europe, then, should take America at its word and hold America to its word. Europe should build on the good things and not dwell on the bad. Finally, Europe should promote the partnership even more than the Americans promote it. America will be a better America as well as a better partner for it.

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