

European Communities

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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

# Working Documents

1982 - 1983

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16 July 1982

DOCUMENT 1-436/82

REPORT

drawn up on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee

on the situation in Poland

Rapporteur: Mr P. DESCHAMPS

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Resolution adopted at the Aitting of 16 September 1982 annexed.

The proposals for resolution listed below were referred by Parliament to the Political Affairs Committee:

- on 14 October 1981, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr ISRAEL on the situation in Poland (Doc. 1-591/81)
- on 16 December 1981, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr ROMUALDI and others on the state of emergency in Poland (Doc. 1-891/81)
- on 17 February 1982, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mrs MACCIOCCHI on the situation in Poland (Doc. 1-1035/81).
- on 14 June 1982, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr GAWRONSKI on aid for Poland (Doc. 1-110/82)

The Committee on Budgets was asked for its opinion on this last motion for a resolution.

At its meeting of 27 and 28 October 1981, the Political Affairs Committee decided to draw up a report on the situation in Poland.

On 28 January 1982, Mr DESCHAMPS was appointed rapporteur.

The Political Affairs Committee considered the present report at its meetings on 24 - 26 February 1982, 28 - 30 April 1982 and 23 - 25 June 1982. At this last meeting it adopted the motion for a resolution which follows by 16 votes to 7.

The following took part in the vote: Mr Rumor, chairman; Mr Deschamps, rapporteur; Mr Baillot, Mr Cariglia, Mr Croux (deputizing for Mr Schall), Lord Douro, Mr Fellermaier (deputizing for Mr Brandt), Mr Fergusson, Mr B. Friedrich, Mr Gawronski (deputizing for Mr Bettiza), Mr Habsburg, Mr Hänsch, Mr Herman (deputizing for Mr von Hassel), Mr Israel (deputizing for Mr de la Malene), Mr Katzer (deputizing for Mr Klepsch), Mrs Lenz, Mr Mommersteeg (deputizing for Mr Antoniozzi), Mr Moorhouse (deputizing for Lady Elles), Mr Penders, Mr Prag (deputizing for Lord Bethell), Sir James Scott-Hopkins, Mr Seefeld (deputizing for Mr Schieler), Mr Walter (deputizing for Mr Motchane), Mr Wedekind (deputizing for Mr Barbi).

The opinion of the Committee on Budgets will be published separately or delivered orally in the House.

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ANNEX I: Motion for a resolution tabled by Mr ISRAEL on the situation in Poland (Doc. 1-591/81)

ANNEX II: Motion for a resolution tabled by Mr ROMUALDI and others on the state of emergency in Poland (Doc. 1-891/81)

ANNEX III: Motion for a resolution tabled by Mrs MACCIOCCHI on the situation in Poland (Doc. 1-1035/81)

ANNEX IV: Motion for a resolution tabled by Mr GAWRONSKI on aid for Poland (Doc. 1-310/82)

A

The Political Affairs Committee hereby submits to the European Parliament the following motion for a resolution, together with explanatory statement

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

on the situation in Poland

The European Parliament,

- A recalling its resolutions
- of 9 April 1975<sup>1</sup>, of 11 May 1977<sup>2</sup>, of 10 May 1978<sup>3</sup> and of 15 October 1980<sup>4</sup> on security and cooperation in Europe,
  - of 18 September 1980 on human rights in Poland<sup>5</sup>
  - of 17 December 1981 on the situation in Poland<sup>6</sup>
  - of 17 December 1981 on the refugees from Poland<sup>7</sup>
  - of 21 January 1982 on declaring a day of solidarity with the Polish people on 30 January 1982<sup>8</sup>
- B having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr ISRAEL on the situation in Poland (Doc. 1-591/81),
- the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr ROMUALDI and others on the state of emergency in Poland (Doc. 1-891/81),
  - the motion for a resolution tabled by Mrs MACCIOCCHI on the situation in Poland (Doc. 1-1035/81),
  - the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr GAWRONSKI on aid for Poland (Doc. 1-310/82),
- C having regard to the report of the Political Affairs Committee (Doc. 1-436/82),
- I. As regards the CSE
- A. in the awareness, as the democratic Assembly representing the conscience of the people of Europe, of its role as the defender of basic freedoms wherever they are threatened and regardless of the geographical situation of or the political system in the countries concerned,
- B. in the awareness that the crisis in Poland is an expression of the growing difficulties of the Communist system in Eastern Europe that will burden East-West relations and weigh heavily on the policy of security and cooperation in Europe,

<sup>1</sup> OJ No. C 95/28

<sup>2</sup> OJ No. C 133/32

<sup>3</sup> OJ No. C 131/47

<sup>4</sup> OJ No. C 291/24

<sup>5</sup> OJ No. C 265/53

<sup>6</sup> OJ No. C 11/86

<sup>7</sup> OJ No. C 11/81

<sup>8</sup> OJ No. C 40/25

- c. whereas the repressive measures taken by the Polish leadership under pressure from and with the support of the Soviet Union constitute an infringement of human rights and of the Final Act of the CSCE signed in Helsinki in July 1975,
  - d. in the conviction that the Polish tragedy can not be removed from the context of the Helsinki Final Act and that in signing those agreements, the European Community entered into formal commitments in the matter of compliance with human rights (by all signatories),
  - E. whereas the military take-over on 12-13 December 1981 and the introduction of martial law are not simply an internal Polish problem, the specific responsibility of the USSR in those events calling for a clear, firm and strong response,
  - F. whereas liberties in Poland have, to an increasing extent, been wilfully suppressed, requiring specific measures to persuade the military junta to loosen its hold on the country,
1. Condemns the proclamation of martial law in Poland and the situation it has produced as a threat to cooperation and security between peoples;
  2. Considers that a return to the spirit of Helsinki on the part of all signatories is an essential part of detente;
  3. Recalls that detente is incompatible with the idea that there are 'spheres of influence' in the world in which infringements of the basic principles of Helsinki are justifiable and where other rules apply;
  4. Recalls the more fundamental point that detente, as manifested in the whole range of mutual commitments of which it consists, is indivisible;
  5. Declares that in its view, any distinction between political, military, humanitarian and economic and commercial detente is unacceptable; and since the various aspects of detente cannot be pursued in isolation or out of step, failure to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms affects economic cooperation,
  6. Stresses, nevertheless, that the primary aim of the policy of the Ten remains that of helping the Polish people along the path of democratic renewal;

II. As regards the USSR

- A. having regard to the specific responsibility of the USSR in the present situation in Poland;
- B. noting that through direct interference and covert intervention, the USSR
  - (a) for a period of 18 months systematically pursued a policy designed to threaten and pressurize Poland, a country in the process of democratic renewal;

- intimidatory military exercises at its borders and even on Polish soil;
  - the official declaration by the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party demanding that 'the course of events be turned back',
  - the press campaign against the freedom movement begun in Poland,
- (b) gave active political support to the decision to take and the implementation of the measures that were introduced on 13 December 1981,

7. Takes note of the decisions to restrict certain imports from the USSR taken by the Council of the Community on 15 March 1982 after the Member States had jointly acknowledged the responsibility of the USSR for what had happened in Poland;
8. Demands that the interest rates on credit granted by EEC Member States to the USSR be brought into line with those on credit granted to other industrialized countries;
9. Should the present situation in Poland persist, demands a fundamental reassessment of the EEC's entire economic policy towards the USSR;

### III. As regards Poland

Noting that:

- A. the process of renewal in Poland had been underway for 18 months without call for or resort to violence (on the part of the free trade union movements, notably Solidarity),
- B. but the continuation of martial law may well create an explosive situation,
- C. in effect, the continuation of martial law brings with it further cases of infringement of the most basic human rights and the rights of citizens,
- D. continuation of martial law also hinders economic revival.

Expresses its indignation that:

10. The militia continues to intern people for the opinions they hold;
11. The special courts set up under martial law render summary justice;
12. The number of cases of arbitrary dismissal is increasing;
13. The 'declarations of loyalty' which officials, magistrates, journalists, teachers and those engaged in scientific research are required to make are a violation of conscience;

14. The disbandment of the Union of Polish Journalists and its replacement by an officially appointed body simply represents a take-over of the media: press, radio, TV;
15. The campaigns in the press, radio and television, now in the hands of or subject to the military, to discredit the leaders of Solidarity are growing louder;
16. It is also the continuation of martial law that allows the military junta in power to step up its attempts to break the solidarity of the Polish people and, more especially, the solidarity between workers and intellectuals, through discriminatory measures, assignment to different camps and the imposition of different conditions of internment;

#### IV. Martial law

- A. whereas it is impossible to accept this growing oppression,
- B. whereas the numbers of detainees released are insufficient,
17. (a) wishes first to express its respect for the courage shown by those in Poland who continue to fight for the preservation of liberty;
- (b) pays special tribute to the determination shown by Lech Walesa and the leaders of Solidarity who are either interned or operating in clandestinity;
18. Recalls the urgent appeal it made in Strasbourg on 17 December 1981 for
  - (a) the repeal of martial law,
  - (b) the immediate release of prisoners,
  - (c) the resumption of the dialogue between the representatives of the Polish people (government, church, Solidarity);Insists on the following demands in particular:
19. Internees must be released and they and their dependants should receive compensation;
20. The trade union law being drafted by the Polish Diet should not only enshrine the established fact of trade union pluralism but also effectively restore the right to a trade union that has already been created and made legal;
21. The right of association must be restored in all sections of the population, particularly in the case of young people who are wholly excluded from public life outside the ruling party;
22. Freedom of information must be ensured by allowing foreign journalists to enter, freely travel and freely report in Poland and by reinstating the union of Polish journalists;

V. Economic aid

A. whereas the resumption or extension of political and economic relations with Poland must be made contingent on the extent of the change in the present situation,

23. Hopes that the West will be ready to grant substantial economic and financial aid to Poland if a decisive change takes place in which the processes of democratic renewal begun in August 1980 are resumed;

24. Recommends that the political and economic authorities of the West adjust their decisions on economic and financial cooperation with Poland in the light of developments in the internal situation of the country;

25. Demands that, notwithstanding the measures referred to in Section II and in paragraphs 8 and 9 in particular, no new offers of credit and aid in any form whatsoever be made for the time being - with the exception of food aid sent through charitable organizations;

VI. Humanitarian aid

A. whereas it is necessary to step up humanitarian aid to the Polish people,

B. whereas, regardless of the situation, solidarity with the Polish people implies that food aid and humanitarian aid should continue,

26. Approves the measures taken by the Council of the Community on 23 February 1982 to continue providing direct humanitarian aid;

27. Advocates support for all forms of private aid to Poland and, more specifically, that the transport costs of aid organized by private individuals should be charged to the appropriate items of the Community budget;

28. Calls on the governments of Member States which have not yet done so to facilitate the sending of gift parcels by private individuals, by assuming direct responsibility themselves for the postal charges involved;

C. whereas it is necessary to arrange also for humanitarian aid to Polish refugees,

29. Reminds the Council of the Community of its commitment to look into what can be done to ease the situation of Polish nationals outside Poland who do not wish to return in the present circumstances;

30. Calls on the Community Member States to join the non-European countries that take immigrants in accepting the tens of thousands of Polish refugees who are still living in refugee camps in Austria;

31. Specifically requests that long-term visas be granted to those Polish nationals in the Member States who wish to postpone their return to Poland without applying for political asylum;
32. Calls for continued assistance to Polish students and graduates for studies at universities in the West;
33. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Community Member States meeting in political cooperation and to the Council and the Commission.

## EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

### INTRODUCTION

The Political Affairs Committee decided to draw up the present report on the situation in Poland: after Parliament had voted a number of separate resolutions in connection with major developments in Poland, and particularly the proclamation of the state of siege on 13 December 1981, it was felt necessary to examine the factors which allowed such a situation to arise and to try to assess how it is likely to evolve in the future.

Such an analysis is the aim and the subject of the present explanatory statement. The practical conclusions drawn from this analysis are presented in the form of a resolution.

Our Parliament cannot regard the proclamation of the state of siege in Poland and its consequences as that country's internal affairs. These events cannot be considered outside the wider context of East-West relations or of the policy of détente, and least of all can they be isolated from the Helsinki Final Act, of which they constitute a flagrant violation.

The political, social and economic divide between East and West, due above all to the misinterpretation of the Yalta and Helsinki agreements by the USSR, creates a state of permanent tension which the peoples inhabiting Central Europe have to endure.

But, more than ten years ago, the era of confrontation gave way to that of détente. The Helsinki Final Act of 1973 was to confer legal status on the de facto state of détente at the same time as it asserted the fundamental rights of the peoples of Europe.

Within the last two years, however, the policy of détente has suffered the gravest set-backs, for which the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the recent events in Poland are 'directly responsible' (Declaration of the Franco-German Summit of 25 February 1982).

More specifically, several months after the military 'coup' and the coming to power of the junta, the situation in Poland, as the Conclusions of the European Council of 29-30 March 1982 stated, continues to weigh heavily on East-West relations and to affect the relations of the Ten with Poland and with the USSR, which country bears an undoubted responsibility for this state of affairs.

Nevertheless, and despite the set-backs, the guiding principles of the policy of détente - firmness with moderation, remain valid. 'We must not respond to these reverses by a return to the cold war or by opting for confrontation. That would be a dangerous and sterile reaction. It would mean the renunciation of all active policy. The response should, on the contrary, consist in a policy in which firmness in defence of our interests and ideals goes hand in hand with the encouragement of a policy of moderation and a permanent offer of mutually advantageous cooperation'<sup>1</sup>.

It is in the latter spirit that this explanatory statement and motion for a resolution deal both with the problem of measures vis-à-vis the USSR and that of conditional economic aid for Poland.

It is in this spirit too, that after a brief summary of the 'changed course' of Polish history after 13 December 1981, an analysis is undertaken of the fundamental constituents of Polish society (the Church - Solidarity - Youth) and the role they should play in the search for a 'national reconciliation' that will safeguard the freedoms that have been regained.

## SECTION I

### SOCIALIST POLAND: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

#### CHAPTER I : YALTA AND SOVIET DOMINATION

##### A. 'Breaking out of Yalta means breaking out of the Yalta myth'

(J. Laloy)

When the last two years' events in Poland are discussed, reference is often made to the Conference at which the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom met in the Crimea from 4 to 11 February 1945. And it is true that it is impossible to obtain a true appreciation of the present situation, search for its fundamental causes, or try to forecast its future development, without referring to the Yalta Agreements. But it is important to know exactly what they comprise and to avoid misinterpretations.

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<sup>1</sup> P. CORTENIER, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the FRG: lecture at the Institut français de relations internationales, Paris, on 16 February 1982

It is an over-simplification to present the Yalta Agreements as a sharing-out of Europe and the world between the United States and the USSR, a binding and definitive division that nothing and no-one can challenge today without taking the responsibility for jeopardizing Peace. Certainly no written document, no evidence, no record exists to support that myth. Actually, the reality behind the Yalta Agreements was not a carve-up but rather a recognition of facts. And, incidentally, what the Soviet system is striving for is not to divide Europe into two blocs but to obtain dominant and sovereign influence over the whole of Europe by claiming a right of intervention here, a right of oversight there.

In February 1945, Poland with the whole of Eastern Europe, except for a large part of Czechoslovakia, was held by the Red Army. It was thus not a question of what Britain and America would allow Russia to do in Poland, but what the United Kingdom and the United States could persuade the Soviet Union to accept with regard to that country.

B. The Yalta Agreement on Poland

A special chapter of the Agreements was devoted to Poland and it laid down:

1. its provisional territorial status (the Curzon Line to the east, substantial territorial gains to the north and west); the final outline of the western frontier would not be determined until the Peace Conference;
2. the form of the future government, to be set up on a democratic basis and to be representative of the Poles in Poland and abroad;
3. the obligation of this 'provisional Polish Government of national unity' to hold free and unconstrained elections on the basis of universal suffrage and a secret ballot.

The United States demanded that the elections be held under international supervision, but this was rejected by Molotov on the pretext that 'it might be offensive to the Poles', as it implied that they were subject to the control of foreign diplomatic representatives.

Both Roosevelt and Churchill stressed that one thing was certain: the Poles should have a relationship of the closest friendship with the USSR based on a genuine desire for cooperation, but within the framework

of a truly democratic system. Churchill, in particular, insisted vigorously that he was more interested in 'Poland's sovereignty and independence' than in the question of the frontiers. He wanted Poland to be 'mistress of herself and captain of her soul' (E. Stettinius, 'Yalta', Paris 1951, p. 151). To Stalin, on the other hand, the Polish question was 'a strategic question of security'. The USSR, he said, wanted a strong independent and democratic Poland which could help to protect the Soviet Union. To this end he wanted to establish a 'security ring' of countries on its borders.

C. Yalta: not a conspiracy but a misconstruction

For the Soviets, Poland was to become, first and foremost, a security buffer that could be relied on both militarily and ideologically. The Americans and the British, who readily accepted that the Polish Government must not be hostile or unfriendly towards the Soviet Union, did not regard this as conflicting with the requirement that the government should be democratic, representative of the whole nation, sovereign and free.

The misunderstanding, deliberately engineered by the Soviets from the outset and thereafter maintained by them and by those prepared to govern Poland on their behalf, remains at the root of the present drama. On the Soviet side, Poland's membership of the eastern military alliance and of the Soviet system is regarded as irreversible. Western democrats, while they do not challenge the allegiance of Poland and other Eastern European countries to the Warsaw Pact, do not see this as precluding an internal evolution of the system of government.

At the time of the Yalta meeting, the Russians were in a position to dominate Europe. Soviet influence would reach as far as Soviet arms could penetrate. The only choice before Roosevelt and Churchill was between war and compromise. Once the alternative was posed in those terms, geographic and strategic facts automatically tipped the balance towards acceptance of the ambiguous compromise.

D. Liberties stifled in stages

A continuous presence of Soviet forces in Poland since 1944, an agreement on mutual friendship and economic cooperation with the USSR concluded in 1945 and renewed in 1965 - these are the crucial elements of the situation in Poland which was now to remain under the dominant

influence of the Soviet Union. Poland, a nation renowned for its deep love of freedom, was from 1945 onwards deprived of freedom to choose either its government or its destiny.

A people's referendum in 1946 confirmed the structural economic changes in Poland, but the first elections to the Diet did not take place until the beginning of 1947. The opposition got 38 seats out of 432. There was no international supervision. It was the last occasion when a legally recognized opposition was allowed to manifest itself before it was suppressed by the regime.

In 1952 a Constitution was voted making the Polish State a 'people's democracy where the power belongs to the workers of the towns and the countryside'. As for civic freedoms, while the letter of the Constitution and the law guaranteed all the freedoms of a democratic system and adhered to the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man, regulatory practice restricted human rights to ensure security of the regime and the established order.

When, in 1976, the 1952 Constitution was reformed, two essential points of the Soviet interpretation of the Yalta Agreements were confirmed:

1. the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) became 'the political force leading the nation in the construction of Socialism';
2. friendship and cooperation with the USSR, as well as peaceful co-existence with states possessing a different social system, were raised to the status of fundamental principles.

This was a decisive turning point and clear-thinking Poles knew it. But, despite the protests of the intellectuals (the 'Letter of the 59') and vigorous criticism by the Primate of Poland, Cardinal Wyszyński, the new Constitution was adopted by the Diet in February 1976.

From that moment onwards, scope for the Polish regime to evolve, whether to meet the needs of economic development or to satisfy the social, cultural and spiritual aspirations of the people, became considerably reduced.

Any attempt by the Polish nation to free itself of the constraints of a rigid and inefficient system would now be thwarted, domestically, by restrictive juridical and constitutional interpretations and meet

with Moscow's accusations of 'disrupting the established military balance' from outside. Any such movement, therefore, would be brutally repressed by the hardliners at home and provoke threats from 'our great allies' in the Socialist camp.

On 23 June 1981 Pravda published a reminder of this coincidence of Socialism's military and ideological frontiers. The Soviet paper claimed that imperialist circles were trying to use the 'Polish breach' to change the status quo in Europe. It accused the imperialists of 'preparing long-term plans to weaken the Polish link in the Socialist community'. Their aim, wrote Pravda, was to 'upset the established pattern of power in Europe and launch an offensive against the post-war order'. But, added the paper, 'the principle of the inviolability of frontiers has become the cornerstone of security in Europe'.

## CHAPTER II : THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND THE POLISH MODEL

### A. The 'system' in its orthodox form

Since Yalta, and especially since the 25th CPSU Congress held in 1976, the Soviet Union has been busy unifying the Socialist countries of Eastern Europe by integrating them increasingly within a common system of which the Warsaw Pact and COMECON are the two pillars. Each Socialist state must totally accept the 'rules of the game' which the USSR laid down many years ago for the Socialist system as a whole. One of the basic rules is joint responsibility for upholding the 'system' within each country.

Poland did not and could not enjoy any special status in that respect and would not be allowed to distance itself in any way from the 'community'.

It is fully subject to the principle of progressive integration in the Soviet Socialist model. The Soviet leaders have, indeed, constantly stressed that Poland was the pivot of the 'security zone' which the USSR was constructing along its western frontiers. Since the purpose of this East European buffer is to constitute an advance military defence line for Soviet territory and an ideological barrier isolating the Soviet peoples from Western influence, there could be no question of allowing Poland any special freedoms in either of these domains.

