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SECOND REPORT

drawn up on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee
on the situation in Poland

Rapporteur: Mr J. GAWRONSKI

Resolution adopted at the Sitting of 11 December 1986 annexed.

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At its sitting of 23 October 1984, the European Parliament referred the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Glinne on the situation in Poland following the amnesty decree (Doc. 2-742/84) pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure to the Political Affairs Committee as the committee responsible.

At its meeting of 26 November 1984, the Political Affairs Committee decided to draw up a report. At its meeting of 23 January 1985, the Political Affairs Committee appointed Mr Gawronski rapporteur.

At its sitting of 11 February 1985, the European Parliament referred the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Alber and others on mailing charges for small packed gifts from Community citizens to Polish people (Doc. 2-1337/84) to the Political Affairs Committee as the committee responsible and to the Committee on Transport for an opinion.

At its sitting of 8 May 1985, the European Parliament referred the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Pordea and others on Poland (Doc. B 2-213/85) to the Political Affairs Committee.

At its sitting of 13 January 1986, the European Parliament referred the motions for a resolution tabled by Mr Pordea and others on the death of the Polish student Marcin Antonowicz (B 2-1194/85) to the Political Affairs Committee.

The Political Affairs Committee considered the report at its meetings of 25 September, 1985, 23 April 1986 and 26 June 1986.

At the last meeting, it adopted the motion for a resolution as a whole by 19 votes to 2 with 6 abstentions.

The following took part in the vote: Mr FORMIGONI, chairman; Mr GAWRONSKI, rapporteur, Mr BAILLOT (deputizing for Mr PIQUET), Mr BALFE (deputizing for Mr LOMAS), Mr BERNARD-REYMOND, Lord BETHELL, Mr BETTIZA, Mr BEYER de RYKE (deputizing for Mrs VEIL), Mr BROK (deputizing for Mr BLUMENFELD), Mr FLANAGAN, Mr GUIMON UGARTECHEA, Mr HABSBERG, Mrs van den HEUVEL, Mr KEPSCHE, Mr MEDEIROS FERREIRA, Mrs PIERMONT, Mr PLANAS PUCHADES, Mr POETERRING, Mr PRAG, Dame Shelagh ROBERTS (deputizing for Lady ELLES), Mr SABY (deputizing for Mr CHARZAT), Mr SEEFELD, Mr SELVA (deputizing for Mr ANTONIOZZI), Mr TZOUNIS (deputizing for Mr CROUX), Mr VERDE I ALDEA (deputizing for Mr MEDINA ORTEGA), Mrs VEIHOFF (deputizing for Mr HANSCH), Mr WALTER and Mr WEDEKIND (deputizing for Mr LENZ).

The opinion of the Committee on Transport is attached.

The report was tabled on 2 July 1986.

At its sitting of 6 October 1986, further to a request submitted by the Socialist Group pursuant to Rule 56 of the Rules of Procedure, the European Parliament referred the report back to the Political Affairs Committee.

At its meeting of 28 October 1986, the Political Affairs Committee decided unanimously to resubmit the present report to Parliament without amendment.

Present: Mr FORMIGONI, chairman; Mr GAWRONSKI, rapporteur, Mr AMADEI, Mr ANTONIOZZI, Mr BALFE (deputizing for Mr Jospin), Lord BETHELL, Mr BOESMANS, Mr BOS (deputizing for Mr Flanagan), Mr CAAMANO BERNAL, Mr CAMPINOS (deputizing for Mr Martelli), Mr CHRISTIANSEN (deputizing for Mr Walter), Mr COSTE-FLORET, Mr CROUX, Mr DANKERT (deputizing for Mr Hansch), Mr DELOROZOY, Mr FELLERMAIER (deputizing for Mr Friedrich), Mr FILINIS (deputizing for Mr Ephremidis), Mrs FLORES VALENCIA, Mr GLINNE, Mr HABSBERG, Mrs van den HEUVEL, Mrs LENZ, Mr LOMAS, Mr de la MALENE (deputizing for Mrs Anglade), Mr MEDINA ORTEGA, Mr NEWENS, Mr NORMANTON (deputizing for Lady Elles), Mr PENDERS, Mr PERINAT ELIO, Mrs PIERMONT, Mr PLANAS, Mr POETTERING, Mr PRAG, Mr ROMEOS (deputizing for Mr Plaskovitis), Mr SABY (deputizing for Mrs Charzat), Mr SEEFELD, Mr SELVA (deputizing for Mr Ercini) and Mr TZOUNIS (deputizing for Mr Blumenfeld).

The second report was tabled on 30 October 1986.

The deadline for tabling amendments to this report will be indicated in the draft agenda for the part-session at which it will be debated.

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The Political Affairs Committee hereby submits to the European Parliament the following motion for a resolution, together with explanatory statement:

A

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

on the situation in Poland

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the following motions for resolutions:
 - . by Mr Glinne on the situation in Poland following the amnesty decree (Doc. 2-742/84)
 - . by Mr Alber and others on mailing charges for small packed gifts from Community citizens to Polish people (Doc. 2-1337/84)
 - . by Mr Pordea and others on Poland (Doc. B 2-213/85),
 - . by Mr Pordea and others on the death of the Polish student Marcin Antonowicz (Doc. B 2-1194/85),
 - having regard to the resolution on the situation in Poland adopted on 16 September 1982 on the basis of the report by Mr Deschamps,¹
 - having regard to the resolution on jamming stations in Europe adopted on 11 October 1985 on the basis of the report by Mr von Habsburg,²
 - having regard to the report of the Political Affairs Committee and the opinion of the Committee on Transport (Doc. A 2-85/86),
 - having regard to the second report of the Political Affairs Committee and the opinion of the Committee on Transport (Doc. A 2-129/86),
- A. whereas martial law was in force in Poland for four years,
- B. whereas, four years after these events, and despite the lifting of the state of emergency, General Jaruzelski's government has been unable to provide solutions capable of satisfying the Polish people's demands for civil and political liberties and an improvement in economic conditions, but has in fact increased repression, for example by violating the autonomy of universities,
- C. deploring the deterioration in the conditions of imprisonment, the increased repression in prisons and the introduction of more severe sentences in criminal cases,
- D. disturbed by the continuing existence of a large number of political prisoners often held in degrading conditions and by the restrictive measures against members of the opposition - including Lech Walesa - and leading figures in academic, ecclesiastical and trade union circles,
- E. whereas the Polish Government has ignored the European Parliament's request that it pay compensation to political prisoners who have been released and whereas the latter encounter systematic discrimination at work,

¹ Doc. 1-436/82 and OJ No. C 267, 11.10.1982, p. 81

² Doc. A 2-103/85 and OJ No. C 288, 11.11.1985, p. 152

- F. whereas Poland's withdrawal from the International Labour Organization has been used by the Government as an opportunity to avoid complying with certain provisions of international law,
 - G. recognizing, that active cultural pluralism can be maintained in Poland,
 - H. having regard to the government's attempts to achieve economic reforms aimed at improving and decentralizing production decisions,
 - I. whereas, however, economic reforms are held back by bureaucratic resistance and the uncertainty surrounding the operation of what is nevertheless an extensive private sector,
 - J. whereas the Polish population live under difficult material conditions,
 - K. having regard to the imposing debt accumulated by Poland towards Western countries,
 - L. aware that, as a result, the European Community can make a constructive contribution to the economic, social and political development of the Polish situation by means of economic and diplomatic instruments,
 - M. whereas the Western countries should direct their action towards respect for human rights, the achievement of more extensive internal pluralism, an improvement in the material situation of the Polish people and a smaller measure of dependence on Moscow for Warsaw,
 - N. aware, however, that the conditions for the establishment of democracy in Poland in the near future do not exist at present and wishing to play a constructive role while remaining conscious of the limits of its own action,
 - O. having regard to the resumption of governmental contacts between Poland and various European countries in the last two years,
 - P. noting the exploratory contacts the Community has made with Poland with a view to normalizing relations,
1. Stresses the need for international efforts to help Poland return to the path of national compromise;
 2. Calls on the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation to draw up a joint EEC strategy on Poland in the light of the events of recent years;
 3. Considers that at the present juncture a policy of political isolation of Poland together with economic sanctions would prove ineffective and counter-productive;
 4. Considers, however, that the authoritarian views imposed on the country since the 1981 clampdown cannot be ignored and forgotten and calls for the immediate release of all political prisoners;
 5. Believes, therefore, that the extent and the nature of relations with Poland should be geared to developments in the internal situation of the country;

6. Stresses, in particular, the value of opening negotiations on economic and trade cooperation with Poland, in order to arrive at agreements which if possible should stipulate conditions for that country's increased social, economic and political liberalization;
7. Stresses the need to continue increasing humanitarian aid to the most disadvantaged sections of the Polish population;
8. Stresses the need for humanitarian aid to be distributed through private and non-governmental channels;
9. Calls in particular on the Member States to make it easier to send gift parcels to Polish citizens, by bearing the postage charges themselves;
10. Approves the special contribution allocated by the Community to the Agricultural Fund managed by the Church, and calls on the Polish Government to authorize the setting up of this fund without further delay;
11. Is closely monitoring the negotiations in progress between the countries of the Paris Club and the Warsaw Government concerning the management of Poland's foreign debt;
12. Believes that in this context the EEC governments should make the granting of new loans to Poland conditional on an agreement on the consolidation of previous debts under terms acceptable to European financial institutions and on the adoption of measures to develop the private sector in Poland;
13. Recalls that relations with Poland should not be confined to contacts with the official authorities, but should also involve genuine and continuous support for the movement of ideas which spawned the experiences of the Polish summer and which retain a dominant position in the minds of the Polish people;
14. Congratulates those statesmen and politicians who, during recent visits to Poland, have expressed the desire to meet members of the opposition and hopes that the Community governments will maintain contacts with the forces representing Polish society;
15. Calls on the Commission and the Community governments to support by all possible means the development of independent and unofficial forms of culture in Poland, through the financing of study grants and overseas publications, and gradually to include in (trade) agreements clauses concerning cultural exchanges, exchanges of information and the free movement of persons;
16. Stresses the need to give legal and material support to Polish exiles in Community countries and the institutions which most effectively represent them, such as the Brussels branch of Solidarnosc;
17. Undertakes to send a delegation of its own to Poland to initiate contacts with the Warsaw authorities, independent institutions, representatives of the Catholic church and representatives of the opposition;
18. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council of Ministers, the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation and the Polish Government.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

In September 1982, just a few months after the December 1981 coup d'etat, the European Parliament adopted the Deschamps resolution on the situation in Poland. This wide-ranging report also included an exhaustive account of events in Poland since the end of the war.

There is no need to repeat what has already been said, but the 1982 resolution can be regarded as the starting point for an account of developments in the last three years.

1.1. A situation of stalemate persists in Poland as regards the government's relations with the people and the church. There is no political resolve on the part of the authorities to overcome the stalemate and open a dialogue with the opposition forces, for fear of legitimising and strengthening them. This difficult situation is accompanied by an economic crisis which has dragged on for years with no perceptible signs of any way out.

1.2. Although it does not appear to be directly threatened, the position of General Jaruzelski and the ruling party is by no means stable. The most glaring example of conflict amongst top leaders was the assassination of Father Popieluszko, a significant political provocation whose real instigators are still unknown despite the fact that the perpetrators of the crime were tried - a thing unprecedented in the countries of Eastern Europe. It is probable that the provocation stems from the conflict between the so-called realists whose main aim is to improve the socio-economic situation and thus overcome Poland's isolation from the rest of the world whilst retaining its ties to the Soviet Union, and the hardliners who favour a return to a way of exercising power that is typical of Communist regimes.

1.3. The former, who are faithful followers of the 'Jaruzelski line', are trying to take a pragmatic approach that responds to national (if not nationalistic) demands within the ideological limits of the system. The latter are disillusioned as a result of losing their privileged position and real influence and are thwarting any attempts at innovation. This is not therefore the usual conflict between factions in a single-party system that concerns tactics rather than objectives. The very fact that Jaruzelski's leadership has not succeeded in fully controlling the security apparatus, one of the mainstays of the régime, is significant.

1.4. Solidarnosc is still very much alive in people's minds and this thwarts all moves towards any sort of trade union pluralism. In recent times, in practice since the 1984 amnesty, there seems to have been a return to repression, and some hardening of the attitude of the authorities is apparent from the arrests and mistreatment of the more visible representatives of the opposition and the harassment of Lech Walesa, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize. The authorities are in fact afraid of an increase in tension and popular discontent and nip in the bud any public manifestation of free expression on major issues, for fear that it may become more widespread.

1.5. Polish society today is in a polarized state. On the one hand social groups such as the young prepared to oppose the authorities. On the other, there are those whose well-being and interests correspond to those of the leading class and they therefore follow its line. In the middle are the vast majority of the people who are weary and up against problems, especially economic ones, every day.

1.6. The Jaruzelski regime must improve the economic situation for the sake of internal and international policy. Internally, the economic crisis and the shortage of consumer goods were undeniably what triggered popular discontent. Externally, the weakness of the Polish economy has made the Warsaw Government dependent on both the USSR and the countries of the West to which Poland's debt has assumed vast proportions. More generally, the image of a Poland that is forced to resort to external humanitarian aid to save its own people from hunger and cold like a Fourth World country is humiliating for the Warsaw regime and jeopardizes its authority in international circles.

1.7. General Jaruzelski's government has introduced a series of reforms designed to improve the efficiency of the economic system and decentralize production decisions. Results have not however come up to expectations, probably mainly because of the narrow basis of consensus on which Jaruzelski can rely: on the one hand, traditional bureaucracy puts up a very strong resistance to measures designed to increase the official's responsibility; on the other, the low morale of the working class and their association of economic reforms with the increase in price of consumer goods make them chary of new policies. Even though more food is available on the market and long queues are no longer seen outside shops, this is because, compared with purchasing power, prices have become too high (and are continuing to increase), thereby depressing demand. Forty years after the end of the Second World War, in a country situated at the heart of Europe with a wealth of raw materials and an agricultural system that was more than self-sufficient until a few years ago, rationing still exists.

1.8. The Polish people might be prepared to accept material hardship as part-payment for the cost of reforms but only in return for concessions over civil and trade union liberties and authentic social representation. Meanwhile, the government is forced to make up for popular discontent in various ways and therefore exceeds budget estimates. Investment plans and economic management in general come up against enormous difficulties: there have had to be massive cuts in imports of intermediate goods because of the considerable drop in exports as a result of sanctions and Poland's indebtedness to the West. Despite the rescheduling of debts (negotiated with the major creditors' banks), Poland's degree of indebtedness is still very high and will remain so for a long time. And Poland's renewed membership of the International Monetary Fund will not change this very serious situation in any substantial way. Even though there has been a slow improvement in industrial production, investments and national income for some months, they are still below the level of the seventies.

1.9. The economic situation does not therefore give grounds for optimism. According to a report produced by the 'Poland 2000' Committee composed of pro-government intellectuals, the country is on the brink of a generalized national catastrophe in economic, social, ecological and human terms. The numbers of those chronically unfit for work has now increased to almost a million; the average lifespan is decreasing and infant mortality increasing; the health situation is plummeting and diseases are spreading.

1.10. In the social field, there seems to have been a gradual decline in the activities of Solidarnosc's clandestine structures. Attempts to force the authorities to give in to their demands by means of strikes and mass demonstrations have been unsuccessful. On the other hand, thanks to the

protection of the church, some forms of independent culture such as clandestine books and newspapers that authentically reflect public opinion are beginning to appear and these should be given prompt and resolute support: this phenomenon is unique in the countries of Eastern Europe. There continues to be a passive resistance movement in one or two circles such as large factories and the universities, despite the recent mass purges of professors not in step with the positions of the regime, but who represent the cream of the Polish intelligensia. It is significant that many companies are self-managed, mainly by ex-members of the Solidarnosc trade union.

1.11. Although no adequate channel has therefore been found for dialogue between the authorities and the people - apart from fronts such as PRON (National Revival Patriotic Movement) - the church is still the only institution with which the government seems willing to maintain working relations in order to arrive at a social entente in the light of supreme national interests.

1.12. The assassination of Father Popieluszko has not led to contacts being broken off between government and episcopacy representatives even though the bishops have reacted very firmly to the government's accusations and attacks and have had to come to the defence of some priests accused of political involvement in anti-state activities. These government attacks should not necessarily be interpreted as a change of course but rather as the necessary counterweight vis-à-vis Moscow and even its own civil servants whose morale has been severely shaken by the trial of security service officials. An attempt is being made to increase the cost of future concessions to the church and to lay down the terms of a resumption of dialogue in a more authoritarian way. In other words, the government is trying to do a blackmail deal: 'We have wiped the slate clean of our misdeeds and punished our own men, now it is up to you to do the same with priests that are politicized and connected with the opposition if you want peace and normal relations'. In return for being given public legal status (experts from both sides agreed to this plan a year ago), the church would have to become more malleable and more willing to collaborate.

1.13. There seems to be some difficulty, at least at theoretical level, in meeting some of the episcopacy's requests concerning legislation in the educational, welfare and even economic fields (the Agricultural Fund project continues to be discussed though no progress has been made towards implementing it), and the government remains impervious to requests for a revival of trade union and associative pluralism in general, and regards the Solidarnosc chapter as closed. The fact that the law provides for some forms of trade union pluralism starting this year does not change this basic impression.

1.14. The considerable prestige the church enjoys at all levels of society is the only stabilizing factor in a situation that is fluid, uncertain and ridden with tension that is in reality never appeased which Monsignor Glemp is trying to neutralize or at least to channel into a purely spiritual context whilst still firmly defending basic human and civil rights.

2.1. Following this brief analysis it would perhaps be useful to go back to the 1982 Deschamps report and have a look at the more specific requests contained in the resolution adopted by Parliament to see what action has been taken on them and whether they still remain valid in the light of developments in the last three years.

(a) Paragraph 9 of the resolution called for a fundamental reassessment of the EEC's entire economic policy towards the USSR if the situation in Poland persisted. The situation in Poland has in fact persisted and some limited trade measures were in fact adopted by the Ten vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. For instance, quotas were set for imports of certain products. Furthermore, these were measures that would be phased out as normalization proceeded in Poland.

(b) Paragraph 19 called for the release of internees and compensation for them and their dependants. Most of the people arrested have in fact been released on various occasions, although many have been rearrested. There are still some 250 political prisoners at present, although the number fluctuates when the government's attitude suddenly hardens. Nothing, however, has been done as regards compensation; instead, in accordance with a practice that is widespread in Eastern Europe, former internees and Solidarnosc supporters systematically encounter difficulties in finding jobs.

(c) Paragraph 23 hoped that the West would be ready to grant substantial economic and financial aid to Poland if a decisive change took place in which the processes of democratic renewal begun in August 1980 and interrupted in December of the following year were resumed. Paragraph 24 recommended that the political and economic authorities of the West adjust their decisions on economic and financial cooperation in the light of developments in the internal situation of Poland.

2.2. However, there has been no resumption of the processes of democratic renewal and very probably there will not be any in the years to come although, for a military regime, the Jaruzelski Government has acted with some moderation and without excessive violence and certainly better than some military dictatorships in Latin America. The European Community, for its part, has not adopted any real sanctions against Poland but has merely suspended the 15% discount on some agricultural products sold to Warsaw, and transferred the appropriations to humanitarian aid for Poland from non-governmental organizations until the end of 1984. Negotiations on the liquidation of the guaranteed debt were also suspended but this is more a reflection of the reluctance of the Ten to grant special terms to Poland than a sanction.

3.1. What conclusions can be drawn from this analysis for Western policy towards Poland? What objectives should be set in order to establish normal relations with Poland and facilitate the democratic process which is now at a standstill? It is clear that Poland is seeking to emerge from international isolation, as was shown by General Jaruzelski's controversial visit to President Mitterand. The resumption of contacts between the governments of the EEC and Warsaw as a result of visits by the British Under-Secretary Rifkind and Ministers Andreotti, Genscher, Howe, Tindemans, Moran and others may already have provided a few useful pointers. In almost all cases the Western representatives chose to meet not only representatives of the government but also of the church and the opposition. This line should be followed and emphasis placed on contacts with those who, with a deep sense of responsibility and much courage, are trying to extend civil liberties, especially freedom of association by maintaining strong pressure on the government. It must be remembered that as long as Polish society is denied its own identity and democratic bodies, the system now in force will never be stable and explosive situations will always be possible.

