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Euro-Mediterranean co-operation: enlarging and widening the perspective
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Introduction

There is little doubt that the Barcelona process, after more than eight years of existence, is nowhere near its objective of turning the Mediterranean into an area of peace, stability and shared prosperity. Efforts undertaken in the last three or four years to reform and restart the process have been fruitless. Two recent developments further contribute to stagnation in the Mediterranean:

First, the enlargement of the European Union to the East has substantially absorbed European attention and resources alike. With the accession of several Eastern-European states the geopolitical weight within the EU is likely to be moved towards East and North. In any case, the voting power of the “Mediterranean Block” will be reduced, and its influence is likely to get seriously diluted. Therefore, many southern partners argue that the enlarged EU will have difficulties in maintaining a balanced policy in the Middle East and in giving fair attention to Mediterranean concerns.

Second, the war and the ongoing crisis in Iraq have profoundly influenced the Mediterranean security environment and the outlook for inter-regional dialogue in a negative way. After the Iraq War it seems that giving new impetus to the Barcelona process is more difficult than ever. To the extent that the Middle East and the Persion Gulf will become the focus of increasing American and European attention in political, security and economic terms, it will raise important questions about the continued viability of the Mediterranean as a strategic space, as well as the utility of “Mediterranean” initiatives. However, the Iraq crisis has underscored the potential utility of North-South dialogue and cooperation in the Mediterranean. But it has also significantly complicated the prospects for cooperation outside a bilateral framework.
By and large, the post-Iraq/pre-enlargement climate is not conducive to smooth dialogue between North and South in the Mediterranean. To make sure that the Euro-Mediterranean partnership will survive and will furthermore gain new vigour, several questions have to be addressed: Is the Barcelona process the correct mechanism to contend with the plethora of political, economic, and cultural security challenges largely emanating along Europe’s southern periphery? What measures can be introduced to make this process more effective and sustainable than it has been in the past? What are the prospects for the future of the Euro-Mediterranean area and what relevant role can the Barcelona process play?

This Discussion Paper contains interventions and statements made during the conference “Euro-Mediterranean partnership: Beyond the Iraq crisis” organised by the Center for European Integration Studies (ZEI) on October 14 and 15, 2003 in Bonn. This IV. Mediterranean Forum was part of a larger project of cooperation dealing with the future of Euro-Mediterranean relations organized by ZEI and the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation in cooperation with the Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission EuroMesco. The intention of both institutions is to intensify the dialogue between academics and politicians from both sides of the Mediterranean in order to create some form of collective identity which – in the long run – may help to ease existing differences and misperceptions.

Both institutions are grateful to the Thyssen Foundation for their generous financial support to this project and its documentation.
I want to thank Prof. Dr. Ludger Kühnhardt and the Center for European Integration Studies for having invited me here today at the University of Bonn to speak about the relations between the Mediterranean and Europe, to explore together some thoughts about this fascinating sea that can be both a divide and a bridge; a sea which lives a quandary, as if caught in a “cul-de-sac” wherein a way out seems difficult - sometimes even impossible; a sea shared by so many countries and yet to each other they can be complete strangers; a sea in common to many peoples caught in the gravitational orbit of mistrust, of extreme passions, of deep mutual miscomprehension. I am delighted to be here today for several reasons.

First the relations between Europe and the Mediterranean have always intrigued me: they have always been central to my thoughts and to my political activities.

Secondly, having forged throughout the years, very good relations with, and enjoying the trust of our southern neighbors, there is a “moral” expectation for Malta as a Member State of the European Union to push upwards the Mediterranean agenda of European affairs, a meaningful debate on Mediterranean issues, issues that are of concern to both Europeans and the Arab world but that have consistently failed to attract their due attention.

Thirdly, the Mediterranean, though an important destination for tourists from Europe, for many in the North, may feel to be distant from the epicenter of world affairs. It is often the case for our region to be completely

* Public lecture at the Festsaal of the University of Bonn, October 14, 2003.
shadowed by developments in other parts of the world even though they would be intractably linked with, and sometimes even influenced by, Mediterranean issues. It is therefore, for me of particular pleasure to note ZEI’s interest in having a chair on our Mediterranean Academy for Diplomatic Studies at the University of Malta.

It is not possible to see through the misty screen that sometimes may appear to dome the relationship between Europe and the Mediterranean and hence, to glimpse where they are heading to, unless one understands what the Mediterranean is. For the French historian Fernand Braudel the Mediterranean is: “…a thousand things together. It is not one landscape, but numerous landscapes, it is not one sea but complex of seas. It is not one civilization, but a number of civilizations, piled one above the other…”

It is indeed difficult to conceptualise a definition, for the Mediterranean is not confined to geography and it goes far beyond history. The Mediterranean is a melting pot of cultures, of values; it is an intersection of three continents, of Africa, Asia, and Europe brought together; it is the birthplace of the three great monolithic creeds. The Mediterranean is the synonyme for crossroads of civilizations. Speaking of his frustration to capture the true Mediterranean feeling in his art, the genius enigmatic painter that Vincent Van Gogh was came out with what could possibly be the best definition of this Sea: “The Mediterranean has the color of mackerel, changeable I mean. You don't always know if it is green or violet, you can't even say it's blue, because the next moment the changing reflection has taken on a tint of rose or grey.” And this I believe is the real value of the Mediterranean: in its diversity is its wealth. It is from this perspective that the future of Euro-Mediterranean relations should be examined.

My country, a small island, just twenty minutes by air from Catania in Sicily, and seventy minutes from Tunis and Rome, reflects this beauty of diversity that the Mediterranean embraces: Malta is a microcosm of the Mediterranean. Indeed everything about us Maltese reflect our Mediterranean-“ism”. Our language for example, is Semitic in origin, has most of its vocabulary from Romance languages, employs European alphabet and its syntax is Latin; our architecture is beautiful intricate Baroque with Arab
nuances; then there is our innate admiration for the blue sea that surrounds us, coupled with our permanent urge to explore beyond our shores, to travel the winds. This has been our existence, our way of life. We lived from this sea, traded with our neighbours, we fought in these waters, we even pirated here. Today the Mediterranean is for us an important source of foreign revenue: tourism.

It is no wonder therefore that Malta follows events in the Mediterranean from close and with great interest: we have long realized that that our prosperity, our very own survival depends on the stability of the Mediterranean. This “concern” pushed Malta in 1972 to advance a theorem in the CSCE that there can be no security in Europe unless there is security in the Mediterranean and that there can be no security in the Mediterranean unless there is security in Europe. This became the Mediterranean basket of Helsinki I.

More recently in 1995, as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, I advanced the idea, during the Final Conference of the Pact on Stability in Europe in Paris, of a Charter of Stability for the Mediterranean. This concept was a few months later further advanced during the Barcelona Conference. The Charter is still under consideration of the Ministerial Meetings. It may eventually prove to be the cornerstone of relations between the countries rimming the Mediterranean.

With this in mind, as Malta becomes a European Member State on the 1st of May 2004, I cannot avoid remembering the statement made Mr. Jacques Delors in 1992 when, then the President of the European Commission: “There is a country one forgets, but which is very important as a symbol: Malta. We must not displace Europe too much to the North while forgetting the South, we would risk losing our sensitivity to the Mediterranean world, which is our world, but at present emulates the dangers for the future of all of us.”

Malta as a neo-European Union Member State, will be in a better position to ensure the proper evaluation and understanding of the Mediterranean world in European affairs and vice-versa. We in Europe are making headway in our quest to make of diversity a unity, a splendid mosaic of cultures;
to make of our past divisions, a reason for working together, a soul and a conscience; to make of frontiers, signposts bringing us ever so closer together where we all feel at home.

But as the post-war-dream of a united Europe becomes a reality, as the unfolding of our “maison commune” takes shape and place, as our Europe becomes stronger and more prosperous, we must start acting decisively on the regions closest to us. And this not only because we may foresee threats but also because of those intrinsic values that make Europe so unique and so different from other powers; of our continent’s age-old vocation to be outward looking, to be an inspiration in the world that encourages peoples to have their chance to take hold of their destiny. In this respect, a clear and committed policy for the Mediterranean is but an obligation: to neglect the cradle that nursed Europe is to abandon the roots of Europe.

In my view, the European Union has to have a deeper insight and a better understanding of the Mediterranean, if it has to have a meaningful role in the region. Some may ask, why have a meaningful role? Some may suggest that the best way how to deal with Mediterranean issues should be on the vertical. This would bring individual European states, Members of the Union, having their own arrangements and contacts with the states of the southern rim of the Mediterranean, strengthening thereby their ties, political and commercial, through bilateral relations.

There is nothing wrong or politically incorrect for individual member states to foster the bilateral relations through the vertical approach; with this important reservation, it would underline the non effectiveness of the European Union to add its political weight to solutions. This would amount to considering the Mediterranean in a state of affairs without a vision to solve its problems. Our experience has shown that vertical relations alone fail in providing solutions to issues which are becoming a growing threat to peace and security, not only within the Mediterranean but also beyond it.

At the core of the Mediterranean explosive situation is the Israeli-Palestinian issue. This festering wound has been poisoning relations between the Arab world and the so called western world. For the Arab peoples consider that the constant humiliation inflicted on the Palestinians, the
futility of the United Nations Security Council resolutions, in particular 242 and 338, have rendered European countries silent and at times, albeit, unwilling accomplices in protracting the state of affairs whereby the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people are being denied.

Terrorism is a major threat to civilization itself; but it is a grave mistake to use terrorism as a justification for the military occupation of Palestinian territory, for the existence and continued expansion of Jewish settlements on Arab land, on the building of a wall conveniently placed as to grab even more land and render the Palestinians not only refugees in their own country but also prisoners in their own country.

Two weeks ago I participated at the 80th birthday celebrations of a great statesman, Shimon Peres, a celebration which was also attended by President Rau amongst others. In the open discussions held, Shimon Peres made abundantly clear that there can be no future for a democratic Jewish state unless two states, Palestine and Israel, are made to live side by side. And may I add that isolating Arafat, and putting the sole blame for the failure of the Road Map on Palestinian terrorism without censoring the spiral of violence on both sides and the persistent settlement policy is to my view a non realistic approach to bringing the issue closer to a solution. Only last Friday, 9th of October, in his briefing to the European Parliament on the Middle East crisis, Dr. Javier Solana, the High Representative of the European Union for the Common Foreign and Security Policy admitted that he is overcome by frustration: “… Frustration because the Middle East is continuing to bleed to death, with a never-ending trickle of lost lives. Frustration because the Israelis and Palestinians have not been able, or have not wanted, to implement the commitments so formally entered into in Aqaba only a few weeks ago. Frustration because tension in the region has again reached extremely worrying levels. Frustration because ever fewer people believe in the Road Map instigated by the Quartet. Finally frustration because the despair which has already taken hold of so many Arabs and Israelis may become established among us, the politicians and among citizens.”
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It is here indeed that the European Union can provide its determined weight against a crisis in frustration which in its process of escalation may envelop the whole Mediterranean region and beyond. Malta’s insistence at Helsinki in the early seventies that there can be no security in Europe without security in the Mediterranean, becomes even more relevant today.

As already mentioned, Malta’s vision of the Mediterranean envisages a Charter of Stability for the region. As was stated in the “Reflections on a Stability Pact for the Mediterranean” communicated by Malta in 1996 to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of countries participating in the Euro-Med process: “The proposal of a Stability Pact for the Mediterranean is based upon a shared awareness that there exists in the Mediterranean a number of identifiable factors arising from the historical, cultural in geo-political configuration of the region itself, which constitute actual or political causes of friction and tension among regional states.”

I have described the Mediterranean as a bomb with an ever shortening fuse. A Council for the Mediterranean, perhaps, may provide the parameters essential to giving the Mediterranean the framework leading to a solution just as, perhaps, the creation of a Council of Europe in the immediate post war, served as foundation of the European Union. We believe that the Mediterranean faces an option: either keeping the Mediterranean as a great divide, bordering the sea with security organizations, or providing the necessary mechanisms on the horizontal aimed at enhancing the stability of the Mediterranean. Most peoples and most governments on both sides of this sea, have come to the conclusion that Europe needs the Mediterranean and that the Mediterranean needs Europe.

In order to give this reciprocal need political visibility, we have to ensure a greater relevance to the Euro-Mediterranean partnership involving the three pillars of the Barcelona process: political dialogue and security, economic and financial partnership, social and cultural cooperation. I do not think that this can be achieved through a one-way traffic. Countries on the southern part of the Mediterranean have also to shoulder their responsibilities and ensuring, for an economic and financial partnership to evolve, the right political and juridical environment.
In the Barcelona Process, the social and cultural pillar is of the utmost importance. This can be best achieved through a stronger people to people approach. The Universities and academies in the Mediterranean have a major role to play, to ensure the social and cultural cooperation, the cross fertilization of ideas, the eventual setting up of a University of the Mediterranean, possibly with campuses in more than one Mediterranean country, with emphasis on Mediterranean studies. This will certainly help in creating a Euro-Med “forma mentis” which in time, will evolve in a correct interaction between the peoples of this sea.

For many in Europe, the Mediterranean may be a far-off sea, with a great magnet call for tourism. It is that too, but much more. For those who studied Roman history, the “Pax Romana” can be seen in the Mediterranean through Sabrata Leptis Magna in Libya, through Jerash in Jordan, the amphitheater at Aspendos in Turkey, the temples of Agrigento in Sicily, the Colosseum in Lyon and the Roman ruins in Seville. The “Pax Romana” was built on the three pillars, political, economic and social unity of the Mediterranean making of it a “mare nostrum”. For the present and for the future, many of the elements mentioned have to be recreated and this is precisely what we are trying to do, so far without success with the Barcelona Process and its three pillars. Prof. Pedig Madvejevic, a scholar of Mediterranean affairs once observed that in the Mediterranean there exists a “strong identity in being” but which is not corresponded by an “equal identity in doing”. What we are trying to stimulate is this identity in doing.

Indeed what we lack in the Mediterranean and for the Mediterranean are not plans and proposals. What we lack is the political will. We in Malta believe that the European Union through its political will and through its policies which are the result of dialogue and cooperation with the other riparian states can succeed in building a “Pax Mediterranea”, which will be of the essence for the future, a guarantee of prosperity, a builder of bridges between Europe and the Mediterranean.

For the European Union, to be able to forge stronger regional relations, not only in the Mediterranean but elsewhere it has to emerge as a more influential world actor. To do this it has to rise to the challenge of a Common For-
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eign and Security Policy; it has to speak a voice in unity, a strong voice that will benefit the emergence of a multi-polar world-order for as Sir Winston Churchill said fifty years ago: “The safety of the world requires a new unity in Europe”

The inability of Europe to speak with one voice and to act in unison, on the outset of the Iraqi crisis is a crude reminder of the long way Europe has to become a world leader in security issues. We, in Europe, have made out of our cultures a treasure, we have built a common home: we have remained Maltese, Germans, French, English but through our common heritage and a determined political will, we are also Europeans. To my view, the future of Euro-Mediterranean relations lies in addressing the problems that are hindering this region from continuing its evolution, the problems that are impeding us to see eye to eye. Only then, when we make way for development can a meaningful intercultural dialogue happen between the northern and the southern coasts of the Mediterranean.

It is a blunder, perhaps paranoia, to mistake frustration, poverty and injustice for a “Clash of Civilisations”. For those who beget self fulfilling prophecies of a clash of civilizations, are not realizing that this clash will be most negative inheritance that we can pass on to our children. For pride and prejudice, are no substitutes to dialogue and understanding. The consequences of a mistaken stand to the Mediterranean will be of serious consequence to all. The immediate impact will certainly be felt by those who are and belong to the region. But it will not be limited to them. Malta’s proactive Mediterranean policy can only have relevance if it is sustained by others, who like us believe that Europe needs the Mediterranean and that the Mediterranean needs Europe.
The Euro-Med Partnership needs a strong push

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) is certainly the most important regional process that currently exists in the Mediterranean as it brings together all of the European Union (EU) member states and twelve Mediterranean countries which are Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority, Turkey, Cyprus, and Malta. (Cyprus and Malta are due to become members of the EU in May 2004, thus reducing the number of Mediterranean partner countries to ten).

In the past decade the EMP has certainly strengthened north-south relations between the EU and the Mediterranean. The sheer amount of meetings and policy actions that have been launched since 1995 has resulted in the creation of an intricate web of political, academic and civil societal networks emerging that are all contributing to a more intensive north-south pattern of relations in this part of the world. In contrast the EMP has only recently succeeded in spurring south-south relations in the Mediterranean despite the high priority that has been given to this objective since the start of the EMP.

The EU has consistently focused on assisting Mediterranean countries become more aware of the opportunities that exist in their neighbouring states, and offering the Mediterranean countries involved in the EMP incentive packages to pursue trans-Mediterranean ventures. The EMP has also ensured that the EU’s focus on enhancing relations with Central and Eastern Europe over the past decade is complemented by an outreach programme towards the Mediterranean that seeks to advance co-operative relations in the area.
As the Barcelona Process approaches its tenth anniversary, Euro-Mediterranean policy makers need to think about measures that will help transform this multilateral initiative from a boundary management exercise to a process that focuses more on encouraging boundary transformation. Euro-Mediterranean initiatives that are in the pipeline and include the enhanced political dialogue, the Charter for Peace and Stability, the creation of a free trade area, and justice and home affairs co-operation must seek to achieve more than maintenance of stable Euro-Mediterranean relations.

If the EU wants to develop a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership that is sustainable it should introduce a series of measures that will allow and enable Mediterranean states to integrate into the international political economy that dominates global relations. The EU’s southern borderlands must also realise that the only policies that will improve their political and economic outlook are those that are home-grown and implemented. If the EU’s neighbourhood policy towards the south is to be successful it must work closely with local reformers and not try to export modalities of reform that have been devised somewhere else.

Given such a heterogeneous cluster of regional dynamics, is the EMP the correct mechanism to contend with the plethora of political, economic, and cultural security challenges largely emanating along Europe’s southern periphery? What measures can be introduced to make this process more effective and sustainable than it has during its first decade of operation? What are the prospects for the future of the Euro-Mediterranean area and what relevant role can the EMP play in this future?

**The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Political, Economic and Cultural Relations**

At the first Euro-Mediterranean foreign ministerial meeting which took place in Barcelona in November 1995, the twenty-seven partner countries established three principal areas of co-operation. The Barcelona Process set out three basic tasks: a political and security partnership with the aim of establishing a common area of peace and stability; an economic and financial partnership with the aim of creating an area of shared prosperity; and a
partnership in social, cultural and human affairs in an effort to promote understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies.

When it comes to the direct tangible endeavours that the Euro-Mediterranean process should seek to realise it is crucial to ask again and again what will determine the success of the over-arching Barcelona process? It will essentially be the Mediterranean countries’ ability to generate higher rates of growth than they achieved during the 1980s and 1990s. In an effort to shore up its external policy towards the Mediterranean the EU adopted a Common Strategy at the Santa Maria Da Fiera European Council which brought to a conclusion the Portuguese Presidency of the EU at the end of June 2000. The EU’s common strategy highlighted the fact that improvement in Euro-Mediterranean relations was dependant on the Mediterranean partner countries playing a more decisive role during the implementation stage of projects agreed upon.

The Common Strategy also called for the active participation of the Mediterranean countries when it comes to defining a co-operative Euro-Med agenda as it is in the interest of Mediterranean states to draw up a list of meaningful actions. The common strategy actually invites them to do this: “the EU is bound to consider recommendations and concerns expressed by Mediterranean partners”. This specific invitation to Mediterranean states to adopt more of a self-help attitude in their interactions with the EU contrasts sharply with the approach to Euro-Mediterranean policy making in previous decades when the EU would more or less dictate the terms upon which co-operative ventures could take place.

The cornerstone of the Euro-Mediterranean security partnership is the envisaged Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability. This document would serve as the framework within which Euro-Mediterranean security relations could be managed in the twenty-first century. A first glimpse of what the Charter for Peace and Stability could include was presented at the Third Euro-Mediterranean foreign ministerial meeting at Stuttgart in April 1999. The Charter is to be a politically binding and not legally binding document. The rule of consensus is to be applicable to all decisions, joint actions, measures and mechanisms. The Charter is to rec-
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recognise the indivisibility of security in the Euro-Med sphere and beyond and to acknowledge the concept of comprehensive security. There is to be no interference in the settlement of current conflicts.

The Charter would serve as a functional instrument for the implementation of the principles of the Barcelona Declaration. The establishment of an enhanced political dialogue is to remain a priority. Once the Charter was agreed upon, more of an effort could be dedicated to partnership building measures, good neighbourly relations, sub-regional co-operation and preventive diplomacy in the Euro-Mediterranean area. The lack of consensus that has emerged in recent years when it comes to agreeing upon a Charter for Peace and Stability dictates that Euro-Med states should focus on strengthening existing pragmatic partnership building measures (PBM’s) as a precursor to a more sustainable multilateral initiative in future. PBM’s will also assist in fostering a Euro-Mediterranean security culture in which the concepts of early warning and conflict prevention become operational.

In the economic sector, by about 2010, the EU will have become by far the biggest single market and the world’s most concentrated area of economic prosperity and internal stability. It will comprise essentially all of Europe, east and west, more than 90 percent of total European population. i.e. almost 500 million people, (half of China or India) and have a combined GDP of some 12 000 billion US-Dollar, an almost unimaginable figure. How will the non-EU riparian Mediterranean countries, from Turkey to Morocco, adapt to these profound geopolitical changes that will take place north of them in the next 12 years? How will they coexist with the future European giant? To what extent will they be drawn into its economic and political orbit? To what extent will they have to integrate with the European and consequently the world economy? These are questions of vital importance for both the EU and each of its Mediterranean neighbours.

A key question to ask is what will determine whether the Barcelona Process is ultimately a success or not? If economic prospects are to improve in the Mediterranean area the Barcelona Process must provide a stable political and security environment by reducing existing tensions and establishing a co-operative zone of security. This includes helping to improve social,
cultural and human affairs across the Euro-Mediterranean area. The Mediterranean epitomises many of the problems associated with the North-South debate. These include migration, terrorism, religious intolerance and the lack of human rights. Nurturing co-operative cross-cultural patterns of interaction which address these issues is a prerequisite to improving economic disparities and ethnic divisions in the area.

Three areas where the Barcelona Process is already starting to contribute are education, human rights and women’s rights. Despite limited actions in each of the three areas, each area remains underdeveloped. A programme of activities that increases awareness of existing trends in each area and also seeks to further discussion on Euro-Mediterranean differences of opinion is essential if a social, cultural and human partnership worthy of such a name is to become a reality. The creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Foundation offers this possibility.

The creation of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area will also impact on the environment. The free trade area is likely to have a detrimental impact as the agricultural sector is forced to adopt more environmentally unfriendly practices of production in order to remain competitive. Specific sectors such as that of water and desertification will require immediate attention and environmental issues should be more directly addressed in the Euro-Mediterranean association agreements. When one explores the repercussions that a free trade area will have on the question of human rights, one should focus on whether European and Mediterranean interpretations of such a complex issue as human rights can ever be harmonised? Human rights activists also have to concentrate their attention on such basic economic and social rights as the right to work, healthcare, education, civil protection, tolerance, and the elimination of discrimination.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in the Twenty-First Century

Throughout its more than thirty years of direct engagement in the Mediterranean the European Union has failed to contain, let alone reverse, economic disparities between the northern and southern countries of the basin.
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It is also quite clear that little progress has been registered in removing the misperceptions and prejudice that currently exist in the region or in promoting further the principles of respect and understanding. A concerted effort in implementing specific goals in each of the three chapters of the Barcelona Declaration is certainly the most effective way to start tackling such problems.

A conceptual re-think is thus necessary if the process of political, economic and cultural adaptation in the Euro-Mediterranean area is to be a successful one. The process and progress need to be carefully monitored. The question of the social impact of the implementation of a free trade area is not a question of lessons and clichés, but of developing realistic policies to cope with the changes being introduced. The benefits of the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area need to be better explained and maximised if the citizens of the Mediterranean area are expected to support this initiative. The name of the Euro-Mediterranean game is that of policy change – MEDA I and MEDA II, the financial facilities of the Barcelona Process during its first ten years of operation are vehicles of such a change. While the EU is seeking to boost political, economic and financial activity across the Mediterranean through the Barcelona Process a basic message that has yet to resonate across the Mediterranean is that it is up to the countries of the area themselves to take the necessary steps to increase economic prosperity.

It has taken the EU 30 years to launch and start implementing a comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean policy. If the Barcelona Process is to provide the foundation upon which a “Pax Euro-Mediterranea” is to be established over the next 30 years, it is essential that the EU focus on spreading prosperity’s benefits more fairly with its neighbours in the south. The Mediterranean must not become a wall of poverty along the EU’s southern periphery. This is the Barcelona Process’ ultimate challenge.

Regional relations in Europe and the Mediterranean since the launching of the Euro-Mediterranean Process in November 1995 have underlined the fundamental fact that this geo-strategic area continues to be dominated by a mosaic of distinct sub-regional constellations, each evolving according to
their own indigenous pattern of relations. Although geographically proximate, developments within Europe and the Mediterranean resemble those of a tale of two different worlds. At a time when the European Union has been harmonising its policies and strengthening its common interests through a process of integration and enlargement, the Mediterranean world continues to be characterised by both limited co-operative and continuous conflictual patterns of relations that have prevented the emergence of a trans-Mediterranean security arrangement.

To the north of the Mediterranean the EU has been advancing at great strides in its effort to prepare for the challenges of globalisation. This includes furthering EMU, “e-Europe”, deregulation, fiscal stability, and company mergers, in an effort to strengthen high economic growth. As a consequence the technology and prosperity gap between the EU and the Mediterranean has been widening in recent years. It is also important to underline that geographic proximity is about the only factor that still brings Europe and the Mediterranean closely together at the start of the new millennium. This is evident when one compares the EU’s economic clout to that of the Mediterranean countries. The combined gross domestic product of Central and Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean partner countries and former Soviet Union is equivalent to that of Italy, with 10 times fewer people.\(^1\) The EU is therefore the rich core and the Mediterranean the poor periphery.

The EU remains by far the most important economic partner of the Mediterranean countries, while individual states to the south account for only small percentages of the EU’s external trade. Even when taken together they account for about 15 percent of the EU’s total exports and imports. This imbalance is mainly due to the difference in national incomes between the rich EU and its poor neighbouring countries. Since the launching of the Barcelona Process the differences in economic restructuring within the Mediterranean between the front-runners such as Cyprus, Malta, Israel and

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\(^1\) See Dauderstädt, Michael, (1997), "The EU and its poor neighbours: how the centres could help those on their periphery", Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, p. 5.
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Turkey and the rest of the slow reformers has also been growing. Cyprus and Malta are EU accession countries and will join the EU in May 2004. Turkey has completed its customs union with the EU after a thirty-year transition period. It is now accelerating its economic and political reforms as part of its preparations to join the EU some time after 2010. Israel has enormously strengthened its links with Europe despite setbacks to a permanent settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the years to come it is likely to further intensify its economic, cultural and political ties with Europe and to turn increasingly into something like a “pseudo-member” of the EU. The countries that have concluded Association Agreements with the EU, namely Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Algeria, Egypt and Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority are likely to move ahead of Syria in terms of economic and, though more slowly, political reforms. Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan remain pace-setters within this grouping.

The large gap in development trends in the adjacent regions of the EU is clear when one compares the eastern borderlands of the EU to those of the south. In recent years, EU accession countries have economically outpaced those in the Mediterranean. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe have made a remarkable transition towards democracy and a market economy. They have been much more successful in attracting foreign direct investment and portfolio capital and therefore substantially increasing the standard of living of their people than Mediterranean countries. Their trade with the EU has been growing at a much faster rate than that of the Mediterranean states.

While such divergent development indicators give rise to concern, they are actually to be expected. Societies rarely move at the same pace. Nor do they respond with the same speed to external challenges. Yet the current pace of transition will result in a Mediterranean that is falling further behind the EU. The differentiation between accession and Mediterranean Partner countries is also better understood when one takes into consideration the following facts. The accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe dispose of a much better human resources basis. The prospect of EU membership constitutes a far more powerful leverage for economic and
political reforms than the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. The EU’s financial support per capita for the accession countries is about six times higher than for the Mediterranean partner countries.

Often espoused as an EU programme for its southern flank to parallel its policies with neighbours to the east, the EMP does not offer the same incentive of EU membership to the majority of its Mediterranean partners. This calls into question the coherence of the economic logic underlying the EMP. While Eastern Europeans can expect ultimately that the free movement of labour (people) will coexist with the free movement of goods and capital between them and the rest of Europe, this is not the case in the Mediterranean. The absence of the free movement of people in the case of the EMP stresses the major difference between EU membership and EU partnership.  

Close to a decade into the Barcelona Process, Mediterranean countries continue to attract less than two percent of international investment. This is mainly due to the region’s profile as a high-risk zone when it comes to political stability. It is also due to the fact that the Mediterranean market remains partitioned in a multitude of small markets. The entire Maghreb market corresponds only to the size of the internal Portuguese market. Internal transaction costs remain very high. The cost for shipping a container from Tunisia to Marseilles is higher than the cost for the same container between Marseille and Asia.

In recent years the EU has launched a Balkan stability pact and programmes that seek closer co-operation between the EU and Latin America and Asia. In 2003 it also launched its “Neighbourhood Policy” that aims at providing a coherent framework within which relations with the EU’s immediate neighbours can be formulated in the years to come. As the EU becomes more engrossed in implementation of its enlargement strategy and

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3 Patten, Chris, “The European Union’s External Policy and the Mediterranean”, MEDA Team Information, Issue No. 8, 1 April 2000.
The Euro-Med Partnership needs a strong push

its neighbourhood policy there is a risk that the priority once given to the Mediterranean could somewhat diminish. If such a risk is not to become a reality the Mediterranean countries must actively seek to engage the EU in political, economic and cultural policies that promote closer Euro-Mediterranean relations.

The time has now come for the Barcelona process to move beyond the talking and thinking stage and concentrate on delivering tangible results that everyone can see and benefit from. Euro-Mediterranean initiatives that are in the pipeline and include the enhanced political dialogue, the Charter for peace and stability, the creation of a free trade area, and justice and home affairs co-operation must become more visible to the public at large and seek to foster a durable Euro-Mediterranean partnership. If the EU and its Mediterranean partners want to develop a Euro-Mediterranean process that is sustainable they should introduce a series of measures that will enable them to work together in the trillion Euros a day international political economy that has emerged. The EU’s southern borderlands must also realise that the alternative to regional and international integration is economic recession and severe socio-economic difficulties. The only way to improve their political and economic outlook is for Mediterranean states to adapt home-grown reform policies to the realities of the global market.

Trade statistics illustrate that this is not happening. Intra-regional Mediterranean trade remains stagnant. South-south co-operation is dormant with intra-regional trade in the Maghreb representing 5 percent of their total trade. Statistics concerning intra-regional trade in the Mashreq is slightly more favourable at about 7 percent. The conflict in the Middle East naturally disrupts such co-operation faster than a flick of the switch.

One approach that may facilitate the task that the EU and Mediterranean countries face when it comes to upgrading the economic profile of the Mediterranean area is to focus on the promotion of sub-regionalism. This exercise must result in the opening of sub-regional markets and the creation of sub-regional free trade areas within the Mediterranean. Trade liberalisation within the Euro-Mediterranean process has so far been taking place on a north-south basis. It is essential that the EU and its Mediterranean part-
ners now focus their attention to opening transnational co-operation at a south-south level. When it comes to the direct tangible endeavours that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership process should seek to realise it is crucial to ask again and again what will determine the success of the over-arching Barcelona process? What policy approaches will facilitate implementation of the ambitious Barcelona Declaration of November 1995?

As the EU enlarges and relations across the Mediterranean continue to evolve at different speeds and in different directions should the EU consider concentrating more of its political and economic resources at the sub-regional level of Mediterranean relations? What instruments and mechanisms will boost the Mediterranean countries’ ability to generate higher rates of growth than they achieved during the 1980s and 1990s? The Barcelona Process agenda beyond 2005 must seek to address the above issues in a direct manner if the EMP is to remain a relevant multilateral forum in the decade ahead.

The Barcelona Process Needs A Strong Push

Almost a decade has passed since the signing of the Barcelona Declaration in November 1995, when the Foreign Ministers of the EU and their colleagues from all the countries around the Mediterranean pledged to progressively establish a Euro-Mediterranean area of peace, stability and prosperity at the horizon of 2010. Since then we have seen profoundly asymmetrical developments in the EU and the Mediterranean: an EU frantically struggling to keep up with the constraints of globalisation, a Mediterranean falling further behind.

The EU has been moving into new areas. It has undertaken two major constitutional reforms, the Amsterdam and the Nice Treaties. It has successfully introduced a common currency, the Euro. It has virtually completed its single market for goods, services, capital and people. It has started to develop a common security machinery to be ready for action by 2003. It has made great strides towards a common area of law and security. The EU has also set itself the objective to become a knowledge society and a common area of research and science by 2010. It has readied itself for the 5th
The Euro-Med Partnership needs a strong push

enlargement: by 2004 10 new member countries from central Europe and
the Mediterranean are expected to join the EU, after having undergone,
during the last 10 years, a thorough transformation process of their eco-
nomic, social and political systems.

During the same period, most of the EU’s Mediterranean partner countries
have moved ahead very slowly. The prosperity gap with Europe, especially
Central European countries, has further widened. It would have widened
even further without the general rise of oil prices and a significant slow-
down of demographic growth, the only positive developments in the re-
gion. There has been no attempt whatever towards more economic, let
alone political integration. The Maghreb has not advanced a bit towards
closer cooperation, contrary to what had been called for by the 1989 Treaty
on the Maghreb Union. Throughout the Mediterranean area, the reform
process has been lamentably slow. Privatisation and deregulation of the
economies are still in the very beginning. Hardly any country has made
convincing strides on the path towards political accountability and democ-

The EU’s Mediterranean policy aims at profound economic, social and po-
litical reforms in the southern neighbour countries. Free trade and EU assis-
tance are only instruments to that end. Yet the work of reform cannot be
done by the EU alone. It has to be done by the Mediterranean countries
themselves, their societies and above all the political elites. To that end,
they have to realise that such reforms are in their long-term interest, in
view of spreading education, more prosperity, better health, more political
stability and less social tension and unrest. Such awareness is largely lack-
ing on the part of the political elites. They are not prepared to abandon their
privileged position to the market forces, to share power with other social
forces, for example, the emerging entrepreneurial class, the trade unions or
the opposition parties. With the exception of the two monarchies, namely
Jordan and Morocco, all the other countries on the southern shores are gov-
erned by quasi - military regimes without proper political legitimacy. This
is the core of the problem and thus the main obstacle to the introduction of
pluralistic societies. Therefore the commitment to respect democratic prin-
ciples and basic human rights, which is an essential element of the association agreements, is likely to remain “lettre morte” for many years to come.

The EU approach is rightly a pragmatic and incremental one. It is based on the hope that the introduction of free trade will oblige the partner countries to introduce more and more elements of the market economy, to reduce the role of the state in the economy, to privatise, to do away with all sorts of bureaucratic obstacles to economic activity and investment, both foreign and domestic. The gradual spreading of market forces will have a triple effect on the societies. It will raise the standard of living of the population, it will create new power centres that will want to participate in the political decisions and it will weaken the role of the state bureaucracies, the military and other “cliques”. It will also enhance transparency of the system, accountability of the budget procedures through appropriate foreign assistance procedures. And very gradually it will tend to loosen the grip of the various political “mafias” and family clans that presently cling to their power.

The EU approach therefore seems to be basically correct. It is no different from that applied in the accession countries for the last 10 years that has achieved a great deal. But in Eastern Europe the EU had a much bigger prize to offer, i.e. membership in the club. And the EU interacted with European societies that wished nothing more than to return to the roots of their culture and to reunite with the rest of Europe. In the south, the EU’s leverage is infinitely more limited. The societies are infinitely less sophisticated, the rulers do not want to part with their privileges, and the EU offers just some 1 billion Euros per year (instead of 3 billion) for a much bigger number of people (150 million instead of 100) that are much poorer (only 20-30 percent of the living standard in the EU accession countries) and have an infinitely lower educational level.

Concretely, the EU should therefore initially focus on the non-political, non-sensitive issues, such as issues related to the business and investment climate, the macro-economic framework, the banking system, the educational system, privatisation, the legal system and the functioning of the judiciary. This is more than plenty on the agenda for the coming 5-10 years.
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that needs to be addressed. It corresponds to the basic and urgent needs of the countries. It is mostly acceptable to the governments. It is part of their ongoing reform processes, however slowly they may proceed.

What does this require from the EU side? More focus on this reform process, regular policy dialogue, both comprehensive and specific. Ideally, each of the Mediterranean partner countries that has ratified the association agreement should prepare an “association strategy”, a list of legislative reform actions to be implemented in a 3-5 year period. The EU should assist in the preparation of these programmes; it should put its funding behind them, monitor their implementation and disburse the funding according to the progress of implementation as is the case in structural adjustment financing.

Why has the Barcelona Process come under fire from both the EU and the MED side? Essentially, because of slow progress in implementation of the EMP’s financial cooperation, of dispersal of efforts, of lack of a clear political message, of hesitation on the part of the Mediterranean countries. For the Mediterranean countries, it was the normal procedure: when something goes wrong at home, blame the other side for the shortcomings and divert the attention from ones own shortcomings. Both sides can do much better, provided they return to the basic strategic goals of the Barcelona Process and concentrate all their energy on getting reforms more effectively done.

The high expectations raised in 1995 by the Barcelona Declaration have not been fulfilled. They will not be fulfilled in the future unless there is a profound change of awareness in the eight Arab Mediterranean partner countries. They have to “change gear”. Otherwise they will continue to fall behind Europe, Asia and America. They should take lessons from Hungary, Estonia or Bulgaria or, more recently, in Turkey for how to do, in order to enable their populations to enjoy a better life, more freedom, better education, more jobs, and less pollution. Everywhere they will find similar answers: accountability and transparency of governments, market economy, higher standards of education, encouragement of civil society, particular of women, privatisation of the banking sector and major utilities, retreat of the government from direct interventions in the economic process.
The EU is willing and able to support whatever reforms governments will be prepared to launch and implement. The Association Agreements signed with all the Mediterranean countries, except Syria, and financial assistance are elements of such support. The establishment of free trade between the EU and each of the Mediterranean countries will, in due time, have a positive impact on the functioning of their economies. The case of Tunisia, the only country that is already somewhat advanced on the road towards free trade is telling in that respect. But the EU should do much more to stimulate and accelerate the necessary reform process in the South. And it should do so urgently.

The EU is itself in a new stage of socio-economic reforms. Since Spring 2000 it is engaged in the “Lisbon Process”, through which it hopes to become the world’s most competitive economy by 2010. The EU should offer its full support to all those countries in the South willing to move ahead with serious socio-economic reforms. With those volunteering for a joint reform effort it should start a process of “open coordination” in a few areas that are essential for more rapid socio-economic progress: education, information technology, deregulation, science and research, and good governance. In return, the partner countries would commit themselves to a set of reform objectives and a strict calendar for implementation.

The EU would have to offer substantial financial assistance to certain packages of the reform process. It would focus its assistance on those countries participating in the joint exercise. In doing so, the EU would transpose its precious experience with the transition countries in Central Europe to the Mediterranean. This will require substantially more personal and financial commitment on the part of the EU Commission and member states than during the past eight years.

*The EU should learn to do better in the future*

First, the EU needs to adopt more of a strategic approach. The problems of the Mediterranean will not be solved within a few years. Both sides have to think and act with a long-term horizon, say 2020. Linked to this is “commitment”. It is hard to say that the EU has, in recent years, been truly
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committed to the cause of development in the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean has been just one among other priorities on the EU foreign policy agenda. The partner countries may not have eased the job. Whatever the past: without firm political will and commitment from both sides Barcelona will not succeed!

Second, the EU should forget about public relations gimmicks. It should focus on those parts of the Barcelona process that really matter for the long-term socio-economic development. That is the standard by which coming generations will measure EU policies, not by the number of meetings that have been held or the volumes of papers produced.

Third, the EU should focus on improving bilateral links. Reforms will have to be undertaken by each and every country. Therefore the EU will have to enter into the substance of societal, administrative, legal, political development blockages and try to unblock these. This will be a patient process that requires continuity of effort. It is here that much can be learnt from the experience with the accession countries. The EU should not be afraid of applying to the Mediterranean its technique of “accession strategies” which would become “association strategies”. The EU should sit down with each of the countries willing to undergo the experience and fix medium-term objectives for education, market opening, judiciary reforms and the assistance to be offered for such reform programmes by the EU. In doing so, the EU should have the courage of using the “stick and carrot” approach: funding should be modulated according to the pace of reforms. The EU might start with the easy reforms, for example, customs procedures, tax laws, competition laws, so as to create “success stories”.

Fourth, the regional approach should be somewhat down-graded and be given a new focus: the EU should try to introduce “open coordination” (Lisbon process) in the Mediterranean, for example, in fields like education, taxation, and privatisation. Thus, the laggards may be shown how their own neighbours proceed and succeed. This may become an important tool of accelerating the overall pace of development, by creating emulation (and transparency) among the partner countries.
Fifth, the regional approach should involve encouragement of south-south free trade. After the Declaration of Agadir, the time is ripe to go ahead with south-south free trade. It may be best to start with the four most advanced countries but it should rapidly also associate the latecomers. Free trade among the south should be completed by 2010 latest.

Sixth, the south-south free trade will only be attractive if the EU finally grants total cumulation of origin so that components from one country may be merged with those from any other Mediterranean country without value-added constraints. Otherwise business investors will not find it sufficiently attractive to produce in the Mediterranean for exports to the EU. Without more FDI the Mediterranean will not be able to catch up with other parts of the world.

Seventh, the EU should be prepared to progressively increase its financial support for the Mediterranean. The 700-800 million Euro p.a. for the whole region, Turkey included, is simply not good enough to make an impact.

Eighth, financial support should be concentrated on the support of specific strategic policies, for example, education. The EU should try to bundle its own assistance with that of member states and multilateral donors and thus create more synergy.

Ninth, the EU should focus its efforts on the eight Arab Mediterranean countries. These are the decisive elements for peace, stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean. Cyprus and Malta will join the EU in 2004. Turkey may follow by 2015. Israel is a case apart which requires a different sort of attention. The economic and social development of the Mediterranean does not depend exclusively on the progress registered towards peace between Israel and Palestine. The lack of peace must not be an alibi for the lack of reforms in the Maghreb or elsewhere.

Tenth, with the progress of the south-south free trade area (FTA) in the Mediterranean, it will become even more important to focus more on the GCC (and Yemen) and to conclude the FTA with this sub region of the Mediterranean. This is important to complete Euro-Arab free trade by about 2015.
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Eleventh, the EU should be much more open on the agricultural front. As it will liberalise its own agriculture, it should review its agricultural trade with the MED and progressively dismantle the remaining obstacles to free trade (calendars, reference prices etc.). This will not constitute a big boost to agricultural exports from the south but deprive the south from exaggerated criticism of EU double standards.

The Barcelona Process is “the only game in town” and it will remain so for another two decades or longer. Europe cannot escape its southern neighbours, however messy their socio-economic situation may become. And the Mediterranean countries will not avoid Europe being a major reference for their future development, from market economy, to high-tech research, freedom of the press, good governance, democracy and human rights. The Barcelona Process must, however not become a scapegoat for the failures of southern countries in doing their homework properly. The EU cannot undertake necessary reforms in the place of the governments in the partner countries. It can only make suggestions, share its own positive and negative experience with those who want to learn. It can try to transpose the basic methodology of the “Lisbon process” with its “benchmarking”, “open co-ordination”, and target setting to those countries in the south that may wish to undertake a similar exercise adapted to their particular challenges. But it should – more than in the past – use its financial support, including that coming from individual member countries, to encourage and support those who are making serious reform efforts.

It would be worthwhile to give a push in this direction and fill the Barcelona Process with new life, starting with one or two countries eager to push ahead their reforms. Once the ice is broken, others will follow suit. It has taken the EU 30 years to launch and start implementing a comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean policy. If the Barcelona Process is to provide the foundation upon which a “Pax Euro-Mediterranea” is to be established over the next 30 years, it is essential that the EU focus on spreading prosperity’s benefits more fairly with its neighbours in the south. The Mediterranean must not become a wall of poverty along the EU’s southern periphery. This is the ultimate challenge facing the international community in the Mediterranean.
The three most active external actors in the Mediterranean, the EU, the United States, and NATO must focus their political and economic resources on ensuring that the Mediterranean does not become a permanent north-south divide. If the existing perceptual and prosperity gap between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean are allowed to increase, tension and hostilities across the Mediterranean will also become more widespread. In such circumstances, sources of instability that include terrorism, illegal migration, the proliferation of weapons and drug trafficking are certain to multiply. Given the common strategic interests the EU, the United States and NATO have in the Mediterranean, co-ordinating their policies towards the part of the world will also provide them with an opportunity to further strengthen transatlantic relations.

Only the creation of a co-operative Mediterranean region in which the perceptual and prosperity gap is addressed, reduced and gradually eliminated, will ensure that the Mediterranean does not become a zone of indifference and an eventual economic wasteland. Integrating the Mediterranean into the twenty-first century international system through mechanisms such as the EU’s recently launched “Neighbourhood Policy” and a sustainable Middle East Peace Process is the immediate challenge that the international community must confront. Otherwise transnational sources of instability emanating from the Mediterranean will continue to manifest themselves at a regional and international level.

The above article is an adaptation of excerpts from Dr. Stephen Calleya’s forthcoming book entitled EVALUATING EURO-MEDITERRANEAN RELATIONS, Taylor & Francis Publications, 2004
In May 2004 the European Union will acquire ten new members, thereby bringing its population to 450 million (an increase of 20 percent) and its gross domestic product (GDP) to over 8,200 million US-Dollar (an increase of 4 percent). An immediate effect of this enlargement will be a change in the make up of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership that was instituted following the adoption of the Barcelona declaration in 1995. Originally, the partnership was between the EU (representing its 15 members) and 12 Mediterranean partner countries (MPCs). Two current MPCs – Malta and Cyprus – will become EU members, and one – Turkey – has been given the official status of candidate to membership (along with Romania and Bulgaria). Therefore, the EMP will involve 25 EU members and 9 MPCs.

It may be recalled that the general objective of the Barcelona Declaration was to turn the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity, and to that effect it was decided “to establish a comprehensive partnership among the participants – the EuroMediterranean Partnership – through strengthened political dialogue on a regular basis, the development of economic and financial cooperation and greater emphasis on the social, cultural and human dimension, these being the three aspects of the EuroMediterranean partnership.”

Since the Barcelona declaration is not a legally binding documents, the various forms of cooperation that it called for and the specific measures listed in the Work Programme attached to the Declaration have been formulated in Association Agreements (AA) which the EU negotiated with
each Mediterranean Partner. As of October 2003, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia have signed and started implementing AA; Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority have interim agreements; agreements with Algeria and Egypt have been signed but are not yet in force; and only Syria is yet to conclude an AA. Upon accession, new EU members will start implementing AA as they will stand in May 2004, i.e. rights and obligations defined by existing AA, and any other ones that may be adopted before that date, will be considered as “acquis communautaire” and will be applicable to old and new members alike. Similarly, MPCs will treat old and new EU members in an identical manner, and their relations with Malta and Cyprus will be governed by these two countries’ new status as EU members.

Keeping these facts in mind, the effects of enlargement on MPCs may be examined through an evaluation of the costs and benefits that MPCs may be expected to derive from applying the AA in the new EMP configuration. The effects on such activities as trade and investment can be projected with a fair degree of confidence, since there are reliable statistics that can be used to estimate possible future trends. But conclusions relating to the political and social areas can only be speculative, since future developments depend on attitudes, perceptions and values of decision-makers as well as on other subjective variables that are difficult to predict with certitude.

**Enlargement effects on trade**

In principle, EU enlargement will give the MPCs a privileged access to ten additional markets with a combined population of 75 million whose average individual income is over 4,300 US-Dollar (see Table 1 below). Non-agricultural goods exported by the MPCs to these new markets will no longer be subject to tariffs whose average rate stands currently at 7 percent, and quotas for agricultural products may be increased as a result of enlargement.
Table 1 - Comparative statistics for Euro-Med Partners (2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region/Country</th>
<th>Population (million)</th>
<th>GDP (current k$)</th>
<th>GDP (PPP, k$)</th>
<th>GDP/capita (current, k$)</th>
<th>GDP/capita (PPP, k$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 MPC</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>246,650</td>
<td>652,118</td>
<td>1,665</td>
<td>4,403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 EU</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>7,885,169</td>
<td>8,916,715</td>
<td>20,971</td>
<td>23,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 ACs</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>327,094</td>
<td>792,512</td>
<td>4,355</td>
<td>10,553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50,777</td>
<td>143,734</td>
<td>4,930</td>
<td>13,955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>45,633</td>
<td>124,431</td>
<td>4,563</td>
<td>12,443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>157,739</td>
<td>349,838</td>
<td>4,076</td>
<td>9,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>8,458,913</td>
<td>10,361,345</td>
<td>26,992</td>
<td>38,671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPC/ACs</td>
<td>197%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPC/EU</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPC/EU25</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2002

But at the same time, MPCs will have to lower duties they presently levy on goods originating in new member states (ACs) to align them on those applied to current EU members. Thus, in May 2004 tariffs on non-agricultural imports will go down from 28 percent to 21 percent for Morocco, and from 27 percent to 11 percent for Tunisia; the rates will continue to be lowered until total dismantling according to schedules stipulated by the AA. Similar measures apply to agricultural goods, with an immediate reduction from 51 percent to 48 percent for goods entering Morocco, and from 81 percent to 77 percent for goods entering Tunisia. As for the other 4 arab MPCs (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon), they will have to abolish tariffs on all goods imported from the ACs, since they presently levy no duties on any EU imports (the same applies to Syria when or if it signs an AA). It may be noted that those tariffs are quite high, ranging from 74 percent levied by Egypt on agricultural products imported from non-EU coun-
European enlargement and its impact on the Barcelona process

tries to 13 percent levied by Jordan on manufactured products coming from outside the EU (see Table 2 below).

Consequently, MPC exports to ACs would benefit from lower tariffs, provided that this measure proves to be sufficient to make them competitive with similar goods sold by other exporting countries. With respect to MPC imports, lower tariffs may theoretically lead to both trade creation and trade diversion. In the first case, goods that were previously hampered by tariff walls will get better access to MPC markets as tariffs go down. In the second case, some trade with the rest of the world may get diverted to the new EU members once the preferential arrangements go into effect.

**Table 2 - Estimated simple average tariffs in the EuroMed region, 2000**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Region</th>
<th>Imports from MFN countries</th>
<th>Imports from EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-agricultural products</td>
<td>Agricultural products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU 15</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average ACs</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average 7 MPC</td>
<td>18.96</td>
<td>40.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria*</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt*</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>73.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan*</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon*</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>51.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria*</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>81.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These countries do not yet have preferential rates for EU goods, Source: DG Trade Market Access Database
However, the preceding discussion is purely theoretical, because in practice there is at present almost no trade between the ACs and the MPCs (see Table 3). The former obtain only 0.6 percent of their imports from MPCs (compared with 49 percent from the EU) and send them 0.8 percent of their exports (62 percent go to the EU). Similarly, 1 percent of MPC imports come from the ACs, and 0.4 percent of their exports go there. Since preferential tariff rates practiced by ACs and MPCs are not significantly different from normal rates, it is unlikely that tariff reductions that will take place after the enlargement will increase existing trade between the two groups.

Table 3 - Distribution of trade flows between regions, 1999
(percent of total)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region/country</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th></th>
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<th>Exports</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU 15</td>
<td>ACs</td>
<td>MPC</td>
<td>EU 15</td>
<td>ACs</td>
<td>MPC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU 15</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACs</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPC</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Commission, Comtrade Database

However, enlargement may – again, theoretically – lead to the emergence of two new types of trade flows. First, some firms from the ACs may take advantage of lower tariffs in the MPCs to position themselves in these new markets. However, this is an unlikely development, because if such firms had a real competitive advantage, MPCs would have purchased their goods. Of course, the case would be entirely different if those firms were competitors for local producers, and tariffs were set deliberately high to protect those producers. In that case, once those protective tariffs are lowered or
abolished, ACs firms may seek entrance into MPC markets. But if such a development would be welcomed in the ACs, it will create serious difficulties in the MPCs. Already, producers from present EU members are taking advantage of lower tariffs to sell more and more goods on MPC markets and, in the process, displacing less efficient local businesses. AC producers may follow suite, thereby creating additional pressure on local economies.

The second type of trade flow that may appear following enlargement is intra-firm or business-to-business (B2B) trade. There are several sectors where cooperation between the ACs and MPCs is possible and could be mutually beneficial. Textiles and mechanical and electrical engineering are examples that come readily to mind. Joint ventures could be initiated in such sectors, each partner making a contribution on the basis of comparative advantages. However, given the weaknesses of the manufacturing sector in the MPCs (insufficient financial resources, low level of technology, etc.), foreign partners would be required to make heavy investments to upgrade MPC firms. The question of whether or not such investments would be forthcoming will be discussed in the following section.

The last trade issue that needs examination is the loss of market shares that MPCs may incur in the EU as a result of enlargement. Between 1992 and 2001, the share of MPC exports in EU markets declined by 10 percent (from 3.9 percent to 3.5 percent), whereas ACs’ market share increased by 78 percent (from 4.8 percent to 9.8 percent; see Table 4). This trend is likely to continue as the new EU members get integrated in the single market, as the multi-fibre agreements (AMF) get phased out, and as European markets become more accessible to producers from other regions under the effect of new GATT/WTO trade rules.

Table 4 – AC & MPC Market Shares in EU Markets (percent)

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPC</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Commission – Comtrade database
This danger makes the need to create B2B trade all the more urgent, which brings us to the second question to be investigated, namely, the effect of enlargement on foreign direct investment (FDI).

**Enlargement effect on FDI**

Table 5 – EU FDI in Selected Regions and Countries

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MPC*</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>1557</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>3500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which Maghreb</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which Morocco</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashrek</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>785</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>2403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which Egypt</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>2104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC**</td>
<td>2613</td>
<td>5090</td>
<td>5314</td>
<td>6496</td>
<td>8531</td>
<td>10514</td>
<td>12263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which Poland</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>1132</td>
<td>2428</td>
<td>2492</td>
<td>4189</td>
<td>7500</td>
<td>9206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which Czech Rep.</td>
<td>952</td>
<td>1593</td>
<td>1308</td>
<td>1916</td>
<td>1576</td>
<td>2479</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Excludes Turkey, Malta and Cyprus; **Excludes Malta and Cyprus; Source: Eurostat: *EU foreign direct investment yearbook*, 2001

The track record of Arab countries in general, and of MPCs in particular, in attracting FDI has been poor and getting worse in the last few years (see Table 5). In 1997 the Mediterranean attracted one percent of world FDI flows, and held 1.3 percent of world FDI stock. In 2000 the figures became, respectively, 0.5 percent and 1.1 percent. Looking specifically at the EU’s FDI flows, they evolved rather irregularly, increasing substantially in 1998, then decreasing sharply in 1999, to increase just as sharply in 2000, reaching some 3,500 million Euros. But even this record sum represented no more than one percent of total EU investments in the world; it barely equalled EU investments in the Czech and Slovak Republics, and represented 38 percent of EU investments in Poland.

MPC businesses may not have greater success in attracting business partners from the AC than they have been from the EU. From the point of view
of EU investors, MPC markets are not attractive for a variety of reasons (small markets, opaque bureaucracies, inadequate infrastructure, lack of qualified labour, etc.). As for AC businesses, not only would they be deterred by these same factors, they would also hesitate to associate with potential competitors. Even before the adoption of the Barcelona Declaration, Easter European firms have been making inroads in EU markets at the detriment of MPCs, despite the fact that the latter had privileges that the former did not have (see Table 6). This is because Easter European businesses are more competitive than their Southern Mediterranean counterparts. Consequently, they would see no reason to team up with competitors – except if they have the intention of absorbing them. Clearly, this is a difficult issue, but there may be potential benefits for both parties to create strategic partnerships in selected sectors, and the MPCs should make a special effort to identify them.

Table 6 – Market Shares of Selected Countries in EU Markets
All Products – 1990 Constant Prices (1990 = 100)

<table>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>98.6</td>
<td>116.6</td>
<td>88.7</td>
<td>114.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>56.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>131.3</td>
<td>112.5</td>
<td>113.4</td>
<td>102.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>74.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>123.5</td>
<td>140.0</td>
<td>164.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>110.2</td>
<td>104.7</td>
<td>99.6</td>
<td>102.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>161.7</td>
<td>223.4</td>
<td>223.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>77.4</td>
<td>89.0</td>
<td>86.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>98.4</td>
<td>142.3</td>
<td>160.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from Eurostat

At present there are no factors pointing to a short-term improvement of this situation. There is a need to reflect on measures that MPCs need to adopt – perhaps with the help of the EU – to attract a greater share of European FDI. In sum, and as far as the second basket of the Barcelona Declaration is concerned, MPCs have incurred a number of costs as a result of AA implementation during the pre-enlargement period. Their trade deficit with Europe increased and government revenue decreased as a result of tariff dismantling. Market shares have stagnated or declined. Local businesses have had difficulties in adjusting to the loss of protection, and many of
them had to close down. Official development aid from the EU and private investment have been far below needs and are declining. Most of all, none of these trends are likely to be reversed, and will probably be reinforced as a result of enlargement – unless adequate measures are deliberately adopted and vigorously put into effect. This, however, can be achieved only if all parties concerned possess the necessary resolve and political will.

**Enlargement and political cooperation**

It is generally agreed that the Barcelona process, after eight years of existence, is nowhere near its objective of turning the Mediterranean into an area of peace, stability and shared prosperity. Efforts undertaken in the last three or four years to “re-launch” or “reinvigorate” the process have been fruitless. Among the reasons that have been advanced to explain this failure is the preoccupation of the EU with its enlargement to the East, a process that has monopolised the attention and the resources of the EU. According to those who hold this view, the low ranking of the Mediterranean in the EU list of priorities can be attributed to the preponderance of members who have few interactions with, and little interest in the Mediterranean. Technically, this view is valid, since only four of the fifteen EU members are Mediterranean or have been active in Mediterranean affairs (Greece is Mediterranean but not active in the Barcelona process, whereas Portugal is not Mediterranean but is quite active in that process). With the enlargement, the “Mediterranean Block” will gain two new members, one of whom – Malta – has been quite committed to the Barcelona process; but the “Northern bloc” will gain eight new members. Consequently, the voting power of the Mediterranean bloc will be reduced, and its influence is likely to get seriously diluted.

In the South, the EU enlargement has not attracted the attention of civil society. The few who are interested in the question tend to think that it will have little positive impact on them. Pointing to the AC stand on the Iraqi war and to Poland’s decision to send troops to Iraq, they argue that the enlarged EU will have difficulties in maintaining a balanced policy in the Middle East and in giving a fair hearing to Arab concerns. The current ten-
European enlargement and its impact on the Barcelona process

dency of lumping the EU into an antagonistic West has simply included the AC in this camp. As for decision-makers, they continue to underline the fact the EU has dedicated and continues to dedicate more resources and attention to its future members than to its southern neighbours. They regret the days when the Southern Mediterranean, or at least parts of it, enjoyed greater attention and more privileges than Eastern Europe, and fear that whatever remains of that attention and those privileges will slowly whither away after the enlargement.

Conclusion

The Barcelona process has been at a dead end for quite some time. Numerous efforts have been made to put it back on track. The most recent is the EU’s new policy of granting MPCs all the advantages of membership except participation in EU institutions. It is not possible here to discuss the merits of this policy or the likelihood of its implementation in the framework of an enlarged EU. But it may be argued that the problem with the Barcelona process is not the size of its membership but lies with its current structure and its underlying principles. First, the MPCs cannot expect to be economically attractive or to protect their interests if they do not participate in the Barcelona process as a single bloc. In this respect, the EU, to its credit, has been urging the MPCs to achieve, if not complete integration, at least greater horizontal cooperation. Secondly, relying on market forces alone to bring about greater welfare in the South has proved to be insufficient and even counterproductive. At the risk of being politically incorrect, it may be argued that numerous problems need vigorous public intervention for their resolution. This is valid not only for such activities as building infrastructure and improving educational and training facilities, but also for setting up common institutions, ordering investment priorities, allocating common economic projects, and obtaining better terms in negotiations with various potential partners.

This is certainly a daunting task but despite the looming difficulties, one should not yield to pessimism or to resignation. For the near future, two tasks need to be undertaken urgently. First, a joint EU-MPC campaign to
demonstrate concretely that the EMP can indeed transform the Mediterranean into an area of peace, stability and shared prosperity, and that the destinies of both shores are intimately linked. Projects and activities should be launched to bring fast and effective relief to problems such as poverty and unemployment and, at the same time, to show EU solidarity with its southern neighbours.

The second task is for the MPCs to organise an awareness campaign in the ACs to convince public opinion and decision-makers there that the two regions may have more common interests than it may appear at first glance. The gap that separates MPCs from the new EU members is not as wide as that with the old members, making cooperation psychologically and materially easier to start and to sustain. The experience gained by the ACs in achieving their post-1989 transformations can be of direct relevance to MPCs, and there would be little political cost arising from efforts made by the MPCs to seek greater involvement with the ACs.

If we are to believe geologists the two shores of the Mediterranean are moving closer together and the distance between them may have narrowed by a fraction of a millimetre since 1995, the year of the proclamation of the Barcelona declaration. But this performance of the tectonic plates has not been matched by the region’s “political plates”. If anything, the two shores have moved further apart, and the distance separating them may even increase after May 2004. Some in the South (a small minority, and continuously shrinking) consider such a development as dangerous, and would like to stop and reverse it. Some in North (also a minority? also shrinking?) have the same view and desire. They all need to join efforts to convey their message to the recalcitrant or uncommitted members of the EU – old and new.
The Mediterranean, seen from most of the European Union’s new member states is a distant sea. The Barcelona process is a concept recognized by only the most diligent of students of European affairs in our countries. It is a struggle to get our domestic politicians to take an interest in salient EU related issues let alone something they consider to be as esoteric as a policy aimed at creating “a region of peace, stability and prosperity” in the Mediterranean. The Barcelona process is important but many of us in the “northern” new member states don’t know it yet. In effect, it all depends on how you look at the map.

Indeed when the Cold War came to an end in 1989, the eyes of the countries emerging from Soviet rule were fixed firmly on an east-west trajectory. Former Soviet satellites like Poland looked east with trepidation and asked: was it really over? And they looked west with hope and asked: will their secure, rich man’s club accept us as members? In the east, Comecon and the Warsaw Pact dissolved without as much as a whimper while NATO and the European Union beckoned in the west as the two institutions which had served the western Europeans well. We in the east thought they would also serve us just as well. The end of the Cold War meant that we were free to join both. But the end of the Cold War also meant that both organizations, and this is especially true of NATO, faced a challenge to their very existence. This meant they have had to change if they were to survive. As a result they are no longer the organizations we had read about in the text books. Suffice to say that Poland joined NATO to be secure and at peace and immediately found itself in a state of war over Kosovo. Also
the fact that we and the other economically backward central and eastern Europeans were joining these organizations meant that they would have to change. This is especially true of the European Union. Indeed it is becoming quite clear that the EU of the 1980’s and 1990’s which did so much to develop the economies of “southern” countries such as Portugal and Spain as well as Greece has receded into the past. The new member states are joining a leaner, less generous EU.

The end of the Cold War also meant the geo-strategic east-west axis quite suddenly become irrelevant. Indeed, thanks to the attack on the twin towers in New York and George Bush’s subsequent “war on terror” it is the north south divide around the Mediterranean and beyond Turkey’s southern border which has become the main geo-strategic axis for Europeans. For Poles and the Baltic states as well as the Central Europeans, who still see the prospect of a renewal of Russian territorial ambitions in Europe as a possible future threat this is a reality which it is difficult to come to terms with. Joining NATO in Polish eyes meant that when the Russians appeared on the country’s eastern frontier at Białystok, the armoured might of the western alliance would stop them in their tracks. Instead “new” and “old” NATO members are being told to prepare for “out of area” operations. Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq show that it is the Middle East where for the moment such operations might take place.

Both enlargement and the Barcelona dialogue are processes which belong to the new post cold war order in Europe. However the new EU member states are only slowly getting accustomed to the idea that the new post cold war order means that they have joined organizations which are changing. And, paradoxically, it is the Americans, not the EU, who are forcing the new member states to face the reality that the map should be looked at from a north-south point of view and not only in the east west direction we have been looking at for the past two hundred years. Note for example the mooted locations of US military bases in Europe. There is talk of them being moved from Germany where the gun barrels pointed eastwards for so many years to countries like Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary where attention will focus on the south.
This should give an impetus to the Barcelona process. The fact that most of the new member states are from the “north” does not necessarily suggest that the EU’s priorities will cease to take in “southern” issues and focus only on questions pertinent to the north and north east. Obviously the accession of Cyprus and Malta mean that the “southern lobby” in the EU will be strengthened. Should Cyprus remain divided then it will continue to attract a great deal of attention in the EU especially in the context of forthcoming accession talks with Turkey. Estonia, Latvia and most probably Lithuania will remain ‘northern’ in their outlook recognizing the greater claim of the Baltic to their attention rather than the Mediterranean. Also the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia will retain a “local” central European outlook and will probably show little interest in “southern” concerns. Hungary however as well as Bulgaria and Romania when they join in 2007 can be expected to take an active interest in the southern rim not only because of their geographical location but also thanks to the fact that the US is focusing on operations in the middle east. And Poland because of its close relationship with the Bush White House and its military presence in Iraq will of necessity be pulled into the north south dialogue – hopefully within the context of the European Union alongside its bilateral relationship with the US.

However there are very important historical and cultural differences between the new member states and the present EU members who are most interested in the Barcelona process. Spain, France and Italy have a relationship with the non EU Mediterranean countries which is rooted in their colonial past. Portugal also has its “colonial” memory. Only Greece was a colonial subject like many of the new member states from central and eastern Europe. For the new member states, by contrast were all subjects of either the Austro Hungarian empire, Russia, Prussia or Turkey (in the case of Bulgaria) and Poland was partitioned for over 100 years by the first three. This is a difference which must be borne in mind. However it is unclear whether this will have a positive or negative effect on the dialogue between the two Mediterranean shores. The new member states have no sense of guilt towards their non EU Mediterranean partners nor do they have a sense of obligation to support them. They do not share a common language nor
are there any links deriving from mass inward immigration or the colonial past. On the other hand the “new” Europeans, as a group of underdeveloped countries in the EU and with a history of being victims of colonial processes, could feel more sympathy for the plight of the non EU Mediterranean partners. Indeed if press reports are to be believed the Polish military contingent in Iraq is having success in stabilizing its area of command by adopting the pose of the friends of the Iraqi people rather than adopting the uncompromising stance of occupiers of the country.

Poland is the special case among the new member states. It is a large country and its recent history of partition and repression has failed to erase a sense that the country is destined to play a major role in the story of nations. This is one of the reasons for the decision to go into Iraq on the coat tails of the Americans. Indeed Poland’s presence in Iraq means that it could play a greater role in the Barcelona process than might be expected.

On the face of it, the auguries for this are not good. Poland’s historic links with the southern Mediterranean rim countries are weak. At the moment they mainly come down to a tourist traffic which admittedly is growing. In the recent past Poles have been in the Middle East and North Africa mainly at the bidding of the great powers as participants in conflicts which were not of their own making. First a military and civilian contingent over 100,000 strong traversed the region from Iran to Egypt between 1942 and 1944. They were part of the allied forces in the 2nd World War. Originally they had been deported to Russia at the beginning of the war and then in 1941 allowed by Stalin to leave through Iran. Secondly the 1970s and 1980s saw Polish companies involved in infrastructure projects in countries such as Iraq and Libya as part of commercial agreements sanctioned by the Soviet Union. Now a Polish military contingent is actively occupying a part of Iraq at the behest of the United States.

There were many reasons why Poland took this rather exotic decision to go to Iraq. It was part of a conscious effort by the country’s post communist ruling left Democratic Alliance (SLD) party to adopt an “American” option in the hope that this would bring a growth in inward investment from the US. This followed the conclusion of the accession negotiations in Copen-
hagen in December 2002 which showed that the EU was ready to agree to less than generous terms for the new members. Subsequent events and the first indications on the financial perspective for 2007 to 2013 as well as proposed changes in regional policies confirm that the EU in coming years will indeed be less friendly to poor new member states than it has been in the past. Fortunately for the EU, the US has in the intervening months given Poland little hope that its loyal stance on Iraq will produce immediate economic benefits which could outweigh the aid the country might get from the EU in the present decade. Secondly, if one remembers that the political party currently ruling Poland has its roots in the communist past then it will be no surprise that it is happy to gain the respectability to be obtained from a close relationship with a Republican White House. But most important of all there is a cross party consensus that everything possible must be done to keep the Americans in a strong NATO and in Europe. For the Poles, and this is probably true of the other new member states, continue to fear a resurgence of Russian ambitions in central Europe and for this reason want to keep the Americans engaged in Europe. And if the price is going to Iraq then Poland’s political elites think that that price ought to be paid. That suggests that in the near and medium term Poland will continue to be involved in the Middle East at America’s side. This also means that the country as an EU member will retain a sensitivity for the region with obvious advantages for the Barcelona process.

Poland’s insurance policy against a resurgence of a threat from the east is to be in Baghdad in the hope that at some time in the future the Americans will repay the favour by defending Białystok. The other face of this policy is and will be a drive to persuade the EU to conduct an eastern policy which will seek to guard against the occurrence of such an eventuality. Poland is keen that the Ukraine should continue to retain its independence of Moscow and that it should maintain its pro EU stance. Part of that policy will be to maintain good relations with Russia and work for a democratization of Belarus in order to remove a semi totalitarian regime from Poland’s border. This is also very much in tune with the “wider europe” strategy prepared by the European Commission. This plan presented by Gunter Verheugen envisages an active EU policy towards Morocco, Tunisia, Jor-
Poland’s policy should also include active support for Turkish membership of the EU. Turkish accession, in accordance with the Copenhagen criteria, would bring a significant element of stability to the Middle East and give the EU a border not only with countries like Iraq but also with the Caucasus in the north. Poland is well suited to conducting a pro Turkish policy as its historic trading links give it a common past with the Ottomans much in the same way as Venice shares its history with them. And it is here, working to support the accession of a Muslim if secular state to the EU that Poland’s eastern policy could make its most important contribution to the Barcelona process.

I have sought to explain that it is the United States which has been instrumental in redirecting the “strategic gaze” of some of the new EU member states southwards. In Poland’s case it has actually put the country onto the field of battle. The question now is whether the dialogue with the Muslim world will continue to be conducted at the point of a gun or whether enlargement states like Poland will turn more to “soft power” processes usually espoused by the European Union. Poland as I have mentioned is, in a sense, already attempting in Iraq to present itself to the local population as “one of them” rather than a dominant force. “We are underdogs too and we know how it feels”, they seem to be saying. However this is happening at the side of the Americans and not within an EU context.

Thanks to media coverage of the Polish presence in Iraq, Polish public opinion is more aware than ever of the problems of the Middle East and the challenge to stability that the area presents. However there is almost no awareness of the fact that the EU, potentially, presents an alternative to the US approach to the region. Few know for example of the EU aid programme to Palestine. As the Barcelona process is primarily about dialogue and this dialogue was initiated in 1995 it seems unnecessary to repeat that dialogue between the Arab world and the EU must be kept up and extended. Given the current intensity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict it may
be that such efforts will yield scant results. The situation in Iraq is also not conducive to dialogue.

However at present there is an opportunity to underline that Christians, Muslims and Jews are united in a common European heritage. This could have beneficial effects in the medium and long term. This is the work which is being done on Europe’s draft Constitutional Treaty by the intergovernmental conference which started in Rome on October 4. Poland and several other countries such as Spain are arguing that the preamble to the text should include a reference to Europe’s Christian heritage in place of the mention of “religious” values which was included in the draft prepared by the Convention on the Future of Europe. It would however seem appropriate that as those of us who pray in the Muslim, Jewish and Christian world, are praying to the same God and that as each of these religions has influenced and continues to influence the development of Europe, the preamble should contain a reference to all three religions. If that proves impossible then none should be mentioned. The inclusion of all three would signal that the European Union was open to all the religious and cultural traditions within its orbit. It would ease Turkish entry into the EU, make it easier to conduct policies in the Balkans and mediate in the Middle East. The retention of the reference to religious heritage would have the same effect. However a mere reference to Christianity would represent the worst possible of all outcomes.

I doubt if the delegates to the IGC will be thinking in these terms. Everyone will still be worrying how to get around France’s objections to the insertion of a clear reference to religion in what that country considers to be a secular document. Turkey, as a secular state, also has its hands tied although it would clearly be in that country’s interest to have the Muslim religion mentioned as a strand in European history. This is a relatively small and clearly symbolic issue but it does show that even among the present member states consideration about how to further the Barcelona process is nowhere near the top of the agenda. This was a point made by Kurt Biedenkopf, the former prime minister of Saxony at a recent conference on enlargement in Vienna. He complained bitterly that he could get none of Germany’s leaders to take an interest in the EU’s own dialogue with the arab countries south
of the Mediterranean even though he himself thought that this was the most important issue facing the EU at present. Alvaro de Vasconcelos expressed his frustration about the process at a conference organized by the ZEI and the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation last December. Then he despaired that the dialogue “is absent” on the political and security basket and he suggested that the process should concentrate on the establishment of a free trade area.

After the US invasion of Iraq and the growing tension between Israel and Palestine it seems that giving new impetus to the Barcelona process is more difficult than ever. The IGC promises to be an exhausting affair. The debate on the financial perspective for 2007 to 2013 as well as the model of regional policy which will be followed in those years will also be difficult as the new member states fight to retain the vestiges of the more generous policy of former years. All this will be taking place against a background of continuing budget problems in Germany and France. EU member states will also be ratifying the constitutional treaty and with referendums planned in some cities this will be fraught with crises. With all this happening will it be possible to get EU leaders to focus on the problems of the Mediterranean basin and the Middle East?

The European Union has an obvious strategic interest in working to bring stability to the states on the southern rim of the Mediterranean and to addressing the problems of slow economic growth and high population growth which are already putting pressure for immigration on the southern EU member states. But making the Barcelona process work is a test for the EU itself as in the post cold war era it seeks to regain its sense of mission. The process of European Integration was set in train after the second world war to end once and for all the murderous tribal wars which blighted the last century.

European Integration is a process in which nation states can secure their interests by working together and without reaching for arms. This idea of states working together in peace is the message that the EU should be propagating as part of the Barcelona process. The “soft power” the EU
European enlargement and the Barcelona process

does not require a change in the Middle East. It should as far as possible replace the model the US has brought to the area. EU leaders have to show the will for this to happen. Should that political will be forthcoming then there is every possibility that the new member states will follow suit.
Mapping the impact of enlargement on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

Introduction

After the fall of the Berlin Wall in the 1989 the European Communities and the European Union, respectively, focused on establishing the relationship with the countries of the former communist bloc. The process, often termed “a historic reunification of Europe” diverted the attention of the EU members to the East, and consequently the amount of attention paid to the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) increased enormously. In view of the EU members, this change of course, as it were, was more than justified. Among many other benefits, the then Twelve were hoping for significant security dividends to be paid because of their investment into the Central and Eastern Europe. After all, the CEECs represented an immediate neighbourhood to the EU, a neighbourhood that at the time was (perceived) a partner with enormous economic potential, yet vulnerable and politically insecure – the two drawbacks that needed to be checked immediately.

1 The term refers to the four Visegrad countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia), the three Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria.

2 For a coherent analysis of the question of legitimacy and justification in the EU’s enlargement policy see Sjursen 2002.

3 At the time of the fall of the iron curtain, and before the 1995 enlargement, only two member states of the EC, Italy and Germany, had immediate borders with the CEECs.
When the first Association Agreements were signed with Poland and Hungary in December 1991, the idea of enlargement of the EC to include at least some of the former European socialist countries was already roaming in the minds of the European decision-makers. Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union\(^4\) has to be read in this context. Accordingly, any democratic European country can apply for the membership. The “Europeanness” of the CEECs was never questioned, and when the Copenhagen criteria set out the conditions for the membership,\(^5\) the process of enlargement could begin.

Regardless of its making the CEECs an utmost priority, the EU has been reminded continuously from the beginning of the 1990s that its new focus to the East should not let its Southern relations to a neglect. The Moroccan wishes for closer economic ties with the EU, the Gulf War, the political crisis in Algeria and the re-opened Middle East Peace Process that led to the signing of the Oslo Treaty in October 1993 are only the most significant issues that emerged at the time, and which acted as an impetus for Mediterranean member states to pursue a more active Mediterranean policy in the EU (Parfitt 1997: 867; Rhein 2002: 702-703). Spain used its 1995 Presidency to the best of its potentials by bringing the Mediterranean issue back to the top of the European agenda, and with an impressive result: the launch of the Barcelona process.\(^6\) The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), invigorated by the Barcelona Declaration, replaced and qualitatively upgraded the previous Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) of the EC.

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4 Also known as Maastricht Treaty, was signed on the 7 February 1992, only a couple of months after the signing of the Association Agreements with Poland and Hungary.

5 In 1993, at the Copenhagen European Council meeting, the Member States set the criteria for membership in the Union. The so called Copenhagen Criteria state that in order to become a member of the Union a country must be a stable democracy, have a functioning market economy and be able to take on the obligations of membership in the EU. The Council Regulation 622/98 later upgraded the criteria to legally binding conditions.

6 For a detailed account of activities of the Southern member states in relation to the Mediterranean policy of the Union in the first half of the 1990s, see Barbé (1998).
In short, it seems quite obvious that the two processes – the EU enlargement and the EU relations with so-called Mediterranean non-member countries (MNMCs)\(^7\) – can hardly be discussed separately from each other as they both touch EU’s inner and outer stability. The EU itself seemed aware of this, as the EMP was created largely as a consequence of a need to balance the Union’s relations towards the East with relations towards the South (Barbé 1998). In this vein, the study seeks to define various aspects of the influence of enlargement on the EMP and, by doing so, to depart from a too simplistic view of the impact of enlargement on the EMP as one of neglect and financial deprivation. Instead, it will try to put the different levels of the enlargement-effect into perspective. It will be argued that although on one side the Eastern enlargement used enormous resources and took some focus away from the Mediterranean, it acted, on the other side, as a strong incentive for the Mediterranean EU-member states to launch a more coherent and all-embracing policy towards the Southern Mediterranean.

The study will proceed with an outline of possible ways of impact of enlargement on the EMP. The analysis will look at: i) the impact resulting from the enlargement process as such; and ii) the situation after the enlargement has been completed, i.e. after the actual accession of the new members takes place. To illustrate the analysis, the study will evaluate the significance of the accession from the perspective of new Mediterranean member states to the Union, i.e. Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia, with the special focus on the latter. Slovenia seems to make a relevant case study. It is a new member state of the EU, generally regarded as a CEEC, yet very much in the process of exploring its Mediterranean identity. In this respect, it seems pertinent to ask the question, what if anything may be expected from Slovenia, a new EU member, in terms of its attitudes towards the EMP?

\(^7\) Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and the Palestinian Authority.
Mapping the impact of enlargement on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

The impact of the process of enlargement is too often seen as that of neglect for the Southern neighbours of the EU, as the integration with the East absorbed much of the EU’s energy (Dinan 1994/1999: 496; Miralles and Johansson 2002: 1; Weltner-Puig 2003: 208). The comparison of the EU’s financial assistance to both regions is at hand to prove such claims. Although the EU had doubled its financial assistance to the Mediterranean in the first half of the 1990s (Rhein 2002: 703), the comparison of the financial aid and structural assistance given to the CEECs and the MNMCs in the early 1990s shows that the ratio was 2.5 to 1 in favour of the CEECs. In terms of respective populations, this means five ECU for every CEECs citizen and one ECU for every MNMC citizen (Barbé 1998: 120). However, the impact of the process of enlargement on the EMP is not confined solely to (the assumptions of) the diversion of the EU’s financial assistance flows from the Southern and South-Eastern Mediterranean to the CEECs.

As already indicated, the mapping which we propose to do will differentiate between the process of enlargement, i.e. the process that has been taking place since the early 1990s and is now coming to a successful close for the majority of CEECs, plus Cyprus and Malta; and the impact of the actual accession of these countries to the Union on the future of the EMP. Within each of these two “periods”, the impact of enlargement on the EMP has to be assessed by analysing the changes that enlargement brought: i) to internal EU matters; ii) to shaping of the relations with Mediterranean; and, iii) more broadly, within the framework of the changes in global European role. Finally, iv) the changes in candidate countries (new member states) with a possible impact on the EMP and MNMCs will be considered.

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8 Eight CEECs shall accede to the Union on 1 May 2004, Bulgaria and Romania are envisaged to join the EU in 2007.
The impact of the process of enlargement on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

The enlargement influenced internal constellations of interests in the EU and the nature of the European policy making. The endeavours taken by the EU in the process of enlargement were primarily driven by the countries that have immediate borders with some of the CEECs, which caused concerns in the southern EU member states. The latter seized the political opportunity to stress the need of a more vigorous approach towards the southern neighbours. As a result, the need for balancing the eastern and southern relations has been present all the way through the enlargement process, and since as early as during the intergovernmental conferences of 1991 (Maresceau and Lannon 2001: xix). Consequently, one may conclude that the process of enlargement did in fact act as an impetus for the creation of the new policy towards the Mediterranean basin.

Further, the process of enlargement influenced the shaping of the EMP. The relations between the EU and the Southern and South-Eastern Mediterranean countries prior to the EMP were based on the GMP, which was

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9 Barbé (1998) showed the complex nature of relations towards the two neighbouring regions, by pointing at the balancing of the relations to the east by those to the south of the EU.

10 The balancing of eastern and southern relations was not, of course, the only external policy that accompanied the process of enlargement. The pursuit of geopolitical aspects in the foreign relation of the EU and the specific spheres of influence of certain member states, can be further seen with the Nordic countries efforts in the Northern dimension policies of the Union (Sicard Filtenborg, Gänzle and Johansson 2002). The Polish advocacy of the closer relations of the Union with the New Independent States (NIS) fits into this trend as well. See e.g. “Non-paper with Polish proposals concerning policy towards new Eastern neighbours after EU enlargement”, as well as the speech by Polish foreign minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz “The Eastern Dimension of the European Union. The Polish View”, delivered at the conference “The EU Enlargement and the New Neighbourhood Policy”, in Warsaw, on 20 February 2003. Both documents are available at http://www.msz.gov.pl/start.php (5 October 2003).

11 In order to replace the number of bilateral trade agreements between the EC and the Mediterranean countries, the GMP was adopted at the 1972 Paris Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the EC.
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limited to governing the trade relations in industrial and agricultural goods between the EC and the Mediterranean countries (Lister 1997: 85). The Barcelona Declaration,\(^{12}\) though overly optimistic in its objectives, goes beyond sheer enforcement of the economic ties between the two regions, to include political, security, economic and financial as well as social and cultural aspects of relations. The economic cooperation within the EMP shows significant similarity to the early shaping of the relations between the EU and the CEECs (Rhein 2002: 703). The principle of conditionality, introduced by the Copenhagen criteria and further developed and applied in the Europe Agreements with the CEECs, is introduced in relation to the Mediterranean basin, in Barcelona Declaration as well as in the Association Agreements with respective MNMCs (Lannon, Inglis and Haenebalcke 2001: 119ff). Finally, the financial and technical measures to accompany the reform of economic and social structures (MEDA) in the framework of the EMP as the main instrument for implementing the financial assistance towards the MNMCs have been reshaped\(^ {13}\) to follow the PHARE model of assistance to the CEECs (Prosperini 2003: 190).

The introduction of the conditionality principle in the context of enlargement, and in relation to the MNMCs, also needs to be viewed at from a wider perspective of the EU’s global role. The period of preparations for enlargement has been marked by the EU’s increasing awareness of its role as a global actor. The changes in the international community, above all the end of the Cold war and the process of globalisation changed the ambitions of the EU members in the EU’s external affairs. Beyond primarily economic orientation, the EU’s external policies became increasingly accompanied with an ambition of political actorness in global affairs. Such new assertiveness (Rummel 1990) in the European foreign policy warranted internal cohesion (Copenhagen criteria) and allowed for the inclusion of po-

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political conditionality in shaping of relations with countries or groups of countries, without giving them the prospect of membership.\textsuperscript{14}

In economics, the increased foreign direct investment (FDI) flow in the CEECs is often mentioned as the primary negative impact of enlargement on the EMP.\textsuperscript{15} However, it is disputable whether these flows have been ever diverted from the Mediterranean region at all. The investment flow in the CEECs is predominantly a consequence of the changes in business opportunities and the economic stability resulting from the transformation of economies and regulation of the markets backed by the adoption of the “acquis communautaire” (Dunning 1993; UNCTAD 1998: 279-289). Khader (2003: 14) recognises that the Mediterranean basin does not compete for the FDI with the CEECs, but with other regions of the world where European FDI have been growing in the last decade.\textsuperscript{16} This does not mean, of course, that lessons cannot be learned from the CEECs experience with the FDI. The relatively smooth, fast, and successful transformation of the formerly planned economies into the functioning market ones could be viewed as a model and incentive for the Southern Mediterranean economies.

Finally, transformation of the CEECs into the open market economy and functioning democracy resulted in them becoming a potential market for

\textsuperscript{14} On the politicisation of relations to other regional groupings in the course of 1990s see Allen and Smith (1996). For the inclusion of political aspects in the relations with Mercosur countries see Sanchez Bajo (1999); for relations with ASEAN compare Forster (1999) and Richards (1999).

\textsuperscript{15} The FDI transactions in the CEECs began to grow increasingly from 1996 onwards. The sum of inward and outward FDI flows soared from ECU 10,5 Billion in 1995 to EUR 23,7 billion in 2000, being mainly composed of inward flows that accounted for more than 90 percent of the sum (Eurostat 2002a: 1). The share of FDI from the EU member states grew from ECU 6,5 billion in 1996 to EUR 19 billion in 2000 (Eurostat 2002b: 1). Meanwhile the FDI flows from the EU member states to the MNMCs amounted to 872 million in 1996 and grew to 3,6 billion in 2000 (Eurostat 2003: 2).

\textsuperscript{16} Data on the destination of the European FDI outside of the EU show e.g. that 10.8 percent of the European FDI in 2000 was directed towards Latin America, whereas only 1.5 percent went to the countries of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (Femise Annual Report 2002: 36-37).
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some of the Mediterranean products as well as in them becoming generally more interested in the Mediterranean area. However, during the course of the enlargement process these countries were absorbed in their own preparations for accession to the EU, therefore the effects of these changes, relevant for the EMP and MNMCs in general, can only be expected to be seen after the enlargement.

The EMP after the accession

At the EU level, there is a change in political, economic as well as in cultural aspects, which is likely to influence the future Mediterranean policy. In terms of political changes that will be brought about by accession of the ten new members, the first change to be observed is a decrease in the institutional weight of the Mediterranean countries in the EU decision-making process. Malta, Cyprus, and Slovenia are among the smallest old and new members, with a small weight in the decision-making process in the Council of Ministers as well as in the European Parliament (EP). A look into the size and geographical position of the new member countries – take for instance Poland, the Czech Republic, or Hungary – promise that the geopolitical weight within the EU will be moved towards East and North. The question also arises whether the enlarged EU will turn more introspect as it happened in the periods following previous enlargements. The Commis-

17 Khader (2003: 14) points to the positive impact the welfare in the new member states and their newly developed interest in the Mediterranean might have on the Mediterranean tourism.

18 Following the distribution of votes in the EP as determined by the Treaty of Nice, of the 147 seats in the EP that are envisaged for the ten new member states only 18 fall to the three new Mediterranean countries (Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia). The ratio of the distribution of votes in the Council of Ministers, as designated according to the Treaty of Nice, is similar, with the three countries comprising only 11 votes of the 147 votes of the new member states all together. The Draft Treaty Establishing the Constitution for Europe envisages the qualified majority in the decision-making of the Council of Ministers consisting of two thirds of the member states, representing at least three fifths of the population of the Union. Malta, Cyprus, and Slovenia together represent only 4,13 percent of the population of the ten new members, which even lessens their weight in the Council decision-making.
sion’s document “Wider Europe – New Neighbourhood Policy”,¹⁹ as the clearest expression of the future European proximity policy, “serves to assuage neighbours’ concerns that the enlargement will mean a ‘Fortress Europe’ or that it will cause new divisions in and around Europe” (Johansson 2002: 4). The document does not differentiate between the EU’s southern and eastern neighbours, but it seeks to building such a relationship between the EU and its new members in which they will, in words of Commission President Romano Prodi “share everything but institutions” (Agence Europe, 12 March 2003).

In terms of change in the EU policies, with the external effect on the MNMCs, policies covering areas such as trade, energy, FDI and agricultural as well as migration policies deserve to be looked at more closely.²⁰ As already noted above, the FDI flows into the CEECs do not compete with the flows into the MNMCs. However, it is worth noting that accession shall not bring considerable alterations in the FDI trend in the CEECs. Statistics shows that with reference to the FDI the CEECs are already integrated in the EU (Eurostat 2002b: 2).²¹ While trade dependence of the MNMCs to the EU will increase only slightly, since the acceding CEECs have a very poor record of economic ties with the countries of Southern Mediterranean, the picture is somewhat in terms of energy dependence of the EU on the outside world. This will increase, but into direction East and not South, since the new members largely depend on energy resources, like gas supplies, from the countries of the former Soviet Union. However, a greater energy dependence on NIS and Russia might not be deemed particularly desirable, and steps towards diversification of this dependence may be envisaged (e.g. extending present pipelines originating in the


²⁰ For an analysis of change brought about by enlargement in various EU policies with the effect on the EMP compare with Tovias (2001).

²¹ This conclusion is based on comparison between the percentage of intra-EU origin FDI and extra-EU origin FDI flows to the EU and the CEECs, respectively, for the
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MNMCs to Cyprus, Hungary and Slovenia should be thought upon in this context) (Tovias 2001: 379-380). For the agricultural policy of the EU it is important to note that the substantial increase in agricultural land, without a major reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), will lead to an increased role of the EU as a food supplier to the outside world and even to a production of some farm products which might compete with MNMCs exports to the EU (e.g. potatoes, vegetables and flowers). No less important could be the effect of inclusion of Cyprus into the common fisheries policy. With the EU backing it, the change in the efficiency of the agreements on fishing in Cyprus’ exclusive economic zone is likely to occur (Tovias 2001: 378). The same applies to exploitation of seabed resources such as gas or oil. Although much disputed in the course of accession negotiations, the envisaged migration flows from the new member states to the old member states do not amount to numbers that would imply an even stricter policy of legal and legitimate migration to the EU from the MNMCs.22

Finally, there is a socio-cultural aspect that should be thought upon. The new member states are, perhaps to a greater extent than the old member states, homogenous and relatively closed societies in which stereotypes are still very much alive. The lack of contact between the CEECs and the MNMCs resulted in a situation, where we can almost talk of the oblivion. The participation of the new member states in the programmes of cultural, social and human co-operation within the framework of the EMP, will help these two regions to slowly get familiar with each other.

Turning to the attitudes of the new member states towards the Mediterranean, the first observation would be that they are silent about their intentions concerning the post-Enlargement external agenda. They are not against further enlargement to include 27, 28 or 29 countries (Tovias 2001: 381). But their focus will most surely be in the South Eastern Europe and in Russia, Moldova, Ukraine, and Belarus. Many of the candidates until re-

period between 1996 and 2000. The data show conversion in the percentage rate of the both types of the FDI between the regions.

22 For a detailed analysis of migration expectations from the CEECs to the EU see Brückner (2000). For a migration potential of the CEECs with reference to the MNMCs see also Khader (2003).
cently did not have a Mediterranean policy of their own (with the exception of Malta, Cyprus, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania) (Tovias 2001: 382-383). However, of importance to the EMP are their stands on issues such as foreign trade, agriculture, development aid policy, and migration policy.\textsuperscript{23} It is worth noting that with regard to foreign trade the candidates are split among those which might be pursuing a more liberal approach (e.g., Estonia, Poland and the Czech Republic), and those which seem more reluctant towards the freer trade (e.g. Cyprus, Hungary, Slovenia), which is the opposite to their stands on agriculture – the issue on which they might as a whole press for a liberalization of the CAP at least for the products they themselves do not produce. This is an attitude, very much in contrast with that of Spain, Portugal, and Greece (Tovias 2001: 382). Concerning development aid, the new members will fulfil their obligations. Yet, they largely perceive themselves as developing countries as well, and therefore do not consider themselves major partners in development policy (Tovias 2001: 383).

\textbf{Slovenia, a new Mediterranean member state}

The inclusion of the three Mediterranean countries will not serve as balancing of the Eastern and Southern policies of the EU in terms of decision-making in the Union. Still, the fact that among the new members there are also countries members of the EMP (Malta and Cyprus) and Slovenia, also a Mediterranean state, is surely worthwhile noting at the very least.

Malta and Cyprus are often seen as a bridge between the EU and the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. They both have closer commercial and economic ties with the region and are advocates of and keen participants in all Pan-Mediterranean and Western Mediterranean initiatives (Tovias 2001: 392; Calleya 2002: 89-92; Melakopides 2003: 2; Vaquer i Fanés 2003: 67). Their foreign policy links with the Arab Mediterranean

\textsuperscript{23} For an excellent overview of the candidate countries attitudes, though only of the countries of the so-called Luxembourg group, towards policies that might affect the MNMCs, see Tovias (2001).
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countries as well as with Israel might be an asset in the Union’s role in the Middle East peace process.

Slovenia, though being considered a Mediterranean country,\textsuperscript{24} does not have an immediate border with any of the countries of the Southern Mediterranean. During its years of independence, Slovenia has been busy with “catching up” during the process of accession to the EU and NATO. Slovenia also devoted much of its time and energy to emerging bilateral issues with the neighbouring countries and to an active role that it began to play in the Western Balkans. It is understandable that little resources were at disposal for foreign policies beyond these immediate concerns. Nevertheless, Slovenia has started the process of developing a coherent Mediterranean policy. With it becoming a member of the EU, the perception of proximity will also change.

Some evidence to confirm this assumption can already be seen. Since the successful conclusion of the accession endeavours in relation to both integrations, Slovenian foreign policy is now viewing its active involvement in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership as its second priority within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the Union. The Government sees the accession to the Barcelona process as a means to strengthen Slovenian Mediterranean identity, etc.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{24} This statement should be taken with a caveat. Slovenia’s own primary self-perception is that of being a Central European country and the Mediterranean identity comes second to that. This self-perception is mirrored in the academic literature on the EMP, where Slovenia is not always counted among the Mediterranean new member states. Thus Khader (2003) and Prosperini (2003) in their analysis of the impact of enlargement on the EMP and MNMCs do not consider Slovenia as a Mediterranean country but exclusively as a Central (and Eastern) European country. Tovias (2001), on the other hand, counts Slovenia among the Mediterranean countries.

\textsuperscript{25} See, e.g., Foreign Minister Dimitrij Rupel’s speech delivered at the Summit of Francophone in Beirut, 18 October 2002, (http://www.gov.si/mzz/govori/02101801.html.) It should be noted, however, that views of Slovenian political parties do not seem to always coincide with this orientation. In a recent study conducted by the authors, it was only one political party (Social Democrats of Slovenia), which included the EMP on its list of several CFSP priorities of Slovenia.
On the more practical note, the Slovenian foreign ministry is in the process of reorganisation and the early experience of taking part in the EMP as an observer since the signing of the Treaty of Accession\textsuperscript{26} has already had an influence on the organisation of the tasks related to the MNMCs in the Ministry. The conduct of relations with the MNMCs is being moved from the Sector for bilateral relations to the European sector and the Sector for development aid.\textsuperscript{27}

The picture of economic links between Slovenia and Mediterranean indicates, however, that this is the area where much ground still needs to be covered. The links that were established in the Yugoslav times have only been maintained but not deepened in the first years of independence, and new economic ties are being built only very slowly.\textsuperscript{28} Trade statistics show a very modest trade exchange between Slovenia and the MNMCs. In 2002, Slovenian trade with the MNMCs amounted to only 116 million USD (Ministry of Economy 2003a: 2), while its total trade with the countries of the EU in 2000 amounted to 14.4 billions Euro (Eurostat 2001: 2). There are no FDI flows between Slovenia and the MNMCs (Ministry of Economy 2003a: 3). However, similar to the foreign policy reorientation, the exploration of the economic opportunities in the Mediterranean is currently under consideration.\textsuperscript{29} These efforts are all still in the very nascent stages, but

\textsuperscript{26} Signed in Athens on 16 April 2003.

\textsuperscript{27} Authors’ interview with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

\textsuperscript{28} The record of agreements on economic, trade and investment co-operation clearly confirms this standpoint. The agreements on economic cooperation with Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Tunis, and Morocco have been succeeded from the agreements between Yugoslavia and these countries in the 1970s. Recently new agreements, including trade arrangements and protection of investment have been signed or are under negotiations with Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Turkey, Cyprus, and Malta (Ministry of Economy 2003b).

\textsuperscript{29} For example, the Ministry of Economy takes an active part at informal ministerial meetings and at working groups within the EMP. The analyses of the possibilities of active involvement of Slovenian enterprises in projects funded by the MEDA programmes are conducted. The Slovenian Chamber of Industry and Commerce organises study visit to Egypt and Turkey to explore the business opportunities.
they do point to something which may be termed “reverse impact” It is not only the impact enlargement has on the EMP that needs to be considered when the future of the EMP is under question. The rough outline of the changes in Slovenian foreign policy and of the undertakings of its economic policy and business strategies suggests that the EMP has an impact on the acceding states as well.

**Conclusion**

The mapping of the impact of enlargement on the relations between the EU and the MNMCs in general and on the EMP in particular shows that the impact takes different turns and, consequently, that it goes beyond the political realist view of balancing the EU’s relations with its neighbours to the east and to the south. Furthermore, it cannot be simply assessed by looking at the flows of financial aid and structural funds designed to CEECs and the MNMCs. Assessing the impact and drawing conclusions as well as making assumptions on the future of the Union’s relations towards the countries east of the new member states and the MNMCs needs to include various levels of analysis, which take global, European, Mediterranean and member states’ perspectives. Only by such holistic approach, as it were, *i.e.* considering all these levels as a single whole, appropriate strategies for the future of the EMP can be shaped.

The presentation of the Slovenian efforts in relation to the newly discovered options for economic and political engagement in the MNMCs suggests that following the actual accession of the new member states the Mediterranean region will not be exposed to neglect by at least some of the new member states. Obviously, the case of Slovenia makes but a small piece in the jigsaw; comparative studies of the efforts undertaken in relation to the EMP and the MNMCs in the new member states will be warranted with a view to understand their expectations in terms of their engagement in the EMP after 2004.
References


Mapping the impact of enlargement


Under Full Sail in a Millennium of Migration? Enlargement in the East and “Push and Pull Factors” in the South

The Mediterranean has always been the area for economic, social, and human exchange between the states of the northern and the southern Mediterranean countries. Conquest, colonialism, trade, and last but not least migration, have shaped relations between its northern and southern shores. Focussing on the enlargement process towards the East of Europe, the European Union got the growing demographic problem and the readiness of the people to leave their home-countries out of sight. However, alongside with the enhanced endeavours of the European Union to intensify and reformulate short-term commercial ties with North Africa, the Levant, and Turkey through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), illegal immigration gained importance as an area of research. Economic and security implications on both sides of the Mediterranean are coming to the fore. Reasons for southern emigration are manifold and obvious. A biblical saying goes “in case the prophet does not come to the mountain, the mountain will come to the prophet.” Same applies to migration. If prosperity does not come to the people, the people will come to the places of prosperity.

Migration in Figures

The deteriorating socio-economic situation and the linked risk of distributional conflicts between the states in the South Mediterranean are the reasons why the European Council in June 1992, during the Lisbon summit, for the first time classified the Mediterranean region as significant strategi-
The Challenge of Migration

cally important.\textsuperscript{1} Future and present scenarios provided by the European Union deal with the problem of uncontrolled south-north migration, of which the EU has always been afraid of.\textsuperscript{2} In addition to the differences in terms of economic figures between the member states of the European Union and the Mediterranean partner countries (MPCs), the demographic difference between the North and the South inevitably attracts growing attention. In unison, the arab MPCs population growth of up to 3 percent was estimated as an essential element of the heterogeneous prosperity between the EU and its southern neighbour region on the other side of the coast. It is conspicuous that over the past decade net migration to the EU has been extensive. After reaching its peak of over 1 Million per annum in the early 1990’s, net migration to the EU declined over the past decade, however, rising back up to 700,000 in 1999 again. The net legal immigration rate for the EU during 1990-98, was at 2.2 per 1000 inhabitants, compared to 3 for the United States and almost 0 for Japan. It is estimated, that illegal immigration in Europe is 60 percent higher, at about 500,000 per annum, than in the United States. The population of the European Union is 34 percent larger than the US population. Refugees seeking asylum in the EU between 1989 and 1998 have also exceeded an average of 350,000 per annum. About 20 percent of the applicants are accepted.\textsuperscript{3} The figures of foreigners of a typical EU country have steadily increased as a result of substantial net migration flows. In Germany for example, this figure grew by about 3 million to 7.3 million between 1985 and 1999. The percentage of the population with foreign nationalities in the countries of the EU is 8.9 percent in

\textsuperscript{1} Hereunto the European Parliament figured already in 1991 out, that “... the pressure of migration will be all the more massive and uncontrollable if the European Community does not establish new and more equitable trade relations with the Mediterranean third parties, and does not institute cooperation that is quantitatively different from that of the past in order to contribute to the development and growth of these countries.” (Resolution A3-121/91 on a renewed Mediterranean Policy Consideration 1, European Parliament).

\textsuperscript{2} The legislation of alien law from all EU-member states can be found on: http://194.235.129.80/euromesco/seccao_geral.asp?cod_seccao=5034.

\textsuperscript{3} Herbert Brücker et al. (eds.): Managing Migration in the European Welfare State, Berlin, June 2001, p. 1.
Germany, 9.1 percent in Austria, 8.7 percent in Belgium, 6.3 percent in France, 2.1 percent in Italy and 3.8 percent in the UK.

Figure I. Migration rates of the EU-15 and selected EU countries, 1988-1998

Sources: Sopemi (2000) and Eurostat (2000)

Three Phases of Migration

Post-war migration in Europe can be divided into three phases: the first phase beginning with the period of foreign worker recruitment after World War II and ending during the first oil price crisis in 1973/74. The second phase starting in the mid 1970s until the 1980s, and the third taking place at the end of bipolarity and the following collapse of socialism in 1989. Dealing with the third wave of migration, forecasts on demographic trends outline the following scenario: The arab MPCs population will rise from 167,43 million in the year 2000 to 204,88 million until 2010. An UNDP study forecasts a rise to 250,47 Million people, based on an annual growth rate of 1.7375 percent until the year 2020.⁴

⁴ More details are presented in Figure II (demographic trends).
Roberto Aliboni’s interpretation of this forecast estimates that the actual number of 9 million people, who are currently unemployed in the region, will rise up to 15 million within the next years if the arab MPCs fail to reconstitute their economic growth. This aspect could contribute to a distinct migration exodus, with the EU most likely being the main destination. An asymmetric forthcoming free trade zone will most likely enforce these developments, which would automatically broaden the gap between South and North irreversible. Although liberal trade-relations are beneficial by matter of principle and have the potential to establish economic structures which enable the people to stay in their respective home-countries, a one-sided liberation with asymmetric tariffs would bring about the contrary. Sub regional instabilities, marginalization and an euro-med collapse would be the outcome. All this is not unknown. Arnold Hottinger described the enormous gap of prosperity between the two Mediterranean shore sides five years ago:

“The 226 million people of the eleven South Mediterranean States gained in 1996 a very unequally distributed income per head of 2336 US-Dollar, in contrast the 176 million people of the five States of the North gained an average of 20,777 US-Dollar. This represents approximately nine times more. At the same time the population of the South grew between 1990 and 1996 for 2.5 percent each year while the population of the North stagnated at 0.3 percent.”

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A Double Challenge

Having above figures in mind, the demographical situation is a double challenge. Firstly, there is a very large young population on the one hand and an emergent elderly population on the other hand and, secondly, the population proportion of the two coasts shores has changed during the last half of the century. In the 1950s 68 percent of the population lived in the northern and 32 percent in southern states of the Mediterranean. This trend has changed intensely. Already in the 1990s the population relation shifted from 42 percent to 58 percent. Prognoses for the year 2010 estimate a proportion of 34 percent to 66 percent. Boustani and Fargues describe the future scenario for the year 2025 as follows: “Of the 170 million additional people living on the shores of the Mediterranean in 2025, 68 percent will have been born in an Arab country, 22 percent in Turkey, and only 10 per-

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cent in Europe.”

More food, water and jobs are needed in order to handle such a population growth thus preventing social crisis. The chart below gives a differentiated overview about the MPCs annual demographic increase. Consequently, it can be said that after the East-West conflict a general paradigm change has taken place: from the security dilemma to the survival dilemma. In developing countries the survival dilemma derives from uncontrolled population growth and regional impacts of the global change of the climate. This has implications with regard to urbanization, soil erosion, desertification, cumulative water deficiency and comestible goods as well as environmental pollution. When the “century of refugees” turned into the “century of migration” Peter Opitz realized that currently the number of economic refugees easily transcends the number of political refugees but the number of environmental refugees could top the number of economic refugees soon.

Figure III. MPCs annual demographic increase

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<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1.82 percent</td>
<td>2.6 percent</td>
<td>1.5 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1.82 percent</td>
<td>2.3 percent</td>
<td>1.5 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>2.9 percent</td>
<td>3.8 percent</td>
<td>2.5 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1.97 percent</td>
<td>0.9 percent</td>
<td>1.3 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2.13 percent</td>
<td>3.1 percent</td>
<td>1.9 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1.87 percent</td>
<td>2.2 percent</td>
<td>1.6 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>2.59 percent</td>
<td>3.1 percent</td>
<td>2.4 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1.12 percent</td>
<td>2.1 percent</td>
<td>1.2 percent</td>
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**Enlargement in the East and “Push and Pull Factors” in the South**

Migration studies distinguish between “push and pull factors” of migration. Civil wars, military conflicts, terrorism and grinding poverty do belong to the push factors. The aspiration and hope for better living conditions, freedom and security are defined as the so called pull factors.\(^{10}\) As a consequence, an intense migration pressure lies on the EU and its member states. The essential push factors are: the extreme population growth of the South with all sorts of social problems entailed, controlled economies whose gains pass off the average population and enriches a small elite as well as asymmetric trade relationships and, thirdly, an emerging factor in future: environmental pollution.\(^{11}\) Also the search for jobs and the refugees’ hope for a better future\(^{12}\) boost the flow of migration to Europe. Moreover, the impact of enlargement of the EU on the Barcelona process will be intense. Several questions come into one’s mind: What does the integration of 10 new eastern member states (NMS) mean for the cooperation strategy with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)? What comes afterwards? What does it mean for the Euro-Mediterranean-Partnership?

The current 15 member states of the EU, the 10 NMS, the remaining three candidate countries (CC) and the Mediterranean partner countries of the EU, are being gradually integrated into a large Free Trade Zone (FTZ), which will cover 37 countries altogether in 2010. This FTZ will be the biggest free trade area worldwide by far. The combined population is about 710 million people. In the year 2000, for example, its combined average GDP per capita is 15,652 US-Dollar and the joint GDP amounted to ap-

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12 Out of seven world regions, the Arab countries had the lowest freedom score in the late 1990s, UNDP: AHDR 2002, p. 27.
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approximately 11.1 trillion US-Dollar purchasing power parity.\textsuperscript{13} As a result of the Copenhagen summit 2002, the status of 10 countries changed (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia). The EU decided to admit these NMS by May 2004. Furthermore, Romania and Bulgaria are already welcomed as member states in 2007. If Turkey fulfills the political criteria of the EU by end of 2004, Brussels will start accession negotiations with Ankara, too. These fundamental shifts in the configuration of the EU will most probably have spill over effects for the entire area of the free trade zone, too.

Most of the tariff barriers will be removed and market size increases. This induces implications to trade and investment. In addition, there are so called indirect effects.\textsuperscript{14} The spill over effects may also trigger economic belongings throughout the FTZ. Moreover, the accession of Cyprus and Malta will have an external as well as an internal dimension. Firstly, the borders of the European Union are extended southwards. This already makes Europe more Mediterranean. Moreover, it strengthens the Mediterranean group within the EU (Spain, France, Italy, Portugal and Greece). There will be seven Mediterranean member states afterwards.

However, economic difficulties appear to be already determined.\textsuperscript{15} In 2004, the 10 NMS will increase the population of the EU by approximately 20 percent while GDP will only be enhanced by 4 percent. This means that GDP per capita in the EU more than doubles the GDP in the NMS. The rigorous tendency of some member states of the EU to subordinate Euro-Med political long-term multilateral goals to unilateral short-term trading interests could be described as an economic boomerang. Uneducated labour, not finding employment in its home-countries will not qualify to the

\textsuperscript{13} The source of all calculations is the World Bank’s Development Report 2002.

\textsuperscript{14} Indirect effects are, for example, increased competition in markets, fundamental changes in economic policies and, last but not least, all sorts of alterations regarding institutions and legal systems.

\textsuperscript{15} The GDP of the EU population (376.4 Mio.) have an amount of 7.8 trillion US-Dollar, the GDP of the 10 NMS population (75.1 Mio.) have an amount of 327 million US-Dollar, the GDP of the MPS population (164 Mio.) have an amount of 357 million US-Dollar.
sophisticated needs of European employers and will increase the problems of the European social welfare systems. A decade ago, a World Bank report already documented: “Unemployment is a serious economic, social and political phenomenon throughout the region. More than 15 percent of the active population is unemployed in the countries of the Maghreb, Egypt, and in Iran, while in Jordan and in Yemen the unemployment rates exceed 25 percent. The consequences of past demographic growth will continue to show up as extraordinary increases in the working age population during the next 20 years. If the region is to find social stability thanks to the productive employment of those currently unemployed and of the work force that will enter the labour market in the future, the rhythm and the nature of economic growth must develop considerably compared to what they have been in the recent past.”

From the illegal immigrants’ perspective, Europe is, of course, still very attractive. As Joffé pointed out: “No wonder that migration seems an attractive option, despite European xenophobia and official discrimination.” Some arab MPCs support this movement. For them the control of illegal migration towards Europe mutated from a punishable act to a booming business. At the same time, xenophobia among the European population increases. The starting illegal south-north immigration is watched with fear. Scientists have already noted that in many ambiances at northern shores of the Mediterranean xenophobic attitudes exist even though not frankly spoken out. In Spain for example, where only every third illegal immigrant gets caught, Moroccans, who try to reach the northern shore in their wooden rowing boats in cover of the

wooden rowing boats in cover of the night, are named “Moros”, “Tunas” or “espaldas mojadas” (wet backs).\textsuperscript{20}

Exaggerated comparisons state that “... the twenty-first century could once again find Islam at the gates of Vienna, as immigrants or terrorists if not as armies. Indeed, massive Islamic immigration into France may already have reversed Charles Martel’s victory in 732 at the Battle of Tours.”\textsuperscript{21} However, the nucleus of such comparisons can be taken seriously and indicates a serious problem with regard to European security interests. Because of this chain – from immigrant, to terrorist and, ultimately, to a soldier of a hostile army – the political and economic stability of all arab MPCs, bilateral or in the framework of the EMP, should thus be in the own security interest of the EU. Inter alia this is due to the fact that, “... a declining North Africa would be a recipe for the rise of Islamist regimes and a major exodus of economic migrants and political refugees to Europe.”\textsuperscript{22}

A fair Euro-Med free trade zone, which would mean a substantial change in comparison to the present status quo of the arab MPCs, should become true. But the pursuit of asymmetric short-term trading interests of some EU member states should not be tolerated by the EU any longer. On the contrary, the framework of an equal playing field for trade and the beginning of a true liberalisation should be established. Otherwise, the arab MPCs would be hit by tough competition of FTZ with which they cannot cope in their current conditions. In terms of migration, this would contribute to the kindling of a demographic bomb. However, a temporary brain-drain\textsuperscript{23}


\textsuperscript{23} The first brain-drain debate came up in the late 70s; Jagdish N. Bhagwati: International Migration of the Highly Skilled: Economic Ethics and Taxes, in: Third World Quarterly, 3/1979, pp. 57-71.
could be measured as a fair strategy for the solution. The immigrants could push the knowledge transfer to their countries. Hence, from this point of view, a brain drain could be turned into a brain gain. Therefore Arab governments should engage highly qualified expatriate Arabs in domestic research & development programmes, instead of purely focusing on repatriation efforts. For all these purposes, a successful labour migration could be arranged in partnership with the EU.

In conclusion, due to the influence of immigrants, the Mediterranean is already everywhere in Europe.\textsuperscript{24} Although the actual enlargement process draws off the attraction of the long-term problems such as migration and demographic proportion, the South cannot be ignored any longer. There will be a life after integration. Multilateral long-term strategies are beneficial for all players. It should be made clear in fact that those member states, whose prefer to preserve domestic industries by protectionism and asymmetric tariff barriers and thus lobbying short-term interests, ignore that problems are getting bigger, not smaller in the future. Helping the Mediterranean partner countries in economic and infrastructural terms\textsuperscript{25} and equaling the common playing-field step-by-step means to give them a stable assistance, which is the basis for economic welfare and political stability. Such an initiative would have potential to reduce migration on the one hand and, on the other hand, would export prosperity towards the southern Mediterranean. Concerning the old biblical saying from the outset, it is the European task to move the mountain earlier than the prophet decides to come.

\textsuperscript{24} This point of view is shared by Volker Perthes: Germany Gradually Becoming a Mediterranean State, Euromesco Paper 1, February 1998.

\textsuperscript{25} Especially a scientific assistance to build up an Arab Knowledge Society is needed. See: UNDP (ed.): Arab Human Development Report 2003.
Impact of the Iraq War on Mediterranean Security and Dialogue

The Mediterranean has been heavily affected by the war in Iraq and its aftermath – an extension of changes set in motion by the events of September 11th 2001, and continuing to unfold. Many of the most pressing security challenges across the region, and the leading impediments to north-south dialogue, pre-date this recent experience, and have been part of the strategic environment for at least a decade, if not longer. In this sense, recent crises – from September 11th to Afghanistan, Iraq and the deterioration of Israeli-Palestinian relations – have simply reinforced pre-existing problems.

The following analysis offers some observations on the current Mediterranean security environment and processes of Mediterranean dialogue in light of recent events, from three perspectives – European, southern Mediterranean, and American – with an emphasis on the latter.

Europe – A Heightened Sense of Risk and Independence

Events of the past few years have underscored Europe’s exposure to security problems emanating from the south. Different constituencies have focused on different challenges, from terrorism and the growing lethality and reach of weapons of mass destruction at one end of the spectrum, to perceived threats to social cohesion and identity flowing from migration, at the other. In the middle of this spectrum are a series of trans-national – really trans-regional – policy challenges, including cross-border crime, trafficking in people, and the drug trade, all with a prominent Mediterranean dimen-
sion. The net effect, has been a growing sense that Europe’s new security challenges, both hard and soft, will emanate from the southern periphery, especially North Africa and the Levant.

This heightened sense of risk has been accompanied by mounting European frustration regarding the EU’s lack of capacity, both political and practical, for projecting power in a concerted manner on the periphery of the continent. That said, and even with the slow development of a common foreign and security policy, Europe’s will and capacity to act are already sufficient for European power to be a factor in the geopolitics of the Balkans, North Africa and even the Levant. These are places where European interests are clearly engaged and where European actors, including southern European states, are capable of effective intervention. This has already been demonstrated convincingly in Southeastern Europe. American complaints about Europe’s limited capability for power projection are certainly valid with regard to the Persian Gulf and Central Asia. They are less accurate with regard to the Mediterranean, Europe’s “near abroad”. Aspects of the “Solana draft” – the European strategy document – are not so far removed from the Bush Administration’s declared national security strategy, with its emphasis on preventive action and environment shaping. The first and most likely theater for this strategy to be employed is, of course, around the Mediterranean, where Europe is capable of taking the lead in crisis prevention and management.

Similarly, the tone and substance of the EU’s new strategy toward neighbors to the south and east – those outside the prospective wave of enlargement – is not dramatically different from the approach emanating from Washington in the post-Iraq environment. European observers have been strongly critical of “neo-conservative” arguments regarding political and economic change in the Middle East, and the notion of “shaking things up” across the troubled region from Morocco to Pakistan. On reflection, however, are the new European arguments regarding conditionality in relations with the southern Mediterranean countries so far removed from intellectual currents in Washington? From the European perspective, much of the current frustration with the Barcelona process flows from the apparent failure of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to foster tangible political
Impact of the Iraq War on Mediterranean Security and Dialogue

and economic change in the south – with perceived security consequences for the north. As the need for a functioning security dialogue with southern Mediterranean partners has become more pressing – a clear product of the post-September 11th, post-Iraq environment – the economic and political dimensions of Mediterranean dialogue that would logically precede and facilitate this discourse, have failed to develop as envisioned at Barcelona. At the same time, Europe, and especially southern Europe, has an increasingly strong interest in giving new security initiatives a dialogue dimension. The current effort to design a new Euro-Mediterranean security dialogue to replace one that had lapsed with the WEU, is evidence of this interest.

The move to revitalize the EU’s security dialogue in the Mediterranean raises questions about the future of NATO’s Mediterranean initiative, and the relationship between these processes. For some time, it has been argued that EU and NATO efforts in the Mediterranean were complimentary to the extent that NATO’s Dialogue focused on hard security matters, and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership focused on political, economic and social development. This apparently neat division of labor now looks less tenable. NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue has become more active on “soft” security cooperation (e.g., civil emergency management) at a time when “hard” security dialogue and cooperation is becoming a more prominent concern for the EU. In this setting, the climate for cooperation will turn to a considerable extent on the overall tenor of transatlantic relations, and the ultimate extent of NATO’s transition to a more global security institution. Iraq, and its aftermath, has given these questions far greater significance than they have traditionally had in transatlantic policy debates.

In a European frame, Turkey is arguably the Mediterranean actor most heavily affected by events in Iraq. The crisis, and the ensuing friction with Washington, came at a particularly challenging time for Ankara, with financial strains and European aspirations providing a backdrop for bilateral diplomacy with the U.S. The inability to reach agreement on Turkish involvement during the run-up to the invasion of Iraq was the product of misunderstandings and mismanagement on both sides. On the U.S. side, the request for unprecedented access to Turkish territory for the deployment of
a large American ground force reflected unfounded assumptions about Turkey’s willingness to make sovereignty compromises, and mistaken judgments about the weight of public opinion – which, as elsewhere in Europe, ran strongly against intervention. On the Turkish side, the well-disposed but still rather inexperienced AKP government in Ankara appears to have mismanaged the parliamentary politics of the proposed agreement. In the event, the agreement failed by only a few votes in the Turkish parliament.

Behind all of this, the essential factor was the profound ambivalence of diverse Turkish elements, including the military. This ambivalence continues to be reflected in Turkish policy in the Fall of 2003, with parliamentary approval for the deployment of Turkish security forces to Iraq, but a willingness to forego the deployment if the Iraqi political leadership disapproves. In many respects, the current impasse is a favorable outcome for Ankara. Washington is pleased with Turkey’s willingness to assist, but Turkey may yet avoid becoming directly embroiled in an unstable and possibly deteriorating situation inside Iraq.

**Heightened Wariness in the South**

The war in Iraq has clearly reinforced longstanding uneasiness across the southern Mediterranean regarding Western institutions, and especially security institutions. It has had an even more pronounced, and sharply negative effect on perceptions of the U.S.\(^1\) Developments since September 11\(^{th}\) 2001, including interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and not least, the deterioration of Palestinian-Israeli relations, have underscored the potential utility of north-south dialogue and cooperation in the Mediterranean, but have also significantly complicated the prospects for cooperation outside a bilateral frame. The basic problem of “image” among southern Mediterranean publics, but also among elites, has worsened considerably. NATO obviously faces the most difficult challenge in this respect. But the EU and the Barcelona process are also part of this difficult equation. Although the

\(^1\) As shown very clearly in polling by the Pew Research Center (2003) and others.
war in Iraq did not produce the kind of popular unrest in North Africa and the Levant that some had predicted, regimes across the region are clearly wary of the implications of any closer, formal association with institutions seen as “interventionist.”

At the same time, and on a bilateral basis, regimes in the south are concerned about renewed pressures for political reform emanating from Washington – and from Europe. Southern Mediterranean leaderships can hardly be comfortable with strategies aimed at “shaking things up” in the Middle East, with Iraq as the first step. The Iraq war has led observers across the region to ask “who is next” – Syria, Libya, Iran? Given the open-ended character of the crisis in Iraq, the short answer to this question, at least from an American point of view, is almost certainly that nobody is next. That said, the environment in the wake of September 11th and the Iraq war is likely to continue to be characterized by closer Western scrutiny of southern Mediterranean societies, regimes and arsenals. Thus, Libya is unlikely to succeed in its efforts to normalize relations with Washington, despite the Lockerbie settlement. For the U.S., the limited advantages of normalization with Tripoli do not yet outweigh the political costs of appearing soft on a state-sponsor, even a former sponsor of terrorism. This is yet another area where American and European approaches are likely to diverge over the next few years.

Unresolved questions regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the mounting debate on both sides of the Atlantic regarding pre-war intelligence estimates, have introduced a dose of skepticism into the political debate over WMD. That said, it is unlikely that the WMD issue, including the issue of ballistic missiles of steadily increasing, trans-Mediterranean range, will fade from the regional security agenda. Certainly, the U.S. remains highly focused on WMD proliferation in its view of North Africa and the Middle East. NATO has taken-up the issue as part of its evolving agenda, and it is sure to be central to Europe’s own emerging foreign and security policy. In five years time, it would be surprising if the WMD issued has faded from the strategic agenda in the Mediterranean, and it is quite likely to be even more prominent as missile-armed states be-
Beyond the Mediterranean itself come to play a more direct role in the security environment along both shores of the Mediterranean.

On the whole, the post-Iraq climate is not conducive to smooth dialogue between North and South in the Mediterranean. Yet, it can be argued that at least some southern Mediterranean partners will see advantages in the quiet development of enhanced ties, beyond traditional bilateral arrangements. Some, such as Algeria, will be keen to promote their own pressing security needs in the context of heightened Western attention to counter-terrorism. Others (Syria? Lebanon?) may wish to acquire some additional international legitimacy and insurance in a climate of more ready and rapid intervention. More active participation in Euro-Mediterranean initiatives could be a promising vehicle for this. If so, Iraq and its aftermath could eventually spur more effective north-south dialogue in the Mediterranean – a remote but possible outcome.

Iraq also places another question in sharp relief: To what extent are southern Mediterranean perceptions of the U.S. and Europe divisible? If perceptions regarding the U.S. and U.S. policy continue to deteriorate, this question could acquire considerable importance, and could influence the direction of Europe’s Mediterranean efforts. If European policymakers, and interested interlocutors in the south, become convinced that close association with unpopular American policies is a leading impediment to dialogue, Mediterranean initiatives may acquire a consciously independent, even anti-U.S. flavor. To date, this has not been the case, despite the peripheral role of the U.S. in current Mediterranean projects (with the exception of those undertaken through NATO), and a degree of wariness about Washington’s intentions in the region. By contrast, if views of the U.S. and Europe remain closely tied in Southern Mediterranean perception, and if views regarding the “West” as a whole remain negative, Mediterranean initiatives of all kinds are likely to face difficult times, especially in the security realm. This prospect also underscores the essential interdependence of European and American interests and policies in the Mediterranean.
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**Flux in American Strategy Toward the Mediterranean -- and the World**

The U.S. has approached the Mediterranean via a shifting balance of European, Middle Eastern and crisis management interests. At certain points, the U.S. has seen its stakes in the Mediterranean largely through a European security lens – the traditional NATO-centric, Cold War approach. At other times, notably during the first Gulf War, and again in the most recent war with Iraq, the Mediterranean has loomed large as a logistical ante-room to the Persian Gulf, and as a base for power projection beyond the Mediterranean *per se*. Throughout, issues and crises around the Mediterranean basin – from the Western Sahara to the Arab-Israeli conflict, from Libya and Algeria to Greek-Turkish tensions in the Aegean, have occupied a remarkable degree of attention in Washington. All three of these broad areas of Mediterranean interest – European, Middle Eastern and crisis management – and the balance among them, have been strongly influenced by events in Iraq.

First, the European dimension of America’s Mediterranean engagement has waned in importance in light of concerns elsewhere, and as the general interest in “European” security has declined. The American strategic class now tends to view questions of European security as essentially settled, with residual problems in the Balkans properly within Europe’s sphere of action. True, there are concerns about Russia’s evolution and geopolitical orientation, with the possibility that some more negative aspects of Russian policy, including arms and technology transfers to Iran or others, could affect security on Europe’s southern periphery. But in general, the thrust of current American thinking is to engage Europe and European security institutions as partners in managing instability *elsewhere*, across the “Greater Middle East” including the southern Mediterranean. Here, the Iraq experience has shown several southern European countries – Portugal, Spain and Italy – to be particularly helpful; a reflection of political affinity at the leadership level, and perhaps a heightened sensitivity to WMD and terrorism challenges based on geography.
Second, the Iraq experience has reinforced the significance of the Mediterranean as a pathway for power projection to adjacent regions. At the same time, it has underscored growing uncertainties regarding access, over-flight, and defense cooperation generally. In the first Iraq war, some ninety percent of the forces and material sent to the Gulf by the coalition went through or over the Mediterranean. An analysis of logistical patterns for the second Iraq war, and the on-going operations, is likely to reveal a similar degree of dependence on this route, including the Suez Canal. Yet, key aspects of this Mediterranean line of communication, notably access to Turkish territory and bases, were unavailable to the U.S. in the spring of 2003. The implications of this have not gone unnoticed by defense planners, and will no doubt reinforce existing interest in over-the-horizon strategies that could circumvent difficult access negotiations (but might also complicate political relations with countries on both sides of the Mediterranean).

Third, the Iraq experience, indeed the experience since September 11th, points to another, wider trend in American foreign and security policy, with potentially far-reaching consequences for the Mediterranean. The last few years have witnessed a progressive erosion of America’s traditional, regionally-based approach to international engagement. There is less and less discussion of the U.S. as a “European power”, or for that matter, “standing interests” in the Middle East or elsewhere. These regional frames have been overtaken by a series of highly pragmatic engagements in pursuit of functional objectives, above all, counter-terrorism. In this climate, cooperation is more closely – and critically – measured, differing national perspectives can more easily be dismissed, and new, tactical alliances (e.g., with Algeria) created on short notice.

The durability of this new functionalism in American policy is an open question. It is certainly possible that several years on from September 11th this approach will begin to fade, and a more traditional sense of regional interests and commitments will reassert itself. In the meantime, this is not a climate that lends itself to new American engagement in the Mediterranean as a region. Recent American trade (MEFTA) and governance (MEPI) initiatives aimed at the Middle East are, of course, relevant to North Africa and the Levant. On the whole, however, they retain an emphasis on bilat-
eral relations, with a focus on concluding a series of separate free trade agreements with Jordan, Morocco and others, which may ultimately add up to a “Middle East Free Trade Area.” This is in line with the current American approach to trade and development negotiations in general. Regional and multilateral frameworks are now clearly out of favor. Moreover, given the weight of Europe in the economic life of all southern Mediterranean states, it is difficult to describe recent American overtures, or earlier ones like the Casablanca economic summits and the “Eisenstadt initiative”, as being truly competitive with European programs, including the Barcelona process.

There has certainly been a revival of American debate over challenges and opportunities in the “Greater Middle East” – from Morocco to the subcontinent – a designation so broad, and embracing so many insecure places as to lose any regional meaning. It is, however, an eminently useful framework to capture a range of related, functional challenges emanating from the “south.” To the extent that the Greater Middle East becomes the focus of increasing American and European attention in political, security and economic terms, it will raise important questions about the continued viability of the Mediterranean as a strategic space, as well as the utility of “Mediterranean” initiatives. There may even be a revival of interest in more global approaches to Mediterranean cooperation, along the lines of the CSCM (Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean) promoted by Italy and Spain over a decade ago; in other words, Mediterranean “plus,” with a purview extending to the Gulf and perhaps beyond. In short, one credible future could well involve EU and NATO Mediterranean initiatives being overtaken by more sweeping, global approaches. Alternatively, the U.S. may well articulate a more deliberate strategy for the Greater Middle East, while Europe chooses to retain a focus on the Mediterranean, where the points of engagement are more direct and European power, both hard and soft, can more easily be deployed.
Looking Ahead

The war and ongoing crisis in Iraq have influenced the Mediterranean security environment and the outlook for Mediterranean dialogue in profound and largely negative ways. More accurately, the war and its aftermath have complicated already difficult challenges for security and cooperation in the region, and have strained the transatlantic consensus that has provided the essential background for much of America’s Mediterranean engagement in recent decades. The mounting insurgency inside Iraq is both a strategic distraction, and a test case for Washington and others engaged in Iraq, including Italy, Spain and, in a different sense, Turkey.

In the current environment, it is tempting for all sides – Europe, the U.S. and the Mediterranean south, to look to parochial interests and pursue independent strategies.

In Mediterranean terms, this is likely to be a dysfunctional approach. The key obstacles to effective north-south dialogue and cooperation, including a resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, clearly cannot be achieved without the active participation of the U.S. And, at this point, American engagement in the peace process probably cannot be sustained without active European support. Similarly, it is difficult to imagine a successful approach to development and reform in the southern Mediterranean that does not reflect a concerted transatlantic strategy. For the south, Europe may loom as a critical economic and perhaps political partner. But the leading security partner will remain in Washington. Moreover, as security itself has come to be measured in more comprehensive social and political terms on both sides of the Mediterranean, a neat division of political, economic and security roles is no longer possible. The Mediterranean security environment is increasingly, inherently interdependent.

It is probably no exaggeration to say that Mediterranean security and Mediterranean dialogue have reached a critical juncture. New declaratory strategies are being elaborated in Europe and Washington, and regimes in the southern Mediterranean are facing unprecedented scrutiny, and pressures. The need for a more concerted approach to Mediterranean problems has
arguably never been greater. But, as at other points over the last decades, the prospects for such an approach will turn critically on developments outside the Mediterranean – in Washington, Brussels, and now Baghdad.
L’impact de la guerre contre l’Irak sur le processus méditerranéen

La question de l’espace euro-méditerranéen n’a cessé d’évoluer depuis plusieurs décennies, (Méditerranée occidentale, Méditerranée orientale) depuis la réalisation des premiers élargissements, les définitions successives de zones de sécurité, le processus de Barcelone et son œuvre, les interférences du processus de paix au Proche-Orient, l’impact des différentes conjonctures. Aujourd’hui, la dernière guerre américaine contre l’Irak ne peut être sans impact sur cette partie du monde.

On a pu s’interroger à maintes reprises sur la nature, le rôle, les interactions et les perspectives de cet espace stratégique. Il a fini par apparaître comme une construction quelque peu artificielle de l’esprit, une zone sans dialectique ni dynamique particulières, une hypothèse de développements et d’interactions devenue tout à coup peu prometteuse aussi bien pour l’Europe que pour les riverains du Sud.

Vu du Sud il faut bien convenir qu’après la chute du mur de Berlin, les pistes de prospection stratégique sur l’espace euro-méditerranéen s’étaient taries au point de se réduire, au cours des dernières années surtout après la guerre froide, à quelques grands débats économiques, à des spéculations sur des problèmes de politique interne des Etats du Sud devenus quasi conventionnels (démathématique, droits de l’homme, constitution, élections..), et à la question du terrorisme. L’essentiel sur le plan de la stratégie semblait se passer partout ailleurs dans le monde, plutôt que dans l’espace euro-méditerranéen.
L’impact de la guerre contre l’Irak

L’histoire récente à travers la guerre américaine contre l’Irak s’est chargée de propulser de nouveau à l’avant-scène la question de l’espace euro-méditerranéen. Quelques niveaux au moins peuvent être sollicités:


Interroger les projections stratégiques générales de ces deux acteurs, et déterminer leur nature, leur place, leurs lignes d’évolution possible concernant l’espace euro-méditerranéen, ne nous concerne que dans la mesure où cela nous permet de voir dans quelle mesure l’histoire récente, l’après-guerre irakienne, lui a conféré un nouveau statut. Et de fait on peut bien parler d’une revalorisation de l’espace euro-méditerranéen et du projet de partenariat entre ses différentes composantes au Nord comme Sud.

La guerre de l’Irak a au moins esquissée la possibilité d’un contrepoids européen de taille à l’ère de la construction de l’empire, en dépit de la dose variable de suivisme enregistré ici ou là : même si l’on doit faire la généalogie de la ligne de conduite russe, les origines et les perspectives de la position allemande.

Mais la véritable interrogation est celle du rapport du Sud aux projets divers de sécurité ou simplement de défense mais que l’on peut bien désormais délimiter comme celui de la régulation du rapport des forces à l’échelle mondiale, en ce temps de renversement du statu quo et de reconfiguration du monde.

Ce que l’on appelle la puissance européenne fait partie des débats sur le pluralisme des intérêts, des pôles, des comportements, des visions d’ensemble, en même temps que la quête par le Sud d’un équilibre des pouvoirs à l’échelle internationale pour que celui qui détient le pouvoir ne soit pas porté à en abuser.
Cela est sans doute derrière la distinction de principe opérée par maintes parties dans le Sud entre les différents occidents et la formulation du vœu que l’Occident européen, bien que pluriel, bien que militairement encore en délibération avec lui-même, contre-balance l’Occident américain, unipolaire, mais déjà à l’œuvre, opérationnel, omniprésent sur le terrain.

2. La guerre américaine contre l’Irak en 2003 alimente de nouveaux débats stratégiques, notamment sur les relations transatlantiques : l’antagonisme, l’affrontement prévautra t-il sur l’harmonie et le travail en commun? Cultures, intérêts et démarches divergents ne peuvent-ils donner que des projets différents?

La présence américaine paraît plus forte aujourd’hui que jamais dans tous les conflits en cours dans la zone (Sahara, Soudan, Chypre, conflit israélo-arabe, Irak).


Quant au Sud immédiat de l’Europe est-il suffisamment présent pour s’introduire dans l’intimité des relations dites transatlantiques? Est-il tout au plus un simple enjeu de celles-ci, ou l’un de ses objets les plus extérieurs?

3. Une multilateralisation est–elle possible? Celle-ci supposerait son acceptation par les États-Unis, mais aussi une remise en ordre de la maison Sud?

C’est dans ce contexte qu’il faut comprendre l’ambiguïté des perceptions du Sud concernant des menaces et des risques, et celle des ennemis (extérieurs/intérieurs) éventuels. L’ambiguïté est grande aussi des attitudes esquissées vis-à-vis des nouvelles configurations hégémoniques. Ce n’est pas un hasard si le premier souci des États du Sud, après avoir pris la mesure de la volonté américaine avant, au cours, et après la guerre, par les discours et les actes, ont commencé d’abord par intégrer cette nouvelle donne.
L’impact de la guerre contre l’Irak

Il n’est pas inexact de dire que pour l’heure on rencontre trois types de réactions:
- l’acceptation du monopole américain,
- le laisser passer, l’adoption d’un profil bas, faire le dos rond en attendant des jours meilleurs,
- la résistance, sous des formes diverses.

Dans les années 80, les tentatives d’élaborations stratégiques de la part des Etats de la rive Sud de la Méditerranée, leurs possibilités d’initiatives étaient importantes. Ils disposaient de marges de manœuvres constantes. Ils pouvaient initier des projets, introduire des contre-projets, opérer des ouvertures, entreprendre des actions. Aujourd’hui, les espaces se rétrécissent et ils semblent de moins en moins acteurs.

4. De ce qui s’est déroulé et de ce qui se déroule toujours en Irak, quelles leçons tirer? Des liens semblaient bien établis entre l’essai de changement de régime forcé en Irak et la “road map” en Palestine au début de la guerre, au moins dans l’esprit des stratèges américains. Aujourd’hui elle l’est moins dans la réalité. Certes l’affaire irakienne ne pouvait que rejaillir sur le pouvoir de négociation de la rive sud dans l’ensemble des dossiers en instance. Le cercle vertueux formé par l’articulation de la paix, de la démocratie et de la stabilité- atteste que réformer les Etats arabes (lutter contre la pauvreté, “moderniser” le système éducatif, réformer la vie politique…) serait déterminant pour la paix. Mais la non-solution des grands problèmes régionaux (le processus de paix israélo-arabe, l’occupation américaine de l’Irak) ne constituent-ils pas des obstacles aux réformes.

De grandes conflictualités enveloppent les Etats et les sociétés du Sud de la Méditerranée. La redécouverte de leurs multiethnicités, de leurs multiconfessionnalités, les aléas de leur processus d’intégration remettent en cause leur existence en tant que Etats et en tant que sociétés. Isolés, faibles, en “’crise” sur divers plans, tous à majorité arabo-musulmane, structurés en Etats nationaux ayant des intérêts nationaux sous pression, ils ne cessent de produire des pathologies politiques, sociales, économiques et culturelles.
Quelles que soit l’hypothèse retenue, comment endiguer ces conflictualités qui enveloppent les États du Sud jusqu’à leurs racines? Comment réédifier le minimum d’intégration nationale nécessaire à la vie étatique nationale?

Par ailleurs, saurait-on sous prétexte qu’il n’y a pas de modèle unique de transition pluraliste, que les différentes expériences de démocratisation connues jusque là attestent de la variété des processus – considérer comme recevable “management à l’américaine” de la réforme démocratique, c’est à dire la démocratisation imposée, exogène?

Comment gérer l’ingérence démocratique sans annihiler à la source les processus internes de passage des différentes variantes des despotismes orientaux aux régimes de la liberté? La démocratie une fois enclenchée, saurait-elle être acceptée avec tous ses risques? Doit-on accepter des formes de pouvoir autres que séculaires?

De ce qui précède on voit quel travail attend le Sud: outre les nouvelles postures que doivent esquisser les forces politiques, s’imposent le renforcement de la communauté nationale (État, nation, société civile), la démocratisation en termes institutionnels et culturels, la réorganisation des cercles de solidarité (de nouveaux rapports avec l’organisation mondiale, les regroupements régionaux, l’espace euro-méditerranéen l’OTAN, les différents occidents…).
From the Mediterranean to a Greater Middle East: Challenges for European Policy Formulation

The events of the 11th September, the second Intifada and the Iraq War have completely changed the conditions for co-operation in the Mediterranean. It is now not possible to pretend to consider these events as minor incidents which do not threaten the basis of this political project.

As noted by Christoph Zöpel: “Because of their relations with the neighbouring region of the Middle East and the Southern Mediterranean, the states of Europe are affected in a different and more immediate manner than the United States by both the Arab-Israeli conflict and the conflict with Iraq. They have a more pronounced interest than the United States in preventing escalation and promoting the resolution of these conflicts, and their actions are more strongly influenced by these motives.”¹ The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership must therefore be rethought from top to bottom, both in its content and in its area of application.

The Barcelona Partnership corresponded to a peace-oriented view of international relations. This view was in the context of a security dynamic associated with the end of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. In many respects, the declaration which was signed in Barcelona in 1995 could no longer be signed today. However, the political, development and security stakes which engendered the declara-

tion are higher than ever. The situation in the Middle East only increases in relevance. Nonetheless, it is necessary to see how the situation has developed after two years of tragic events and whether it is possible, in spite of everything, to find a new approach, a reopening which also includes the question of the Middle East.

Co-operation on a heap of rubble: an analysis of the effects of the crisis

The consequences of September 11

In many respects, September 11 represents an earthquake in international relations. Wounded to the core by radical Islamic terrorists of Arab origin, the United States certainly committed itself to an all-out anti-terrorist campaign, but also combined this objective with a battle against proliferation which led less than a year later to the war in Iraq. The consequences of these political decisions weigh heavily on the Mediterranean and Middle East region.

The “terrorisation” of international relations by the United States: “war against terror”

The struggle against Islamic terrorism as defined by the United States implies a world-wide organisation with which all the countries of the world must co-operate, either willingly or by force. The document published by the White House: “The National Security of the United States” in September 2002, is particularly explicit. Under a single heading of “war against terror” President George W. Bush combined terrorism and the risks of proliferation. This globalisation of the real and/or presumed threat enables global action to be justified anywhere in the world and, notably, pre-emptive war. In many respects the war in Iraq may be regarded as a direct manifestation of this doctrine. We wrote in 2002: “The war against Islamic terrorism is limited by the universality of its presence and the porosity of world society. (...) This struggle will be long and essentially shadowy. This
is why the “re-territorialisation” of the threat (as has been done in Afghanistan and then extensively, Iraq) has become indispensable to respond to the shock of the “defeat” of September 11.²

Stefano Silvestri has summed up this problem in a very illuminating way, in three parts:

1. Total pre-emption (or total intervention): when the United States intervenes or when it desires to do so.
2. World-wide suppression: an integrated security system is constructed.
3. Reinforced stabilisation mission: a combination of pre-emptive and defensive intervention.³

The states of the world, and notably the states of the Third World, have no other choice than to co-operate or suffer the consequences. The compensation is better economic co-operation and increased development from the benefits of the WTO and free trade. The democratisation of authoritarian states seems also to be one of the objectives, which the neo-conservatives (Kagan, Perle, Kristol etc.) hammered away at in the media at the time of the Iraqi conflict and which crops up again in the national security strategy already quoted. This trend carries with it its share of destabilisation, even if the disastrous post-war situation in Iraq does not bear out the fabulous hopes and dreams of the “neo-cons”.

**Suspicion in the Muslim world and the risk of confusion.**

The fact must be faced that the events of 11th September caused a change in the view of the Western world vis-à-vis the Arab one. The confusion between radical Islamic terrorism and Islam is a reality in some minds. Ahmed Driss thus remarked: “A certain phobia has seized the North Mediterranean; some consider that geographical proximity to North Africa and the

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Jean-François Daguzan

Middle East, added to the fact that Europe harbours a large Muslim minority susceptible to the turmoil of this region, makes Europe more vulnerable to terrorist threats. It is in its own interest to affirm its solidarity with the anti-terrorist struggle of the United States.”

But it is not sure that a pro-active position on solidarity would be sufficient enough to counter the anti-Muslim feeling in the North. In the United States, this phenomenon has taken an uncommon form with the almost direct accusation of Saudi Arabia or the systematic criticism of some pressure groups or individuals taking the debate into the university sphere.

**The effects of the second Intifada.**

As noted recently by Alvaro de Vasconcelos: “The deterioration of the current peace process, however, which in fact began with the assassination of Rabin by a Jewish extremist, and the advent of Netanyahu’s government, increasingly contaminated the political and security dialogue within the EMP.”

The ostracising of Israel is now an intrinsic reality. The spiral of violence/repression/terrorism has become a feature of daily life in Israel and Palestine. It has also become a feature of Arab public opinion bombarded with images of conflict but more broadly in Europe too. The (modest) relations entered into since the Oslo accords between the Arab states and Israel have, with the exception of Jordan, returned to their lowest level. It is therefore impossible at the moment to imagine any relaunching of the po-

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6 A good example of this media pressure is the incredible result of the European Commission poll on the most dangerous countries for the World peace where 57 percent of people designed Israel as the first cause of risk. See, Le Monde November 11 2003, Un sondage européen désigne Israël comme une « menace pour la paix ».
litical dialogue of the Barcelona process. This state of affairs paralysed the Marseilles conference of November 2000 and still blocks the process.

In addition, the systematisation of the suicide attacks contributes to the deterioration of the Palestinian image in international public opinion. The risk that this strategy poses to the Palestinian cause is very serious. In fact, however one views the brutal Israeli military actions in Palestine, nothing can justify murderous suicide attacks aimed at the civilian population. The employment of identical methods is progressively degrading the perception of Palestinian claims and identifying them with those of Al Qaida. We therefore find ourselves facing a double breakdown: a political one on the one hand and a breakdown in the respective imaginations of the Moslem and Western worlds on the other. This crisis is now accompanied by the emotional shock of the Iraq War.

**The effects of the Iraq War**

*The destabilisation of the Middle East.*

Bruno Tertrais has noted that “at the same time, this new defeat of an Arab army confronted by a Western one is likely to feed the military inferiority complex long felt by many of the elites of the region. It also risks provoking a new ‘Gulf War effect’, that is, contributing to reinforcing the idea in the minds of the leaders of the regional powers that only so-called asymmetrical or non-conventional means, such as proliferation or terrorism, can enable them to take on the American military hyperpower. Paradoxically, this war could therefore increase the threats which justified its prosecution...”.

*The pressure on Syria, Lebanon and Iran.*

The Iraqi question is only one facet of the new strategic situation in the Middle East. Its development should depend on two factors. Either the

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United States wins its bet in Iraq and the idea of a “forced” remodelling of the Middle East becomes a reality, or the situation continues to deteriorate and the local opposition forces profit from the vacuum left by America to spread their influence into other structurally weak countries; which is to say almost all of them.

Bruno Tertrais has also remarked: “Obliged whether they like it or not to assume the task of nation-building in Iraq, as in Afghanistan, the United States intends next to take on the remodelling of the region, with the first priority as the Israel-Lebanon-Syria zone, probably followed by the Gulf region, with Saudi Arabia in mind but also Iran, a future nuclear power.”

But this is only one scenario. The other could be an acceleration of the destabilisation of the region, which seems to be the aim of the terrorist forces in Iraq, and it is not certain that these are exclusively local. The Al Qaida dynamic seeks to base itself on a rejection of the United States in a troubled and unclear situation in order to gain ground by promoting degeneration and a war of attrition.

**A new economy in the Gulf in gestation?**

Will the arrival (and the continued presence?) of the Americans in Iraq profoundly change the economic relationships of the Middle-Eastern region and, in so doing, world trade? It seems likely that taking control, at least indirectly, of Iraqi oil was not completely absent from the minds of the conquerors of Baghdad, although it was not necessarily determinant in taking the final decision. Nowadays, Iraqi oil, with its abundant reserves, is an important element in the oil scene. It is not one of the key elements, even if the future needs of Asia, and above all, a China in headlong growth,

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will increase its importance.\textsuperscript{10} The explanation must be sought much more in the diversification of sources (notably in respect of Saudi Arabia).

However, the intention to apply the recipes of American liberalism to the Middle-Eastern region and elsewhere can be discerned in the minds of neo-conservative analysts and think-tanks, as well as in the White House document of September 2002. To create a large open market in the Middle East starting from Iraq (once re-built) thus appears to be a medium-term objective.

This approach is not the European one. The last ten years have shown that pure liberalism applied without safeguards can wreak havoc including in allegedly stable economies (Argentina for example). The European approach, as developed first in the Partnership for Peace with Central and Eastern Europe, then in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, could find an application here; a politically credible alternative for the reconstruction of Iraq followed by the whole region.

\textit{Is the EMP threatened?}

In view of this relatively bleak and generally pessimistic picture, can a relevant logic for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership still be defended? The temptation to withdraw does exist. It is pervading Europe at a time when economic difficulties are pressing countries to take refuge in their national sanctuary. Fortunately or unfortunately, such a solution is untenable. The Mediterranean and the Middle East influence our societies by their geographical proximity and by the effects of all manner of phenomena which they export as far as Europe (presence of a considerable Muslim community, the “Al Qaida effect”, the role of oil, the repercussions of the Arab-Israeli (non) peace process, etc.).

From this point of view one can share in the analysis of Ambassador Amre Moussa, the Secretary-General of the Arab League, supporting increased investment by Europe in the Near East: “The European role in peace is not

that of the generous onlooker, but that of one involved and threatened by the consequences of the deterioration of the situation in this region”.

The expectations of the Arab countries, and also of Turkey in respect of a European initiative in the Middle East are a reality which must imperatively be taken into account. To a certain extent, these countries do not wish to remain in a strategic embrace with the United States, with which they can only have an unequal and disproportionate relationship in all respects. It is therefore indispensable to make sure that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership survives and, furthermore, to give it new vigour and a new reach, but how?

1. The EMP must survive but its rules must evolve

A political re-launch of the EMP cannot be envisaged while the Israeli-Palestinian crisis remains at this level of violence and paralysis. The “political co-operation” part can only remain at the minimal level at which it has been since the Marseilles Conference of October 2000. However, it would be disastrous to halt the Barcelona Process but it is imperative to make it evolve in order to preserve it. As Antonio Missiroli said, the EMP has to be revised on “a more realistic but also more tangible prospect of structured partnership.”

Given the obstructions of all kinds which bedevil it today, the following alternatives and solutions can be proposed. Rather than adopting a defensive frame of mind a dynamic approach is suggested.

Preserve and reinforce technical co-operation.

The true strength of the EMP resides in the formidable network of solidarity which has been established around the Mediterranean. Thousands of programmes are in place which structure a field of co-operation which touch on social and economic levels: from major infrastructure projects to

The emphasis must therefore continue to be placed on lateral co-operation involving areas of major common interest (environment, sea, energy infrastructure, telecommunications). This approach must be coupled with the development of micro-projects which provide links between the societies of the two shores of the Mediterranean (women’s rights, human rights, urbanisation, media etc.). The modest successes of the EMP are due to these small programmes. The EMP is above all a collection of networks bringing together men, countries and the shores of the Mediterranean. For several years now, the tendency of the Commission has been to favour large projects for administrative management facilities. The two poles of the Partnership must be re-balanced and the links reinforced, at a time when mutual suspicion is tending to grow.

In this setting, the MEDA programme plays an invaluable role. It certainly helps the partner states to get their economies to conform with free-trade rules, but it is also an underpinning for investment, and demonstrates the Union’s practical determination to reinforce the insertion of the Mediterranean region into the European economic system. Co-operation in development and solidarity therefore go hand-in-hand with the adjustment to world standards of competition. This is a political approach, but the political dimension of the EMP is paralysed by the problems mentioned above.

**Political co-operation: an “à la carte” approach.**

The EMP in its indivisible form is no longer viable. If its principles are to survive, a way must be found to surmount the obstacles using an appropriate policy. One possibility is the creation of reinforced co-operation with the Maghreb. Not all the players in the Mediterranean are in as difficult a situation as the Near East. Even though most of the countries are affected by the problems described above, it is possible to suggest increased co-operation to a group of states desiring to go further together in a defined area, whether political or technical. On what can be termed the “oil stain”

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principle, other countries can be brought into this initial co-operation. The Maghreb seems today to be the part of the Mediterranean with which it would be possible to begin co-operation in the fields of security, anti-terrorist action, and also social or environmental protection projects. A recentring might be envisaged around a new 5+5, as in the Sainte Maxime meeting of 9 and 10 April, which was merely a simple renewal of contacts. But to concentrate on the Maghreb seems insufficient in every respect in view of the new strategic situation in the Middle East. The relaunching of the EMP also involves the creation of a European initiative in the Middle East.

2. The Middle East must be the object of a specific common initiative

The overall destabilisation of the Middle East caused by the Iraq War could turn out to be totally detrimental to Europe. The countries of the Arabian/Persian Gulf cannot be left in a bilateral situation with the United States when the conquest of Iraq has been experienced as an aggression and an occupation. Without exaggerating the future of the American presence in the country, the EU must be capable of suggesting political overtures which support that which must be considered clearly as a “fait accompli”.

In this respect, the thoughts formulated by Martin Ortega in respect of Iraq alone can be applied to a European initiative concerning the Middle East: “The question now is: should there be a common European policy on Iraq? This question must be answered in the affirmative for two reasons. Firstly, the aforementioned principles - and the values and principles contained in the Treaty on European Union (which basically coincide with the values and principles enshrined in national constitutions) - cannot be defended by the member states alone. Defining a common policy and endorsing it through specific action is the only way the Europeans can be consistent.

with their own convictions. Secondly, European citizens require that both their national states and the European Union define foreign policies that take into account common values and principles and contribute to their wider application.”¹⁵ In addition, much as creating a common policy on the principle of cohesion is indispensable, putting the policy into action is equally necessary as far as influence and, simply, security is concerned. Europe must ensure that the shock wave of American action in Iraq does not produce negative effects on its own stability.

One can therefore suggest the creation of a common strategy for the Middle East and connect it with the common strategy for the Mediterranean of 19 June 2000. Their overall objectives are the same. It must involve Iraq and its Western neighbours (Syria, Jordan and Turkey), the Gulf states and Iran. Its content should touch on questions of security, non-proliferation, economic co-operation, and also the issues of democracy, basic rights and human rights. This initiative cannot be launched without associating the United States with its implementation, but it could be set in motion by the Union alone.

It could also allow, as suggested by Ortega, the European national foreign policies to be brought together. France, Belgium and Germany could re-connect their approaches without too much difficulty with those of Italy, Spain and Great Britain. The cohesion lost in the crisis could then be restored. Some conclusions of the European Council of Thessalonica (June 19-20 2003) stressed on the reinforcement of relations with the Arab World. It’s a good idea but too close to the defunct and historically¹⁶ dated “Dialogue euro-arabe”. The critical point is the security of Arab-Persian Gulf and the dialogue has to include Iran. On the other the Maghreb is far from the same difficulties and risks than the other region, despite serious problems (economy and Islamist terrorism).

That being so, there is no question of absorbing the Middle East in the EMP. We would then face the prospect of a widened co-operation which


¹⁶ Conclusion of the Presidency, annex 1 SN 200 2003, p. 19.
would end up losing its direction and impact. As Eric Philippart has noted, “On the other hand, including Iraq in the EMP would necessitate some Euro-Med rethinking. Keeping the Mediterranean as the main geographical reference would become much more difficult after the inclusion of Iraq.”\textsuperscript{17}

This is why specific action is required in respect of the Middle East which would be connected to a common Mediterranean strategy and, if necessary, to action developed in the framework of the EMP, but it would retain its independent logic. Such a strategy would no longer be deleted. Some U.S. Think Tanks now proposed a specific action toward Middle East led by United States. For instance, the Nation Defense University preached for a NATO initiative to “create a Partnership for Cooperation (PfC) with Greater Middle East.”\textsuperscript{18}

EU must take the initiative immediately.

In the same way, a common Near-Eastern strategy should be created and implemented, in the setting of a new “road map” project, which would enable the political dialogue to be advanced in a way which is not possible in the present framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. In this way, projects would move forward in parallel at various speeds, which would enable the whole to progress much more rapidly than at present or, at least, not to hold up developments in particular sectors or places.

In conclusion, in spite of the very serious current difficulties, it is possible to conceive of a relaunch of the processes of co-operation. The European Union in development cannot remain a passive observer of a strategy which passes it by. It must constitute its own periphery, which in the hypothesis of Turkey joining will certainly reach as far as the Gulf. But it must also cope with the security logic which is now becoming apparent to return to the idea of co-development and shared stability which inspired the founders of Barcelona. From this point of view one agrees with Ambassador Ounaïs who affirmed: “The concept of a partnership based on the acceptance of parity, forms a part of and surpasses our common history, while bearing an

From the Mediterranean to a Greater Middle East

immense promise of understanding and solidarity. It is this promise which shapes our common horizon”. 19


A comprehensive grand Atlantic strategy for a system-opening, cooperative transformation of the Greater Middle East and for the inclusion of the region in the process of globalisation will have to be flexible regarding the scope of its approaches. It must recognise the overlapping nature of issues and the need for gradual advancement in the most daunting fields which will require patience, rigid time-frames and mechanisms of conditionality to commit all participants to success. The US and the EU will have to make up their mind whether they will approach the challenge with enabling or vetoing intentions among themselves. Both might have their legitimate and necessary place (deterrence and cooperation). But it would end in useless frustrations if the Atlantic partners were to quarrel more among themselves by using veto capacities over decision making or actions of the other instead of looking together into the same direction and offering system-opening support for those societies and countries in the Greater Middle East that want to be partners in the process of transformation. It is imperative for the West to combine a comprehensive strategy with a pragmatic sense of priorities and posterities, a reality check about possible next steps and the appropriate combination of goals and instruments.

The next steps and most urgent test cases for the ability of the US and the EU to develop a new transatlantic project are as following:
Elements of a New Common Transatlantic Project

1. Rebuilding Iraq and returning sovereignty to the Iraqis with the goal of constitutional-based secular statehood, rule of law and democracy that can grow as part of a new development bargain among Western and Arab donor countries;

2. Constitutionalizing Afghanistan and supporting the development of a multi-ethnic state which will institutionalize peaceful and democratic solutions to pending cleavages in the Afghan society;

3. Resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict and creating a two-state solution in line with the time frame of the Quartet’s „Road Map“ and generating long-term cooperation among the two entities;

4. Bringing about peaceful regime change in Iran which is to say enhancing the domestic reforms towards an open society and the rule of law based on Iran’s full compliance with the internationally recognized non-proliferation mechanism for nuclear weapons;

5. Introducing the first elements of a comprehensive CSCE-like (Helsinki-Process) mechanism for the whole region which will include the EU and the US as well as Russia¹, possibly under the umbrella of a UN mandate.

Invasion and regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq have defined the most immediate challenges in the Greater Middle East, have created circumstances for a lasting US military presence, have brought NATO and multilateralism back, and have clearly contributed to the perception in the West that the Greater Middle East does exist and is the most crucial challenge to all Western countries. While crisis management will remain focussed on the immediate places of unrest and while the unpredictability of developments in countries such as Iran and Saudi-Arabia remain most crucial in light of their potential global implication, the overall development of the Greater Middle East is at the long-term center of the issue.

From the perspective of global consequences, a succesful system-opening and cooperative transformation of the Greater Middle East would stabilize the world order, it would deescalate the danger of proliferation of terrorism

¹ On Russia’s internal dealings with Islam see: Uwe Halbach, Rußlands Welten des Islam, SWP Studie S 15/April 2003 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik).
which is also threatening various countries in the Greater Middle East. It would facilitate the inclusion of the Greater Middle East in the globalized structures of the world economy and thus critically support policies of inclusive development all over the region. Both in terms of geopolitics and geoeconomics, an inclusion of the Greater Middle East as a zone of stability which is making optimized use of its resources and neighbourhoods will become an important element towards a more stable and thus multipolar world order.

From the perspective of regional implications and bi-regional consequences, a successful system-opening and cooperative transformation of the Greater Middle East would enhance the potential for regional cooperation along the model of the European Union, of NAFTA or of the Council of Europe. It would leave room for sub-regional cooperation, for instance in the Maghreb and in the Gulf, but also in continuity with the mechanism of the Barcelona-Process. It would also open potential for enhanced trans-regional and biregional cooperation, although this would lead to new questions about the role of the Western partners. The US might focus on strategic cooperation along the line of NATO’s Mediterranean policies while the EU might favour civil cooperation along the model of the Barcelona Process. Overlaps and conflicts of interests might arise, for instance with regard to the relationship of the Gulf Cooperation Council to the Barcelona Process. This is all the more of relevance for European policy makers as the Gulf Cooperation Council might extent cooperation and eventually integration to a rebuild Iraq and may be even to a transformed Iran.

It will be in the interest of the European Union, to broaden its horizon and to develop strategies towards the Greater Middle East with a focus on concentric circles and specific solutions to the range of problems ahead. Supporting the development of human resources that are important for the establishment of rule of law and democracy in countries like Egypt, engaging Saudi-Arabia into a dialogue about a more open-minded definition of Islam which takes into account the parameters of the modern secular and plural-

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istic state, encouraging the reconciliation of Islamic interpretations of society with secular and inclusive concepts of a pluralistic notion of the state, supporting the economic diversification in the Gulf economies, encouraging Israel and Palestine to search for the nucleus and appropriate tools which will positively link their respective developments - these are but a few glimpses into a tall and long agenda.

What does „concentric circles“ mean? It means an overlap of institutional and policy mechanisms which are strongest in a centre and remain overlapping as they are stretching to the outer regions thus maintaining their special situation and yet connecting them with the overall mechanism of policy cooperation. The Atlantic partnership between the US and the EU clearly serves as the centre piece of any successful evolution of the scheme. The second layer is defined by the „Barcelona-Process“ where the EU is in the driving position and NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue where the US is in the driving position. The third layer will have to connect both the US and the EU in a more comprehensive way with the Gulf region, where both are pursuing bilateral (US) and biregional (EU) approaches of different priorities and density. In the mid-term, Iraq will be considered to be part of the Gulf region. The fourth layer will have to connect both the US and the EU with the other parts of the Greater Middle East with Iran and Afghanistan as special cases, the Caucasus republics and the republics of Central Asia. It remains to be seen in which way Russia will be connected (or wants to be connected) to one or the other or to all layers of the cooperative system of concentric circles. Turkey is involved on the side if both the US and the EU through its membership in NATO and as a consequence of its status as an EU candidate.

In terms of policy content, the different layers of the concentric circle of cooperation and partnership consist of different priorities and densities. The Barcelona-Process will remain defined by its civil and largely socio-economic character. The NATO Mediterranean Dialogue will remain defined by its strategic and security-oriented character. Reaching out to the Gulf Cooperation Council countries will mean to define a common agenda with them which includes specific bilateral and biregional aspects (trade, security, energy) and links to the overall regional development (their role in
the implementation of a Middle East peace solution; their role in the recon- 
struction and constitutionalization of Iraq and Afghanistan). Both aspects 
do likewise hold for the countries of the Caucasus and of Central Asia, 
though with an applied arrangement in the field of economic cooperation. 
A stable Afghanistan could in the end be considered as being part of Cen- 
tral Asia. A transformed Iran might be considered as a Gulf country, even- 
tually even linking with the Gulf Cooperation Council. These, of course, 
are anticipated thoughts which go way beyond the current situation and 
serve only as a compass to understand the potential of the dynamics if the 
idea of a Helsinki-like process would be taken up, encompassing the whole 
of the Greater Middle East.

As far as the Middle East peace process is concerned, a Helsinki-like „Con- 
ference on Security, Cooperation and Partnership in the Greater Middle 
East“ could serve as a guarantor for the implementation of the final results 
of a Middle East peace solution, whatever they will be at the end. Thus, 
Russia’s participation in the overall project is useful and a mandate of the 
United Nations for the evolutive creation of a new regional security and 
cooperation frame will be imperative as was the case with CSCE. A „Con- 
ference on Security, Cooperation and Partnership in the Greater Middle 
East“ would eventually be able to make use of the guaranteeing and ena- 
bling involvement of the US and the EU (and Russia and the Gulf coun- 
tries). It would encourage to continue with specifical and rather dense re- 
gional schemes of cooperation such as the Barcelona-Process, with 
NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, and with specific dimensions of coop- 
eration with Central Asia and the Caucasus. And, of course, such an overall 
regional process has to enable, support and gradually incorporate and trans- 
form the very focussed activities which are necessary as long as Afghani- 
stan and Iraq require external support in their stabilization and rebuilding- 
phase, and as long the relationship between Israel and Palestine has not ma- 
teralized on the basis of a viable two-state solution. At same ultimate stage 
of the process, these countries could become „normal“ participants of the 
overall process and overcome their current status as centres of conflict or 
post-conflict crisis management.
Such an ambitious scheme can only materialize and work on the basis of pragmatic and gradual evolution which takes into account the different levels of cooperation that already exist or dominate the mutual perception. It seems unlikely to extent the model of the Barcelona Process to the whole Greater Middle East as it does not include the United States. It is insufficient to extent NATO’s Mediterranean policy to the Greater Middle East as it is too security-driven. It would be insufficient to define the priorities of the common project of system-opening and cooperative transformation of the Greater Middle East according to the most difficult countries where post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction are vital, such as Afghanistan and Iraq. It is likewise important to encourage the constitutional developments in the Gulf states, enhance the component of conditionality and frankness towards Saudi-Arabia, to learn from the Algerian tragedy and to prevent Tunisia and Egypt falling back more than their peaceful, open and stable development can afford. It will be useful for the West to support Libya in returning to become a viable member of the international community and thus a relevant regional partner. It will be important to support those countries of the Greater Middle East with fundamental development problems, such as Yemen, Sudan, some of the Central Asian and Caucasus republics.

The two most crucial issues for the next two years are: a peaceful transformation of Iran and a two-state solution to the Middle East conflict. Whether the Atlantic partners - bilateral or as part of the Quartet which includes Russia and the United Nations - can achieve their goals immediately and

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3 In this context, it is interesting to note that Western initiatives which seem to be supportive of positive changes in the Arab world could easily lead to opposite results. The countries of Northern Africa, for instance, are enormously dependent upon import taxes on EU goods, although this practice runs counter to all European commitments for free trade. During the 1990s, import taxes on EU goods resulted in 19.2 percent of all tax income of Algeria; in Morocco, the amount was 10.3 percent, in Tunisia 15.9 percent and in Egypt 7.9 percent. On this aspect of the ambivalence of an early free trade zone between the EU and its Southern Mediterranean partners, see: Jörg Wolf, Staatszerfall: Die riskante Stabilisierungsstrategie der Europäischen Union für den südlichen Mittelmeerraum, in: Christopher Daase (ed.), Internationale Risikopolitik: der Umgang mit neuen Gefahren in den internationalen Beziehungen, Baden-Baden 2002, p. 248.
unequivocally will define the destiny of the idea of a long-term common strategic project. Failure in coordinating a peaceful and evolutive transformation in Iran and failure to bring about a sustainable two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict will be more critical than any other pending problem as test case for the renewal and reorientation of the Atlantic partnership. One must already be more than sceptical about the realisation of the time-frame as outlined in the Quartet’s Road Map for a solution to the Middle East conflict. This does not enhance, but it rather undermines the Western credibility in the region. As far as Iran is concerned, the US has to abstain from unilateral, let alone military solutions while Europe has increased the pressure through means of conditionality to give sense and teeth to its constructive dialogue with the Islamic regime in Tehran.\footnote{See Johannes Reissner, Europas „kritischer“ Dialog mit Iran, in: Klaus Schubert/Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (eds.) Die Europäische Union als Akteur der Weltpolitik, Opladen 2000, pp. 173 ff.; Gawdat Bahgat, The Future of US-Iran Relations, in: Journal of South Asian and Middle East Studies, Vol. XXV, No.2/2002, pp. 68 ff.}

While old-standing and newly emerging conflicts will dominate the daily agenda of policy-makers and the media, it is critical for the long-term realisation of the idea of a common Atlantic project to develop the frame for a bi-regional mechanism with instruments comparable yet applied to the Helsinki-Process which brought the Cold War to its peaceful end. Most likely can the Middle East conflict trigger the beginning of such a process that should reach out beyond the conflict-resolution between Israelis and Palestinians.\footnote{See Volker Perthes, The Advantages of Complementarity: US and European policies towards the Middle East Peace Process, in: Volker Perthes (ed.), Germany and the Middle East. Interests and Options, Berlin 2002, p. 53 ff.; Jerrold D. Green, La politique américaine et le conflit israélo-palestinien, in: Politique étrangère, No.3/2002, pp. 617 ff.; Joseph N. Yackley, Politikkoordination im Nahen Osten. Transatlantische Strategien zur Konfliktlösung?, in: Internationale Politik, 57, No.1/2002, pp. 45 ff.; Martin Ortega (ed.), The European Union and the crisis in the Middle East, Chaillot Papers No. 62/July 2003 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies); Muriel Assenburg, Die EU und der Friedensprozeß im Nahen Osten, SWP-Studie S 28/July 2003 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik).} It would be worthwhile to explore the launching of a CSCE-type of conference to prepare for the final stages of conflict-resolution among
Elements of a New Common Transatlantic Project

Israelis and Palestinians. The presence of all relevant regional and international actors could increase the legitimacy of the final solution, but also the pressure in order to bring it about. Israel and Palestine should not be just two neighbours living separate from each other. If the vision of a Greater Middle East transformed shall become reality, the two former adversaries will at some stage find their specific equivalent of the mechanism that brought about confidence, cooperation and integration between France and Germany. Water and energy as both being scarce and simultaneously available in abundance might play the role in the Middle East that coal and steel have played for France and Germany in the 1950s.

The perspective for regional economic and social cooperation could be part of a larger bi-regional frame with full inclusion of the US and possibly Russia, supervised and legitimized by the United Nations. A Helsinki-Process-like approach to link the Greater Middle East with the Atlantic partners will include procedures, mechanisms and criteria for bringing about various „baskets“ with the leverage for package-deal solutions that can be perceived as a mutual success. Security, the fight against terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, the transformation of military and militia forces into armies which are loyal and accountable to civil leadership; outlining the broad dimensions of mutually beneficial economic and technological cooperation which will include investor’s security, dealing with pull- and push factors for migration, the definition of minimal social standards; an increased and free encounter and cooperation among societal groups and non-political actors, which includes media representatives as well as all dimensions of religious dialogue and the search for the preservation and use of common cultural heritage; common concern about the realisation of sustainable human development, including training of human

6 How difficult this already is in the context of the well established Euro-Mediterranean partnership, see: Ulrike Julia Reinhardt, Civil Society Co-operation in the EMP: from Declarations to Practice, EuroMesCo Papers No. 15/2002 (Lisbon: EuroMediterranean Study Commission); about the broader context of culture and politics in Mediterranean governance see: Indra de Soysa/Peter Zervakis (eds.), Does culture matter? The relevance of culture in politics and governance in the Euro-Mediterranean zone, ZEI Discussion Paper C 112/2002 (Bonn: Center for European Integration Studies).
skills: these could be elements for the most relevant „baskets“ to be included in a reshaped Helsinki-type process. The goal of this process will be to bring about sustainable transformation in the Greater Middle East and to transform the relationship between the Greater Middle East and the Atlantic partners into one of cooperation and common approaches to global challenges.

The interesting question prevails: who could and who would launch such an initiative? It should be in the interest of the European Union to do so. As far as the embodiment of the European Union is concerned, I would propose that both the European Parliament and the European Commission should take the initiative; both should look for support from leading EU member states who could support the idea in the European Council. In June 2004, a new European Parliament will be elected, followed by the nomination and approbation of a new European Commission. As both elections will follow the enlargement of the European Union to ten new member states, both EU institutions will have additional weight. I would strongly advise the European Parliament and the European Commission to prepare for a joint initiative for an applied version of the Helsinki process for the future relationship between the Greater Middle East, the European Union and the United States - most likely also the Russian Federation and possibly under the auspices of the United Nations - for the winter 2004/2005.

As seen from Washington or Brussels, the Greater Middle East is going to be the centre of strategic, political and socio-economic concern, but also of cultural and religious consideration for many decades to come. The region as a whole must be taken into consideration. This requires comprehensive approaches, also among foreign policy communities and academic experts which tend to underuse the potential for interfaces among them. Subregional forms of cooperative development will have to be intensified without losing the perspective for the overall picture. Promising issues will have to be identified which could impact on the potential for cooperation inside the Greater Middle East, in a post-conflict Middle East or between the Greater Middle East and the West. The prevailing existence of threat potential and the dangers stemming from the export of instability to the West will have to be addressed with cautious realism. A transregional
or bi-regional frame will have to link the Atlantic partners with the coun-
tries and societies of the Greater Middle East.

All in all, the key for success and the focus must be clear: The new transat-
lantic project must engage as many countries and societies in the Greater
Middle East, Israel including. This will be the best recipe for lasting and
sustainable success. This is a tall challenge for the EU and the US in light
of a world region whose problems has divided the Atlantic partners over
the past more than any other region in the world. Nevertheless, it has to be
tested. 7

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7 On the experience of the European Union with the promotion of democracy in
Northern Africa as part of the Barcelona-Process, see: Richard Gillespie/Richard
Youngs (eds.), The European Union and Democracy Promotion: The Case of North
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