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The End of the Cold War and US-EU-Relations

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Introduction

We begin with a version of our preferred theoretical approach of Political Culture¹ applying it to U.S. foreign policy formulation on the one hand, and the nascent European Union Common Defense and Security Policy (CDSP) as well as its most recent “Rapid Reaction Force” (RRF) developments on the other. We also suggest that the modern nation-state is one form of ethnocentrism, which arises from a *primordial* human urge to live together as social animals in Aristotle’s terminology. We suggest that the nation-state is only one of many theoretically possible forms of ethnocentrism, as “weak” or “failed” states and empires also exist. We see the modern “nation” as the creation of the modern state and not vice versa. We are therefore of the “modernist” school which differs from the primordialist and perennialist schools of thought in that modern nations as forms of social cohesion *are by no means a matter of historical necessity*. Some form of

¹ See Jeffrey S. Lantis, “Strategic Culture and National Security Policy,” *International Studies Review* (vol. 4, issue 3), fall, 2003, pp. 87-113. For an interesting book review analyzing the role of political culture and other forms of political and economic development in the ex-Soviet world, cf. Troy McGrath, “From Communism to Capitalism: Liberalization, Learning, and the Long Road,” *ibid.*, pp. 167-179. For an interesting application of “Political Culture” to recent US foreign policy, cf. Ch. 8, “Americans’ Values, Beliefs, and Preferences: Political Culture and Public Opinion in [US-GC] Foreign Policy,” in Eugene R. Wittkopf, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., & James M. Scott, *American Foreign Policy* (Thomson/Wadsworth), 2003, 6th Ed., especially pp. 248-250.

social cohesion larger than the family *is* in our view a matter of historical necessity, but the nation-state is the form which actually dominates. Thus even though nations are “natural” in the sense of fulfilling the historical human need for some form of social cohesion transcending the family, they are not “inevitable” in our view. Again, this issue lies beyond the specific purview of our paper. But a brief review of the work of theorists of nation formation and in the case of the European Union, supranational entity formation, is fundamental to understanding our paper.²

Walter Lippmann notes in chapter two of his classic, *U.S. Foreign Policy*³ “The fundamental principle of a foreign policy”:

“The thesis of this book is that a foreign policy consists in bringing into balance, with a comfortable surplus of power in reserve, the nation’s commit-

- 2 A useful review of this difficult topic is found in Vojin Rakic, “Theories of Nation Formation and Case Selection: The Meaning of an Alternative Model” in *Nationalities Papers*, vol. 26, no. 4 (1998), pp. 599-613. In this comparison of various theories, Rakic considers *inter alia* the differing views of Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso), 1983; Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard), 1960; Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell), 1983; Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan), 1945; Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell), 1986 and Pierre Van den Berghe, *Race and Ethnicity* (New York: Basic Books, 1970).

Although a discussion of political culture as the basis of foreign and domestic policy is also outside the purview of this paper, a few bibliographical citations may be appropriate. Basing their views on Almond and Verba’s study of five cultures published in 1963 (Gabriel A. Almond & Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture, Political Attitudes in Five Nations* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co.), 1965); Almond and Powell argue, “A political culture is a particular distribution of political attitudes, values, feelings, information and skills.” Gabriel A. Almond, G. Bingham Powell Jr., (eds.), 3rd Ed. *Comparative Politics Today: A World View* (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman, 1984), p. 37b. Based on rather sophisticated statistical longitudinal studies, Inglehart concludes that Almond and Verba were right... and enduring cross-cultural differences [between countries-GC] exist and can be measured and further that “political culture is a crucial link between economic development and democracy.” (Ronald Inglehart, “The Renaissance of Political Culture,” *American Political Science Review*, December, 1988, pp. 1204-1219, *passim*. See also an unpublished MS by Glen D. Camp, “Political Culturalist Explanations and the East European ‘Sea Change’: Is a Predictive or Explanatory Model Possible?” prepared for the New England Studies Association, 04/13/91.

- 3 Walter Lippmann, *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (NY: Pocket Books, 1943), pp. 6-7 [bolding and ital. added-GC].

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ments and the nation's power... The statesman of a strong country may balance its commitments at a high level or at a low, but whether he is conducting the affairs of Germany, which has had dynamic ambitions, or the affairs of Switzerland, which seeks only to hold what it already has, or of the United States, he must still bring his ends and means into balance. *If he does not, he will follow a course that leads to disaster.* "(ital. added-GC)

In sum, Lippmann argues that a prudent foreign policy requires that national foreign policy ends must be tailored to national means, i.e., means and ends must be in balance. The temptation by an activist U.S. administration is usually to "bite off more than it can comfortably chew"-regardless of the moral issues involved-as in Vietnam and perhaps in Iraq. This leads to our first problem: has the US in its recent foreign policy, via its own expenditures and "side payments" made to its various allies, engaged in "imperial overstretch"? Or is it strong enough, wise enough, and effective enough to handle both domestic and foreign commitments?⁴ Paul Kennedy argues for "imperial overstretch"⁵ Other students of current US policy, while demanding strong US support for coalition partners such as the EU and NATO, deny any relative decline in US power. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., for example, denies the probability of "a Roman fate for the United States" (i.e., collapse from internal 'rot': "I will show that at the beginning of the

4 Side payments are described and analyzed in William H. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven/London, 1962), pp. 105-106, pp. 115-20, and pp. 120-123. For Riker's putative limits on side payments, cf. p. 129.

5 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *The Paradox of American Power, Why the World's only Superpower Can't Go It Alone* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002), p. 112. On the U.S. in relative decline, see Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (NY: Vintage Books, 1987), pp. 514-535, "The United States: The Problem of Number One in Relative Decline." For Kennedy's theory of "imperial overstretch" and the concomitant problem of relating commitments to resources noted by Lippmann as well as the new problem of nuclear holocaust as the number of nuclear powers inevitably grows; cf. Kennedy, *ibid.*, pp. 514-515. In this passage Kennedy seems to wonder-as do we- whether US political leaders can handle the resulting "triple threat" of "imperial overstretch," commitments beyond US resources, and nuclear proliferation all at the same time. Cf. also Charles Tilly's provocative review of Motyl's incomplete "explanation" of *The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires* in Alexander J. Motyl's, *Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires* (NY: Columbia Univ. Press), 2001.

new century, such evidence is slim.”⁶ Much as we respect our former Dean, we must disagree. We find both statistical and anecdotal evidence point in the opposite direction. The US, like Russia though much less dramatically, is weakening in the sinews of economic, fiscal, and industrial power. It is becoming “hollowed out” in terms of its educational and infrastructure resources as well. Thus, like the former Soviet Union, the US is becoming primarily a military superpower with its “side payments” leading to “imperial overstretch.” But its leaders refuse to face the fact that it cannot “go it alone” and insist on pursuing a unilateral policy based on the “bright shining” instrument of its massive military, unmatched by any persuasive moral “coalition of the willing.” The result is a dramatic and dangerous gap between America’s unilateralist military policy on the one hand, and its moral and diplomatic policies on the other. We believe, in short, in the “Declinist” school of thought on US foreign policy. We see the mighty US dollar declining against the euro, the US current account balance falling into greater and greater deficit, and America’s quondam financial superiority threatened by a mafia-like “Greed is Good” mentality. The quality of US schools, hospitals, and public services shrink even as cities and towns perch on the edge of bankruptcy while 44 million citizens are excluded from any kind of health insurance. “Ill fares the land, to hastening ills a prey, where wealth accumulates and men decay.”⁷

The Cold War’s End and the Demise of the USSR

As Jessica Matthews trenchantly notes: “At its outset, the end of the Cold War meant the loss of the automatic deference accorded the US as the leader in the fight against a common mortal enemy. The absence of an external enemy...allowed domestic politics to acquire a much larger role in foreign policy on both sides of the Atlantic.”⁸ However, the view from opposite sides of the Atlantic then became crucially different: the US looked

6 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., op. cit, p. 112.

7 Oliver Goldsmith.

8 Jessica L. Mathews in “Estranged Partners,” *Foreign Policy* (November/December, 2001) as reprinted in *American Foreign Policy*, Annual Editions (03/04), pp. 43-46).

out from its side and saw a world with many threats including “ethnic cleansing” and a growing vital threat from weapons of mass destruction which permeated the society after 9/11. The EU countries saw no need to counter these threats as a vital interest of their member states especially since the US was protecting them with its unmatched military machine. Moreover, the EU states were deeply engaged in an historic *volte-face*: the enlargement and deepening of the hugely successful economic powerhouse of the European Union. And the economic “heart” of the EU, Germany, was engaged in a vastly underestimated project of bringing the former East Germany (GDR) up to the very high standards of West Germany at a vast cost to its taxpayers with concomitant prejudices of “Wessies” vs. “Ossies” [West Germans vs. East Germans-GC].

Contrasting US vs. EU Post WWII Development

We posit an infrangible link between several historical manifestations of US Reversion to what we view as a “neo-Imperial Isolationism;” the latest version is the “Bush Doctrine of Pre-emption.” Earlier versions included the old Manifest Destiny” doctrine, Polk & TR Corollaries to the Monroe Doctrine, and Senator Albert Beveridge’s Jan. 1900 speech to the US Senate. The background to the Bush Doctrine is clearly linked to doctrines of the US as a special country, a “city on a hill” and the mythology of “American Exceptionalism” - the view that America is a “special” country marked by God for a moral, economic, and especially military dominance in the world. At first linked to Latin America by the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, it then developed further in “America’s backyard” to the “Polk Corollary” of 1845 by which the US acquired Arizona, California, and Texas after a brief invasion of Mexico. Then in 1904 came the Teddy Roosevelt (TR) Corollary by which the US assumed the right to occupy Central American countries guilty of putative “chronic wrongdoing” which might in America require intervention by “some civilized power”, namely the US.⁹ The Truman Doctrine added Greece and Turkey to the US list of for-

9 Julius W. Pratt, *A History of United States Foreign Policy*, 2nd Ed., (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.), 195, pp. 168-9, 244, 417, and passim.

eign protected states and threatened Russia with nuclear weapons after WWII if Russia would not leave Iran even as Eisenhower during the Korean War threatened to use US nuclear weapons if necessary to end the Korean War.

In sum, US Exceptionalism is a foreign policy doctrine of ethnocentrism, akin to other examples utilized in other countries but mediated by an American political culture which gave it a specific character. One thinks of Bismarck's *Drang nach Osten* (March to the East) or Moeller van den Brock's apotheosis to *Das Dritte Reich* in Germany which preceded Hitler's *Mein Kampf* (*My Battle*); to France's self-proclaimed mission under Napoleon to carry the doctrines of "La Nation humaine" to less fortunate countries. One may add the Comte de Gobineau's ideal of French racial superiority expressed in *Essai sur l'inegalite des races*. Finally, Great Russian ethnocentrism was clearly enunciated in Nikolai Danilevsky's 1869 essay, *Rossiya I Evropa* (*Russia and Europe*), or the views of Constantine Pobedonostsev. In each case, the powerful force of ethnocentrism was expressed in nationalistic terms as mediated by the political culture of a unique nation-state. In the American case it was mediated by a particular set of historical experiences associated with the conquest and peopling of a new continent and the brutal clash with its indigenous peoples now termed "Native Americans." Perhaps only in Australia or Canada was the US experience roughly duplicated, though the Russian conquest of Central Asia under Gens. Constantine Kaufman and Michael Skobelev was in some ways remarkably similar.¹⁰

The current manifestation of American ethnocentrism involves the effort to control WMD proliferation via unilateral US military power. It involved a clearly dismissive attitude toward multilateralism even toward US allies such as the UK and an effort to insist that the US-led "coalition of the willing" is really very powerful regardless of the facts that the countries involved-except for the U.K.-are minor powers. It further involved denigrat-

10 See Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia*, 2nd Ed. (London: Oxford Univ. Press), 1969, p. 432 where he notes that this Russian expansion "bears a certain resemblance both to colonial wars elsewhere and to the American westward movement."

ing “Old Europe” i.e., France and Germany while apotheosizing small powers such as the Baltic countries, Romania, and Poland. Moreover it involved the disregard for politico-cultural differences with putative enemies.

The US attitude of expansionism under Manifest Destiny began with some mordantly amusing examples of US cultural ignorance at the highest levels. For example, President McKinley lamented (the White Man’s Burden) in the best Rudyard Kiplingesque language: “there was nothing else for us [Americans-GC] to do but to take [the Philippine islands-GC] them all and to educate the Filipinos and to uplift and civilize and Christianize them...and I went to bed and ... slept soundly.” Unfortunately for “them”; McKinley evidently did not know that the Filipinos had been Christians (albeit Catholics) for some 400 years!¹¹

Even more primitive, by current standards of Manifest Destiny, was U.S. Senator Albert Beveridge’s address to the US Senate in January, 1900:

“...the times call for candor. The Philippines are ours forever.... [but-GC] this question is deeper.... It is racial. God has not been preparing the English-Speaking and Teutonic peoples for a thousand years for nothing.... No. He has made us the master organizers of the world to establish system where chaos reigns... he has made us adept in government that we may administer government among savage and senile peoples.... And of all our race he has marked the American people as His chosen nation to finally lead in the regeneration of the world. This is the divine mission of America.... We are trustees of the world’s progress, guardians of its righteous peace.”¹²

We suggest that, *mutates mutandis* and despite unpersuasive politically correct statements to the contrary, this attitude subconsciously informs current US political culture as reflected in the Bush Doctrine. and the attitudes of those “conservative policy advocates” who in January 1998 sent a letter to President Bush. “Among the 18 signers were Donald H. Rumsfeld, Paul D. Wolfowitz, Richard L. Armitage, and Richard N. Perle, all former officials in Republican administrations.”¹³ Clearly the Bush Doctrine suggests an

11 Sheldon Appleton, *United States Foreign Policy, An Introduction with Cases* (Little, Brown and Co.), 1968, pp. 65-66.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 65.

13 Steven R. Weisman, “Pre-emption Evolves from an Idea to Official Action,” *New York Times*, 03/23/03, p.B1A.

apparent “Search for Enemies,”¹⁴ an expressed distaste for “Nation-Building” as in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Balkans. This distaste seems oddly mixed with an apparent unilateral military imperial “Overstretch.” (War against Iraq). We suggest this growing US imperial unilateralism is part of the recrudescence of U.S. Manifest Destiny clearly strengthened by the US position as the last superpower with legitimate worldwide commitments.

Clearly the US remained the only world superpower after the demise of the USSR. “Containment” via “mellowing” had largely succeeded as George Kennan had predicted. Moreover, the U.S. was left with an enormous military machine unmatched in the world. The irresistible temptation was to use it for ends which seemed obviously beneficial to the coterie of conservative intellectuals grouped around the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and brought into the U.S. Government by George W. Bush, Jr. Often referred to “Neo-Conservatives” or “Neo-Cons”; they felt strongly that “chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs of ‘rogue states’ must be confronted with pre-emptive or even preventive action before an imminent threat materializes.”¹⁵ Also called “Hawks”, they had been working on the problem of proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) for some years before and felt strongly that the US had failed in the Gulf War I in 1991 since Saddam remained in power. Weisman notes that some of them had worked under the older Bush and when his son assumed office, many returned to power. Since the opposition Democratic Party seemed bereft of ideas on how to remove the worldwide threat of proliferating WMD, the conservative hawks “ended up dominating the administration’s policy, defining an important shift in U.S./ foreign policy thinking.”¹⁶

Clearly, however, the policy Rx of the conservative Neo-Con Hawks - Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Paul D. Wolfowitz, Richard L. Armitage, Richard N. Perle, Vice President Cheney, Douglas J. Feith, and I. Lewis (Scooter) Libby - is both broad and audacious. It is supported by the so-

14 John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies, A CIA Story* (NY: W.W. Norton), 1978.

15 Weisman, *op. cit.*, p. B1A.

16 *Op. cit.*, p. B1A [bolding added-GC].

called “Religious Right” (even though most religious groups in the US and abroad strongly opposed it in general, and especially in the Iraq War). Opposing groups include the Pope and most non-Baptist fundamentalist leaders of the US Protestant clergy, as well as most Muslim, Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox clergy at home and abroad.

But the Neo-Con Hawks back in 1992 (under then-Secretary of Defense Cheney) developed “a document known as the *Defense Planning Guidance* which argued that the US should be prepared to use force to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons”¹⁷ It was not too far an intellectual leap from there to the 30-page document issued by the White House on September 17, 2002 entitled: *The National Security Strategy of the United States*.¹⁸

The FAS analysts, however, (Karl Kaysen, John D. Steinbrunner, and Martin B. Malin) argue that the document is really misleading. “Pre-emption” in the document’s case means “using force in anticipation of a danger to prevent hostile states from acquiring WMD or harboring terrorists” But the FAS analysts conclude: “In this particular case, “pre-emption” ... is a mischaracterization, since that term usually is taken to mean striking the first blow when war appears to be imminent and unavoidable. What the US is proposing is more properly characterized as “preventive war.” that is, a war of choice to prevent the emergence of a threat further in the future.”¹⁹ (We must add that in our view, the Planning Document goes even further: It proposes a form of *permanent* as well as *preventive* war, since the enemy is self-expanding for US policy reasons and thus is conveniently never conquered.)

Our FAS authors note further that under Truman and Eisenhower “such thinking was consistently rejected at the political level on both moral and

17 Steven R. Weisman, “Pre-emption Evolves From an Idea to Official Action,” *New York Times*, 03/23/03, p. B10A-B.

18 For a lucid discussion of this document and its etiology and ramifications, cf. FAS, vol. 55, no. 5, September/October 2002, “Behind the Prospect of War with Iraq: The New U.S. National Security Strategy.” For a copy of pp. 1-2, cf. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>.

19 FAS, op. cit., p. 5A. [bolding added-GC].

strategic grounds as Russia and China developed nuclear WMD.²⁰ Today, they conclude, “preventive war” “is our declared policy to maintain the capability to wage preventive war against those who may threaten us with weapons of mass destruction.”

In our view, the Bush Doctrine of preventive war as the linchpin of US efforts to stop the proliferation of WMD is incompatible with the UN Charter as well as most international efforts such as the ABM Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the International Court of Justice, the Land Mines Treaty, the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, and even the Kyoto anti-Global Warming Treaty. The Bush Doctrine simply means the US will go it alone or with a “coalition of the willing”, i.e., those willing to accept US world hegemony in the name of halting proliferation of WMD. The audacity of the basic idea is stunning—as is its arrogance²¹ and the near-certainty that it will fail. For even limited military success will increase resistance in the recusant world both developed (Old Europe) and developing (Arab countries). Surely the international

20 *Ibid.* For details of the Truman-Eisenhower repudiation of “preventive war” cf. Marc Trachtenberg, “A Wasting Asset’: American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance,” in Marc Trachtenberg, *History and Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1991), pp. 100-152 [bolding added-GC].

21 As a vivid example of the Bush Administration’s hawks’ arrogance, consider Richard Perle’s contemptuous view of the United Nations as a “Coalition of the Befuddled, Abject Failure of the United Nations,” in *The Providence-Journal*, 03/31/03, p. A10. Perle generously allows the UN a residual “good works” function, but emphatically excludes any policy-making role for the “chatterbox on the Hudson.” “What will die in Iraq is the fantasy of the UN as the foundation of a new world order.” After two world wars, it appears that Pearlle, like the Bourbon aristocrats after 1815 in France, “has learned nothing and forgotten nothing.” He is certain that “As we sift the debris of the war to liberate [sic!-GC] Iraq, it will be important to preserve, the better to understand, the intellectual wreckage of the liberal conceit of safety through international law administered by international institutions.” So much for Wilson, FDR, and Arthur Vandenberg. So much from Hugo Grotius to Hans Kelsen, so away with Immanuel Kant’s dream of Eternal Peace (Ewiger Friede). Under Bush only US unilateral power will be permitted to safeguard the peace and only as Washington defines that term. Thus the Iraqis will be liberated according to Washington whether they like it or not. And it appears that a great many of them, while hating Saddam Hussein equally hate the idea of foreigners liberating their country. Washington now speaks minatorily as it did in Vietnam of course “winning the hearts and minds” of the people.

dash for WMD exacerbated by US *action* against Iraq and *inaction* against North Korea, will continue despite any unilateral US action. Yet surely also only a tough international regime with teeth and legitimacy provided by the UN and enforced by the world's major power could possibly stop the proliferation of WMD.

Yet as Prof. Nye has noted, the paradox of American power is that the world's only superpower can't go it alone.²² Our defense budget is today larger than the combined defense expenditures of the next 25 largest militaries²³ but weapons alone cannot win wars. And if our use of them turns the world against us, we will eventually lose since we need moral, economic, and especially political support from willing allies. This was brought home most vividly by Turkey's refusal to let us use its terrain for a badly needed "northern front" against Iraq. Even when we in effect tried to "bribe them" via a huge "side payment" of \$26B. They insisted on \$32B in a US aid package!²⁴ With allies like that, the US hardly needs enemies, and one wonders how many US soldiers were wounded or killed because of this Turkish action and how long the reconstruction was prolonged because the U.S. Fourth Infantry Division had to be diverted from the Turkish Coast to Northern Iraq.

We conclude that the neo-Cons' idea of using the huge superiority of the U.S. military was a "quantum jump" but still clear akin to the liberal vision of the "best and the brightest" under President Kennedy. His successors Lyndon Baynes Johnson, and his brilliant Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger all wanted to defeat Ho and the North Vietnamese. The Neo-Con idea also had echoes of the effort to defeat Fidel Castro in Cuba via an attack of expatriates at the Bay of Pigs. We suggest that *all* these military operations had as a tacit or expressed false predicate that the U.S. military could quickly defeat such

22 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *The Paradox of American Power, Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone* (Oxford: Oxford U. Press, 2002).

23 FAS, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

24 Dexter Filkins with Eric Schmitt, "Bargaining: Turkey Demands \$32 Billion U.S. Aid Package," *New York Times*, 02/19/03, p. A17. Also see, "Turkey requests more U.S. aid in return for help against Iraq," *Providence Journal-Bulletin*, 02/19/03, p. A6.

backward nations and easily *rebuild them after their defeat*. In each case a plausible scenario was put forward which was congruent with elite attitudes in the U.S. and within “the beltway.” What was **not** considered, we suggest, was how the targets of the U.S. military or their allies (in Cuba, Afghanistan, or Iraq) would actually respond. But the success of US operations depended upon responses by the target peoples congruent with US elite expectations: i.e., we would “win the hearts and minds” of the Vietnamese peasants, the Cuban people, or the Iraqis who would quickly appreciate the basic altruism of US actions and intentions. They would thus revolt against their cruel masters, i.e., Ho, Fidel, and Saddam. They didn’t, of course, for various reasons having, in our view, to do with **their** quite different political cultures. Even in the case of Iraq, the repressed Shia protested vigorously against US “occupation”. This despite the irony, so evident on US television, that they could never have protested at all under Saddam’s brutal Sunni secular dictatorship! That irony seemed lost on the protesting Shia, however, who seemed to dislike a foreign (US) “occupation” almost as much as they detested Saddam’s domestic dictatorship.

At present it appears that some of the realities of US foreign policy have begun to “sink in.” the Neo-Con “unilateralists vs. the “internationalists” in the Bush Junior Ad-ministration seem to have split. Warren P. Strobel suggests:

“The Unilateralists jokingly refer to themselves as a cabal and their goals include stamping out international terrorism; eliminating nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in unfriendly hands; negotiating a peace treaty between Israel and all its Arab neighbors on terms favorable to Israel; and eliminating international constraints on America’s freedom of action. Secretary of State Colin Powell and his allies in the uniformed military and the CIA share at least the first three goals, but seek to accomplish them by working within the existing international system. The internationalists favor repairing relations with France, Germany, and Russia, all damaged in the disagreement over the Iraq war; revitalizing the United Nations, and pursuing a peace deal between Israel and the Palestinians, even if that means pressuring Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to make concessions.”²⁵

25 Warren P. Strobel, “Foreign policy divides Bush team,” *Providence Journal*, 04/19/03, p. A9abc.

The US civilian elite thus projected upon these target peoples its own political cultural beliefs usually without any detailed knowledge of how the peoples themselves felt. Nor could the US decision-making elites understand these political cultural beliefs since they were totally alien to their own upbringing both as Americans in general, and as elite Americans in particular. US decisional elites came largely from either Eastern “liberal” establishment “hawks” on Vietnam and Cuba; from or Western “Neo-Con” establishment “hawks” as supported by fundamentalist Christians on Cuba and Iraq. The considered opinions of many State Department desk officers and CIA specialists with actual areal experience in these target countries was usually overlooked and apparently never made it to the decision-making levels of the US government. In some cases, top-level pressure was placed upon “working level” officials to “cook the books” or twist facts and policy Rx to those desired by the White House.²⁶

The failure of cabinet-level and National Security Council and White House decision-makers to understand foreign political cultures is, in our view, related to the fact that they are drawn from the ranks of successful oil industry executives, international and national banking experts, and occasional “hawk” academics with a limited understanding of US and especially foreign political cultures. Clearly they often have very little understanding of the foreign political cultures which they target. For example in the two different US Government agencies in which the author served, it was striking how little the operating heads knew about the countries in which they were operating: language, religion, culture, history, even geography were impressive by their absence.

Tragically we conclude that typically “Those who know are not decision-makers, while decision makers are those who don’t.” The US system for foreign policy execution thus strongly favors poorly informed foreign policy leaders as we have seen in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Columbia, Iraq, Rwanda, and Vietnam. This long-term problem is severely exacerbated by

26 Cf. James Risen, “C.I.A. Aides Feel Pressure in Preparing Iraqi Reports”, *New York Times*, 03/23/03, p. B10F.

adding ideological fanaticism to the process. It is unfortunate, but true, as Gary Sick observed recently that: “Iran has its Ayatollahs - and we have ours”²⁷

“War is too important to be left to the Generals”

-- Georges Clemenceau

Moreover, despite the admonition of Georges Clemenceau, Prime Minister of France during WWI cited above, we suggest that the US develops its foreign and security policies largely based upon the use of the military option, for several reasons. First, the military option often seems “quick and easy,” while the process of “nation-building” is slow, expensive, and frustrating. Bush instinctively rejected “Nation-Building” as a policy objective during his last presidential campaign. Second, the American political culture stresses the use of “force first”. This is the way the US expanded across a continent with the use of technological superiority and superior organization against the indigenous population.²⁸ It also worked very well against Mexico under Polk and against Columbia under Theodore Roosevelt in establishing the Panama Canal.²⁹ Why interfere with a successful strategy? The “Bush Doctrine as currently interpreted by the Secretary of Defense has developed a new and audacious war strategy: overwhelmingly superior weapons technology with a minimum of conventional ground forces.

27 Gary Sick on Lou Dobbs TV Program, “Money Line,” 05/12/03. We agree that “on the issues of defense and security, the blow-back [between the US & France and Germany-GC] is likely to be fiercest. U.S. officials have talked of limiting France’s influence in NATO.” On this point, cf. Daniel Rubin, “U.S. begins repair of ties with Europe,” *Providence Journal*, 05/03/03, p. A6.

28 Cf. Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Significance of Frontier in American History* (1893). “Turner pointed out that the frontier has been the one great determinant of American civilization, a point of departure from previous writers who stressed continuity of American institutions with Europe.” Richard B. Morris (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of American History* (NY: Harper & Bros.), 1953, p. 578A.

29 Cf. the detailed account by David McCullough, *The Path Between the Seas, The Creation of the Panama Canal, 1870-1914* (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1977).

The End of the Cold War & US-EU Relations

This has led to a conflict in military strategy between Rumsfeld and quondam Gen. Colin Powell whose “Powell Doctrine” dictated overwhelming force both technological *and* conventional. The Rumsfeld Doctrine not only won the war in Iraq, but will probably change the face of war worldwide in the future.³⁰ But it may also lose the peace in Afghanistan and Iraq for it led to too few “boots on the ground” to prevent looting or destruction of hospitals and priceless antiquities as well as vital oil production facilities in Iraq. It may also lead to the failure of US efforts at “Nation-Building” in both countries.³¹

Under either Doctrine, however, the U.S. Government emphasizes compulsion, not persuasion. Its leaders do not listen well to “non-Group Think” speakers, especially those with deplorable foreign accents who present uncomfortable facts. We agree “In America, as elsewhere, foreign policy is made by elites rather than by the populace and elite values are likely to differ from those of the masses.” But Appleton is also correct in asserting that in American egalitarian ideology, and often in practice, “American political institutions and traditions ordinarily ensure that the nation’s political leaders will share the fundamental value orientations of their followers, at least in part.” In addition the electoral power of the populace is sufficient to set

30 Matthew Brzezinski, “Autopilot: Can the Next War Be Fought with No Soldiers at All?”, *New York Times Magazine* (04/20/03, section 6), pp. 38-42.

31 *The New York Times* summarized the apparent failures of the Bush Doctrine well in our view: “The yearning to right wrongs has a noble tradition in American foreign policy, and few could oppose those portions of the Bush doctrine that would extend the benefits of freedom, democracy, prosperity and the rule of law to the far corners of the globe. Unfortunately, these goals were overshadowed by an arrogant, go-it-alone stance and an aggressive claim to the right to use pre-emptive action against threatening states.” The Times concludes: “For many people and nations, the way the Bush administration went after Saddam Hussein confirmed fears, raised by the [Bush-GC] doctrine. That is one reason why the move to war drew so much opposition around the world, and why this page urged the administration to pursue its goals in Iraq within an international framework. A doctrine that purports to spread happiness, but ends up spreading resentment, is not working, no matter how many statues come tumbling down. That is why it is especially important now to show that the US also has the confidence and wisdom to sheath its sword until it is really needed.” Editorial, 04/13/05, p. 12.

important basic limitations on the freedom of those who make US foreign policy.”³²

We suggest then, that the *basic* modal view of Americans is *still Isolationism* and that Arthur Vandenburg’s *volte-face* affected primarily the political and military elite at the end of the Cold War. Hidden behind the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan lay the mass and elite view of America, the “City on a Hill,” the country of moral purity founded by those who sought religious freedom and a more egalitarian, richer, and fuller life. Much as intellectuals may scoff—especially at President Bush’s efforts to transfer vast sums to the very wealthy at the expense of the middle class—this Lockean myth of putative equality still maintains its power to inspire most Americans. This is especially true when US armed forces are engaged against enemies real or created, since such conflicts are covered by “Old Glory,”—the US flag and potent nationalist symbol of American unity.

We contend that the link between the current “Unilateralism” of the “neo-Cons” is infrangibly connected to the Isolationism regnant during the post-WWI period up to Pearl Harbor. “Isolationism” and “Unilateralism” are thus joined at the policy hip, since the neo-Cons wish to operate in “isolation” from the rest of the world and in opposition to the world’s expressed desire for “Internationalist” solutions operating through the United Nations and in support of the Charter and international law. The US has violated both in the Iraq case and now finds itself without significant support in rebuilding what it has destroyed. James Steinberg, deputy national security adviser to ex-President Clinton, notes the audacity of the neo-Con plans: “One option is for Mr. Bush to make clear that “Saddam was a pretty unique [sic-GC] case” in which the US felt it had to act without explicit U.N. approval, but “we’re not trying to break the (international system...).” “The other ... is to see the war in Iraq as a ‘world-transforming event’ that leads to a radical overhaul of global institutions such as the UN and possibly to American military forays elsewhere.”³³ Again, one may admire the audacity of the Neo-Con plan but regret its results and the enormous costs

32 Sheldon Appleton, *United States Foreign Policy: An Introduction with Cases*. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.) 1968, pp. 37-38.

33 Strobel, *op. cit.*, p. A9c [bolding added-GC].

it will place on American alliances, foreign policy, and skyrocketing national debt if carried out.

Moreover, in the recent past American mythology has been based upon real fact. America *is* a rich country, and the frontier and the six-shooter helped make each man equal- unlike Europe with its *true* conservatives such as Bismarck in Prussia, Gobineau³⁴ in France, or Pobedonostsev or Danilevsky in Russia. In the US, however, “Conservatives” (Federalists and Anti-Federalists) not only supported the Revolution - they led it. The US Constitution was required for their own prosperity; indeed it was a set of rules within which each individual and each group could and does struggle for power with some justified hope of attaining their share.

In Europe, however, long after the French and Russian revolutions and the Weimar Republic the “old Cons” won. The trick was to “marry” conservative ideology with nationalism, religious intolerance, and racism, which the masses could then be persuaded to accept. Thus Bismarck’s *Kulturkampf*

34 See his *Essai sur l'inegalite des races humaines* which first appeared in 1853. He combined racism with nationalism just as did Konstantin Petrovich Pobedonostsev known as the “evil genius” of the reigns of Alexander III and Nicholas II. Interestingly enough, Richard Perle of the Bush Administration is often referred to by his opponents as the “dark Angel” and deemed the intellectual and political leader of the Neo-Con leaders of the Bush Doctrine. On Gobineau, see Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class [Elementi de Scienza Politica]* (NY: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc.), 1939, pp. 17-8. On Pobedonostsev, see Ernest J. Simmons (Ed.), *Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press), pp. 113-128, “Pobedonostsev on the Instruments of Russian Government,” by Robert F. Byrnes. On Danilevsky’s “quasi-scientific racist variety” of Pan-Slavism, cf. Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia*, 2nd Ed., (London: Oxford Univ. Press), 1969, p. 500; also Thomas Riha (ed.), *Readings in Russian Civilization*, vol. II, 1700-1917 (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press), Ch. 31, pp. 387-393, “The Slav Role in World Civilization.” In words strikingly reminiscent of US Senator Albert Beveridge (with appropriate changes for Russian political culture), Danilevsky notes: “.... there hardly ever has existed or exists a people so capable of enduring such a large share of freedom as the Russians and so little inclined to abuse it, due to their ability and habit to obey, their respect and trust in the authorities, their lack of love for power, and their loathing of interference in matters where they do not consider themselves competent.” In sum, Danilevsky makes a virtue of what Americans might call Russian habits of slavish obedience to authority and sees putative dislike of power as the touchstone of Russians’ superiority over other peoples. [p. 389b].

(cultural war against the Catholic Church) and his *Maigesetze* (May Laws) against the Socialist Party of Germany (SPD) were populist measures. Similar attitudes by Gobineau and Pobedonostsev married religious, class, and nationalist pressures to crush liberal views of constitutional democracy in post-revolutionary France and Czarist pre-revolutionary Russia.

In the US, however, most people could expect material prosperity, and even immigrants and the poor could hope for a very real increase in their standard of living. Therefore all classes supported the US Constitution. As one German analyst put it, what destroyed “the class struggle in America was the Ford car and apple pie.” Our professor Louis Hartz argued therefore that the US never had a truly conservative, openly anti-democratic conservative movement such as that supported by Bismarck, Gobineau, or Danilevsky, or Pobedonostsev since American “conservatives” at least nominally supported the Bill of Rights. It is an irony of American life that the US Constitution did not seem to inhibit the reification of their views to any substantial degree. The powerful myths of US political culture remain intact long after the reality of economic and financial life has made a mockery of Lockean and Smithian theories of equality and the “free market.” For most Americans, the US is still a “City on a Hill” with “liberty and justice for all” and under God (since 1954).

Thus the enduring elements of the American political culture have remained largely preserved by the central myth of US life: “all men are created equal.” Other attributes of American political culture include an aversion to theory, *per se*, and a preference for the tangible over the intangible. This preference is mixed in with a “short time perspective” and a distaste for long-term orientation. In foreign policy this abbreviated time perspective and desire for “quick concrete results” have been embodied by the Neo-Cons in Afghanistan and Bosnia and Kosovo. It is also seen in President Bush clearly expressed distaste for “nation building.” Again, as Appleton notes: “... much to the nation’s detriment, those who advocate the kind of foreign policies most likely to prove effective in the long run are often at a critical disadvantage in the political marketplace.”³⁵ We suggest that: “Nation-Building” in general and specifically in Iraq will be

35 Appleton, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-43, *passim*.

that: "Nation-Building" in general and specifically in Iraq will be short-changed by Washington Neo-Cons, since they influenced as elite policy-makers by mass attitudes demanding quick results. We also suggest that the "preference for military solutions" is also part of US political culture as adopted by the elite yet consistent with mass attitudes. Other attributes of the US political culture with a serious impact on the formulation of American foreign policy are the diversity of the US population when juxtaposed with the peculiar effectiveness of interest groups. Thus we notice the lack of concern for looting in Iraq as part of what Appleton refers to as the "normal indifference of the many to foreign affairs has been to increase the influence of the few."³⁶ The evident disinterest of the Pentagon for cultural treasures looted from the Iraqi National Museum vs. the careful positioning of US troops to guard the Iraqi Oil Ministry suggest elite concerns vs. public indifference. Clearly the US ideological commitment to "democracy" or "free markets" is not violated by failure to protect hospitals or ancient antiquities. Neither is the awarding of major contracts to US companies with close ties to the Bush Administration (Bechtel and Haliburton). Elite media such as the *New York Times* may complain bitterly but the Murdoch-controlled press and Fox News do not, and the mass of Americans does not complain either. Rather both are supported and watched by the great middle class of Americans.

In conclusion, US diversity, tight organization of certain elites such as business and military, and a vague amorphous commitment to terms such as "democracy" or "free market" do not appear contradictory to the generally accepted modal American political culture. Only when leaders unwittingly and obviously contradict that culture does the US electorate respond negatively. Two examples are when President Eisenhower publicly admitted the U-2 pilot, Francis Gary Powers, was spying on the USSR or when Ronald Reagan tried to trim "social security" did each of these very popular leaders run into "a firestorm" of criticism. The first violated the obviously absurd principle that the US never engages in "immoral behavior" such as spying, and the second that a beloved leader would injure the wel-

36 *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45.

fare of “senior citizens” by reducing their “right” to social security in old age.

A second important factor is that Washington is a political city with a unique “Beltway” political subculture. Its main interest is power—who has it and how to get it. The joke is that “if you want a friend in Washington, get a dog.” Moreover, money talks and the Department of Defense has \$350B, while the CIA and all other members of the intelligence community get about \$18B. The State Department’s financing is much less than either and, worse yet, it represents not US but “foreign” interests and “foreign” governments.

Why “State Can’t Lead”³⁷

One official points out the reasons why the U.S. Department of State “can’t lead.” We have found in our own experience in Government that, unfortunately, he seems to be correct and that State’s and the C.I.A.’s expertise often does not make its way up the chain of command to the decision-making levels with often tragic results:

- First, the State Department is not equipped to coordinate actions of other Agencies and departments efficiently.
- Second, if ... State attempted this Role [as it occasionally does as noted above-GC] bureaucratic in fighting and parochialism would result.
- Third, the [NSC] is a better organization to coordinate foreign policy - it is the only governmental unit that can function as a neutral policy broker from the president’s perspective.
- Finally, fourth, the White House often does not trust the State Department to be the primary organ of advice and information.

37 Duncan L. Clarke, “Why State Can’t Lead,” from *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1987), pp. 128-142 as reprinted in Jerel A. Rosati, *Readings in the Politics of United States Foreign Policy* (NY: Harcourt Brace), 1998, Ch. 11, pp. 104-5 [bolding added-GC].

Additionally, Clarke highlights the powerful role played by the Foreign Service subculture in all this.” Thus “State Can’t Lead” in U.S. foreign policy and is often “suspect” at the White House and NSC and DoD. Struggles between the Secretary of State vs. hawkish assistants to the President for National Security Affairs or the Secretary of State vs. Secretary of Defense are common and famous for their savagery, e.g., Cyrus Vance vs. Zbigniew Brzezinski or Colin Powell vs. Donald Rumsfeld. In both cases State lost.

The result is that although theoretically, the Secretary of State is supposed to be “the President’s chief foreign policy adviser” usually he isn’t. Some such as Cordell Hull were simply bypassed by the President, others such as Henry Kissinger kept their NSC hats even though they are appointed Secretary of State. Kissinger co-opted a few a few top Foreign Service Officers while ignoring the rest as he and President Nixon themselves conducted US foreign policy. Under Kissinger, even the Defense Secretary was subordinate in many cases as the former conducted “2nd track” or covert diplomacy while others led the 1st track of public diplomacy to end the Vietnam War (unsuccessfully we may note). One must also note in fairness that except in Europe and Vietnam, the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy was often strikingly effective as in the opening to China and US-Russian détente. But we suggest that was largely because they listened and did not consider themselves experts in areas where they did not know the cultures. In Vietnam, both were “locked into” policies originated by presidents Kennedy and Johnson, while Kissinger failed in his “Year of Europe” and especially in Cyprus because he thought he knew the areas well. As Mark Twain once observed: “It ain’t what you knows that gets you in trouble, it’s what you knows that ain’t so!” And Kissinger’s Metternichian *Realpolitik* ran into a rather different and evolving philosophy developed by creative giants such as Robert Schuman, Jean Monet, Konrad Adenauer and Charles de Gaulle - a union of Europe based on French-German *rapprochement*. In the meantime, US policy under Kissinger was imposed upon US officials with personal experience and detailed knowledge of the political cultures of the target countries. In one case, this led to the famous “Kissinger grunt” regarding US policy toward Angola, a rare example of humor in a decidedly unhumorous situation:

“Potts turned to Mulcahy and spoke pleasantly.
“Well, Ed, what did Kissinger say?”...
Finally Mulcahey spoke, “He didn’t exactly *say* anything.” ...
“Did he read the paper?”....
Mulcahy nodded ruefully.
“He read it. Then he grunted and walked out of his office.”
“Grunted?”
“Yeah, like, unmph!”....
“Well, was it a positive grunt or a negative grunt?”...
“It was just a grunt. Like *unnaph*. I mean it didn’t go up or down.”

Stockwell concludes that his little underling group agreed to do nothing since “Inaction was safe and easier to correct.” Thus was U.S. policy decided on the Angola war in the spring of 1975 under Henry Kissinger’s iron control, a control that lasted some eight years and increased as President Nixon became increasingly preoccupied by Watergate.³⁸

EU & Member State Policy-Making

In EU member states, however, the foreign minister often leads his country as seems true under Joscha Fischer of Germany or his counterparts in Britain and France. Thus the accumulated “lore” of the foreign minister of the EU member state is applied to solving an existing problem such as Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, or Iraq. This does not always produce a viable solution, but we would suggest that it is a more effective arrangement than the US system. We have already cited the “Tiger of France” during WWI, Georges, Clemenceau, ’s *bon mot*, “War is too important a matter to be left to the generals.” Pearl Harbor is perhaps an outstanding example of this policy. When his carrier pilots returned jubilantly, Admiral Yamamoto sadly observed, “I fear we have but awakened a sleeping dragon!” The British insist that the military should always “be on tap, but never on top.” In the US case, the culture of the military is quite different from that of the British Army, which has always allowed officers more freedom, e.g., T. E. Lawrence, “Chinese Gordon” *et al*. In the US the dangers of “group think” seem quite intimidating and the best generals themselves speak of “inces-

38 John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies, A CIA Story* (NY: W. W. Norton), 1978, p. 22.

tuous amplification”³⁹ or what we could call “Group Think” as applied to civilian DoD decision-making. This is why it is a pity that in the US system, those State and C.I.A. desk officers with hands-on experience with foreign political cultures are often excluded from real decision-making. Frequently, as noted earlier they are either sidelined or they are forced to “cook the books.” One C.I.A. officer who allegedly experienced this was John Adams III whose studies of Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese (NVA) infrastructure led him to question official DoD estimates of Viet Cong force levels.

The EU member states are all democracies- indeed the *acquis communautaire* and Copenhagen Agreement and other accession documents require a strict adherence to a liberal “civil society.” The gap between Europe and America is wide.⁴⁰ The main reason Turkey has not yet been accepted is that the EU has doubted its adherence to a democratic, constitutional civil society. Thus the irony is that Turkey- in rejecting U.S. demands for troop transit rights over its territory has, for perhaps the first time, rejected the views of its generals and listened to the demands of its people.” So much for the value of democracies as allies in the U.S. Bush policy.

Moreover, both as member states and as a slowly solidifying pre-confederacy, the EU peoples clearly prefer a foreign policy of support for internationalism. They differ from the U.S. in two respects:

1. They have experienced the horrors of war on their own land and therefore want a world order under the UN and not under the US.
2. They did not undergo the terrorist horrors of 9/11 on their territory, and they doubt the efficacy of the US unilateral anti-terrorist policy.

39 Craig A. Smith, “Joking Aside, A Serious Antipathy To Things American Rises in Europe,” *New York Times*, 02/14/03, p. A11. “The joke, playing off the European stereotype of Americans as simple-minded ... highlights the surprisingly vast cultural gap that divides and periodically confounds people on either side of the Atlantic.... The Iraq crisis has sharpened those differences and exacerbated the current sense of trans-Atlantic estrangement.”

40 Craig A. Smith, *ibid.*

Nor do they have the resources as member states, to defend against terrorism worldwide with their limited national means.⁴¹

Additionally, unlike the US which settled these problems in 1789 and 1861-1865, the EU member states are preoccupied with rule-based continental developments via an agenda for enlargement and deepening the currently somewhat shallow organization of the EU. Created by intellectuals with a dream of uniting democratic Europe and thus preventing the recrudescence of the Napoleonic Wars, WWI, and WWII; the EU leadership has relatively less interest in non-regional affairs. Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina are one thing, Vietnam, Somalia, and Iraq quite another. An interesting exception is the Congo, where the nascent RRF will deploy troops in support of French forces already there.

In an illustrative statement issued on February 18, 2003, the 15 heads of state of the EU issued a statement which was tough on Saddam Hussein but made clear the EU's basic preference for a peaceful solution of the Iraq problem. Moreover, it "perfectly captured the divide between the US and a vast majority of European public opinion. 'We are committed to the United Nations remaining at the center of the international order,' the declaration said. 'We recognize that the primary responsibility for dealing with Iraqi disarmament lies with the [UN-GC] Security Council.'

The EU heads of state declaration went even further into dangerous waters. "In what may be viewed as a form of world government, the supervision of countries by an international civil service bureaucracy whose headquarters is the UN." Bernstein notes the divide between Europe and the US: "This is a notion that has long been viewed with suspicion by the US." He concludes: "the cultural differences between Europeans and Americans boils down in practice to this: European governments believe in the UN as the 'center of world order' and the American government, especially the current American government, tends to be hostile to that idea."⁴²

41 Cf. Richard Bernstein, "The Europeans: Nations Prefer World Order Centered on U.N., Not U.S.," *New York Times*, 02/19/03.

42 *Ibid.*

Yet how odd! For the fact is that the UN is largely an American invention, its headquarters are located in the US, and efforts to develop the concept of international law and international judicial institutions had strong support in the U.S. Everyone at the time recognized the obvious: FDR was “the spiritual father of the United Nations.”⁴³ Washington did not join the League of Nations, but it did join its associated legal organ, the Permanent Court of International Justice. The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 was a joint effort by the U.S. and France to “outlaw war.”

Most of the problems in EU foreign policy decision-making in our view derive from its organizational structure. Indeed we must agree that “...much of the policy of the EU can best be understood as bureaucratic politics”⁴⁴ Like most “top-down” political structures it suffers from bureaucracy and its attendant weaknesses. It also has an associated dilemma in the EU Commission: its conscience forces it to enlargement and attempted integration of states which are not fully developed civil societies, but its structure and history give it a “remote and intrusive” appearance to its national member states and peoples. This is often referred to as “the democratic deficit” which is natural for a supranational organization originated by brilliant bureaucrats which has not had time to anchor itself in the affections of the people of the member states.⁴⁵

Yet the European Union has become perhaps the most hopeful product of the horrors of WWI and WWII. It is clearly the world’s largest trading bloc and its introduction of the European Monetary Union has transformed the economies both of the member states and the entire world. Before the current enlargement to 25 members, the 15 had a larger population than the US (375.3million vs. 271.5 million and an aggregate GDC slighter smaller than the EU: (\$8,345.9 billion vs. \$8,230.9 billion.)⁴⁶ The EU has thus become an international organization and a sort of pre-confederal suprana-

43 Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Swords into Plowshares, The Problems and Progress of International Organization* (NY: Random House) 4th Ed., p. 61.

44 M. Donald Hancock, David P. Conradt et al., *Politics in Europe*, 3rd Ed. NY/Seven Bridges Press, LLC), 2003, p. 502.

45 Passim, pp. 480, 489.

46 Hancock, et al, Table 31.1 & 31.2, pp. 468-9.

tional body with many characteristics of a national government. Its constituent organs mirror in some ways the typical structure of European cabinet democracies rather than the presidential structure familiar to Americans. Both legislative and executive functions are thus “mixed” rather than separated as in the US system. The Council of the EU and the European Council really represent the member states and are made up of officials representing the 15 member states. The EU “executive power” resides primarily in the European Commission which is a supranational body that exercises important executive and supervisory powers on behalf of the EU as a whole and which makes its decisions behind closed doors. The analogy here would be the Cabinet in the UK which, under the leadership of the Prime Minister, usually also does not reach decisions openly until it presents them to the House of Commons where they are debated vigorously. The only EU body with “transparency” is the elective European Parliament whose deliberations are open as in the case of European member state democracies including the U.K.

Clearly “From the outset, the European integration movement has been ‘elite-driven’, with all major initiatives to create, deepen, and expand the Community emanating from the national and regional political levels of politics.” Such decision-making, while understandable, leads to a feeling of “remoteness” and a ‘democratic deficit’ in institutional behavior and accountability.”⁴⁷

The EU Council

From our perspective looking for a cohesive foreign policy from the EU, the fact that the only “binding” body of the EU is the Council whose “directives” are binding as to results, although implementation is left to the governments of the member states. However, the Council also issues “regulations” which are directly binding and require no implementing national legislation as in the case of the directives. Thus unlike UN Secretariat “decisions” or international treaties, the EU regulations do not require member

47 *Ibid.*, p. 480.

governments' "enabling legislation" to carry out their intent. For this reason the EU Council is "supranational" rather than solely "intergovernmental" in law and in practice.

A major problem with respect to delicate foreign policy and security issues for the EU is the complex nature of "decision-making modes" employed. Major "substantive" issues require unanimity of the Council, simple majority of Council votes for "procedural" issues, and the famous (or infamous) qualified majority voting or QMV.

Under the Single European Act of 1986 the QMV procedure has been changed somewhat which in turn has increased the "supranational" character of the Council and the EU itself so that now a simple majority is now "sufficient to enact most policies."⁴⁸ The Council is also widely seen as the "brake" in the EU structure, if not the "locus" of most "parochialism" in the EU. With the addition of Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995, the "blocking minority" of the Council of 23 was increased to 26, while 23 could postpone a Council decision. The Council QVM went from 53 out of 76 but after the compromise agreement of March 1994, the QVM became 62 of 87. The danger to any individual member state increased and none wished to become a "pariah" within the Community. This contributed to the "revolt" against Margaret Thatcher's opposition to an increased UK role within the EU, particularly increased UK support for the EMU. It also contributed to her decision to resign as Tory Party leader in late November of 1990.

The European Commission

The European Commission is the more permanent executive of the European Union and thus the source of much of the movement toward greater integration both enlargement by the addition of primarily Eastern European members plus Malta and Cyprus as well as "deepening" of the EU's power, i.e., further progress toward a pre-confederal organization. Thus commissioners take an oath of loyalty to the EU and promise to accept no national instructions on policy. Formerly a "haven" for national politicians who

48 Hancock, *et al.*, p. 484.

were regarded as “uncomfortable” at home, the Commission was something of a pleasant “exile”. More recently, however, it has become a home for younger technocrats such as Roy Jenkins of the UK and Jacques Delors of France who have supplied much of the drive for enlargement and deepening of the EU. Other commissioners have been regarded as too close to their home countries despite their oath to be independent.

The EU Council appoints one commission member as President with close consultation with the member countries. The tradition has arisen that the Commission President will alternate between the larger and the smaller member countries. The Commission is the major “permanent executive” of the EU and thus has been the opposite of the Council - the major power behind more EU integration. As such the term “Commission” applies not only to the 20 commissioners, but also to the permanent bureaucracy of the Commission, i.e., the “Eurocrats” in Brussels. This includes some 2,500 civil servants plus 10,000 additional staff. Most Eurocrats are EU employees though some are on leave from their member state governments. The EU bureaucracy is divided into 36 “directorates-general (DGs), which correspond to specific functional or policy tasks. Though smaller than many member state bureaucracies, they are highly skilled. Each “DG” is headed by a director-general under the supervision of a commissioner and a cabinet of no more than six personal advisers.

Clearly the work of the Commission is analogous to that of a member state public bureaucracy except that the EU “Eurocrats” are less concerned with the direct implementation of laws than their member state opposite numbers. In most instances the Eurocrats depend on their national counterparts to implement Community law. The main job of the Commission is to generate rules, *European rules*. The Commission thus promulgates rules and regulations based on the underlying constituent EU treaties: the Treaty of Rome, the Single Europe Act, the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Maastricht Treaty and others. Though most Commission rules must be approved by supervisory groups under the Council, the initiative for rulemaking lies in the hands of the Commission and its Eurocrats which are usually given considerable influence over the final shape of EU policy just as is true in the case of member state and U.S. bureaucrats. This

is the more true since the Commission sets the EU Council's agenda and this gives the Commission the opportunity to try to increase the speed of integration—both economic and political.

This increasing role of the Commission has led to a dilemma discussed earlier—it has become the “conscience” of the EU, pushing for enlargement on moral grounds, but it also is seen by many outside experts and populations as embodying a “democratic deficit” which is perhaps endemic to its bureaucratic remoteness and elite-driven staffing. Since the EU has an “open” Parliament and an embryonic if sophisticated executive, its major structural political problem is how to link the two. At present, the Commission is not clearly accountable to the EU Parliament analogous to the way public executive bureaucracies in member states are “responsible” to their parliaments or as the US executive departments are responsible to the US Congress for carrying out the laws and for justifying funding. Moreover, despite direct elections to the EU Parliament, the EU still lacks a strong direct relationship with “its” citizens and has a ways to go to resemble a conventional European parliamentary democracy.⁴⁹

The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

Even as the EU has emerged as an economic giant and provider of political stability throughout the world, it remains a “net consumer” of military security depending ultimately upon the US for protection against weapons of mass destruction. Like Japan, great economic and trade power creates a vacuum which must be filled by itself or an outside power. Thus despite their preoccupation with domestic economic and social issues, the EU countries must face their “military” deficit. They have thus begun to establish a Common Foreign and Security Policy or CFSP required as the EU emerges as a world power itself, independent to a limited degree from its

49 We are indebted to Hancock *et al.*, *op. cit.*, *passim*, chs. 31-32; John Peterson (eds.), *The Institutions of the European Union* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press), 2002; Stephen George & Ian Bache, *Politics in the European Union* (Oxford Univ. Press), 2001; as well as the useful though brief, John Pinder, *The European Union, A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press), 2001 for the above conclusions.

member states. The effort to create such a CFSP runs headlong into the gravest dilemmas of the EU: its origins as a kind of customs union⁵⁰ as it moved from European Coal and Steel Community through its European Community to its current EU with a nascent executive (the Commission), a Parliament, a European Court of Justice, a Central European Bank and a European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, A Court of Auditors, an Economic and Social Committee, and a Committee of the Regions. It has revolutionized Europe's currency with the introduction of the Euro under the European Monetary Union. Now it has very tentatively begun to develop a CFSP and- most hesitantly of all- a European army of 60,000 men. Just as a "language is a dialect with an army" so an EU without one remains helpless in the cruel world of international relations marked by "*No Common Power*"⁵¹ The EU strove to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the first Gulf crisis which failed as many of the EU and Arab countries joined the US in ejecting Iraq from Kuwait. The EU's foreign ministers sought to mediate a cease-fire to the Yugoslav Civil War- again with disappointing results since no EU army existed or was contemplated. Finally the Treaty of Amsterdam empowered the EU Council (not the Commission) to "define the principles and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, *including for matters with defence implications* (ital. added-GC). Article 13 of the Treaty. The functions of a future EU Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) would include peacekeeping, crisis management, humanitarian and rescue operations. The rotating presidency of the EU is assigned formal authority to represent the EU in all matters regarding CFSP.

To help the presidency and the Council, the Amsterdam Treaty authorized the transformation of the secretary-general of the Council into the office of

50 Ernst Renan in his famous 1882 Sorbonne lecture of March 11, 1882, "What is a Nation?" put the matter clearly: "Community of interest brings about commercial treaties.... a Customs Union is not a country." Reprinted from Arend Lijphart, *World Politics* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc.), 1966, p. 79.[bolding added-GC]

51 Robert J. Lieber, *No Common Power, Understanding International Relations*, 3rd Ed. (NY: HarperCollins), 1995. Lieber quotes Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan*, Chapter 13: Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common power to keep them in awe, they are in that condition which is called war."

High Representative for the CFSP. (article 18 of the Amsterdam Treaty). The first “High Representative” of the EU, the Spaniard Javier Solana Madariaga, was appointed by the EU Council in 1999. He had been Secretary-General of NATO previous to his EU appointment.

Different rules apply under the Amsterdam Treaty to military and non-military decisions with the former generally requiring unanimity by the Council and the latter the QVM.⁵² The difficulty for an EU military force (RRF) is that the member states are loathe to provide funding for it especially as it seems to weaken the most sensitive area of EU member state sovereignty - national defense. In addition, many of the large EU countries, especially Germany and France, are trying to *reduce* defense expenditures since their social welfare costs have risen to the point that they threaten to overprice wages and thus reduce export sales. The EU therefore to date has only a small army, but has recently set up a central military headquarters for the future RRF in Tervuren, a suburb of Brussels as part of a new defense strategy. It has also deployed the RRF to the Congo in support of French and Uruguayan peacekeeping forces already there.⁵³ In a highly unpersuasive statement in our view, President Jacques Chirac argued “We are not threatening the transatlantic alliance [e.g., NATO-GC]” but he is quoted as being unwilling to accept a bipolar world dominated by the US: “There is a multipolar world next to the US, with Europe and China. We need a strong EU to have balance,” he said.⁵⁴ But until the proposed Rapid

52 For details, cf. pp., 522-23 in Hancock et al., op. cit. The EU Council agreed that EU armed forces would be subordinate to the Western European Union (WEU) in peacetime and to NATO in wartime. The Treaty of Nice in December 2000 provided for a political and security committee, a military committee, and a military staff within the EU to consider European crises in close consultation with NATO. The hope was expressed to deploy a EU military force by the middle of the decade.

53 “With the approval of the United Nations, France is committing troops to Congo, augmenting the besieged Uruguayan peacekeepers who have been providing a safe haven for more than 35,000 Congolese non-combatants. The French have stated that they will stay until Sept. 1. By then (September 1, 2003-GC), the European union expects that its Rapid Reaction Force will have been deployed to the Congo in support of the French. This intervention will be the first test of the E.U.’s reaction force.” Richard J. Norton, “Act now to save Congo,” *The Providence Journal*, 06/12/03, p B6.

54 Judy Dempsey in Brussels in the *Financial Times* of 05/30/03, pp. 1-2. “EU Leaders

Reaction Force of 60,000 men is fully deployed and operational, the EU is unlikely to be taken seriously by the US⁵⁵ if then.

In our view, the result is to make the EU a non-serious player in regional and world security and to increase European reliance on the US, which is simultaneously seen by many Europeans as an unreliable expansionist hegemonic power. Here again, the divide across the Atlantic seems very serious and both sides of the ocean have contributed by commission or omission. If the Germans do not wish to see Iraq rebuilt by US and UK military forces, they have the option of creating a joint force (RRF) with their French allies. At present, however, they see to want it both ways—criticize the US and UK, but offer no military alternative themselves.

The Military & Security Divide between the US and the EU

The basic problem facing the US and the EU is that the latter recognizes the rise of modern political development in Europe as well as in the Arab and Muslim world and most of the remaining developing world. But the US does not. Bush and his advisers seem to have chosen the wrong epoch for atavistic empire-building - the age of hegemonies is over: As Karl Deutsch foresaw:

unveil plan for central military HQ.” Moreover, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder who is also reputed to be trying to repair ties with Washington noted: there was “very little Europe” within NATO, which Ms. Dempsey concludes was a “veiled criticism over US domination of the alliance.” The current Franco-German brigade would be expanded to give a big push to the EU’s 60,000-strong rapid reaction force [RRF-GC] supposed to be operational by the middle of this year [2003-GC].” They also want to create a European command for strategic air transport by July—a crucial military command the EU lacks for transporting troops and humanitarian aid. European training centers for airlift and helicopter crews would also be set up to harmonise tactics.” Just how this RRF could be established and at the same time defense expenditures be cut by France and Germany is not clear to us. But the overall irritation by “Old Europe” for current US policy in Iraq seems very clear.

55 *Ibid.*, p. 1. Dempsey notes: “Since September 11, 2001, France, Belgium and Germany have campaigned for a stronger European defence policy to give bite to Europe’s foreign policy and to be taken seriously by the US. So far, only France and Britain have begun spending more on defence.”

The End of the Cold War & US-EU Relations

“Worldwide we are witnessing a decline of fatalism and submissiveness to deprivation and oppression. The age-old mass apathy on which the old empires were founded is going irretrievably. We are living in an age of declining tolerance for frustration, for alien rule, and for government from a great distance. This is an age of rising costs of foreign intervention and of its declining effectiveness.”⁵⁶

Thus the US is confronted with rising costs of intervention combined with declining effectiveness. These are marked by an environmental gap already discussed, an economic and trade gap over US-EU issues such as subsidy problems in steel and agriculture (even bananas!); genetically modified bulk food grains; insensitivity to oil drilling in areas such as the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) and Oganiland in Nigeria; human rights issues (the death penalty; the ICC, US walk-out from the Durban, South Africa Conference on Race, etc. Whether willingly or not, the US cannot effectively rely on one leg for its foreign policy: the military. It cannot go it alone even if that were desirable for the military depends upon the economic and political support of many countries even in the narrowest of senses, i.e., access to raw materials which must be imported.

Thus for America to prosper it must return eventually to the reconstruction of world community especially an Atlantic Community even after damaging it severely as witness the splits in NATO and growing unnecessary antagonisms in US relations with South and North Korea, the Muslim world, Russia and China. It sometimes appears as if US policy were deliberately antagonizing the entire rest of the world. America and Europe must become partners again even as trade rivalries proliferate for both have as their bases the unconscious and conscious political cultures rooted in a common set of ideas: the vital importance of civil society and common set of human values.

Conclusions

We agree with Deutsch, in words easily drawn from today’s headlines or TV, he notes:

56 Karl W. Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations*. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice Hall, Inc.), 1978. 2nd Ed., pp. 282-283 [bolding added-GC].

“In our collective sense of belonging, we may learn to seek more for human solidarity and wisdom, and less for national power and prestige, more for the community (...). And less for the peck order of a chicken yard.”

Deutsch concludes:

“In world politics, we may learn to outgrow the fascination of a pseudo conservatism which for thousands of years has trapped people into that futile path which the ancient writers of Greek tragedies called *koros*, the hero’s pride in success; *hybris*, tragic arrogance and overreaching and *ate*, the eventual madness of doom which drives the hero to rush toward self-destruction.”⁵⁷

As my Arab students say, “Inshallah” - may it be willed by Allah.

57 Deutsch, *op. cit.*, , pp. 282-283 [ital. added-GC].

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