This article claims that within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the Union mainly assumes the role of civilian power. Sometimes it also has to assume the political power role and becomes influential by using the attraction of full-membership. However, in cases like the conflict in the Middle East, where the Union still wants to be influential but the ‘membership’ instrument cannot work, the Union displays a poor record. In such situations, institutionalisation of the security dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership may help.

Introduction

Among the foreign policy choices before any international actor is that of determining its position on the isolationism-internationalism continuum. The ends of this range are marked by minimal (that is the isolationism end) and maximal (that is the internationalism end) participation in the international system. In the case of the European Union (EU), if taken as a unified entity acting as an international actor, it is difficult to pinpoint a precise value on this continuum as this value has changed considerably over time in terms of intensity, nature as well as according to the region of the world in question.

In basic terms, it would not be wrong to claim that the EU has displayed a shift towards the internationalist end progressively. Until the beginning of the 1990s, the Union was more concerned with completing its political and economic integration process, and this process was indeed almost completed with some positive results like the Single Market and a single currency as scheduled. Since the Treaty of Maastricht, however, the Union has been trying to develop an effective common foreign and security policy with an internationalist shade. An almost simultaneous qualitative change in the nature of this process occurred in the sense that whilst the
Union has rather been seen as a civilian power in the international scene until recently, there now are the signs of its aspiration to become a political power too. Some regions or country groups like the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states, the Balkans and the Mediterranean have been priority-areas in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the Union. Among these, the Mediterranean exhibited a typical case since the relations between the Union and the countries of the region have always had a political aspect; different than the case of the other regions with which the Union has relations, since as early as the 1970s the Union established contacts with the Mediterranean countries which go beyond providing financial and technical assistance. Since then, the political/security element gradually gained importance and now, this article claims, it needs new instruments like a new organization to govern some issues in this realm.

The Two Faces of the Foreign and Security Policy of the EU

The sources that examine the EU as an international actor (for example (Duchéne, 1973), (Hill, 1990), (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999) or (Ehrhart, 2002)) draw attention to the fact that the European Community (EC) gave the impression of a civilian power in its first decades. That means that in its external relations the Community preferred quiet diplomacy, economic interdependence, multilateral connections and exchange. In concrete terms, it favoured persuasion to coercion; instead of solely relying on European institutions, it followed multiple media and fora of discussion; and finally, it pursued open diplomacy and encouraged public discussion of foreign policy matters (Hill, 1990: 31-35).

Parallel to its ‘civilian power’ identity, the Community developed a ‘political power’ identity. If we take political power literally and in its formal and institutionalised form, what we see is a series of scattered -and belated- attempts in the history of the Community in

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1 The image of the Community as a civilian power was introduced to the literature first by Duchéne (1973). Then, after Bull’s (1982) criticism of the EC as a civilian power, Hill re-examined the question whether the EC was indeed a civilian power or a political power.
this framework: as late as 1970, the Luxembourg Report established the European Political Cooperation (EPC) mechanism which was based on mere foreign policy co-operation and co-ordination. The Single European Act (SEA), then, constituted a legal basis for the EPC. Nevertheless, the result of the process has been the appearance of the (CFSP) of the Union as a separate and intergovernmental pillar with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992.

However, the ‘political power’ identity of the Community as a function thrived independently from and earlier and more remarkably than the inchoate institutional structures it was supposed to emanate from. Whereas the ‘civilian power’ identity presupposed that external relations be based on persuasion and negotiation, the Community started using its economic potency for political purposes; persuasion and negotiation were replaced by coercion and compulsion with economic means. Whilst there was no mention of foreign or security policy in the Treaty, the Community was devolved substantial powers in the field of external economic relations. Through the integration process based on the Treaty, a customs union was set up against the outside world, and a Common Customs Tariff was levied. The term ‘fortress Europe’ was frequently used to denote the state of the Union in this period. The powers of the Community in the field continuously increased to include external representation and negotiation by the Commission in international trade matters. The external relations of the Community used “both carrots (offering or granting rewards) and sticks (threatening or inflicting non-violent punishment)” (Smith, 2000:38).

Nonetheless, examples of the Community directing its political power in this sense specifically and conspicuously on a focal point are infrequent. A rare illustration of this kind may be the relations of the Community with the central and eastern European countries (CEECs). In the last decade, the Community arguably applied an imposition for them to accept specific development directions: an offer of membership was presented to them as a ‘carrot’ which was made conditional to some policy changes mainly on the basis of the Copenhagen criteria. This approach of the Community overlaps with the political power pattern of behaviour (Ibid.).
This leads us to examine whether the EU is willing and/or able to act as a political power, and if it is, whether it can do that each time by exploiting the appeal of full-membership. The Mediterranean policy of the Union will constitute a suitable and interesting case to inquire about these questions.

EU’s Approach to the Mediterranean: A Civilian or Political Power?

The origins of the Mediterranean policy of the Union go back to the year 1994. In June 1994, the European Council in Corfu decided to prepare a proposal for a Mediterranean policy. Since 1991, trade and aid relations between the Union and its Mediterranean neighbours had been overshadowed by the Union’s close relations with the CEECs. Moreover, the Union was trying to achieve the following specific objectives related to the region: preventing wars among the countries of the region, ensuring stabilization by reducing socio-political conflicts, obstructing exports of terrorism and drugs from the region, and impeding the flow of illegal immigration (Rhein, 1996: 77-78). In 1995, the ambitious Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) project was launched, and since then, the co-operation between the two parts has flourished to cover such areas like environment, science, technology and industry. However, this expansion in terms of content did not entail a comparable change in nature; in its Mediterranean policy as such the Union remained mainly a civilian power. Bretherton and Vogler (1999: 156) affirm this argument by stating that “(i)n the Mediterranean region, even where economic presence is substantial, as in relations with Israel and the Maghreb countries, this does not provide a basis for political influence”. In a more detailed fashion, Onursal says that the EMP bears all the characteristics of a civilian power approach:

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2 An interesting view of the relations between the Union and the Mediterranean countries from this perspective, is that of Pace (Pace, 2002) who examines EU-Mediterranean relations in the context of the concept of ‘otherness’.
• It is a partnership based on developing socio-economic structures in Mediterranean countries in order to encourage them to transform themselves into countries respectful of democracy, good governance and human rights.
....

• The EMP has a multilateral and multidimensional framework which requires both vertical and horizontal action and co-operation. Besides bilateral agreements between the EU and each of the Mediterranean countries providing special status for Mediterranean Non-Member Countries (MNCs), there are regional arrangements among the Mediterranean countries which provide a framework for horizontal co-operation.
....

With such a use of multiple avenues, the Community aims to prepare the ground for political dialogue to reduce conflicts and for closer relationships in a wide range of areas such as industry, energy, environment, and communication technologies.
....

• In order to reduce conflicts and misunderstandings inherent in the region, which have prevented any kind of co-operation for years, various kinds of meetings are taking place in the EMP process³:

  - Euro-Mediterranean Civil Forum is an open area of discussion for the future of the Mediterranean region and the partnership, and it has working groups making efforts for the development of regular contacts between the different dimensions established by the Barcelona Declaration.

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³ The network of meetings and conferences has developed much since then (see Bretherton and Vogler, 1999: 160-161) for a later account). However, this character of the system has not changed.
A Parliamentary Forum prospected, gathering the members of the EP, of the parliaments of the 15 Member States, and of the parliaments of the 12 Mediterranean partners.

Conferences among Foreign Ministers are organised periodically.

Consequently, the EMP process has the characteristics of the civilian model foreign policy of the EU which results from, according to Hill, the intellectual impact of a new model of interstate relations, the disposition of considerable economic influence over the management of international economy, the possession of a vast network of contacts and agreements with every region of the international system. (Onursal, 1997: 6-7)

The post-Maastricht literature on Euro-Mediterranean relations includes pieces which may imply that the authors saw the Union taking on a political power status over the region. In 1997, Piening was claiming that the mode and especially the encompassing nature of the relations between the EC and the CEECs since 1989 had suggested that a similar approach may be reproduced for the Mediterranean (Piening, 1997: 80). Similarly, Bretherton and Vogler asserted that with the impetus gained from the Maastricht Treaty, from the experience with the CEECs -here they refer to Piening-, and from the positive atmosphere created by the progress -of the time- in the Middle East Peace Process, the Union may expand the scope of its approach towards the Mediterranean.

But, these expectations have not been met and the Union has preferred to deal with the so-called soft security issues as by their

\[\text{[4]}\] In the context of the Mediterranean, hard security issues can be listed as the conflicts in the Middle East, the conflicts between Turkey and Greece, the problem of weapons of mass destruction, and the security of energy supplies. Soft security issues, on the other hand are the need for economic co-operation, the flow of immigration, the environmental questions, and the problems related to terrorism, minorities and human rights.

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mainly socio-economic nature they are more suitable to being managed by a civilian power approach. Soft security issues require lesser imposition of policies than in the case of hard security issues, and may be sorted out within the mechanisms described in the quotation from Onursal cited above. A group of writers believe that this group of issues should have priority in the Mediterranean agenda of the Union anyway. The famous think-tank the RAND Corporation, for example, holds that excessive emphasis on hard security issues is a simplistic depiction of the problems, and that the situation in the region is shaped more by political upheaval and socio-economic pressures, and by accompanying instability and tension (De Santis, 1998). In the same way, Busuttil points out that despite the armed conflicts in the Middle East and former Yugoslavia, security and its perceived absence should be viewed as much less military and much more socio-economic in nature (Busuttil, 1995: 129). If we are to agree with this view, we may deduce that the Union is equipped with the correct strategy. Indeed, if Aliboni is right, “(m)any Med partners agreed to the Euro-Med partnership not for its security elements, but because they saw it as a way to get economic and financial aid” (PMI, 1998: 9).

Not denying the necessity and success of the civilian side of the issue, it may nevertheless be put forward that there are some issues in Euro-Mediterranean relations to the solution of which the EU cannot contribute by remaining in the confines of the civilian power approach. These problems are the disputes between Turkey and Greece, and the conflict in the Middle East.

The disputes between Turkey and Greece mainly centre around the disputes over the Aegean Sea and Cyprus. These disputes - especially the Cyprus problem- have been introduced into the agenda of the Union first, with the efforts of Greece (PMI, 1997: 78) and also by the fact that all the parties (Greece, Turkey and Cyprus) are involved in the European integration process (Greece being a full-member since 1981, Cyprus due to become a full-member in May 2004, and Turkey a candidate state since 1999). In this context, it is unwarranted for the EU to assume a political power role in the issue. Actually, the EU is leading the issue into a
specific direction by using ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ as the definition of the political power rôle requires:

Mr Jean Christophe Filori, Press Spokesman of the European Commissioner for Enlargement Mr Gunter Verheugen, replying to questions said that if there was still no peace settlement when the EU executive reported in December 2004 on Turkey's own bid to open accession talks, it would be very difficult to recommend starting negotiations.

"If by the time of the report at the end of 2004 there is still no settlement on Cyprus, we will be facing this rather weird situation where a candidate country knocking at the door does not recognise one of our own member states", he said.

Asked whether the EU would consider part of its territory under illegal occupation after Cyprus' accession, Mr Filori replied: "Yes, we can look at things in that way. This occupation has always been considered illegal by the international community, including the EU. Nothing changes there". (PIO, 2003)

It is not surprising to see that yet another hard security issue to the solution of which the Union feels obliged to contribute is handled by using the allure of membership. We see a parallel here to the case of the CEECs.

But the second main conflict that has a relevance to the Mediterranean Policy of the Union⁵, the conflict in the Middle East seems more problematic for the Union since it technically does not permit the use of the decoy of membership: the parties involved in the conflict are simply non-European countries that have no prospect of membership of the Union. It is true that the EU has a major function in the Middle East Peace Process by providing political and economic support. In concrete terms this covers

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⁵ The Middle East Peace Process is assumed separate but complementary to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. See the quotation from Europa below.
Political support

- Facilitator in the Peace Process, notably through regular meetings with the main actors involved and visits by EU leaders ..., by the EU Troika (present and incoming Presidency, the High Representative for CFSP, and the Commission) and the activities of the EU Special Envoy for the Peace Process, Ambassador Miguel Moratinos. The political talks with all parties, aimed at promoting the EU's positions, contribute to strengthen the role of the Union in the negotiations for the final settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict.

- Frequent CFSP statements by the EU Presidency call upon the parties to overcome the stalemate of the process or support and welcome progress achieved.

- CFSP joint actions such as monitoring of the Palestinian elections of early 1996 and training of Palestinian policemen.

- Transatlantic dialogue and cooperation on the MEPP (resulting, inter alia, in the EU-U.S. Declaration on the Wye Memorandum, December 1998).

- Facilitator of regional dialogue through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Although separate, the Barcelona Process and the Peace Process are complementary. Without the 1991 "Madrid Process", the Barcelona Process would not have been possible four years later in the present form. One of the successes of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is to have allowed, against a tense background, dialogue to be pursued between Mediterranean Partners involved in the MEPP in a context of regional meetings on all questions of common interest. The Partnership still remains the only multilateral forum outside the United Nations where all the conflict parties meet. The Palestinian Authority is recognised as an equal Mediterranean Partner.

- The Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability, elaborated by senior officials of the 27 partners dealing with political and security matters, will
contribute to the maintenance of peace and ensure stability in the region. This instrument, which will cover existing partnership-building or confidence-building measures, will give the EU a lasting political role in this conflict area.

**Economic support**

- Largest donor of non-military aid to the MEPP: 179 million euro a year on average over the past six years in direct support of the Palestinian Authority, refugees and regional Peace Process projects. With indirect support to the Peace Process (bilateral and regional aid) of more than 630 million euro to Israel's four neighbouring countries, the EU's total economic support on average goes beyond 810 million euro a year in EC grants and EIB loans (747 million euro in 1999).
- First donor of financial and technical assistance to the Palestinian Authority providing over 50% of the international community's finance for the West Bank and Gaza Strip between 1994 and 1998 (grants and loans of the EU and its Member States during that period total 1.5 billion euro). Together with Norway, the EU co-chairs meetings of the international donor mechanism, the Ad-Hoc Liaison Committee for Assistance to the Palestinians (AHLC). EU assistance, including from its Member States, as regular budget support to UNRWA for the benefit of Palestinian refugees totals 505 million euro in grants for 1994-1998. Thus total aid to the Palestinians for the period 1994-1998 accounts for 2 billion euro.
- First trading partner and major economic, scientific and research partner of Israel.
- Major political and economic partner of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt.
- Gavel holder of the Regional Economic Development Working Group (REDWG) within the Multilateral Framework of the Peace Process and co-organiser of the working groups on environment, water and refugees.
Regional economic, social, cultural and human cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process encourages integration and mutual understanding among the States and peoples of the region.

Bilateral economic and financial cooperation with all parties involved in the MEPP (except Israel due to its high GDP level), provided through the MEDA Programme of the EU budget as one of the main instrument of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, creates the conditions for peace, stability and prosperity in the region.

Besides the European Council and the EU Council, the European Commission plays a major role in shaping the EU's position and supporting its role. (Europa, 2003a)

Even the severest critic of the function of the Barcelona Process in the Middle East Peace Process would have to accept the estimable fact that within the activities of the Barcelona Process Israeli officials sit at the same table with their counterparts. The Special Envoy of the Union to the Middle East Peace Process, Miguel Angel Moratinos, draws attention to this fact, and is hopeful about the Union’s position about the future task of the Union in the Middle East. (PMI, 1998: 16-17). However, it is very obvious that the problem persists. It would of course be unjust to blame the EU for the failure of the international efforts to put out the blaze in the Middle East. It is also difficult to pinpoint the reasons for the inadequacy that lies on the EU’s part. But we may deduce the following points:

1) The general weakness of the CFSP of the EU: Instead of detailed arguments, it would suffice here to recall that the CFSP is rather based on the lowest common denominator principle, and is not backed up by a military capability.

2) The fact that EU-Middle East relations are mainly based on economic grounds: Both of the parties of the EU-Middle-East affiliation prefer to base their relations on
economic grounds. For Chris Patten, the External Relations Commissioner, for example, an amelioration in the EU-Middle East relations first and foremost means an increase in EU’s spending on the area:

I note the calls in both reports\(^6\) for the EU to play a more active role in the Peace Process. Let us not underestimate our contribution. We are the major donor to the Palestinian Authority. Last year €155.6 M was earmarked from the Community budget which included € 90 M for a special cash facility which I made available at the end of the year to preserve the institutional framework of the Palestinian Authority that we have helped to create and fund. And there are other ways in which we are raising our profile: J. Solana is an active member of the Committee established to find out the facts behind the recent troubles, and our Special Envoy, M. Moratinos, is in close touch with all the parties involved in seeking a settlement. (Europa, 2003b)

Later on Mr. Patten illustrated the same fact with a meaningful title to an article he wrote for the *Financial Times*: “A Road Map Paid for in Euros” (Patten, 2003).

Also, the Med partners agreed to the Euro-Med partnership not for its security elements, but because they saw it as a way to get economic and financial aid” (PMI, 1998: 9).

What, then, would be an alternative strategy for the EU in dealing with the Middle East or with similar problems that may arise in the Mediterranean? Is there a way for the EU to be more effective in the region acting as a political power? The following section seeks to answer this question within a Mediterranean perspective.

\(^6\) Refers to the two reports prepared for a Common strategy for the Mediterranean and reinvigorating the Barcelona process.
A New Institutional Basis for EU-Mediterranean Security Relations

Today, the clash in the Middle East is probably the most problematic security issue on the agenda of EU-Mediterranean relations. But, since the Mediterranean region is rather a cluster of many different regions each having its own potential conflicts, it is difficult to ensure that no other conflicts will accompany the one in the Middle East; and it is not likely that the Union will be able to use the attraction of membership to extinguish them. Biad divides the possible conflicts in the region\(^7\) into two categories. His first category is “constituted by territorial and border disputes such as those between Israel and Palestine, Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, Greece and Turkey, Turkey and Syria, Egypt and Sudan, Spain and Morocco and those in the Western Sahara” whereas his second category is “represented by ethno-cultural rivalry as in the former Yugoslavia, Cyprus, and that which is part of the Kurdish question” as well as “the low-intensity violence of terrorism in Algeria and Egypt” (Biad, 1999).

One way to prevent such conflicts is to bring in a new institutional structure. The introduction of such a structure can be justified by at least four arguments:

1) The current presence of the USA in Iraq and the reaction displayed against this situation by both the indigenous people of Iraq as well as by many of the countries of the world, should now forbid Western powers from appearing ‘invasive’. Biad had given an appropriate warning, saying that in the framework of the relations with the Mediterranean countries,

response to a security threat should not be based on an imposed formula that carries with it the risk of being perceived as intrusive in the eyes of the southern countries. Rather, such a response should be based on a co-operative approach that

\(^7\) For an alternative and detailed account of alternative lists of possible risks that the EU may face from the Mediterranean region see (Tanner, 1999).
departs from a common definition of risks and responses. (Biad, 1999)

A Euro-Mediterranean security organisation would be a venue where the security problems of the region will be discussed in the presence of all the parties involved.

2) To complement the previous point, the establishment of such an organisation will also serve some practical aims as well. Calleya’s criticism of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership process in general is valid in this context too. He says that this Partnership is “too centred on Brussels, and a Mediterranean pole must be created to balance the relationship and to eliminate neo-colonial tendencies….” (PMI, 1998: 10).

3) The cleavage between the USA and some of the Member States of the Union once again casts doubts over the transatlantic connection of the European security structure. Considering the fact that the Union is still short of the necessary military might to intervene in conflicts, the importance of preventing conflicts before they break out becomes apparent. An institutional structure seems likely to be helpful to this aim.

4) The option of including the Middle Eastern countries in the existing organisations is not possible in many cases as “many countries in Central and Eastern Europe, or even in Central Asia and the Middle East, passionately desire to join the EU or NATO but do not fit –economically, militarily or politically” (Calleo, 2001).

There have already been some efforts to institutionalise the security dimension of Euro-Mediterranean relations. These include the OSCE/CSCE, the Euro-Arab Dialogue, the Five+Five\(^8\), CSCM, the ACFIS and the Mediterranean Forum. However, for some reason

\(^{8}\) France, Italy, Malta, Spain and Portugal on one side and Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia on the other side.
none of these schemes could establish necessary mechanisms for conflict prevention.⁹

In fact, the Barcelona Declaration itself also contained the seed for such a mechanism to develop: The Action Plan for the Development of the Political-Security Chapter of the Barcelona Process identified six priority areas:

- Enhancement of stability and reinforcement of democratic institutions,
- Preventative diplomacy and good neighbourly relations,
- Confidence and security-building measures,
- Ways and means of arriving at regional security and an arms control and disarmament arrangement,
- Prevention of and fight against terrorism,
- Fight against organised crime (Marquina, 1999)

To realise these aims, four operational mechanisms were proposed:

- The establishment of communication networks among focal points,
- Strengthening dialogue as an early warning procedure (by setting up a Euro-Situation Centre) and establishing a dispute prevention mechanism.
- Appointing conciliators to facilitate political conciliation procedures,
- Peaceful settlement of disputes by Euro-Med instruments. (Ibid.)

These proposed mechanisms are criticised by Marquina as being “purely diplomatic”, and having a “short-term” and “voluntary” basis. Indeed, throughout the four years since Marquina’s article nothing much has come out of these mechanisms.

The exigency for institutionalising the security side of the Euro-Mediterranean relationship on the one hand, and the failure of the

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⁹ For more information on these attempts and their failure, see (Biad, 1999) and (Marquina, 1999).
attempts in this framework on the other has induced politicians and academics alike to put forward proposals. These proposals extend from setting up of an over-arching security organisation to establishing a more modest conflict prevention centre.

According to Armand de Decker, the chairman of the Belgian Senate, the EU should form a kind of cordon sanitaire in the Mediterranean. A new security organisation that will emulate the NATO with its secretariat and parliamentary assembly, in his opinion, is the best instrument to ensure security in the Mediterranean. In a generally critical tone against the American approach to the developments in the Middle East, de Decker maintains that, this organisation can be called “the Euro-Mediterranean Alliance” and should welcome the access of all the coastal countries of the Mediterranean. (Gorus, 2003: 37)

Abdullah Toukan, an advisor to King Hussein of Jordan, has a more moderate blueprint. He aims at preventing conflicts before they arise. He

envisions a Conflict Prevention Centre as a regional forum for policy-makers to address a wide range of non-military security related issues such as energy, water, demography, human rights and the environment. To shape the relations between participating states, Toukan proposes following the general guidelines of Article VIII of the United Nations Charter as well as the more specific codes of conduct set out in the Helsinki Final Act. Toukan notes that working with Europe, by building on its experience through the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), would provide an important link between Middle Eastern and European Security. (Toukan, 1997: 80)

The four requirements mentioned above for an institutionalised form of Euro-Mediterranean partnership can be satisfied by the proposals of de Decker and Toukan both, or anything in between at

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10 De Decker does not use the term cordon sanitaire. But his idea seems to fit the term.
present it seems difficult to specify the best form for such an organisation. De Decker’s suggestion may seem pretentious, but we should remember that it was the idea of European integration itself which was once scorned. Toukan’s side, on the other hand, may also be criticised as having the defect of remaining ineffective in the face of real threats. However, taking into consideration the differences of opinion, needs and capabilities both among the Member States of the EU as well as among the Mediterranean countries, such modest proposals seem more likely to survive and function.

Conclusion

The Union aspires to become more internationalist as it gets more integrated. Yet, it is a fact that the oft-quoted flaws of the CFSP prevent the Union from getting as internationalist as it desires. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is an exceptional case in this context since

1) The Union is able to evade the restrictions of the CFSP by pursuing a civilian power approach towards many of the Mediterranean countries; instead of leading them in specific directions, it chooses a mode of relationship based on co-operation, dialogue and assistance;

2) In the case of the issues where the civilian power approach is short of engendering the desired effect, the Community resorts to the political power approach and uses full-membership as a ‘carrot’. This strategy did work in the case of the CEECs - outside the Mediterranean region - and to some extent in that of Turkey - in the Mediterranean;

3) However, there are - and may be in the future- some cases where the civilian power approach is still inadequate but at the same time full-membership is no enticement. The conflict in the Middle East is an example of this; and

4) In the cases mentioned in the previous point, establishing some institutional mechanisms at Euro-Mediterranean level
would serve some aims: the Mediterranean countries, having an equal say, will not feel coerced or manipulated; the unidirectional and centralist nature of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership will gain a more balanced structure; the institution will be a forum where conflicting parties will have the opportunity to come together; and there will be an opportunity for the Union to obviate direct American involvement in the region in the long-run.

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