"EURATOM, ITS RELATIONS TO THE OTHER EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES AND ITS REGULATORY RESPONSIBILITIES"

Address by Theo Vogelaar
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I. The program of this Institute speaks of "the European Community" instead of the (three) European Communities. I'm glad it does as this simplification is to a great extent justified. In fact the three existing Communities merely represent three aspects of one vaster concept, the concept of the economic integration of the six Member States composing the Community.

Although the three Communities differ as to their tasks, their field of action and - to some degree - as to means and powers given to them for the achievement of their aims, they all operate mainly along the same pattern. Moreover all three are means to the same final end, further European integration.

Nevertheless there is some danger in putting too much emphasis on these elements of uniformity.

There is a tendency at present in Europe, and outside, to have the three European Communities all merged into one, for sound reasons of efficiency mainly.

My personal feeling (and I want to emphasize that I express nobody's opinion here but my own) is that such an amalgamation into one
Community, covering all fields of industrial activity, would put too much stress on the economic aspect of the whole operation, and too little on the political side of our endeavour. Merging the Communities may be a completely logical and sound operation if one considers economic integration as the final end, but not if one considers the point where we are now, as an intermediate station on the road to a much closer political union of the Member States than the present Community in all its economic aspects has to offer.

Of course, cooperation between the institutions of the three Communities, has to be as intensive as possible. Duplication of work and any confusion have to be avoided. For that reason, in the Treaties establishing the Economic Community and Euratom, a high degree of coordination and simplification has been provided for. To the same end, the Coal & Steel Treaty has been modified, with the result that a multiplicity of institutions responsible for the achievement of similar aims within the European Communities has been avoided. Instead, a certain number of single institutions has been created. There is one single Parliament, called the Assembly, and one single Court of Justice for the three Communities.

Both, the Common Market Treaty and the Euratom Treaty, provide for the establishment of an Economic and Social Committee, acting in a consulting capacity and assisting the Council of Ministers and both Commissions in the fulfilment of their task. There are, however, not two Committees, but only one for the two Communities.

There is in fact one single Council of Ministers for Euratom and the Common Market. The Council of Ministers for the Coal & Steel
Community has a slightly different task, but has in fact the same composition, namely of the Cabinet members of the Governments of the Member States. Moreover between the Executives (High Authority, the Economic Commission and the Euratom Commission) a number of inter-executive working groups has been formed, such as:

1. **The Committee of the Presidents of the three Executives.**
   This Committee examines problems on the general policy and all those questions where a common policy of the three Executives is required.

2. **The Committee of Inter-Executive Cooperation.**
   Each Executive is represented in this Committee by one of its Members, assisted by staff members, if necessary. This Committee examines general questions of organisation and all other issues, not being general political questions, where a common policy of the three Executives is required.

3. **Inter-Executive Working Groups.**
   These groups are composed of a member of each Executive, assisted, as need may be, by a secretary and one or more staff members.

   In fact there are five working groups:

   a) on foreign relation questions (e.g. problems of the Free Trade Area);

   b) the energy committee on the common energy policy of the Member States;
To the outside world, the number of institutions functioning within the Community may be confusing. In fact their variety is not the cause of the main problems of the Community's future. The question how to push the Community on, how to transform the now existing basis of economic integration into a closer political union forms the bigger issue.

Complete amalgamation might, I fear, result in a limitation of our ways and means to our political destiny, involving greater risks as to the successful and speedy arrival. To prepare and to try a federal form of Government in Europe requires the greatest variety of experiments and expediency. Restrictions as to form and shape seem more appropriate in a later stage, not during the period of political research and revolutionary development, in which Europe now finds itself.

II. The struggle for integration on the old Continent is indeed of a revolutionary nature. But it is a new type of revolution fought with extremely peaceful weapons, the weapons of law and conviction.

The classic European habit of seeking bloody solutions to all important issues seems to be abandoned. The growing institutions have to fight to hold their own, but they have no forces in the sense of armies, troops or policemen to maintain the law or defend themselves against disruptive forces within the Community. In this fight the law is their
only support and trust. The military men have been replaced by the lawyers. This is a change which, of course, makes things better, but which involves at the same time some inconveniences, with which you and I are, professionally, familiar.

Fortunately the European Community has allies. Initially, that is to say at the time the concept of the three Communities was devised, the six Governments themselves, led by the creative minds of a few great Statesmen, took the lead of public opinion, which saw in European integration the great hope for a better future.

After the conclusion of the Treaties, a new strong ally came to the Community's help. It is business now that anticipates the future economic situation in which it has to operate, thus becoming the principal power impatient to get the Community into full existence. At the same time the national Governments appeared to grow less enthusiastic. The driving force of the Statesmen, who initially conceived the Community, was to a certain degree replaced by the more conservative tendencies of the six national administrations, which now have the principal responsibility for the way the long-term masterplan has to be transposed into short-term procedures. These more conservative tendencies are, it should be granted, rather natural. Each Government has the instinctive practice to preserve its national powers and to use these powers to protect those national elements which might be affected by the development of the new Community. Business life however is not impeded by these political implications, but envisages the final market situation which, it feels with unfailing instinct,
will - sooner or later - be established. Those who act first on these anticipations will have the best starting position under the developing circumstances. The hurry of industry to adapt itself to the future infuses the Community now, with the momentum necessary for success. Moreover the general public seems to be continually in support of closer political unity among the European nations.

The motives for a closer union, however, seem to have changed in the course of the years; anyhow the accent has been shifted.

The driving motive for the conclusion of the Coal & Steel Treaty in 1951 was to constitute peace in Europe and to guarantee its maintenance. The preamble of the Coal & Steel Treaty expresses this idea clearly in nearly every paragraph by saying, for instance: "... that world peace may be safeguarded only by creative efforts as great as the dangers menacing it; that Europe should contribute to civilisation by the maintenance of peaceful relations; that the Contracting Parties are resolved to substitute for their historic rivalries a fusion of their essential interests and to establish, by creating the Coal & Steel Community, the foundation of a broader Community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts". The doom of war is everywhere in this preamble.

The climate in 1951 was favorable to this approach: great parts of Europe had to be reconstructed from scratch and the recollection of the disasters of war was fresh in every mind. Some years later the possibility of an internal European war seemed extremely remote, as it is now. In 1957 it was no longer necessary to include in the preambles of the new Treaties a specific reference to a ban of war.
The European Economic Community is not presented to the world as the great newly discovered remedy against the evils of war. The motives expressed have a more positive flavour. The Treaty speaks of the wish for an even closer union between the European peoples, of eliminating the barriers which divide Europe, of removing existing obstacles, and trade restrictions and of assuring fair competition for European industries as a means not merely to exclude future wars, but primarily to ensure economic progress, to improve the standard of living and to develop the prosperity of Europe and the overseas territories to which it has special ties.

But the considerations that led to the Coal & Steel Treaty, namely the threat of war, and those that led to the Common Market Treaty, namely the economic barriers which have been dividing Europe so long, have one thing in common: they both look over their shoulders to history and there they find the justification for the creation of each Community.

For Euratom the background is different. The action is as positive as the results anticipated. The Euratom Treaty - in its preamble - doesn't look backward to past wars or existing obstacles to free economic development. It solely looks ahead, offering the prospect of a better future as a result of the creation and development of nuclear industry,

There is another difference of accent between Euratom and the other two Communities.

In the preamble of the Euratom Treaty the parties express their conviction that "only a common effort undertaken without delay, can lead to achievements commensurate with the creative capacities of the six
countries." This indeed is full of wisdom and modesty. Euratom is based on the realistic feeling of the participants, that they are small and, individually, would be too weak to cope effectively with the big problems of nuclear development. But their starting point is a full confidence in the adequacy of their combined skill and science.

There is a last general remark which I want to make in order to indicate Euratom's special character. And again I take the words of the Treaty: "The aims of Euratom shall be to create the conditions necessary for the speedy establishment and growth of nuclear industries." This means that Euratom has to further industry directly, whereas the Coal & Steel Community and the Common Market do so indirectly by creating a favourable climate and stopping there. This difference of purpose results in a difference of procedure and execution. The direct relations between Euratom and industry compels the Euratom organisation to think, so to say, the industrial way.

The Treaty provisions contain certain safeguards which take care of this situation. The institutional balance of power within the Euratom Community (Council of Ministers, Commission, the Assembly and the Court of Justice) is approximately the same as within the Common Market. But the Euratom Treaty provides for an even more regular exchange of views and compulsory consultation between the Commission and representatives of industry. For instance in many cases, a proposition of the Commission to the Council of Ministers to enact a regulation, has to be preceded by a consultation of industrial committees (Economic and Social Committee, Scientific and Technical Committee and the Advisory Committee of the Supply Agency for
nuclear fuel). In practice the Commission calls for the views of representa-
tives of industry and their technical experts of its own free will (insurance
matters, naval propulsion, health protection, etc.) and will go on doing so
in order to be able to fulfil its task competently.

III. According to the program of this conference my second topic is
the regulatory function of the Euratom Commission, taking this function
as an example for the structure of all three Communities. Strangely enough
its regulatory power is in practice of less use for the Euratom Commission
in gaining its objectives than it is for the Executives of the other two
Communities.

I have just explained that Euratom's primary aim is to further
industry directly. But the direct links the Euratom Community, or rather
its Executive, the Commission representing the Community, has with industry,
seldom take, or will take, the shape of imposing Euratom's will upon
industry. The support Euratom is to give to industry should not be of a
form that ties down business activity or that should bring industry under
control of a new super-governmental institution. On the contrary, the idea
is that private enterprise or special Government entities operating in the
nuclear field, as the case may be, maintain the largest freedom for develop-
ment. Euratom has to stimulate, and will regulate no more than is strictly
necessary. As a result the Commission's legal ties with industry are more
contractual than regulatory. No other Community has concluded as many
private contracts with industry as Euratom has.
Not only have contractual relations been established with enterprises, but with Member States as well. The establishment of Euratom research centers at Ispra (Italy), Karlsruhe (Germany) and Petten (The Netherlands) are not based on the exercise of legislative power, but on contracts freely negotiated and concluded, or to be concluded shortly, between the Euratom Commission and the Member States, Italy, Germany and The Netherlands, respectively.

Apart from contracts with States, persons or enterprises within the Community, contracts have been concluded with third countries. Here, of course, I don't refer to international agreements or conventions for cooperation, which the Euratom Commission has concluded with the United States, Great Britain and Canada, but to contracts concluded within the framework of such cooperation. The Joint U.S.A./Euratom Program for reactor buildings and common research is such a contract although I won't deny - by saying so - the lofty nature of the contracting parties, being the Euratom Commission and the U.S. Government.

The contracts concluded, or to be concluded, with industry do not only involve European industry, but others as well. For instance - and this may affect the client of any lawyer in this country - as a result of the U.S.A./Euratom Program a number of research contracts have been negotiated and concluded with U.S. industry.

The Joint U.S.A./Euratom Research and Development Board has so far received 281 definite proposals for participation in this program; 120 by European parties, 79 by U.S. parties and 82 by Europeans and Americans.
combined. Of these, 23 have been accepted: contracts have been concluded for an amount of about 1 million dollars. 19 proposals are now being negotiated for an amount of approximately 4 1/2 million dollars. The rest of the proposals are either rejected or subject to further examination. And this is yet the beginning of a 100 million dollar program to which either party - Euratom and U.S.A.E.C. - will contribute with equal shares.

It should be observed that contracts for research work in the United States are concluded by the U.S.A.E.C., whereas Euratom is the contracting party for research work to be carried out in Europe, but all contracts involve the consent of both Euratom and the U.S.A.E.C.
IV. From what I have been saying about the influence of the industrial character of Euratom on the Euratom Commission's policies and procedures nobody, I hope, will derive the false conclusion that Euratom is merely a sort of big investment house spending money and making funds available. I have only put emphasis on the industrial aspect of Euratom as I thought this might be of interest from the standpoint of the American lawyer who faces problems of doing business in the Community. Actual problems of business exist in the atomic trade already; U. S. industry is already beginning to have direct dealings with Euratom or with enterprises within the Community. Euratom is there to promote mutually beneficial relations.

But we should not forget Euratom's principal means of achieving its aim and mandate. The six Member States of the Community have channeled into Euratom a number of powers which Euratom can use, as a supranational institution, against anybody within the Community, including the Member States. This granting to Euratom of special but limited regulatory powers is indispensable and we will see why.

First, nuclear science and industrial development in the Community is in arrear as compared to the United States, Russia and Great Britain. To make up for this and to arrive at a really speedy development of nuclear industry, exceptional measures have to be taken, requiring such regulatory authority.

Furthermore: applying nuclear power and carrying out nuclear research work is a hazardous and even dangerous operation. The relative
smallness of the Member States and high population density, require coordination and harmonization of measures to insure protection for health, as well as measures against abuse of materials.

Finally: nuclear industry in Europe is in its infancy. There are as yet few vested interests in the field and, hence a fine opportunity is offered to prevent the establishment of trade restrictions for nuclear products. These trade restrictions could result from customs duties as well as from restrictive practices and price manipulations of industry itself.

It is not my intention to enumerate all the regulatory powers of Euratom, but I will indicate some main types and examples related to the issues I just mentioned, to illustrate the system:

(a) The Treaty provides in Chapter II that the Commission shall disseminate to Member States, persons and enterprises within the Community all information which results from the implementation of the Euratom research program or which is communicated to the Commission with the right to make free use of it. Further, the Commission acts as an intermediary for the exchange of provisional or final results of research work done within the Community. It has to create - so to say - a market of technical and scientific information.

The Commission has to be kept informed of all applications for patents relating to a specific nuclear subject as soon as they are filed with a Member State. In many cases the Commission may have an interest in being informed of the contents of such application, the
existence of which it has been notified. If the applicant should not
consent to the communication of the contents of his application, the
Commission is nevertheless entitled, after a certain lapse of time, to
receive all information it wants, from the Member State concerned.

The same sort of procedure is applicable as regards patents
themselves. In the event an amicable arrangement is not reached with
the patent owner, non-exclusive licenses may be granted to the Commission
or to other entities in the Community through the intermediary of the
Commission by means of arbitration. If the patent owner refuses to
submit the case to arbitration, the Commission can require that such
licenses be granted directly by the Member State where the patent has
been filed. By requiring this, the Commission is, I think, executing
a regulatory power. But from the whole procedure it is clear that full
safeguards have been inserted for the protection of private interests.
The final power to demand a license against the will of the patent owner
should be considered as an ultimate remedy. The Commission has first to
make all efforts to reach a satisfactory arrangement with the inventor
or the patent owner.

This procedure demonstrates Euratom's nature, its determination,
to assist industry, to exercise its responsibility in the ways consistent
with business practice and to reserve its power of decision only as an
ultimate act.

(b) In matters of health protection the major responsibility
lies with Member States. But, in order to harmonize the measures to be
taken and to guarantee that all States take adequate measures, the
Euratom Commission has, with the assistance of highly qualified experts,
worked out basic standards regarding:

1. The maximum doses of ionizing radiations compatible with adequate safety;
2. The maximum permissible degree of exposure and contamination and
3. The fundamental principles for the medical supervision of workers.

These basic standards have been determined by the Council of Ministers in conformity with the proposal of the Commission after consultation of the Assembly and the Economic and Social Committee. The Council could have rejected the Commission's proposals - in fact it has not. The Council had no power to modify them unless by unanimous vote. According to the legal procedure provided for in the Treaty, the basic standards have been communicated to the Member States in the form of a so-called directive. A directive binds Member States as to the result to be achieved, while leaving them, or their domestic agencies, the responsibility as to ways and means. Consequently, the basic standards will have to be translated into State legislation, the Commission having to be assured of its adequacy. If a Member State fails to do so, the Commission may initiate action before the Court of Justice of the Communities, which may condemn such States to enact appropriate legislation. The authority to pass directives is a sort of indirect legislative power given to the Community in special cases. The legal authority of the Community is superior to that
of the Member States, not only in the sense that no national Parliament or Government may disobey, but - as eight years Coal & Steel experience have shown - no Member State will disobey once the Court of Justice has decided.

(c) In matter of safety control there is a more direct approach. Regulatory and administrative measures can be taken by the Commission in order to satisfy itself that in the territories of Member States:

(1) Ores, source materials and special fissionable materials are not diverted from their intended uses as stated by the users and

(2) That the Treaty provisions are observed with respect to supplies and any special undertaking concerning measures of control entered into by the Community in an agreement concluded with a third country or an international organization.

At variance with U. S. practice, Euratom doesn't issue licenses. Anybody within the Community is allowed to set up or to use facilities for the production, processing, separation or use of nuclear materials without a license from Euratom. But anyone setting up or employing such facilities shall make a declaration to the Commission setting out the basic technical characteristics of such facilities. The nature and scope of this obligation has been defined in a regulation of the Commission,
although the Treaty gives no such power to the Commission explicitly. But in this and other cases, the Commission has based itself on the theory of implied powers, by asserting that it could not perform its task properly, were it not to have available, in sufficient detail, the information which the industries concerned have to communicate in order to comply with the general rule provided for in the Treaty. The Member States - reluctantly - have resigned themselves to this thesis and this was a legal victory of the Commission.

Now then the Commission, being in possession of all relevant data concerning the facilities, requires the maintenance and the presentation of operating records in order to permit accounting for ores, source materials and special nuclear materials used, produced or transported. The contents of these operating records are defined in regulations drawn up by the Commission and approved by the Council of Ministers.

The facilities may be inspected by agents of the Commission who shall, at all times, have access to the facilities subject to safety control so as to satisfy the Commission that the control provisions of the Treaty and the relevant regulations are adequately followed.

In the event of infringement, penalties may be imposed by the Commission. This is the only case where the Treaty provides for direct sanctions. The sanctions include, amongst others placing of the enterprise under the administration of a board appointed jointly by the Commission and the State concerned, as well as the withdrawal of nuclear materials. Furthermore, in the event of infringement of the control
provisions or opposition to the carrying out of inspection, the Commission - if there is danger in delay - may itself issue a written order, in the form of a decision, to the effect that the inspection be carried out. Such decision shall be submitted without delay to the President of the Court of Justice for subsequent approval.

If there is no danger in delay the Commission shall apply to the President of the Court of Justice for a warrant to enforce the carrying out of the inspection. In such a case the President shall give a decision within a period of three days.

Here indeed we have a case of full federal powers and means. Regulations are issued by the Commission, which supervises their execution. The Court of Justice has full jurisdiction and special proceedings adapted to the urgency of the matter. Of course, here as in all other cases where the Court passes a sentence, the writ of execution shall be served by the national authorities, without any further "exequator" being required. The verdicts of the Court of Justice are in all respects put on a par with those of the national courts and tribunals.

The role which the single Court of Justice of the three Communities has to play in the whole legal system of the Community, cannot be sufficiently stressed. In fact the Court is the highest authority on the respect of the Treaty provisions, the supreme protector and hope of the Community's powers.

(d) During this conference the problems of the common market in being have been discussed. It should be realized, however, that a
complete common market exists already for the exchange of nuclear products, including products which can, by their nature, be solely used by nuclear industry or for nuclear research purposes and those which are only in fact used for these purposes, although by their nature they could be used otherwise. As from January 1, 1959 this common market is in full existence and there is an entirely free exchange without any customs duties on imports and exports and without any quantitative restrictions between the Member States. In this respect Euratom is the vanguard of the Economic Community. There has even been established a common customs tariff with respect to imports from third countries. Member States agreed on this tariff before January 1, 1959. If they had not done so the Commission could have used its regulatory power to lay down the duties to be applied, but the Member States - under the lead of the Commission - preferred to anticipate such measures. The duties of the outer tariff vary from 0 to 12 percent, but for reactor and reactor parts and equipment this tariff has been suspended for a period of three to five years the lengthening of this regime not being excluded.

In this matter we see that the regulatory power of the Community works preventively and has, by its existence alone, sufficient weight to bring about the desired results.

(e) Finally I would like to say something on the problem of competition and restrictive trade practices.

I must confess not to be an expert on rules of competition, but it seems to me that there is an alternative to anti-trust and cartel laws,
namely the prospect of actual Government interference with prices; the one system may supersede or be complementary to the other.

The Euratom Treaty has no specific provision on this subject. Therefore, the enterprises or persons active in the nuclear field are subject to all rules of competition of the Common Market Treaty, which are applicable regardless of the activity of the enterprises.

Nuclear industry is distinguished from other industry by the use it makes of nuclear material, and for that reason it depends on the supply and sale of those materials.

Now then, the Euratom Commission has very wide powers in matters of the supply of nuclear materials to users within the Community, the exportation of such materials outside the Community and their price at each transaction. Its authority to intervene in this area reinforces the competition rules of the common market as regards persons or enterprises active in the nuclear field. Trade in these materials can be controlled by Euratom so as to exclude unfair competition in the basic resources of nuclear industry.

I will only very summarily indicate the system.

The Euratom Treaty provides, that the supply of ores, source materials and special fissionable materials to users within the Community shall be ensured on the principle of equal access to resources and by the pursuit of a common supply policy. All practices designed to ensure a privileged position for certain users are prohibited.
For this purpose an Agency has been constituted which has legal personality and is entrusted with vast powers, but operates entirely under the control of the Commission. This Agency has an exclusive right of concluding contracts relating to supplies of those materials coming from inside or from outside the Community. The Agency has not, by necessity, to be a party itself to all supply contracts. It even seems more desirable that it is not, leaving the interested trading partners to arrange their own transactions. Only in exceptional cases, for instance a general shortage demanding an allocation of available supplies prorata to the orders, or in case of supplies within the framework of an international agreement entered into between the Community and a third country or international organisation, the Agency will act in its own name and on its own account. The right to conclude contracts will normally be delegated to the interested parties, to act themselves under the control and with the consent of the Agency, which will issue a license for the transaction provided that the contract complies with the standard clauses established by the Agency (for instance regarding its duration), and provided that the price is in accordance with the price levels ascertained by the Agency on the basis of its market analysis.

Moreover the Agency has an option right on all such materials produced in the territories of Member States. The Agency will make use of this right, in particular if equal access to the resources or the common supply policy are endangered, that is to say in case of shortage and in case industry does not honour the rules of fair competition.
The Agency's first task is to receive all offers and demands in order to be in a position to analyse, and if need be, to supervise the market and to ensure that prices result indeed from the free comparison of offer and demand.

Now if the Agency finds that any irregular practices designed to ensure a privileged position for certain users exist, it has to report them to the Commission.

If the Commission considers that the Agency's findings are well-founded, it may, in the case of disputed offers, restore the prices to a level compatible with the principle of equal access. For instance if an exceedingly low price were offered to a certain group of users only, the Agency could require that all users may buy at such price, or else it could exercise its right of option to purchase at that low price on behalf of other users. In addition, the Agency may use the mechanism of price adjustments in order to equalize prices.

In the extreme case the Council of Ministers may, if the general price level needs correction, fix prices, but then the Council must unanimously act on a proposal of the Commission.

In fact actual price regulation will, in all probability, only seldom be imposed, but it is available as a sort of last resort, to avoid unfair competition and price manipulations as regards the vital needs of nuclear industry. The regulatory power of Euratom in supply matters is, I think, not equalled in strength by any power allowed to any other institution under the Community Treaties.
At the beginning of my speech, Mr. President, I have pointed out the specific nature of Euratom as compared with the other two Communities. There is one last aspect I would like to stress.

By looking into the future, rather than backwards to the mischiefs of the past, and because of the absence of vested European interests in the nuclear field, Euratom, by its very nature, leans towards international cooperation. There can be no doubt as to the peaceful nature of its aims, notwithstanding certain countries' asserting to the contrary.

Nuclear science and its applications constitute a new activity of mankind. No military considerations can - in the end - restrict the interchange of knowledge and experience across borders and curtains. Moreover nuclear accidents threaten to cause damage regardless of these borders or curtains and this aspect demands international arrangements for safety and protection. Is it unreasonable therefore to foresee that atomic development may result in bringing peoples together?

In the two years of its existence Euratom has successfully sought international cooperation not by means of nicely worded diplomatic conventions, but on the basis of close day-to-day work with outside nations. Its first main activity has been the establishment of a Joint Program for Research and for Reactor Construction, together with the U. S. Government. By initiating this program your Government has given generous assistance to help Euratom start on its way. This farsighted political decision to do so deserves the greatest admiration. Even if
the Power Reactor Program should turn out to be less extensive than originally envisaged, the political value of this decision remains unaltered.

By contributing in a very active manner to O.E.E.C. projects such as the British Dragon reactor project and the Norwegian Halden reactor, Euratom has crossed the borders between Europe of the "six" and Europe of the "seven". In addition there is intensive cooperation with Great Britain and Canada on concrete issues.

The aims of Euratom, its field of action, the economic and political significance of its Member States, its actual and potential propensity to international cooperation all make Euratom an eminent factor in the establishment of world understanding and peace.

Moreover Euratom's international nature may contribute to prevent any undue tendency to protection, exclusion or isolation within the European Community.

But Euratom is a young institution and only one of the elements of the growing political union among the European peoples. This union itself deserves - and needs - the sympathy and aid of the New World.

The great interest you are demonstrating in our Community affairs during these meetings gives a measure of your support to our undertaking.