


# EUROPE AS SEEN BY EUROPEANS

Ten years of European polling — 1973-1983

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Originating department:  
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**Europe as seen by Europeans**  
**Ten years of European polling — 1973-1983**

Manuscript by Jean-Claude Deheneffe, completed in June 1983.  
Introduction by Jacques-René Rabier.

This publication is also available in the following languages:

DA	ISBN 92-825-3919-9	Europæiske meningsmålinger i 10 år
DE	ISBN 92-825-3920-2	Die Europäer über sich selbst — 10 Jahre Eurobarometer
GR	ISBN 92-825-3921-0	Πώς βλέπουν τους εαυτούς τους οι Ευρωπαίοι — Δέκα χρόνια Ευρωβαρομέτρων
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PT	ISBN 92-825-3927-X	O que pensam os Europeus — Dez anos de sondages Eurobarometro

Cataloguing data can be found at the end of this publication

Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1983

ISBN 92-825-3922-9

Catalogue number: CB-NC-83-007-EN-C

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
*Printed in the FR of Germany*

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## Introduction

by Jacques-Rene Rabier

All administrative authorities need not also to be able to inform, but also to seek information. While the powers of the European Community institutions may admittedly still be limited, they nevertheless made it one of their primary concerns from the very outset to keep the European public informed about the purposes, objectives and results of their actions; they were also concerned to keep their collective finger on the pulse of European needs and expectations.

For many years the relationship between the institutions of the European Community and the population of the Member States was channelled principally through an assembly comprised of representatives appointed by the national parliaments. Since 1979, the European Parliament, which has been endowed with a number of the functions proper to the national parliament in any democratic society, has been directly elected by the people having the right to vote in national elections. But even before the introduction of universal suffrage as a feature of European Community democracy, a system of regular surveys of attitudes and opinions had been established along the same lines as those carried out in Western democracies for decades; these became the Eurobarometer opinion polls.

What are they? What they are not is a cut-price referendum, nor a collection of expert opinions; still less are they an attempt by social scientists, the authorities or government

managers to manipulate the citizenry. They are simply a means of studying scientifically — with all that implies in terms of rigour and precision — what ordinary men and women think about the problems that affect them most closely.

The mechanics of the opinion poll are well known; they consist in administering an oral questionnaire to a number of individuals, specially selected as a representative sample of the study population. To put it another way, each individual in the surveyed population must possess an equal chance of being questioned: whatever the sampling technique actually employed, a representative sample of a national population would have to contain a more or less equal proportion of men and women, people in the 15 to 24 and 50 to 55 age brackets, workers and employers, urban and rural inhabitants, people living in the various regions, etc., as there are in the population as a whole taking the most recent census figures as the basis.<sup>1</sup>

Opinion polls first made their appearance in the United States shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War. After the war, the technique spread throughout Europe and all the non-totalitarian countries. The 1950s saw a boom in the demand for attitude surveys, not only from business, but also interest groups, political parties and governments. The institutions of the European Community began to use them as early as 1954, but it was not until 1973 that they took their present form. And the history of their development is not without interest.

The passage from a haphazard practice to a systematic policy is the product of two almost simultaneous, and certainly cumulative, influences: one was the pressure exerted by the European Parliament, even before the decision had been taken to make that body representative through direct elections; the second was the enlargement of the European Community to include three new members: Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom.

The European Parliament has always kept information policy (which is the Commission's responsibility as the executive body of the Community) under very close scrutiny. And it was Parliament which, early on in its life, expressed its support for an on-going, in-depth survey of European public opinion, in order to keep the citizens of Europe better informed.

In 1972, for example, the rapporteur of the European Parliament's Political Affairs Committee received the unanimous support of parliamentarians in saying that:

*Opinion polls are a crucial source of feed-back. Your Committee notes that, since the adoption of the European Parliament's Resolution of 24 November 1960, a number of opinion polls have been conducted and their findings published. Further surveys are being planned. Your Committee hopes that the Executive will expand these opinion polls into a regularly and systematically used instrument, and that it will make the complete findings regularly available.*<sup>2</sup>

1972 also marked a watershed in the consultation of the populations as a whole in the historic undertaking which is the construction of a united Europe, the hallmarks of whose early stages had been a degree of 'elitism'.<sup>3</sup> It was in that year that five referendums were held in Western

<sup>1</sup> See appendix.

<sup>2</sup> Report of W. J. Schuijt on information policy (Doc. 246/71, 7 February 1972, p. 14).

<sup>3</sup> The existence of this 'operating elitism' should not be permitted to blind us to the fact that the institutions of the European Community, created between 1950 and 1957, were established by democratic procedures: governmental initiatives and ratifications approved by the national parliaments of the countries concerned.



Europe on the accession of the new members to the European Community: a referendum in France to assess the degree of popular support for enlarging the Community and the French Government's policy towards Europe; and four other referendums in Ireland, Norway, Denmark and Switzerland, respectively — the three former being to decide on whether or not to become full members of the Community, the latter in respect of a simple association agreement. The 'in-or-out' issue was also a matter of intense concern to the British public, culminating in a decisive vote in favour in the House of Commons.<sup>1</sup>

The 'man-in-the-street' therefore made his voice heard in a number of countries on the subject of Europe and the Community. It was not surprising therefore, that even before (let us not forget) the decision had been taken to have a directly-elected European Parliament, the resolutions demanding regular and systematic opinion polls, designed and conducted throughout the Community according to a common programme, were firmly established.

The first survey for the nine Member States of the newly-enlarged Community was conducted in September 1973, and 'Eurobarometer' proper was born in spring 1974. Since then, with uninterrupted regularity, these surveys, appearing in April and October, have been providing valuable twice-yearly information to the Community institutions, other interested agencies, the press and the public itself, on the thoughts, feelings, hopes and fears of Europeans on the entire spectrum of matters dealt with by the Community or likely to impinge on related concerns: the socio-political climate, attitudes to European unification and Community solidarity, opinions on a variety of aspects of existing or proposed policies, and so on and so forth.

In Autumn 1980, just a few months after its own accession to the Community, the surveys were extended to include Greece. Since the same date, a number of questions have also been asked in Spain and Portugal concerning the proposed membership of those two countries.

Technically speaking, and without wishing to get lost in a morass of detail, the surveys are carried out among individuals aged 15 and over. An identical set of questions, carefully designed to be the same for all countries, is put to representative samples of the population in each of the countries; each national sample — renewed each time — thus constitutes a scale model of the population of the survey country. Some 10 000 individuals are interviewed in their homes by professional interviewers employed by 10 national survey institutes, all selected by tender. Since 1973, some 100 000 people have thus been given the opportunity to express their opinions on questions which are asked either each time or from time to time, sometimes on specific issues (where the questions may be asked again at a future date if it seems appropriate) and sometimes on new issues arising out of European events.

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Whenever the question of opinion polls is raised, two questions immediately spring to one's lips: 'how reliable are the findings?' and 'what use are they?'. I propose to try and answer both these fears here.

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<sup>1</sup> The referendum in the United Kingdom did not take place until two and a half years after accession — in June 1975.

As to their reliability, the non-specialist reader will form his own opinion on that having read this brochure. At this stage, suffice it to point out that social scientists are increasingly relying on opinion polls as a means of studying topics across a broad spectrum: societal problems such as retirement age, part-time working, capital punishment, abortion, protection of the environment, attitudes to the family and optimum family size; product images and buyer intention; the impact of advertising campaigns, the image of an official body and propensity to join; media audiences (for a newspaper, radio station or television programme); popularity ratings (of the government, a political party, a personality, a policy, etc.). In theory at least, there is no limit to their scope, provided the objectives are clearly defined and questions correctly formulated (i. e., relevant, unambiguous, comprehensible and socially acceptable to the interviewees). If so many qualified researchers — and those who fund them — have faith in opinion surveys, then that is proof — or at least, substantial proof — of their reliability. But as with any measuring equipment, including the household barometer, it has its limits of reliability — which are, however, well-established.<sup>1</sup> As to the interpretation of results, whether it be that offered by the press or by the investigators themselves — they are to be taken like all information, and examined with a critical eye. No more, no less.

The second question — ‘what use are they?’ — is not so easily answered. It could be asked of any form of research: is the ultimate objective simply to satisfy the curiosity of the researcher, to further strengthen the power of the decision-makers, or to improve Man’s estate? A vast question!

In the present case, the objective defined by the European Community was clear and unambiguous: to improve the institutions’ knowledge of the people under its authority in order to keep them better informed on the policies affecting them and the bodies who initiate, decide on and carry out those policies. The findings of these opinion polls also form part of this social communication circuit; that is why they are not only published in a form accessible to the general public, but are also made freely available to interested researchers, under the control of the international scientific community.<sup>2</sup>


The Eurobarometer findings are thus used in a number of immediately identifiable ways:

- (i) The institutions of the Community use them as a basis — more or less — on which to formulate policies and sound out public feeling. This is particularly true of the public information policy — which is far from being an isolated instance, however.
- (ii) The findings which journalists consider of most interest to their readers are published — more or less accurately — in the press.
- (iii) National bureaucracies, political organizations, professional bodies, trade unions and other groups all make use of selected findings of particular interest to them. They may even be used by a political party to build up a clearer picture of its grass roots support, as

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<sup>1</sup> The reliability of survey findings depends principally on sample size rather than the sample/whole population ratio. The Eurobarometer surveys are based on a sample of 1 000 individuals in each country except the United Kingdom (1 300 including over-representation for Northern Ireland) and Luxembourg (300). A note in the technical appendix specifically states that percentage differences below 5 points are not normally considered statistically significant.

<sup>2</sup> Eurobarometer surveys are published in all the official languages of the Community and circulated free on demand. The original data are stored on magnetic tape and are freely available for consultation by all researchers worldwide.



a basis for further analysis by its own research department. Where any government agency or organization of any kind needs information from a number of countries on an issue already discussed in the European surveys, then it may well be in its own interest to use questions in a tried and tested formulation; or, as the case may be, to formulate an entirely different set of questions.

- (iv) Social scientists can now mine an extraordinarily rich seam of international information dealing with a wide range of issues — particularly attitudinal changes towards the same issues in different countries.
- (v) Finally, suggestions for questions to be incorporated in future Eurobarometer surveys are welcomed from any individual or group, who may also take the initiative into their own hands and put pressure on both public and private bodies to conduct surveys they consider of value.

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When the users of any given social communications policy lay out the results in this way, the reader is quite entitled to suspect them of exaggeration. And that is why we prefer to leave the last word with others.

At a meeting in Brussels last May, the senior executives of the national information services of the European Community countries were unanimous in saying how valuable they considered the regular polls of European public opinion conducted under the name 'Eurobarometer'.

A few weeks later, the findings of the most recent Eurobarometer survey were published by one of the most highly-reputed European news bulletins, with the recommendation that its


readers procure for themselves a copy of the survey, but that, above all, the 'decision-makers' should study it with care: 'to find out how to call a halt to some developing situations and encourage the development of others'.<sup>1</sup>

To put it another way, it is only by increasing their awareness of what they themselves and each other think of the issues confronting them as individuals, and collectively as the Community in which they live, that Europeans will be capable of fully controlling their own destinies.

This booklet aims to make this instrument of research and action more accessible to the lay reader. It shows how Europeans see themselves, and Europe will only become truly viable if each one lends his hand to making it so.

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<sup>1</sup> *Europe*, press information sheet, 8 July 1983.



## I — The resilience of European public opinion

By and large, Europeans support the idea of a united Europe. That is the message which stands out from the 20 or so surveys carried out in this series over the past 10 years.

Whether or not the resilience of public opinion in this area is based on a misconception of the real implications and their probable political and economic impact is of little importance. The European public makes its voice heard as at once an actor in, and a spectator of, the political scene. That opinion represents the deep-rooted attitudes of the European population. And it is from those attitudes that the politicians and decision-makers should draw their inspiration.

The results of the surveys analysed in this booklet demonstrate that even the thorniest of those problems which jam the machinery of European administration still find broad support among the European public. This is particularly true of a European currency, the European

passport, the fight against unemployment, and the financial sacrifices which Europeans declare themselves willing to make.

All of these themes show how deeply the idea of European citizenship has not only permeated all strata of the population, but has also taken deeper root than sound common sense might lead one to think. Some of the results are quite simply astonishing, and seem to indicate that 'being a European' is as much a matter of logical reasoning as it is a feeling.

Has Europe already become a nation to which we are attached, heart and soul?

### *A European currency*

Long before the President of the European Commission publicized the benefits of a single European currency in 1977, European public opinion had already declared itself strongly in favour of such a system.

#### QUESTION

*The Nine countries of the European Economic Community (Common Market) are together dealing with a number of shared problems. Could you tell me if it appears very important to you, important, of little importance, or not at all important:*

— *to create a single European currency to replace all the national currencies of the Member States, including your own?*

TABLE 1  
For a European currency (%)<sup>1</sup>

	Autumn 1974	Spring 1975	Autumn 1975
Very important	18	25	25
Important	29	32	33
Fairly important	25	22	20
Not important at all	28	21	22

<sup>1</sup> Overall results for the Community weighted according to the relative importance of each country in it. For an equal number of interviews, therefore ( $\pm 1\ 000$ ), an Italian reply, for example, is attributed a weight five times that of a Belgian reply.

Taking into account only that segment of the public who considered it 'very important' or 'important', it remains a fact that 47% (autumn 1974), 57% (spring 1975) and 58% (autumn 1975) of those interviewed and answering the question were in favour of introducing a single European currency.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In order to simplify the presentation of the tables, percentages have been calculated only on the number of replies actually received. Where the number of 'no replies' is statistically significant, however, it is indicated in brackets.

Condensing the data provided in Table 1, then, we find that, between autumn 1974 and autumn 1975, public opinion on the creation of a European currency was:

For : 54%  
 Indifferent : 22%  
 Against : 24%

Compare that distribution with the replies received in autumn 1976 to a question on the same topic, but phrased differently and requiring a different response, and the subtle differences cannot be ignored. Thus the question:

*Would you be in favour of, against, or indifferent to having your national currency replaced by a European currency?*

received the following replies:

In favour : 50%  
 Indifferent : 7%  
 Against : 43%

A comparison of the results from the 1974-75 surveys with that of 1976 shows the following breakdown:

TABLE 2  
 Comparison of attitudes to a European currency  
 according to two differently formulated propositions (%)

	1974-1975	1976
For	54	50
Indifferent	22	7
Against	24	43

While the proportion of interviewees in favour of introducing a single European currency remained relatively constant (50% in 1976 against 54% in 1974-75), the percentage of those against increased significantly, drawn mainly from the 'middle ground' of those previously indifferent.

This swing was principally attributable to the way in which the question was phrased and the approach adopted. Whereas the three surveys carried out in 1974-75 emphasized the *creation* of a European currency, the 1976 poll stressed the *suppression* of the national currency. While the difference in emphasis had no adverse effect on that part of public opinion already in favour of creating a European currency, it did have the effect of mobilizing the indifferents to seek refuge in resistance to change.

A breakdown of the replies received based on social characteristics (age, sex, level of education, etc.) produces findings, in relation to the creation of a European currency, which directly controvert all prevailing opinions.

The received opinion that the young are more open to the European ideal is contradicted by the results in this case, which tend to demonstrate a correlation between advancing age and

support for a single European currency. Against the 30% of young people between 15 and 19 in favour of such a system can be set the support of 60% of adults aged 50 years and over.

It is worth recalling that Table 2 clearly shows more than half of our European interviewees supporting the creation of a European currency. Such a result, remarkable in itself, merits closer analysis. On the one hand, the European public appears certainly more constant than the Community's Finance Ministers, however the data are analysed (unweighted per country, weighted average for the Community, broken down by sex or age, etc.). The fact that over half the European public agree on the idea of a strictly European currency unquestionably points to a lively degree of interest in it at a time — 1974-76 — when the idea had not been officially mooted. Even the ECU (European currency unit) had not yet made its appearance.

No-one, however, should be tempted to conclude from this that a European currency is a matter of fundamental concern to Europeans. In a list of the problems with which the European Community is concerned, ranked in descending order of importance, the creation of a European currency is at the bottom of the list.

TABLE 3  
Importance attached to the different problems being dealt with by the European Community

Rank	Concern	Index <sup>1</sup>
1	Common fight against rising prices	2.64
2	Introduction of a common policy for protecting nature and fighting pollution	2.26
3	Protection of consumers against fraudulent selling and misleading advertising	2.21
4	Working out a common energy supply policy	2.19
5	Achieving a common foreign policy in discussions with America and Russia	2.04
6	Coordinating social policies	1.98
7	Modernizing European agriculture	1.97
8	Reducing the differences between regions	1.85
9	Introducing a common policy on aid to the underdeveloped countries outside Europe	1.57
10	Introducing a single European currency	1.52

Sources: Eurobarometer No 4, autumn 1975 and Eurobarometer No 5, spring 1976.

<sup>1</sup> 'Very important' = 3; 'important' = 2; 'fairly important' = 1; 'not important at all' = 0; the index therefore varies between 0 and 3.

### *Willing to make sacrifices?*

Despite, or perhaps because of, the recession squeezing the economies of Western Europe, the European public has shown itself not unreceptive to the idea of making personal sacrifices (such as paying slightly higher taxes) for what they considered good reasons. Thus, for example, Europeans were more prepared to make personal sacrifices for economic reasons ('to help another country in the European Community experiencing economic difficulties') than for political ones ('to help bring about the unification of Western Europe').



## For political causes

In 1975, the question was twice put:

*Would you be prepared, or not, to make some personal sacrifice, for example, paying a little more tax, to help bring about the unification of Europe?*

TABLE 4  
Willingness to make sacrifices for political causes (%)

	Spring 1975	Autumn 1975
Very willing	6	5
Fairly willing	22	23
Not too willing	25	27
Not at all willing	47	45

## For economic causes

During the autumn of 1978, and spring 1981, at the very height of the economic recession whose effects had by then spread to the great majority of the European public, our interviewees were asked:

*Would you, personally, be prepared or not to make some sacrifice, for example, paying a little more tax to help another country in the Community experiencing grave economic difficulties?*

TABLE 5  
Willingness to make sacrifices for economic causes (%)

	Autumn 1978	Spring 1981
Yes	48	46
No	52	54
(No reply)	(16)	(14)

The most striking feature of this result is the finding that almost half of those questioned were prepared to pay a little more in taxes to help out another country experiencing economic difficulties, at a time when the purchasing power of the individual household was under its greatest strain. Without this poll, the generosity of Europeans with respect to economic causes would have remained undiscovered.

A comparative examination of Tables 4 and 5 reveals that the economic ties between Community countries are stronger than its political solidarity, despite the deepening recession. From the very outset, one of the Community's abiding objects has been to forge closer links in all fields between the populations of its Member States; clearly, it has enjoyed greatest success in the economic sphere.

The more highly-educated segment of our samples (in full-time education up to the age of 22 or more) were the most willing to make sacrifices — for both economic and political causes.

TABLE 6  
Willingness to make sacrifices for political or economic causes (%)

	Political cause	Economic cause
For	28	47
Against	46	53
Indifferent or (no reply)	26	(15)

TABLE 7  
Willingness to make sacrifices according to level of education (%)

Age on completing education	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22 and over
Sacrifices for a political cause	21	21	26	32	33	44	44	41	48
Sacrifices for an economic cause	44	36	41	42	51	58	55	63	68

The response to the concept of a unified Europe, therefore, here expressed in terms of solidarity between countries, becomes more immediate and positive as the educational level rises.

Identification with the European ideal is expressed in economic, rather than political, terms. If Europe is ever to achieve the full political and economic unification of its Member States, then, the decision-makers at both national and Community level will need to adopt a more positive strategy in the political sphere. European public opinion is open to such an approach, as can be seen from the support for a European currency and the willingness of Europeans to make sacrifices; and as we shall go on to demonstrate in other areas.

### *A great majority in favour of the European passport*

The reduction of customs formalities is one of the tangible signs of unification of which Europeans are most keenly aware. From a practical point of view, one might even class it as one of the few visible achievements having a perceived impact on the life of the European 'man-in-the-street'.

In spring 1981, we asked our interviewees:

*Are you for or against the idea of a European Community passport which would replace the national passport (of your country)?*

TABLE 8  
Attitudes to the European passport (%)

Very much for	: 38	Total	For	: 74
Somewhat for	: 36		Against	: 26
Somewhat against	: 13			
Very much against	: 13			



Three quarters of the Europeans we interviewed in 1981 were in favour of the idea of a European passport. The replies themselves revealed a remarkable degree of internal consistency. With only a barely perceptible decline in support amongst the lower-educated and those aged 60 and over.

While we have concentrated in this section on the purely European response, there are also interesting conclusions to be drawn from a country-by-country breakdown of the replies. The support for a European passport was more marked among the six founder countries of the European Community (the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) than in the more recent members. Some instincts and attitudes take a long time to die: and that is certainly the case with the symbols of national identity.

### *Priority for combined action against unemployment*

Unemployment is a matter of serious concern which the majority of Europeans would prefer to see treated at Community level rather than being left to the national governments. This trend was confirmed by the outcomes of four polls conducted in 1976, 1978, 1982 and 1983.

On all four occasions, the question was couched in similar terms:

*In your opinion, would it be better to deal with unemployment by combined action through the Common Market, or rather by an action of (your) own government independently of other countries?*

TABLE 9  
The best way to fight unemployment (%)

	Autumn 1976	Autumn 1978	Autumn 1982	Spring 1983
Combined action (European)	42	53	62	71
Independent action (national)	58	47	38	29

This reveals a striking trend in public opinion. Having witnessed the failure of national attempts to solve the root problems of rising unemployment, the European public is coming to place the confidence it has lost in its national governments in the Community (a shift of 20% over 6 years). Unemployment has moved from being a merely national problem to being one of wider Community concern; an attitude also found in spheres as disparate as water pollution, the protection of endangered species or the search for alternative forms of energy.

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\* \* \*

It is clear, therefore, that Europeans view the Europe as a more appropriate forum than the national one for certain matters; and that the steps taken at European level to solve certain problems attract greater credibility than independent action by national governments. And the more pressing the problem in the eyes of the European public, the greater the credibility attached to a European solution.

The European public's perception of the magnitude of a problem is at least as important as its objective seriousness in justifying recourse to combined action.

It is also clear that, since the founding of the European Community, a European spirit has begun to grow up amongst its inhabitants. It is a spirit based more in economic ties than political solidarity; it is formed of an informed mixture of a feeling of European citizenship (whether through a European currency or passport) and the affirmation of a national or regional identity.

The future growth of the European spirit and the resilience of the idea which is the corollary of it is wholly dependent on the affirmation of binding economic and political ties forged with respect for the integrity of the identity of the individual — be it cultural, linguistic, regional or whatever.



## II — Underlying attitudes to the European Community

The most striking trend is the surprising consistency of attitudes towards the European Community. Even the well-established tendency of enthusiasm to dissipate with time has not eroded the underlying belief of our interviewees in the unification of Europe.

Throughout the turbulent journey towards European unification, the ups and downs, the crises and setbacks, the faith of the European public has remained unshaken. Not the energy squeeze, the trade disputes with America and Japan, the steel crisis nor the world recession have succeeded in undermining the underlying confidence in the European Community.

We shall be looking at these deep-seated attitudes through three particular themes. Firstly, the spectrum of opinions, hopes and beliefs about a united Europe; a sort of climate, general feeling and consensus of opinion. We shall be examining the degree of *support for the unification of Western Europe*. Our second field of examination revolves around the far more concrete and specific question (and one in which the personal involvement of the interviewees is a cru-

cial factor), *the attitude to one's own country's membership of the Community*. Our third theme will be in some ways, a mirror-image of the second, in that we shall be considering *attitudes if the European Community were to be scrapped*.


These three themes will illustrate the depth of the attachment felt by Europeans for the Community. However (and this will be examined separately), it would not be correct to conclude from this consensus that European public opinion is monolithic. Differences of opinion and feeling are in clear evidence, principally attributable to national, cultural or other sociologic differences.

### *Thirty years of large majority support for a united Europe*

The question has been put on a number of occasions since 1973 and even well before:

*In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe? If for, are you very much for or to some extent for? If against, are you very much against, or to some extent against?*

While admittedly couched in very general terms, the question is nevertheless interesting on at least two counts. Firstly, it is not restricted in ambit to a concrete achievement (the European Community) but probes further to examine a general feeling, possibly emotional to some degree, of support for the ideal of a united Europe. And secondly, we now have available data on this question going back over the past 30 years. The positive attitudes towards the unification of Europe since 1952 can be clearly seen when depicted in graph form. The findings do not differentiate according to the number of countries polled (4 countries from 1952 to 1967, 6 countries in 1970, 9 countries from 1973 to 1980, and 10 countries from 1980 onwards), since that is not statistically significant one way (relative weight of countries most in favour) or the other.



The findings are quite remarkable: support for a united Europe has varied over the past 30 years only by percentage points within a bracket of 81 to 91% in favour, with an average of 87%.

What, then, are the obstacles to the Community fully achieving the goals laid down in its founding treaties?

Firstly, and this should not be underestimated, 15% of those interviewed were not drawn, or not at all drawn, by the European ideal. That represents a powerful degree of inertia in the population of Europe. Secondly, and equally important, are the national, regional and cultural feelings which unquestionably found themselves pushed into the background in the first flushes of Community enthusiasm. Each person perceives loss of identity in his own, subjective, way. However that may be, it, too, constitutes to varying degrees, a further form of passive, or even active, resistance to understanding between peoples.


### *For or against membership of the Community*

Here, the aim has changed from assessing whether the climate of opinion supported or opposed an ideal to eliciting opinions on an established fact:

*Generally speaking, do you think your country's membership of the European Community is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?*

This question has been regularly asked each year since 1973. Graph 2 illustrates the number of those who thought it a 'good thing'. Once again, the constancy of the opinions stands out: over the past 10 years, the trend has moved only within a bracket of 68 to 54%.

Since the degree of support tended to be stronger among the six founding countries than among more recent members, we have illustrated the findings in those countries by a broken line (EUR 6), and the findings in the Ten by an unbroken line (EUR 10).



The arithmetic mean for the Ten over the years is thus:

Good thing	:	61%
Bad thing	:	14%
Neither good nor bad	:	25%

Despite the relatively stable opinions, Graph 2 nevertheless does reveal a slight downward trend in support for the Community, offset by a rise in the 'neutral stance' (neither good nor bad) rather than those expressing outright opposition.

This graph, again, demonstrates the existence of a positive attitude; although less pronouncedly so than that in favour of the ideal of a united Europe.

### *Regrets if the European Community were to be scrapped*

This question sought to shift the emphasis away from the positive aspects (trends in attitudes towards a project or an achievement) towards the negative, and purely speculative, possibility of the European ideal being finally cast aside.

The question:

*If you were to be told tomorrow that the European Community (Common Market) had been scrapped, would you be very sorry, indifferent (not caring either way) or relieved?*


has been put regularly in the same form 10 times since 1973. The findings are:

TABLE 10  
Attitude if the Common Market had been scrapped (%) (EUR 6 and EUR 10)

	Aut. 73	Spr. 74	Aut. 74	Spr. 75	Aut. 75	Aut. 77	Spr. 81	Aut. 81	Spr. 82	Aut. 82	Spr. 83
EUR 6											
Very sorry	47	65	65	60	56	57	49	51	53	49	54
Indifferent	41	30	31	35	40	38	44	45	42	44	43
Relieved	12	5	4	5	4	5	7	4	5	7	3
EUR 10											
Very sorry	47	55	56	56	53	51	42	43	45	43	46
Indifferent	41	31	34	34	37	36	40	43	41	40	44
Relieved	12	14	10	10	10	13	18	14	14	17	10

The negative reactions to the European Community ('relieved') correlates fairly closely to the negative response to other matters at some 14%. The truly significant difference, however, lies in the ground lost by the positive response ('very sorry') to the neutral ('indifferent'). However, given that the question refers to a hypothetical scrapping of the European Community, it should come as no surprise that 38% of respondents prefer to wait and see.





- Sustained but weak opposition
- Dwindling support
- Increasing indifference

The attitudes to the European Community can be broadly divided into these three groups which cumulatively represent the underlying attitudes of the European public.

The clear message to 'Europe' of the 20 surveys analysed in this booklet is that its population consists of 14% of people opposed, 25% indifferent and 61% in favour of continued and increased European integration.

But the corollary of dwindling support is not increased opposition. Rather, the disaffected and perturbed are moving to occupy the middle ground of indifference.

Support for the European ideal remains more alive in the six founding countries than in the more recent members.

The findings need to be interpreted in the light of established realities and developments. The European Community is no longer a far-fetched idea, still less a dream. It has become a reality; a work of Man, endowed with all his weaknesses and imperfections. And in the face of that, enthusiasm must begin to wane slightly.

Nevertheless, there can be no escaping the conclusion that while the European ideal may no longer be fresh, it is enduring.

### *European opinion and national opinions*

Whether European or national, public opinion is not monolithic. Customarily, the findings of international surveys are presented on a country-by-country basis; but it would be dangerous to conclude from that that the contacts are first and foremost German, French or Italian rather than men and women, young or old, wealthy or poor, educated or uneducated. And the same applies to European opinion, which, after all, is only the collated opinions of individuals (men and women, young and old, etc.) from 10 specific countries.

But — and without wishing here to delve into that form of sensationalism which describes any country as more receptive to an idea than any other, or ranking nations according to problems — it must still be admitted that nationality is one of the significant variables in attitude-shaping.

It was a significant factor in the replies 'very satisfied' received to the question:

*On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied, with the life you lead?*

TABLE 11  
'Very satisfied' with the life they lead (%)

Country	1973	Spr. 75	Aut. 77	Aut. 78	Spr. 79	Spr. 81	Spr. 82	Spr. 83
Denmark	51	51	52	57	51	59	57	54
The Netherlands	41	33	44	44	46	44	42	39
Ireland	53	36	42	41	37	34	40	35
Belgium	43	39	46	46	42	36	29	23
Luxembourg	40	26	38	34	33	40	39	38
United Kingdom	33	32	31	32	27	32	36	29
Germany	16	13	24	20	24	16	20	18
France	15	16	13	11	11	12	16	11
Italy	8	7	8	9	9	13	14	11

The feeling of satisfaction was considerably more marked in the smaller countries of the Community (Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland and Luxembourg) than in the bigger ones (United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy). A correlation was also established with geographical location — in their groups, the more northerly countries had greater satisfaction ratings (Denmark and the Netherlands in the smaller countries; the United Kingdom and Germany in the larger).

But national public opinion is no more homogeneous than European opinion. Both are shaped by the interplay of the entire spectrum of trends followed by young and old, the educated and educationally-deprived, opinion leaders and others.

One thing all surveys agree on, however, about the opinion leaders — that is, those people whose professional lives lead them to exercise greater influence on other's opinions than others do on theirs — is that their behavioural patterns are entirely unlike those of the rest of the country. Whatever nationality they may be!

The opinion shapers in the Eurobarometer surveys are identified by their propensities not only to initiate political discussions among their circles of friends, but also by their propensity to mobilize others to their own deeply-held convictions.

A breakdown of the support for the unification of Western Europe into the replies given by opinion leaders and those given by the rest of the population reveals sharply-drawn differences in opinion between the two groups.

TABLE 12  
Support for the unification of Western Europe by leadership rating in 1981 (%)

	'Very much for'		
	Leaders	Rest of population	Population as a whole
Belgium	42	17	18
Denmark	24	16	17
Germany	52	29	31
France	22	15	16
Greece	35	28	30
Ireland	39	19	20
Italy	45	34	36
Luxembourg	57	42	45
The Netherlands	35	29	30
United Kingdom	28	16	17


The opinion leaders, who make up on average 1.5% of the total population, exert a quantifiable effect on the opinions of their fellow citizens. The precise degree may vary between countries, but the phenomenon itself is constant.

\*  
\* \* \*

Clearly, nationality is not the only variable by which opinions are shaped.

The discrepancies in the national findings would appear to be more closely attributable to differing political, socio-economic and cultural climates than to differences in basic mentality. In general the regions of a single country present wider variations than do the national averages; even more marked variations can be perceived between social groups (young people, well educated, opinion leaders, rural populations, etc.). Those who are, or perceive themselves to be, more advantaged, tend to be markedly more in favour of the Community, whatever their nationality.

The traditional method of presenting the findings of international surveys with a national emphasis is primarily a habit which conceals — by construction — the similarities or differences between social groups.



### III — Trust between peoples

#### *Between the Community countries*

In 1980, we sought to assess the degree of mutual trust between the populations of the European Community countries, with the question:

*Now I would like to ask about how much you would trust people from different countries. For each country, please say whether, in your opinion, they are in general very trustworthy, fairly trustworthy, not particularly trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy.*

TABLE 13  
Europeans' trust in other Europeans in 1980 (%)

Trust shown in:	Very trustworthy	Fairly trustworthy	Not particularly trustworthy	Not at all trustworthy	No reply
Danes	24	58	14	4	(28)
Luxemburgers	21	59	16	4	(29)
Dutch	24	56	15	5	(21)
Belgians	18	59	18	5	(21)
Germans	20	49	19	12	(11)
British	14	52	25	9	(10)
Irish	14	47	26	13	(26)
French	15	45	26	14	(11)
Greek	8	44	33	15	(27)
Italians	6	37	36	21	(14)

Shifts in the degree to which any people or group of peoples trusts in any other are slow to make their effects felt due to the complexity of the variables upon which the attitudinal movement is based (geographic, religious, cultural, historic, economic, psychological, etc. factors).

The findings for certain of the Community Member States, however, display a slowly-rising trend in mutual trust (thus, while in 1970 only 9% of Europeans found the French very trustworthy, the number had risen to 12% by 1976 and 15% in 1980).

### *Towards applicants for membership*

How much trust do the existing Members of the Community have in their potential new partners?

Our questions concerning the trust ratings accorded to other peoples extended beyond the strict confines of existing Members to assess the degree of trust felt in the Spanish and Portuguese.

TABLE 14  
Europeans' trust in the Spanish and Portuguese in 1980 (%)

Trust shown in:	Very trustworthy	Fairly trustworthy	Not particularly trustworthy	Not at all trustworthy	No reply
Spanish	7	42	36	15	(17)
Portuguese	7	40	36	17	(30)

A rapid comparison of Tables 13 and 14 would seem to suggest the existence of a northern European prejudice against southern Europeans; but this would be a false conclusion to draw, since the trust rating of the Spanish and Portuguese was highest in Ireland, the Portuguese were regarded with most suspicion by the Italians.

### *Trust in other peoples*

Europeans are gradually coming to acquire a feeling of European citizenship, with all that implies for their attitudes to the world geopolitical structure. Europeans are becoming more open towards, and less suspicious of, other nations.

In 1976 and 1980, our interviewees were asked how much they would trust the Swiss, Americans, Chinese and Russians. In 1980 only, the Japanese were included in the list.

In 1980, the trust ratings of the Swiss and Americans were both considerable and exhibiting a slight upward trend from 1976. There was also a marked increase in trust in the Chinese, which nevertheless fell below that in the Swiss and Americans. Distrust of the Russians was both marked and increasing. The Japanese occupied a middle ground in 1980.

**TABLE 15**  
**Europeans' trust in the Swiss, Americans, Chinese, Russians and Japanese (%)**

Trust shown in:		Very trustworthy	Fairly trustworthy	Not particularly trustworthy	Not at all trustworthy	No reply
Swiss	1976	28	54	12	6	(18)
	1980	35	48	11	6	(15)
Americans	1976	18	51	22	9	(12)
	1980	26	48	18	8	( 9)
Chinese	1976	5	23	31	41	(23)
	1980	18	27	17	38	(29)
Russians	1976	5	22	33	40	(17)
	1980	5	19	27	49	(15)
Japanese	1980	19	42	23	16	(19)

In-depth examination of these findings displays little significant difference between the peoples of Community countries in their views of the five non-Community nations. There is least difference of all with increasing distrust (of the Russians and, to a lesser extent, the Chinese).



## IV — The accession of Spain and Portugal

### *Attitudes of the Ten*

How do Europeans feel about the accession of Spain and Portugal to the Community?

In autumn 1977, we asked our interviewees:

*Three European countries — Greece, Portugal and Spain — have recently applied to join the European Community (Common Market). Do you, personally, think that Greece's entry into the European Community will be a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?*

*And Portuguese entry?*

*And Spanish entry?*

Bearing in mind that in 1977 Greece was not yet a full member of the Community, but only an applicant for membership, our respondents thought as follows:

TABLE 16  
Attitude to the accession of Greece, Portugal and Spain to the European Community (%)

	Good thing	Bad thing	Neither good nor bad	No reply
Greece	42	20	38	(23)
Portugal	43	21	36	(22)
Spain	48	20	32	(20)



Four Europeans in five either positively supported or were indifferent to Portuguese and Spanish accession, with the positive reactions outnumbering the negative by more than two to one.

A comparison of these findings with those relating to the respondent's view of his own country's membership of the Community reveals a slight increase in the percentage of those opposed (+ 5%). While 15% of Europeans considered their own country's membership a 'bad thing', 20% also held the same view on the accession of Spain and Portugal.

TABLE 17  
Attitude to the accession of Spain and Portugal compared with membership  
of the individual's own country (autumn 1977) (%)

Community attitude to:	Good thing	Bad thing	Neither good nor bad	No reply
Portuguese membership	43	21	36	(22)
Spanish membership	48	20	32	(20)
Own country's membership	60	15	25	( 7)

### *Reactions in Spain and Portugal*

Since 1981 a number of surveys have been carried out in Portugal and Spain parallel to the Eurobarometer polls. The aim of these surveys, using a restricted sequence of questions, is to elicit Spanish and Portuguese public opinion on the prospect of joining the Community.

The prospect is viewed favourably in both countries, although a higher degree of involvement is discernible in Spain than in Portugal, where as many as 50% of our respondents were indifferent or refused to reply.

The Spanish view the European Community as a bulwark of democracy, as helping the country's economic development and strengthening Spain's voice in world affairs; whereas in Portugal, the primary motivators are economic (increased choice of consumer goods, energy supply) and political (giving Portugal a role in the world).

Since 1980, the Eurobarometer polls in Spain and Portugal have included a question on attitudes to joining the Community phrased in similar terms to that put to respondents in the ten Member States (see Chapter II).

*Generally speaking, do you think your country's membership of the European Community (Common Market) will be a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?*

TABLE 18  
Comparison of opinions on the accession of Spain and Portugal with attitudes to  
membership of the individual's own country (1980-82) (%)

	Good thing	Bad thing	Neither good nor bad	No reply
Spanish opinion on Spanish membership	52	6	17	25
Portuguese opinion on Portuguese membership	24	6	13	56
Membership of own country	52	15	26	7

While more than half our Spanish respondents supported their country's moves to join the Community, a correlation did appear between the rise in those undecided ('neither good nor bad') and the protracted accession negotiations. The same correlation appeared in the Portuguese survey. The majority of those replying in Portugal thought accession a 'good thing', but more than half our interviewees did not reply to this question.


Leaving aside the high to very high non-response rate, there was no significant difference between the opinions of the Spanish, the Portuguese and individuals in the ten Member States as to the benefits of Community membership. In all cases, however, the percentage of the public considering it a 'good thing' outweighed the uncommitted and the antipathetic.

\*  
\* \* \*

The process whose ultimate aim is the construction of a united Europe is moving forward, actively supported by the great majority of Europeans (including, more remotely, the Spanish and Portuguese). Identification with Europe is, at present, seen almost entirely in economic terms (c.f. Chapter I), although indicators do exist to suggest that identification in political terms is slowly beginning to dawn in the European consciousness. The motivations of Spain and Portugal are an example of that movement.

Overall, public opinion throughout the ten Member States welcomes Portuguese and Spanish membership of the Community, while not blinding itself to the problems accession is likely to create.

Likewise, the majority of the public in both Spain and Portugal support their countries' accession to the European Community even if, in many cases, that membership is not one of their principal preoccupations.



## V — Europeans and the future

### *How will the European Community look in 10 years' time?*

In 1981, a question was put containing three hypotheses:

*Here are three ways in which the European Community might develop in the course of the next 10 years. Can you tell me which of these three is the most likely to happen?*

- 1. The ties between the member countries of the Community will get weaker because, in these times of great difficulties, each country will be thinking above all of its own interests.*
- 2. Cooperation between the countries belonging to the Community will carry on more or less as it is now.*
- 3. The ties between the member countries of the Community will get stronger because, in these times of great difficulties, the member countries will become more and more aware that they cannot solve their problems on their own.*

28% of Europeans opted for the first alternative ('ties will get weaker'), 38% chose the neutral option ('carry on as it is now') and 34% the third ('stronger links').

In other words, more than seven Europeans in 10 feel that links between the Member States over the coming decade will be at least as strong as they are now.

That is a challenge to the future for the European Community. The European public believes in it; and one token of that faith is the general willingness of Europeans to see the Community taking combined action to tackle unemployment.

## *Hopes and fears for the future*

What are likely to be the forces for change in the lives of Europeans during the coming decade.

In spring 1982, Eurobarometer asked its respondents two questions about their hopes and fears for the future. Their replies showed a broad level of agreement.

The three most recurrent 'hopes' were:

- (i) scientific and technological developments (selected by 39% of Europeans),
- (ii) understanding and goodwill between fellow citizens (35%),
- (iii) prospects for improved living standards (31%).

The three principal factors for fears were:

- (i) rise in crime and terrorism (71%),
- (ii) rising unemployment (66%),
- (iii) despoiling of natural life (57%).

Interestingly enough, the principal hopes and fears are all economic and social. Politically-oriented possibilities were less frequently selected. This correlates with the greater willingness expressed by Europeans to make sacrifices for economic rather than political causes (Chapter I). Both in today's world, and that of the future, 'economics' prevails over 'politics'.

The full findings of the questions on the hopes and fears of the European public confirms the lack of response generated by political topics.

### **Hopes**

*Here are a certain number of things which might bring about changes in the next 10 or 15 years in the way people live in your country. Which of them in your opinion are the most promising, offering the most hope for the future?*

	Findings (%)
1. Scientific and technological developments .....	39
2. Changes in moral values (in your country) .....	21
3. Prospects for the standard of living (in your country) .....	31
4. The unification of Europe .....	17
5. Understanding and goodwill amongst the people of your country .....	35
6. Changes in relations between East and West .....	25
7. Understanding between the industrialized countries and the Third World .....	27
8. Relations between local and regional authorities and national government .....	17
9. The quality of life .....	30
10. None of these .....	9

## Fears

Here are some kinds of fears which are sometimes expressed about the future, say in the next 10 or 15 years, of the world we live in. I would like you to tell me which of the following really concern or worry you.

	Findings (%)
1. More and more artificial things are coming into the life we lead (housing, traffic, food) .....	41
2. The despoiling of natural life and the countryside by pollution of all kinds .....	57
3. Increase in unemployment as a consequence of the automation of jobs .....	66
4. Your country's loss of influence in Europe .....	14
5. Prolonged breakdown in supplies of oil and natural gas .....	23
6. The invasion of your country by low-priced products from the Far East .....	20
7. A critical deterioration in international relations .....	35
8. A rise in tensions between different groups in your society resulting in serious and lasting disorders .....	38
9. A reduction in the influence of Western Europe in the world .....	10
10. The risk that the use of new medical or pharmaceutical discoveries may severely affect the human personality .....	29
11. Rise in crime and terrorism .....	71

## The great causes

What are the great causes of today which Europeans consider worth fighting for? In 1982, we asked:

Which of the ideas or causes in the following list are sufficiently worthwhile for you to do something about, even if this might involve some risk, or giving up other things?

	Findings (%)
1. Sexual equality .....	16
2. Protection of the environment .....	35
3. World peace .....	67
4. Struggle against poverty .....	40
5. Our country's defences .....	23
6. My religious faith .....	16
7. The unification of Europe .....	11
8. Freedom of the individual .....	40
9. Human rights .....	44
10. Revolution .....	3
11. None of these things .....	7

In all countries without exception, one great cause stands out from all the others — that of *peace* (selected by 67% of all interviewees), followed by four others with relatively little to choose between them: human rights, the struggle against poverty, the freedom of the individual and protection of the environment.



An interesting comparison can be made between the number of Europeans choosing peace, and those fearing a third world war within the next 10 years.

TABLE 19  
A third world war within the next 10 years? (%)

	Autumn 1977	Spring 1980	Autumn 1981	Autumn 1982
Those considering a third world war probable	14	34	24	18

The perception of the risk of a third world war, which showed a marked increase between 1977 and 1980, has tended to drop again since then.

The fact that 67% of Europeans would be prepared to work for peace in 1982 should be set beside the 18 Europeans in 100 who consider a third world war probable. War and peace are

clearly subjects of deep concern to Europeans. They are part of the European consciousness and Europeans are prepared to take active steps to preserve peace, as was clearly demonstrated by the pacifist demonstrations of 1982.

The prospects for the European Community over the next 10 years, then, seems set to be a process of continued integration in the face of increasing indifference. The European mood is less one of wanting to construct Europe than to get on with living in it.

Their hopes and fears for the future are principally economic and social; they think much less in political terms. But Europeans are still prepared to make an active stand for the great causes which most closely affect their lives — such as that of peace.

## Technical appendix



## I — Surveyed population, size of the samples, dates of fieldwork

Year	Number of countries	Size of samples	Dates of fieldwork
1973	9	13 500 people	September 1973
1974	9	9 300 people	March-April 1974
	9	9 100 people	October-November 1974
1975	9	9 400 people	May 1975
	9	9 150 people	October-November 1975
1976	9	8 600 people	May-June 1976
	9	9 200 people	November 1976
1977	9	9 050 people	April-May 1977
	9	8 900 people	October-November 1977
1978	9	9 350 people	May 1978
	9	8 800 people	October-November 1978
1979	9	9 000 people	April 1979
	9	9 000 people	October 1979
1980	9	8 900 people	April-May 1980
	10	10 000 people	October-November 1980
1981	10	9 900 people	April 1981
	10	9 900 people	October 1981
1982	10	11 700 people	March-April 1982
	10	9 700 people	October 1982
1983	10	9 500 people	April-May 1983

An identical set of questions is put to representative samples — different each time — of the population aged 15 years and over in each of the countries: each sample — renewed each time — thus constitutes a scale model of the population of the survey country. The surveys are carried out by professional interviewers in the homes of the selected respondents.

The poll is conducted by national survey institutes, all members of the 'European Omnibus Survey'. All the institutes comply with the standards set by Esomar (European Society for Opinion and Marketing Research). They are selected by tender.

## II — List of institutes carrying out the surveys

June 1983

Belgique/België	Dimarso
Danmark	Gallup Markedsanalyse
Deutschland	Emnid-Institut
Ellas	ICAP Hellas
France	Institut de sondages Lavalie
Ireland	Irish Marketing Surveys
Italia	Istituto per le ricerche statistiche e l'analisi dell'opinione pubblica (DOXA)
Luxembourg	Institut luxembourgeois de recherches sociales (ILRES)
Nederland	Nederlands Institut voor de Publieke Opinie (NIPO)
United Kingdom	Social Surveys (Gallup Poll)
International Coordination	Helene Riffault (‘Faits et Opinions’, Paris)

All Eurobarometer data are stored at the Belgian Archives for the Social Sciences (1, Place Montesquieu, b 18, B-1348 Louvain-La-Neuve) and at the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (Ann Arbor, PO Box 1248, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106, USA)

For all information regarding opinion surveys carried out for the Commission of the European Communities, please write to J. R. Rabier, 200 rue de la Loi, B-1049 Brussels.

### III — Sampling

The sample has been designed to be representative of the total population aged 15 years and over of the 10 countries of the Community. In each country a two-stage sampling method is used:

#### *Geographical distribution*

For statistical purposes the European Community divides Europe into 129 regions. The survey takes place in 126 of these regions (Corsica, Greenland and Valle d'Aosta excluded).

In each country a random selection of sampling points is made in such a way that all types of area (urban, rural, etc.) are represented in proportion to their populations.

The interviews are distributed in more or less 1 150 sampling points.

#### *Choice of respondents*

For each survey different individuals are interviewed in the master sample of sampling point described above. Within these sampling points the individuals to be interviewed are chosen:

- (i) either at random from the population or electoral lists in those countries where access to suitable lists of individuals or households is possible: Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Luxembourg;
- (ii) or by quota sampling. In these cases, the quotas are established by sex, age and profession on the basis of census data: this system is used in France, Italy, United Kingdom, Ireland and Germany;
- (iii) or by a method combining the two preceding ones ('random route'): Greece.

## IV — List of publications based on Eurobarometer surveys

June 1983

- Les Européens et l'unification de l'Europe/Europeans and European Unification* (FR/EN).  
Survey for February/March 1970, Brussels, June 1972.
- L'opinion des Européens sur les aspects régionaux et agricoles du Marché commun, l'unification politique de l'Europe et l'information du public* (FR).  
Survey for July 1971, Brussels, December 1971.
- Satisfaction et insatisfaction quant aux conditions de vie dans les pays de la Communauté européenne* (FR).  
Survey for September 1973, Brussels, June 1974.
- L'Europe vue par les Européens* (FR).  
Survey for September 1973, Brussels, August 1974.
- Eurobarometer* (Published in all the official Community languages).  
Biannual surveys published regularly since June 1974.
- Femmes et hommes d'Europe/European men and women* (FR/EN).  
December 1975, 215 pp.
- Le consommateur européen/European consumer* (FR/EN).  
May 1976, 175 pp.
- La perception de la misère en Europe/The perception of poverty in Europe* (FR/EN/DE/NL/DA).  
March 1977, 144 pp., 2nd edition (FR) September 1981.
- La science et l'opinion publique européenne/Science and European public opinion* (FR/EN/DE/IT/NL).  
October 1977, 98 pp.
- Les attitudes de la population active à l'égard des perspectives de la retraite/The attitudes of the working population to retirement* (FR/EN/DE/IT/NL/DA).  
May 1978, 52 pp.
- Les attitudes du public européen face au développement scientifique et technique/The European public's attitudes to scientific and technical development* (FR/EN).  
February 1979, 67 pp.
- Femmes et hommes d'Europe en 1978/European men and women in 1978* (FR/EN).  
February 1979, 248 pp.
- Chômage et recherche d'un emploi: attitudes et opinions des publics européens* (FR with abstracts in EN/DE/NL/IT/DA).  
September 1979, 74 pp.
- Les Européens et leurs enfants/The Europeans and their children* (FR/EN/DE/NL/IT/DA).  
October 1979, 102 pp.

*Les femmes salariées en Europe: comment elles perçoivent les discriminations dans le travail/European women in paid employment: their perception of discrimination at work (FR/EN/DE/NL/IT/DA).*  
December 1980, 72 pp.

*Les Européens et leur région: étude exploratoire sur la perception des disparités socio-économiques/Europeans and their region: public perception of the socio-economic disparities: an exploratory study (FR/EN/DE/NL/IT/DA).*  
December 1980, 62 pp.

*L'opinion européenne et les questions énergétiques/The European public opinion and the energy problem.*  
To be published.

*Les jeunes Européens: étude exploratoire des jeunes âgés de 15 à 24 ans dans les pays de la Communauté européenne/The young Europeans: exploratory study on young people aged from 15 to 24 years in the countries of the European Community.*  
To be published.

*Les Européens et l'environnement/Europeans and the environment.*  
To be published.

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Commission of the European Communities. Rue de la Loi 200, 1049 Bruxelles

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Tlf. 14 41 40  
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## NIPPON

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## ASIA

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European Communities — Commission

Europe as seen by Europeans — Ten years of European polling — 1973-1983

Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities

1983 — 47 pp. — 16.2 x 22.9 cm

European Documentation series — 7/1983

DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, NL, ES, PT

ISBN 92-825-3922-9

Catalogue number: CB-NC-83-007-EN-C

This collection is an edited version of the findings of 20 public opinion polls carried out in the Member States of the European Community over the past 10 years. They reveal the resilience of the attitudes held by Europeans to the construction of a united Europe, and illuminate their deeper-lying opinions on a variety of matters over the past 30 years. The replies illustrate how Europeans feel about other countries outside the Community, particularly those such as Spain and Portugal who are applying for membership. The final chapter examines the attitudes of Europeans to their future.

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
Year in year out for the past 30 years, through successes, crises and setbacks, public opinion polls have shown Europeans to be consistently supporting Europe. The 20 surveys analysed in this omnibus publication show 14% of Europeans opposed to a united Europe, 25% indifferent and 61% in favour.

More than 7 out of 10 Europeans see the ties binding the Community countries as being at least as strong during the coming decade as they are at present — a declaration of faith in the future of Europe.

Chief amongst the causes for which Europeans would be prepared to make sacrifices and run risks comes that of peace, followed by defence of human rights, the freedom of the individual, the war on poverty and protection of the environment.

The vast majority supported the idea of a European passport. Combined action to fight against unemployment was seen as preferable to purely national measures. More than half the Europeans questioned were in favour of the creation of a single European currency.

The hundreds of other findings collected over the past 10 years not only reveal how Europeans see themselves, they provide an insight into the depths of the European consciousness.



ISBN 92-825-3922-9

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