ALFRED MOZER:

A NEW PLoughSHARE FOR EUROPE

It would seem that European integration is proving the truth of what we learned at school, that with a fulcrum and a long enough lever one could shift the world.

The lever in European integration today is agricultural policy. Have the weapons with which national states formerly fought to defend their agriculture now been turned into a ploughshare that can give fresh life to the Europe we are cultivating?

From the great mass of work done every day by the European Commission - that motor turning at full speed, whose unwavering belief in ultimate success is not to be shaken by a Council of Ministers, however unwilling to settle anything - three decisions stand out as of more than average significance in 1964: the recommendations in the early summer on stabilizing the economy in certain member countries (Italy, the Netherlands, France); the decisions on the industrial exceptions list for the customs negotiations in the Kennedy Round and, finally, the agricultural policy decisions. The decisions on the exceptions list and on agricultural policy were taken in two marathon sessions of the Council of Ministers at the end of the year. On the morning of 15 December exhausted Ministers groaned that there must now be an end to 40-hour sessions, glowering reproachfully at the apparently indefatigable Mansholt - farmer and statesman in one, which is no bad mixture. One feels like telling the Ministers that "They mock themselves and know it not". After all, the marathon sessions are not a requirement of the Brussels Commission but the consequence of a Council of Ministers which is loath to take decisions and which, the whole year through, is continually casting round for bolt-holes and subterfuges and then has in extremis to comply with deadlines. Unconsciously, of course, a vague awareness of the immunity of the decisions is also behind all this. It is a rare sight and a sobering psychological strip-tease: the qualms of worthyburghers stepping out into a society where the trail has not been blazoned.
If we consider these three great decisions, essential differences can be seen. The measures to stabilize the economy found a ready hearing, although the Treaty of Rome offers only a slender basis for genuine Community measures of this kind. This fact is worth pondering: for it shows that when a serious financial and economic situation in one or more of the member countries threatens, because of the degree to which the economies are already interwoven, to affect the whole Community, the consciousness of joint responsibility is now greater than the national pride with which we have been so familiar, and which often appeared in the form of *Schadenfreude*, a feeling of satisfaction that it was the other fellow who was in trouble. Fear of imported inflation and the economic and political dislocation that follows in its train may for a while even succeed in preventing Government lawyers from sniping from their entrenched positions in the Treaty. It is a pity that this consciousness of solidarity can only be born of fear. It could equally well result from perspicacity and understanding, which ought to lead on to the necessary corollary of readiness to help in the form of a genuine right to a say in shaping the economic policy of those helped, in other words, to a common monetary and economic policy.

At the beginning of December the completion of the industrial exceptions list for the Kennedy Round had created a politically favourable atmosphere. The purpose of the Kennedy Round is to help world trade by far-reaching customs disarmament. An endless list of headings for exemption from this tariff reduction would inevitably reduce the value of the negotiations from the outset. The effects on the political climate are easy to see. In some countries there is a suspicion that at least one Community country - France - is ill-disposed towards the Kennedy Round for political reasons. Now, however, a list of exceptions has been decided on within the time-limit and its scale does not brand the EEC as more protectionist than the other countries taking part in the negotiations. Once again France has proved that its desire is to strike a hard bargain but not to sabotage. The desire to drive a hard
bargain is in no way improper or even unnecessary when the customs policy of the USA is considered.

This is just the sort of case which should be used to prick the shimmering bubble of national irreproachability. The patriotic mathematicians who everywhere wring from the trade figures proof of their country's so laudibly— or at least plausibly— outward-looking attitude while they deplore the disgraceful chauvinism and autarkic aspirations of their wicked neighbours are turning out work that is not worth the paper it is written on. Public statements by Ministers in their capital cities, candid assurances to the ambassadors of their negotiating partners fade into the background when the Six sit down to negotiate and their own interests are at stake. Magnanimity over concessions is then usually limited to products of interest to the other fellow. It can be observed repeatedly how a position hitherto defended is abandoned with a large-hearted gesture— and flourish of trumpets obbligato— when it also touches on the interests of another member country which, it can be quietly hoped, will stick out in defence of the interest one has sacrificed with such apparent generosity. In saying this we do not at all wish to uphold the disregard of legitimate interests, as this would be unrealistic. We mean however to denounce the sanctimoniousness with which each country praises its own generosity and castigates its neighbours for their shameful conduct. Anyone familiar with what is said and what is meant at the negotiating table— and they are really not always identical— will soon be inoculated against the assiduously fostered lie which dominates the journalistic world in every one of our countries: that Europe would be saved if only the others would negotiate half as reasonably and fairly as we do. How long will it be before this dross, left behind by a nationalism long since consumed in Europe's internecine wars, is reduced to the level of the ill-feeling between Prussia and Bavaria, which today serves mainly to provide copy for comic papers?
Where, for instance, has it been made clear to the public in Germany and the Benelux countries that the Kennedy Round involves more difficulties for France and Italy than for them? The starting point for the customs negotiations in Geneva is the common customs tariff. This was set up as a rough average between the tariffs of two areas with high protective duties (Italy and France) and two with low protective duties, the Federal Republic and Benelux: the territories with high protection had to reduce it, but those with low duties saw their previous protection increased. Thus, for the Federal Republic and the Benelux countries, any reduction in the present customs tariff means a step back towards their earlier positions, whereas France and Italy are being asked to take a further, a second, step towards giving up protection for domestic industry. Of course, customs dismantlement is a desirable thing (provided always that national tax manipulations do not at the same time cancel out the benefit to the consumer). But when the attitude of the different countries is judged, they are entitled to a fair assessment of the special difficulties arising for them.

Furthermore - and this too deserves attention - the present stage of the structure of our Community and its lack of a common external trade policy hamper the negotiating position of EEC.

In this connection there is at work something quite other than the bad - or insufficiently good - will of one member country. Until the time when they are exchanged by the negotiating partners in Geneva, these exceptions lists are a sweet or a bitter secret. They are drawn up in the strictest secrecy. In Washington for instance they are hatched out in the smallest study groups. In our Community this list of exceptions must be negotiated and decided on in the privacy of a Council of Ministers at which a hundred people - the Ministers and their expert advisers - are present. And this spectacle is repeated at every decisive step in the Geneva negotiations.
It will perhaps be understood that the situation of the EEC delegation is not exactly an enviable one and that the two-front war demands superhuman skill of the responsible member of the Commission, the Belgian Jean Rey. What he achieves at the negotiation table in Geneva he must defend in the Council of Ministers in Brussels. And his size in shoes cannot be so small that he does not somewhere and at some time tread on the long national toes of those concerned.

When all difficulties and all national taboos and hypocrisy are taken into account, the result of this session early in December, thanks to which the EEC can enter the Kennedy Round in good time and in a position to negotiate, is in itself a remarkable achievement.

Finally the third and, to my mind, the most far-reaching decision: the agreements on agricultural policy.

Here I cannot escape addressing an apology and a request to the reader. When I read the expression "cereals price" I feel inclined to skip the rest of the article - even if I have been tempted as far as the point where this phrase occurs. Probably no phrase has adorned or disgraced the columns of the newspapers more in the last year than this one. Europe seemed to be synonymous with cereals price. My request to the patient reader is that he should nevertheless not be frightened away. I hope to make it clear that the agricultural policy decisions of 15 December 1964 are of the closest concern to him. In saying this I am not thinking in any way of the price of bread. Nor of potatoes, consumption of which the well-to-do citizen is generally still prepared to limit. I do not think it at all exaggerated to forecast that with these decisions something will again occur similar to what was jokingly said about the six EEC Treaty countries: six years after the signing of the Treaty they had begun to understand what they decided at the time. The agricultural decisions of 15 December 1964 also set points which reach far beyond the agricultural policy framework and necessarily lead to consequences which justify the title of this article. Europe has been given a new instrument.
With or without the Community, agriculture is today a major social problem for all industrially advanced countries. In all industrial societies, as a result of technical progress and rationalization, more is being produced with fewer hands. Whatever the manipulations and corrections we may be prepared to make to the "free" play of supply and demand while we consider our existing economic system more suitable than a controlled economy, this fact and its consequences will remain. Where the demand for a product is practically unlimited, technical progress and rationalization are a welcome gain. If in manufacturing industry output threatens to go far beyond requirements, the requisite adjustment, in the form of conversion to the production of other goods, will be made - by no means painlessly. As long as no limits are set to what people want - and where are such limits to be seen in human nature? - human inventiveness will be active in transforming the luxuries of life into necessities. Where required, publicity helps to counter the absence of needs among the masses which was deplored by Ferdinand Lassalle a hundred years ago. If even this does not solve the problem, production will be guided by limiting working time - but in the 365 days of a year there are natural limits to the amount of leisure time.

Economists and sociologists can and must discuss for hours on end all these things and their consequences, and they will do so much more eruditely than I ever could; when however the word "agriculture" is pronounced, everything suddenly becomes quite different.

And it is different. Not that agriculture is an economic reserve unspoiled by technical progress and rationalization. Nothing is less true. The rise of productivity in the agriculture of the industrialized countries is no whit less remarkable than in the rest of their industrial activity.

The difficulties lie elsewhere. A fastidious welfare society demands the satisfaction of sophisticated requirements in many fields, but is not very exacting when it comes to mere
foodstuffs, consumption of which rises roughly in step with the increase in population, but very little per head. The attempt to solve this problem by going over to processed products is limited by the differences in conditions of production. Here too, moreover, there are limits to the expansion of production and these limits are influenced by the fact that productivity is rising in the processed products sector also. Thus, as Fourastier has shown, there is a change in the pattern of society, with agriculture giving way to industry and then to the supply of services. This process can be observed in all industrially advanced countries, and it is both a condition and consequence of industrial development. In the USA, for instance, every farming magazine voices the feeling of pride that the nation is being better fed with a smaller labour force and claims for agriculture the merit of having made possible and promoted industrial development by releasing surplus labour.

In the industrialized countries of Europe, too, the flight from the land has been going on for decades, sometimes rapidly, sometimes less rapidly. The working conditions in industry, both as regards wages and leisure, are attractive for prosaic young people from the farms. There are more desirable occupations at the week-end than feeding cattle or milking cows, and nobody has yet invented a five-day cow.

Both from the angle of balancing supply and demand - and here the countries that export industrial goods cannot allow themselves to neglect agricultural imports - and also from the angle of the labour force, agriculture is in an increasingly difficult situation. For reasons which have little to do with economics but a lot to do with politics, the industrially advanced countries have developed, in isolation from the general principles of economics, an agricultural policy which is a patchwork of disconnected measures closely resembling that economic system of state trading abroad and controlled economy at home which the western world considers should be rejected out of hand. If we are to talk of integration, then one of the most urgent needs is to integrate agriculture into the overall economy of the industrially advanced countries.
This criticism does not apply solely to the EEC countries, but it does include them. For them the need to produce a common policy offered a chance of escaping from the cul-de-sac of a troublesome short-term policy which, with the aid of more and more subsidies, has been able to retain some of the trappings of success. In reality, this chance was the result of a shortcoming—the lack of courage among the Governments of the member countries to agree on a specific common policy during the negotiations on the EEC Treaty and to incorporate it in that instrument. It was hoped to get around the ticklish matter of agricultural policy, to evade which is one of the rules of modern political wisdom (in the EFTA Treaty, too, agriculture is excluded), by introducing Article 43 into the EEC Treaty. This article shifts to the EEC Commission the responsibility of doing what the statesmen could not manage themselves: within two years the Commission was to work out proposals for a common agricultural policy and submit them for decision to the Council of Ministers (which can only amend such proposals by unanimous vote). It was left to the silly Europeans in Brussels to try their hand at producing something more than the lowest common denominator of a compromise between the practices of six States and to develop a common agricultural policy that would meet the urgent need to integrate agriculture in a way that would benefit both the economy at large and agriculture itself. The day will come when it will be possible to tell the Brussels story of Mansholt and his faithful henchmen: men with theoretical and practical knowledge of agriculture, whose economic perspicacity, coupled with their sense of duty and strength of will, has provided agriculture in our Community with a structure built on a market economy which serves equally agriculture and the Community. (I may be permitted to say this as a collaborator of Mansholt without blowing my own trumpet, for I am not a member of that distinguished team. My knowledge of agriculture extends no further than being able to distinguish between wheat and rye, and during the American chicken war I was more interested in the war than in the chickens.)

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Where then is the practical answer to all the problems of this common agricultural policy? In place of the multitude of measures taken independently as countries ran into difficulties, measures which smell so suspiciously of a managed economy, a common machinery is to be established. Within the Community this machinery will allow the common market to emerge, and in dealings with the outside world it will provide only one common level of protection for our farmers: in other words it is a system which corresponds roughly to the customs protection available to manufacturing industry.

Acknowledgement of the existence of this external protection by the Community is described as unheard-of protectionism (the scope of this protection is and naturally remains a constantly disputed point). However, EEC need not shun responsibility for it. First of all, because it is in no way alone in applying such a measure, and the lower world market price is certainly not achieved without manipulations by other countries. The Commission's proposal to negotiate about this protection in the Kennedy Round, exactly as if it were an ordinary customs tariff (naturally on a basis of reciprocity) is in itself evidence that the protection which the EEC is prepared to offer its farmers is not at all out of proportion to what the other industrially advanced countries afford their agriculture, even though the forms may differ.

There is yet another very sound reason which justifies protecting one's own agriculture. If the age of the second industrial revolution confronts agriculture with the tremendous task of structural transformation, the present generation of farmers is entitled to demand that it should not be expected to shoulder alone the consequences of a national agricultural policy which is no longer tenable. What is going on here and now is a social process common to all the industrially advanced countries (EEC or no EEC). The task of the Community is to prevent this process from becoming what the first industrial revolution was for so many craftsmen: a period of proletarization, misery and dislocation.
It is precisely because the market policy decisions of 15 December clear the road for work in the field of structural policy that they are so important - and this, in the form of regional policy, must cover much more than just the agriculture of an area.

Regulations for the application of the machinery described above have been issued in the course of the last few years for about 80% of agricultural products; the remainder is to be dealt with in the coming months.

This machinery could not however be effective as long as there was no decision on the common price for wheat. In order to be able to express the protection in terms of money, it is not sufficient to know the world market price for a particular agricultural product; there must also be a decision by the Council of Ministers on the common price to be paid to the Community's farmers. It is the difference between this internal price and the lower world market price which constitutes the protection.

On 15 December 1964 a common price was decided on for the most important basic product, grain. Subject to certain adjustments which may meanwhile be made, this common price will be valid in the Community from 1 July 1967. (The author must draw a polite veil over the pains that the birth of the new situation will cause, for instance in the Federal Republic of Germany, and the preparatory exercises that will have to precede it.)

It is worth while to consider a number of consequences that will ensue from these decisions and will be significant both for agriculture and, far beyond it, for the whole integration process. The list of these consequences, which makes no claim to be complete, shows once again that when a stone is thrown into a pool the ripples will spread in ever widening circles. Our list provides a good illustration of the position already reached in economic pooling.
The decision on the cereals price calls for similar decisions on the other agricultural products and presupposes that this machinery, a similar set of instruments, will be provided for them - in particular for dairy products and sugar (such a phrase flows easily from the pen, almost like water off a duck's back, yet it represents months of work for the agricultural department in Brussels, which has about one tenth of the staff of a Ministry of Agriculture in one of the larger member countries).

By the time the common machinery for trade with the outside world comes into play, recourse to these instruments between the Member States must cease. As there was no common price, these States had differing prices and the machinery had to be used by each country to offset differences between its own price and those of the other member countries. With the introduction of the common price there is no further need for the "internal levy", and a substantial advance is therefore made towards simplification.

The EEC is consequently reaching a position in which it can negotiate with the outside world in the agricultural sphere as in others. Now that it can itself lay its protection on the negotiating table, it is in a position to demand that others should do likewise. When we look at the USA or England, it is evident that we have here a political development of no small significance. With the important role it plays in trade policy, EEC can discuss its own and other countries' agricultural policies in international debates on agricultural protection and thus promote recognition of the need to seek world-wide solutions for the problems affecting particular commodities. The oft-quoted Atlantic Partnership can here go into action and prove its worth in a limited sector which is particularly important for the young nations.
A question which has not yet been touched on, but which is certainly not unimportant, is our old friend money. Who gets the proceeds when imported products are pushed up from the world market price to the intra-Community price? Who pays the refunds on exports when high-cost domestic products are exported at the lower world market price?

Once there are no customs frontiers between the member countries and a product intended for Germany, for instance, reaches the continent via the port of Rotterdam, it would indeed be convenient but wrong to allow the levy to accrue to the Netherlands Treasury. A Community fund must therefore be created. (Its name is the European Guidance and Guarantee Fund, known sometimes by its French initials as FEOGA - a further contribution to the cryptic list of international abbreviations.) This Fund serves a twofold purpose: (a) the balancing of refunds against levies, and (b) helping with some of its resources, in the financing of structural projects. When the proceeds from levies are inadequate for these tasks, member countries' budgets may be called upon to help. How heavy this call can be and how the burden will be divided up among the Member States is a matter on which the EEC Commission is to make proposals before 1 April 1965; the Council of Ministers will have to take its decision before 1 July 1965, the day on which the provisional arrangements come to an end. In order to maintain the Bonn Government's interest in this decision, the French delegation has suggested that the degressive Community assistance which the Federal Republic is to receive during a transitional period to compensate for the reduced grain price should be paid from this Fund. This means that if there is no financial arrangement there will be no compensation. When it is realized that once the whole Community agricultural policy is fully in operation this Fund may have a turnover of a few thousand million £, we may get some idea of the mass of negotiation and decision-making still to be coped with in the first half of 1965.
However - and here we go far beyond the confines of agriculture - what does the acknowledgement of a financial sovereignty proper to the Community mean for this Community's structure? So far national Governments and Parliaments have fixed the price of grain; in future this will be done by the Council of Ministers in Brussels on a proposal of the Commission - from 1 January 1966 by qualified majority. This decision on price also settles the amount of the levies and, consequently, the amount of money that will be available to the Fund. It would be completely wrong to accept this transfer of national executive power to Community organs (in point of fact to the Executive, i.e. the Commission, and the Council of Ministers, which after all is also supposed to be a Community organ and not just a conference of national ministers) without ensuring that the powers which national Parliaments will no longer be exercising over their own executives are at the same time transferred to the European Parliament. Finally the structure of the European Community should not be modelled on some ancien régime. In this connection a kind of parliamentary right of supervision is in no way adequate to the purpose. This is the task of an audit office. A way must be found of creating for the European Parliament powers equivalent to those which the national Parliaments renounce. The EEC Commission will be neither able nor willing to lay before the Council of Ministers a proposal for a financial arrangement without touching on this problem of parliamentary responsibility. The application from 1 July 1967 of the decisions already made, and of those which still lie ahead, allows time to settle this problem and possibly to create a genuine, fully-operative Parliament by stages before the end of the transitional period.

However, this will require that the members of the national Parliaments gear their own thinking and the public activities of the parties to which they belong to the new Executives and the places at which future decisions will be taken. It is already clear today that most of the member countries are conscious of the link between financial arrangements and democratic structure. There may indeed be one member country to which the Parliament appears less important. However, it is precisely this country which is greatly interested in the financial arrangements. Perhaps in Bruxelles, and possibly in Bonn too, people are not
without reason assuming that the interest of this country in the financial arrangements must lead it to discover and to honour even the value of democracy.

These are not the only repercussions. If from 1 July 1967 the common agricultural market is to be effective, all the remaining internal customs frontiers for industrial goods must by then disappear and the common external tariff must be enforced. This does not, however, seem to be becoming the main problem.

More important are the proposals elaborated by the EEC Commission in its "Initiative 1964": the harmonization of taxes, the abolition of frontier controls (including the subtle measures invented to destroy the advantages offered by customs disarmament), the mastering of certain monopolies, the campaign against distortion of competition and the solving of the problem of a common transport policy. Once firmly consolidated internally, the Community will have to set itself to devising a common external trade policy. And, finally, the fact that the common agricultural prices are fixed in units of account (equivalent to dollars) may stimulate agreement on the common monetary policy mentioned earlier, since this makes nonsense of attempts by any country to manipulate the currency. If foodstuff prices, based on the unit of account, automatically follow every change in the value of a currency, monetary action loses much of its point.

Apart from the mention of common external trade policy - particularly for trade with the State-trading countries - these remarks apply to European internal policy. Contrary to the expectations of many people, and my own also to some extent, the end of the year brought one very positive result. On 1 January 1965 France took over the routine chairmanship in the Council of Ministers for six months. M. Pisani's energy is making itself felt in the Council of Ministers of Agriculture.
It does not look as though the process of economic integration is coming to a standstill or, still less, that it can be reversed. It is moving forward painfully and by fits and starts, but it is moving.

The difficulties increase with every hour we come closer to the end of the transitional period, and this cannot be laid at the door of any one member country. Measured against the difficulties and the results, the temporary setbacks are an almost natural and, certainly, an understandable phenomenon which should not lead to despondency.

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Although there is, then, no lack of wearisome and difficult tasks in the field of economic integration, we must see whether there are other fields of work which perhaps are already ripe for inclusion in the integration process, or will be so in a few years.

When the interweaving of six national economies into a single entity similar to a domestic economy is found to be producing a new force, people may wonder what end this power will serve.

Of course, they are told, it will contribute to the external consolidation of this society and to its internal well-being. This is indeed no petty purpose, but it is hardly satisfying. Little pleasure is derived from seeing an individual devoting all his capacities to satisfying his own wants, and the same is true of a Community. It can aim at increasing this power in order to obtain more power, perhaps to break the power of others (we have had all that before). It can also fit this power into a greater Community which could seek, not indeed to impose its own way of life on others, but to set an example by its own humane internal structure and, in addition, to offer help to those who wish to develop their society.

All these possibilities are there. They do not exclude readiness to guarantee one's own security; what they do exclude is the will to aggression. But such an attitude is far removed from capitulation.

The answer to this question will come, but it will not be automatic, not just a by-product of economic integration. Economic integration, which in the final analysis is as much politics as anything else, is invading the sphere of foreign policy. Anybody who reads the daily papers and glances through the reports on trade treaties and trade policy needs no further proof that external trade policy is a part of foreign policy, for "small presents keep friendship alive".

It would therefore be quite a useful beginning if the Foreign Ministers, Heads of Government, or even Heads of State - we cannot go any higher - were to discuss what use could be made, and what misuse should not be made, of power.
Naturally, they all want peace. There are no Heads of State with any other objective. Naturally, they are all unselfish and despise the lust for power. Hypocrisy is the tribute which deceit pays to truth. But despite all agreement on aims, great, noble aims, there will be very many differences of opinion in those concrete cases - and they are the majority - where white and black turn to a dirty grey and conduct can by no means be defined unambiguously, clearly and unanimously.

There is matter enough for many talks, both general and on details. Talks between equals, and not between a high priest and his acolytes. Talks in which the special interests of any one in the group receive due attention, since in this Community there can be no first and second class citizens or nations.

Today such talks are handicapped by the question of the means of defence. Where this subject is concerned I find myself in the same situation as Golo Mann in the last number of the "Neue Rundschau": between the writing of this article and its publication the author can turn out to be a false prophet. Nevertheless, I venture to say here that the unsatisfactory development is beginning to emerge, that the "reform" of NATO is coming to mean its reduction to an old-fashioned alliance or coalition and that, within this Atlantic Alliance, a second alliance, internal to Europe, will emerge. This is a process of disintegration.

We will have to count ourselves lucky if at least this does not break the link between the small and the wider alliance, and we will just have to hope that this retrograde step can be made good in a few years without having had to pay once again a bitter ransom for our coalitions, alliances and axes.

The emergency military solutions which, given the attitude of the French President, will probably have to be accepted in order to maintain at least minimum Atlantic-European links, should not however lead us to subordinate integration in the field of foreign policy to this concept.
The usefulness of talks between the responsible statesmen about a common external policy is beyond question - even in fields where there is at first agreement to disagree. But institutionalization, the creation of organs for common external policy, only occurs when a certain degree of agreement on objectives has become evident. The existing Communities were created, not because the questions of coal and steel policy, of the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, or the common economic policy, were solved, but because there was agreement on the objective of finding common solutions, and it was therefore possible to overcome the difficulties of execution. This must also apply to external policy. The touchstone will be external trade policy, which is already awaiting solution within the framework of EEC.

It is only once we get to this point that the question of institutions will become topical. I take it that the Ministers of Foreign Affairs wish to decide on foreign policy, and I will make so bold as to claim that on this point their Excellencies are one hundred per cent in agreement with me. Now we have this Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs; in conformity with the Treaty, it claims the right of decision in the existing Communities. It also has a Secretariat at its disposal - that of the Council of Ministers. For the three existing Communities we have one Parliament, whose powers, it is to be hoped, will soon live up to its name. At home its members speak and help to decide on questions of foreign policy. Why should they not be allowed to do so in Strasbourg? By the time when, after many and heated discussions, institutionalization becomes a necessary background to external policy, the present High Authority and the two Commissions of EEC and Euratom will have been merged. Then the Directorate-General in the EEC which today deals with external trade relations will probably become part of an "External Relations" department, while the merged and, perhaps, expanded Commission may well have to undertake the task of making foreign policy proposals for the Council of Foreign Ministers.
Of course, this is crystal gazing. There is no cause for precipitate action. The present inclination to set up some sort of institution regardless of the stage reached in the present integration process rests on a confusion between form and content. It is no good choosing a mould before we know what we are going to put into it. This confusion may be accidental, but may also be intentional. The intention could be to deflect the process of integration, to make it head for failure. No European should allow himself to be misused for such purposes. It is one of the more bitter ironies of history that we have to see today how well-meaning Europeans who rejected the so-called "Political Union" as an umbrella organization deliberately placed over the existing organs of integration are allowing themselves to be used for the task which General de Gaulle, the father of this Political Union, fortunately failed to achieve.

It is difficult to see why the Europeans should now implement what he did not succeed in forcing upon them. These good Europeans should indeed take the practical attitude of France as an example. Despite the tirades of the Head of State against integration and supranationality (and here it is impossible to express in writing the contempt which the General succeeds in giving to these words) France makes its contribution, as demanded by the Treaty, to integration and supranationality in the framework of the existing Communities. If the General is overcome by horror at the thought that this interpenetration could one day logically lead to the inclusion of foreign policy in this process (and hastily brings heavy pressure on his best friends to prevent this) the Europeans after all have ceased to tremble at this development. They will be happy if the exchange of ideas on the external policy to be followed by the Community leads to satisfactory results. They will be all the more happy if it should also prove that this common external policy can find the support of more than the six EEC countries.