WHAT PROSPECTS FOR NORMATIVE FOREIGN POLICY IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD?

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What prospects for normative foreign policy in a multipolar world?

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Chairman’s Summing-up

François Heisbourg

The XXIXth meeting of the European Security Forum was also the opportunity to launch the book “Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The European Union and its global partners” edited by one of our speakers, Nathalie Tocci. We were therefore fortunate to be able to draw both from the presentations given at our 26 May meeting and from the work done by the contributors to this timely book.

Lanxin Xiang, Professor at the Graduate Institute in Geneva (IHED) presented his paper under the title “There is no such thing as a normative Chinese model”, underscoring that the Chinese view is ethical and temporal rather than ‘spatial’ (i.e. in which politics are polarised along left/right lines). Thus China likes Europe’s social (i.e. ethical) democracy, but not democracy as egalitarianism. China, we were reminded, takes the long view. To the chairman’s doubts about Chinese views on the non-use of force being close to those of the EU – after all, hadn’t China resorted to force to ‘teach a lesson’ to Vietnam in 1979; and hadn’t China publicly stated the possibility of using force to recover Taiwan? – the speaker indicated that China tended to use force defensively (as in Korea in 1950 or against India in 1962). Mention of Admiral Zheng He’s navy in the XVth century was made. Lanxin Xiang reaffirmed the view made in his paper that the post-modern EU and traditional Chinese mentality bear strong resemblances, and that EU and Chinese foreign policies could converge, notwithstanding different approaches to the central place of democratisation in EU norms.

In her oral presentation Radha Kumar of the Delhi Policy Group also drew on the long historical view, emphasising the role of Kautilya (3rd century BC) as a source of Indian foreign policy inspiration notably in defining the three pillars of state behaviour (engagement; adherence to rule-based norms supervised by judges; transparency). She noted that these were at some variance with enlightenment values as retailed through British colonial rule; they are closer to US approaches. She reminded us that foreign policy in Indian history had been the product of Empire (Maurya, Moghol…). In domestic terms, the constitutional emphasis is on collective rather than on individual rights; pluralism in a union composed of language-based states goes further than in the US or European constitutions. Certain rights (e.g. family law) are administered by the corresponding religion.

She noted that during the Cold War, India’s policy of non-engagement was at variance with the historical record. To a question from the chair noting the disconnect between India’s democratic nature and Kautilyan legacy on the one hand, and a Realpolitik approach in Sudan and Myanmar similar to that of China, she noted that:

- In Sudan, India is a profit-sharing partner in the greater Nile oil consortium, but is not physically present as an actor on the ground;
- In Myanmar, India is courting the Junta as a response to Chinese influence.

In conclusion, she remarked that the Achilles heel of Indian foreign policy was its sometimes unrealistic strand, as in the opposition of part of the body-politic (e.g. the CP-ML) against the nuclear deal with the US.

Andrey Makaryachev, Professor at the University of Nizhny-Novgorod, spoke to his paper entitled “In quest of subjectivity: Russia’s normative offensive and the triple politicisation of norms”, noting that Russia’s foreign policy had become increasingly norm-based in terms of the arguments used, as is witnessed by the handling of the Kosovo issue. The disagreements are less on the general nature of norms (peace, security, democracy, liberty, human rights, etc.) than on their content; and there continues to be a refusal of any kind of judgement on Russia’s domestic standards.
Walter Slocombe, former US Undersecretary of Defense presented the paper prepared by Daniel Hamilton on “The United States: A normative power?” (a contributor to the book edited by Nathalie Tocci). He stressed that a normative policy implies standards that are consistent, explicit and universal, noting the importance of the Enlightenment legacy. Since Kosovo had been mentioned, he underlined the tension between normative ends and normative means; the Kosovo campaign had been the opposite of an interest-driven war.

Nathalie Tocci, presenting her paper “When and Why Does the EU Act as a Normative Power in its Neighbourhood?”, focused on the question of ends and means applied to the case of the EU. She noted that it was easier to agree on norms than to act on them; that it’s easier to be normative when interests are not involved; that there is a need for mechanisms to define the collective EU interest; and that normativity tends to apply in contractual, civilian relations, whereas its ceases to be at a premium when we face coercive influences.

Given the wealth of presentations, time for debate from the floor was limited. A German participant raised the issue of the stability of a multi (or non)-polar system, as well as that of the consequences of cultural relativism for war and peace: after all, there had been a lot of cultural relativism on show between the contrasting presentations. He also wanted to draw out the panellists on the ‘tying of hands’ in a normative foreign policy, an issue much dwelt upon in Ms. Tocci’s paper. A Dutch participant wondered whether there could be agreement on universal norms between some of the rather parochial great powers. A member of the Russian mission referred to his country’s desire for deep reform of the OSCE, in terms of ODHIR (Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) and the election observers.

Lanxin Xiang, in response, noted that there is no universal Chinese set of norms, that China is agnostic in this regard. He considered that multi-polarity can be stable, with a form of “democratisation of international relations”.

Radha Kumar held the view that there is a core base of principles on which there can be agreement. As for the tying of hands, she stated that the UN still remains the institution of choice, but that reform is required; unfortunately, the trend in this regard was towards fragmenting rather than universalising. China needed to become a major player in the Bretton Woods institutions as well as in the Asia context; but this would create complex reactions in the continent. Kosovo should be viewed as a specific European issue, not as a broader, global precedent, noting that Serbia in the erstwhile Yugoslav federal system had taken away Kosovo’s regional autonomy.

Andrey Makarychev was sceptical about universal norms. He posed the question: “Who are the political actors of the international system?, since we now have alongside state actors, a number of collective actors (EU, NATO…), unrecognised states, NGO’s etc. What is the meaning of international society under these conditions, and how much multiplicity can we afford in the international society?”

Walter Slocombe refused relativism when it comes to certain fundamental rights (such as the issue of abuse of detainees). Countries can live together with vastly different internal regimes. It may be true that everybody wraps their interests in norms and values: but the proposition can work the other way around (e.g. adopting democratic norms is usually good for interests such as business and peace).

Nathalie Tocci reasserted the need for consistency. Kosovo may be small, but the way it is handled is important from the standpoint of actors of the global international system. Referring to the Chinese approaches, she also underscored the importance of the relational aspects of norms.
When and why does the EU act as a normative power in its neighbourhood?¹

Nathalie Tocci²

Introduction

Since its inception, the European Union was conceptualised as (and prided itself on being) a distinctly ‘different’ type of international actor. Over the decades, it has been described as a ‘civilian’ (Duchene, 1973, p.19), a ‘soft’ (Hill, 1990) and most recently a ‘normative’ power in international relations (Manners, 2002, 2006). The EU’s official texts make similar claims about the Union’s role in world politics. Since the 1970s, in fact, norms and values began permeating European foreign policy documents and declarations (see Hill & Smith, 2000). At a two-day meeting of EU heads of state on 14-15 December 1973, which resulted in a declaration on Europe’s international identity, the delegates talked about building a ‘just basis’ for international relations. The 1986 Single European Act called upon the Community to “display the principles of democracy and compliance with the rule of law and with human rights” in its conduct of external relations. The 1988 Rhodes European Council called for an EU role in preserving international peace, promoting the solution to regional conflicts, demonstrating solidarity for democracy, supporting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, strengthening the effectiveness of the United Nations and improving social and economic conditions in less developed countries. The Maastricht Treaty went further, calling for the preservation of peace and security, the promotion of international cooperation, the fight against international crime, the development of democracy and the rule of law, the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the support for economic and social development (Article J.1). Most explicitly, the Lisbon Treaty states that in international affairs the EU would be guided by and would seek to promote the values on which the Union is founded, including democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law (Title V, Article 21; Title V, Article 2c).

This paper attempts to go beyond these assertions. Rather than assuming that the EU is a normative international player simply by virtue of its declarations and its ‘different’ non-state nature, we take for granted that in different geographical regions and at different points in time, the Union’s foreign policies have taken on dramatically different forms. If by a normative foreign policy we mean pursuing normative foreign policy goals through normatively deployed means and having a discernible normative impact, then what emerges, perhaps inevitably, is that the EU is not always normative, as is the case with any other international actor. The fact that the EU is a sui generis actor as opposed to states such as the US, Russia, China or India, does not fundamentally alter the reality of its foreign policy practice. As we shall see below, at times EU foreign policy has been normative, while at other times it has been status quo oriented, at other times still it has been realist and even imperialistic. For the purpose of this paper, a realpolitik actor is one that pursues self-interest, in violation of laws and norms; an imperial actor is one that pursues normative goals but does so in violation of existing norms in the deployment of its foreign policy instruments; a status quo actor is one that pursues self-interest in compliance with existing norms and laws.

In order to make sense of these different types of foreign policy approaches, this paper teases out the principal dynamics at work in determining why the EU acts the way it does in different cases, and draws some lessons about the nature of the EU’s role in the world.

¹ This paper is largely drawn from N. Tocci et al. (2008), The EU as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor, CEPS Working Document No. 281, CEPS, Brussels.

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The EU as a multifaceted foreign policy actor

We can quite easily think of cases in which the EU has acted in a variety of different ways in world politics. Table 1 sets out cases in which the EU acted as a normative, realpolitik, imperial and status quo power, as well as cases in which the impact of EU foreign policies reflected (intended) or otherwise (unintended) the original foreign policy goals.

Table 1. The EU’s role in the world: Selected sub-case studies

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<th>Case Study</th>
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<td>Central &amp; Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Non-normative</td>
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In cases such as the eastern enlargement and policies towards neighbouring Belarus, the EU has pursued normative goals (political and economic reform) through policy instruments that were crafted and deployed within the confines of the law (the accession policy and targeted sanctions respectively). Yet while the EU succeeded in engendering democratisation and economic modernisation in Eastern Europe, its double-track strategy of sanctioning the Belarus regime while supporting civil society has, to date, failed to alter the nature and strength of the authoritarian regime in Minsk. The Belarus leadership has not reacted positively to EU sanctions, while EU actors recognise that they have been unable to convey effectively their message of support to the Belarusian population.

By contrast, in the case of Russia and Syria, the EU has behaved in an overall realpolitik manner. Vis-à-vis Russia, commercial and energy interests explain the sidetracking of EU political pressure on Moscow in the context of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and the Four Common Spaces; pressure has neither been exerted through dialogue nor conditionality. Likewise in Syria, realist concerns, such as preserving the regional balance of power between Israel and its neighbours, and following the line set by the US, have had a larger sway over EU policies than aims to see political transformation in Syria and a law-based agreement between Syria and Israel. In turn, the deployment of EU policy means has been rather inconsistent, ranging from un-kept promises of ratifying Syria’s Association Agreement, to sporadic pressure on the regime (i.e. regarding Lebanon) without constant attention to Syria’s deficient human rights record.
In Kosovo and Israel-Palestine, the EU has behaved as an imperialistic actor, meaning an actor intent on creating new norms in the violation of existing international law. While intervening in the pursuit of normative goals (i.e. the prevention and rectification of injustice in Kosovo, and a two-state solution and respect for human rights in the Middle East;), the EU has often sidelined or violated international law. In the case of Kosovo this has taken place both in the context of war, unsanctioned by the UN, in which several member states took part. In the case of the Middle East, the EU, through its bilateral cooperation with Israel, has on several occasions (related to trade and research principally) extended benefits to Israeli settlements in the occupied territories in violation of the Geneva conventions. Yet results have differed. While Kosovo’s independence has been recognised, possibly leading to a revisionist setting of ‘new norms’, in the Middle East, by contrast, a viable two-state solution appears to be an increasingly distant chimera (the Annapolis process notwithstanding), and violations of human rights and international law persist unabated.

Finally, the EU has acted as a status quo player in North Africa and Ukraine. In both cases, the Union has primarily pursued non-normative goals. In North Africa, the EU prioritised its trade and increasingly its security interests over the promotion of political reform. Moreover, its trade policies, while beneficial to itself, have been detrimental to the growth and modernisation of the dependent North African economies, given its refusal to liberalise trade in agricultural products. In Ukraine on the other hand, while favouring Kiev’s European orientation and its reform process in principle, especially since the orange revolution, normative aims have been hollowed-out by the resistance of several member states to grant Ukraine a European perspective, not least out of fear of an eventual dilution of their power internally within the EU. In both cases, however, the means pursued by the EU were normative. Relations have been conducted through EU contractual relations, including the Association Agreements, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, and, more recently, the European Neighbourhood Policy. Given that the EU has been on the stronger side of these contractual ties, Brussels has ensured that the pursuit of its self-interest has been channelled through clear and transparent legal rules. The results have differed however. In North Africa, EU involvement has not opened the way for a deep process of political and economic transformation, while in Ukraine, despite widespread feelings of deception on the part of the EU and ongoing political instability and corruption, the post-revolution period has seen the consolidation of democracy.

The dynamics at work in EU foreign policy

But what do these cases tell us about the EU as a (normative) foreign policy actor? And more precisely what are the factors determining how and why the EU acts in specific ways in different foreign policy instances? Several broad lessons can be brought to the fore.

Beginning with the goals pursued, we can contrast the normative and imperialistic cases in which the EU opts for normative goals, with the realpolitik and the status quo cases, in which self-interest prevails. Why did the EU prioritise normative goals in cases such as Eastern Europe, Belarus, Kosovo and Palestine; but not in Syria, Russia, North Africa and Ukraine?

Analysing these cases, it emerges that when the EU has acted as a normative or imperialistic power, pursuing normative goals, normative and self-interest objectives have either overlapped or have not contradicted each other. In the case of Belarus, the EU has been able to pursue its (limited) trade interests alongside its democracy-driven sanctions. In the case of Eastern Europe instead, in view of the paramount strategic objective of ‘reuniting Europe’, the EU could not tolerate the candidate countries’ blatant violations of norms, in so far as these could ultimately threaten the EU from within. In this respect, enlargement policy can be seen as a special case precisely because it is not, strictu sensu, foreign policy. Likewise in the two imperialistic cases, after decades (in Israel-Palestine) or years (in Kosovo) of standstill, the member states converged at the level of rhetoric, to pursue normative objectives consisting in a rights-based, two-state solution in both Israel-Palestine and Serbia-Kosovo. In both cases, discursively agreeing on normative goals has been the least
controversial option for the EU, despite the fact that, particularly in the case of Kosovo, important differences between member states remain.

In the realpolitik and status quo cases, instead, the configuration of self interests and intra-EU divisions has been far more pronounced, leading to a prioritisation of self-interest. On the one hand, strong and competing self-interests such as energy security (Russia), transatlantic cooperation in the Middle East (Syria), commercial interests and the management of migration flows (North Africa), and member state preservation of their internal power (Ukraine) have trumped competing normative objectives. On the other hand, the primary concern of several member states to pursue their disjointed self-interests at the expense of EU-wide objectives, and member state ability in EU foreign policy to veto collective action explains the prioritisation of self-interest in these cases.

Turning to the foreign policy means used, here normative behaviour can be found in the normative and the status quo case studies, in contrast to the realpolitik and imperialistic cases, in which the EU has acted in contravention of or sidelined international law and multilateral institutions. The primary, albeit not only, explanation of why this has been the case seems to lie in the EU’s internal capability, although in a manner that partly contradicts the intuitive consensus about EU foreign policy. The problem in fact does not seem to lie in the fact that the EU has insufficient capabilities (e.g., in the military domain). Normative means tend to be deployed when the EU chooses to act within the confines of its international agreements with third states and has limited or no coercive instruments at its disposal. Indeed, normative means have been deployed in cases where the primary vehicles of EU policy have been contractual relations, whether the accession process (Eastern Europe), the association process (North Africa), the Partnership and Cooperation process (Belarus) or the ENP (Ukraine). By contrast, whereas the EU has disposed of contractual options in the realpolitik and imperialistic cases, it has either chosen not to make use of these instruments (Syria) or it has pursued its objectives beyond the blueprint and stated aims of these contracts (Russia, Kosovo and Israel-Palestine). Of course, in some cases, the EU has been strongly pressed by external actors and factors to sideline rules and law. In the Middle East, the US has induced the Union to either avoid concluding a contractual agreement (Syria), or to set aside or violate the norms, rules and laws embedded in these agreements (Israel-Palestine). In the other cases, Russia’s new assertiveness has either obstructed international legal channels (Kosovo) or cornered the Union into sidelining the human rights and democracy standards spelt out in its bilateral agreements with Moscow.

Yet while important in defining or constraining foreign policy means, the external environment is critical above all in influencing the EU’s foreign policy impact. Naturally, what the EU does is the primary determinant of its impact. Hence, it is far more likely that the Union will have a normative impact when it pursues normative goals and means (Eastern Europe) than when it acts in an imperialistic, realpolitik or status quo way. But on the one hand, the Belarus case exemplifies that this is not always the case and that the Union can fail to engender a normative result despite its pursuit of normative goals through normative means. On the other hand, the cases of Syria, Ukraine and Kosovo suggest that the EU can have a normative impact even when either its goals or policy means are not normative.

Especially in these non-intuitive cases, the role of the external environment is of the essence. A conducive external context is of primary importance for an effective normative impact. In Syria, Damascus’ isolation by the West and its many internal weaknesses explain in part why, to some extent, the Ba’ath regime has abided by international norms, especially in terms of retreating from Lebanon and accepting an international presence there. Furthermore, the EU is Syria’s first trading partner and is viewed as a less aggressive actor than the US. Hence, against all odds, Damascus strives to keep a door open to Brussels. In Kosovo, despite Russian resistance, the West has the power to assert the end-game and recognise secession, even if in contravention of international law. In Ukraine, paradoxically it is the nearby pressurising influence of Moscow that has induced pro-reform actors in Kiev to latch on to the EU irrespective of what the Union says and does and in spite of the EU’s lukewarm reception of Ukraine’s membership ambitions. In the case of Eastern Europe however, the
complementary support of the US and the international financial institutions, as well as the warm reception of EU involvement by the Eastern European countries has served to bolster the effectiveness of normative EU goals and means.

By contrast, an unfavourable external environment, coupled with EU weakness vis-à-vis third states or the wider milieu, reduces the likelihood of a normative impact. In Belarus, in the absence of free media, the Belarus leadership has divulgated its own vision of reality, hardened its stance and instumentalised Western pressure to induce a ‘rally around the flag’ effect. Belarus’ relatively stable economic situation and its geopolitical anchorage to Russia have also made the country less dependent upon Europe. In Russia, the discovery of energy leverage and an accompanying political (re)assertiveness on the international scene have contributed to undermining the effectiveness of the EU’s normative message, and allowed Moscow to play member state interests against each other. In the Middle East, the EU’s acceptance of playing second fiddle to the US, its preoccupation with maintaining close ties with Israel and the hold that Israel itself has on the EU have all induced the Union to strive for a modicum of stability in the region and respect rights. Finally in North Africa, whereas the EU has sufficiently strong bargaining power vis-à-vis the Maghreb countries, the resilience of these regimes has reduced the prospect that the EU’s (secondary) normative goals will have a discernible impact on the ground.

Transforming the EU into a normative power in the world

The discussion on means and impact points to a conundrum. On the one hand, the EU is more likely to pursue normative means when power relations between the EU and a third state are relatively balanced and relations develop within the confines of mutually negotiated agreements. On the other hand, power and particularly relational power seems to be of critical importance to engendering a normative impact, given that even the best of intentions may be an insufficient condition of success (Belarus).

How can the EU escape this conundrum and maximise its chances of acting as a ‘normative power’ (Manners, 2002), as it repeatedly proclaims its role in the world?

In so far as the EU and its member states do not live, at least not always, on Kagan’s Venus (Kagan, 2003), but rather are also driven by self-interest just like any other international actor, there is little point in naively asserting that the EU should sideline its interests and goals in the name of its proclaimed norms. Desirable as it may be, simply calling for this to happen will not change the dynamics at work. Neither can the EU single-handedly affect the external environment in which its foreign policies unfold. While it can certainly influence the external context, particularly in its neighbourhood where it has real foreign policy presence, it is also bound to rely on fortuitous external circumstances to effectively assert its normative power.

One suggestion is to improve the EU’s internal capabilities. This would not necessarily mean strengthening capabilities in the classic sense of the term such as for example organising greater economic leverage or building military capacity. Strengthening capabilities in these terms could, by contrast, damage the EU’s normative role by generating internal EU incentives to bend the law in order to pursue foreign policy goals in the interests of the EU or its member states. Instead, the Union could strengthen its web of contractual relations with third states in a manner that would ‘tie its own hands’, thus reducing its ability to act non-normatively. This would entail developing further the set of rules and laws that bind EU external behaviour in relation to third states, and link these rules and norms explicitly to the obligations set under international law. It would also entail establishing or strengthening the EU’s internal institutional watchdog mechanisms, ensuring that when one EU actor (such as the Council or Commission) behaves or is tempted to behave in contravention of set rules, others (such as the Parliament) are ready and able to prevent this from happening. Understanding the importance of working in this direction is predicated upon an appreciation that the EU is not necessarily normative and that its internal actors are often driven by the very same set of interests and priorities that motivate other international actors. A shift in this direction would also substantiate
claims that the EU’s *sui generis* nature reflects a truly novel identity as a normative actor in world politics.

**References**


The United States: A normative power?

Daniel Hamilton

The shifting centres of gravity in US foreign policy

This paper on US foreign policy summarises the conclusions of a larger study, which in turn is a contribution to a multi-country project (concerning also the EU, China, India and Russia), published by CEPS and edited by Tocci et al. This project has used a common analytical framework, consisting of several stylised foreign policy paradigms: normative, realpolitik, imperial, and status quo. Tocci acknowledges that the same international actor can display all these types of foreign policy in different regions and in different policy areas at different points in time. The US case study indicated that the US, at least can – and does in fact – engage in each of these ways simultaneously.

But what do these typologies really tell us? Do they help us answer the question of whether the US is a normative power? While the US may at times indulge in all of types of foreign policy, this however begs the deeper question: overall, which most closely reflects the core of US foreign policy? Which examples are representative of deeper currents in American society, and which are not? Which are exemplars and which are exceptions?

Our first finding is to refute the rather superficial claim that the US used to be a normative power but isn’t today. While most ‘normative power EU’ theorists acknowledge, in the words of Diez and Manners (2007, pp. 170, 174, 186), that the US “has exemplified the concept of a normative power during parts of its history”, particularly “in the inter-war and immediate post-war periods”, they deny that this has been true more recently. As this study has shown, however, the US advanced normative and non-normative goals, and deployed normative and non-normative means, before and after World War II, just as it does today. The reality is that the relative value or cost of these options has presented itself to every US Administration and Congress; the US has not swung from purely normative phases to non-normative ones.

This underscores my point that the more appropriate question is not whether the US is a normative actor but the degree to which it is one. I submit that this is also the more appropriate question when it comes to analysing other countries as well. To answer this question it is necessary to determine where the real centre of gravity lies when it comes to characterising the US role in the world. This requires us in turn to assign some kind of weighting to the different paradigms.

Overall, my review of US foreign policy indicates that the United States has been and continues to be simultaneously a guardian of norms established by the international community; a norm entrepreneur challenging those norms and on balance pushing the international community toward stronger norms enshrining human rights and the rule of law and democratic societies; a norm externaliser when it tries to advance norms for others that it is reluctant to apply to itself; and a norm blocker when it comes to issues that may threaten its position, or that exacerbate domestic divisions among the co-equal branches of US government or among the fluid yet often conflicting currents of American domestic thought regarding America’s role in the world.

In addition, due to shifting political constellations and the separation of powers inherent in the US constitutional system, it is not easy to predict where the US may come out on any particular normative issue. The open and rather fluid nature of the US system indicates that coalitions transcending nominal
party allegiances need to be built on most issues, and the strength and durability of such coalitions depend not only on the issue at hand, but on its relationship to many other issues.\textsuperscript{2}

Moreover, the particular weight of any one of these typologies varies over time. In general it may be said that the ‘normative intended’ dimension carries considerable weight and is a legitimate source of pride within the US foreign policy tradition. There are of course cases in which the US seeks to advance normative goals through normative means, but with major unintended consequences, but on the whole these appear to be less weighty. Over the course of the past 90 years the US has also exhibited a strong tradition of hegemonic (as opposed to imperial) behaviour. There have been flashes of imperialism, but overall they have been subsumed within a broader pattern of hegemony. While one can certainly identify cases of US realpolitik, intended or unintended, overall they appear to arise on a more case-by-case, ad hoc basis and thus seem less representative than the other two categories. There are fewer identifiable cases of US status quo orientation, but here again the case study approach limits the analysis, since the US is considered widely to be a major, if not the main, custodian and steward of the current international system.

In sum, the mainstream of US foreign policy tends more often than not to reflect a varying blend of normative and hegemonic approaches. This mainstream tradition, however, has been challenged by the historically unusual Wilsonian-Jacksonian coalition that over the past six years has dominated the US executive branch, with only some countervailing influence by the legislative and judicial branches. Challenges to the mainstream in the 1990s instead came more often than not from influential Jacksonian and Jeffersonian elements in the Congress. These shifting coalitions indicate that it is premature to conclude that the US has turned from the fundamental instincts that have guided it for the past sixty years. The rhetoric of the major contenders for the presidency in 2008, in fact, seems truer to mainstream tradition than to US activities of the recent past. Clinton, McCain and Obama each essentially claim to be the person best able to pass what Henry Kissinger has called the historical test for this generation of American leaders: how to use preponderant US power to achieve an international consensus behind widely accepted norms that will protect American values in a more uncertain future.

As we have seen, there is a particularly acute tension within the normative-hegemonic approach, and that is the extent to which the US is willing or able to bind itself to the norms it advances for others. This tension has characterised US foreign policy for many decades. For instance, no country was more responsible than the United States for the creation of the United Nations, and President Harry Truman was clear from the outset what this would mean. On June 25, 1945, in his closing address to the San Francisco conference that drafted the UN Charter, he stated, ‘[W]e all have to recognize, no matter how great our strength, that we must deny ourselves the license to do always as we please’. This statement has not always sat comfortably with Truman’s successors. As Stephen Schlesinger (2006) notes, “Washington discovered soon after the UN’s birth that despite its veto power in the Security Council, it could not always control its wayward child. As a result, ever since 1945, US leaders have approached the UN with ambivalence: hoping, on the one hand, to use it to further US national security interests, while, on the other hand, worrying that too much involvement might constrain the United States' ability to act”.\textsuperscript{3} This tension has characterised America’s approach to most international institutions and norms, even though public opinion polls consistently record strong public support for multilateral approaches to international challenges.

The US has not always mastered this tension well. As Kalypso Nicolaïdis (2004) notes, “in non-American eyes, there is a world of differences between the ‘righteous might’ of Roosevelt’s era and the self-righteous might of George W. Bush”.

\textsuperscript{2} The same, I would argue, can be said of the EU and individual EU member states. The exact mix changes in each state.

\textsuperscript{3} See also Bull (1977).
On balance, however, and despite exceptions, over the past sixty years the US has sought to manage its normative-hegemonic interplay by accepting some limits on its power and being bound by broader international norms and commitments, in exchange for greater legitimacy and acceptance of its leadership by others. The unresolved question in the post-Cold War, post-September 11 world is whether the US and other key players are prepared to stick with this bargain, or whether the US will increasingly act as a ‘norm externaliser’, i.e. using its power to advance broad norms for others but refusing to apply such norms to itself, and whether other nations will refuse the ‘followership’ that leadership requires. “Nothing undermines US authority more than the perception that the United States considers itself too powerful to be bound by the norms we preach to others” notes former US National Security Advisor Sandy Berger (2004).

**Comparing the US and the EU**

Since this project was prompted by consideration of the EU as a normative power, and since much of the literature in this regard contains explicit or implicit references to the United States, a few points warrant consideration.

First, much of the literature on the EU’s alleged ‘normative power’ ignores some fundamental underpinnings of European order that have enabled conceptions of normative power to develop and be exercised at all. During the first half of the 20th century most Europeans squandered any pretension they might have had to normative leadership through two World Wars and continued colonial rule. Following World War II, the US security guarantee removed – at least for half a continent – a key source of European conflict: the perceived need by mistrustful European states to build arms and alliances against their own neighbours. The American security commitment offered west Europeans an umbrella under which they could reconcile and agree on new norms that could offer a common foundation upon which they could work together and with others. Over time, the reassurances offered by a supportive – yet comfortably distant – hegemon enabled Europeans to create a community within which they could derive their security from each other rather than against each other. The very creation of the EU and the ability of its members to domesticate their foreign policies and render them normative rested on security guarantees provided by the United States.

It is perhaps easy today to forget that NATO was the umbrella under which the European integration project could proceed, or that postwar institutions were created as much to prevent west Europeans from again dragging the world into conflict and depression as to prevent Soviet dominance or communist infiltration. Kalypso Nicolaidis (2004) notes that “[T]he creation of a quasifederation without collective security as a driving force was an aberration of history made possible to a great extent by the US”.4

Moreover, this security logic continues even today – despite the end of the Cold War, despite September 11, and despite transatlantic and inner-EU squabbles over Iraq and other issues. The US continues to provide the ultimate reassurance enabling Europeans to reconcile, build and extend their Union. This is as evident in Kosovo today as it has been throughout the Balkans for the past decade and more.5 This logic has been particularly evident in the determination of Central and Eastern European states to join NATO as well as the EU. New member states have been very clear about this

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4 There is perhaps a relevant historical analogy, however: the young US also enjoyed the luxury of believing in its own normative uniqueness in the 19th century because it was protected by the British navy from being dragged into inner-European conflicts. This constructed a space in which Americans could enjoy a rare vacation from harder international realities – and in which such notions as American “exceptionalism” and “the virtues of isolationism” flowered and became such powerful guiding narratives.

5 During the Kosovo war and its aftermath, the US used the slogan “the only exit strategy is an integration strategy” to press the EU to recognise the logic of its own enlargement and to work with southeast Europeans to create conditions enabling them to join the larger Union, even as it also agreed to extend its own security commitments to those countries willing and able to join the Atlantic Alliance.
relationship: while they have been keen to integrate with European societies within the EU, they are ultimately reassured in doing so through their membership in NATO.

The ‘normative power’ Europe discourse is strangely silent on this point. I was struck that the case study of EU enlargement in the EU working paper failed to even mention the parallel process of NATO enlargement and the obvious relationship between the two. While each operates according to its own particular logic, most EU countries are NATO countries, and the same officials and populations have been addressing the same historic opportunity: to extend to as much of the European continent as possible the democratic, free-market space where war simply does not happen.

This relates to a point Diez and Manners (2007, pp. 176, 180) have made about the relationship between normative and military power. “In contrast to civilian power”, they note, “normative power is not the opposite of military power. It is entirely conceivable that military force is used to back up the spread of normative values” and that “military capabilities may underpin normative power”. I couldn’t agree more. What is important to add, however, is that in some instances the military capabilities – and political commitment – that underpin the EU’s ability to project normative power are provided not by the EU but by the United States.

Second, much of the literature describing “normative power EU” is highly selective, including policies of EU member states when it is convenient and excluding them when it is not. There are two dimensions to this. The first has to do with foreign policy, where authority and competence still reside largely with member states. The EU, qua EU, in fact, has little real purview over the vast range of foreign policy decisions confronting any particular EU nation. Any consideration of the EU as a normative foreign policy actor, therefore, needs to consider the actions of individual EU member states, not just examples of common EU action. This is important for our purposes because the tendency is to compare the EU with the United States. In one such comparison, for instance, Diez and Manners (2007, p. 182) argue that the US readily resorts to force, whereas “the fact” is that “the EU or, rather, EU member states consider the use of force a last resort”. Really? What about the British and Polish invasion of Iraq and Spanish support for it? What about German, British, French, Dutch etc. intervention in the Balkans without a UN mandate? What about French or British interventions in Africa or the British intervention in the Falklands? My point is not to criticise such decisions, it is to ask for greater analytical rigour – for this, too, is the EU.

The other dimension has to do with domestic policies, or the extent to which EU member states have coordinated and ‘domesticated’ aspects of their interactions with one another. There is no doubt that in many areas there have been historic successes, even as progress is halting in other areas. The issue is whether the EU’s ‘normative power’ is enhanced by projecting such ‘domesticated’ policies abroad or by advancing them at home. This debate, new to the EU, echoes the long-standing American debate between Jeffersonians and Wilsonians. The EU’s normative power in this regard seems to be more influential simply through its example at home – the fact that nations that regularly used violence against each other now join together in common cause in a variety of traditionally domestic policy areas. There seem to be relatively few examples where the EU has projected its ‘domesticated’ policies abroad. The death penalty seems to be a prominent one, but even here success seems limited largely to Europe and Latin America, and problems of ratification and implementation in vast parts of the world remain (Katzenstein, 2006). Nonetheless, the possibilities are intriguing.

If one looks for examples beyond treaties and international law, however, one uncovers some promising experiments in the international extension of domesticated EU policies – particularly with the US. The recently created Transatlantic Economic Council, for instance, is in essence an effort to tie the US and the EU into a consultative process that identifies and then seeks to resolve domestic regulatory or policy barriers to the deeper integration of their economies, and to consider whether common standards developed through this process could form the basis for broader international norms. Yet it is striking that most of the literature either ignores the US dimension or goes to great pains to define “normative power EU” against the US example.
These considerations lead to a third point – the role of the United States, or perhaps more accurately, stereotypes of the United States, in European debates about ‘identity politics’. Proponents of “normative power EU” refreshingly acknowledge that the notion of ‘normative power’ is part of the broader debate about identity politics in Europe, and as such requires an ‘other’ against which such identities are constructed. “Not only is the success of this representation” of normative power EU “a precondition for other actors to agree to the norms set out by the EU”, state Diez and Manners (2007, pp. 173-188), “it also constructs an identity of the EU against an image of others in the ‘outside world’”. After reviewing the literature, however, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the ‘other’, whom, the adherents of “normative power EU” are constructing their arguments ‘against’ is in fact the EU’s closest partner, the United States.

Diez and Manners explicitly seek to draw such distinctions. They argue that the American tradition of ‘exceptionalism’ essentially disqualifies the US from being considered a normative power, whereas it is precisely what they believe to be Europe’s ‘ordinariness’ that provides “normative power EU” with such strength and attraction. This represents almost wilful ignorance of the strong exceptionalist rhetoric that is part and parcel of daily European political debates. In fact, the very premise of normative power is that Europe is uniquely positioned to guide humanity to a better future.

The more compelling distinction, it seems to me, is rooted in each partner’s sense of its own exceptionalism. As Kalypso Nicolaidis (2004) notes, historians trace difficulties between France and the US to their similar sense of mission, of being the upholders of political and philosophical models for the world through the avowedly universal reach of their respective 18th century revolutions. I would add that German critiques of the US are also rooted in part in a German sense of exceptionalism: since Germany had been exceptionally evil, many Germans today believe their country must be exceptionally good. Since the US helped inculcate such beliefs in German society over two generations, it is particularly grating for Germans when US achievements fail to meet US aspirations, or when US demands of solidarity force Germans to abandon black and white in favour of grey. The moralistic undertone to much German critique is inescapable, even when it is not explicit.

These dilemmas arise in part because both the US and the EU think of themselves as normative powers projecting their internal norms of democracy and human rights abroad. Nevertheless these two competing exceptionalisms are of a different kind. As Nicolaidis (2004) notes:

Their respective founding myths, the escape from despotism and the escape from nationalism, tyranny from above and tyranny from below, led both entities to elevate commitment to the rule of law as their core. But this was domestic law in the US, supra-national law in the EU; this meant checks and balance between branches of government on one side, between states on the other. While the US progressively became a federal state, the EU, admittedly still in its infancy, is braced to remain a federal union of nation-states. In the last two decades, while both the US and the EU have been fertile grounds for exploring “subsidiarity”, and multilevel governance, the EU alone has explored ways of doing this without coordination by a centralized state, through methods that might one day be relevant to global governance. US exceptionalism is a national project; European a postnational one.6

Within this distinction lies an opportunity: to reconcile these different ‘normative’ traditions rather than to deny the legitimacy of one or the other or to ignore the common foundations upon which they are based – all in all, an attractive agenda for US-EU relations.

6 See also Hamilton (2004); Keohane (2002); Brimmer (2006).
Russia is usually portrayed as either a fundamentally pragmatic or a Realpolitik type of international actor. Yet the end of Putin’s presidency was marked by what might be figuratively called Russia’s ‘normative offensive’: surprisingly enough, Russian foreign policy discourse became – at least rhetorically - increasingly normative. In fact Moscow seems not only to accept the normative challenges thrown down by parts of Europe but even to politically counter-attack in the normative battlefield. According to a renowned Russian journalist, “pragmatism is death for Russia. Without a value-oriented positioning Russia would simply turn into a resource-rich object of alien subjects’ policies”.

Starting from the outbreak of the ‘colour revolutions’ in countries of its ‘near abroad’ Russia, indeed, has invested heavily in the infrastructure of a soft power. This type of reaction could be discerned, for example, in the State Duma statement of October 2nd, 2007 accusing the Saakashvili regime of violating the principles of democracy and abusing human rights, including tightening control over opposition, the media and dissidents. In the case of Ukraine, Russia’s key normative argument refers to the security decisions taken without due account of public opinion as “non-democratic” (of course, the point here is the Ukrainian NATO application). In 2008 Russia proudly announced the establishment of the Institute of Democracy and Cooperation (IDC) with two key headquarters – in Paris and New York. This move, quite new in the tradition of Russian foreign policy, can be interpreted as a direct response to the activities of European and American foundations and think tanks in Russia and, simultaneously, as an alternative to the Western interpretations of normativity in world politics.

In theory, there are two important facets to normative behaviour. Firstly, a normative power has to be grounded in a certain set of ideas, as opposed to the pursuance of purely material advantages. Secondly, a normative power has to be based upon multilateral institutions, as opposed to unilateral actions. Only a combination of these two aspects gives a proper model of normativity in international relations. Seen from this perspective, the emergent normative framework of Russian foreign policy so far seems to be deficient. Even the cooperation within the Northern Dimension initiative, in spite of its undeniable normative background in terms of establishing multilateral trans-border mechanisms, was largely perceived by sub-national elites in Russian regions as a source of economic and financial gains. By the same token, Russia’s commitments to international legal norms in the Kosovo issue were contaminated by the unveiled pursuance of economic goals as well. Russia’s harsh criticism of Estonia’s decision to remove the Second World War monument in 2007 did not reveal a comprehensive normative policy conduct either: it was based upon a strong ideational background but lacked both a clear institutional dimension and mechanisms of coordination with other (at least post-Soviet) countries.

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Against this background one may presume that the normative turn in Kremlin foreign policy can be discussed as one of its political instruments aimed at reinstalling Russia as one of key international subjects and an organic part of the ‘international society’– a status which, Moscow feels, is either disputed or directly challenged by many in the West. As the IDC Director put it, the Freedom House’s ranking of Russia at the level of countries like Angola, Libya and Uzbekistan is an exclusionary and unfair move that makes Russia resist and rebut it. In the meantime, the sensitiveness of Russian authorities to such normative gestures from the part of an international NGO is a good proof of the understanding that the only way to gain political subjectivity in international society is through the recognition of a country’s democratic credentials and, consequently, observance of democratic procedures.

In this paper I will argue that it is exactly this political logic that sustains Russia’s ‘normative offensive’; it is therefore, political effects that such a turn eventually entails. More specifically, there are three modalities inherent in the politicisation of norms.

**Firstly**, most of Russian opinion- and policy-makers admit that there is always a certain degree of political decisionism in a normative type of foreign policy. This argument splits into two parts.

*On the one hand*, in the likely cases of collision between different norms it is a political decision that prioritises one over another. For instance, in discussing the Kosovo situation from the normative point of view, Vladimir Putin implicitly admitted that there might be a conflict between the two constitutive principles of international society - territorial integrity vs. peoples’ right to self-determination. Yet, according to him, the first principle has to prevail, since the second deserves a double negative marking as a left-over of the Soviet strategy in times of colonialism.

*On the other hand*, in many cases norms applicable to one situation might appear to be irrelevant to or questionable in other – even seemingly similar - cases. Coming back to the Kosovo incident, many Russian analysts deem that global politics are defined not by shared rules of the game but rather by sovereign decisions on the part of the pivotal actors, first of all the United States and the European Union, who most of the time tend to act in a decisionist way. This argument appears to parallel the reasoning of those European experts who suggest that “the EU has a very ‘undemocratic’ approach, since it tends to select its interlocutors” in a variety of issues related to human rights and democracy.

**Secondly**, one “of the political effects of norms” is the perspective of exclusion looming large behind their implementation. Normativity presupposes an interplay between inclusion and exclusion: certain norms are referred to as ‘constitutive’, while others are ignored or marginalised. The normative appeal “is more and more marked by a frontier … between those who succeeded in remaining ‘within’ (the ‘developed’, those to whom the rules of human rights, social security, etc., still apply) and the others, the excluded (the main concern of the ‘developed’ with regard to them is how to contain their explosive potential, even if the price to be paid is the neglect of elementary democratic principles)”.

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5 Andrei Bystritskii, “Gibel’ ili kontsert” (Death or concert), Apologiya, No. 9, 2006, p. 15.
Consequently, “the ‘normal’ ones are the ones born in the ‘normal’ fabric of the so-called European culture and believed to be a product of an imagined and invented European and culturally homogeneous civilization … which is placed in contrast to the ‘deviant’, the non-native … the one born outside Europe”.11

All this is arguably very much relevant to EU – Russian relations, since, as many European authors assume, “through its normative-power narrative, Brussels necessarily ‘others’ those international actors that lack moral fervour… Moreover, in this tradition of thought, the term ‘norm’ is a close conceptual affiliate of the term ‘legitimacy’”.12 As a pertinent example, one may refer to the Polish ‘Eastern Dimension’ project that introduced ‘Easternness’ not as a unifying platform for shared values but as a concept that “underlines the existence of a divide between”13 the accession countries, on the one hand, and Russia – on the other.

Russian views – even of ostensibly liberal profile - do not seem to differ much from those mentioned above: “Under the guise of European values, the EU pursues a peculiar kind of bureaucratic imperialism that seeks to modify and partially control EU’s neighbourhood through various instruments like the ENP, the Common Spaces, the Energy Charter, etc.”, one author argues.14 Another Russian scholar deems that the expansion of EU’s “normative empire” represents a political challenge to Russia15 and pushes her outside the so called “new (enlarged) West”.

As a reverse side of this challenge, Russia has every reason to perceive the European normative discourse as constitutive of her own international subjeohood: in an indicative utterance of Natalia Narocnitskaya, “the IDC has to make Europeans question the widely spread stereotype of Russians as a barbaric nation”.16 Thus, the Russian game is two-fold: on the one hand, Moscow does accept the normative distance with Europe, though reformulates it in her own way: “today the West is short of non-economic values”. What stems from this enunciation is that the West is in no way ‘untouchable’ on normative grounds and, therefore, its pretensions to monopolise the interpretation of democracy have to be rebuffed.17 Yet on the other hand, Russia – through a variety of discursive moves – is eager to (re)imagine a Europe she might feel comfortable with (“We are to defend not a Europe of gay parades, but a Europe of Mozart, Goethe and Schiller”).18

Thirdly, the normative type of international policy behaviour leaves ample space for “normative disagreements”,19 i.e. contestation and re-definition of key normative signifiers.

A major source of discursive discord between Russia and the EU could be discerned in the way both parties utilise the normative language of communication. While frequently using the same normative

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18 Natalia Narocnitskaya, op. cit.
vocabulary, European and Russian discourse-makers deliberately infuse them with different meanings. It is exactly where the sources of misunderstanding come from, provoking - as a chain reaction to these discursive ruptures – multiple attempts to symbolize the differences. A few examples could be pertinent at this juncture, all based upon Ian Manners’ identification of key norms that shape EU policies.20 These norms, arguably, might be tackled, in terms of Ernesto Laclau, as “privileged, hegemonic signifiers which structure, as nodal points, the ensemble of a discursive formation”. Yet, in the meantime, these signifiers tend to remain vague and imprecise, and it is exactly what constitutes for Laclau “the very nature of the political”.21

Peace (and, therefore, security). Here we see a clear perceptional gap: for countries like the UK it is the Kremlin that represents a security threat (and, therefore, ought to be securitized) due to its complicity in the murder of Alexander Litvinenko, while for Russia herself it is the UK, which hosts key figures of the Chechen terrorist groups that is perceived as a security problem. The Russian government has repeatedly raised similar issues in diplomatic talks with Denmark, Sweden and some other European countries.

Democracy. European discourse contains a number of arguments critical to EU democratic credentials. Some authors argue that in the Balkans, “an election is less about domestic legitimacy than about international legitimacy”.22 Others, in the meantime, deem that democracy promotion became a type of “technique of governance beyond political discussion”, which faces problems wherever “the power relations are so asymmetrical that the attempts to legitimize and rationalize the projection of power through technocratic means fail”.23

Even the most liberal of Russian policy analysts side with this critique and speak of the “democratic deficit” within the European integration process.24 Meanwhile, in Russia this argument is paralleled by an attempt to automatically project the concept of democracy – originally crafted for describing the state of domestic political regime – to the whole international area. It is within this context that one has to discuss the concept of ‘democratic multipolarity’, which posits that the idea of democracy, being transferred from the domestic to the international domain, is denotative of a plurality of interests whatever the nature of these interests might be. It is debatable whether a ‘democratic multipolarity’ model with such key actors as, for instance, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Libya, Nigeria or Venezuela would lead to a more secure world.

The simultaneous activation of the ‘sovereign democracy’ and ‘democratic multipolarity’ concepts renders a profound effect on the way the normative type of arguments is employed by Russian authorities. On the one hand, the Kremlin refuses to recognise the legitimacy of any attempts to assess the quality of domestic electoral or human rights norms (since Russia’s democracy is a sovereign one, no foreign government can impose its standards or judge whether domestic practices correspond to any norm external to Russia). On the other hand, Russia keeps a free hand in appraising the international behaviour of other countries, expecting them to act ‘democratically’, i.e. respect the interests of all parties involved. In other words, having foreclosed the internal political space from external criticism, Moscow claims to possess a full right to point a finger at those countries it thinks are ‘violators’ of ‘international democracy’ (reduced, as I have mentioned earlier, to the plurality of

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actors). By doing so, Russia claims that foreign policies of countries that speak of themselves as democracies are not that democratic at all: in particular, Putin referred to the European support of the ‘orange revolution’ in Ukraine as an intervention from the outside which, as a form of external pressure, allegedly can’t be democratic.

The rule of law. Again, Russia’s response to Europe in this domain redirects attention from the domestic understanding of the ‘rule of law’ to the international one. Putin repeatedly expressed his doubts about whether European countries are sincere in their legal commitments as soon as it comes to their foreign policies. The Kosovo debate is perhaps a good case in point.

Another line of reasoning is the questioning of the leadership of the Western countries in terms of the attractiveness of their legal culture. Thus, according to Narochnitskaya, the right of French children to denounce their parents is highly controversial for Russians. She then gives another example of legal imperfections, this time in the United States where, according to her observations, most of the time voters’ identities are not being properly checked.25

Liberty. There is a strong Russian conservative discourse aimed at drawing a line of distinction between the Western and the Russian versions of liberty. According to the conservative tradition of thinking, liberty is not about making individual choices, but about something more fundamental – getting rid of sin, including the alleged freedom to commit blasphemy and sacrilege.26 Many Russian political thinkers are convinced of Russia’s ability to confess and defend “genuinely Christian and, therefore, genuinely European values, among which the key one is the value of free human beings whose liberty is derived from its creation on the basis of the image of the Lord”.27

Russian official discourse seems to be more nuanced in this respect. Foreign Minister refers to Russia’s eagerness to contribute to the formation of “a single Euro—Atlantic space of freedom and democracy” – a strategy that partly explains the creation of the IDC. Yet in the meantime, the numerous references to normative arguments lead Russia to criticise those Western countries that, in Russia’s opinion, “are ready to forgive the friendly governments for everything – from cracking down opposition and pressuring on business to open repressions and even crimes against opponents”.28

Respect for human rights. In Europe, the key criticism in this domain is grounded on the presumption that “the West presents itself in a form bereft of any normative core as long as its concern for human rights only extends to promoting free markets abroad”.29 The key Russian argument seems to be a bit different – it points to the questioning of the universal and absolute applicability of the human rights concept. It is highly indicative that these claims come largely from religious circles. Thus, according to a key figure in the Russian Orthodox Church, in the public sphere “it is the moral norms that could be used as restrictions for human rights implementation”.30 Otherwise, the logic goes on, the human rights agenda might turn aggressive, as exemplified by public demands to legalise same-sex marriages, the adoption of children by homosexual couples, gays’ employment in public education, etc.

There is another twist in Russia’s human rights discourse – the increasing attempts to raise concerns about the state of human rights in the EU countries. As the chairman of the “United Russia” party puts

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25 Natalia Narochnitskaya, op. cit.
it, “Russia is very much troubled by the human rights situation in countries like Estonia and Latvia where hundreds of thousands of people are deprived of basic civil rights … since they can’t elect and be elected, and their native language can’t be used for communication with authorities”. It is at this point that the human rights discourse turns into Russia’s implicit – and somehow dissembling – claims to be “more European than Europe itself”: “In making the case against the effacement of the Second World War memories, Russia defends European values and the future of all Europe”, – the argument goes on. In continuation, Russia is eager to portray itself as a country where ethnic and cultural differences are tolerated and respected, as demonstrated by the centuries-long co-existence of the Russian and Muslim population in Russia’s heartland. As Narochntskaia claims, “Europe has absolutely no right to accuse Russia of xenophobia, since in this respect Russia appears to be a much healthier nation”.

Therefore, one may see that normative discussions are an important part of Russia – EU relations. The reasons behind the re-actualization of the normative discourse seem to stretch far beyond specific issues like, for example, the fairness of elections in Russia. Russia accepted the normative challenge because of the awareness that it is exactly the normative matters that are being used by Western countries to define how ‘civilised humankind’ – one facing the threats of terrorism and other security challenges – looks. In fact, Russia’s newborn normative zeal is a crucial tool in her attempts to be accepted as a legitimate and constitutive member of the international community which, by and large, might be equated with the West. In fact, what is at stake is the drawing of the borders of this ‘international community’ and the distribution of roles within it.

The normative debates between Russia and Europe mostly deal with such issues as: a) which norms should be given priority in particular situations; b) how far each of the two parties should go with internationally promoting these norms; and c) whether ‘domestic’ norms may be equally applicable for the international arena as well. Indeed, Russia wishes to be recognised in Europe as an equal partner in norm-setting, but this intention is not to be understood as an indication of Russia’s possession of its ‘own’ norms that Europe, arguably, either rejects or disregards. Russia seems to be ready to offer an alternative reading of a set of norms constitutive of European identity, but definitely not to substitute them with some kind of Russia-only norms or values.

By way of conclusion, one may argue that Russia apparently accepts strong political connotations of norm-based discourse, but the politicisation described above is never complete, since on certain occasions it may be reversed by a series of implicitly de-politicised moves. One of them was Dmitry Medvedev’s reference – made at the German – Russia Forum in Berlin, June 5th, 2008 – to human rights issues as a value per se, irreducible to matters of political bargaining between Russia and the West and not susceptible to any kind of political trade-offs. Another example of the same sort is Moscow’s unease with NATO’s insistence on a logical linkage between the normative issues (like the state of democracy in applicant countries) and security (their perspectives to join NATO). On the one hand, the Kremlin fears being excluded from the NATO-centered security domain on the basis of Russia’s alleged failure to meet Western standards of democracy. On the other hand, the troublesome lesson Moscow may draw from the conflation of security and democracy arguments is that the more it supports undemocratic practices in neighbouring countries, the fewer are their chances of NATO membership. It is at this point that an inherently ‘undecidable’ character of Russia’s normative discourse becomes obvious: it seeks to reinvent the values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, but in the meantime seems to be succumbing to the temptation of pragmatically implementing them as (supposedly) effective foreign policy tools.

32 Boris Gryzlov, op. cit, p. 25.
34 Dmitrii Trenin, op. cit, p. 206.
There is No Such Thing as a Normative Chinese model

Lanxin Xiang

Misreading China’s Rise?

Many key concepts currently used in the West about China’s internal governance and foreign policy can no longer be valid, especially those from the fields of political science and history. We need a new conceptual framework and analytical tools. The world's preoccupation with China's sudden rise as an economic superpower is a matter of some bemusement among Chinese political leaders and intellectuals. Massive trade surpluses with the rest of the world? The embrace of free markets and globalisation? The Chinese have been there before. As we see it, this is not China's rise, but rather its restoration to its historical position of global influence.

Today's restoration constitutes China's third great encounter with the West, following the Jesuit missions of the 16th century and the Opium Wars of the 1840s. The current encounter – this time between equals – will produce much more than economic competition with the West. As China's economic strength grows, no one, not even the Chinese ourselves, can prevent China's influence from spreading into politics, values and ideology. It is in those arenas that conflicts with the West, the United States in particular, can arise, and unfortunately, it is precisely in those areas that misunderstandings between China and the West run rampant.

To come up with a normative Chinese model as regards world affairs, one must start with the simple but often neglected fact that China has no faith in any universal value, hence has never offered any model in the past and will never do so in the future. Chinese tradition stipulates that any governance style, either domestic or external, be contingent in a historical and cultural context. A normative model would mean a value system that clamours for universal status, but China never believes in ‘universalism’ of any kind and universalism (a word synonymous to Catholicism) can never be translated accurately into the Chinese language.

Domestic Governance

Western powers should abandon the idea that the ‘democratisation’ of China will definitely take place in the future. From the Chinese perspective, Western democracy in its post-Enlightenment form is a Gothic, pseudo-secular system. It is deeply rooted in Christian theology. The United States today holds the last defensive line of a political ideology buttressed by a three-fold theology: metaphysical interpretation of human history – the Hegelian philosophy of history, a teleological tool of analysis, and an eschatological faith. China has none of the above. “Is Confucianism or Daoism a religion?” is a question the Westerners are never in a position to answer, but the Chinese never in a position to ask.

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4 For example, it would be most misleading to say that China has accepted at least ONE universal value by signing up to the UN “Universal declaration of Human Rights”. In fact, the Chinese version is “The World Declaration of Human Rights” (shijie renquan xuanyuan). The difference is obvious to those who know Chinese: the world is dominated by nation states.
The democratisation of China is not preordained by universalism. On the contrary, the traditional Chinese political logic remains the dominant force in China. The communist party cannot escape the same fate as all the dynasties before it. According to tradition, politics is a relationship between water and boat. Water (people) can allow the boat (government) to float but can also overturn the boat. The real issue of political legitimacy in China is thus not ‘democratic legitimacy’ (or procedural legitimacy Chengxu Hefa, as the Chinese call it), but ‘deeds legitimacy’ (Zhengji Hefa) based on the continued performance of the leadership. Most Western observers have missed this point.

The Chinese view about internal and international politics is more coherent than outsiders have realised, since it is essentially an ethical one. In Chinese tradition, a ‘state’ is the extension of the family, as the Chinese term ‘Guojia’ (state-family, the official terminology for the ‘state’) indicates. Thus, only moral authority can guarantee the long-term stability of a family as well as a state. It would be misleading therefore to use Imperial Germany as a historical analogy in describing China’s ‘rise’ today. To put it simply, there is no inherent ‘power politics’ logic that would automatically lead China into repressive policies at home and expansionist policies abroad. Any use of force has to be morally justifiable. Even in actual warfare, winning without engaging in battle is considered the most ideal result.

**National Security**

The Chinese view of national security is predicated on two factors: the modern Chinese experience since the Opium War of 1840s and the traditional culture concerning armed conflict. The first factor is crucial, since modern China has been a victim rather than a beneficiary of the existing international system (the Westphalia System). Before the Opium War, the Chinese perception of national security was based on a relatively benign hegemony – a Sino-centric international relations network, known as the Tributary System, in which China received ‘tribute’ (i.e. a formal diplomatic gesture by foreign countries to present a gift to the Chinese emperor, symbolising the acceptance of Chinese leadership) in exchange for trade and protection.

The Westphalian conception of power and balance of power was unknown to the Chinese until the Opium War and was imposed by Western powers upon Asia to replace the Tributary System with a new ‘Treaty System’. Operating through competitive principles of free trade and extraterritoriality, the Treaty System never provided China with any real sense of national security. On the contrary, these two principles inevitably turned China into a major playground of the political and economic rivalry among the Great Powers. In other words, Western imperialism created, for the first time, a malignant ‘balance of power’ system in Asia that had little to do with local culture. It was a miniature version of European power politics.

In the first half of the 20th century, the ‘rising’ Japanese made an extraordinarily bold attempt at establishing a malignant hegemony in the region – the so-called “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere”, to replace the Treaty System. But this was a short-lived adventure. After a bloody civil war in the late 1940s, the Chinese communist party was able to seize power, with popular support mobilised successfully during the war against Japan. The dramatic ending of foreign domination means that China has obtained, for the first time in modern history, the opportunity to design a national security policy based upon its own national interests. But China’s humiliating past has always cast a long shadow on any security policy. Self-reliant economic development and strong national defence have been two main pillars of the new regime.

The second factor, the influence of cultural heritage, is no less important. From the very beginning of the People’s Republic, the Chinese view of security has been influenced by China’s ancient tradition and attitude regarding the use of force to deal with security threats. Some Western scholars have labelled this factor as ‘strategic culture’. According to Iain Johnston, the dominant Chinese strategic
culture is *parabellum*, a term he used to refer to Chinese ‘cultural realism’ – the alleged pro-offensive approach to dealing with the threat from the enemy.\(^5\)

This analytical framework seems useful, especially since it is designed to ‘correct’ the prevailing view in the West about an inherent Chinese ‘pacifism’. But it is also misleading, because it suggests that war and peace can be considered separate subjects in Chinese tradition, ignoring the interactive dynamics of the two aspects of using force. The Confucian tradition dictates that the Chinese forego territorial conquest and colonial adventure; hence the traditional Chinese purpose of using force has to be fundamentally defensive, and linked to the desire of achieving a more durable peace at the frontiers through military superiority. The prevailing inclination is neither aggressive nor offensive.

More significantly, domestic stability always takes priority, since true national security requires, above all, building harmony within society, which cannot be achieved by any conquest of a foreign land. The alleged Chinese’s propensity of using force is at best a pseudo-thesis, just like another pseudo-thesis: the ‘Venus vs. Mars’ parody, advanced by Robert Kagan,\(^6\) about Europe’s innate unwillingness to use force in world affairs. The Europeans, like the Chinese, are by no means allergic or oblivious to the use of force, they simply want to reduce the role of using force in international affairs and more importantly, when force is necessary, it must be used with the consent of the international community at large. The Sino-European preference for moral authority in using force should not be confused with universal pacifism. Neither China nor the EU holds a typical pacifist view that rejects the use of force under any circumstances. It is here that traditional China and ‘postmodern’ Europe meet.

Undoubtedly, the body that represents the moral authority of the international community has so far been the United Nations. Therefore, the EU and China share a common interest in upholding UN authority when force must be used in settling international disputes. Multilateral diplomacy is logically considered to be the foundation for seeking international consensus.

**Foreign Policy and Global Governance**

In the foreign policy arena, the experience of European integration is equally important, because it provides real hope for China’s peaceful integration into the world. Beijing’s declared foreign policy principle is to promote “peace and development” (*heping yu fazhan*). This is certainly a great leap forward from the days of Mao when ideology dominated China’s external relations. However, the theme of peace and development does not have a unique operating value, because every country can make this general claim. One important, but little noticed, principle that Beijing has recently added to its grand strategy of ‘peaceful rise’ is a theory of ‘democratisation of international relations (*guoji guanxi minzhuhua*)’. Uttered by an undemocratic state, such a theory has failed to be taken seriously. However, it is precisely what China may demand from and hope to contribute to the future international system.

By using the word ‘democratisation’, the Chinese seem to be searching for a way to embrace certain fundamental values of the cultural West. Specifically, they are eager to see an internationalised version of the key principles of the French Revolution of 1789. The principles of ‘Equality, Liberty and Fraternity’ inspired a whole generation of the Chinese revolutionaries in the 20th century, who established the People’s Republic. But the West seemed not only to have failed to stave off its internecine wars, but also to have adopted a double standard when applying these principles to the non-European world. The European Union is in fact the first successful experiment in applying these principles to intergovernmental relations.

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\(^5\) According to Iain Johnston, strategic culture consists of a central paradigm, designed to answer three questions: 1. what role warfare has to play in human affairs; 2. the nature of threat and enemy; and 3. how effective is the use of force in dealing with the threat? See Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, pp. 248-251, Princeton, 1995.

In practical terms, international ‘equality’ is another expression for the multipolar system; international ‘liberty’ at least protects national independence; and international ‘fraternity’ requires an amicable and multilateral approach bound by international norms and regulations. This is the world China has been desperately seeking since the Opium War of 1840. It took some 160 years for China to reconcile with a system that has inflicted enormous pains on its people in the past.

As a result, Chinese diplomatic outlook and behaviour have undergone fundamental transformations. Two typical diplomatic behaviours have derived from the painful historical encounter with the West. First there was the ‘G-One’ behaviour of distrusting any international system and its sub-systems. For most of the Cold War, China was known as a G-One country, pursuing its own independent objectives while jealously guarding its national sovereignty. The irony is, in comparison with the United States, China had far more experience in unilateralist behaviour. Beijing never had much faith in multilateralism, let alone alliances. Its only alliance experience with the Soviet Union ended in a bitter confrontation.

Second, the ‘friend or foe’ mentality is gone. China never understood the European integration process until recently, because the European model of diplomatic ‘muddlism’ did not fit the Chinese Communist notion of an effective strategy in a revolutionary world.

Today, China is no longer a revolutionary power. The new Eurasian orientation of China’s grand strategy has brought about great changes to China’s foreign policy practices. Since the mid-1990s China has abandoned the G-One posture, and begun to participate and initiate multilateral organisations. China is an active member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a founder of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a recent member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and a proactive and constructive member of the UN Security Council. But China lost no independence in multilateral diplomacy. For example, China is engaged actively in non-proliferation issues without necessarily acceding to a Western conception of its rationale. Nevertheless, China has finally stepped out of the ‘Middle Kingdom Complex’.

More interestingly, in the process of rediscovering its own history, China has also discovered the unsurpassable advantage of handling its external relations with ‘go-go-muddlism’. The geopolitical instinct may tell the leadership in Beijing that the Euro-Asian orientation is far superior to a Pacific orientation when searching for a safe route to enter the world. The Euro-Asian continent is absent of major strategic confrontations; a muddling-through diplomatic approach may take long time but is safer than the water-muddying approach in the Pacific. There the potentially explosive issues are abundant, such as the real or imaginary US-China strategic rivalry, the crisis on the Korean Peninsula, a rearming Japan and last but not least, the intractable Taiwan Question. China is eager to learn from the EU experience, for the EU happens to be the shining model of muddlism in the 20th century and the current world.

In conclusion, Beijing is not seeking a place in the sun, but finding a place in the shade. The Euro-Asian continent casts a long but comfortable shadow for years to come. With a grand strategy of ‘peaceful rise through Euro-Asia’, a long-term peaceful Chinese foreign policy is thus on the horizon. The West should focus not on changing the nature of Chinese internal and external policies, but encourage China in a process of reclaiming traditional, Confucian values.
India as a Foreign Policy Actor – Normative Redux

Radha Kumar

Introduction

Observers of Indian foreign policy are often puzzled by its inchoate combination of idealist rhetoric on international issues, post-modern nitpicking in negotiations and isolationist behaviour when it comes to matters of national interest. “What does India want?” they ask in frustration: “do you want to be a major power, or do you just want to score points?”

The question is a difficult one to answer. When India achieved independence in 1947, the country’s founding fathers assumed it would be a leading international player, expanding rules for normative behaviour in relation to goals as well as means. But though India’s founding fathers produced grand policy visions, such as the 1946 Asian Relations Conference for an institutional structure to buffer Asia against the Cold War, they were unable to translate their sweeping goals into action. The Chinese revolution, followed by the Korean, Vietnamese and Cambodian wars, brought the Cold War into the heart of Asia (Gonsalves 1991).

Sixty years later, India’s new policy-makers define India as ‘a rising power’ that is today beginning to match global goals and means in order to achieve the most favourable results for its citizens, and at the same time expand normative principles for inter-state and transnational behaviour. India’s steady 8-9% growth over the past decade, and the Indian government’s proactive diplomacy in the same period, allow Indian policy-makers to bring context and substance to the normative principles that their predecessors advocated – a development that one leading Indian analyst describes as “crossing the Rubicon” from idealism to pragmatism (Mohan, 2003), and another as “India Unbound” (Das, 2002); both phrases indicating what a large leap it is. During the Cold War, Indian policy-makers advocated principles divorced from political reality, to use Morgenthau’s definition (Morgenthau, 1982), but today they seek to combine normative principles with national interest, in the way that most states do, especially those with regional or major power ambitions.

As other papers in this series have pointed out, categories of what is normative vary from culture to culture, and are hotly debated across cultures (Tocci, 2007, pp. 2-3). The international norms that do exist do not represent an international consensus on even the lowest common denominators of normative international relations; when nations view themselves as normative foreign policy actors they are inevitably selective.

In terms of definition, therefore, this paper inclines towards Daniel Hamilton’s argument that all states behave normatively to a varying extent; what is important is the degree to which they are normative as well as the issues that elicit their normative behaviour. Thus, for example, the US and China behave least normatively when it comes to security threats (accepting that the use of force can be a normative means), while most of the EU countries and India tend to be more normative in their reactions. On the other hand, the US is most likely to come to the rescue of a persecuted state, the EU and India are less likely to and China is the least likely of all. Then again, the US and India provide far greater freedom of labour movement, including immigration, than do the EU or China; conversely, the US and China are the greatest investors in other countries’ infrastructure development.

To these distinctions we need to add another variable: regional differentiation. If regional perceptions are taken into account – how your neighbourhood views you – China would come off as less

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1 Professor Radha Kumar, Director of the Mandela Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution at Jamia Millia Islamia University and trustee of the Delhi Policy Group, is a specialist on ethnic conflicts and peace processes.
threatening than the US, EU or India, not to mention Russia. The EU pattern of pushing norms in its immediate neighbourhood is not a common foreign policy practice; less intervention is considered more normative in most parts of Asia. This may partly be due to the post-colonial heritage in which establishing sovereignty is itself a prime normative goal.

With these caveats, this paper applied Tocci’s typology to eight case studies of India’s foreign relations – with Pakistan, China, Japan, the US, Nepal, Sikkim (now an Indian state), Myanmar and the EU – to examine what kind of foreign policy actor India is, accounting for varied purposes and power. Do India’s current foreign policy actions conform to its founding fathers’ vision? If they are different, can they still be called normative? Have Indian views on what constitutes normative foreign policy changed? What can other countries expect from India?

**What do Indians consider to be normative foreign policy?**

Indian views of what is normative in foreign policy are framed by the canonical 3rd-4th century text on statecraft, Kautilya’s *Arthashastra* (laws of political economy), which highlighted three key pillars of normative state behaviour: engagement with the world, adherence to rule-based norms, and transparency.

Written for the most outward looking of India’s several empires, the Mauryan dynasty, whose rule spanned the Indus valley and was home to one of the greatest universities of its time: the Buddhist seat of Taxila (now in Pakistan), the *Arthashastra* viewed the Mauryan empire’s neighbourhood as a core foreign policy priority and defined its relations within a set of concentric circles. He also counselled more general realist precepts: greater powers should be cultivated, equal or weaker powers could be defeated through judicious alliances, and weaker powers could be attacked, patronised or ignored.

These views led to a debate on whether Kautilya was the ultimate political realist or whether the *Arthashastra* skillfully combined elements of idealism with *realpolitik* serving the national interest (Boesche 2003; Alagappa 1998, pp. 74-5). The latter characterisation is more convincing – Kautilya believed that alliances for peace were preferable to war even if war highlighted a country’s primacy over others.

Had the traditional strand remained dominant in Indian foreign policy doctrine it would have been easy to classify India as a normative (although not necessarily naively idealist) international player. But British colonialism added a new element to Indian foreign policy – that of dependency. Whereas previous empires had been rooted in India and adopted foreign policies that served Indian state interests, Britain was a far-away country and India’s foreign policy was adapted to suit British interests. Thus what I term ‘unrealpolitik’ international action (because it subordinates national interests to that of other countries) entered into Indian foreign policy.

Indian attitudes towards norms based on Enlightenment values were also complicated by the fact that these values arrived in India as a consequence of empire. Indians have tended to view European and to some extent American references to normative behaviour with scepticism. Most Indian policy-makers and analysts do not, for example, see a difference between European policies in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the US and allied invasion of Iraq. Humanitarian intervention, they argue, is not distinct from regime change or ‘shock and awe’: it is more often a cover for imperial design (Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 2003, pp. 44-5; Dixit, 1999; Naqvi, 1999).

In an attempt to rid itself of unrealpolitik, during the Cold War, India’s foreign policy focus was on decolonisation and multilateral constraints over Great Power domination. Furthermore, Indian leaders sought consensus rather than using economic, political or military pressure to influence world affairs, an approach that lasted well into the 1990s.

Following the 1962 war with China – which was largely Tibet-driven and in which India suffered a crushing defeat – and Nehru’s death in 1964, Indian foreign policy veered back to unrealpolitik, which in this case put the interests of the USSR above its own. Unrealpolitik reached its zenith under Indian
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1966-75, 78-84), during which period India aligned itself firmly with the USSR and its economy became dependent on the Soviet military-industrial complex.

With the end of the Cold War, India experienced what some called an opportunity to combine normative and realpolitik goals (Kumar, 2006), and others defined as a conflict between the two (Mohan, 2003). But Indian policy-makers were slow to take advantage of this new opening. It was only in the early years of the 21st century that Indian policy-makers made a concerted effort to re-engage with the world; and this time it was the Kautilyan strand in Indian foreign policy that came to the fore.

In contrast to India’s Cold War leaders, the country’s new policy-makers came to the conclusion that if India was to pull its weight internationally it would have to become an economic and regional power (Dasgupta, 2003, pp. 92-111; Schiff, 2006). This was a view that had been cogently put by Kautilya and kept alive during most of the Mughal Empire because its rulers became native to India, but was then lost during colonial rule and the Cold War.

After the first wave of economic liberalisation in 1990-1, when many of the bureaucratic constraints on industrial growth were lifted, wave two of economic liberalisation prioritised resource and infrastructure development. The new policy-makers believed that neither could be achieved without integration into the global economy. So they swung into an active diplomatic campaign to improve relations with the major powers, identified as the US, EU, Russia, Japan and China (Dasgupta, 2003) and implement a ‘Look East’ policy in the wider Asian neighbourhood, especially the ASEAN countries where the Indian ‘footprint’ had a long reach (Saran, 2003, p. 115).

India, which had eschewed membership of multilateral forums under Indira Gandhi, joined a slew of regional trade and security organisations in the short span of a decade, such as ASEAN, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Asian Regional Forum, the Asia-Europe Meeting process and the East Asia Summit. Finally, India’s new policy-makers also recognised that India would fail as a regional power until it could turn its South Asian neighbours around. As a result, the Indian government launched several new peacemaking initiatives – with Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, Nepal, and Sri Lanka – hoping that these could help pull South Asia out of the slough of hostility and poverty that it had slipped into following independence from British rule.

The new diplomacy had mixed results. On the whole it yielded rich dividends for improved relations with the major powers and East Asia; but South Asia proved to be an uphill climb.

### The Eight Case Studies

**Indian Foreign Policy: Selected Case Studies**

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<th>Type of Actor</th>
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What kind of a foreign policy actor is India? From the cases above a mixed picture emerges, but certain general conclusions can be derived nevertheless.

Speaking at a think tank in 2007, Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon identified three key goals for India foreign policy: “Firstly, ensuring a peaceful periphery; secondly, relations with the major powers; and, thirdly, issues of the future, namely food security, water, energy and environment”\(^2\) (Menon, 2007).

The means that he enlisted to pursue each goal were different. To build peace in the neighbourhood, India looks to create social partnerships, offer economic benefits such as zero tariff for the poorer South Asian countries, support cross-border infrastructure and development projects, stress ‘civilisational linkages’ that grew from the ancient flow of people and ideas, and work for intra-regional trade through SAARC, ASEAN and the East Asia Summit. Significantly, Menon described the neighbourhood, as Saran did, in the same terms as Kautilya: “expanding circles of engagement, starting with the immediate neighbourhood, West Asia, Central Asia, South-east Asia and the Indian Ocean region”.

There is, however, a slight elision of categories in this description. Looking at the eight cases, there is a clear distinction between India’s policies in South Asia and India’s policies in East Asia. In South Asia, India has increasingly engaged in peacemaking both with its neighbours (Pakistan) and between warring factions within its neighbours (Nepal). India has not been so proactive with the one South-East Asian country with which it shares a land border, Myanmar; and is gingerly in peacemaking with its most powerful neighbour, China.

Indian policy-makers, therefore, perceive a greater threat to the country’s security from instability in its South Asian neighbours, an assessment that the US and EU share. They also act with more confidence in seeking to resolve the threat, and have used a very wide range of normative means, from back channels to hotlines to tracks one and two, from military to civilian CBMs, to help develop normative neighbourhood relations. The EU is in some ways a model – India seeks greater regional economic integration through SAARC as a means of peace-building in the region. It is significant that Menon’s speech was remarkably silent when it came to the peace initiatives that India launched in the late 20\(^{th}\) and early 21\(^{st}\) centuries. Whether this means that Indian policy-makers continue to have reservations about the scope of and for normative relations in South Asia is an open question.

Turning to the broader Asian neighbourhood, the first striking point is that India’s Look East policy indicates a new departure for India, a focus on maritime interests. India has found it easier to develop strong relations with its neighbours at sea than with its land neighbours, and these successes have entered Indian doctrine. Today Indian policy-makers see India as “at the confluence of two seas”, to use the words of the 17\(^{th}\) century Indian ruler, Dara Shikoh, and India’s navy is involved in an increasing number of multilateral exercises to improve maritime security.

India’s Look East policy has clearly been the primary impetus to India’s recent economic growth and has deepened strategic relations with the major powers, whom Menon listed as the US, EU, Japan, Russia and China (in that order). India-US strategic cooperation was founded on maritime security in South-East Asia and the Indian Ocean, as was India-Japan strategic cooperation, and the former was accompanied by a rapid rise in trade. Up until 2005 the US was India’s largest trading partner, with a trade volume of $32 billion that year. The US has now been outstripped as a trading partner by the EU and China, but arguably it was the India-US strategic partnership that prompted the India-EU and India-China partnerships, both of which gained substance only after they took off. Menon tellingly commented that the India-US partnership had a “positive effect… on our dealings with the rest of the world” (Menon, 2007).

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\(^2\) Shri Shivshankar Menon, “The Challenges Ahead for India’s Foreign Policy”, Speech by the Indian Foreign Secretary at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, 10 April 2007 (http://meaindia.nic.in/cgi-bin/db2www/meaxpsite/coverpage.d2w/coverpg?sec=ss&filename=speech/2007/04/11ss01.htm).
That said, India’s goals in partnering with the Great Powers were quite different from India’s goals with Asia; they were, in Menon’s words, “access to markets, high technology and resources crucial to our future economic growth and development”. While Indian goals thus mix realpolitik and normative elements, the means that India has used are by and large within the normative framework of international law (the EU-India and India-Japan strategic partnerships). But they have also on occasion sought to alter or expand international law (the US-India civil nuclear energy agreement). At the same time, India is developing institutional partnerships, for example between space, technology, defence and agricultural agencies (the EU and US), as well as through membership of regional forums (the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit).

If these points indicate that India is beginning to expand as a normative foreign policy actor and has been able to bring some depth to its normative behaviour as a rising power, it is also worth noting that Indian policy-makers have encountered a surprising obstacle to achieving some of their goals, in particular the civil nuclear energy agreement – domestic political opposition. This casts doubt on whether there is internal consensus or even clarity on what constitutes the national interest, and raises the question of whether the unrealpolitik strand in Indian foreign policy is as strong as ever.

These factors indicate that India might remain a rising rather than an established power for a longer time than it would take if the country’s political parties had an overarching and non-partisan conception of the national interest. This is unlikely to affect India’s behaviour as a normative foreign policy actor, though it will dent policy-maker confidence and could mean that India’s ability to be effective in its actions will be curtailed. Much depends on how well the India-EU and India-US partnerships develop on the one hand, and how steadily India’s Look East policy progresses on the other hand. The potential is good: each set of relationships is based on a strong foundation of goodwill, little strategic competition and Diaspora ties. The India-China relationship is more complicated and lacks the foundation that the other three have, but it too could improve as the other three progress.

In short, India is steadily becoming a more influential as well as normative foreign policy actor, despite domestic confusion, and this trend is set to grow over the coming decade.

References


European Security Forum
A joint initiative of CEPS – IISS – DCAF – GCSP

The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) joined forces late in the year 2000, to launch a new forum on European security policy in Brussels. The objective of this European Security Forum is to bring together senior officials and experts from EU and Euro-Atlantic Partnership countries, including the United States and Russia, to discuss security issues of strategic importance to Europe. The Forum is jointly directed by CEPS and the IISS and is hosted by CEPS in Brussels.

The Forum brings together a select group of personalities from the Brussels institutions (EU, NATO and diplomatic missions), national governments, parliaments, business, media and independent experts. The informal and confidential character of the Forum enables participants to exchange ideas freely.

The aim of the initiative is to think ahead about the strategic security agenda for Europe, treating both its European and transatlantic implications. The topics to be addressed are selected from an open list that includes crisis management, defence capabilities, security concepts, defence industries and institutional developments (including enlargement) of the EU and NATO.

The Forum has about 100 members, who are invited to all meetings and receive current information on the activities of the Forum. This group meets every other month in a closed session to discuss a pre-arranged topic under Chatham House rules. The Forum meetings are presided over by François Heisbourg, Chairman of the Foundation for Strategic Research, Paris. As a general rule, three short issue papers are commissioned from independent experts for each session presenting EU, US and Russian viewpoints on the topic.

The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) is an independent policy research institute founded in Brussels in 1983, with the aim of producing sound policy research leading to constructive solutions to the challenges facing Europe.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), founded in London in 1958, is the leading international and independent organisation for the study of military strategy, arms control, regional security and conflict resolution.

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) promotes good governance and reform of the security sector. The Centre conducts research on good practices, encourages the development of appropriate norms at the national and international levels, makes policy recommendations and provides in-country advice and assistance programmes.

The Geneva Centre for Security Studies (GCSP) is an international foundation that was established in 1995 under Swiss law to promote the building and maintenance of peace, security and stability.