SPEECH GIVEN

TO

MID-ATLANTIC CLUB

BY

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The relationship between the United States and Europe is never easy and can never be taken for granted.

It does not require great powers of perception to realize that at the moment it is not proceeding particularly smoothly.

The sounds of creaking if not splintering can be distinctly be heard.

My personal conviction is that the relationship will survive intact but we have to ask ourselves why we are hearing those sounds at all.

The symptoms of a deterioration in our relationship are well known; our respective responses, apparently

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so different, to the crises in Iran and Afghanistan. The causes, however, run deeper. They stem first from misconceptions that each has about the other, second, from the way in which the United States reaches its decisions and, third, from the way in which Europe often fails to reach coherent and comprehensive decisions. Compounded with all of those factors is the fault on both sides of the Atlantic of defining the word "security" too narrowly.

First, the misconceptions that Europeans persist in having about the United States. Europeans arriving in the U.S. come with one common prejudice; that what they will find here will be bland, uniform and without variety; and therefore easy to comprehend and deal with.

Movies and television have accustomed them to expect a homogeneous culture based on hamburgers, Coca-cola,
OVERSIZED AUTOMOBILES AND, MORE RECENTLY, JOGGING.

On the surface, that prejudice may be confirmed by initial experience, but what dispels it is the realization that at a deeper level this is, in fact, a country of enormous diversity. Once Europeans have made that discovery, it is something they never quite recover from.

There is the diversity in the origins of every American. One quickly learns that ethnic origin can be nearly as important to individuals, and particularly groups of individuals, as being American itself. E pluribus unum has been realized. The nation-building is over and the nation feels confident enough to admit the racial and ethnic differences of its constituent parts.

It may not yet be admissible to joke about an ethnic group, but it is more than permissible for an individual to readopt some of a culture that was supposed to have been \left behind
LEFT BEHIND IN THE OLD WORLD, THE IMMIGRANT FATHER STRIKING HIS CHILDREN BECAUSE THEY LAPSE INTO THE LANGUAGE OF HIS NATIVE COUNTRY HAS BEEN REPLACED THREE GENERATIONS LATER BY AMERICANS WHO SEE NO CONFLICT OR DANGER IN HAVING TWO IDENTITIES AND WHO WILL PROUDLY PROCLAIM THEMSELVES AS POLISH-AMERICAN, JAPANESE-AMERICAN OR MEXICAN-AMERICAN.

THE EUROPEAN BEGINS TO APPRECIATE THAT THERE ARE RICH AND DIFFERENT SEAMS RUNNING THROUGH WHAT HE HAD SUPPOSED TO BE A SINGLE CULTURE CARVED FROM ONE COMMON STONE.

THEY ARE VERY REAL DIFFERENCES THAT STEM FROM DEEPLY INGRAINED INTERESTS; THE MOST OBVIOUS EXAMPLE BEING THE TENSIONS THAT EXIST BETWEEN THE ENERGY HAVES AND THE ENERGY HAVE-NOTS.

IT IS AT THIS POINT THAT EUROPEANS SHOULD BEGIN TO BECOME AWARE OF THE DIFFICULTIES THE UNITED STATES HAS IN REACHING DECISIONS. NOT ONLY IS THERE A DIVERSITY OF REGIONAL INTERESTS, BUT THERE IS THE PROLIFERATION OF SPECIAL INTERESTS THAT PLAY AN EVER-INCREASING ROLE IN THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS.

ALL OF THESE INTERESTS, BE THEY FARMERS, CONSUMERS, OIL COMPANIES, STEEL COMPANIES, DOCTORS, PRO-NUCLEAR, ANTI-NUCLEAR, ENVIRONMENTALISTS OR WHATEVER, ARE WELL ORGANIZED AND ABOVE ALL POLITICALLY ORGANIZED.
They have taken up well-entrenched positions on the chessboard of national and local politics, in many ways appearing to have taken over from the established political parties. They are very often also a factor in international relations.

So too are the numerous independent and executive agencies whose nameplates seem to adorn every corner of the maze that is political Washington.

It is both right and understandable that domestic interests and agencies should be fully involved in every decision of the U.S. government. But in their multiplicity and diversity there lie inevitable sources of internal conflict, an added degree of pain in the decision-making process and endless possibilities for lack of communication. All of which makes true consultation with America's allies more difficult.
None of this makes life particularly easy for those Europeans in Washington whose task it is to explain to their capitals that a decision of the President is not necessarily a decision of the United States. It can be hard for our politicians and civil servants to understand how it is that the gap between executive and legislature yawns ever wider when in our own countries the two are often inseparable. It is harder still for them to understand that the Chief Executive does not have a political party whose support he can count on in carrying out a decision.

This is not a comment on the personalities involved. It is an observation on a system, or at least on how it has evolved.

The checks and balances of a system devised in the 18th century were built-in to deal with the problem of the supposedly
OF THE SUPPOSEDLY DIVINE POWER OF MONARCHS. WITH THE
DEMISE OF NATIONAL POLITICAL PARTIES, THE UPSURGE OF
SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS, THE ROLE OF SPECIALIZED AGENCIES
AND THE TOTAL DECOUPLING OF EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATURE, WE
ARE LEFT ASKING WHETHER THESE CHECKS AND BALANCES HAVE NOT
IN FACT LED TO A PARTIAL PARALYSIS OF THE TEMPORAL POWER
OF THE PRESIDENCY.

THE CONSEQUENCES FOR EUROPEANS THAT FLOW
FROM THIS WAY OF DOING THINGS ARE TWOFOLD. CONTRARY TO THE
MYTHS OF RECENT YEARS, WASHINGTON DOES NOT HAPPEN BEHIND
CLOSED DOORS: EUROPE, ON THE OTHER HAND, DOES. IN THE U.S.
SYSTEM THE DEALS AND COMPROMISES ARE STRUCK IN THE OPEN.
THE WHOLE PROCESS IS CONDUCTED IN PUBLIC. WHILE THIS MAY
APPEAR TO BE HEALTHY AND INDEED DEMOCRATIC, IT CAN RESULT
IN LEADERSHIP THAT IS SOMETIMES HAMSTRUNG AND WHOSE POSITIONS
ARE INFLEXIBLE. ONCE THE DOMESTIC DEAL HAS BEEN PUT
TOGETHER THERE MAY BE LITTLE ROOM LEFT FOR MANOEUVRE IN

/ANY NEGOTIATION
any negotiation that follows with foreigners. That is the first consequence.

The second flows from the fact that there is nothing final about many decisions taken in the United States. Even when the public bargaining between Congress, White House, and special interests is apparently over, the decision is still contested. There are always the courts, the press and public opinion to whom further appeal can be made.

It is at this point that the executive often turns to the friends and allies overseas and expects to find from them the support it cannot muster at home.

When that support is not automatically forthcoming, there is a sense of betrayal, of a lack of solidarity. This is made all the more acute by the use that is then made domestically and politically of the fact that the President has not been able to win round America's friends and allies to his position.
As we find ourselves ineluctably drawn into the American political process, what are in fact minor differences of opinion begin to take on the proportions of major disagreements.

Suddenly, it appears that Europe can no longer be counted on in a crisis. But the belief that Europe will always react exactly as America does is a misplaced one and stems from a lack of understanding in this country of what we do share and what we do not share with America.

We do not share the same geography.

Our neighbours are not Canada and Mexico, they are the Soviet block, the Middle East, and Africa.

We do not share the same history. Our colonial past is more recent as are our civil wars.
We do not share the same international economic relations. Our economy is far more dependent on external trade than is that of the United States, both in terms of our needs for supplies and for markets.

What we do share with the United States is the same basic set of beliefs and values; more so than with any other country. We also depend on one another for our future prosperity and survival. Those are the things that bind us together and make us partners, whether we like it or not -- and I do like it.

But being partners does not only mean shouldering common burdens and responsibilities. For the partnership to work we also have to make an effort to understand the ways in which we each differ and the constraints under which each operates.
Too often we are made to feel in Europe that Americans do not always understand that our interests are not always identical, that we cannot always respond to the same challenge in the same manner.

This does not mean that we do not feel solidarity with the United States, it simply means that we may have our own way of doing things.

We may also have our own way of looking at things. There is always more than one interpretation of an international event. We all know that the Russians are in Kabul, but do we know why? Does any one partner in the alliance have the monopoly of wisdom in answering that question?

In our relations with one another we should be able to tolerate differences of opinion just as we tolerate them within the democratic system of any one of our countries. That is the essence of a real partnership.
Anything else is bound to be one-sided and eventually rendered meaningless.

On each side, we may have to agree to disagree at times, either on our analysis of an event or our responses to it; so long as in so doing we are all still faithful to our common interests and values.

What each does may differ but its symbolic significance must remain the same.

There is a clear message in the Community's recent decision to further strengthen its contractual economic links with Turkey, Yugoslavia and Rumania. There is also a cost to us in economic and financial terms.

This is not the kind of action that is accompanied by war-whoops and the roll of drums but it is also not without its political and strategic significance.
There is nothing necessarily wrong with the fact that Europe and the United States differ in their perception of an international event or their responses to it. It would be neither a healthy nor even a credible partnership if we always marched in lock-step. The important thing is that we both understand the differences of one another's approaches and accept that they may be but minor differences.

If on either side, we choose to systematically treat any variation in our views or attitudes as major differences, we shall be giving others the opportunity to drive a wedge between us.

At the same time, it is also important that we do not allow the issue of East-West relations to dominate our thinking to the exclusion of a number of other issues; issues that may not appear to be as immediate or even as politically exciting, but which may both be harder to resolve and which present no less of a threat to our overall security and well-being.
There is the delicate matter of maintaining an open competitive trading system in a period of high inflation, rising unemployment and low growth. There is the question of the proper relationship between the industrialized world and the developing world. There is our continued collective dependence on imported oil.

These are as much security issues in today's world as those we traditionally class as political military issues. One wonders in these areas who makes the greater contribution to overall security. Is it Europe, is it the United States?

Political military and political economic issues both touch on our security; they not only overlap but they are also intertwined.

Once that fact is realized, there is a logical conclusion that we in Europe cannot escape. That is, that we have to develop a common foreign policy.
I believe that the license of expressing oneself personally is something permitted departing diplomats and I should perhaps emphasize that my observations on this question constitute a personal view rather than official commission policy.

It is therefore my own view that if we were to develop a common foreign policy, many of the frictions in our relationship with the United States would be considerably reduced. How often have I heard or read in this country how much more smoothly the relationship between us operates when, as in the field of trade, the United States is dealing with a Community that is speaking with one voice on the basis of a commitment that has been arrived at through the institutional process of the Community. And how often is one reminded of Henry Kissinger's cri du coeur: "To whom do you pick up the phone when you want to speak to Europe?"
THAT WE HAVE SO FAR FAILED TO FULLY BITE THE FOREIGN POLICY BULLET WILL COME AS NO SURPRISE TO THOSE WHO ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.

OUR POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS ARE DRAMATICALLY, chaotically young. THEY DO NOT NECESSARILY PRODUCE DECISIONS AS THEY ARE NEEDED AND THE DECISIONS THEY DO PRODUCE TEND TO BE MORE RIGID THAN NECESSARY.

WE ARE TALKING ABOUT NINE COUNTRIES, A COMMISSION, A COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, IN RECENT YEARS A EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND NOW TOO, A LEGITIMATE AND DIRECTLY-ELECTED PARLIAMENT. EACH IS Trying TO DEFINE ITS ROLE, WITH EACH ANXIOUS NOT TO LOSE ANY DEGREE OF ITS INFLUENCE.

THERE CAN BE A TEMPTATION FOR OUR FOREIGN PARTNERS TO EXPLOIT THIS INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY. IT INCREASES, IF THAT IS POSSIBLE, THE COMPLEXITY OF OUR /RELATIONSHIPS
RELATIONSHIPS AS THE COMMUNITY SLOWLY COMES OF AGE.

WE HAVE, HOWEVER, AGREED THAT SOME EXTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS SHOULD BECOME AN AREA OF COMMUNITY RESPONSIBILITY, BUT WE HAVE ONLY DONE SO BECAUSE WE MAINTAIN A FICTION THAT THERE IS A NEAT LINE THAT DIVIDES THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY FROM THE POLITICAL. DIFFERENT PEOPLE IN DIFFERENT GROUPS HANDLE OUR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS EITHER IN POLITICAL COOPERATION OR THROUGH THE COMMUNITY, ACCORDING TO WHETHER THE SUBJECTS IN QUESTION ARE COVERED BY THE TREATIES OR NOT. THIS DISTINCTION IS WEAKENING THE DEFENSE OF OUR INTERESTS AND THE STRENGTH OF OUR POLICIES.

FOUR YEARS IN WASHINGTON HAVE ENABLED ME TO SEE HOW ARTIFICIAL A DISTINCTION IT IS AND HOW MUCH MORE DIFFICULT IT MAKES OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH OUR PARTNERS.
In a sense, we are at a very similar stage to that we were in in the late 1940's. At that time, we made the discovery, and acted upon it, that each of us separately in Europe would count for nothing economically if we remained separate and did not pool our resources.

We do now have a certain economic strength as a Community. We can no longer shun the political responsibilities that spring from it. Nor, in our own interest, should we fail to use the opportunities it gives us.

Political cooperation between our countries has been a great step forward. But it is dated. Since 1973, the Community and its member states have been thrown onto the world stage. Our institutions were not ready and our policies had hardly been defined.
For Europe to carry political weight in the world, to be able to be master of its own destiny, intergovernmental cooperation is now not enough. It was not enough to create economic unity. It will not be enough if we are to assume our responsibilities and play the role in world affairs that should be ours.

The problem was clearly identified by Leo Tindemans in his 1976 report on European Union, when he suggested a new step towards a common foreign policy. To make European identity credible to the outside world, he proposed in his own words, "changing the political commitment of the member states which is the basis of political cooperation into a legal obligation".

My own feeling is that the time has come to recognize that a valid and lasting foreign policy for Europe requires us to use to the full the economic importance
IMPORTANCE THAT WE HAVE AS A COMMUNITY. We can no longer afford to pretend that our political strength is unaffected by our economic strength. Our methods and goals in each area are part and parcel of one foreign policy for the Community.

This would not involve a loss of independence; in fact, globally, it would mean quite the reverse. It would meet rather than confirm the fear of those who point to an autarchic economic community. We would in fact no longer be open to the charge that we were exercising economic power without political responsibility.

It would also do much to improve the climate of relations between the United States and Europe as a source of confusion was removed.

There would, however, still remain the fundamental problem of understanding one another, of appreciating and accepting one another's differences.
ALTHOUGH WE MAY EACH HAVE DIFFERENCES OF PERCEPTION, IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS DO UNDERSTAND ONE ANOTHER PRETTY WELL.

But we have to go further and deepen that understanding beyond the official and diplomatic level. Our peoples themselves have to know one another better and to accept the differences between us as they exist. This can only happen with a constant interchange of people and ideas.

One of the successes of the European idea has been the personal contacts that have developed across our frontiers.
FRONTIERS BETWEEN STUDENTS, PROFESSIONALS, BUSINESSMEN, CIVIL SERVANTS AND POLITICIANS WHO HAVE ALL LEARNED TO LIVE TOGETHER AND TO WORK TOGETHER. THAT IS THE REAL FABRIC OF THE SOLIDARITY THAT EXISTS BETWEEN OUR NINE COUNTRIES; NOT THE BUREAUCRATIC INSTITUTIONS THAT MANAGE THE TECHNICAL DETAILS OF THE COMMUNITY.

THE MOST STRIKING EXAMPLE OF THIS CONTEXT AT THE PERSONAL LEVEL IS THE ENORMOUS NUMBER OF EXCHANGES THAT NOW TAKE PLACE BETWEEN OUR YOUNG PEOPLE, IN PARTICULAR THOSE OF FRANCE AND GERMANY. THIS IS AN AREA WHERE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE THERE CANNOT BE TOO MANY PROGRAMS, TOO MANY INSTITUTIONS OR TOO MANY DOLLARS SPENT.

EUROPEANS NOW COME TO THE UNITED STATES MORE EASILY AND CHEAPLY THAN THEY EVER USED TO. THE GREAT WORRY IS THAT FEWER AND FEWER AMERICANS WILL BE ABLE TO /VISIT
VISIT EUROPE. THIS IS ONE OF THE WORST CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEPRECIATION OF THE VALUE OF THE DOLLAR.

WE HAD GROWN USED TO THOSE YOUNG AMERICANS APPARENTLY LOAFING ABOUT AND WASTING THEIR TIME IN PARIS, MADRID OR LONDON. IN FACT, THEY WERE LEARNING TO UNDERSTAND THE REALITY OF EUROPE TODAY.

IT IS THE FRIENDSHIPS AND UNDERSTANDING THAT ARE BUILT BETWEEN ORDINARY MEN AND WOMEN THAT WILL ULTIMATELY DECIDE THE NATURE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN NATIONS AND CONTINENTS. THAT HAS BEEN SO FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE WHERE WE HAVE TAKEN AS OUR WATCHWORD THE THOUGHT EXPRESSED BY JEAN MONNET: "WE ARE NOT FORMING AN ALLIANCE OF STATES, WE ARE UNITING PEOPLES".

IT IS JUST AS TRUE FOR THE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE PEOPLES OF EUROPE AND THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES.