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**“United in Diversity”:
The Church’s Experience and the
European Union’s Identity Motto**

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Abstract

The paper analyses a potential relationship between religion and politics in the context of the EU's motto, unity in diversity. It's aimed at verifying the thesis that claims the European Union's identity motto has its roots in the ecclesial model of identity. The following analysis is a two-stage one. First, it considers whether the Church's and the EU's respective "unities in diversity" mean a similar thing; secondly, it elaborates the channels (cultural, ecclesial and political) through which the ecclesial model has been transferred into European politics. In the last part of the contribution, the author considers the significance of the ecclesial experience for the current European integration debates.

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Key words

European identity - unity in diversity - Catholic Church - derivation - secularization - transmission channels.

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“United in Diversity”: The Church’s Experience and the European Union’s Identity Motto

Michel Gierycz

1. Introduction

The expression *E pluribus unum* may be legitimately associated with the US motto. The United States has embraced a unity model founded on constitutional patriotism¹ that unites - in a proverbial melting pot - diverse cultural identities into a single American nation. Yet obviously, by adopting “unity in diversity” as its motto, the European Union does not refer to the American experience. On the contrary, the profoundly different emphasis on national identity in 21st century Europe and 18th century United States seems to suggest that the proposed model of unity in diversity is totally different from the American one.²

In this context, note that the American experience is not the only one to draw from. For instance, we can also mention in that context the experience of the Roman Empire, or the recent experience of India. Nevertheless, in deeper analysis, it is worthy to note that unity in diversity evokes completely different associations in Christians (and especially in Catholics) - namely, those of the fundamental ecclesial experience: the way the Church is present in the world. The Church, or *Ecclesia*, is always *united*, but at the same time it remains culturally *diverse*. In searching for the origins of the EU motto that illustrates a Europe-specific cultural phenomenon, consider John Paul II’s argument that, “the Catholic Church in fact provides a model of essential unity in a diversity of cultural expressions ... a sense of what unites beyond all that divides.”³ For obviously, this sense allows the development of European integration.

In the following paper, the author will look into a potential relationship between religion and politics in the context of the EU’s motto. The quite

¹ Cf. Wil Arts, Jaques Hagenars and Loek Halman, “The Cultural Diversity of European Unity: An Introduction”, in *id.* (eds.), *The Cultural Diversity of European Unity* (Brill, Boston, 2003), 1-12.

² *Ibid.*

³ John Paul II, *Post-synodal Apostolic Exhortation Ecclesia in Europa of His Holiness Pope John Paul II to the bishops men and women in the consecrated life and all the lay faithful on Jesus Christ alive in His Church the source of hope for Europe* (hereinafter: *Ecclesia in Europa*), at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_jp-ii_exh_20030628_ecclesia-in-europa_en.html.

recent dispute over a reference to Christianity in the preamble to the Constitutional Treaty (CT) demonstrates that European elites have failed to discern Christianity's specific significance for the unique construction of the Old Continent. In fact, academic reflection - as Joseph Weiler rightly points out - hardly identifies this problem either, at best mentioning the role Christian faith played in the lives of the Founding Fathers.⁴ Yet the EU derives the definition of its identity - whose ultimate expression is the EU motto - from European experience, which seems to be comprehensible with reference to the experience of the *Ecclesia*.

The analysis carried out in this contribution is aimed at verifying the proposition that the European Union's motto unity in diversity has been derived from the ecclesial model. In this context, 'derivation' means the application by a secular political system of a model moulded by ecclesial practice by translating its content into political and legal terms. Note that derivation, as a form of secularisation, although associated with translating theological terms into political and legal language, has not necessarily borrowed its detailed semantic content. Derivation theory therefore assumes that various shifts in meaning are possible during the translation of any such notion.⁵

The following analysis is a two-stage one. First, it is necessary to consider whether the Church's and the EU's respective "unities in diversity" mean a similar thing; therefore, it needs to be determined if both realities are similar to the model of our interest. Only after such a similarity is established can further insight into the derivation be considered legitimate. For, in the end, it may turn out that just like in the case of the American *E pluribus unum*, this motto will mean something for the Church that is incompatible with the EU experience. Secondly, if essential similarities are found, then the channels through which the ecclesial model has been transferred into European politics should be considered. Apart from demonstrating a semantic similarity between unity in diversity in ecclesial reflection and the EU's political space, the identification of transmission paths will form the second precondition, allowing for the establishment of a link between the ecclesial experience and the European Union's motto.

There is one more methodological remark to be made. The exemplification of Christian understanding of the principle of unity in diversity is made by referring to the experience of the Catholic Church. It is worthy to mention

⁴ Joseph H. H. Weiler, *Chrześcijańska Europa* (original title: Un' Europa cristiana. Un saggio esplorativo) (W drodze, Poznań, 2003), 72-75.

⁵ Cf. Michel Gierycz, "Teologia polityczna a metoda badania relacji religii i polityki w procesie integracji europejskiej" 2(15) *Przegląd Europejski* (2007), 39-50.

that in some other Christian churches (e.g., in the Orthodox Church) this principle also occurs in its own way, while (as it will be shown later) still being rooted in the experience of Christianity as such. There are at least two reasons to pay special attention to Catholicism. First, at least for Western Christianity, the Catholic Church seems to be the best representative, as it follows the tradition of Christian unity in diversity: Catholicism, although global and culturally diverse, remains at the same time united in its theological and moral doctrine. Second, also in respect to numbers, the Catholic Church is leading.

2. The Ecclesial Experience and the EU's Political Experience

2.1. "United in Diversity" in Catholic Ecclesiology

Unity in diversity in Catholic ecclesiology describes a feature of the Church's activity that has been present since its earliest times,⁶ and that is currently guaranteed and confirmed by Ecumenical documents and authoritative papal teaching.⁷ Therefore its nature is first and foremost descriptive: it does not impose diversity within Church's unity, but identifies the way *Ecclesia* deals with this objective reality. Of course, historically, one knows that cultural diversity was often a problem for the Church.⁸ Nevertheless, in Catholicism we discover a peculiar understanding of unity in diversity that remains in the very heart of that religion, even if it was not always followed by the Church in its history.

The fundamental issue is: what kind of diversity is at stake? Carl Schmitt once pointed out that creating *complexio oppositorum* is essential to the Church, both in the area of policy and theology.⁹ As he remarks, "there seems to be no such contradistinction Catholicism would not contain."¹⁰ In this context, unity in diversity may be therefore reflected as a set of internal opposites, reconciled within Catholicism in an indeterminate way. On the other hand, as the Catechism points out, "among the Church's members, there are different gifts, offices, conditions, and ways of life"¹¹, thus it might be risked to conceive of the principle of unity in diversity in strictly institutional terms, or, to paraphrase the language of ecclesiology, hierarchical and charismatic ones.

⁶ Cf. Acts of the Apostles, 15.

⁷ Cf. John Paul II, *Redemptoris missio*. On the permanent validity of the church's missionary mandate (hereinafter: *Redemptoris missio*), at http://www.vatican.va/edocs/ENG0219/_INDEX.HTM.

⁸ Even at the very beginning. Cf. Acts of the Apostles, 15.

⁹ Cf. Carl Schmitt, *Rzymski katolicyzm i polityczna forma* (original title: *Römischer Katholizismus und politische Form*), in *Teologia polityczna i inne pisma* (Znak - Batory, Kraków-Warszawa, 2000).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 87.

¹¹ *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, at <http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc/index.htm>, para. 814.

The first of the sketched options should be rejected, since the principle analysed applies to the way the community of the Church operates, as opposed to its dogma or political associations. Unity in diversity may be therefore at best understood as one of the expressions of the Schmittian *complexio*, rather than as its substitute or equivalent.¹² Yet, according to the Church, unity in diversity is uniquely Catholic. It is therefore no accident that the Catechism explains that, “Holding a rightful place in the communion of the Church there are also particular Churches that retain their own traditions.”¹³ This apposition suggests that the perception of unity in diversity is most of all a “membership in a universal community which is rooted in but not confined to local communities”,¹⁴ and relates the principle analysed to “unity in a diversity of cultural expressions”.¹⁵

A deep relationship between unity in diversity and the specificity of Catholicism is indicated in a work by Henri de Lubac.¹⁶ As he underlines, despite the etymological similarity of ‘universal’ and ‘catholic’, the latter expression could not be replaced by the former, because what is Catholic-specific is not so much global dissemination as “the power of utmost unity”.¹⁷ In this expression, ‘unity’ and ‘universality’ merge, which explains why the “word ‘catholic’ could be used at an early stage to describe both universality of the Church and the orthodoxy of its faith.”¹⁸ As a result, “it is critical to describing the authenticity of the Church, composed of particular churches, which is wholly expressed in all of them combined.”¹⁹

De Lubac’s analysis introduces the essentials of the united-in-diversity problem in Catholic ecclesiology. For whereas the Church, because Christ is present in her²⁰ and “she has been sent out by Christ on a mission to the whole of the human race”²¹, is regarded as universal, at the same time “this universal Church is in practice incarnate in the individual Churches”²² that are

¹² As for the other eventuality, it should be pointed out that, in fact, the only feature that would not distinguish the Church from other international organisations would be the institutional meaning of unity in diversity; a broadly understood multiplicity of gifts, offices or conditions might be almost identically observed within the UN system.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ John Paul II, *Ecclesia in Europe*, para. 116.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Henri de Lubac, *Kościoty partykularne w Kościele powszechnym* (original title: *Les églises particulières dans l’Église universelle*) (Wydawnictwo WAM, Kraków, 2004), 26-29.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 27.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 27-28.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 29.

²⁰ *Catechism of the Catholic Church...*, para. 830.

²¹ *Ibid.*, para. 831.

²² Paul VI, *Apostolic Exhortation Of His Holiness Pope Paul VI Evangelii Nuntiandi. To the episcopate, to the clergy and to all the faithful of the entire world* (hereinafter: *Evangelii nuntiandi*), at

“made up of such or such an actual part of mankind, speaking such and such a language, heirs of a cultural patrimony, of a vision of the world, of an historical past, of a particular human substratum.”²³ In fact, a “universal Catholic Church” is impossible, because Catholicism, while including universality, also refers to particularity. As a result, if the Church reaches out beyond its limits to “become even more Catholic”,²⁴ this means not only territorial expansion, but also in a sense discovering a new cultural dimension of its identity. According to the Catholic doctrine, any *ad gentes* mission should lead not so much to “joining the Church” as to founding a Christian community, building a particular Church “which functions normally in its local setting.”²⁵ As a result, “a concrete and living unity of the Church is not equivalent to uniformity. It is, if one may say so, a ‘pluriformity’, a kind of concert, harmony”,²⁶ in which any particular tradition becomes something very precious that highlights Catholic unity.²⁷ It may not be otherwise, because the “universal Church persists in local churches which in turn embody the universalism of the Catholic Church in their lives as particular communities.”²⁸ Hence, from its early times the Church in a sense has “affirmed” cultural diversity,²⁹ forbidding only what has been contrary to its creed. Such an approach to diversity that is aimed at incarnating the Gospel into different cultures has been referred to in modern teaching of the Church as inculturation.³⁰

The affirmation of diversity requires answering the question of its limits. Undoubtedly the process of inculturation and the interrelated inreligionization³¹ is constantly exposed to the threat of syncretism, which makes inculturation a “difficult and delicate task”,³² to be implemented in a

http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_p-vi_exh_19751208_evangelii-nuntiandi_en.html, para. 62.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Timothy Radcliffe OP, *Globalna nadzieja* (original title: *Globalising Hope*) (W drodze, Poznań, 2005), 183.

²⁵ John Paul II, *Redemptoris missio*, at http://www.vatican.va/edocs/ENG0219/_P7.HTM, para. 48.

²⁶ de Lubac, *Kościoty partykularne...*, 53.

²⁷ Vatican Council II, *Decree on the Catholic Churches “Orientalium Ecclesiarum”*, at http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vatii_decree_19641121_orientalium-ecclesiarum_en.html, para. 2.

²⁸ John Paul II, *Misja Kościołów lokalnych w obrębie Kościoła powszechnego*, in *Katechezy Ojca Świętego Jana Pawła II. Kościół*, Wydawnictwo „M”, Apostolicum, (Kraków- Ząbki, 1999), 491-492.

²⁹ Of course, such openness wasn’t always realized within the Church. Cf. Radcliffe OP, *Globalna nadzieja...*, 181.

³⁰ Piotr Mazurkiewicz, *Kościół i demokracja* (Instytut Wydawniczy Pax, Warszawa, 2001), 46.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 51.

³² John Paul II, *Post-synodal Apostolic Exhortation Ecclesia in Africa of the Holy Father John Paul II to the bishops, priests and deacons, men and women religious and all the lay faithful on the Church in Africa and its evangelizing mission towards the year 2000* (hereinafter: *Ecclesia in Africa*), at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_jp-ii_exh_14091995_ecclesia-in-africa_en.html, para. 62.

sense ex definitione, intended over the long term.³³ For if it should mean something more than a pure external adaptation and “seek to dispose people to receive Jesus Christ in an integral manner ... on the personal, cultural, economic and political levels”³⁴, it also needs to remove from local cultures everything that contradicts the Christian message, so that the distinctiveness and integrity of the Christian faith is not compromised in any way.³⁵ Therefore, inculturation is bound by the compatibility with the Christian message and communion with the universal Church.³⁶ Which means that the Gospel’s message, as *adhortation Evangelii nuntiandi* emphasises, although expressed in local languages, signs and symbols, must be assimilated by particular churches without the slightest betrayal of its essential truth.³⁷ This also results from the fact that the Church itself is, in a sense, subordinated to these values - she is not capable of changing them in any way.

In summing up this sketch on the meaning of unity in diversity in Church’s theology, let us draw a “deep structure” that is inherent to the analysed model and that has a potential application to EU political space. Formally, “united in diversity” is of a descriptive nature. Most of all, it describes the way the community functions and highlights the respect for its inherent diversity; it is, in a sense, a description of the cultural identity of the Church. Unity in diversity is here the ‘by-product’ of a self-awareness and self-interpretation of the community being analysed. As for the contents, a central problem is the way cultural diversity has been preserved in a single community - a religious one in the case of the Church-, leading therefore to the issue of how to approach the culturally ‘different’ who, in this case of the field of faith and shared values, are simultaneously ‘equate with us’.

The assertion that universality is manifest in locality and that Catholicity is not an abstract universality has been central to the Catholic approach to the tension between unity and diversity.³⁸ As a result, the respect for and affirmation of diverse cultures becomes *conditio sine qua non* of preserving the identity of the whole community. Diversity is therefore not seen as a problem to unity. On the contrary, diversity is in fact perceived as the only possible form of unity: it brings into focus the true meaning of community. Such an approach to cultural diversity implies an affirmation-based attitude to

³³ *Id.*, *Redemptoris missio*, para. 52.

³⁴ *Id.*, *Ecclesia in Africa*, para. 62.

³⁵ *Id.*, *Redemptoris missio*, para. 52.

³⁶ *Id.*, *Ecclesia in Africa*, para. 62.

³⁷ Paul VI, *Evangelii nuntiandi*, para. 63.

³⁸ Paul VI underlined that there does not exist a “universal Church”: “Church *toto orbe diffusa* would become an abstraction if she did not take body and life precisely through the individual Churches”, Paul VI, *Evangelii nuntiandi*, para. 62.

the cultures of “others”, allowing for the discovery of an element of truth about oneself. At the same time, it provides guarantees for the local language, tradition or customs.

A precondition of the sketched attitude to different cultures is the awareness of the values that may not be compromised, the imponderables that are invariably valid irrespective of culture. In the case of the Church, as indicated above, these include the integral Christian message and, actually inherent to it, communion with the universal Church. Therefore, a credo is at stake that may not be modified or betrayed when in contact with a different culture. For, as Piotr Mazurkiewicz notes with reference to the Church, “there would have been no catechism if the Gospel changed in interaction with culture.”³⁹ To thrive according to the model of unity in diversity requires, therefore, in light of the Church’s experience, fundamental principles and values that exist independently from the Church herself, and that permit to build the identity of a multicultural community.

2.2. “United in Diversity” in the European Union

The model of unity in diversity was first mentioned *expressis verbis* in the context of the European Union in 2000, when, as a result of a competition, the European Parliament proposed it as the motto of a united Europe.⁴⁰ Three years later it was proclaimed by the members of the European Convention and enacted as the EU motto in Article I-8 of the Treaty they had drawn up.⁴¹ However, as Gabriel Toggenburg notes, since “diversity is a wild and chameleonic animal with thousands of heads”,⁴² the essence of the EU’s motto may become somewhat fogged,⁴³ which actually happens in the literature on the subject. At the start of our analysis, it would be beneficial to look into currently inapplicable meanings ascribed to unity in diversity in theoretical and normative reflection, in order to sketch on this basis the adequate meaning of the EU motto.

³⁹ Mazurkiewicz, *Kościół i demokracja...*, 52.

⁴⁰ Gabriel N. Toggenburg, “‘United in diversity’: Some thoughts on the new motto of the enlarged Union”, (2004) at <http://www.ciemen.org/mercator/pdf/simp-toggenburg.pdf>.

⁴¹ Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, *OJ* C310, Volume 47, 16 December 2004, at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:310:SOM:en:HTML>, (hereinafter CT)

⁴² Toggenburg, “‘United in diversity’: Some thoughts on...”, 2.

⁴³ Gabriel N. Toggenburg, “Unity in diversity. Searching for the Regional Dimension in the context of a somewhat foggy constitutional credo”, in Roberto Toniatti, Marco Dani and Francesco Palermo (eds.), *An ever more complex Union. The regional variable as missing link in the European Constitution* (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2004), 27-56, at 27.

2.2.1. The Substance of EU's "United in Diversity"

The European Union motto is sometimes construed as a sign of disintegration and a paradoxical terminal point of European law that started from the principle of supranationality.⁴⁴ The meaning of Article 1-8 of the Constitutional Treaty or Article 6 of the Treaty of European Union (TEU) is then interpreted in the context of European law, which differentiates, if only potentially, the status of countries within the European Union. Stressed is the fact that such unity in diversity is not only a legal, but also a political principle. In this context, the European debate raises such notions as 'multi-speed Europe', 'Europe à la carte', or "variable geometry Europe",⁴⁵ indicating a political will to further differentiate the European structure. The European Union, already somewhat differentiated *ad intra* (having various "inner circles") should in the process of further integration deepen its drive to disintegration, thus becoming even more a community "united in diversity."⁴⁶

Apart from the mentioned visions, such interpretation is undoubtedly corroborated by various legal regulations that lead to a kind of "unequal membership." Mentioned should be, for example, derogations from the Schengen acquis or some provisions of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)⁴⁷, and finally various "transitional periods" and protective clauses adopted for the post-accession period and concerning as much as 15 out of 31 negotiated chapters.⁴⁸ This assertion seems to be corroborated even more by some of the treaty mechanisms, including first of all the enhanced-cooperation provisions that allow for the establishment of stronger integration ties among a few willing Member States while leaving behind the "obstructive" ones. They perfectly match the political perspective of a "multi-speed Europe" or Balladur's "concentric circles".

Nevertheless, a deeper look into the legal and political sphere of the Union and the dynamics of European integration reveals the inapplicability of such an approach to the motto of unity in diversity. First, from the legal point of view, note that most provisions that differentiate EU membership status are limited in time. Such a situation is evident *expressis verbis* in the case of post-accession derogations from the acquis on the common market (valid for a strictly limited period) or on the accession to the EMU (new members may participate, if their budget deficit is below 4% GDP) and the Schengen acquis.

⁴⁴ Cf. Andrea Ott, *Unity in Diversity? Differentiation in EU Law and policy in an Enlarged European Union* (Centrum Europejskie Natolin, Warszawa, 2004), at http://www.natolin.edu.pl/pdf/zeszyty/NatolinZeszyt15_Ott.pdf.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 55-56.

⁴⁶ Toggenburg, "'United in diversity': Some thoughts on...", 2.

⁴⁷ Ott, "Unity in Diversity?...", 59-63.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 70-73.

Consequently, unity in diversity does not make sense in arrangements whose “diversity” is temporary by definition. Secondly, the derogations in relationships between the States of the “old Union” are intended for a limited period as well, even if their terminal date cannot be determined. For example, this is clearly indicated by - with reference to the EMU - the construction of Article 122 of the EC Treaty, which provides for a review of a derogation every two years by the Council.⁴⁹ Third, and finally, the enhanced cooperation introduced by the TEU is perceived as a necessary evil, which is undoubtedly confirmed by Article 43a, which reads, “enhanced cooperation may be undertaken only as a last resort”.⁵⁰ It is indicated even more clearly in the wording of Article I-44 of the Constitutional Treaty and the new Article 20 of the TEU (following the Treaty of Lisbon [TL]), which, in defining in more detail the condition of a possible “enhanced cooperation”, stresses that its purpose is to “further the objectives of the Union, protect its interests and reinforce its integration process”. Furthermore, it reads that such “cooperation shall be open at any time to all Member States”, and that the decision about its commencement may be adopted only “when it has established that the objectives of such cooperation cannot be attained within a reasonable period by the Union as a whole”. In light of the solutions adopted by the TEU, CT and TL, it is difficult to uphold the assertion that the principle of unity in diversity is a principle to constitutionalise a disintegration within its framework, based on different status of EU members. They rather mean that any “unequal status” is treated as a temporary solution, which in principle is not of a definite nature.

Even leaving aside the above-mentioned legal arguments, note the important theoretical problem resulting from the adoption of the outlined understanding of unity in diversity, which in fact undermines the point for the European Union. A distinct feature of the integration project that to a large extent determines its success is the solidarity of the Member States. Therefore, in fact, as researchers in the field note, the category of unity refers to the notions of equality, solidarity and loyalty of Member States.⁵¹ Yet any potential ‘multi-speed’ Union undermines a fundamental equality of the members, and also for this reason, it may be accepted only as a temporary arrangement from the perspective of integration theory. Finally, on the political level, note that despite the abundance of proposed designs to differentiate the membership status, none of them have materialised. Rather, the political practice to date indicates that the postulate of differentiation is

⁴⁹ Art. 122(2) Treaty establishing the European Community, *OJ C 325 24* December 2002, at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm>.

⁵⁰ Art. 43a, TEU.

⁵¹ Ott, “Unity in diversity...”, 41.

used as a strong political argument to persuade a State reluctant to deepen its integration to change its stance. To sum up, even if disintegration is to be treated as a model of *one Union in diversity*, this is only *per analogiam*, as an intellectual concept and with the awareness that it is counterproductive to the essence of the integration project: a real unity (solidarity) of States that takes into account the actual dimension of European diversity.

Another interpretation of unity in diversity that sometimes appears in the literature on the subject is deduced from Article 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR). In it, unity in diversity applies to “minority cultures, regional identities, or migrant communities”,⁵² while stressing that what lies at stake is the diversity not amongst Member States, but within individual EU Member States.⁵³ In such context of unity in diversity, Romano Prodi, still as the President of the European Commission, pointed to New York as a shining example of how diversity can achieve “great things”.⁵⁴ He stressed that in the US context there is no such thing as a “melting pot”, but “a rich and complex multicultural tapestry”.⁵⁵

However, the perception of European unity in diversity in the context of multiculturalism seems to be a problematic solution. Undoubtedly, the protection of cultural diversity also applies to local cultures, which is apparent from Article 151 of EC Treaty⁵⁶ about national and regional diversity. This notwithstanding, the articles which according to the Convention’s explanation form the basis of the CFR provisions, clearly state that the Community’s cultural policy “shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States”.⁵⁷ Only through the recognition by the Member States of local cultures as being an essential element of their respective national cultures do the latter receive EU protection. Hence, Polish Tartars can probably count on the protection of their culture, but Turkish immigrants in Germany rather not. As a result, to ascribe the EU’s motto to the model of the inclusive diversity of cultures is misleading, because it ignores a fundamental reference to the cultures of nation-states. Consequently, it may be suggested that the EU motto is a way to forming a multicultural society, or that has a meaning similar to Indonesia’s or South Africa’s mottos, signifying an exceptional intensity of subnational diversity of the ethnos. This of course is incompatible with European realities. Therefore, one has to agree with

⁵² Toggenburg, “‘United in diversity’: Some thoughts on...”, 5.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁵⁴ Romano Prodi, “Cultural diversity and shared values”, New York University Law School, New York, 4 November 2003, at https://www.ebu.ch/CMSimages/en/INFOEN_097_tcm6-8335.pdf.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ See Draft Article III-280 of the CT.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

Gabriel Toggenburg's conclusion that there is no reason to assume that the Union's motto has been invented to "threaten the Member States with a sort of multicultural EU vision".⁵⁸

In view of these statements, reference should be made to the proper subject matter of the unity-in-diversity principle. Essential directions for this are provided, not only by the cited provisions of primary legislation, but also by the history of European integration process.

Following the initial failures of the ambitious political initiatives of the 1950s, the process of European integration came to be considered in a context wider than just the economy, and issues were raised regarding respect for and preservation of cultural diversity. Although the postulate of unity in diversity was not formulated directly, already the initial documents concerning a united Europe stressed that the preservation of cultural diversity was one of the motives and preconditions for a deeper unity of Member States. Such an approach is clearly visible in the 1973 Copenhagen Declaration on European identity. The then nine members of the Community declared their wish - upholding their shared principles of representative democracy: the rule of law, social justice and human rights - that the "cherished values of their legal, political and moral order are respected, and to preserve the rich variety of their national cultures".⁵⁹ Unity in diversity was therefore linked to the diversity of national cultures, and - interestingly - it was interpreted at the time as a sort of *differentia specifica* of the planned European project. The third paragraph of the Declaration reads, "The diversity of cultures within the framework of a common European civilisation, the attachment to common values and principles, the increasing convergence of attitudes to life, the awareness of having specific interests in common and the determination to take part in the construction of a United Europe, all give the European Identity its originality and its own dynamism."⁶⁰

In practice, such an approach to national cultures surfaced, for example, in the attitude to the position of national languages in the Community. Although the Treaty of Rome leaves the decision on the use of languages at Community institutions and policies to the discretion of the Council of Ministers, such decision must be taken unanimously.⁶¹ As a result, all four languages of the Member States at the time (French, Dutch, German and Italian) were adopted

⁵⁸ Toggenburg, "'United in diversity': Some thoughts on...", 5.

⁵⁹ Declaration on European Identity (Copenhagen 14 December 1973), at <http://www.ena.lu>.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ Peter Yves, "Managing or Celebrating Linguistic Diversity in the E.U.?", 03/04 *Note de recherché*, *L'Institut d'études européennes*, (Montréal, 2004), 1.

as “official and working” languages having an equal status.⁶² The subsequent accession of other countries has effectively broadened the set of “official and working” languages of the Union. Instead of adopting one of the languages as a Community *lingua franca* or declaring, as did the United Nations, several languages (e.g., those of founding States or of States with biggest populations) as official languages - which would be more economical and maybe more practical - the European structures have guaranteed such status to a number of languages almost matching the number of Member States, thus creating a specific ideal model for the operation of Community institutions. This model assumes an equal status and use of all languages of the Member States, and therefore is focused on the protection of national linguistic identities.

Along with the ‘new opening’ of the integration process effected at Maastricht, which significantly expanded the ambitions of the Communities, expressed both in the founding of the European Union and the transformation of the EEC into the European Community, the guarantees for European diversity in the united Europe have been even more highlighted. The preamble to the TEU, while emphasising a “new stage in the process of European integration”,⁶³ just following the indication of common legal principles of Member States, declares that deepened solidarity must respect their traditions, culture and history. The initial paragraph of Article F articulates that the “Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States”.⁶⁴ Furthermore, articles 126-128 of the EC Treaty, inserted pursuant to Article G of the TEU and related to the sphere of culture and education, stress the fundamental significance of national cultures.

Given such thinking about cultural diversity that is present in the process of European integration, and the legal solutions adopted just at the moment of creation of the Union and within the framework of the initial legal regulations for culture, it should be stated that the principle of unity in diversity describes, as the historical experience of Europe indicates,⁶⁵ a unity in diversity of national identities throughout the European Union. Therefore, it relates to what is known as the exclusive perception of the analysed model,⁶⁶ and consequently to entities with state character, rather than to social or

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ Preamble to the Treaty on European Union (Text of Maastricht), at <http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichteu.pdf>.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ Cf. Oskar Halecki, *The Limits and Divisions of European History* (Sheed & Ward, London-New York, 1950).

⁶⁶ Toggenburg, “Unity in diversity: Searching for the Regional Dimension...”, 27.

ethnic groups.⁶⁷ Unity in diversity perceived in such a way is, besides, entrenched in the every-day European experience, indicating that “cultural diversity is an element of European identity almost equally important as the three classic pillars of European culture”.⁶⁸

2.2.2. Guarantees of Cultural Diversity in EU Legislation

In analysing the legal guarantees of cultural diversity, first note that the preamble to the TEU retains the link between ‘deepened solidarity’ that expresses the essence of a new stage of integration, and a respect for the history, culture and traditions of European nations.⁶⁹ The initial rules of the Treaty to regulate Union’s operation stress that the development of unity within its framework must not adversely affect cultural traditions of Member States. According to Article 6(3), the Union must respect their identities. At the same time, note that the Amsterdam reforms moved the provision that expresses the above-mentioned rule from its prominent first place in Article F to paragraph 3 of Article 6. Independently of these ‘spatial’ changes, respect for the history, cultures, traditions and identities of Member States is one of the general principles of integration expressly guaranteed by the EU. This is supported by the wording of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which declares in the Preamble that the “Union contributes to the preservation and to the development of these common values while respecting the diversity of the cultures and traditions of the peoples of Europe as well as the national identities of the Member States and the organisation of their public authorities at national, regional and local levels”.⁷⁰ Article 22 of the Charter reaffirms at the same time that the Union “shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity”.⁷¹ Therefore, it should be noted that the protected diversity refers to national identities of Member States, with the guarantees encompassing their respective cultures as well as religious, linguistic and political-legal traditions.

The EC Treaty adds more detail to the general acknowledgement of respect to diversity as outlined in the TEU and the CFR. In the area of culture, the Treaty states that, “The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the

⁶⁷ Toggenburg, “‘United in diversity’: Some thoughts on...”, 2.

⁶⁸ Piotr Mazurkiewicz, “*Kategoria narodu w debacie nad Traktatem ustanawiającym Konstytucję dla Europy*”, in *id.* and Sławomir Sowiński (eds.), *Religia - tożsamość - Europa* (Ossolineum, Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków, 2005), 110.

⁶⁹ Preamble the Treaty on the European Union (TEU).

⁷⁰ Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, *OJ C 303* of 14 December 2007, at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

fore.”⁷² Note that the TEU defensively-expressed right to “respecting the cultures of the Member States”⁷³ is transformed in the EC Treaty into a Community policy goal: it has to promote the “flowering of cultures”,⁷⁴ which, while indeed in line with the principle of unity in diversity, remain, as it were, in a constant tension between the affirmation of what is common and uniting, and what is different. Hence, the next paragraph of the aforementioned article is not surprising in that among the fields of potential Community activity there are, side by side, the dissemination of culture and history of the European peoples as well as the safeguarding of cultural heritage of European significance.⁷⁵

According to the Treaty, the Community’s cultural activity should be, in principle, of subsidiary nature: its role is first and foremost to encourage the Member States to cooperate. The supporting and supplementing of States’ actions by the Community is admissible under Article 151 only ‘if necessary’. The EC Treaty therefore not only fails to create the basis for a Community cultural policy as understood on the national level, but also considers the Union’s activity in this field as an extremity. This is also indicated by a significant restriction of the scope of the Community’s cultural action, evidenced by a detailed list of admissible activities. The Treaty only provides for “incentive measures, excluding any harmonization of the laws and regulations of the Member States” and recommendation as methods of the Community’s influence.⁷⁶ At the same time, the Community is required to take cultural aspects into account in its actions in other fields of activity.⁷⁷ Therefore, the Treaty in a way endeavours to impose restraints on the economically-minded Brussels bureaucracy. In light of these solutions, it seems evident that the Treaty regards cultural diversity as a European value and a Community policy goal, leaving the development of culture in the province of national activity.

A similar approach may be identified in the provisions on education. Article 149 of the EC Treaty provides for an almost identical scope of Community action in the field of education as in culture. Again, we are confronted with a subsidiary nature of Community action, expressed by the encouragement of the Member States to cooperate, and “if necessary, by supporting and

⁷² Art. 151(1) EC Treaty, OJ C 321 E/1, at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/ce321/ce32120061229en00010331.pdf>.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ Preamble TEU.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, Art. 151(2).

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, Art. 151(5).

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, Art. 151(4).

supplementing their action”.⁷⁸ The above-mentioned article qualifies also that the Community action should fully respect “the responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity”.⁷⁹ The Union may not interfere with the content of educational programmes and the whole education systems, leaving their entire management to the Member States. Its competencies are enumerated in paragraph 2,⁸⁰ with the proviso that even for the listed competencies the Union may apply only the above-mentioned incentives and recommendations.⁸¹

Not delving into a detailed analysis of Article 149 of the EC Treaty, let us focus on two details important to the central problem of this chapter, both of which are related to linguistic policy. Paragraph 2 of the analysed article mentions Community action for “developing the European dimension in education”.⁸² Such wording could sound sinister for example in the context of Euroculture concepts that appear from time to time.⁸³ This notwithstanding, the Treaty defines very precisely what such an expression means: the European dimension in education is to be strengthened “particularly through the teaching and dissemination of the languages of the Member States”.⁸⁴ Ergo, linguistic diversity, which is one of the basic expressions of cultural diversity, has been recognised as a constitutive feature of being European. Piotr Mazurkiewicz notes that, throughout the EU, “protection of national language is perceived as an essential element of the European dimension, and language itself as a special element of cultural heritage”.⁸⁵ Also the fact that - in accordance with Articles 53 of the TEU, 314 of the EC Treaty, and 61 of the Accession Treaty - treaty texts currently have twenty-one original language versions should perhaps be seen in this context; it would seem to confirm the importance of national-culture diversity for the Union’s identity.

The first regulation on religious diversity was brought by the Treaty of Amsterdam, and more precisely in the attached Declaration on the status of churches and non-confessional organisations, declaring that,

the European Union respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of churches and religious associations or communities in

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, Art. 149(1).

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, Art. 149(2).

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, Art. 149(3).

⁸² *Ibid.*, Art. 149(1).

⁸³ Piotr Mazurkiewicz, *Europeizacja Europy* (Instytut Politologii UKSW, Warszawa, 2001), 78-79.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ Mazurkiewicz, *Kategoria narodu...*, 110.

*the Member States. The European Union equally respects the status of philosophical and non-confessional organisations.*⁸⁶

Although such expression is less determined than the one originally proposed by Germany, which emphasised that the constitutional and legal status of religious communities in Member States expresses the identity of the Member States and their cultures and is part of common heritage,⁸⁷ it may be considered a sufficiently capacious formula to guarantee the particular status of religion and religious freedom in its collective dimension.⁸⁸ Meanwhile, it seems that the issue of respect for religious diversity, including respect of the particular status of churches in European countries, constitutes one of the most difficult elements for the Union to fully accept. Evidence of this may be seen in the overlooking of that issue at Maastricht, or the failure to insert a clause about churches in the Treaty of Amsterdam, or, finally, the recent dispute on *invocatio Dei* in the Constitutional Treaty. On the other hand, there is an obvious evolution towards respecting that diversity, which expresses itself inter alia in the proposal of Article I-52 of the CT, which - as intended by its creators - not only transforms the clause into an article of European legislation, but also requires a regular dialogue of the Union with churches.

Finally, let us raise the issue of the different ways in which public authorities of the Member States are organised, and therefore, of the respect for different political systems and constitutional traditions. The issue has not been regulated in detail by European law till the Reform Treaty,⁸⁹ but has been simply assumed implicite. In this respect, contestation of the principle of internal sovereignty would undermine the essence and purpose of European integration. Therefore, what we find in the primary legislation is minor guidance as a reminder of the validity of this principle. On the 'highest' level, it is expressed in, for example, the arrangement of the European Council, espousing the principle of the 'head of state' or 'head of government'. In fact, whoever sits there depends on the constitutional traditions of the respective Member States, and may not be imposed by the decision of any EU body. On the 'lowest' level, this principle is confirmed, for example, by

⁸⁶ Treaty of Amsterdam, Final Acts and Declarations Adopted by the Conference, at <http://www.eurotreaties.com/amsterdamfinalact.pdf>.

⁸⁷ Helmut Juros, "Klauzula o Kościołach w Traktacie Amsterdamskim", in Aniela Dylus (ed.), *Europa. Fundamenty jedności* (Fundacja ATK, Warszawa, 1999), 161-173, at 164.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ Cf. new Art. 4 TEU.

Article 39 of the EC Treaty that makes workers in the public service the only exception from freedom of movement.⁹⁰

To summarise, EU primary legislation, both on the level of general rules and detailed provisions, cares about the retention of European diversity in the process of deepening integration. In general, this diversity refers to the space of culture in its broadest sense, both in the dimension of arts, education, religion, and political-legal traditions specific for particular Member States.

2.2.3. *The Bonds of European Unity*

As is commonly known, at the start of the integration process the Communities founded their unity around economic and political objectives. Unity was therefore entrenched, at least formally, in the utility of common activity. Remarkably, the focus on political or economic goals is a weakness, in that it pushes towards unification. Consequently, anything that opposes a tangible purpose starts to be treated as a problem. Negative consequences of such pressure were felt painfully by the Member States, at least at the turn of the 1990s, in the common-market building process.⁹¹ The utilitarian logic seems to be well ingrained in the philosophy of Article 11 of the EC Treaty, which provides for ‘enhanced cooperation’. For if utility is decisive for European cooperation, in some cases it would be fully justified to tighten such cooperation with only a few.

If, for the above-mentioned reasons, the perception of unity in diversity as a way leading to disintegration is misleading, let us explain here that a deep reason for this inadequacy is that, in fact, since its very founding the Union has endeavoured to overcome the logic of the market. As Joseph Weiler rightly points out, the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights has been a remarkable expression of such endeavours. As he notes, it is an “important symbol providing a counterbalance to the euro and the whole European economic sphere, a part of the constitutional picture of European integration that has significantly contributed to understanding Europe as a community of values”.⁹²

Article I-1 of the Constitutional Treaty proclaims the EU - for the first time *expressis verbis* - as a community of values, by stating that, “The Union shall

⁹⁰ Art. 39 EC Treaty.

⁹¹ Cf. Erwin Vetter, “Deutschland: Die Sicht der deutschen Länder”, in Rudolf Hrbek (ed.), *Die Anwendung des Subsidiaritätsprinzips in der Europäischen Union - Erfahrungen und Perspektiven* (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1996), 9-21.

⁹² Weiler, *Chrześcijańska Europa...*, 26. Incidentally, this has had a symbolic rather than practical significance, because since the time of the EC Treaty, the Union had already been based on axiological principles shared by all Member States (Article F).

be open to all European States which respect its values and are committed to promoting them together”.⁹³ Consequently,

*having territory in Europe is insufficient for a State to become an EU member; it is necessary to respect the values that the CT considers European, and even to promote them. That fact is additionally strengthened by Article I-59, which allows to suspend certain rights resulting from Union membership, including voting rights, exactly due to a serious and persistent breach by a Member State of the Union values.*⁹⁴

In fact, the CT provisions, which are echoed in the Reform Treaty, correspond to the earlier arrangements of the EU Treaty. The Treaty on European Union formulated in Article 6 (previously F) a catalogue of Union principles (liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law) which the Reform Treaty refers to as the “Union’s values”, extending their list to include human dignity and equality. The TEU, like the CT and RT, makes Union membership conditional on the respect for the above-mentioned principles (Article 49) and provides for acute sanctions for breaching them (Article 7). Consequently, the Union has become not only an economic or political community, but most of all a community of values. The fact that the only necessary condition of Article 49 of the TEU for EU-membership application is respect for European principles is a meaningful expression of this case.

Not delving into a detailed analysis of individual Union’s values and their interpretation in other articles of the Treaty, it needs to be affirmed that the particular attention to European principles and values seems to suggest that there is a kind of axiological credo of integration. Whereas acknowledging the Member States’ right to be guided by their respective axiological canons, the Union requires a minimum respect for common values.⁹⁵ As a result, European diversity seems to be presented by the Treaties not only as an autonomy of culture or language, but also as a full eligibility of various incarnations of universal (at least in the European context) axiological principles within the diverse identities of national states. At the same time, the extent of possible diversity seems to be delineated by these fundamental principles and values.

In light of European law, there is one provision to the above interpretation. The concept of ‘incarnation of axiology’ provides for the existence of a

⁹³ CT Art.I-1.

⁹⁴ Mazurkiewicz, “Wspólne wartości w Traktacie...”, 220.

⁹⁵ Stefan Hambura and Mariusz Muszyński, *Karta Praw Podstawowych z komentarzem* (Studio Sto, Bielsko-Biała, 2001), 36.

metaphysics of values that is characteristic of metapolitical constructions on which constitutional systems of nation-states are founded. Yet values do not appear to be assigned in the European Union for the ontological status of objective properties, but rather only a cultural and historical status. It is clearly stated in the new second recital of Preamble to the Treaty on European Union proposed in the Reform Treaty.⁹⁶ Nevertheless, some signs of such understanding can also be found in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The European Union adapts in the CFR provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights, which it undertook to respect, adjusting them to the current status of legislation in the Member States. Nevertheless, that adjustment sometimes meant ‘modernisation’ of the content of the proclaimed rights. One classic example of such ‘modernisation’ is made in Article 9: the right to marry. As it is stated in Legal Explanations to CFR,

the wording of the Article has been modernised to cover cases in which national legislation recognises arrangements other than marriage for founding a family. This article neither prohibits nor imposes the granting of the status of marriage to unions between people of the same sex. This right is thus similar to that afforded by the European CHR, but its scope may be wider when national legislation so provides.

Such an understanding of the right to marry, rooted in the principle of flexibility, tries to eliminate potential axiological-rooted conflicts in the EU. Nevertheless, it also changes the definition of marriage, and de facto withdraws from considering human rights in terms of natural law.⁹⁷

The change in the meaning of fundamental human rights as well as the new recital in the preamble to the TEU in the context of unity in diversity mean that the axiological credo of integration is actually something flexible and changeable, and may be redefined in the future. In a sense, the right is actually not ‘recognised’, but ‘established’. For if values are fundamental, because “in the course of history they have been declared as such by all Member States, and today they express themselves in national constitutions and views shared by the citizens”,⁹⁸ in course of future events they may be modified and subjected to political debate and political decisions.

⁹⁶ “Drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law.”

⁹⁷ Piotr Mazurkiewicz, “Wokół Karty Praw Podstawowych UE” (original title: Around the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights), 7(3) *Chrześcijaństwo-Świat-Polityka* (2008) (original title: Christianity-World-Politics), 29-32, at 31.

⁹⁸ Mazurkiewicz, “Wspólne wartości w Traktacie...”, 223.

2.3. Conclusions

The previous analysis permits the discovery of essential structural and semantic similarities between Catholic theology and political space of the European Union with regard to the model of unity in diversity. First, similarity is perceptible on the formal level. In both systems, unity in diversity is of descriptive nature. Therefore, it first describes a reality, and only thereafter has a normative meaning. As a consequence, given the origins of the principle, it may be noted that both in the religious and political spheres its use had been superseded by variously regulated reality that renders the essence of unity in diversity. From the substantial point of view, it may be found that both in the case of the Union and the Church, the principle of unity in diversity derives from a concept of collective identity that proposes a way of discharging the tension between universality and particularity with the aim of discovering and highlighting a universal dimension of particular traditions and searching for unity on this basis. Furthermore, note that in both communities unity in diversity is linked to guarantees for cultural identity and an emphasis on the importance of common values, and the essence of the principle is closely related to the problem of the core identity of a given community (the Church - Catholicity, EU - Europeanness). It also seems that any inconsistency in the law and practice of the European Union regarding the normative meaning of this model may be comprehensible from the perspective of the Church's experience - in which case the assimilation of the normative meaning has lasted, *sensu stricte*, for ages.

An important difference between how unity in diversity is perceived from the normative viewpoint and in the ecclesial space lies in the way unity foundations are perceived. Whereas both in the case of the Union and the Church the sphere of axiology is an important basis, in the case of the Union the space is not unchanging. The result of replacing a metaphysics of values with a sociology of values resembles, to use a Biblical metaphor, building on sand rather than on rock. Which also explains why, as the integration progresses, the motto of unity in diversity, currently relevant as a Union's identity symbol, may become outdated or change its meaning, for example, towards a multicultural interpretation that is currently inapplicable.

This difference notwithstanding, the semantic structure of unity in diversity in the European Union and in the Church remains similar, which opens the way to identifying the channels of transmission of the ecclesial model to the political space.

3. Transmission Channels

Transmission channels are understood here as the ways religious terms are transferred and pre-translated into the political space (the final translation already takes place in the political space). For if we have identified structural and semantic similarities between the notion of unity in diversity in the Church and in the European Union, we should also analyse how the principles can be transmitted and translated from the religious into the political sphere, and therefore how these principles are derived from the sphere of *sacrum*.

The works by Carl Schmitt, who, in what is known today as a political science, was first to try and trace the process of adoption of religious notions by the government, demonstrate unequivocally that religious principles transpire into the political sphere first and foremost through culture that moulds the way of thinking and gives meaning to the notions used in a community.⁹⁹ In searching for the ways the model of unity in diversity has been adopted, it seems appropriate to first ask about the impact of Christianity on European cultural identity. For, in a sense, the cultural channel is the threshold transmission channel of religious reflection into politics.

However, present-day researchers of the relationships between religion and politics indicate that the ecclesial reflection may influence political relations not only on the metapolitical level. In light of their analyses, it seems justified to state that the representatives of both the political and ecclesial communities may be involved in the transmission. As a result, although in searching for the transmission channels it seems appropriate to first ask - following Schmitt's argument - about the impact of Christianity on European cultural identity, one should also comment on the activity of the Church (the ecclesial channel) and societies or political elites (the political channel). However, the roles of both channels are different.

With reference to the ecclesial channel, note that the Church supports the process of adoption first of all through its support for and promotion (during public or political dispute) of some concepts or solutions consonant with the Church's vision of the integration process. However, the final adoption or rejection of a religious category is decided in a political and legal sphere by political decision-makers (society directly or through political elites). In other words, although not infrequently some concepts appear in a political dispute due to ecclesial activity, the final decision about whether or not to adopt any

⁹⁹ Cf. Carl Schmitt, *Politische Theologie. Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität* (Duncker&Humbolt, München, 1922).

category worked out during religious reflection into the political system is taken within the framework of a political process. Depending on whether or not there are any shifts in meaning, the derivation may take the form of adaptation or modification.

3.1. Cultural Paths of Transmission

The question of the role of culture has a special significance in the European context, for the issue of what Europe is turns out to be indeterminable without reference to culture.¹⁰⁰ In this context, telling questions asked by Ms. Barbara Skarga, the Polish philosopher, may be quoted:

*Is Europe only a continent? But where do its boundaries lie? On the Urals or on the Elbe? Does it stretch to the Pyrenees or to the Atlantic, to the Danube or the Black Sea? (...) Geographical boundaries do not match those that are present in social conscience. Historical, political boundaries are subject to constant change. And yet we talk about Europe as a certain whole, we value it, we are proud of it, sometimes we curse it.*¹⁰¹

It seems that such questions asked in diverse intellectual milieus¹⁰² bring, generally speaking, one answer - namely that the “geographical concept of Europe is something secondary. Europe is not a continent that may be contained in geographical terms. It is a cultural and historical notion.”¹⁰³

Considering Europe as ‘a continent of culture’ highlights in a special way the issue of the cultural basis for transmission channels. This concerns the question of the significance of the Christian religion for the salient features and imperatives of the European cultural reality. Of key importance here is the extent of impact Christianity had on the natural association formed in minds between the notions of Europe, on the one hand, and unity in diversity on the other.¹⁰⁴

Undoubtedly, “Europe has always been filled by diverse, different, sometimes disparate content; its meanings and effect have evolved over time and differed depending on place”.¹⁰⁵ Nonetheless, if we want to avoid boiling

¹⁰⁰ Mazurkiewicz, *Europeizacja Europy...*, 14.

¹⁰¹ Barbara Skarga, *O filozofię bać się nie musimy* (Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa, 1999), 100.

¹⁰² Joseph Ratzinger, *Europa. Jej podwaliny dzisiaj i jutro* (original title: Europa. I suoi fondamenti oggi e domani) (Wydawnictwo Jedność, Kielce, 2005), 9.

¹⁰³ Ratzinger, *Europa. Jej podwaliny...*, 9.

¹⁰⁴ Mazurkiewicz, *Europeizacja Europy...*, 25.

¹⁰⁵ Krzysztof Pomian, *Europa i jej narody* (Słowo-Obraz Terytoria, Gdańsk, 2004), 7.

down the specificity of European culture to multiculturalism - thus in fact eliminating this specificity - it must be noted that the 'diverse content' does not mean at all a 'cultural melting pot' or a mere syncretism. To recognise the cultural specificity of Europe, whose complex construction is "composed of, on one hand, the spirit of Greece and heritage of Rome adopted by Roman, Celtic, Germanic, Slavic and Finno-Ugric peoples and, on the other, the Hebrew culture and Islamic influence",¹⁰⁶ provokes one rather to seek a bond that assimilates these diverse traditions and, in a way, transforms them to become intrinsically European. As Rocco Buttiglione observes, this bond in the European context is a precisely Christian thought¹⁰⁷ which remains an "essential fact that has shaped the souls of peoples and nations in their existence, culture and development".¹⁰⁸ Fernand Braudel stresses this point when he says that, "throughout Western history, Christianity has formed the core of and enlivened the civilization, even if the latter made it change as a result, and has united it, when the civilization has tried to escape it".¹⁰⁹ As a result, "the European thought exists only in dialogue with Christianity, even when this dialogue is very lively, and discussion violent".¹¹⁰ Hence, Karol Wojtyła's logical conclusion comes to mind, which is that "the frontiers of Europe are most of all the frontiers of Gospel influence".¹¹¹

The above remarks give a clue how to answer the question asked earlier. If Christianity forms the core of European culture, to the extent that "the frontiers of Europe are most of all the frontiers of Gospel influence",¹¹² this means that fundamental Christian values will also play a decisive role in the long-term with regard to the shaping of the cultural identity of the Old Continent, which "while remaining something concrete, real"¹¹³ is at the same time filled with local diversities, national traditions and dissimilarities.

The most crucial element of European culture "seems to be the concept of the supreme status of the individual".¹¹⁴ Consequently, if we look into Christianity's specific contribution to European culture, we will undoubtedly

¹⁰⁶ Piotr Mazurkiewicz, "Chrześcijańskie korzenie Europy", in Maciej Koźmiński (ed.), *Cywilizacja europejska. wykłady i eseje* (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar-Collegium Civitas Press, Warszawa, 2004), 45-66, at 47.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Rocco Buttiglione and Jarosław Merecki, SDS, *Europa jako pojęcie filozoficzne* (Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, Lublin, 1997).

¹⁰⁸ Mazurkiewicz, *Chrześcijańskie korzenie Europy...*, 47.

¹⁰⁹ Fernand Braudel, *Gramatyka cywilizacji* (original title: *Grammaire des civilisations*) (Oficyna Naukowa, Warszawa, 2006), 359.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 364.

¹¹¹ Karol Wojtyła, "Gdzie znajduje się granica Europy", 28 *Ethos* (1994), 27-34, at 32.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ Skarga, *O filozofię...*, 100.

¹¹⁴ Mazurkiewicz, *Europeizacja Europy...*, 25.

find the picture, deeply rooted in the Bible, of man as a person.¹¹⁵ The Christian anthropological concept lies therefore at heart of European understanding of social life and democracy, which “has come to light when man has been called upon to realise in his earthly life the principles of dignity of the human person, personal freedom bounded by respect for the rights of others, and practising brotherly love towards all”.¹¹⁶ It was Christianity that first allowed the establishment of a balance “between individualistic and collectivist vision of social life”,¹¹⁷ thus overcoming pre-Christian primacy of the polis.¹¹⁸ It was no coincidence that it is Thomas Aquinas who gives the fullest truth that man is a social creature, but also a person; therefore while he needs community, he cannot be fully subjected to its power.¹¹⁹ A consequence of implanting Christian anthropological vision into European culture is the community of values founded on the conviction of the inviolability of the human person, which is now the foundation of the EU's axiological credo.

The reflection on the cultural roots of unity in diversity should not overlook the importance of evangelisation for the condition of Europe's cultural identity. For it is important to ask if the concept of unity in diversity has come to being under the influence of Christianity or the other way round - perhaps it is a consequence of the failure of the christianitas concept. The question is important to the extent that only in the first situation do we have a model that takes inspiration from Christianity, and therefore with it, the argument that “Christian concepts and attitudes have survived and remained in human subconscious”.¹²⁰

If we recognise, after Oskar Halecki, that “European history is a history of all European nations seen together as a community significantly different from others”,¹²¹ which perhaps best expresses the specificity of unity in diversity in the exclusive meaning of that term, we should acknowledge a particular role of Christianity for the shaping of such community. I have already mentioned the dimension of building ideological and cultural unity when referring to the general role Christianity has played in European culture. The question remains: why is this unity in diversity?

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 302.

¹¹⁶ Robert Schuman, *Dla Europy* (original title: Pour l'Europe) (Znak, Kraków, 2003), 34.

¹¹⁷ Mazurkiewicz, *Europeizacja Europy...*, 342.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 344.

¹²⁰ Schuman, *Dla Europy...*, 35.

¹²¹ Oskar Halecki, *Historia Europy. Jej granice i podziały* (IEŚW, Lublin, 2001), 20.

Let us note that the above question applies in fact to the form of the postulated unity, and therefore to the question of how Church approached the “alien”, pagan cultures, and therefore to the building of christianitas. Consider in this context that an essential presumption for this approach can already be found in the attitude of Christians to the heritage of Greece and Rome. As Piotr Mazurkiewicz remarks, “entering the Greco-Roman world, Christianity was not ill-disposed to ancient culture and was able to assimilate what had been real achievements of antic geniuses”.¹²² For it assumed that,

*the truth is dispersed in all over the world, and the full Truth is available in Jesus Christ. Such an attitude did not open the way to cultural syncretism, but was related to recognizing the synthesis of Christ and his Gospel as a valid measure of truth. The new religion has transformed the pagan world of the past, in a sense internalizing it.*¹²³

By meeting European barbarians, Christianity dealt with cultures significantly lower in civilisational development. As a result, in accordance with the regularities of cultural diffusion, the spread of Christianity marks the shrinking of the culture of barbarian collectivism.¹²⁴ Nonetheless, evangelisation was not tantamount to cultural uniformisation. On the contrary, as Karol Modzelewski observes, on adopting the faith, the newly-baptised have internalised cultural models according to their needs and circumstances.¹²⁵ As a result, “the Greco-Roman civilization in its Christian version was adapted to special needs and nature of the converts.”¹²⁶ Consequently, as Oskar Halecki emphasises, new national cultures were born, which together formed the European civilisation in its final shape”.¹²⁷ Hence, we should agree with John Paul II's conviction that the spread of the Christian faith was the driver behind European continent's unity in diversity¹²⁸ and acknowledge a remarkable feature that the “dates of European peoples coming into existence surprisingly regularly matched those of their lords being baptized”.¹²⁹ The model of Europe that is “united in diversity” has been inscribed into European culture due to Christian influence. As a result, it must be stated that Christianity comes to be the ideological foundation that brought the notion of unity in diversity into the heart of European culture. The notion, clearly expressed in Catholic ecclesiology, thus has become fully

¹²² Mazurkiewicz, *Chrześcijańskie korzenie Europy...*, 48.

¹²³ *Ibid.*,

¹²⁴ Karol Modzelewski, *Barbarzyńska Europa* (Iskry, Warszawa, 2004), 459-460.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 450-451.

¹²⁶ Halecki, *Historia Europy...*, 28.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ Cf. John Paul II, “‘European Act’ at Santiago de Compostela 9 November 1982”, in *V/3 Insegnamenti* (1982), 1257-1258.

¹²⁹ Mazurkiewicz, *Chrześcijańskie korzenie Europy...*, 46.

consistent with the self-interpretation of the Old Continent, which opens the way to researching other channels of its transmission from the religious into the political sphere.

3.2 Ecclesial Transmission Channel

In considering the ecclesial transmission channel, particular attention should be paid to the Church's actions vis-à-vis enlarging the European Union and reinforcing respect for national identities in the integration process. Activity in these fields - manifest in official addresses to European politicians, informal meetings, and finally, a genuine lobbying for tangible systemic solutions - although devoid of the power of political decisions, has undoubtedly strengthened the transmission of the ecclesial model to European politics. The activity has assisted European politicians in the adoption of an interpretation of the integration process, and therefore of a vision of the role and status of the Communities on the European continent that is closely linked to the model of unity in diversity.

The addresses of the Holy See, in particular during John Paul II's pontificate, leave no doubt that the issues of European integration formed an essential point of papal reflection.¹³⁰ A key issue raised by John Paul II was the central problem of the integration process: the problem of European unity and an attempt at determining what 'Europeanness' means and, consequently, what the European Community should become. In his teaching about Europe and Europeanness John Paul II referred to the ecclesial model of unity in diversity. As he stressed, "The Catholic Church in fact provides a model of essential unity in a diversity of cultural expressions, a consciousness of membership in a universal community which is rooted in but not confined to local communities, and a sense of what unites beyond all that divides".¹³¹ By demonstrating that Europe, as a continent of cultural origin, was coming into existence in substantial part as a result of Christianisation, "to the extent that the frontiers of Europe match those of Gospel influence",¹³² he pointed not only to the significance of Christian roots as a foundation of unity, but also to the fact that due to evangelisation unity in diversity has come to be a constitutive feature of Europe, because "European peoples have evolved in parallel with their evangelization".¹³³ Consequently, in his teaching he was updating the outlook of Europe as a continent which, in a way *per analogiam* to the Church, is in its deepest substance united on the level of values,¹³⁴

¹³⁰ Michał Gierycz, "Jan Paweł II a integracja europejska" in 4 *Znaki Nowych Czasów* (2003), 33-41.

¹³¹ John Paul II, *Ecclesia in Europe*, para. 116.

¹³² John Paul II, "'European Act'...".

¹³³ *Ibid.*

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

although at the same time diverse, even in its basic cultural forms, breathing with ‘two lungs’, that of East and West, with Central Europe lying in between the two traditions.

Papal interpretation of the Church-Europe relationship has also affected the teaching of European integration and the purview of the Communities. Considering that the process of European integration has a deep cultural, moral and spiritual dimension, the Pope was stressing from the start the importance of national identities to the European edifice. As he noted already in 1979 in a speech to the Bureau of the European Parliament, in the course of European integration

*people who are coming closer to each other have already belonged to nations with their own history, tradition and rights, and in particular the right to their sovereign identities. These nations are called to unite closer with each other. Their association should not head towards homogenisation. On the contrary, it should contribute to the promotion of rights and duties of the nations along with respecting their sovereignty; in such way better harmony may be achieved that predisposes the nations to uniting while retaining all their values, and in particular moral and spiritual ones.*¹³⁵

Therefore, unity in diversity in its exclusive meaning was presented by the Pope to European politicians as a suitable model for the Communities, corresponding with both the historical and cultural realities of Europe, and the ecclesial experience.

The ecclesial and European models of unity in diversity constantly spurred John Paul II to remind with resolve that Western Europe is not the totality of Europe, and to call to adopt a broader perspective of the integration process. The uncovering of spiritual unity of the east and west of Europe,¹³⁶ and the reminder that the nations of what was called the *Eastern bloc* also belong to European family were important elements of papal teaching. This aspect of the teaching should be underscored, because it demonstrates that the Church considered European integration in the context of unity in diversity in times when Europe was commonly identified with Western Europe. By galvanising the remembrance of Central and Eastern Europe in the time of Iron Curtain, John Paul II opened a totally new perspective for the integration process at the precise moment when no politician was disposed to such reflection at all.

¹³⁵ Paweł II, *Przemówienie do Prezydium Parlamentu Europejskiego...*, 129-130.

¹³⁶ Cf. Jan Paweł II, “Homilia podczas Mszy św. na Wzgórzu Lecha, Gniezno 3.06.1979” in Jan Paweł II, *Pielgrzymki do Ojczyzny: 1979-1983-1987-1991-1997. Przemówienia, homilie* (Społeczny Instytut Wydawniczy Znak, Kraków, 1997), 33-39.

The efforts the Pope made following the ‘Autumn of Nations’ for the nations of Central and Eastern Europe to “regain their place” in Europe¹³⁷ was a logical consequence of the earlier position of the Vatican. Yet they are worth remembering, because in fact they were undermining a paradigm prevalent in the West at the time that Europeanization meant “shifting the borders of the West towards the East (the extension of Europe)”.¹³⁸ Meanwhile, at least in the Polish context, John Paul II was stressing that, “at the turn of the second millennium the Polish nation has acquired the right to joint the process of creating a new face of Europe on a par with other nations”.¹³⁹ The phrase “on a par” is reminiscent that integration is not ‘joining’, but uniting, an actual ‘exchange of gifts’, in this case between the countries of the EU and Poland, exactly within the framework of the unity in diversity model.

These remarks indicate that the issue of respect for cultural diversity in the course of the unification process, and therefore of reviving the model of European unity in diversity, constituted one of the essential elements of papal teaching on European integration, which is based on ecclesial experience. The updating of this principle on the level of the Holy See corresponded with the action undertaken by Commission of the Bishops' Conferences of the European Community (COMECE) and national episcopates.

To fully appreciate COMECE's efforts to update the principle of unity in diversity, full account should be made of their activities at the turn of the century in support of Union enlargement. These efforts consisted in meetings with EU authorities (including visits by representatives of the episcopate from candidate countries to Brussels), symposiums dealing with the integration of Eastern and Western Europe, or statements issued on this matter prior to EU summits. To demonstrate their reviving significance in the context of unity in diversity, special attention should be paid to declarations on EU enlargement, issued in 1997 and 2002.

In their declaration of 1997 the bishops expressly backed EU enlargement, noting that thinking about Europe as a citadel inaccessible to other European countries is a ‘dangerous illusion’. They remarked that the inclusion of Central and Eastern European countries into the integration process constitutes not only a political obligation that is anchored in treaties, but also a moral commitment, in view of the fact that these countries express their wish to join the Union and make efforts for meeting the high standards of

¹³⁷ Jan Paweł II, *Przemówienie do korpusu dyplomatycznego, Rzym 13.01.1990*

¹³⁸ Sławomir Sowiński and Radosław Zenderowski, *Europa drogą Kościoła* (Ossolineum, Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków, 2002), 29.

¹³⁹ Jan Paweł II, *Homilia podczas Mszy św. z okazji 1000-lecia śmierci świętego Wojciecha, Gniezno 3.06.1997*

accession.¹⁴⁰ Such arguments may be subsequently found in the comments by EU politicians, including by Gunter Verheugen, who was responsible for enlargement.¹⁴¹ According to COMECE, the reunion of Europe would be an important moment for the whole world, and would allow the Union to meet global challenges.¹⁴² As a result, although not referring directly to the term of unity in diversity, COMECE acted for changing the paradigm of Europeanness, quite prevalent in EU countries, in which Europe was equated with the West, and the related role of the Community, while offering its grassroots contribution to building a Community “united in diversity”.¹⁴³

COMECE's position of 2002 was equally supportive of the unity in diversity model. It stated that the accession of ten countries of Central and Eastern Europe constitutes not so much enlargement as “Europeanization” of the European Union¹⁴⁴ giving “an opportunity for renewal of the Union and its original mission to promote freedom, justice, peace and prosperity both within and without its own borders”.¹⁴⁵ According to COMECE, the enlargement provides the European Union with “a new cultural and historical quality and identity” through which “this community of different cultures will constitute a step towards a European common good”.¹⁴⁶ The bishops emphasised that, “It is essential that the accession of ten new Member States does not lead to new divisions in Europe”,¹⁴⁷ pointing to the need to take into account the efforts of Bulgaria and Romania for the membership in 2007, and the ambitions of Turkey and the countries of South-Eastern Europe. Therefore, they indicated that, on one hand, the identities of the nations entering the EU should be appreciated and their right to co-decide on the shape of the future Europe respected, and on the other, those who for various reasons remained ‘outside’ of the Union but nevertheless belonged to European culture must not be forgotten. In this way, once more, on another level, and by other methods, COMECE has been reviving in the political sphere the main elements of papal teaching on the importance of unity in diversity for the integration project. In this way, an interpretation of the point of the integration process and the Union as a whole is also made available to

¹⁴⁰ *Building a Spiritual Bridge of Unity Between Peoples. A Statement by the Bishops of COMECE on the Enlargement of the European Union*, at http://www.comece.org/upload/pdf/com_elarg_970509_en.pdf.

¹⁴¹ Maciej Drzonek, *Między integracją a europeizacją* (Księgarnia Akademicka, Kraków, 2006), 130.

¹⁴² *Building a Spiritual Bridge...*

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴ COMECE: *Hope, Trust, and Solidarity*, COMECE's statement on EU enlargement, at http://www.comece.org/upload/pdf/com_elarg2_021206_en.pdf.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

European politicians, echoes of which could be subsequently heard in political statements.

In analysing the promotional activities for some concrete solutions to reinforce the principles promoted by the Church, we should mention the significance of local churches. In the context of respect for the principle of unity in diversity, a good example seems to be the role played by the Polish episcopate during the accession negotiations.

The church in Poland has been, in particular, interested in guaranteeing inviolability in the Union of basic values that form, as Archbishop Muszynski put it, part and parcel of culture and identity of the Polish nation.¹⁴⁸ At stake have been the protection of life from conception until natural death, protection of marriage perceived as a relationship between man and woman, and the protection of family.¹⁴⁹ Some commentators have suggested that the Episcopate aimed at inserting these guarantees into the accession treaty, and consequently not only to recognise the precedence of Polish law on these issues, but also to enshrine these guarantees on the level of European law.¹⁵⁰ Although such interpretation does not seem to be obvious, what is certain, as Archbishop Gocłowski put it, is that the Church meant to

*[insert] a clause to the treaty of accession of Poland to the European Union that would contain a statement that the Republic of Poland assumes superiority of its legislation over EU legislation on the protection of life from conception until natural death, as well as on the issues concerning family and marriage perceived as a relationship between woman and man.*¹⁵¹

The Church's wish was difficult to materialise *ex definitione*, in particular, given the political circumstances of Poland at that time. The most vulnerable stage of accession negotiations coincided with the government of a coalition of post-communist parties. The meeting of the Joint Committee of the Episcopate and Government failed to work out a final consensus. Nonetheless, the representatives of the Polish Episcopate formulated and disclosed to the public their statement, from which it appeared that the issue is a “*sine qua non condition* for the support for EU accession”.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁸ Drzonek, *Między integracją a europeizacją...*, 262.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 261.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁵¹ Archbishop Tadeusz Gocłowski, *Mam nadzieję, że dokument zabezpieczy to, o czym rozmawialiśmy z rządem*, at <http://ekai.pl/europa/?MID=4182>.

¹⁵² Drzonek, *Między integracją a europeizacją...*, 262.

The Church's argument for the preservation of these guarantees was so intense that the government realised that "it must do something" in this respect.¹⁵³ Finally, a week following the Joint Committee meeting, the government formulated a guarantee subsequently enclosed to the Accession Treaty. It stated that,

*The Government of the Republic of Poland understands that nothing in the provisions of the Treaty on European Union, of the Treaties establishing the European Communities and the provisions of treaties amending or supplementing those treaties prevents the Polish State in regulating questions of moral significance, as well as those related to the protection of human life.*¹⁵⁴

Undoubtedly, due to its minor legal significance and legally unspecific character the government declaration failed to evoke particular delight. As Archbishop Muszynski said,

*Government Declaration to the Accession Treaty is a compromise. Like any compromise, it does not fully satisfy anyone, but it is good that there is such clause. The content suggested by bishops are confined within the notions of the document. Thus, the government declaration is a summary, a briefest capture of what bishops have postulated, since the issues of marriage and family constitute moral problems. Yet, undoubtedly the Church would have appreciated a full list of its postulates.*¹⁵⁵

From the point of view of the Church's influence on the Union's operation according to the principle of unity in diversity, note that even though the guarantees of protection of national identity with regard to morality and protection of life fell short of hierarchy's expectations, they nevertheless strengthened the functioning of the Union according to the principle of unity in diversity in its exclusive meaning.

3.3 The Political Transmission Channel

The political channels of transmission may in general apply to two situations: transmission through political elites, and transmission in the course of various procedures of direct civic participation. In the first case it would entail the application in the framework of political life of the principles worked out in

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ Declaration by the Government of the Republic of Poland Concerning Public Morality (AA 43/03, no. 39), at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement_new/treaty/default_en.htm.

¹⁵⁵ Archbishop Henryk Muszyński, *Deklaracja jest owocem kompromisu*, at <http://ekai.pl/europa/?MID=4182> stan na styczeń 2007.

religious reflection that have been revived by the Church, most of all by Christian politicians. In the second case, the political transmission channel applies to the transmission of a principle from the theological order to the political space by appealing to social conscience, in which this principle, due to cultural considerations or the reception of Church's teaching, would be considered as a principle essential to the life of a political community.

In connection with the representative nature of modern politics, and in particular in connection with the immanent elitism of the EU's political construction, of these two “political” transmission channels the crucial role is played by political elites. As is known, the European Union does not hold referendums or legislative plebiscites, it does not leave its planned projects to the decision of European societies, etc. This is related not only to a lack of political will or the “democratic deficit” - a notion described in handbooks - of the EU's political system,¹⁵⁶ but also to the fact that there is no such thing as a European society to which one could appeal in such a plebiscite; it is no accident that the Treaty on European Union speaks about solidarity among the “peoples of Europe”.¹⁵⁷ Nonetheless, although this assumption is in general, correct, even in such ‘elitist’ system some elements of the first type of transmission through the political channel are still possible, and this is the case with unity in diversity.

Recall that the Union's motto was inaugurated in a peculiar way, namely, not so much through the proclamation of European elites, but by reference to the conscience of the peoples of Europe. At the turn of the 3rd Millennium a competition was held, in cooperation with the European Parliament, to work out a Union's motto.¹⁵⁸ Forty proposals were submitted by periodicals from fifteen countries and more than 80,000 responses by schoolchildren.¹⁵⁹ The principle of unity in diversity won in this plebiscite and was subsequently accepted by the then EP President, thereafter enshrined in the draft Constitutional Treaty. Thus the media, schoolchildren and European politicians combined to admit that unity in diversity renders and should render the essence of united Europe.

The triumph of unity in diversity may be therefore legitimately perceived as a confirmation of Braudel's theory about “long-term cycles”, which says that “civilization is always the past, living past”, and its history consists in

¹⁵⁶ Cf. Dimitris N. Chrysochoou, “EU democracy and the democratic deficit”, in Michele Cini (ed.), *European Union Politics* (Oxford University Press, Oxford-New York, 2005), 365-380.

¹⁵⁷ Cf. Preamble TEU.

¹⁵⁸ http://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dewiza_Unii_Europejskiej.

¹⁵⁹ Cf. Toggenburg, “‘United in diversity’: Some thoughts on...”.

“searching in the past what has retained validity until present day”.¹⁶⁰ The case of proclaiming unity in diversity indicates that this Christian principle, materialised due to Christianisation on the Old Continent has remained in the conscience of both European societies and politicians important for the description of what Europe is, and by extension, what the European Union is. This consequence was in turn possible owing to prior ‘extension of perspectives’ of the integration process onto Central and Eastern Europe, which also became possible, inter alia, thanks to the significant efforts of the Church. Also discernible in the EU's motto are the Church's reviving efforts for the interpretation of enlargement as ‘Europeanization of the Union’.

Of course, the development of discussion on EU identity may over time undermine the point of the analysed model. For its normative significance depends on concrete choices made within the legal order of the Union, either in favour of diversity, or the opposite, that is, uniformization. Nevertheless, current solutions concerning respect for cultural diversity and national identities, and particular attention to common values demonstrate that Union's political elites have translated in a natural way - making any modifications necessitated by structural differences - the ecclesial model of unity into the political realm.

4. Two Conclusions for European Integration

The analysis carried out shows that there is a legitimate view that the EU has derived the model of unity in diversity from the Church's experience. In the case of the EU's motto, we are confronted not only with a semantic similarity with regard to the meaning of that model in the ecclesial and political experiences, but also with identifiable, concrete transmission channels through which the religious model could penetrate the political and legal sphere. Let us recall: the adoption does not mean a simple or even conscious projection. For this is obvious: the Union is not a religion. The translation of religious terms into a political sphere always requires adapting a model to the specificity of the political domain, and - not infrequently - also a significant modification in meaning, which is also evident in the case of unity in diversity.

It seems worthwhile, as a summary, to contemplate the significance of the described relationship between the Union's motto and the ecclesial experience for European integration. It seems that two important conclusions concerning the debate on European identity may be drawn.

¹⁶⁰ Braudel, *Gramatyka cywilizacji...*, 58.

The first one is of a general nature and applies to the framework conditions of the European debate on identity. Not infrequently, European political elites have assumed that religion, belonging mostly to the private sphere, has in principle no importance in the political realm. A classical proponent of such attitude is Valery Giscard d'Estaing, who, on questioning the need to refer in any way to God in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, explained that, "European are living in a secular political system".¹⁶¹ Secularity seems to be here a byword for a kind of impermeability of politics that is allegedly separated from religion by a high and deeply founded wall. Such an assumption, or - from the functional point of view - axiom, is currently characteristic not only of political discourse, but also of scientific reflection about politics. The process is aptly diagnosed by Ernst Wolfgang Böckenförde. As he points out, whereas "over centuries, reflection and theory of the political order in a society were linked to religious perception, and in Christian times - also theological ones",¹⁶² present-day science originates from a view of scientificity that is characteristic of the turn of the 20th century: that "political and social sciences should be based on exclusively rational, empirically verifiable statements, and on this basis to explore and explain social phenomena and expressions of order".¹⁶³ Due to its origin, political science has 'parenthesized' the question of God, becoming an "atheist science in the proper sense of the term".¹⁶⁴

Against this background, it is no wonder that in addressing the scientific approach to the role of Christianity in course of European integration, Joseph Weiler notes that,

*With some exceptions, the meaning of Christianity for the project of European integration, for Europe's self-consciousness is not clear even for Christians themselves. There is a vast literature, not only scientific, on the topic of European-integration process. ... However, only after a long search could we find any work in this large literature to seriously come to grips with the relationship between the Christian thought and European integration. ... One could not help the feeling that Christian thought and European integration are contained in two totally separate spaces.*¹⁶⁵

¹⁶¹ Mirosław Ikonowicz, "Co zrobić z *invocatio Dei*?" 10 *Przegląd* (2004).

¹⁶² Ernst Wolfgang Böckenförde, "Teoria polityki a teologia polityczna. Uwagi na temat ich wzajemnego stosunku" 3 *Teologia polityczna* (2005-2006), 301-312, at 301.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 302.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵ Weiler, *Chrześcijańska Europa...*, 72-73 and 75.

This modest contribution indicates that the above judgement would be premature. The religious and political realms, also with reference to integration process, seem to be closely related. Secularity does not preclude using patterns, models or principles previously ingrained or developed in the religious setting. Meanwhile, the analysis indicates that it is religious heritage that gives the European Union today a key to self-understanding. For, after all, the motto of “united in diversity” is exactly a symbol of EU or European identity. And the fact that the Union has such symbol is in large part owing to Christianity. Therefore, the first conclusion to be drawn from this analysis would suggest a redefinition of the framework conditions of discussion on European identity.

Another conclusion may be encapsulated in a conviction that the ecclesial experience may constitute an important inspiration for effectively building the European Union's identity. As Joseph Weiler aptly notes in his work, although “Europe is not a religion that could be modelled on Christianity ... the Christian thought gives us tools, conceptual challenges and ideas which - when applied carefully - may be extremely useful in our endeavours to identify a typically European behaviour pattern in the internal and external ad gentes relationship”.¹⁶⁶ It seems therefore that the stated adoption also brings important tools for the comprehension and building of European unity in diversity.

As already mentioned, the issue of unity in diversity appears in the context of European identity *from the start*, as it were. This identity has come to be treated in two ways: as supranational or post-national identification. The term supranational is usually used to denote identity presented as cosmopolitan, and the post-national one defines civic or constitutional identity. In the first case, the European identity is perceived as a variant of national identity based on a wider population, which at some point is bound to replace national identity.¹⁶⁷ As a result, national identity is negatively evaluated.

The concept of post-national identity is another attempt to approach the tension between universalism and particularism. Whereas the concept of supranational identity presupposes a drive towards some kind of cultural homogeneity, this concept of European identity promotes cultural pluralism.¹⁶⁸ As Gerard Delanty stresses, “as a kind of tangible whole, Europe

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 93.

¹⁶⁷ Mazurkiewicz, *Europeizacja Europy...*, 77.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 83.

without nation-states is meaningless”.¹⁶⁹ Consequently, “the European identity, as a reference to what is universal (common at least in the European dimension), assumes a prior reference to particular values. It is based on national identities and, in this sense, it rises to the supranational level. Therefore, instead of replacing national identities, it strengthens them, while at the same time seeking what unites the nations of Europe and protection of which is necessary for preserving particular identities.”¹⁷⁰ In such a setting, the tension between *universalism* and *particularism*, which is characteristic of the discussion on Europe’s identity, finds another solution: Europeanness is then interpreted not so much as a ‘sublime’ universalism, but as a particular incarnation of that universalism. In such perspective, the European identity has already been shaped historically and rendered by the model of unity in diversity.

If the motto adopted by the European Union, based on cultural and religious heritage of the Old Continent, is an important political voice in the discussion of the way European identity is understood, it should also determine the path of European-integration development. This study of the Union’s motto allows to link its inherent identity variants to the post-national model, which is far from seeing European identity as competing with the national one, and which is remarkable as a new dimension of Europeans’ identity.

This observation is especially important if we consider that in building the European identity, European politics sometimes seems to head in the opposite direction. “Uncountable political declarations highlighting, for instance, the importance of minority protection, tolerance, pluralism, regional identities, etc., demonstrate that diversity is increasingly perceived as a value *per se*”,¹⁷¹ breaking free from the needs or expectations of the Member States. On the other hand, there are activities clearly visible in EU politics that run along the lines successfully applied in the process of formation of nation-states. They may be described in short as “establishing tradition” which is central to conceiving a community.¹⁷² In his monograph on this issue, Cris Shore points out three elements of such tradition: symbols of social coherence, traditions to legitimise institutions, and those related to socialisation, are concepts “perfectly integral to the understanding of cultural

¹⁶⁹ Gerard Delanty, *Odkrywanie Europy. Idea, tożsamość, rzeczywistość* (PWN, Warszawa - Kraków, 1999), 205.

¹⁷⁰ Mazurkiewicz, *Europeizacja Europy...*, 84.

¹⁷¹ Toggenburg, “Unity in diversity: Searching for the Regional Dimension...”, 53.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 54.

policy of European integration”.¹⁷³ Finally, European legislation contains some modifications counterproductive to the exclusive model of unity in diversity. Let us mention the weakening in the Amending Treaty of the position of nation-states expressed by the departure from the principle of “one state - one Commissioner”, or the covering of the area of culture by qualified-majority decision-making.

Yet, the awareness of the link between the Church's identity and Europe's identity, and as a result, the Union's identity, would require a serious approach to the EU motto as well as finding another way to enhance European identity. Namely, axiology as a foundation for unity should be seriously considered. Let us note that the Union struggles to do that, which is evidenced by the Charter of Fundamental Rights. It's surely an important step. Nevertheless, it seems that, with regard to strengthening the axiology, considered should not be only the strengthening of the scope of these rights and values, but rather, their power, or - in other words - their ontological status. In light of post-national identification, the issue of insufficient symbolism or social coherence is not the Union's chief problem. More problematic is the fact that the metaphysical basis for Union's axiology, and consequently the universalism of values, has been lost.¹⁷⁴ Hence the source of Poland's and the UK's opposition to the validity of the CFR on their territories. At least in Poland's case, it is clearly related to the fear of a potential cultural imperialism connected with its application - the values espoused in the Charter with respect to sometimes important questions seem to be divergent with the constitutionally-guaranteed values cherished by Polish society.¹⁷⁵

It seems that the adopted way of building European identity based on sociologically constructed axiological credo can be in fact counterproductive. Breaking the links between axiology and metaphysics deprives values of their universal dimension,¹⁷⁶ withdraws from considering the law in terms of

¹⁷³ Cris Shore, *Building Europe. The Cultural Politics of European Integration* (Routledge, London & New York, 2005), 41.

¹⁷⁴ It's even easier to observe in the Treaty of Lisbon, in which values, as declared in the Preamble, derive from “cultural, religious, and humanist inheritance of Europe”. Such an approach - at the metaaxiological stage - proclaim *de facto* cultural relativism, and call in question the whole European tradition of understanding human rights - cf: Marek Piechowiak, “Karta Praw Podstawowych UE - wróg czy sprzymierzeniec tradycyjnych wartości” (original title: The Charter of Fundamental Rights - Enemy or Ally of Traditional Values?), 7(3) *Chrześcijaństwo-Świat-Polityka* (2008), 23-28.

¹⁷⁵ In fact, as Daniel Cohn-Bendit notes in his critique of Poland's stance, Poland does not want “a mere Charter of Fundamental Rights to be basis for moral norms” Cf. Daniel Cohn-Bendit, “Polacy odrzucając Kartę szkodzą sobie samym”, *Dziennik*, 3.12.2007. The problem is that this should not be surprising in the framework of European legal tradition, according to which moral norms result not from the adopted law, but on the contrary, they are foundation of the law created by man.

¹⁷⁶ And also, in some cases, may drift them towards ideology.

natural law, and replaces it by the principle of flexibility.¹⁷⁷ Such a method, paradoxically, does not eliminate axiological-rooted conflicts in EU. We could observe it in a recent case: some Member States didn't want to recognise the values 'established by vote'. But the problem is much deeper. The rule of flexibility opens the question of whether the European Union is able to protect universal values, and also, if it can protect itself from values alien to its culture.¹⁷⁸ Consequently, in the case of fundamental values, the rule of flexibility should not be treated as an 'effective tool' in establishing or supporting European unity in diversity. It seems to be rather a method of deconstruction of the most important bonds of European unity and European identity.

¹⁷⁷ Cf. Piotr Mazurkiewicz, "Wokół Karty Praw Podstawowych UE" (original title: Around the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights), 7(3) *Chrześcijaństwo-Świat-Polityka* (original title: Christianity-World-Politics) (2008), 29-32.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

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