The EU's concept of activation for young people: 
towards a new social contract?
Eduardo Crespo  and Amparo Serrano 
1. Introduction
The concept of activation covers a wide range of employment measures 
with very different approaches and emphases that are determined by the 
cultural and political traditions of each country, or even of the various 
regions within a country (Barbier 2000; Lodemel and Trickey 2001). 
However, despite the existence of these socially determined differences, 
all the measures have in common the fact that they are based on a new 
definition of the relationship between rights and responsibilities, in 
other words a new social contract. They all share the principle that the 
main responsibility for dealing with unemployment lies with the 
individual. In this context, responsibility is not simply taken to mean 
that the causes of unemployment are individual (that is, blame), but also 
in terms of making the individual responsible for implementing 
strategies to find work. What this amounts to is a redefinition of the 
established relationship between individual and society. The 
institutionalisation of social welfare through the welfare state was based 
on an understanding of unemployment as a threat to society, and it was 
therefore assumed that it was society's duty to tackle this threat. It 
should be pointed out that one of the cornerstones of the prevailing 
model of social welfare and production in our society at the time was 
the principle of advance planning and regulation. Risk was seen as a 
burden which needed to be tackled through institutionally provided 
means. However, in contrast to this principle of society being 
responsible for dealing with risk, what we are seeing today is that the 
individual is increasingly being expected to undertake risk management. 
Risk is no longer seen as something negative but as something which is 
inevitable or even positive and necessary for economic growth and 
individual well-being. This change in the way in which risk is portrayed 
has come about as the discourse of the knowledge-based society has 
gained currency. According to this discourse we are witnessing the 
emergence of a new model of production which requires new principles 
for social and economic intervention. The European Union, particularly 
in its European Employment Strategy, has been especially active in 
promoting and spreading the knowledge-based society discourse and 
the need to review the social contract. Young people are one of the 
main targets of activation-based measures, largely because it is easier to 
make them accept what other groups might consider to be a rather 
questionable form of intervention in view of its coercive and 
paternalistic nature. Lodemel and Trickey (2001) show how this could 
be seen as an extension of the principle of institutionalised compulsory 
education for young people, something which is no longer questioned. 
Other issues that should be mentioned are the lower social value placed 
on young people's work, the lower expectations of young people (which 
means that they are likelier to accept jobs with poorer conditions), and 
the potential danger of their work ethic suffering.
The first part of this paper will consider the nature and extent of 
European Union regulation in this field, and will attempt to 
demonstrate the significance of the role played by the EU's institutions 
as promoters of ideological socialisation. Whilst it is true that the 
European Union did not invent the activation-based discourse, it has 
nevertheless played a major role in its propagation and in establishing 
the terms in which the problem of unemployment is discussed. The 
second section will examine the way in which the model of production 
is changing and how this has led to a need for new terminology that 
enables us to understand the 'social question'. Finally, we will analyse 
the discourse of the EU's institutions, particularly in respect of the 
European Employment Strategy, with a view to establishing the basis of 
the EU's discourse with regard to activation.
2. The EU employment strategy: coordination of national 
policies for combating unemployment
At the 1997 Luxembourg Summit, the EU's member states agreed to 
coordinate national policies for combating unemployment at European 
level. Whilst this strategy was aimed at all unemployed people, particular 
emphasis was placed on certain groups, such as the long-term 
unemployed, young people, and women.
The Luxembourg process probably constitutes one of the most credible 
attempts so far to create a social Europe. Its aim is to establish 
mechanisms for coordinating employment policy at European level. 
Thus, employment policy is being used to take the first steps towards 
complementing economic convergence with social convergence, 
although control of employment policy will remain in the hands of 
national governments. Rather than meaning the division of 
responsibilities between the national and the European level or the 
harmonisation of legislation in the different member states, what this 
amounts to is the establishment of dual-level cooperation and 
coordination with regard to employment policy (Goetschy and Pochet 
1997). The idea is to create an open and flexible means of coordination 
between different levels aimed at solving common problems (Pochet 
2001). This open form of coordination allows for a type of regulation 
which falls somewhere between more legislation-based regulation, 
which is considered to be inappropriately inflexible, and more flexible 
forms of 'soft regulation' (official recommendations, exchange of 
information, best practice, and national experience, development of 
structural indicators, joint information). Hence, it is designed to increase 
the legitimacy of European-level actions whilst still respecting both the 
huge diversity of labour markets in the member states and the national 
regulatory systems (Goetschy 1999). 
The EU's employment strategy thus combines a methodology (aimed at 
driving policy in a common direction) with a number of quantified 
goals, and can be described as a process of creating regulations by 
consensus (Salais 2001) that comprises several stages. First of all, the 
EU establishes a set of guidelines (common targets for combating 
unemployment) based on a joint analysis of the situation in the different 
member states and of the main policy issues that need to be addressed 
in order to reduce unemployment. Comparative indicators are then 
developed in order to evaluate the results achieved in each country. 
Thereafter, the member states have to draw up an annual National 
Action Plan (NAP) for the implementation of the employment 
guidelines. The transposition of the guidelines into quantified national 
targets should respect the principle of subsidiarity and be in keeping 
with the broad principles of national economic policy. The NAPs are 
reviewed by the European Union (in accordance with the principle of 
multilateral supervision) and also using the peer review method, and an 
evaluation report is drawn up ('joint employment report') which makes 
a series of recommendations. 
This process has been consolidated as it has developed. Thus, at the 
recent summits in Lisbon and Nice, particular attention was paid to the 
creation of statistically comparable joint indicators in order to enable 
more effective evaluation of employment policies and to allow best 
practice to be identified. It appears that the trend is towards an 
inductive form of regulation based on principles such as coordination 
and awareness-raising (promoting exchange of information, 
communication, conferences) rather than more legislative forms of 
regulation such as directives.
Brief evaluation of the open method of coordinating the EU 
Employment Strategy (EES)
A number of criticisms have been levelled at the Luxembourg process, 
questioning the real impact of the EU's strategy and whether it is 
actually possible to talk of an EU strategy for combating unemployment 
at all. First, the weak regulatory content and modest scope of the 
strategy have been criticised. Unlike in the case of EMU (economic and 
monetary union), the EES is based on guidelines and recommendations, 
and no specific penalties are available if these guidelines are not 
followed. Consequently, the employment strategy is in no way 
comparable to the verifiable and very clearly defined criteria for 
economic convergence, where sanctions were in place for countries that 
failed to meet the criteria. This means that in most cases the NAPs 
amount to little more than a continuation of existing policy, with the 
production of the action plans simply being an exercise in dressing up 
existing practices as part of a European strategy. Furthermore, most of 
the NAPs fail to adopt an integrated approach and do not clearly 
specify concrete targets, the resources available for implementation, or 
the indicators to be used for evaluation.
Another criticism of the EU's employment strategy is that only limited 
financial resources are available for it. Indeed, the process was only 
accepted by the member states on condition that no additional financial 
resources would be required, in circumstances in which some countries 
are seeking to reduce the level of their contributions to the EU's budget 
(Goetschy 1999; Keller 2000). The only EU funding available is through 
the structural funds; however, these are also aimed at regional economic 
projects designed to promote convergence in terms of development 
across the EU. It could therefore be argued that the EES is not so 
much a European strategy as a strategy for coordinating national 
policies which is wholly dependent on the extent to which member 
states are prepared to cooperate (Keller 2000). A further problem is the 
vagueness and weakness of the concepts underpinning the strategy, for 
example, employability, flexibility, activation, and partnership, all of 
which are ambiguous terms which can be interpreted in various ways, 
making it easy for member states to simply continue their existing 
policies.
Despite these weaknesses, the EU's strategy could still have a significant 
impact at national level. The vagueness of many of the concepts 
employed does not necessarily have to constitute a weak point; indeed, 
it could be construed as a strength, since it makes it easier to adapt the 
strategy to different national labour markets.
Furthermore, although there are no official penalties for failing to 
implement the strategy, peer pressure may yet ensure a high degree of 
compliance: whilst the guidelines may not be legally enforceable, the 
symbolic importance of meeting them is nevertheless considerable. 
Poor results on the basis of the structural indicators established by the 
EU are likely to provoke considerable political debate domestically 
(Pochet 2001).
Indeed, the mere act of reclassifying existing policies into the categories 
established by the new employment guidelines has had a major symbolic 
impact. There can be little doubt that the socio-cognitive influence of 
EU discourse is increasing and that national policy is adapting more and 
more to the framework and approach of the European Union (Barbier 
2001).
This approach has had a far-reaching impact on the way in which the 
problem is described and has influenced the overall direction of the 
debate. For example, terms such as employability, activation, 
benchmarking, partnership, and mainstreaming are becoming more and 
more popular at national level. Although these concepts were not 
invented by the European Union, it has nevertheless made them into 
official terms and popularised them. The institutions of the EU play an 
important role in determining the direction of the debate on this issue 
and in proposing new ideas and measures. In other words, they have an 
important socialising role, especially when it comes to developing a way 
of describing and explaining the problem of certain groups' exclusion 
from the labour market. This is certainly one of the conclusions that 
can be reached regarding the impact of the EU's strategy on young 
people (Serrano 2000).
With its emphasis on identifying and exchanging 'best practices', the 
EU's strategy seeks to make it possible to share diverse practices and to 
promote the concept of learning from each other (Pochet 2000), all of 
which strengthens the socialising role of the European Union's 
institutions (Teague 2001). Indeed, it could be argued that more rigid 
forms of legislation-based regulation would be poorly suited to today's 
rapidly changing world. The kind of regulation envisaged by the EES is 
more flexible and could also be a very important means of influencing 
the situation. To some extent, the EU is adopting a regulatory system 
which is similar to the one previously adopted by the OECD, where 
recommendations and identification of best practice also played a key 
role in the discourse at national level.
In the case of groups such as women and young people, this process 
has led to greater emphasis being placed on evaluation and has 
promoted awareness of the need to develop suitable indicators 
(Behning and Serrano 2001). This in turn has meant better information, 
and a better understanding and greater awareness of the problem. In 
this respect, the process has had a significant impact at national level in 
terms of raising awareness of the situation of certain groups in the 
labour market.
The European Union is therefore promoting a new way of 
understanding the 'social question' in line with the prevailing model of 
production. The next section will look at the links between the 
prevailing model of production and ways of regulating the 'social 
question'.
3. Model of production and social welfare
The European Union is playing a major part in defining both the terms 
of the debate surrounding the social question and the explanations that 
are coming to be accepted regarding the causes of unemployment. The 
EU's institutions have made activation the cornerstone of their social 
welfare model. The reasons put forward for this approach are changes 
in the number and make-up of the unemployed, the rise in the number 
of people claiming benefit, and the associated rise in public spending. 
These changes have brought about a debate concerning the viability of 
a welfare state which has witnessed a transformation in the 
industrialised society model of production which was the very reason 
for its creation in the first place. In this section it will be argued that the 
EU model of activation-based intervention is a consequence not only of 
the problems with funding the social security system but also of new 
production requirements (being prepared to change jobs frequently, 
dynamism, initiative, autonomy). These are things which the EU 
presents as a fait accompli, arguing that modern society has changed 
over to a new model of production characterised by the metaphor of 
the knowledge-based society. It is not our intention to discuss whether 
or not this assertion is justified, but rather to examine the way in which 
the knowledge-based society requires a new ideology which has found 
concrete expression in the shape of the discourse regarding activation. 
Thus, the changes in the model of production are affecting the 
established, institutionalised relationship between employment and 
citizenship, altering the balance between social rights and individual 
responsibilities, and thereby contributing to a reassessment of the 
regulatory and legal basis of the welfare state.
Labour regulation in industrialised societies
Stability is the fundamental principle on which industrialised societies 
have traditionally been based. In order to achieve this stability it was 
necessary to eliminate uncertainty by means of strict labour regulation, 
removing risks and controlling future events. Economic and social 
stability were key requirements for this model of production. In 
organisational terms, the model was based on the strict division of 
labour (specialisation), keeping the manufacture of a product separate 
from its design, and a rigid structuring of the tasks performed at work. 
Centralised and hierarchical organisations met the market's requirement 
for the mass production of identical goods. Economic and social 
stability were fundamental requirements of this model of mass 
production.
Social stability was achieved via the institutionalisation of the welfare 
state and of industrial relations. The institutionalisation of industrial 
relations allowed disputes to be predicted, planned for and regulated, all 
of which had a positive effect on companies' profitability. Whilst the 
market does play an important regulatory role, it also has a number of 
weaknesses. The market alone does not guarantee stability and 
productivity, which is why social regulation of the market was 
necessary. This in turn is why state intervention was needed in order to 
ensure that certain areas were not regulated solely in accordance with 
the principles of financial profit. In this way, the welfare state 
constituted a way of protecting against risk. The institutionalisation of 
social welfare in the shape of the welfare state was further encouraged 
by the fact that unemployment came to be seen as a risk. The extent of 
unemployment meant that the liberal ideas that had prevailed 
previously, according to which poverty and joblessness were the 
responsibility of the individual, were no longer sustainable. Recognition 
of the intrinsic inequality of human beings led to a series of contractual 
guarantees being officially codified for employees. This, together with 
the statistical approach which was starting to be employed in order to 
measure unemployment and poverty more accurately (that is, on the 
basis of their causes, with a distinction being drawn between voluntary 
and involuntary unemployment) led to the problem being seen in terms 
of risk rather than individual fault (Rosanvallon 1995; Vanthemsche 
1994). The idea of the state guaranteeing security in the face of 
temporary risks was reinforced by modernist thinking which presented 
progress as an inescapable imperative and saw strength and the ability 
to predict the future as guaranteeing this progress. According to this 
view, if humankind's ability to reason was used correctly, it would 
enable us to control our species' destiny and free the individual from 
poverty, allowing us to overcome natural and social determinism 
(Touraine 1993). Work thus became the cornerstone of society's future. 
This combination of factors allowed people to manage the uncertainty 
implicit in the condition of being an employee. The social contract 
established as a result of the above enabled a degree of redistribution of 
income among the people protected by social security and throughout the 
whole life of each individual (the spreading of risk across society).
In this model, the individual was generally portrayed as a member of a 
group, be it a kin group, a group of workers, or a national group. Social 
welfare was structured on the basis of these three groups: the family, 
the factory or company, and the nation. The prevailing intervention 
strategies were based on (contributory) social security systems and aid 
(benefits), and the unemployed were the beneficiaries of social welfare 
programmes targeted on specific groups. This sectoral welfare state 
model was based on centralised regulation (substantialist regulatory 
values) in the framework of a general and abstract (and hence universal) 
law (social rights). Social welfare was regarded as a right intrinsic to the 
condition of citizenship.
The transformation of the model of production and social welfare: 
labour regulation in the knowledge-based society
In contrast with the above, the basic principle that characterises the 
model of production that is currently emerging is risk or instability. It is 
considered impossible to regulate events before they happen and risk is 
seen as inevitable. This makes it necessary to promote flexibility, so that 
people are able to cope with uncertainty and adapt to rapid changes in 
production demands. In this model of production, the ability to cope 
with unforeseen and sudden changes is held to be a prerequisite of 
economic success. In order to achieve this, a different organisational 
model is often encouraged, based on a multiskilled workforce and the 
linking of production and design. Some organisations have horizontal 
structures which require more independent workers with greater 
individual responsibility and able to perform a much wider range of 
tasks in order to meet the more individualised requirements of the 
market.
This model of labour regulation is accompanied by the emergence of a 
model of social welfare regulation which sees insecurity as inevitable. 
Rather than protecting against risk, the welfare state concentrates on 
promoting risk management (workfare), thereby consolidating the laws 
of the market. Thus, the market becomes the only regulator, punishing 
anyone who fails to adapt to its absolute laws of technological 
development and competitiveness. This technological determinism and 
tendency to see change as inevitable evokes a number of Darwinist 
metaphors. Likewise, the abovementioned change in the role of the 
welfare state is justified by the portrayal of unemployment as something 
for which the individual is responsible. The individual is seen as being 
responsible for managing risk (for example, the loss of one's job), and 
this risk is considered to be an inevitable fact of life.
Against this background, citizenship is held to be something that an 
individual has to earn rather than possesses as a right. As such, 
citizenship is described fundamentally in individual terms rather than in 
social terms, being determined by personal behaviour (individual 
choices and attitudes) and focusing on the individual's responsibilities 
rather than those of the welfare state. All of this contributes to the 
emergence of a 'mistrustful welfare state' which concentrates on 
combating dependency, condemned as nothing more than people 
sponging off the state. The core of the social question thus ceases to be 
the dependent relationship between employees and employers and 
becomes instead the issue of dependency on the welfare state. The main 
features of this trend are summarised in the following table.



Table 1: From socialisation of risk towards individualisation of risk


Socialisation  
of risk
Individualisation  
of risk

Principles of 
productive and social 
model
Planning and pre- 
regulation
Rapid change and 
instability
Social representation 
of unemployment 
Social risk: societal 
duty to tackle risk (of 
unemployment, 
poverty, and so on)
Individual 
responsibility: risk is 
unavoidable. Individual 
duty to tackle the 
situation
Target of the 
institutionalisation  
of solidarity
The wage earner's 
condition implies 
dependence on 
employers 
Dependency on the 
social state
Social model 

Welfare: protection 
against risk. Provide 
resources which 
guarantees security and 
stability
Workfare: provide 
tools to individual to 
manage risks

It is therefore important to analyse the types of policy to which this 
emerging model of production and social welfare is leading. It is the 
belief of the authors that the institutional discourse, particularly of those 
institutions that play an important regulatory role at supranational level 
(OECD, EU), is having a major ideological influence on the way in 
which the social welfare model is changing, with activation-based 
measures and employment policy being a case in point. The discourse 
of the European Union on the subject of activation, especially in the 
context of the Luxembourg process,  is making a key contribution to 
the legitimisation of both the emerging model of production and, 
simultaneously, the development of a new 'social contract'. We will now 
examine this process in more detail.
4. Activation in EU discourse: the characteristics of the 
social welfare model being proposed
Discourse is not merely a means of expressing decisions and actions 
that have already been taken: it too is an action which can have a 
number of different functions. The main function of political discourse 
in general, and more specifically of the discourse regarding activation, is 
to justify and legitimise the decisions taken by institutions.
Political discourse is therefore a rhetorical action designed to justify to a 
target audience decisions that have been taken. It seeks to present these 
decisions as reasonable conclusions that have been arrived at on the 
basis of a definition of reality and a set of values that are allegedly 
shared by the target audience – for example, social welfare (Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1988) – or in accordance with supposedly 
universally shared principles, such as the fight against dependency or 
unemployment. In this respect, the political discourse concerning 
activation actually constructs a definition of reality. As Fairclough 
(2000: 1) points out in relation to the language of the new capitalism, 
Language is an important part of the new order. First because imposing 
the new order centrally involves the reflexive process of imposing new 
representations of the world, new discourses; second because new ways 
of using language are an important part of the new order. So the project 
of the new order – a project because it is incomplete, and those who 
benefit from it are working to extend it – is partly a language project. 
Correspondingly, the struggle over the new order is partly a struggle over 
language.
The reality constructed by the EU discourse on activation both defines 
the social actors and their responsibilities (section A), and produces the 
individuals that it relates to (section B).
A. Defining the situation: the role of the social institutions
These authors would argue that the EU's discourse regarding the 
current situation in Europe is profoundly contradictory. On the one 
hand, it is based on the need to adapt actively to the new economic 
order, and in this respect it considers national and European institutions 
to be responsible for managing this process of change (responsible for 
activating the economy, activating the workforce, and activating social 
welfare, see A.1). On the other hand, it also seeks to present change as 
something natural, adopting a fatalistic attitude according to which the 
situation is inevitable, which means that there is very little that the 
institutions can do about the tyrannical demands of new technologies 
(A.2).
A.1. Active adaptation: the European social model.
 The discourse on activation is a discourse about change and more 
specifically a discourse about the need for both the economy and 
individuals to be proactively involved in change. This active adaptation is 
declared to be a current need and something that is likely to continue to 
be necessary in the future. 
The rapid changes in information technology, communication and life 
sciences make it necessary for each Member State . . . to be at the cutting 
edge of the knowledge-based and innovatory economy and society, the 
wellspring today of growth and development. (European Council 2000b: 
14)
To a great extent, adaptation consists in knowing how to make the most 
of the potential of both the EU's citizens or workers and the 
information society itself: 
The rapid and accelerating pace of change means it is urgent for the 
Union to act now to harness the full benefits of the opportunities 
presented. (European Council 2000a: 1)
Preparing the transition to a knowledge-based economy, reaping the 
benefits of the information and communication technologies, 
modernising the European social model by investing in people and 
combating social exclusion and promoting equal opportunities are key 
challenges for the Luxembourg process. (European Commission 2001b: 
8)
This active adaptation is based on what has come to be known as the 
European social model, something which is paradoxically understood as 
both a reality and a process: 
The Union must shape these changes in a manner consistent with its 
values and concepts of society . . . (European Council 2000a: 1)
[this model is] characterised in particular by systems that offer a high 
level of social protection, by the importance of social dialogue and by 
services of general interest covering activities vital for social cohesion, 
[this model] is today based, beyond the diversity of the Members States' 
social systems, on a common core of values. (European Council 2000b: 
14)
Given that it is a model (which is comparable to other models such as, 
perhaps, the 'American way of life'), it is said to have a history, which 
'has developed over the last forty years' (ibid.), despite the fact that the 
political and social map of Europe forty years ago bore little 
resemblance to the current one (half of Germany was under 
Communist rule, Portugal and Spain had fascist regimes, and Greece 
was an authoritarian monarchy). In this way, we can see how a view of 
Europe as a homogenous entity with a set of shared values has been 
constructed. Identifying these common values thus becomes a means of 
constructing a shared identity, as well as an argument justifying the need 
for a supranational organisation such as the European Union. The 
European model is something which does exist in its own right (vis-à-
vis the American one), but it is also something that is being constructed 
(insofar as it is currently undergoing a transformation). It is therefore a 
model based on two different comparisons: a spatial comparison 
between the 'European model' and the American model, and a 
comparison in time between the current modernisation of the social 
model and the model of the past. 
Social policies are not simply an outcome of good economic 
performance and policies but are at the same time an input and a 
framework. In this context, the modernisation of the social model means 
developing and adapting it to take account of the rapidly changing 
economy and society, and to ensure the positive mutually supportive role 
of economic and social policies. (European Commission 2001a: 5) 
Having defined the situation as described above, the EU established a 
global strategic plan for itself at the Lisbon Summit, which was rather 
optimistic in tone: 'to become the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable 
economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social 
cohesion' (European Council 2000a: 3). 
In order to enable the transition to this new knowledge-based economy, 
a number of social strategies and actions have been developed with the 
aim of finding solutions to specific problems such as the balance 
between supply and demand in the case of the new skills needed in the 
knowledge-based economy. 'Europe's advance into the Information 
society is a shared responsibility requiring rapid action' (European 
Commission 2000: 29). It is here that the EU's popular discourse on 
activation turns up with its three key elements: activating the economy, 
activating individual workers, and activating social welfare. The first 
element of this strategy of social intervention to create jobs is the 
activation of the economy. The institutions of the European Union 
have a key role in providing member states' economies with access to 
new technologies, thereby ensuring economic and monetary stability 
and encouraging and promoting entrepreneurship. Secondly, the EU 
stresses the importance of activating potential workers by helping 
individuals to adapt their technical skills and psychological qualities to a 
new economic order characterised by constant change, fierce 
competition, and the requirement that workers should be always 
available and totally committed to their work. The final element of this 
discourse is the activation of social welfare, which penalises anybody 
who fails to contribute to the creation of economic wealth and 
encourages mobility between different social positions.
A.2. Passive adaptation: the discourse of inevitability. 
The basis of the EU's discourse on activation is encapsulated in an 
assertion that is taken to be self-evident and indisputable: we are already 
living in a knowledge-based information society. The information 
society is defined as a global reality which therefore transcends the 
borders of the EU. 'The European Union is confronted with a quantum 
shift resulting from globalisation and the challenges of a new 
knowledge-driven economy' (European Council 2000a: 1).
The concept of the knowledge-based information society, which is a 
term coined by social scientists to refer to recent socio-economic 
changes, is thus converted into an indisputable fact which is presented 
in the absolute terms of an objective reality. This phenomenon of 
presenting a given situation as natural is an ideological process whereby 
social concepts and explanations are transformed, in this case via 
discourse, into facts of nature. The main function of this process is to 
prevent the definition of the situation that has been adopted from being 
questioned politically. After all, if something is considered to be natural, 
then it is indisputable, it cannot be questioned, or rather it would be 
pointless to question it. Nature is not something that you question; all 
you can do is try to understand it and adapt to it.
Consequently, the basis of this discourse is the very way in which it 
defines what a knowledge-based information society is: a reality that we 
have no choice but to accept, the main characteristics of which arise 
from technical processes that are both economic (the new global 
economy) and technological (the development of information and 
communications technologies [ICTs]). As explained above, this reality is 
presented as natural and hence it is seen to be as inevitable as any other 
fact of life, meaning that adaptation to it is all that can be done at a 
political level. In light of the above, it is only logical that the most 
sensible political approach is the one that makes the most of the new 
situation. Should any political conflict arise, it will always be of a 
technical rather than an ideological nature.
Another specific characteristic of the discourse on activation is that by 
invoking metaphors of both commitment and struggle it ends up being 
very vague. The concept of a struggle or a fight, which is so evident in 
the European Union's discourse, simply serves to reinforce the 
metaphor of dynamism which underpins the activation model. The 
rhetoric of commitment appears in the use of various metaphors linked 
to effort and struggle: for example, the EU is committed to combating 
unemployment, exclusion, and other social problems. But as we have 
seen, this struggle is presented as a process of necessary adaptation to 
something which is inevitable. In effect, this is a passive process, and 
the EU's discourse is a discourse of 'passive activation'. Straehle et al. 
(1999) come to a similar conclusion after analysing the Presidency 
Conclusions of Jacques Santer and the speeches of Commissioner 
Flynn over a period of several years: They demonstrate that 'a metaphor 
of struggle is repeatedly invoked in conjunction with (un)employment' 
(ibid.: 71). In their analysis of the different uses of the metaphor of 
struggle, however, they point out that even when 'struggle' is employed 
to refer to the use of specific tools to overcome a particular problem or 
situation – that is, when it is used in a very concrete type of discourse – 
the structure of the discourse remains abstract: 
More important to note about the kinds of tools used in the struggle 
against unemployment is that while nouns like strategies and initiatives or 
verbs such as monitor, examine, and keep track of may appear to a reader or 
audience to be concrete political interventions, upon closer consideration 
it is clear that they are actually relatively abstract. ...although these 
activities seem like material processes [that is, concrete actions], they are, 
in fact, largely mental processes. (Straehle et al. 1999: 86)
In this, the authors see a paradox: 'political measures against 
unemployment, despite being constructed in "active" terms [that is, the 
EU must take up the "fight" against unemployment], must be 
embedded in economic actions, which, in the sense of market 
regulation, are reduced to a minimum, that is, are largely "passive"' 
(ibid.: 93). 
We have reached a similar conclusion. In our view, the basis of this 
passive form of activation is a discourse characterised by vagueness. 
This is an idea which was developed some years ago by the sociologist 
Uli Windisch to explain xenophobic discourses. In this type of 
discourse, the individual or player who has carried out or is responsible 
for an action is not precisely identified. The basic structure used by this 
discourse is the impersonal form, with impersonal words and phrases 
such as 'one', 'they', 'it', and 'there are' being preferred. In this type of 
discourse, the whole of society ('them' or 'everyone') is collectively 
responsible for the phenomenon in question. In the case studied here, 
the impersonal element is provided by the reference to an economic 
reality that is presented as being inevitable. 
The developing information society has the potential to transform 
Europe into a society and economy in which advanced technologies are 
used to improve the living and working conditions of all citizens. 
(European Commission 2000a: 3)
These changes are affecting every aspect of people's lives and require a 
radical transformation of the European economy. (European Council 
2000a: 1)
We could summarise the contradictory nature of the activation 
discourse in the following table.

Table 2: Contradictory nature of the activation discourse


Active adaptation: 
European social model 
(adaptability)

Passive adaptation 
(Discourse of the 
unavoidable)
Role of the 
European 
institutions
Management of change 
towards knowledge-based 
society
To react vis-à-vis new 
productive paradigm
Type of discourse
Focus on dynamics 
metaphors (fight, combat, 
etc.) 
Abstract structure
Mental processes 
(monitor, exchange, 
examine)
Impersonal forms 
Type of intervention
Activate: economy, 
workers, social protection
Reactive capacity
Social differences
Technical, digital and 
skills gaps
Individual attitudinal 
differences

B. Production of suitable individuals
Any system or method of production requires a certain kind of 
organisation and a certain kind of individual. The Fordist industrial 
production model required – or rather requires, insofar as it is by no 
means a model of production that has disappeared – a planned and 
centralised organisational structure and disciplined individuals. It is 
already many years since Michel Foucault correctly identified the close 
relationship between the modern age and discipline – discipline at work, 
in the penal system, and at a psychological level. 
The new methods of production and organising work, which Manuel 
Castells designates 'the network society', require new kinds of personal 
skill which go beyond mere technical know-how and discipline in the 
workplace to embrace every aspect of an individual's life. It is no longer 
enough for people to have the appropriate knowledge, they must also 
have the appropriate attitudes and be flexible about when they are 
available for work, which really means that they must be permanently 
available.
The moral justification for these new demands on workers, which 
embrace their whole life, tends to be based on the same individualistic 
subjectivity which characterises labour policy. The emphasis placed on 
psychological factors, and in particular on personal availability, is 
especially important in this respect. There can be little doubt that this 
kind of moral discourse is limited in terms of both its scope and its 
effectiveness, amongst other things because it is completely irrelevant to 
many jobs. As Rose (1989) points out, many jobs simply require you to 
be prepared to accept the management's authority and respond to 
financial incentives; in other words, all that is needed is the ability to 
react in an environment which is structured in terms of rewards and 
penalties. The situation is very similar in the case of activation-based 
employment policies.
Just as in the case described above, what we are really witnessing is a 
contradiction between the values of personal autonomy and the values 
of pragmatism. The discourse of personal autonomy is the discourse of 
personal commitment and responsibility. The individual required by this 
discourse is an analytical person who is able to weigh up which is the 
best alternative in a creative, interdependent relationship, a person who 
is basically internally or intrinsically motivated and who acts in 
accordance with his or her own convictions and commitments (B1). On 
the other hand, the individual required by a reactive discourse informed 
by the values of pragmatism is a behaviouristic person who thinks 
reactively and adaptively rather than in an analytical and symbolic 
manner. Such individuals choose the most gratifying (or least 
unpleasant) course of action; they are motivated by external factors and 
act because they are prompted to do so by their circumstances (B2).
Therefore the prevailing discourse on activation of the European Union 
is very ambiguous as to whether the individuals that it seeks to target 
are active individuals (internally motivated, see section B.1) or activated 
individuals (passively motivated, see B.2). Although the rhetoric of 
personal autonomy is employed, a number of lines of reasoning are also 
used which foster the creation of dependent individuals.
B.1 'Active individuals'. 
The information society defined above requires a certain type of 
individual to develop. The activation of individuals is understood as a 
process aiming to help them to adapt to the new economic order in the 
knowledge-based society. This adaptation is not purely technocratic, it is 
also moral.
The aim is to produce workers able to 'guarantee supply' by providing 
them with the skills and qualifications required by companies in the 
emerging sectors. In the case of young people, it is thought that by 
providing them with IT skills, for which an increase in demand is 
forecast in the next few years, they are being prepared for the future. 
Since the information society requires flexible workers with a task-
oriented approach to work and with a range of qualifications, all workers 
should be trained in the field of the information society and have access 
to the Internet […] 
Technological development and the globalisation of economies have 
permanently changed the character of both work and employment . . . 
Employment has become on average less stable and less certain than in 
the past, and more dependent on high skills and adaptability. (European 
Commission 2000a: 13)
The rhetoric of adaptability and flexibility transforms the instability and 
uncertainty of the economy into a personal problem. Whereas 
adaptation is a process, adaptability is a quality and it is a term which is 
used in very different ways by different people. The discourse of the 
EU tends to use adaptability generically to refer to the adaptability of 
both businesses and workers. The obvious issue that arises from this is 
that what is merely an organisational problem for a business is a 
personal problem for a worker: workers are expected to have a certain 
attitude and to be permanently available, or as Gee et al. (1996) put it, 
they must be 'eager to stay and ready to leave'.
This personal adaptability is described as employability (personal 
competencies which allow individuals to adapt to different situations): 
'[c]ombat long-term unemployment by developing active preventive and 
reintegration strategies based on early identification of individual needs 
and improving employability' (European Council 2000b: 19).
The main tools of this employability are 'life-long education and 
training, in particular in new technologies', and its function is seen as 
enabling a supply-oriented social policy: 'in order to avoid skills 
shortages' (ibid.). 'Improving basic skills, particularly IT and digital 
skills, is a top priority . . . This priority includes . . . overcoming the 
present shortfall in the recruitment of scientific and technical staff'. 
(European Council 2001: 3)
EU policy therefore aims to concentrate on guaranteeing a supply of 
skilled labour.  The problem is clearly presented in terms of the supply 
of skilled workers rather than the demand for work. Given this 
approach, the institutions view their responsibility in terms of 
producing workers who are able to meet current business needs, that is, 
to meet the demand for flexible workers which in some cases they 
attribute to the requirements of the supposedly impersonal and natural 
phenomenon of the 'knowledge-based society', whilst in others it is 
explicitly identified as a requirement for 'successful businesses': 
It is necessary to guarantee the supply of specialist workers in the 
information society both in the short and the medium term, otherwise 
opportunities for job creation and growth will be wasted. Likewise, new 
forms of organising work such as teleworking increase productivity and 
improve quality of life in the information society. (ibid.)
Work in successful businesses is no longer the same as in the old 
industrial model, . . . instead it requires flexible and adaptable workers 
with a range of skills'. (ibid.)
In this way, for example, adaptability is linked to competitiveness and 
combating social exclusion, as if they were all part and parcel of the 
same thing: '[i]t is essential for skills to develop and evolve in order to 
improve adaptability and competitiveness and combat social exclusion' 
(European Council 2000b: 14).
It is assumed that producing flexible individuals will make a positive 
contribution to the fight against social exclusion. The fight against 
exclusion, which is one of the explicit challenges that the EU has set 
itself, is based on the idea that participation in the labour market is the 
best way of combating exclusion:  '[p]aid employment for women and 
men offers the best safeguard against poverty and social exclusion' 
(European Council 2001: 7). 
In this way, the abstract discourse concerning adaptability is converted 
into an equally abstract but at the same time asymmetrical requirement 
for people to accept certain responsibilities. The risk of social exclusion, 
which is described exclusively as not participating in the labour market, 
is put down to a lack of training in the field of ICTs. Statistics are used 
to justify this analysis; obviously, they serve to back up the assertion 
that the poorer a person's qualifications, the poorer their employment 
situation, the worse their job, and the more likely they are to be 
unemployed or to stop looking for work. By explaining social inequality 
in terms of personal qualities (training), it becomes possible to describe 
it as a 'digital divide' and to attribute ultimate responsibility for it to the 
individual, whilst also rather abstractly making the social partners partly 
responsible:
It is crucial to improve qualifications and increase the opportunities for 
lifelong education and training, giving an essential role to the social 
partners. (European Council 2001: 14)
However, the Employment in Europe 2001 report (European Commission 
2001c) casts doubt on the theory that a lack of technical training is the 
only or the main reason for exclusion. 
When asked to assess their skills with respect to their current job, 
moreover, 58 per cent of all the employed in Europe declare that they 
have skills to do a more demanding job and thus seem either over-
qualified for their job or ambitious to perform more demanding tasks. 
While this self-assessment is similar across men and women and younger 
and prime-age workers, full-time and part-time employed as well as 
workers on permanent and temporary contracts, it differs significantly by 
sector and educational background: 41 per cent in industry compared to 
57 per cent in services and two-thirds of the high-skilled declare 
themselves as 'over-qualified' for their current job'. (European 
Commission 2001c: 73)
The problem comes when you try to deal with structural problems as if 
they were personal problems. The solution that is effectively being 
offered is one of individual social mobility, that is, one based on 
personal development, especially in terms of acquiring new skills. A 
variety of institutions can provide help with this personal development, 
although ultimately it is the individual who is responsible for it.
To improve job quality in Europe in a sustainable way, labour market 
policies and regulatory frameworks have to be designed to help people – 
in particular, the currently disadvantaged, trapped in low quality jobs – 
move up into jobs of better quality . . . Concerted efforts to promote 
qualifications . . . would be conducive to further improvements in the 
quality of jobs in Europe. (European Commission 2001c: 80)
No allowance is made for the potential existence of a fragmented labour 
market in the information society, or even, to some extent, polarisation: 
if somebody is in an unstable work situation it is down to their lack of 
skills. This discourse transforms a lack of jobs (or a lack of decent jobs) 
into a lack of personal skills (essentially training, but also attitudes and 
values).
Furthermore, this new age allegedly makes the main existing problems 
in the field of discrimination irrelevant:
Since a worker's gender is irrelevant in the digital age, and limitations of 
space and time or because of disability are fewer, the information society 
will be a world in which everyone has greater access to work. (ibid.)
This leaves us wondering whether they think that gender was a relevant 
'limitation' in the previous, non-digital era which therefore justified 
discrimination in terms of access to work. The discourse is consistent 
with this interpretation: policies promoting equal rights have become 
policies promoting technological development, and demands for 
personal dignity and recognition of diversity have been turned into a 
personal skills issue.
According to this purely economics-based understanding of social 
cohesion, social differences are reduced to mere technical differences 
on the one hand (such as whether an individual has access to and is able 
to use ICTs), and to 'individual and moral' differences on the other (for 
example the ability to deal with change, attitude to work, and so on). 
Hence, the social divide is transformed into a digital divide (ibid.) with 
unsurpassed rhetorical sleight of hand. The digital metaphor is 
widespread, ranging from its use in defining the information society to 
the description of social and labour relations within this information 
society, with the term 'digital divide' being employed to refer to the 
polarisation of the labour market between people who have been 
trained and educated to use ICTs and those who have not. The social 
divide between workers on short-term contracts with poor conditions 
and those with greater job stability is put down to people's individual 
skills and their access (which is also presented as an individual issue) to 
basic information technology (computers and the Internet). Likewise, 
differences between the situations of individuals are attributed to the 
way in which each individual has managed his or her 'employability' and 
their skill in adapting to a changing world. According to these criteria, 
the socio-political analysis of the information society amounts to 
nothing more than a technical analysis of the best ways of matching 
supply to demand.
This individualised form of intervention rejects the approach of seeking 
to bring about the structural changes needed in order to resolve the 
more global political issues of which exclusion is a part. In other words, 
the overall context of the problem, in this case the socio-economic 
causes of unemployment, is ignored. By concentrating on measures 
designed to change individuals' attitudes to work (job-seeking, training, 
etc), the issue is turned into an individual, psychological problem. Social 
differences can thus be presented as 'personality' differences, that is, 
differences in people's ability and attitudes with regard to fitting into 
society and being prepared to adapt to the demands of work. Hence, 
this type of intervention involves transferring conflicts from the macro 
sociological level to the individual, personal level.
B.2. 'Activated' individuals: the modernisation of social security. 
The flexibility discussed above is not the flexibility of independent and 
analytical individuals who are able to take their own flexible decisions, 
rather it is flexibility understood as adaptability. What is being described 
is passive adaptation to a situation which is externally imposed, and 
which is coercive in nature: 
Workers in the digital age therefore need to be ICT literate, highly skilled 
and have a high degree of personal autonomy, and mobile and ready for 
continuous training (lifelong learning). (European Commission 2000:14)
It is interesting to note the rhetorical use of the term 'the digital age', 
implying that anyone who is reluctant to accept the new social policy 
model is in fact being reactionary and traditionalist. In other words, 
such people are reacting against the 'new age', and are rejecting new 
(digital) technologies in favour of tradition. Anyone who calls into 
question the new ways of subjugating and using force against workers is 
condemned, not as a revolutionary but as a reactionary.
Furthermore, the discourse of autonomy, mobility, and job quality is in 
contrast to the coercive instruments that have been established to 
increase the activity rate and to push people into work. In particular 
since the Lisbon summit, there has been a shift in the emphasis of the 
European Union's social model towards putting economic factors 
before social ones. At the same time, the priority has changed from 
combating unemployment to increasing employment (Pochet 2001). 
Employment is thus presented as the solution to all our problems 
(Barbier 2001). The goal of increasing employment forms the basis of 
the activation measures aimed mainly at women, older people, young 
people, and those who are excluded from the labour market. This 
emphasis on increasing employment means that priority is being given 
to the quantitative aspects of the labour market crisis with less attention 
being paid to its qualitative aspects. In this respect, social welfare 
systems are designed 'in order to make work pay' (European Council 
2000b: 23). 
Benefit, tax and training systems – where that proves necessary – must 
be reviewed and adapted to ensure that they actively support the 
employability of unemployed persons. Moreover, these systems should 
interact appropriately to encourage the return to the labour market of 
those inactive persons willing and able to take up a job. Particular 
attention should be given to promoting incentives for unemployed and 
inactive people to seek and take up work . . . (European Commission 
2001b: 11).
The measures referred to above are designed to increase the incentives 
for people to look for work, and as such they imply major changes in 
the relationship between employment and citizenship. As the 
Presidency Conclusions of the Stockholm European Council state: 
'[w]ell designed and functioning welfare systems should be seen as 
productive factors by offering security in change' (European Council 
2001: 6). This idea, which was already present at the Nice summit, is 
considered to be a sign of progress and modernisation. The activation 
measures are used as a way of making the right to social welfare 
conditional, with those who do not wish to co-operate being subject to 
a system of penalties. The fact that there is now a set of compulsory 
conditions that determines whether one can have access to certain 
rights, with the threat of penalties for those who fail to meet these 
conditions, explains why it is appropriate to talk of the social contract 
underlying citizenship being rewritten. 
This change in the framework of social cohesion is happening against 
the more general backdrop of a transformation in the way in which 
citizenship is understood. Social citizenship, which in the past was 
basically interpreted in legal terms as a set of rights and duties, is now 
turning into a more contractual concept based on the ability not so 
much to demand collective rights as to choose, as an individual, 
between different lifestyles ('a society more adapted to the personal 
choices of women and men': European Council 2000b: 12), or a society 
where mobility is seen as a right ('the protection of the social rights of 
workers who exercise their right to mobility' – European Council 
2000b: 15). What this fails to take into account is the fact that for many 
people mobility is not a product of their right to choose but rather a 
situation in which they are forced to emigrate. This transformation is 
connected to the more general transformation of the nature of 
individuality in today's world and the emergence of new lifestyles which, 
rather than being viewed as assigned social identities, are seen instead as 
personal choices. Paradoxically, however, in those cases where people's 
circumstances do not allow them a real choice between different ways 
of living, this supposed emancipation provided by what might be 
termed individual-centred policies becomes something similar to what 
Robert Castel has described as 'negative individuation', that is, a sense 
of isolation that is reinforced by a discourse of personal freedom and 
choice. 



Table 3: Contradictory nature of the activation discourse


Active individual
Activated individual

Norms and values
Ethic of personal 
autonomy: personal 
motivation, implication 
and responsibility 
(reflexive individual able 
to evaluate)
Instrumental ethic: 
external motivation, 
individual who is able 
to react and to adapt, 
who make choices 
between incentives and 
sanctions (sticks and 
carrots)
Discourse style
Rhetoric of adaptability 
and flexibility
Dependent subjects 
motivated by external 
gratifications

Role of the welfare 
state
To produce subjects 
adapted to new needs, 
with flexibility, mobility, 
and autonomy
Disciplined individuals
Social question
Fight against social 
exclusion by promoting 
personal adaptability 
(employability)
Fight against inactivity. 
Social protection is no 
longer a universal right 
Social inequalities
Based on individual 
competences (training, 
responsibility, and so 
on)
Based on moral 
competences (work 
ethic)

5. Conclusions
A study of the European Union's discourse with regard to its social 
welfare model enables us to analyse the strong interconnections 
between the ideological demands of an economic model and the state, 
in its role of ensuring the economic model's viability. The globalisation 
of trade and the mass integration of new technologies into production 
processes have led to the need for a new model of production and 
social welfare. In order for the new model of production to be viable, 
major changes in the principles that formed the basis of the social 
welfare model of industrialised societies are required. The EU's 
institutions are playing a more and more important role in social welfare 
regulation (supranational regulation). They have developed a 
sophisticated discourse regarding activation, which has become the 
cornerstone of the European Union's proposed social welfare model, in 
the face of what it describes as a changing economy.
The EU's discourse concerning activation contains an inherent 
contradiction, which is a reflection of the fact that it is just so much 
political rhetoric. It seeks to promote individual autonomy and combat 
dependency, but does so by coercing people on benefit and workers, 
thereby restricting their autonomy and freedom to make individual 
choices. Furthermore, the concept of activation, which is presented as a 
metaphor encapsulating the attitude that people should adopt in the 
face of the current changes, contrasts with the way in which these 
changes are declared to be natural and inevitable in an attempt to justify 
the argument that it is necessary to adapt (passively) to the new model 
of production. Finally, activation measures are presented as a means of 
fighting social exclusion, whereas in fact they often increase social 
exclusion, particularly when their coercive nature and the poor quality 
of the choices on offer actually drive people towards exclusion. 
Nevertheless, the contradictory nature of this discourse might have to 
do with its two different levels. The first level comprises the economic 
dimension and operation of the productive model. The second level 
refers to a social dimension or a political response. Activation seeks to 
promote economic dynamism while at the same time it attempts to 
enhance passivity and political resignation. In other words, individuals 
do have a high degree of autonomy on how to adjust themselves to the 
changing rules of the game, but this autonomy will never enable them 
to seriously question these rules.
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  Lecturer and researcher at the Social Psychology Department of the Faculty of 
Sociology at Madrid's Complutense University. E-mail: sosoc05@emducms1.sis.ucm.es
  Researcher at the European Trade Union Institute, Brussels, and Associate Professor 
at the Social Psycology Department of Social Sciences Faculty, Madrid. E-mail: 
aserrano@etuc.org.
  The discourse that has been analysed has not been restricted to texts directly related to 
the Luxembourg process (employment guidelines, joint reports, and so on). Rather 
other, more general documents concerning the EU position on economic and social 
changes have also been used. The documents selected were those felt to be most 
relevant to the subject being discussed, namely discourse relating to activation. These 
were mainly Commission communications and the conclusions of European Council 
summits. 
  In light of this emphasis on training as a tool for adapting people to the new economic 
conditions in the knowledge-based society, there is significant empirical evidence to 
suggest that the need for skilled labour in the field of ICTs is actually very limited and is 
concentrated in a small number of sectors directly involved in the production of ICTs 
(Ardenti and Vrain 2001; Beaujolin 1999, Vendramin and Valenduc 2000). Furthermore, 
this exclusive emphasis on ICTs when analysing employment trends and training needs 
should be severely condemned since it completely fails to reflect on what the role of 
education should be (education is seen as merely a tool for providing a skilled 
workforce, without even considering what sort of training is needed for those people 
who are not going to work with ICTs). 
  This is a totalitarian discourse according to which work is an absolute imperative and 
is the only way in which a person can form part of society. Non-commercial work such 
as looking after one's children or voluntary work is penalised: the only way in which one 
can contribute to society is by participating in the world of commercial work.