Vision Europe Summit

Beyond Crisis Management:

The Path Towards an Effective, Pro-active and Fair European Refugee Policy

Matthias M. Mayer, Project Manager, Bertelsmann Stiftung
Mehrdad Mehregani, Project Manager, Bertelsmann Stiftung

BertelsmannStiftung · bruegel · CASE – Centrum Analiz Społeczno-Ekonomicznych CASE – Center for Social and Economic Research · CHATHAM HOUSE The Royal Institute of International Affairs · Compagnia di San Paolo · CALOUSTE GULBENKIAN FOUNDATION · NOTRE EUROPE JACQUES DELORS INSTITUTE · SITRA

Beyond Crisis Management:

The Path Towards an Effective, Pro-active and Fair European Refugee Policy

Contact

Dr. Matthias M. Mayer
Project Manager
Program Integration and Education
Bertelsmann Stiftung
+49-5241-81-81564
matthias.mayer@bertelsmann-stiftung.de
http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de

Contents

Executive Summary

Europe urgently needs an effective, pro-active and fair refugee policy. Short-sighted policy-making and a narrow focus on what seemed to be in the immediate national interests have led to a conglomerate of European refugee policies. These policies are clearly ineffective and resulted in a large and partially uncontrolled refugee movement to and within Europe in 2015. Refugee flows to Europe are unlikely to subside soon, as many conflicts persist and the average duration of protracted refugee situations worldwide is on the rise. In a reaction to these circumstances, the European Commission has proposed a number of initiatives to reform the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Consensus is more likely on the introduction of restrictions and sanctions rather than, for example, fair distribution systems or pooling sovereignty on the EU level by establishing a strong EU Agency of Asylum. Yet, especially pro-active solutions that meet Europe's humanitarian responsibilities are necessary.

The paper puts forward policy-recommendations for a paradigm-shift from reactive to pro-active refugee policies. The overarching objective is to create further legal channels for refugees to seek protection in Europe. Measures include both national and EU-policies and are supposed to pave the way to a sustainable and coherent European refugee policy. The policy recommendations are clustered in five overarching themes: create safe passages to protection, improve national asylum processing and integration systems, establish further legal pathways for mixed migration, enable protection in the region of origin, and tackle the root causes of forced migration through a sustainable foreign, economic and trade policy. Finally, it has to be stressed that only if we can restore Europe's political will to manage refugee flows together, there will be sustainable solutions in sight. Regular dialogue taking into account the different resources and histories of the countries are the way forward. If member states can incrementally alight their different national policies, a comprehensive European refugee policy may follow. Given the current political differences amongst member states, this will be a lengthy process – but certainly worth the effort.

1   Introduction

An increasing number of conflict situations and the temporary opening of new migration routes to Europe have led to a surge in the number of people seeking refuge in Europe. In 2015, 1,257,030 first time asylum applications were filed in the EU, and from January to June 2016, the figure amounted to 592,795 (Eurostat, 2016a; 2016b). The high numbers of refugees dramatically exposed the weaknesses of the current European Asylum System (CEAS) and showed that it is clearly dysfunctional in times of high refugee inflows. These circumstances may be here to stay, as, for instance, the number of protracted refugee situations worldwide is on the rise. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) defines protracted refugee situations as situations, where refugees are in exile for five or more years after their initial displacement, without immediate prospects for implementation of durable solutions (UNHCR, 2009). UNHCR indicates that in 2015, 41% of the refugees under its mandate were in protracted refugee situations and the average duration of a protracted refugee situation constituted 26 years (UNHCR, 2016a). A comparison with the year 1993 shows a significant increase of 17 years (Milner, 2014, p. 153). Hence, finding solutions that are both sustainable and implemented must be a key priority for EU member states – and for the international community in general. Short-sighted policy measures, such as closing national borders and underfunded refugee camps (without access to education, qualifications and work opportunities) are not apt to deal with refugees in the long-run and might backfire significantly as the events of 2015 have demonstrated. Many migrants have died in an attempt to cross the Mediterranean and uncontrolled refugee flows to Europe in combination with hasty attempts to organise European solidarity through relocation of asylum seekers from Italy and Greece as well as resettlement of refugees from the crisis region in the Middle East led to a massive resistance from countries, such as, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and added further strain to the political climate in Europe. Chancellor Merkel, for instance, admitted in a press conference in September 2016 that she had relied on the Dublin system for too long and, with hindsight, would have prepared Germany better for the refugee inflow of summer/autumn 2015 (Tagesschau, 2016).

Thus, it is only timely to discuss policy proposals on how refugee policy in Europe can be managed in an effective, pro-active and fair way. The UNHCR identifies three durable solutions for refugeehood: Resettlement to a safe country, integration in the receiving society and voluntary return (UNHCR, 2016c). However, these policy measures have failed to provide the envisaged durable solutions to a great number of refugees (Collett, Clewett, & Fratzke, 2016, p. 3; Long, 2014, p. 475). Focussing on the expansion of legal migration routes available to refugees, to supplement the three durable solutions, can help to improve the outcomes of refugee policy. For migration and refugee policy to be sustainable, it is important to be fair to all parties involved (migrants, origin countries, and receiving countries) – even if this is a very challenging undertaking (cf. Dräger & De Geus, 2015, p. 9-10).

The paper will first highlight the importance of legal migration routes for refugees and then outline a number of key challenges European refugee policy faces. Subsequently, it will briefly present the status quo of the CEAS and discuss the recent reform proposals of the European Commission. The paper will close with offering policy recommendations on the way towards an effective, pro-active and fair European refugee policy.

2   Towards Sustainable Solutions: The Importance of Legal Routes

Migrants have four kinds of legal categories to their disposal that allow them to migrate to another country. First, people may migrate for employment purposes; in practice, this is almost entirely restricted to skilled migration (seasonal workers programmes, for instance in the agricultural sector, can represent an exemption). Second, states allow the migration for education reasons, most notably for undertaking university studies. The third legal migration path is family reunification, which means that members of the core family are allowed to join a person who has the legal right to reside in another country. The fourth possibility is to claim asylum. Even the signatory states of the Geneva Convention require refugees to enter their territory to file asylum. However, in order to reach their territory, refugees are – safe very few exceptions, such as resettlement programmes that tend to be quantitatively insignificant – forced to rely on irregular migration channels.

A large share of irregular migrants are refugees, even though they might not qualify for a legally codified protection status. To create legal pathways for refugees is thus the most obvious option. However, it is not the only one. As people migrate because of a mix of motivations, some refugees who file for asylum might have been able to migrate using another legal category, such as employment, education, or family reunification – even though this number is likely to be limited. Nevertheless, to curb irregular migration and/or to prevent people to request asylum who have little prospects to receive protection, it is important to discuss whether and under what circumstances it might make sense to channel these people into other legal migration categories.

3   Lack of Legal Migration Channels for Refugees Poses Multiple Challenges for Europe

European migration policy faces important challenges. One is the lack of legal migration routes to Europe. Currently, there are hardly any legal migration pathways that allow refugees to access Europe in a safe and orderly way. Under the EU-resettlement scheme of July 2015, which foresees to resettle a total of 22,504 persons, until mid-July 2016, only 8,268 people had been resettled. These figures are small compared to the 1,257,030 first time asylum applications that have been filed in EU members states in 2015 or the estimated 1,015,078 refugees that arrived in Europe by crossing the Mediterranean in 2015 (Eurostat, 2016a; UNHCR, 2016b). On a global scale, there is a similar picture: resettlement numbers are insignificant as there are places only available for less than one percent of the global refugee population (Van Selm, 2014). One of the most terrifying

consequences of the dearth of legal migration channels for refugees constitutes dead or missing migrants in the Mediterranean; UNHCR estimates 3,169 persons in 2016 (until 5 September 2016) (UNHCR, 2016b). In addition, there is a large number of people who have died when trying to cross the Sahara. A thriving smuggling industry and chaotic circumstances in transit and destinations countries represent further important detrimental effects.

In an attempt to curb irregular migration from Turkey to Europe, the EU and Turkey concluded an agreement which stipulates that, as of 20 March 2016, all irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands (and hence into EU-territory) would be returned to Turkey. For every Syrian being returned to Turkey, another Syrian is supposed to be resettled to the EU and distributed between EU member states. However, the agreement does not represent a sustainable solution to manage refugee flows from Syria. Resettlement is going slow and as of end of September 2016, only 1,614 Syrian refugees have been resettled from Turkey to Europe (European Commission, 2016j). Thus, the agreement cannot be seen as offering quantitatively significant legal routes for refugees to the EU, but rather represents a cork to stop the refugee influx.

Another corollary of lacking legal routes for refugees, and a second important challenge, is the rise of mixed migration. Migration motivations of refugees and economic migrants are not always easy to distinguish and often people migrate for a combination of reasons, or motivations are subject to change.[1] As a result, the asylum system is often used by (economic) migrants, who, for instance, seek to escape dire poverty, because of the inexistence of alternative routes for migration. Especially in times of high asylum claims, this adds further strain to asylum systems. Betts (2013, pp. 4-6) coined the term survival migration to conceptualise the problem, that many people are forced to flee their country of origin because of reasons, such as failed states, environmental disasters, and the erosion in livelihood. Betts (2013, p. 188) defines survival migrants as "persons who are outside their country of origin because of an existential threat to which they have no access to a domestic remedy or resolution." Neither of the above causes of migration is covered by the internationally accepted refugee concept, which was created after the Second World War to protect people in Europe from individualised prosecution by their own governments (Betts, 2013, p. 188). This means that states tend not to offer protection status for many contemporary refugees (cf. Angenendt, Kipp & Meier, forthcoming). These protection gaps often force people into irregular migration channels where they end up filing asylum claims without much prospects of being granted a legal right to stay.

A further challenge is the lack of an effective and fair distribution system across Europe. The Dublin system shifts the burden of processing arrivals to the southern "frontier countries", such as Italy and Greece. In times of high asylum flows to Europe this burden amounts to a great challenge, especially for crisis-torn Greece. Plus, some asylum seekers try to avoid being registered in the first EU-country they arrive to reach a more attractive destination (for a further discussion of the shortcomings of the current CEAS, see section 4.1). Even though the structural deficits of the Dublin-system have been known for a while, EU member states have missed out on developing a fundamental alternative to the Dublin system (Angenendt, Kipp & Kosch, 2016, p. 2). As the majority of member states benefit

---

[1] For a detailed discussion of mixed migration, see Angenendt, Kipp & Meier (forthcoming).

from the current asymmetric burden sharing, they did not have the incentive to change the system. Also, more recently, the political costs of accepting relocation have risen or have even been pushed up by local politicians. In an attempt to restore Dublin transfers to Greece within the current system, the Commission has adopted a number of recommendations in February 2016, June 2016 and September 2016 (cf., for instance, European Commission, 2016k).

In addition, the EU is deeply divided on whether to accept a meaningful number of refugees at all. In 2015, Germany, Hungary and Sweden alone received 62% of asylum claims, and their share of the actual inflow of asylum seekers is even higher (Mayer, 2016, p. 6). It has to be mentioned, however, that Hungary only granted a protection status to 505 asylum seekers in 2015 (Eurostat, 2016d). Hence, only a few countries, most notably Germany and Sweden, have taken on the responsibility to accept asylum seekers in relatively large numbers. But the issue is more complex, as other states feel that especially Germany's unilateral "open-door" policy induced more refugees to migrate, which, in turn, put strain on transit countries, such as Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia (Mayer, 2016, p. 8); this also applies to Austria, that, in addition to being a transit country, received a significant number of asylum applications. It is hard to imagine a sustainable solution to the current refugee situation that does not involve EU member states coming together to more fairly share the burden in some sort of consensus (Mayer, 2016, p. 8).

Demographic developments are likely to increase migration pressures to Europe and reinforce the issues outlined above in the years to come. According to calculations issued by the United Nations, without migration, by the year 2050, (wider) Europe's working age population would decline by 96 million. Conversely, Africa's working age population would increase by 919 million and Asia's working age population by 517 million (Azahaf, Kober & Mayer, 2015). Thus, the need to implement a fair and effective European asylum policy now is very pressing as it might be strained in the future even more. It is important to create such as system with a strategic view and not in a modus of short-term crisis management. It is important to mention that a fair and effective European asylum policy has to be one component of a comprehensive strategy to deal with these demographic changes.

4 The Commission's Proposals to Reform the Common European Asylum System and Establish Migration Partnerships with Third Countries – Up to the Task?

4.1 Status Quo and Context

The main legislation on asylum in the EU essentially is based on five legal pillars as well as a support agency – the European Asylum Support Office (EASO). Together, they constitute the CEAS (see Box 1). The five pillars consist of two regulations (Dublin Regulation and Eurodac Regulation) and three directives (Asylum Procedures Directive, Qualification Directive and Receptions Conditions Directive). Regulations are binding legislative acts and must be fully applied by the member states. Directives, however, are legislative acts that only define common goals, which all member states

must achieve. Their implementation falls under the responsibility of the states themselves who establish their own laws on how to reach those goals.

The Main Pillars of the CEAS

Dublin Regulation: The Dublin Regulation determines which Member State is responsible for examining an asylum application in the EU. In general, the responsibility lies with the Member State of first entry in Europe.

Eurodac Regulation: Eurodac is the central fingerprint database for asylum seekers in the EU. When someone applies for asylum in the EU, irrespective in which Member State, their fingerprints are transmitted to the central Eurodac system to define which Member State is responsible for examining the application. This is to prevent asylum seekers from lodging applications in other Member States.

Asylum Procedures Directive: The Asylum Procedures Directive aims at harmonising asylum procedures within the EU. The directive also includes provisions for determining an asylum application as "unfounded" or "inadmissible". This might be the case, if an asylum seeker entered the EU through a "safe third country" for instance.

Qualification Directive: The Qualification Directive is supposed to establish common grounds for granting international protection and contains a series of rights for its beneficiaries (i.e. non-refoulement, residence permits, travel documents, access to employment)

Reception Conditions Directive: The Reception Conditions Directive tries to set common minimum standards for living conditions (i.e. access to housing, food, employment, health care) of asylum seekers in the EU, while their applications are being processed.

European Asylum Support Office (EASO): EASO was established in 2011 in order to strengthen the development of the CEAS by supporting the cooperation between Member States on asylum policy.

Box 1: The Main Pillars of the CEAS

The CEAS was supposed to establish minimum standards for dealing with asylum processes in the EU. From the very beginning, though, some of its aspects have been criticised. Particularly, the Dublin Regulation has raised concerns for putting disproportionate pressure on the member states with external borders who have long been most affected by irregular migration.[2]

The fundamental shortcomings of the CEAS were fully displayed when the number of people seeking asylum in Europe increased significantly in 2015. While the Dublin Regulation practically failed, the other pillars of the CEAS have been strained as well. Recognition rates, for instance, have differed drastically between EU countries, contributing to secondary movements of asylum seekers to only a

---

[2] Before 2015, the majority of irregular migrants has entered in a legal way (with a visa or as tourists on short-term permits, for instance) but have overstayed.

few countries in the EU (i.e. Germany and Sweden). Regarding recognition rates in 2015, Germany accepted 57% of all applications in first instance decisions, Sweden 72% and the Netherlands 80% (Eurostat, 2016c). Hungary (15%) or Poland (18%), on the other hand, recognised drastically fewer applications in comparison (Eurostat, 2016c). Most of the 174,435 first time asylum applications reported by Hungary for 2015 have never been decided as asylum seekers have moved to another country (cf. Eurostat, 2016a; 2016d).

Acknowledging the shortcomings of the current system, the European Commission (2016c) presented proposals for a major reform of the CEAS "in order to move towards a fully efficient, fair and humane asylum policy – one which can function effectively both in times of normal and in times of high migratory pressure". The main goals of the proposals are to reduce the incentives for irregular migration as well as improve the migration management within Europe. On 4 May and 13 July 2016, the Commission presented legislative proposals to

- reform the current regulations and directives of the CEAS;
- transform the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) into a significantly more capable EU Agency for Asylum;
- establish – for the first time – a common EU resettlement framework.

Furthermore, on 7 June 2016, the Commission presented a proposal for enhanced cooperation with third countries through the establishment of Migration Partnerships.

4.2   European Commission Proposals of 4 May 2016

4.2.1   Reform of the Dublin Regulation

Prior to the legislative proposal that was presented on 4 May 2016, the Commission had outlined two potential reform options for the future of the Dublin Regulation in a press release on 6 April 2016 (European Commission, 2016a). Option number one entailed a comprehensive reform of the Dublin Regulation by introducing a permanent distribution mechanism for asylum seekers based on predefined criteria (i.e. GDP and size of population of a member state). Option number two, instead, foresaw to maintain the current system while adding to it a "corrective allocation mechanism" (Fairness Mechanism; European Commission, 2016b) to support member states in times of disproportionate migratory pressure. Likely, because of fundamental objections towards a permanent distribution key by some member states (particularly in Eastern Europe), the Commission opted for the second option in the end. It foresees that if the number of asylum seekers a member state receives exceeds a predefined benchmark, all new incoming asylum seekers will be automatically allocated to other member states. This would only be the case however, if the asylum seekers' applications were not found inadmissible, i.e. because of coming through a first country of asylum or a safe third country. If a member state would refuse to participate in the Fairness Mechanism, the member state would be obliged to pay €250,000 per person to the member state who would handle the application of the asylum seeker instead (European Commission, 2016c).

Furthermore, the proposed amendment to the Dublin Regulation obliges all member states to first assess whether an asylum application is admissible, before actually allowing the opening of a formal asylum procedure (ibid.).

4.2.2 Extension of the Eurodac Regulation

The proposal of the Commission is supposed to enable a more comprehensive acquisition and storage of personal data of asylum seekers in the Eurodac system, i.e. names, dates of birth, citizenships and facial images (European Commission, 2016b).

4.2.3 Establishing an EU Agency for Asylum

The Commission proposes to transform EASO into a "fully-fledged European Union Agency for Asylum with an enhanced mandate and considerably expanded tasks to address any structural weaknesses that arise in the application of the EU's asylum system" (European Commission, 2016b). The new agency has been envisaged to reduce divergences within the EU concerning the assessment of asylum applications and information sharing between member states. The Commission proposal includes that the new agency may deploy asylum support teams in times of disproportionate pressure to the asylum system of a member state, putting the CEAS at risk – even if the member state concerned is against it (European Commission, 2016c).

4.3 European Commission Proposals of 13 July 2016

4.3.1 Reform of the Asylum Procedures Directive

In order to guarantee coherent asylum procedures in the EU, the Commission proposes to replace the current directive with a regulation (European Commission, 2016f). Thereby, the Commission seeks to discourage secondary movements of asylum seekers, since – so far – most of them have tried to reach only a few countries within the EU (i.e. Germany, Sweden, Austria and the Netherlands). Furthermore, the Commission proposal aims at simplifying and shortening asylum procedures in the EU (max. six months; for inadmissible applications only one to two months). Moreover, it foresees common guarantees for asylum seekers, additional sanctions and proposals to have a common definition for safe third countries, in perspective culminating in a common EU list (European Commission, 2016g).

4.3.2 Reform of the Qualification Directive

The Commission proposes to replace the existing directive with a regulation to establish common grounds for granting international protection (European Commission, 2016f). Particularly, the proposal aims at overcoming the existing divergences of EU member states' asylum recognition rates and their varying definitions of protection statuses (i.e. regarding the duration of residence permits). To support the harmonisation, member states shall be obliged to consider country of origin-reports by EASO when assessing the legitimacy of asylum applications.

The proposed regulation also foresees a number of restrictive measures perceived to decrease the incentives for secondary movements of asylum seekers within the EU. For instance, by impeding access to long-term residence permits or by obliging member states to conduct regularly status reviews for refugees potentially leading to an end of the protection status (European Commission, 2016g).

4.3.3   Reform of the Reception Conditions Directive

The Commission proposes to amend the current directive in order "to ensure that asylum seekers can benefit from harmonised and dignified reception standards throughout the EU, hence helping to prevent secondary movements" (European Commission, 2016f). The proposal contains measures to support the integration of asylum seekers, i.e. through the possibility of accessing the labour market after a maximum of six months – if the labour market is not strained by high unemployment rates and unless the asylum seekers' applications are "likely to be unfounded and treated in an accelerated procedure" (European Commission, 2016g).

A positive provision is that unaccompanied minors are to be assigned a guardian at the latest five days after lodging an application. At the same time, the proposal also foresees a number of restrictive measures, i.e. through residence and reporting restraints with the possibility of detention if "an asylum seeker is not complying with the obligation to reside in a specific place and where there is a risk of absconding" (European Commission, 2016f).

4.4   Proposal for an EU Resettlement Framework

On 13 July 2016, the European Commission proposed an EU Resettlement Framework to complement the CEAS and "ensure orderly and safe pathways to Europe for persons in need of international protection" (European Commission, 2016h). The new framework is meant to assist the implementation of migration compacts (Migration Partnerships) with designated third countries (countries of origin and transit; for details, see section 4.5). This is based on the idea that third countries might be more willing to readmit people who were denied asylum in Europe if the EU pledges to take in persons in need for international protection via resettlements at the same time.

The Commission proposal introduces a permanent framework with a unified procedure for resettlements to the EU. However, the number of people to be resettled through the framework would be decided by member states themselves. Hence, member states could even decide to resettle no asylum seekers at all. This might be the Achilles heel of the proposal. Those who would decide to participate in the framework are supposed to be financially compensated with €10,000 per person through the European Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF). Critically, only people who did not (attempt to) flee to the EU irregularly within the past five years, will be eligible for resettlements (European Commission, 2016i).

4.5 Proposal for Enhanced EU Cooperation with Third Countries (Migration Partnerships)

On 7 June 2016, the Commission outlined ideas for an enhanced cooperation framework with third countries to better manage migration (European Commission, 2016d). The proposed cooperation will take the form of tailored compacts (Migration Partnerships) "that will be developed according to the situation and needs of each partner country, depending on whether they are a country of origin, country of transit or a country hosting many displaced persons" (European Commission, 2016d). One of the key goals of the compacts is to significantly reduce irregular migration to the EU. In the short term, migration compacts are envisaged with Jordan and Lebanon – in the intermediate and long run, also with Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Ethiopia, Senegal, Tunisia and Libya (European Commission, 2016e).

In order to actually make the Migration Partnerships work, the "full range of EU policies and external EU instruments" is supposed to be used – complemented by policy tools of member states (European Commission, 2016d). Particularly, this includes foreign, economic and development policy as well as cooperation on border control. If a third country denies to cooperate, development cooperation might be reduced. Meanwhile, the Commission proposes to increase the capacity of its external financial instruments (i.e. strengthening the budget of the Trust Fund for Africa with one billion Euro), to tackle root causes more effectively than in the past (ibid.).

4.6 Assessment of the European Commission's Proposals

The proposals of the European Commission pursue three overarching objectives:

- Overcoming divergences between member states concerning the implementation of the CEAS, i.e. through replacing directives with regulations, transforming EASO into an EU Agency for Asylum with an extended mandate or establishing a Fairness Mechanism to allocate asylum seekers in the EU more fairly;
- Discouraging secondary movements and irregular migration via restrictions and sanctions as well as through enhanced cooperation with third countries (Migration Partnerships);
- Enhancing legal pathways to Europe via an EU Resettlement Framework.

Replacing directives with regulations is a sensible step towards harmonising asylum processes and recognition rates within Europe. Transforming EASO into a more capable EU Agency for Asylum to better support and monitor member states with the implementation of the CEAS would be an improvement as well. A Fairness Mechanism might also help ease the burden on those member states (namely Greece and Italy) who have been under enormous pressure because of irregular migration. Yet, it does not seem likely at the moment that there will be a consensus on some of those proposals (i.e. Fairness Mechanism and the EU Agency of Asylum's right to act against the will of a member state). Particularly, as regards the obligation to pay €250,000 per person in case of a refusal to participate in the Fairness Mechanism, it is very unlikely that there will be an agreement among

member states. It is striking that the proposed EU Resettlement Framework, on the other hand, foresees to assist member states with only €10,000 per resettled person. Indeed, it might be more useful to significantly increase the financial and structural incentives to allocate asylum seekers (via relocations or resettlements).

Overall, a consensus among member states currently seems more likely regarding the introduction of restrictions and sanctions to reduce irregular migration to the EU and secondary movements within Europe. Particularly, with respect to obligatory inadmissibility checks (proposed Dublin Regulation) and the stricter application of safe third country provisions (envisaged reform of the Asylum Procedures Directive), which might effectively hinder many asylum seekers from lodging applications in the EU. Regarding the establishment of migration compacts with designated third countries (Migration Partnerships), it has to be seen, to what extent they could actually become mutually beneficial partnerships, respecting the rights of asylum seekers and migrants. There has been a broad range of critique, particularly from NGOs, which view the migration compacts as an illegitimate form of externalising migration control (cf., for instance, Amnesty International, 2016). Moreover, some members of the European Parliament voiced their concerns about the Migration Partnerships (cf. European Parliament, 2016).

The proposed EU Resettlement Framework would be a significant first step to enhance legal pathways and effectively reduce the incentives to flee to Europe irregularly. However, given the fact that member states would be able to decide on the number of asylum seekers to be resettled, it remains to be seen whether the framework will actually be successful.

5   Recommendations

This chapter presents a number of policy recommendations in order to fulfil the paradigm-shift from a reactive to a pro-active European refugee policy. The recommendations comprise a mix of national and EU-level measures and most recommendations have a national as well as an EU-level dimension. Of course, a coherent and effective EU refugee policy would be the most desirable option. However, this is difficult to achieve given the current political climate. Thus, smaller bottom-up steps on the national level (in the same direction) in combination with top-down EU-level efforts may be a more pragmatic approach that might eventually lead to an effective, pro-active and fair European refugee policy in the future. The policy recommendations are clustered in five overarching themes: create safe passages to protection, improve national asylum processing and integration systems, establish further legal pathways for mixed migration, enable protection in the region of origin, tackle the root causes of forced migration through a sustainable foreign, economic and trade policy. A final remark highlights the importance of member states' political will to reform current refugee policies.

5.1 Create Safe Passages to Protection

5.1.1 Resettlement

Resettlement from crisis countries or refugee camps in neighbouring countries allows a safe passage to protection. In addition, as most refugees in crisis regions do not live in refugee camps, it is important to identify other places, from where refugees can be resettled. As noted above, there are by far too few resettlement programmes worldwide. Out of the resettlement places offered, the US, Canada and Australia provide 90% of the global capacity (Van Selm, 2014, p. 512). In 2015, UNHCR indicates that 81,000 individuals departed to resettlement countries with UNHCR's assistance (UNHCR, 2016d). This figure is dwarfed by the total of 16.1 million refugees under UNHCR's mandate at the end of 2015 (UNHCR, 2016a).

EU member states should increase the numbers of resettlement places available. A possible option is the UNHCR's resettlement programme. The EU Resettlement Framework proposed by the European Commission in July 2016 might be a further option in the future, but it does not oblige member states to resettle refugees. Thus, it is crucial to generate the political will in EU member states to boost their resettlement efforts. For this to succeed, it is important that all, or most member states contribute to this process – according to their individual capacities. It is unlikely that only a few member states will undertake efforts to increase their resettlement places on their own. The advantages to resettlement as an effective and manageable way to cope with high refugee flows has to be continuously highlighted and discussed across the EU.

However, it is critical, that offering a limited number of resettlement places is not used to legitimise curbing refugee flows beyond resettlement programmes and to reduce the availability of other status of protection (cf. Angenendt, Kipp & Meier forthcoming; Kleist, 2016). Offering increased numbers of resettlement places can be expected to reduce incentives for individuals to use irregular routes to access protection, in Europe for example. Thus, it is unlikely that increased resettlement opportunities will come on top of current refugee flows, but rather will reroute current flows via irregular routes. Nonetheless, it has to be mentioned that an effective but fair border management is imperative for EU member states to step-up their resettlement efforts.

5.1.2 Humanitarian Visas

Humanitarian visas represent a further option for refugees for a legal and safe route to Europe. Such visas could be provided by individual states unilaterally, and Brazil and Switzerland have recently offered humanitarian visas – although in limited numbers (cf. Betts, 2015; Thränhardt, 2016). Even better would be an EU-wide solution. Part of such an EU-effort could be to create small consular outposts outside the European Union, for instance, in Turkey or Libya (Betts, 2015). These outposts could be moved when migratory routes shift. Such outposts would allow people to be screened, for instance, by an EU Agency for Asylum, and those meeting the criteria would be granted a humanitarian visa. Another option could be to empower member states' consulates to issue EU-humanitarian visas. Persons with a humanitarian visa could then travel to Europe by plane or ferry at their own expense, which would be cheaper and much safer than paying smugglers for a journey to

Europe. Upon arrival, the visa holder would need to file an asylum claim. An EU-humanitarian visa would require an EU-wide distribution mechanism. Humanitarian visas would work best if offered to nationals from countries with high protection rates. This could counter the argument, critics of such an approach might put forward, that humanitarian visas might represent a further pull factor for individuals with little chances of being recognised as refugees to seek protection in Europe. A slight increase of refugees from the most crisis-torn regions would certainly be an acceptable price to pay for one further step towards a fair and effective EU refugee policy (Betts, 2015).

The idea of humanitarian visas for refugees has a historical precedent: the Nansen Passports used by the League of Nations. Between 1922 and 1942, the scheme was recognized by over 50 countries and enabled around 450,000 people, including Assyrian, Armenian and Turkish refugees, to travel safely to Europe (Betts, 2015; Wallaschek, 2016). In recognition of its achievements, the Nansen International Refugee Office received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1938.

5.1.3   Private Sponsorship of Refugees

Private sponsorship programmes for refugees provide for another safe way to reach a country offering protection and offers many advantages, also for paving the way for refugees to integrate in the host society. Private sponsorship can supplement traditional refugee resettlement programmes, by means of communities and other nongovernmental entities directly supporting the arrival and integration of persons in need of protection (Collett, Clewett, & Fratzke, 2016, p. 22). To be successful, the design of such sponsorship programmes is crucial: Guidelines should present the purpose of private sponsorships, who is eligible to sponsor and be sponsored, the responsibilities of sponsors, and the safety net in place should problems arise (Kumin, 2015, p. 1).

A well-developed good policy-practice has been implemented by Canada.[3] It allows private citizens to play a role in Canada's refugee policy. A sponsorship usually starts with a group of friends, family, neighbours or colleagues who get together and decide they want to be sponsors. The group often already knows a refugee who they want to sponsor. Sponsors close a contract with the Canadian government and sponsors commit to providing emotional, material and financial support for one full year (Omidvar, 2015).

The programme builds social capital and is an effective tool for settlement. Refugees who are privately sponsored have better employment outcomes than those who are sponsored by government or who claim asylum in Canada: In the first two years of arrival, private sponsored refugees in Canada earned or exceeded a salary of C$20,000 – higher than any other refugee group (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012, p. 8).

---

[3] Further information on the Canadian Private Sponsorship Programme can be found here: http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/publications/ref-sponsor/index.asp?utm_source=immigration.gc.ca%2Frefsponsorship& utm_medium=URL_direct&utm_campaign=form-help.

There is not one single model for private sponsorship programmes and they need to be adopted to the specific country context. But a well thought through implementation of such programmes in the EU and its member states would be an important supplement to resettlement programmes and constitute an effective way to provide legal routes for refugees to Europe, in combination with good integration prospects.

5.2 Improve National Asylum Processing and Integration Systems

5.2.1 Effective National Asylum Systems

In the absence of a fully-fledged EU-asylum procedure, EU member states need effective national systems for processing asylum claims and dealing with asylum seekers. They need to possess the capacity to process asylum claims efficiently, provide adequate housing, integrate those with protection status into society, and keep careful track of the identities of asylum seekers in the country. It is important that national authorities demonstrate their ability to act. This still requires significant efforts across the EU because opportunities to improve capacity in recent years were missed. It is equally important to keep asylum systems flexible so they can cope with fluctuating demand – also with support by an EU Agency for Asylum (Mayer, 2016, pp. 7-8).

5.2.2 Labour Market Integration of Refugees

Labour market integration of refugees is as essential part of a sustainable refugee integration in host societies as well as a life in dignity. The UN Development Report (2015, p.1) states: "Ultimately, work unleashes human potential, human creativity and the human spirit." Effective labour market integration of refugees is consequently a crucial part of a sustainable refugee policy. However, labour market outcomes of refugees tend to be poor. On average, it takes refugees up to 20 years to have a similar employment rate as the native-born (OECD, 2016, p. 21). Support measures can help refugees to find an employment commensurate to their qualifications and skills.

Most refugees do not have formal qualifications or the documents that prove they do. But often refugees possess competencies that they have acquired non-formally or informally. A flexible skills assessment and possibilities for modular qualifications are needed (for refugees, but also in general). This could also meet the expectations of refugees to be employed early (Aumüller, 2016a).

As many refugees will not be able to access the regular labour market because of lacking formal qualifications and language proficiency, concepts are needed to avoid future long-term unemployment of refugees. Job opportunities outside the private labour market which are combined with language tuition, skills development, job application training etc. might represent one possibility. Possibilities of a social labour market should be explored – otherwise there is the danger, that refugees might move into the informal labour market instead (Aumüller, 2016b). If well managed, such publicly funded not-for-profit jobs can also bring symbolic returns to society that in turn might increase acceptance of asylum seekers amongst the population.

It is important that labour market support measures start early, i.e. already during the application process. Labour market integration of asylum-seekers and refugees should be handled as a flexible process which focuses on the individual requirements of the persons concerned. A long-lasting linear process – first step: language proficiency, second step: skills assessment, third step: getting vocational orientation and so on – should be avoided. Instead, the different elements of labour market integration should be paralleled. Refugees should benefit from an individual coaching which also takes into account the needs of social integration – passing the legal asylum procedure, accommodation, family unification, coping with trauma etc. (Aumüller, 2016b).

5.2.3   Voluntary Return

The focus on recent policy proposals, such as the New Migration Partnership Framework[4] or the regulation on a European travel document for the return of illegally staying third country nationals[5] proposed by the European Commission, has been on the return of persons who are not eligible for a protection status. While this is an important feature of an effective refugee policy, also the return of persons with protection status needs to be part of a forward-looking EU refugee policy. If the causes for refugee migration in the country of origin subside, return to the country or region of origin may be an important option for refugees. Return has to happen voluntarily to be a safe process – in accordance with the principle of non-refoulement (Bohnet & Rudolf, 2015, p. 2; United States Institute for Peace, 2016).

Re-establishing economic livelihoods, political capital, and social networks can pose serious challenges (Hammond, 2014, p. 508). The EU and member states should provide assistance to facilitate the return process of refugees. For return to be a smooth process, a few principles need to be kept in mind: Post-conflict situations are transitory processes and cannot be equated with the end of all conflict and significant levels of violence might continue to exist (Bohnet & Rudolf, 2015, p. 1). Return and local integration should not be set against each other. The experiences and competencies acquired in the country offering protection might be helpful for re-integrating in the country of origin (Bohnet & Rudolf, 2015, p. 4). Thus, investments of receiving countries in refugees' integration can also be investments in stabilising the region or country of origin economically and politically. Moreover, returning refugees may serve as channels for invisible transfers of modernity, social and political changes, and learning processes at the family, community and citizenship level (cf. Garson, 2015, p. 19). Also the experiences and competencies acquired in the country offering protection might be helpful for re-integrating in the country of origin (Bohnet & Rudolf, 2015, p. 4). Finally, relief and development efforts should be part of any sustainable return programme (Bohnet & Rudolf, 2015, p. 5).

---

[4] COM(2016) 385 final.

[5] COM(2015) 668 final.

In Germany, the Centre for International Migration and Development (CIM) runs the Migration for Development Programme which offers support to returning experts (Heimer & Münch, 2015, pp. 46-47).[6] The programme includes individual counselling regarding return and career planning, information on the origin country's labour market, job-placement services, continuing support in re-entering a career within the home country, and the provision of local contacts. In certain cases, financial grants by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) are provided, toward travel, transportation, and the establishment of a workplace. Another programme helps migrants to start a business in their home country.[7] While these programmes do not have a refugee focus, they offer important insights for return programmes targeting refugees.

5.2.4   Reform of the Dublin System

The structural deficits of the Dublin system have to be overcome in order for national asylum procedures to function effectively and fairly. The responsibility to grant protection to those individuals in need has to be shared across EU member states – taking into account different national resources and histories. One step towards a fairer distribution of asylum seekers represents the Commission's "corrective allocation mechanism" proposed on 4 May 2016; however, it might be useful to step up incentives to distribute asylum seekers (cf. section 4.6). Initially, the Commission's considerations included a more wide-ranging option of a permanent distribution mechanism presented on 6 April 2016, which was then abandoned in favour of the more modest "corrective allocation mechanism" (cf. section 4.2.1). Given the current political climate, a fundamental overhaul seems impossible to realise in the near future and smaller steps of reform are preferable to a standstill. Nonetheless, a more ambitious reform of the Dublin system should remain a medium-term objective.

Countries without borders with third-countries, such as Germany, have for a long-time benefitted from the Dublin system. Even though its shortcomings were obvious and the southern "frontier countries" had to shoulder most of the burden. Now, the situation has changed and Germany is amongst the greatest supporters of a new EU-wide distribution mechanism for refugees. To convince other countries to accept any form of such a system, this history has to be taken into account. Hence, the way towards any serious EU-distribution mechanism is likely to proceed in small steps and to entail concessions to countries carrying the largest burden under the current Dublin system.

5.3   Establish Further Legal Pathways for Mixed Migration

As discussed above, migrants often migrate because of a mix of motivations. Many individuals who claim asylum migrate out of economic necessity and do not qualify for a status of protection. Expanding the opportunities to migrate to the EU through new economic migration channels might contribute to disentangling mixed migration flows and to reducing the pressure on asylum systems. Even though, the quantitative potential of this way is likely to be limited. There are a number of ways

---

[6] More information on the programme can be found here: http://www.cimonline.de/en/61.asp.

[7] More information on the programme can be found here: http://www.cimonline.de/en/2593.asp#top.

to migrate to EU member states for employment reasons, but these pathways tend to be restricted to skilled and highly skilled workers (seasonal workers programmes can be an exception). In order to separate economic from refugee migration, the establishment of new migration channels for un-skilled workers needs to be discussed. Currently, this is largely unpopular in EU countries and politi-cally not to be realised. But it might be an option in the future, when demographic aging and shrinking in Europe has progressed further. It is crucial, however, that this is supplemented by efforts to improve labour force participation of the domestic population and the upgrading of working conditions of currently rather unpopular professions, such as caretaking.

5.4 Enable Protection in the Region of Origin

5.4.1 Temporary Protection in Refugee Camps in the Regions of Origin

Protection in the region of origin can serve as an intermediate solution to cope with refugee flows. Refugee camps in neighbouring countries, for instance, can offer individuals in need of protection a safe place in relative vicinity to their home country, thereby avoiding to embark on dangerous journeys to other safe countries; a further beneficial side-effect comprises reduced revenues for smugglers. Refugee camps can be a reasonable policy option in particular if it is unclear how long a particular crisis situation will persist. In case the situation is resolved, refugees will be able to return to their home country soon and contribute to rebuilding and stabilising the country, for example.

In order for refugee camps in crisis regions to be a viable option, it is important that they are well funded. Chronic underfunding of organisations, such as the UN World Food Programme led to reduced food allowances for refugees in Jordan and Lebanon in early 2015. These deteriorating cir-cumstances drove many refugees to seek better living conditions elsewhere (Mayer, 2016, p. 4). This was one of the chief drivers that caused the massive refugee inflow in Europe in 2015 that the EU and its member states found difficult to manage. Hence, well-funded refugee camps in neigh-bouring countries can be an important buffer – especially in times of high refugee migration from one region of origin – and should be part of a pro-active EU-refugee policy. From there, refugees could travel to other places offering sustainable protection, for instance, through resettlement programmes, private sponsorship programmes or humanitarian visas. It is important that the time refugees spend in camps is used properly; just offering protection without anything else is not enough. Education, qualification measures, and work opportunities can both improve the labour market integration prospects in later host countries as well as contribute to stabilising their home country in case of return. Refugee camps should only serve as intermediate solutions to refugeehood and should not externalise the responsibility for a sustainable EU-refugee policy to countries in crisis regions.

5.4.2 Local Integration in the Region of Origin

Local integration in neighbouring countries is another source of protection for refugees. Estimates indicate that, in Turkey for instance, around 20% of all refugees live in camps and around 80% in Turkish cities (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2015). In Jordan, around 80% of all Syrian refugees live outside camps, mostly in the cities of Irbid and Amman (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016a). In Lebanon, the

government seeks to avoid establishing camps for Syrian refugees. Thus, most Syrian refugees live in improvised tent settlements, garages, unfinished houses, or even flats (if they can afford it) (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016b).

Refugees in neighbouring countries mostly live in precarious situations without the right to work or to receive social benefits and often do not have access to healthcare. European governments need to work with countries in crisis regions to improve and legalise the status of refugees. This will necessitate significant investments. A further option comprises the support of civil society initiatives that can provide food or education.

5.5 Tackle the Root Causes of Forced Migration through a Sustainable Foreign, Economic and Trade Policy

A sustainable solution to the large asylum inflows to the EU must address the root causes of forced migration. This is an extremely challenging task and might require EU member states to make concessions. Tackling the root causes includes ending the conflict in Syria and putting a stop to the terror of the Islamic State group. Moreover, it involves helping refugees' and migrants' home countries to develop. In addition to development cooperation, trade and economic policy must be viewed in a differed light – beyond the traditionally narrow notion of national interests.

Article 208 of the Lisbon Treaty states, "[…] The Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries." This principle needs to be incorporated better in policy-making of the EU and its member states. Short-term gains of certain economic and trade policies need to be replaced by a more long-term and holistic view of policy-making. For instance, jobs in developing countries need to be decent. The long-term costs of underdevelopment will dwarf any short-term gains through cheap production sites of European corporations in developing countries. Another field of action could be reducing subsidies for agricultural production in Europe or improving the prospects for businesses in developing countries. In addition, simplifying remittance transfers and targeted investments by the diaspora community should be part of a sustainable development policy for countries of origin (Mayer, 2016, p. 9).

Serious investments in developing countries of origin constitute an important part of tackling the root causes of forced migration. For instance, states attending President Obama's Leaders Summit on Refugees in September 2016 have committed to increase their 2016 financial contributions to UN appeals and international humanitarian organisations by around $4.5 billion over 2015 levels (The White House, 2016). When compared to the funding gap for humanitarian action of estimated $15 billion, this is clearly not enough and even higher spending is necessary (cf. High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing). It might also be worthy to discuss the role private sector organisations might be able to play to supplement those funds.

Asylum policy can no longer be reduced to dealing with the people who arrive at our doorstep. Rather, it must acknowledge the connectedness of the world and the fact that people emigrate out

of desperation. It is time that the EU and the world's other developed economies tackle the root causes of migration flows. If they do not, the number of migrants to Europe is bound to increase further (Mayer, 2016, p. 9).

5.6　Final Remark: Establish Political Will for Reform

The above recommendations require member states' political will. However, since the significant inflow of asylum seekers in 2015 added another difficult situation to the EU's list of challenges, member states have been unable to find any sustainable concerted European solutions. A key challenge for the EU and member states to manage migration effectively and pro-actively represents the question of how member states can align their national interests and find common ground to tackle this massive challenge together. Certainly, there is no silver bullet to create political will amongst member states, however, a few steps towards similar national policies might help and might lay the foundation of a more comprehensive European refugee policy. For instance, member states need to have a shared foreign policy vision. This means, that they have to establish a common understanding of the political situations in origin countries of refugees. Only if this can be achieved, a harmonisation of national protection rates – or even EU-level asylum procedures – are thinkable.

Migration policy needs to be based on a forward-looking and coherent strategy. It cannot consist of short-term and reactive crisis management. Migration flows need to be monitored, and large spikes need to be forecasted as far ahead as possible (Mayer, 2016, p. 8). The EU and member states need to demonstrate that they are in control of refugee flows. In addition, an effective and fair asylum policy should be insulated from populist debates, but at the same time not left for elites to shape on their own. This is a delicate task, and to strike the right balance, a strong civil society and transparent policy-making are needed (Mayer, 2016, p. 8). Constant dialogue about refugee policy between and within member states is imperative.

About the Authors

Matthias M. Mayer is a Project Manager with the Integration and Education program at the Bertelsmann Stiftung. Before joining the Stiftung, he served as both a Research Associate at Germany's Federal Office for Migration and Refugees in Nuremberg and a Project Manager for the High-Level Consensus Group on Skilled Labour Demand and Immigration for the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration (SVR) in Berlin. He received his PhD in European Studies from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) in 2011.

Mehrdad Mehregani is a Project Manager with the Integration and Education program at the Bertelsmann Stiftung, working on European migration and refugee policy. Prior to joining the Bertelsmann Stiftung, he served as a Project Manager at the Mercator Program Center for International Affairs being in charge of Stiftung Mercator's High-Level Fellowship-Program, and a Researcher at the Migration Branch of the International Labour Organization (ILO). He received his MSc. in EU Politics at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) in 2011.

Acknowledgements

References

Amnesty International (2016, June 27). European Commission "compacts" represent responsibility shirking, not responsibility sharing. Amnesty International. Retrieved from http://www.amnesty.eu/content/assets/public_statements/EUR0343192016ENGLISH.pdf (Accessed July 10, 2016).

Angenendt, S., Kipp, D., & Meier, A. (forthcoming). Gemischte Wanderungen: Herausforderungen und Handlungsoptionen einer Dauerbaustelle. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.

Angenendt, S., Kipp D., & Koch, A. (2016). Grenzsicherung, Lager, Kontingente: Die Zukunft des europäischen Flüchtlingsschutzes? *SWP-Aktuell.* Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Retrieved from http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2016A30_adt_kpp_koh.pdf (Accessed October 9, 2016).

Aumüller, J. (2016a). Arbeitsmarktintegration von Flüchtlingen: bestehende Praxisansätze und weiterführende Empfehlungen. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung. Retrieved from https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/Projekte/28_Einwanderung_und_Vielfalt/Studie_IB_Arbeitsmarktintegration_Fluechtlinge_2016.pdf (Accessed October 9, 2016).

--- (2016b). Case Study Germany. In Bertelsmann Stiftung (Ed.), *From Refugees to Workers. Mapping labour-market integration support measures for asylum seekers and refugees in EU Member States. Volume II – Literature review and country case studies*, pp. 68-78. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.

Azahaf, N., Kober, U. & Mayer, M. (2015). Policy Recommendations for Fair Migration Governance. In Bertelsmann Stiftung (Ed.), *A Fair Deal on Talent – Fostering Just Migration Governance. Lessons from Around the Globe*, pp. 315-24. Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung.

Bertelsmann Stiftung (2016a). Fakten zur Europäischen Dimension von Flucht und Asyl: JORDANIEN. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung. Retrieved from http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/BSt/Publikationen/GrauePublikationen/EZ_Faktenchek_Jordanien_07_16_DE.pdf (Accessed October 9, 2016).

--- (2016b). Fakten zur Europäischen Dimension von Flucht und Asyl: LIBANON. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung. Retrieved from http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/user_upload/EZ_Faktencheck_Libanon_06_16_DT.pdf (Accessed October 10, 2016).

--- (2015). Fakten zur Europäischen Dimension von Flucht und Asyl: Türkei. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung. Retrieved from http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/user_upload/EZ_Faktencheck_Tuerkei.pdf (Accessed October 10, 2016).

Betts, A. (2015, September 24). Let Refugees Fly to Europe. *The New York Times.* Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/25/opinion/let-refugees-fly-to-europe.html?_r=1 (Accessed October 10, 2016).

--- (2013). *Survival Migration.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Bohnet, H., & Rudolf, M. (2015). Voluntary Return of Refugees: Chances for Peace and Sustainable Development? *Policy Brief 3/2015.* Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion.

Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2012). IMDB 2008 Immigration Category Profiles. Privately Sponsored Refugees. Findings from the Longitudinal Immigration Database (IMDB). Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Retrieved from http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/pub/imdb/PSR_3.pdf (Accessed October 10, 2016).

Collett, E., Clewett, P., & Fratzke, S. (2016). No Way Out? Making additional Migration Channels work for Refugees. Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe. Retrieved from http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/no-way-out-making-additional-migration-channels-work-refugees (Accessed October 10, 2016).

Dräger, J., & De Geus, A. (2016). Fostering a Triple Win through Fair Migration Governance. In Bertelsmann Stiftung (Ed.), *A Fair Deal on Talent – Fostering Just Migration Governance. Lessons from Around the Globe*, pp. 9-10. Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung.

European Commission (2016a, April 6). Commission presents options for reforming the Common European Asylum System and developing safe and legal pathways to Europe. European Commission, Press Release. Retrieved from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1246_en.htm (Accessed October 10, 2016).

--- (2016b, May 4). Towards a sustainable and fair Common European Asylum System. European Commission, Press Release. Retrieved from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1620_en.htm (Accessed October 10, 2016).

--- (2016c, May 4). Questions & Answers: Reforming the Common European Asylum System. European Commission, Fact Sheet. Retrieved from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-1621_en.htm (Accessed October 9, 2016).

--- (2016d, June 7). Commission announces New Migration Partnership Framework: reinforced cooperation with third countries to better manage migration. European Commission, Press Release. Retrieved from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2072_en.htm (Accessed October 10, 2016).

--- (2016e). Managing the Refugee Crisis – A New Partnership Framework. European Comission, Fact Sheet. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/20160607/factsheet_managing_refugee_crisis_new_partnership_framework_en.pdf (Accessed October 10, 2016).

--- (2016f, July 13). Completing the reform of the Common European Asylum System: towards an efficient, fair and humane asylum policy. European Commission, Press Release. Retrieved from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2433_en.htm (Accessed October 9, 2016).

--- (2016g, July 13). Reforming the Common European Asylum System: Frequently asked questions. European Commission, Fact Sheet. Retrieved from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-2436_en.htm (Accessed October 11, 2016).

--- (2016h, July 13). Enhancing legal channels: Commission proposes to create common EU Resettlement Framework. European Commission, Press Release. Retrieved from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2434_en.htm (Accessed October 11, 2016).

--- (2016i, July 13). Establishing an EU Resettlement Framework: Frequently asked questions. European Commission, Fact Sheet. Retrieved from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-2437_en.htm (Accessed October 11, 2016).

--- (2016j, September 28). Implementing the EU-Turkey Statement – Questions and Answers 2016. European Commission. Retrieved from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-3204_en.htm (Accessed October 10, 2016).

--- (2016k, September 28). Delivering on migration and border management: Commission reports on progress made under the European Agenda on Migration. European Commission, Press Release. Retrieved from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3183_en.htm (Accessed October 19, 2016).

European Commission / OECD (2016). How are refugees faring on the labour market in Europe? A first evaluation based on the 2014 EU Labour Force Survey ad hoc module. Working Paper 1/2016. Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/berlin/publikationen/Arbeitsmarktintegration-von-Fluechtlingen-EK-OECD-Arbeitspapier-092106.pdf (Accessed October 9, 2016).

European Parliament (2016, June 7). State of play of the external aspects of the European migration agenda: towards a new 'Migration Compact' (debate). Strasbourg: European Parliament.

Eurostat (2016a). Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex. Annual aggregated data (rounded) (migr_asyappctza). Retrieved from http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_asyappctza&lang=en (Accessed October 18, 2016).

--- (2016b). Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex. Monthly data (rounded) (migr_asyappctzm). Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/migr_asyappctzm (Accessed October 18, 2016).

--- (2016c). EU Member States granted protection to more than 330 000 asylum seekers in 2015. Eurostat, Press Release. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7233417/3-20042016-AP-EN.pdf/34c4f5af-eb93-4ecd-984c-577a5271c8c5 (Accessed October 10, 2016).

--- (2016d). First instance decisions on applications by citizenship, age and sex. Annual aggregated data (rounded) (migr_asydcfsta). Retrieved from http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_asywitfsta&lang=en (Accessed October 18, 2016).

Garson, J.P. (2015). The Benefits of the Migration of Talents: Evidence and Prospects. In Bertelsmann Stiftung (Ed.), *A Fair Deal on Talent – Fostering Just Migration Governance. Lessons from Around the Globe*, pp. 13-24. Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung.

Hammond, L. (2014). 'Voluntary' Repatriation and Reintegration. In E. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, G. Loescher, K. Long, & N. Sigona (Eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies*, pp. 499-511. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Heimer, A., & Münch, C. (2015). Making Labor Migration Fair: Approaches in Selected OECD States, Origin Countries and International Organizations. In Bertelsmann Stiftung (Ed.), *A Fair Deal on Talent – Fostering Just Migration Governance. Lessons from Around the Globe*, pp. 35-103. Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung.

High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing (2015). Too important to fail – addressing the humanitarian financing gap. Report to the Secretary-General. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/news/WEB-1521765-E-OCHA-Report-on-Humanitarian-Financing.pdf (Accessed October 11, 2016).

Kleist, O. (2016, July 11). Die europäische Flüchtlingskrise und die Zukunft des Resettlements. bpb Kurzdossier. Retrieved from http://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/kurzdossiers/230521/zukunft-des-resettlements (Accessed October 5, 2016).

Kumin, J. (2015). Welcoming Engagement: How Private Sponsorship Can Strengthen Refugee Resettlement in the European Union. Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe.

Long, K. (2014). Rethinking 'Durable' Solutions. In E. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, G. Loescher, K. Long, & N. Sigona (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies*, pp. 475-87. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mayer, M. (2016). Germany's Response to the Refugee Situation: Remarkable Leadership or Fait Accompli? Washington D.C.: Bertelsmann Foundation.

Milner, J. (2014). Protracted Refugee Situations. In E. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, G. Loescher, K. Long, & N. Sigona (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies*, pp. 151-62. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Omidvar, R. (2015, June 22). A Citizen's Tool for Refugee Resettlement: Canada's Refugee Sponsorship Program. Retrieved from http://www.globaldiversityexchange.ca/a-citizens-tool-for-refugee-resettlement-canadas-private-sponsorship-of-refugees-program/ (Accessed October 10, 2016).

Tagesschau (2016, September 19). Merkel räumt Fehler ein. Retrieved from http://www.tagesschau.de/inland/merkel-pressekonferenz-119.html (Accessed October 9, 2016).

The White House (2016). Fact Sheet on the Leaders' Summit on Refugees. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/20/fact-sheet-leaders-summit-refugees (Accessed October 9, 2016).

Thränhardt, D. (2016). Speed and Quality – What Germany Can Learn from Switzerland's Asylum Procedure. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme (2015). *Human Development Report 2015: Work for Human Development.* New York: UNDP.

UNHCR – The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2016a). Global Trends. Forced Displacement in 2015. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/576408cd7/unhcr-global-trends-2015.html (Accessed October 8, 2016).

--- (2016b). Refugees/Migrants Emergency Response – Mediterranean. Retrieved from http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php (Accessed October 10, 2016).

--- (2016c). Solutions. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/solutions.html (Accessed October 5, 2016).

--- (2016d). Resettlement. The UN Refugee Agency. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/resettlement.html (Accessed October 5, 2016).

--- (2009). Conclusion on Protracted Refugee Situations. No. 109 (LXI) – 2009. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/excom/exconc/4b332bca9/conclusion-protracted-refugee-situations.html (Accessed October 12, 2016).

United States Institute for Peace (2016). Return and Resettlement of Refugees and Internally Displaced Populations. Retrieved from http://www.usip.org/guiding-principles-stabilization-and-reconstruction-the-web-version/10-social-well-being/return-and- (Accessed October 11, 2016).

Van Selm, J. (2014). Refugee Resettlement. In E. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, G. Loescher, K. Long, & N. Sigona (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies*, pp. 512-24. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wallaschek, S. (2016). The Nansen Passport – A Solution To The Legal Statuses of Refugees. *Social Europe.* Retrieved from https://www.socialeurope.eu/2016/08/nansen-passport-solution-legal-statuses-refugees/ (Accessed October 11, 2016).

Vision Europe Summit

Contact

Dr. Matthias M. Mayer
Project Manager
Program Integration and Education
Bertelsmann Stiftung
+49-5241-81-81564
matthias.mayer@bertelsmann-stiftung.de
http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de