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41/82. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
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Sir Oliver Wright, who took up his appointment as British Ambassador to the United States in September, made a major address to the Pilgrims of the United States at the Waldorf-Astoria, New York on October 28, 1982.

The following is a text of his speech.

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There is something very reassuring about a Pilgrims Dinner. I have in my hand the record of a Pilgrims Dinner given in this hotel on 22 April 1946 in honour of the then retiring British Ambassador, Lord Halifax. Hugh Bullock's name is in it. It was given to me shortly after Marjory and I arrived to take up our duties as Vice-Consul in New York by my well-loved chief, Sir Francis Evans, marked "bedtime reading". I have kept it all these years. For my chief and mentor clearly wanted a young diplomat to know at the outset of his working life what really mattered in the relationship between Britain and America.

Ambassadors may come, as I have come, and Ambassadors may go, as assuredly I shall go, but the Pilgrims go on forever. Hugh Bullock goes on forever. And that is a very reassuring thought too.

It is tempting on an evening like this to deal with the topics of the day, like steel, the pipeline, the alleged wickedness of the CAP, and so forth. But these are ephemeral topics - steel was settled between the first draft of this speech and its delivery - and I have no doubt that greater intelligences than mine are being applied to the problem of solving the other conflicts of interest. I am quite sure that they will be solved. No doubt to the dissatisfaction of everybody: for solutions mean compromises not victories and we all prefer a victory to a compromise. Diplomacy is about bargains and preferably bargains that stick. Which means that you have to give if you want to take. In democracies you don't get much credit for that. Not in foreign affairs you don't. Foreigners don't have votes.

But I shall, with your agreement, resist the temptation to deal with the ephemeral and instead share with you some thoughts of a more permanent nature on the transatlantic relationship and on the relations between Britain and America, as they have developed in the 36 years which have elapsed since that Pilgrims Dinner of April 1946.

I

In 1946, when I got here, the Anglo/American relationship was in pretty good shape. Together we had shared a tremendous experience, the War. Together we had enjoyed the comradeship that comes from enduring hard times together to the moment of victory. In the war, we had grown to know each other better than ever. We had come to rely on each other. We knew we could trust each other. That knowledge, that confidence and that trust was what made what we called the special relationship.

After the war, another tremendous experience: the creation of the post-war world. That great and good man Dean Acheson called his autobiography "Present at the Creation" - a modest description of the immense contribution he made. I was also present at the creation, but as I was only a Vice Consul at the time, you may be forgiven if you did not notice it.

Two great acts of statesmanship - the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Alliance - restored the prosperity of ravaged Europe and ensured its safety.

We have only to look at the prosperity and safety of the Western world today, despite all the temporary setbacks, to find the memorial to the wisdom and enlightened self-interest of the political leaders of 36 years ago, on both sides of the

As a result you have 250 million Europeans to share the beliefs of 250 million Americans in liberty under the law, and government by consent. I hope you feel as I do that the effort was worthwhile. Putting it more crudely, I hope you feel as I do that your investment has paid dividends.

Indeed, if one looks back to those years, it is quite astonishing how far-sighted were those who were present at the creation. And how durable was their achievement. They set the pattern of the post-war world. And the pattern they set has stood the test of time.

II

At least, so far. I say "so far" quite deliberately. For, as John Foster Dulles used to say, all life is change; and life is certainly changing. It is changing in ways that are inevitable, in the sense that there is nothing much you can do about it. But we can, if we choose, do something about managing the consequences of change. Children grow up, that is inevitable. Just because children grow up, it does not mean that the family disintegrates. It can; but it need not.

Let me briefly indicate the way the patterns of the transatlantic relationship seem to me to be changing.

First, America has changed. America has changed a great deal since my wife and I first came to America in 1946.

The pattern of population has changed. In 1946, New York State was the most populous state of the Union and sent 47 representatives to Congress. Today it sends 34. In 1982, California is the most populous state of the Union. In 1946

it sent 25 representatives to Congress. Today it sends 45. I am told that the population centre of the US moved west of the Mississippi for the first time in 1980 and is now to be found bright-eyed and bushy-tailed in De Soto, Missouri.

This pattern has been reflected in the Wright family. Our eldest son was born in the Harkness Pavillion, New York in September 1946. Our youngest grandchild was born in Los Angeles in August 1982.

The pattern of the economy has changed. While New York City retains its primacy as the centre of the US financial scene, modern technological industry has moved from the frost belt to the sunbelt. And with population and economy, the political centre of gravity of the United States has shifted West and South as well. Three of the last four Presidents of the United States have come from the sunbelt.

The Pilgrims, who have been here throughout this change, will know how to evaluate it better than I, who has been here two months.

Secondly, Europe has changed and Britain has changed with Europe. Thanks to American far-sightedness and European hard work, Europe is now, on average, as prosperous as America. Europe and America have about the same number of people. And we have about the same gross national product.

This means that the power relationship between Europe and America has changed too. The new Chancellor of West Germany put it succinctly the other day when he characterised the transatlantic relationship as: "Friendship and partnership, but not dependency".

And Britain has changed too. Since 1946 it has ceased to govern a quarter of mankind: instead, 47 former British dependencies have come to independence and membership of the Commonwealth and of the United Nations. In 1946 the membership of the UN was, I think, 50. Today it is 157.

Britain has lost an empire, but peace to Dean Acheson's spirit, it has found a role: as a member of the European Community, but maintaining its worldwide interests as a member of the Commonwealth, and by its relationship with the United States helping to ensure that the European Community is outward looking.

Thirdly, times have changed. Where is the prosperity of yester year when we all took growth for granted? In hard times, people tend to look round for someone to blame. Since foreigners don't have the vote, the tendency is to blame foreigners, the other guy. We Europeans and you Americans have that human quality in common too: I saw it referred to the other day as "the Blame Game".

Fourthly, people have changed. Those who were responsible for the creation of the post-war world - Truman and Acheson and Marshall, Attlee, Bevin, Adenauer and Monnet and Spaak, are no longer with us. Those like myself who were formed during the creation of the post-war world are still here. But those who follow us will neither have been responsible for the post-war world nor will they have memories of its creation. Unless we too are as wise and far-sighted as those who created the patterns of the post-war world and convince those who follow us of the validity and value of the post-war patterns, then the change that we shall witness over the next three

decades will not necessarily be a change for the better. Self-interest must needs prevail, but let us see that it is enlightened self-interest.

III

This brings me to the pipeline. From the fundamental to the ephemeral.

For the pipeline, it seems to me, is only the outward and visible sign of the inward and spiritual essence of the change that may be taking place in the transatlantic relationship.

We should, in my view, not have had this unnecessary row if the changes that I have drawn attention to had not taken place: if the political centre of gravity in America had not shifted in part from the frost belt to the sunbelt: if the power relationship between Europe and America had not altered from dependency to partnership: if the generations who cared for the transatlantic relationship had not changed. For if these things had not changed we should still have been talking to each other instead of past each other.

The question is: what do we do about it? Or rather: do we want to do anything about it?

Speaking for my government and for my fellow citizens, and for myself I do want to do something about it. Why?

Quite simply, because regardless of change, I believe that Britain and Europe still need America. And because I believe that America still needs Britain and Europe.

I suppose it is only natural that Americans are more conscious of the fact that Europe needs America, than that America needs Europe.

Europe does need America: there can be no question about that. The American commitment to the defence of Europe is vital to the security of Europe. It always has been. It still is. And it is likely to remain so for as far ahead as it is useful to look.

But while that is true, I sometimes get the impression that Americans believe that the Europeans are not doing enough to defend themselves. That simply is not true. On a recent visit to the Mid-West it was even suggested to me that now that Europe was as prosperous as America, they could get on and defend themselves on their own. That simply is to ignore the lessons of history.

Not enough Americans are aware that Europe provides 90% of the ground forces of the NATO Alliance and 90% of its armoured divisions. Not enough Americans are aware that Europe puts into the field 75% of the tanks and 75% of the combat aircraft. You may read from time to time of peace movements, unilateral disarmers and the like in Europe. But they are minority movements and it is always the noisy minority rather than the silent majority that makes news.

The silent majority in Europe, and certainly in Britain, takes defence very seriously indeed.

I don't want to harp on the Falklands campaign except to thank you and your fellow-Americans for your wonderful support. That support warmed our hearts. It did not surprise us. We

were after all fighting for principles as fundamental to you as to us: resistance to unprovoked aggression, and the right of all peoples to self-determination; to live under a government of their own choice. I believe you thought we did the right thing. I hope you thought that we did it quite well. At least it showed that my fellow countrymen are still prepared to fight when unprovoked aggression places freedom in peril. And that the Armed Services of the Crown are second to none in their professionalism.

Britain is supposed to be a male-dominated society and London a man's city. Odd, because we have at the head of our affairs two matchless women: The Queen to reign over and the Prime Minister to govern us. We are very lucky.

Before coming to America, I briefed myself at the Ministry of Defence in London. I asked about the lessons of the Falklands. All the soldiers, sailors and airmen were unanimous in their praise of the clear and firm political direction of the war they had received from No 10 Downing Street.

The Prime Minister, I might add, is in no doubt about the vital importance of the North Atlantic Alliance. In a speech to the Conservative Party Conference earlier this month she said:

"A strong and united Western Alliance is a guarantee of our peace and security. It is also a beacon of hope to the oppressed people of the Soviet bloc. Britain is a reliable ally, and with a Conservative Government will always remain so, reliable in NATO, reliable beyond NATO, an ally and a friend to be trusted."

But I find less public awareness in the US that America needs Europe. But that, if you will allow me to say so, is no less true.

To begin with, Europe is America's best customer, for industrial and for agricultural goods. You sell the EC \$52 billion worth of goods a year. I and some of my colleagues spent a day, three weeks ago, with Secretary of Agriculture Block down on his farm in Galesburg, Illinois. It was a wonderful experience. He had the neighbours in to meet us. We enjoyed a hog roast. I found that the American farmer is having a hard time and perhaps as a result does not much like the EC and its CAP: he tends to blame Europe rather than the recession and the high value of the dollar for his problems.

I had to remind some of them that Europe is the American farmer's best customer; that he sells \$9 billion a year to Europe off American farms; and that the trade in agriculture is 4:1 in America's favour. I don't mind that. Maybe the CAP isn't perfect. But I was brought up to believe that the customer was right. And the best customer should be rightest of all. I ask for the help of the Pilgrims in proclaiming this truth.

Again, America has invested a lot of capital in Europe, over \$100 billion at the last count. And draws excellent dividends from those investments. Europe welcomes American investment as America welcomes European investment. We need each other for trade and investment.

Even more important, to my mind, is the fact that Europe is inhabited by 250 million people who believe passionately in liberty under the law, in government by consent, in the same things that you believe in.

The attraction of democracy in Europe is growing, in West and East. Greece, Spain and Portugal are all governed by consent today: that was not so a few years ago. The Poles have an unquenchable thirst for freedom: the suppression of it has caused the tragic events in Poland today.

Take away those 250 million people who share your values and beliefs and I think that America might feel very lonely in a hostile world. We all need our friends as much as our friends need us.

The argument that Europe is now rich enough to defend itself is short-sighted for it ignores the lessons of history.

Britain has learned the hard way, that to preserve its security it needs allies and must maintain its first line of defence on the continent of Europe. That is why we were one of the founder members of NATO and station 65,000 soldiers and airmen on the North European plain in British Forces Germany. Britain defends itself in Europe.

America in the same way defends America in Europe. That is why you station 300,000 soldiers and airmen in Europe. It is part of the collective insurance policy we have all taken out together since the last war to ensure that war does not happen again.

None of us took out that insurance policy before 1914.
The result was World War I which you had to enter in 1917.
None of us took out that insurance policy before 1939.
The result was World War II which you had to enter in 1941.
I hope we do not need to learn the lesson a third time.

True, it costs you and it costs us a lot of money.
That is the way of insurance policies: the best ones don't
come cheap. But however expensive they may be, they are
a lot cheaper than war.

And the best way to start another war would be for America
to cease to defend America in Europe.

IV

I come back again to the pipeline. Even though it may be
on the way to a solution, it contains a lesson for us all.

America and Europe disagree about the pipeline, not
because we disagree about the nature of the Soviet regime
or on the facts of Soviet military strength, or the risks of
doing business with it. Europe doesn't want to become
dangerously dependent on Russia for its energy. Europe doesn't
want to transfer dangerous technology to the Russians. Europe
doesn't want to give excessive credit to the Soviet economy.
On all these things we have no major disagreements on the
principle, though we still need to discuss the practice. Where
we do disagree is on what the sanctity of contracts means
in the case of the pipeline and on who should decide when it
is right and proper to break those contracts. Instead of talking
to each other and listening to each other about this, we got

impatient with each other. Instead of coming to a compromise we went our separate ways. The result was that the row did more damage to the Alliance than to Russia.

Fortunately, high intelligences on both sides of the Atlantic are applying themselves to resolving the conflict. I believe they will succeed, if only for the reason that they dare not fail.

But this will not mean that those of us who value the Alliance and who wish to cherish the transatlantic relationship will be able to relax. If we do, it is I fear inevitable that similar misunderstandings, giving rise to similar rows, will occur in the years ahead.

The Alliance will become increasingly vulnerable to the disruptive effect of these squabbles unless we apply ourselves to the task of renewing the common data bank of knowledge and outlook which has underpinned the Alliance since I first came here in 1946. We must work at maintaining and developing the human feelings of friendship and trust that are as important to the Alliance as common interests. We must not make the mistake of taking these feelings for granted.

Let me quote from my distinguished predecessor in this hotel 36 years ago. Lord Halifax said:

"In this pattern of Anglo/American relations, we shall welcome variety as long as the pattern remains, and we shall not fear differences so long as behind them there is this common and this compelling purpose, for in a torn and disrupted world there is so much that humanity claims imperiously from us both, so much that you and we can do together and that neither of us can do separately."

It is predominantly the task of governments to conduct sensible, predictable policies, with a certain sense of continuity. We all need to know where we stand in order to maintain trust between our nations. That is difficult in democracies, where governments tend to change at unsynchronised intervals and do not always place continuity in foreign policy at the top of their list of priorities.

But ordinary people, the business community, the academic community as well as the political, military and intelligence communities also have roles to play.

Ultimately, all business is conducted by people. And it is the shared knowledge and common experience that enables business to be conducted effectively. When it is, good will, friendship, affection will inevitably follow.

That is why the Pilgrims are so important, the Pilgrims of the Great Britain as well as the Pilgrims of the United States. For decades you have devoted yourselves on both sides of the Atlantic to keeping open the channels of communication between Britain and America, through which Anglo/American understanding has flowed in both directions to the greater enrichment both of Britain and of America.

If my analysis is right, you still have an important role to play, a great deal of work to do. It is to keep replenished the common data bank of knowledge. It is to ensure that the lines of communication are kept open. It is to keep Anglo/American friendship in repair. It is to maintain the trust and confidence that should come to us as naturally as the air we breathe.

You have in the past performed this task with distinction. You must keep at it now. Then success will attend your efforts in the future as well. My prayer to you is: Do not weary in well-doing.

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A1-6, B4, EEC, B1/a, P1/2/3/4/5/6/12/13/16.