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Transatlantic relationship

European Parliament resolution on the Commission Communication to the Council on Reinforcing the Transatlantic Relationship: Focusing on Strategy and Delivering Results (COM(2001) 154 – C5-0339/2001 – 2001/2139(COS))

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the Commission Communication (COM(2001) 154 – C5-0339/2001),
- having regard to the Transatlantic Declaration on EU/US relations of 1990 and the New Transatlantic Agenda of 1995 (NTA),
- having regard to Articles 11 and 12 of the Treaty on European Union, which impose on the Member States a binding requirement to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity,
- having regard to the Treaty on European Union, in particular Article 6(2) thereof, which lays down the requirement that the EU must respect fundamental rights, and Title V thereof, which sets out provisions governing the common foreign and security policy,
- having regard to the Conclusions and Plan of Action of the extraordinary European Council meeting in Brussels on 21 September 2001¹, the Declaration by the Heads of State or Government of the European Union and the President of the Commission on the attacks of September 11 2001 and the fight against terrorism made at the informal European Council in Gent on 19 October 2001² and the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council meeting in Laeken on 14 and 15 December 2001³,
- having regard to the Joint Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of the European Union, the President of the European Parliament, the President of the European Commission and the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of 14 September 2001⁴ on the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the large number of victims and the far-reaching implications for the security of members of the public,
- having regard to United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1368 (2001), adopted by the Security Council at its 4370th meeting on 12 September 2001⁵ and 1269 (1999), adopted by the Security Council at its 4053rd meeting on 19 October 1999⁶ condemning all acts of terrorism, irrespective of motive, wherever and by whom committed, and reaffirming that the suppression of international terrorism, including that in which States

¹ <http://ue.eu.int/pressData/en/ec/140.en.pdf>.

² <http://ue.eu.int/pressData/en/ec/ACF7BE.pdf>.

³ <http://ue.eu.int/pressData/en/ec/68827.pdf>.

⁴ <http://ue.eu.int/pressData/en/er/Declaration.en1.pdf>.

⁵ <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/res1368e.pdf>.

⁶ <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/99sc1269.htm>.

are involved, is an essential contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security,

- having regard to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), adopted by the Security Council at its 4385th meeting, on 28 September 2001¹,
- having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948², to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union³, and to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)⁴,
- having regard to its resolutions of 17 May 2001 on the state of the transatlantic dialogue⁵; of 5 July of 2001 on the death penalty in the world and the introduction of a European day against the Death Penalty⁶; of 5 September 2001 on the existence of a global system for the interception of private and commercial communications (Echelon interception system)⁷; of 4 October 2001 on the extraordinary European Council meeting in Brussels on 21 September 2001⁸; of 29 November 2001 on the preparation of the Laeken European Council⁹; and of 13 December 2001 on EU judicial cooperation with the United States in combating terrorism¹⁰,
- having regard to its recommendation of 13 December 2001 on the crisis in the Middle East and the role of the European Union in the region¹¹, as well as to its resolutions of 7 February 2002 on the situation in the Middle East¹² and of 20 January 2000 on the Middle East peace process¹³,
- having regard to its resolutions of 25 October 2001, on the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference¹⁴ and of 13 December 2001 on the WTO meeting in Qatar¹⁵,
- having regard to the results of the Hearing on a Global Dimension for a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership held in Brussels on 19 February 2002,
- having regard to its decision of 12 December 2001 setting up and establishing the membership of a delegation for relations with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly¹⁶,

¹ <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/res1373e.pdf>.

² <http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html>.

³ OJ C 364, 18.12.2000, p. 1.

⁴ <http://conventions.coe.int/treaty>.

⁵ OJ C 34 E, 7.2.2002, p. 359.

⁶ OJ C 65 E, 14.3.2002, p. 364.

⁷ OJ C 72 E, 21.3.2002, p. 221.

⁸ OJ C 87 E, 11.4.2002, p. 216.

⁹ Texts Adopted, Item 18.

¹⁰ Texts Adopted, Item 13.

¹¹ Texts Adopted, Item 7.

¹² P5_TA(2002)0054.

¹³ OJ C 304, 24.10.2000, p. 202.

¹⁴ OJ C 112 E, 9.5.2002, p. 321.

¹⁵ Texts Adopted, Item 14.

¹⁶ Texts Adopted, Item 1.

- J. regretting the US administration's shift towards unilateralism at a time when the major challenges facing the international community in areas such as environment protection, development or collective security call for closer international cooperation and respect for multilateral rules,
- K. concerned by the United States' failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol on reducing greenhouse gases, the Biodiversity Convention, the Treaty establishing an international criminal court, the Ottawa Convention banning land mines and the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty; expressing its concerns about the USA's plans to develop and deploy its National Missile Defence System, its rejection of the Verification Protocol of the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention, its unilateral exemptions to the Chemical Weapons Convention and its failure to sign up to the 1989 Convention on the rights of the Child,
- L. recommending that current transatlantic structures should be updated, with the emphasis on a clearer definition of roles between Europe and the United States,
- M. regretting that there is a distinct lack of leadership within the EU and the US caused in part by the lack of a communautaire approach in the former and an ambiguous approach in the latter resulting in no clear vision as to how the transatlantic partnership should develop over the next five years,
1. Notes the substantive implications and the depth and durability of the emotions caused by the attacks of September 11 on US public opinion and institutions, which will undoubtedly dominate the nation's collective memory for generations and its foreign policy for many years;
 2. Underlines that the attack of September 11 2001 has nothing to do either with a so-called clash of civilisations nor with a single act of terrorism, but rather with a new and different kind of conflict aiming to undermine open societies, which makes it indispensable to establish reinforced ties between the US and the EU, given both the community of values that are now at risk and the interests that both sides have in common;
 3. Underlines that international terrorism must be combated firmly, not only by military means but above all by addressing the roots of the tremendous political, social, economic and ecological problems of today's world;
 4. Reaffirms that NATO remains not only a fundamental guarantee for Euro-Atlantic stability and security, but also the essential framework for coalition operations; is deeply concerned by the rising unilateralism in US foreign policy and the lack of interest in close consultation and cooperation with the European partners;
 5. Believes, in this respect, that enhanced cooperation between the US and the EU in foreign policy could contribute decisively to the solution of the main crises with regard, in particular, to the Middle East, as well as strengthen the profile and the effectiveness of international organisations, in particular the United Nations;
 6. Notes the importance of the concept of linkage, whereby aspects of economic, political and security policy are now closely tied together; emphasises that closer institutional

relations between NATO and the EU are needed in order to make both of them stronger by bringing together, when necessary, the non-military tools at the disposal of the EU and the decisive military capabilities available to NATO;

7. Considers that it is necessary, in this context, for the US and the EU to work together to update both NATO and the New Transatlantic Agenda with a view to developing a strengthened transatlantic partnership based on a new confidence pact and the concept of mutual recognition of where their respective roles can be clearly defined;
8. Reaffirms that the EU should be a coherent, reliable and equal partner to the US in the context of NATO and that, to that end, courageous steps towards a strongly integrated ESDP in the Community structures are necessary;

Implications of the attacks of September 11 on European-American security and defence matters

9. Recalls that cooperation within the Atlantic Alliance continues to be of decisive importance for security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region and that is in the interest of the transatlantic partnership to strengthen Nato's capabilities and European defence; renewed efforts are needed to resolve outstanding problems in areas such as the long-term relationship between NATO and ESDP, avoiding any unnecessary duplication, as well as promoting defence industry cooperation;
10. Believes that NATO should continue adjusting to the change in relationships that has taken place over the past decade since the fall of the Berlin Wall, recognising in particular the need to respond to new global challenges such as the fight against international terrorism; realises that the emphasis as regards reform of political and military structures is shifting from collective defence to collective security;
11. Notes the fact that the EU ministers for defence and the High Representative for the CFSP examined the possibility of the European Union replacing NATO in the autumn for the Amber Fox peace-keeping mission, which is based on the protection of international observers in Macedonia;
12. Underlines the necessity to enhance a transatlantic dialogue on the economic, social and ecological causes of insecurity in order to develop a common and comprehensive definition and conception of security and risks to security;
13. Is concerned about the very different approaches to the issue of collective security that seem to exist on both sides of the Atlantic; realises that priority should be given to important security topics such as non-proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction, missile defence systems and the role of the United Nations and the Security Council in particular;
14. Firmly believes that responding to other important global challenges such as the issue of global warming (i.e. ratifying and implementing the minimum standards of the Kyoto Protocol) and the issue of global justice (i.e. the establishment of the International Criminal Court) are other issues that require preferential treatment in the reinforcement of transatlantic relations;

15. Reiterates its opinion that it is very much in the interest of both global and American security that the USA fully accede to and participate in the newly established International Criminal Court; expresses therefore its extreme disappointment at the recent decision of the US government to disengage from the Court by openly stating that it will not ratify and does not wish to become a party to the Treaty;
16. Disapproves in the strongest terms of the USA's 'unsigned' of the Treaty establishing the International Criminal Court; considers this unilateral decision to be all the more serious as it comes soon after the 60 ratifications needed for the Rome Statute to enter into force on 1 July 2002, and for the ICC to assume jurisdiction in respect of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, were obtained; welcomes the swift reaction by the EU High Representative for the CFSP and calls on the Council and the Commission to do whatever is necessary to make this disapproval known to the US authorities and to reiterate the EU's support for the establishment of the International Criminal Court, in particular by taking part in the ceremonies organised for 17 July 2002 to mark the Statute's entry into force on the fourth anniversary of the adoption of the Treaty establishing the International Criminal Court;
17. Is convinced, in particular, that modernisation instead of marginalisation of the partnership requires, on the one hand, that the US assure both technological cooperation and the opening up of defence procurement markets to help European industries develop and, on the other hand, that Europe act together where possible and capable to do so;
18. Notes the dramatic difference in "value for money" between EU defence spending and that of the US, and underlines that this can only be overcome by courageous steps in the field of arms procurement; expresses its view that a strong, efficient and viable European armaments industry, including research and development capacities, is a prerequisite if the European defence industry is to compete on more equal terms with the US defence industry;
19. Notes the most recent developments in the field of the ESDP, including the European Rapid Reaction Force; is of the opinion that improving military capacities requires adequate defence budgets and can primarily be achieved by rationalising defence efforts, by synergies between national and multinational projects and by continuing to do away with obsolete Cold War structures and forces; urges Member States to take the necessary action to ensure that all foreseeable commitments can be met;
20. Points out that balanced cooperation between the EU and the USA in the field of external relations is vital to solve the major conflicts in the world and to develop conflict prevention strategies; welcomes, in this regard, the positive results achieved in joint post-war actions in the Balkans;
21. Underlines that transatlantic partners should work together, opening a wide-ranging debate on new security threats so as to define a common position, taking into account existing non-proliferation and disarmament treaties, to avoid militarisation of space and the proliferation of any kind of weapons of mass destruction;
22. Urges the EU and the US to seek to ensure the revival of institutionalised or negotiated arms control at multilateral level within the United Nations system and at bilateral level, to prevent a new arms race, to support regional and global action to prevent the

proliferation of small arms and light weapons, to contribute to a general strengthening of measures for the prevention of civil conflict, and not only to refrain from any action which could contribute to a further weakening of the Chemical Weapons Convention monitoring body but also, rather, to comply with their financial commitments immediately;

Political issues in the aftermath of 11 September 2001

23. Recalls that, to evolve and adapt itself adequately to the current new global context, the transatlantic partnership needs to be broader and more transparent, based on the conviction that global security and stability are best promoted by leading nations having a strong commitment to and respect for institutional and rule-based multilateralism in international relations and within international organisations (UN, IMF, World Bank, WTO);
24. Believes that the consequences of the shock of 11 September 2001 to the transatlantic partnership should now lead to a reinforcement of the political dialogue at its core, able to permanently assess, define, and oversee concerted action on shared global priorities;
25. Is deeply convinced that any contribution to a possible solution for the global topic of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict requires an active approach of both transatlantic partners working closely together;
26. Regrets that progress under the NTA has been limited when measured against its original purposes, due essentially to a lack of political determination and leadership and that, without these ingredients, the NTA has become largely a bureaucratic inter-administration exercise disconnected from its political mentors;
27. Urges the Commission to draw up an ambitious and coherent global proposal for political dialogue under the transatlantic partnership as one of the main priorities for the EU's common foreign and security policy, strengthening the various instruments at its disposal, such as the RELEX team on transatlantic issues;
28. Proposes, in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11 2001, that the existing partnership should be reinforced by establishing joint action in a number of areas, both in the political and economic domain;

Economic and trade relations

29. Strongly condemns the unilateral measures taken by the US in the case of steel clearly having a strong impact on the world economy, which is in a fragile condition, and supports the Commission and the Member States in actions taken against those measures;
30. Condemns the recent decision of the US Administration and Congress to approve a huge increase in agricultural subsidies, which is a breach of faith in view of the commitment made by the USA and other WTO members at Doha in 2001 to negotiate substantial reductions in trade-distorting agricultural subsidies; fears that this US action will undermine WTO negotiations, with appalling consequences for world trade and, in particular, for sustainable development and export prospects for developing countries;

31. Calls for a proposal by the Commission for an update of the TEP by the end of summer 2002 aiming at a more substantial economic agenda taking into account the 'positive agenda' agreed at the US-EU Summit in May 2002 and the proposals suggested in this resolution; moreover asks for an analysis of the functioning of the TEP and a clear strategy for future transatlantic political and economic cooperation by the end of 2002;
- (a) invites the Commission to consider how EU-US economic interdependence operates at sectoral level (for instance in the 'agro-industry', automobile, aerospace, food and health, pharmaceutical and biotechnology sectors and in the area of e-commerce) given the fact that a transatlantic market in a growing number of sectors already exists, having a huge impact on both domestic markets and job creation;
 - (b) supports the effort of the Commission to conclude a bilateral agreement in air transport services and urges the Council to mandate the Commission to negotiate a Transatlantic Common Aviation Area;
 - (c) calls for a new competition agreement to reduce further procedural differences and to allow the exchange of confidential corporate information;
 - (d) welcomes the efforts undertaken by the Commission to establish "Guidelines for Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency" with the US;
 - (e) calls for the conclusion of bilateral agreements on mutual recognition of authorisation, licensing or certification of service suppliers, namely in the areas of insurance, architecture and engineering services;
 - (f) calls for deeper cooperation in the area of financial services, in order to reach a compromise in areas such as accounting standards;
 - (g) urges the Commission to define an inclusive procedure in all areas where Member States have competence and co-competence, like financial services, to allow the transatlantic market to develop more smoothly; comparable efforts should be undertaken by the US authorities to include individual States more effectively;
32. Recognises that whilst only 2% of transatlantic trade causes disputes between the two parties, solutions should be expedited in accordance with obligations under WTO rules and a means found to work more closely and effectively together to manage potentially divisive trade disputes, such as the ongoing steel dispute and the foreign sales corporation tax; calls on the Commission to enhance the early-warning mechanism and to evaluate the creation of a formalised inter partes procedure which could help to solve trade disputes bilaterally before opening the existing multilateral WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure;
33. Recognises the value of the transatlantic dialogues, but recommends strongly that their objectives be revitalised and redefined; in particular the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) should reorganise its management structures, refocus its goals and streamline its activities; urges the Commission to pay greater attention to, and give stronger support for, the functioning of the transatlantic initiatives for SMEs, in particular TASBI;
34. Calls upon the EU and the US to re-invigorate the Transatlantic Environmental Dialogue (TAED), which has been stalled for more than a year;

35. Recognises that major obstacles in transatlantic cooperation reside in removing remaining tariff and non-tariff barriers, particularly in the services sector and in the textile sector due to a lack of internationally agreed rules and enforcement mechanisms;
36. Asks the Commission to continue to monitor and encourage the wider use of the agreement on data privacy ('safe harbour') and report to the European Parliament as necessary, including on increasing its coverage to important sectors currently excluded, notably financial services;
37. Stresses the need for legislators to be appropriately involved in structured Transatlantic cooperation, which would require, on the European side, that the mostly informal influence of the European Parliament should be formalised; proposes to evaluate carefully the need for, and operational status of, a representative of the European Parliament in Washington complementing the work done by the Commission in relation to legislative activities of Congress and Senate;
38. Urges the EU and the US to agree on a renewed and comprehensive strategy coordinating their policies specifically in the economic area to restore confidence in the global market and to initiate joint actions within the appropriate international fora:
 - (a) continuing their commitment to reform the WTO in a substantive way, specific attention should be drawn to the need to establish a parliamentary component to the WTO; reforming the institutional architecture mainly through greater efficiency, transparency and inclusiveness and allowing the "New Trade Agenda" to develop;
 - (b) addressing the 'relationship between trade, debt and finance' as called for by the Doha WTO Conference, by means of an enhanced reform of the World Bank, and asks the Commission and the Member States in this context for a proposal analysing new methods and introducing new instruments such as an International Development Fund for heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC);
 - (c) implementing a balanced development policy including initiatives by the United States along the lines of the 'Everything But Arms' initiative adopted by the EU;
 - (d) adopting a joint approach to support measures to assist developing countries in the implementation of the TRIPs agreement in line with the decisions of the Doha WTO Conference;
 - (e) developing a common approach with a view to reacting effectively to global challenges such as money laundering and trafficking in human beings;
39. Asks the Commission to systematically inform the European Parliament about the ongoing SIAs for any relevant policy initiative concerning EU-US trade relations;
40. Calls upon the EU and the US to ensure that the rules of the World Trade Organisation consider legitimate national measures adopted to protect consumer health, animals and the environment, and that national and international initiatives raising social, health and environmental standards are respected at WTO level;

41. Calls upon the EU and the US to work constructively together in the forthcoming WTO negotiations on trade and environment, in particular to ensure that the objectives and provisions of Multilateral Environmental Agreements are respected under WTO rules, to achieve trade liberalisation in environmental goods and services that will tangibly promote sustainable production and consumption and to ensure that use and development of environmental labelling schemes is facilitated;
42. Stresses again the need for a global and multilateral approach in the fight against climate change and reiterates its view that the Kyoto process remains the key instrument in this strategy. Is therefore deeply concerned about the US climate change strategy made public on 14 February 2002, which confirms the unilateral approach adopted by the US administration;
43. Calls for a reinforcement of the pre-dispute process to be supported by a resolution by both American and European trade negotiators and legislators to make more strenuous efforts to head off disputes at an early stage;
44. Asks the Commission to develop a strategy for cooperating with the US in the fields of 'critical infrastructure', such as power plants, water supply and telecommunication networks, transport and cargo which are at risk from possible criminal offences and terrorist attacks; also asks the Commission to ensure a close cooperation of the 'cyber-security agencies' which are being established; moreover the Commission should report back to the European Parliament on the results of this cooperation;
45. Points out the importance from a commercial standpoint of establishing rules for the European Union and the United States governing tariff and non-tariff barriers, so that access to their respective markets is on a reciprocal basis;
46. Urges a concerted and coordinated programme by the EU and USA to reduce dependence on non-renewable sources of energy so that competitive advantage is not distorted;
47. Congratulates the US Senate on rejecting plans for oil exploration in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge;

Suggestions for a renewed transatlantic partnership for the third millennium

48. Recommends making pursuit of common global interests (spread of democracy, modern governance, open societies and markets, sustainable economies, freedom of expression, fundamental human rights and respect for the rule of law around the world) as the central defining political purpose of the transatlantic partnership;
49. Believes that the solutions proposed in the Commission's last communication on a new impulse for EU-US relations, focusing on strategy and delivering results with regard to limiting the number of summits, the proliferation of priority issues and the inclusion of policy-makers in an institutional framework have to be further developed in order to match the requirements of the developing transatlantic partnership;
50. Calls on the Commission to draw up an in-depth report on future transatlantic relations to be submitted no later than 30 September 2002, setting out the evolving linkages between political, economic and security policy and the consequences these have for further

integration of the ESDP in order to be able to function as an equally coherent partner to the US;

51. Welcomes, in the short term, Spain's priorities for its Presidency of the European Union including Community initiatives in the fight against terrorism and the need to strengthen EU-US relations beyond the commercial sphere;
52. Calls on the United States to step up its cooperation with the European Union to combat money laundering and the use of international financial circuits and offshore centres for criminal purposes, in addition to its efforts simply to combat the funding of terrorism;
53. Urges the EU and the US to seek to ensure the revival of institutionalised or negotiated arms control at multilateral level within the United Nations system and at bilateral level, to prevent a new arms race, to support regional and global action to prevent the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and to contribute to a general strengthening of measures for the prevention of conflicts;
54. Proposes the following suggestions for strengthening parliamentary involvement in the process:
 - (a) given their respective competencies, especially in the field of trade and foreign relations, and as it is already the case in other decision-making and similar fora involving or not non-EU members (i.e. the European Council itself, the Rio Group, the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, etc), the President of the European Parliament and the Speaker of the US Congress should be involved in EU-US Summits, when they are organised at presidential level;
 - (b) in addition, the political association with legislators should also consist in a formal session with the Senior Level Group prior to each summit; this has only happened once under the NTA in Washington in May 1999;
 - (c) as a final step, the existing inter-parliamentary exchange should be gradually transformed into a de facto 'Transatlantic Assembly';
 - (d) a European Parliament funded post should be established in the Commission Office in Washington;
55. Is concerned that, as a result of the lack of political will:
 - (a) the Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue (TLD) has not yet been fully activated and there is as yet no early warning system in place between the two sides;
 - (b) the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) is in fragile condition, and its value is being increasingly questioned ;
 - (c) the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) is now for all intents and purposes non-existent;
56. Regrets that other transatlantic dialogues such as the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD), the Transatlantic Labour Dialogue (TALD) and, above all, the Transatlantic

Environment Dialogue (TAED) have not achieved satisfactory results; demands that real priority be given to making sure that these dialogues are effective and coherent;

57. Calls for an increase in the budget allocation for the EC/USA cooperation programme on higher education and vocational training (2001-2005) to make it possible to boost support for higher education and vocational training bodies so that joint associations can be set up to carry out joint projects between the European Union and the United States;
 58. Calls for the Youth Programme to be extended so that exchanges can be organised for youth organisations between the EU and the United States, in order to promote greater awareness of the political and social reality on either side of the Atlantic; believes that a transatlantic youth dialogue should be established;
 59. Deplores the decision taken by the US government to withdraw from signing the treaty on the International Criminal Court;
 60. Condemns the recent decision of the USA not to ratify the treaty establishing an International Criminal Court, a step which runs contrary to the commitments made by President Clinton on 31 December 2000; calls on the US to engage in a constructive dialogue with respect to the International Criminal Court and its eventual ratification; furthermore, calls on the US to sign and ratify the Kyoto Protocol and to accede to other important international conventions on antipersonnel mines and on human rights and, in particular, to ratify the Biodiversity Convention, the Ottawa Convention banning land mines and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and to reaffirm its undertaking to comply with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
 61. Calls for an end to the embargo against Cuba, and the rescinding of the extraterritorial 'Helms-Burton' law;
 62. Condemns the use of the death penalty that is still carried out in thirty-eight of the US States and calls on the USA to abolish the death penalty; further calls for enhanced EU-US cooperation in the field of human rights;
 63. Welcomes the outcome of the EU-US Summit held in Washington on 3 May 2002 and supports, in particular, the concept of a positive agenda; recommends that proposals should be elaborated which will update the NTA to take account of the new situation, with the objective of completing this revision by the end of 2004, building up a renewed partnership on the basis, among others, of the abovementioned suggestions;
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64. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the parliaments of the Member States and to the President and Congress of the United States of America.